Confronting Religious Extremism in the New Silk...

Confronting Religious Extremism in the New Silk Web

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Confronting Religious Extremism in

the New Silk Web

Charles Magee RAMSEY① （Department of Religious Studies, Forman Christian College）

Abstract: The rise in religious extremism is highly documented, but not well understood. The most frequently cited explanations are economic and sociological. However, the specific role of religion has received far less attention and is often glossed within social-scientific analysis. The aim of this paper is to elucidate the rise of religious ideology in pre-modern Indian Muslim thought and to draw attention to the importance of religious narratives in causing and possibly resolving violent religious extremism in Southwest Asia. This historic setting, more than any other, informs the trajectory of competing religious expressions of Islam. Two positions are considered because of their polar responses to similar phenomenon. These proceed from the same school of thought, and overlap considerably in the use of interpretative methodologies, yet they articulate radically different visions for fidelity to Islam. One has been used to legitimize and mobilize extremist violence in order to establish a righteous society, the other to advocate for a pluralistic participation with the secular state. Their shared roots allow for a juxtaposition that allows for a cursory description of the challenges faced within the Muslim community to retain fidelity to some most cherished values. It is argued that within the Muslim religious intellectual tradition there are ample resources to support a dynamic and pluralistic society. The identification and promotion of these values is essential to halting the spread of violent extremism. Interventions need to promote proponents of this narrative

① Dr. Charles Magee RAMSEY, assistant professor of Religion and Public Policy, Department of Religious Studies at Forman Christian College, Lahore, Pakistan.

Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol. 9, No. 4, 2015

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and avoid practices that further alienate and limit the natural outworking of this dialogue within Muslim communities. Key Words: Islam; Shanghai Cooperation Organization; Pakistan; Extremism; Governance; The New Silk Web

Introduction

Statements from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan (September 2014), are indicative of a growing threat to regional security in Central and Southern Asia. This volatile area has experienced substantial political upheavals in the past decade, and the need for state-level security coordination was a central reason for the formation of the SCO (Frost, A., 2009). However, the link established between security and religious extremism adds a new layer to this highly complex international conglomeration. The tenor of the situation was made clear by China’s President Xi Jinping’s call for SCO “to focus on combating religion-involved extremism” (Tiezzi, S., 2014: September 13). Consequently, religious extremism has been specifically underscored as a challenge to China’s development plans and international relations in the region, and as a challenge to be confronted through governmental cooperation.

The proposed expansion of SCO membership to South and Southwest Asian nations is recognition of the need for state-level cooperation to ensure political stability. Increased turmoil predicted by the departure of US forces from Afghanistan has added impetus for Pakistan, India, and Iran to become more actively involved in the SCO. The protracted civil war in Syria, now spreading into Iraq, also has political repercussions in this region. There is broad recognition that these conflicts are interrelated. President Xi Jinping’s call for state-level cooperation against religious extremism underscores the severity of this threat to the region. It also recognizes the trans-cultural and trans-regional nature of religious extremism stemming from certain factions in Muslim communities, and the implications of this for the network of nations along what Adam


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Webb, Professor of Political Science at Hopkins Nanjing, has termed the “New Silk Web”. China has taken steps to revitalize the ancient maritime and overland silk routes which will bring increased capital and trade into the region along with greater Chinese influence. Pakistan, for example, has been granted $46 Billion for the development of an economic corridor linking the two countries, and this in addition to the deep water Gwadar Port in the Indian Ocean. Similar projects are being processed by the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank across the SCO region, particularly in areas near the Xinjiang border, an area predominantly populated by Muslims.

The rise in religious extremism in Muslim communities is highly documented, but not well understood. There is a considerable literature that examines the current situation through the progression of events from the last half of the twentieth century and before. These broadly converge around the end of colonialism in the 1950s and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. The most frequently cited explanations are economic and sociological. However, the specific role of religion has received far less attention and is often glossed within social-scientific analysis (Ahmed, A., 2013: 96-133). The hermeneutical foundations, or interpretative lenses, appropriated to stimulate, legitimize, and sustain an extremist religious ideology that tolerates terrorism as a political means is yet to garner similar coverage. Strategies attempting to mitigate and reverse the tide of extremist violence have largely sought to address grievances through political and economic change. These are certainly important factors, however, strategies will achieve only limited success unless these recognize and address the interpretative narrative that is understood to legitimate and promote “unholy terror” (Lewis, B., 2004: 137).

The aim of this article is to elucidate the rise of religious ideology in pre-modern Indian Muslim thought and to draw attention to the importance of religious narratives in causing and possibly resolving violent religious extremism. This historic setting, at the convergence of China, Central Asia, and the Indian Subcontinent, informs the trajectory of competing religious


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expressions of Islam. Two positions are considered because of their polar responses to similar phenomena. These proceed from the same school of thought, and overlap considerably in the use of interpretative methodologies, yet they articulate radically different visions for fidelity to Islam. One has been used to legitimize and mobilize extremist violence in order to establish a righteous society, the other to advocate for a pluralistic participation with the secular state. Their shared roots allow for a juxtaposition that allows for a cursory description of the challenges faced within the Muslim community to retain fidelity to some most cherished values. It is argued that within the Muslim religious intellectual tradition there are ample resources to support a dynamic and pluralistic society. The identification and promotion of these values is essential to halting the spread of violent extremism. Interventions need to promote advocates of this narrative and avoid practices that alienate and limit the natural outworking of this dialogue within Muslim communities. Failure to do this will result in the creation of parallel systems of education and governance that establish a state within a state, and ultimately undermine the institutional frameworks required to sustain the intended economic development (Sikand, Y., 2006: 15-20).

Crisis in Islamic Civilization?

Contemporary literature frequently refers to regions with historically large Muslim population as constituents of an Islamic civilization. Marshall Hodgson’s differentiation between Islamic and Islamicate is helpful (Hodgson, M., 1974: 3-71). The former refers to a core set of beliefs, which will be summarized below; the latter to diverse cultural elements associated, with varying degrees of overlap, in the region between where Western and Chinese civilizations meet. Though precise definitions and boundaries differ, the area covered therein includes Central and Southwest Asia, North Africa and the Middle East. The term “Islamicate” underscores the diversity of ethnicities, languages, and religious


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expressions in this region while recognizing the overarching Muslim heritage and shared cultural values. Appreciation of the peculiarities of this region is vital, as is the recognition that this is a hinge civilization that connects Europe, Africa, and Asia. The ancient Silk Route, its thoroughfares and alleys, crisscrossed much of what is now modern Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and India, which is basically the roster of the SCO. And, according to China’s new development plans, these will again become more closely interconnected as major nodes in the New Silk Web. Thus, to draw from ‘Ali Allawi’s assessment, it is vital to comprehend the “crisis” in Islamicate civilization (Allawi, A., 2009: 1-21).

Bernard Lewis, who like Allawi wrote from Princeton, described the inherent danger of this crisis. In 2004, he forewarned the religious extremism referenced by President Xi Jinping at the SCO summit. Lewis wrote:

Sooner or later [extremist groups] will clash with the other neighbors of Islam—Russia, China, and India—who may prove less squeamish than the Americans in using their power against Muslims and their sanctities. If the fundamentalists (religious extremists) are correct in their calculations and succeed in their war, then a dark future awaits the world, especially the part of it that embraces Islam (Lewis, B., 2004: 164). According to Lewis, and of course Samuel Huntington,

predicted that cultural fault-lines would be increasingly exploited to fracture stability and generate regional wars in order to consolidate a section of the global Muslim community. The experience of violence and alienation would catalyze the formation of a new, or renewed, political state. The broken pieces of a larger political union based on Islamist values would be fashioned so as to create what Faisal Devji describes as a new “Zion,” an ideological homeland and religious-political Muslim epicenter capable of counterbalancing other global powers, namely China and the West (Devji, F., 2013: 13-49). A short-term “dark future” is deemed as worthy means to bring about a brighter end. Extremism stirs the government


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machinery, radicalizes the youth, and galvanizes discontent. Although reasons presented may differ, agreement remains amongst these scholars that the crisis, the dissonance experienced between “Islam and Modernity” is the fulcrum upon which religious extremism turns. Let us consider the response factors.

Economic Factors

The most frequently stated cause for religious extremism is

economic. Many regions that are socio-culturally Muslim are underdeveloped and afflicted with the issues of chronic poverty (Collier, P., 2007: 79-98). Religious extremism is described as a response to poverty and unequal access to resources. There are complex explanations for this, including prejudice and exclusion, and the enduring legacy of colonialism. In the case of pre-partition India (pre-1947), there were government policies that limited—or at least hindered—Muslim access to education and consequent agency within the government structures. As David Lelyveld explained, the colonial policy was to “divide and conquer” the region by leveraging communal antagonism (Lelyveld, D., 1978: 2-9). However, this was also a two-way street. There were portions of the Muslim community that understand nonparticipation as a form of resistance. In order to preserve and sustain the traditional way of life perceived to be under threat, a parallel economy develops and grows to act like a state within a state. This is particularly seen in the areas of education and personal law, but it has implications regarding investment, taxation, language and means of communication, and these affect practically all areas of life. Some of this is the result of alienation and structural violence, but regardless of causes, it has the effect of subverting the governing institutions, and it has become a powerful form of nonparticipation in the globalized economy. We will consider this aspect further below.

There were also segments that sought to compete within the new market, but who felt constrained by traditions or practices, or otherwise stated, “cultural values”. The work of Lawrence Harrison,


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in dialogue with economists, like Abdul Haq, and, more recently, Timur Kuran, evaluates economic performance through the lens of cultural values that affect the pace and predisposition to succeed in the global economy (Huntington, S. & Harrison, L., 2000; Kuran, T., 2011: 3-25). In this perspective, elements from a region or of domains therein, offer indicators for the propensity of a society to climb the rungs of the socioeconomic development ladder. Kuran has convincingly argued that legal norms (particularly with reference to the Hanafi shari’a tradition, that is prevalent in the areas discussed here) hindered the accruement of capital and slowed Muslim business development in pre-partition India. Beneath this is the quest to explain two observable factors: 1) the lower representation amongst Muslim commercial firms as compared to those owned by entrepreneurs from other communities; 2) the slower uptake in developing economic institutions (rules and systems) that fostered the growth experienced in regions with similar resource factors. A reason was sought for why Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, experienced sustained high economic growth (Gross Domestic Product) but low human development (Human Development Index). The answer offered was that it was an issue of cultural values: there were practices, beliefs, or perceptions that limited successful integration of resources so that a society could attain the benefits of sustainable development.

From this vantage point, even if there were greater investment and a climate created for sustainable development, as is the stated plan by China for this region, then the issue of religious extremism would not be resolved. And, though one questions the degree to which sustainable development efforts have been attempted in the region, still extensive studies such as that by Krueger and Maleckova indicate that “economic disparity is seldom cited as the source of rage...The proponents of violent religious extremism tend not to be from amongst the poor; in fact they are often educated and financially viable” (Krueger, A. & Maleckova, J., 2003: 135-137). Though space does not permit this factor to be further explored, it is noted that there is ample evidence that economics alone cannot


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account for the problem or offer a composite solution. Interests alone would not bring about the changes needed for stability and peace.

Political Factors

A second frequently cited reason for religious extremism is political disaffection. In some ways similar to the economic view, this posits that political factors cause religious communities to be disenfranchised. In short, there is an assumption that exacerbated alienation generates violence. This is strengthened by the realization that religious conversion has largely followed preexisting social boundaries, or “tribal lines” (Zutshi, C., 2003: 210-249). As observed by Eliza Griswold in Africa and John O’Brien in the Indian subcontinent, religious and tribal loyalties are by and large indistinguishable for most adherents. And, Pakistani anthropologist Akbar Ahmad, underscored the importance of this link, namely between religion and tribe, in characterizing what some have called “Muslim culture” (Ahmed, A., 2013b: 96-98).

In tribal societies loyalty is extended along bonds of kinship, and this has unmistakable political implications which have hindered the development of loyalties that extend beyond tribal bounds. This of course is perceivable in other religious traditions, but it is taken up here because it is a recurring theme applied towards elucidating the causes of the “systemic violence” confronting Muslim political leadership (Pryce-Jones, D., 2002: 1-16).

One result of the tyranny of kinship is the frailty of institutions. This cements economic disparity, and hinders the establishment of larger systems required for sustained development. Cultural affinity gives way to cronyism, and resources are not allocated justly, but along lines of loyalty. In this view, terrorism is not a response to low market opportunities per se, or even a lack of educational opportunity, but rather a response to “political conditions and long-standing feelings (either perceived or real) of indignity and frustration that have little to do with economics but rather with political disenfranchisement” (Krueger, A. & Maleckova, J., 2003:


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142-144). According to this view, equitable political systems would curtail religious extremism. If there were free and fare elections, and a political system built upon merit, then the issue would be resolved. Interventions and support from members of the SCO, for example, would be sought to promote political stability and equitable participation. This, along with economic investment leading towards economic growth, would bring stability to the volatile areas of Central Asia. However, this explanation does not account for the rise of religious extremism in the strongest and most stable states. China, Russian, England, Spain, and the United States have dynamic political arenas, yet they have been rocked by terrorist attacks. Although economic and political factors indubitably play a role in fomenting violent religious extremism, these do not suffice as an explanation, or sufficiently shape a longer-term solution.

Ideological Factors

Though economic and political factors are doubtlessly important, enough attention has not been given to the importance of ideology in understanding the crisis. By this we mean that undergirding the observable phenomena is an interpretative layer shaped by competing visions of what is required for Muslim fidelity. The dissonance created by the “loss of sovereignty” (to use Ayesha Jalal’s term) creates an exploitable space. As ‘Ali Allawi explained, the crisis in Islamic civilization has occurred because a significant number of Muslims do not believe that Islam as a religious system “can conform” to the post-Enlightenment individualist secularism and remain true to its own nature. Although Allawi writes from Princeton University, he understands that Islam is in a “clash of civilizations” and the fault lines are caused by incompatible societal values. In his estimation, fidelity to Islam demands the implementation of social mores and a political structure that can absorb or facilitate these. Though not his premise, his position indicates a concerning doubt about whether being Muslim is


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compatible with full participation in a secular society. This is a position regularly stated by more conservative Muslim camps, as will be discussed below. However, the fact that this endures even for those active in the higher echelons of political and academic leadership underscores the profound importance of this topic. Development interventions and policy plans must take seriously this issue if they are to elucidate its ramifications and identify possible ways forward (Schirrmacher, C., 2013: 2-5).

Allawi’s diagnosis of a crisis in Islamic civilization is not new. Although he is an Iraqi Arab, his analysis of current state of affairs begins in India (Allawi, A., 2009: 41-44). Allawi follows the well-worn path to situate the crisis within the development of Islam as an ideology. The trajectory towards this new phenomenon is traced back to intellectual developments in the seventeenth century (Peters, R., 1980: 131-132; Smith, W., 1962). The changes were no less radical in nature or consequence then those of the sixteenth century Reformation in Christendom. Reforms (islah) in religious thought eventually impacted all areas of Muslim life.

In order to facilitate analysis, and to reinforce the ideological nature of modern religious extremism in Southwest Asia, two distinctive responses are considered that proceed from these reforms. This region is selected due to the high degree of influence it wields upon the practice of contemporary Islam in general, and along China’s western borders in particular. Each purports to represent the religion’s original vision and thus to be the truly orthodox. Although there are elements of overlap and agreement, each presents radically different conceptions of what is required of Islamic fidelity. These two competing visions are the fault line in Allawi’s civilizational crisis, and these are the determining forces at play in this region. A historical glance will bring these two competing narratives into sharper relief so as to inform of the importance of taking ideological concerns seriously in the development and implementation of development plans.


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Sources of the Crisis in this Context

As Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Professor of Islam at Princeton, has convincingly argued, the study of contemporary Muslim societies must be situated in the realization that there has been no greater rupture in the history of Islam than that brought about by the impact of Western modernity (Zaman, M., 2004; Metcalf, B., 1982). For the Muslims of pre-partition India, a land that extended to modern day Afghanistan and whose intellectual influence ran into Central Asia, the final loss of Mughal sovereignty in 1857 closed the chapter of a protracted era of Muslim political dominance. The empires were so expansive that political dominance was taken for granted by Muslims. This success took on a theological nature because it testified to apocalyptic claims. Muslims, recipients of the final dispensation, would usher in humanity’s final era. Thus, British colonial power, and its accompanying enlightenment ideals and technology, not only altered the balance of power in the Indian landscape, but also raised existential questions about the future of the religion. One consequence of this is the sleigh of issues addressed in nineteenth century Islamic reformist thought. And, the profound challenges brought forth in these theological enquiries mark the contours of contemporary South Asian Islam.

Muslim responses to modernity varied greatly in India. We present two examples, from among many other possible ones, that are informative because of their lasting influence and practicality for discussion. The first is Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (d. 1905), founder of Dar ul-‘ulum Deoband, one of the world’s largest and most influential conservative Muslim seminaries (Ingram, B., 2009: July). The second is Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), founder of the first modern Muslim College, now known as Aligarh Muslim University. They share many common descriptors, both individuals are Indian, Urdu-speaking, Sunni, Hanafi, Sufi Muslims, and they studied under the same teachers in Delhi. They have set of roots. Yet, the societal structure envisioned by their writings is dramatically different. The manner in which Muslim fidelity is ascertained, and


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that the community is to relate with other socio-religious expressions makes for stark contrast. The key writings that account for the theological trajectory played out in Southwest Asia today trace back to these divergent tracks.

Theological Roots

Two competing visions of Islam, represented here by Gangohi in Deoband and Khan in Aligarh, offer important insight into the “crisis in Islamic civilization.” These are diverging branches proceeding from the same root, namely from Delhi’s Madrasa-i Rahimiyya, the House of Shah Wali Allah (d. 1762). The sage’s theological synthesis spawned what Barbara Metcalf termed the “revivalist movement,” or a flourishing of theological reflection and innovation which has matured into the denominations seen in South Asia today, and which greatly influences regions of Central Asia as well.

In Shah Wali Allah’s estimation, there was a crisis in Islamic Civilization, as he knew it. This was evidenced by the lethargy and corruption of leaders, slack social mores, and the empire’s failing fortunes. In short, the reasons were economic, political, and social. However, the fundamental cause, he argued, was theological. In his estimation, the religious education system was in need of severe reform. Learning consisted primarily of regurgitated (taqlid) legal verdicts from secondary sources (Hourani, G., 1985: 208). There was scant value placed on creative and critical thinking, all the awards went to those who could blindly recite earlier verdicts. The solution proposed was fundamental reformation of religious knowledge. He led students to go “back to the Qur’an, and forward with critical thinking (ijtihad)” (Hassan, R., 2009: 182; Nizami, K., 1957: 511). The texts were translated into the vernacular languages of Persian and Urdu—because of which he faced multiple death threats (Baljon, J., 1986: 16-18; Noor, W., 1988: 24; McAuliffe, J., 2007: 219). Scriptures were to be read by the common man. They were not for the specialist elite, but offered guidance to the common man. The Delhi


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school led the way for an engagement with religious ideas that would have been inconceivable through medieval analogical reasoning. Across the spectrum, from conservative to liberal, the principal Muslim religious voices in South Asia all trace their roots and claim to Shah Wali Allah.

In the days of Khan and Gangohi, the central topic under discussion was the place of sunna, or the example of the Prophet, in determining Qur’anic interpretation. The scholarly curriculum converged upon the rigorous study of Prophetic traditions (ilm-i hadith) (Brown, D., 1996: 1-21). The classical consensus, sustained from the time of Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi‘i (d. 819), understood sunna as virtually equal, or “coextensive” in religio-ethical authority with the Qur’an. As Imam al-Ghazali later clarified, “God has but one word which differs in the mode of its expressions. On occasions God indicates His Word by the Qur’an, on others, by words in another style, not publically recited, and called Sunna” (Brown, D., 1996: 1-21). Both were understood as necessary for determining authentic belief and practice. This is the quest to delineate authentic practice and belief. This is the core hermeneutical issue at the fault line of these two camps. Or, otherwise stated, this is the hermeneutical fulcrum of the crisis.

Shah Wali Allah upheld the traditional view that Sunna was organically entwined with the Qur’an. But, he was troubled by discrepancies in the recorded traditions. Like the scholastic theologians of old (Mu‘tazila) he agreed that “the Sunna would be indisputable if only we had sure knowledge of it. Thus, building upon the tradition of the Indian ‘Abd al-Haqq Dihlavi and his teacher in the Arabian Hijaz, Shaykh Abu Tahir Muhammad al Kurdi (d.1733), he pursued a contextual study of these recorded traditions and their chains of transmission (isnad) (Allāh, S., 1995: xxvii). The resulting view was that shari’a must be understood as historically conditioned rather than monolithic. He posited that there was an innate flexibility in Muslim law that allowed for the versatility of civilization. The result of this was twofold. First, it stimulated the direct study of the foundational sources, including


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their translation into the vernacular Persian and eventually Urdu. Second, it reinvigorated debates regarding the role of Sunna in authentic practice. During the day of Khan and Gangohi, these remain central in religious discourse. In summary, the scholars were concerned with one main question: to what degree is the Prophet’s example incumbent upon Muslim faith and practice. The answer to this question is of utmost importance for understanding today’s dilemmas.

Ideological Branches

The latent social changes in these religious reforms came to a political head with the rise of Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi’s (d. 1831) Mujahidin movement. Though the military wing was short lived, the ideological reach lives on in the vision for a political identity grounded not in culture or geography, but in the restoration of the original Muslim community as exemplified by the Prophet’s earliest followers in Madinah (Hussain, M., 1957: 577). This was not a move to reinstate the Mughals, or even a new dynasty, but rather a stated attempt to recreate a “Kingdom of Islam” on the model of the Prophet and the first followers (salaf) (Hussain, M., 1957: 577).① As seen in the puritanical demands of the Taqwiyat al-iman (Strengthening the Faith) and Sirat al-mustaqim (The Straight Path), individual behavior and societal structure were to be reconceived according to Sunna (Sanyal, U., 2005: 32). These seminal works reflect the thought of Ibn Tamiya (d.1328), whose influence is also clearly discernable in the works of the arch-conservative Al-Wahhāb (Hussain, M., 1957: 577; Wood, S., 2007: 9-12). A vision is cast of Islam as essentialist ideal that can be actualized through the emulation of the lives the salaf and tabi’in (plural tabi’un), the first and most rightly guided followers of the Prophet (Bari, A., 1957: 547). In this understanding, Sunna offers guidance for each aspect of life, including the political.

① Shāh Ismā‘īl articulates this vision for political leadership in Mansab-i- imamat.


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Barelwi did not have the military strength to bring forth the full weight of his vision. He could not erase the diversity from the region under his control along the present Pakistan-Afghanistan border, but his followers certainly tried (Rizvi, S., 1980: 343-349). The practical thrust was to redirect indigenous spirituality away from the cult of the local saint and towards the singular worship of the One God (Haroon, S., 2007: 43; Sanyal, U., 1996: 204-213). It was a move away from localized shrine-based institutional loyalties towards an overriding ascription to an idealized and universal Muslim community. And, in the absence of a king, social and political agendas became increasingly formulated by the religiously trained.

It is worth noting that both Gangohi and Khan were staunch supporters of Barelwi’s Mujahidin, but overtime each formulated a distinct course of action. Gangohi was heir apparent to a Sufi shrine, and was trained in a madrasa to assume the duties of a religious cleric (imam). Sayyid Ahmad was also the son of a mystic, but the grandson of an aristocratic nobleman and was groomed as an administrator in the East Indian Company bureaucracy. Despite these early differences, their trajectories converged in the arched corridors of Delhi’s Jamia Masjid, where each studied with the sons and grandsons of Shah Wali Allah. They embraced the same basic methodologies, but their applications diverged considerably.

For Gangohi, the foundational source for interpreting the Qur’an is Sunna. That which contravenes this example is harmful innovation (bida’). Fidelity is measured by approximation to the idealized example. Tradition faithfully applied prescribes practice and ensures success over time. Islam is recognized as the final dispensation of primordial monotheism and fidelity to God requires ascription to Muhammad as Prophet and the revelation he was granted now recorded as Qur’an. Eternal salvation is through Islam alone. All ethical and moral decisions are made in accordance with his recorded example, and the principles derived thereof.

However, Gangohi was not a politician or political theorist. And, the few clues offered in the writings of Deoband’s founders


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indicate that there was no clear political agenda. Ashraf Ali Thanavi, for example, is adamant that theocracy is not the model and is not the historic prophetic model. Despite the unique example of Islam’s Prophet, he argued, earlier prophets and the first Muslim rulers, the “rightly-guided caliphs,” did not collapse the distinction between religious and political leadership (Zaman, M., 2007: 53). However, it was the social practices of the communities affiliated with this grass roots religious movement that proved to be of greater significance than any stated vision. One of Gangohi’s key legacies is the instruction that it is forbidden to do certain things simply because these are done by the “non-Muslims.” This includes singing songs, dressing in Western attire, celebrating traditional harvest festivals or attending celebrations of other religious communities. What began as a call for segregation so as to ensure the survival of a pure remnant, grew overtime to be a society within a society. The community abstained from participation in the British political economy as much as possible (Ingram, B., 2009: July).①

What began as a move to ensure the preservation and propagation of religious knowledge and leadership at the grassroots level, has evolved over the past century into the disenfranchisement of a significant population. The result is a parallel system were the community has its own laws, social norms, educational facilities and to some degree its own economy (Alam, A., 2006: 175-195; Ali, S., 2010: 73-95). The educational system is not comprehensive, or meant to prepare for broader employment. It teaches religion, and promotes the learning of Arabic, whereas the surrounding community adopted English and Hindi. This took root in United Provinces, Punjab, and Bihar, and then eventually spread to what is now Pakistan and into Afghanistan and Central Asia as the dominant source of religious authority for mainstream Sunni Muslims. In this vein, Islam is described as a complete way of life. Arab cultural values are understood as religiously normative and that which is conflicting is dismissed as harmful innovation. ① For a summary of these points, see Muhammad Isma’il, Taqwiyyat al-Iman, Multan: Kutub Khana-i Majidiya, pp.14–17.


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Sayyid Ahmad Khan takes a radically different course. In his modernist view, the most important element in Qur’anic interpretation is reason. The meaning of the holy text is considered self-evident when read according to postulated universal principles. The message of Islam is monotheistic faith, and thus Islam progresses and expands quietly through human history in the guise of multiple religious expressions. This is a pluralistic religious view that upholds the salvific efficacy of other faiths. The Prophet’s example is limited to the subject of religion and is not extended to his role as statesman. The prophet is revered as the greatest among men, but also as a messenger sent to correct and continue what had been previously articulated by others. In summary, far greater emphasis is placed upon the Qur’an than upon the Sunna.

Sayyid Ahmad was more involved in politics than Gangohi, but he also did not articulate a political vision. In the absence of other alternatives, he recognized the inevitability of British rule. He strongly advocated local representation in government bodies, but stopped short of calling for home rule. He lent support for the existing precedence of Muslim participation in British administered schools and offices. He called for Muslim participation in the government and believed that the colonial administration was pragmatically necessary until Indians could learn to utilize the technological innovations that fuelled European power. He recognized British rule as legitimate, in the same way his ancestors had previously acceded to that of the Hindu Maratha. For Khan, minority status was reconcilable with Muslim practice and if forced to chose, he would support the British against the Ottomans, though many of his compatriots understood Istanbul to be the heir to the caliphate. In short, Khan believed that there were principles for good governance and participative citizenship in the teachings of Islam. One could be a Muslim and a full citizen of a country that was not ruled by Muslims, or established upon overtly Islamic norms. Islam’s religious principles, Sayyid wrote, are demonstrated in that “even Arabs progressed and benefited from their application” (Khan, S., 2010: 457). The strength of Islam is that its


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ideals supersede culture and allow for the successful integration of Muslims in other societies. Khan and Gangohi represent competing visions of Islam. Their writings have contributed significantly to contemporary ideological expressions. Khan is recognized as one of Pakistan’s founding fathers because of his contributions in the field of education. Many of the early national leaders were Aligarh graduates. These embodied a liberal religious approach as reflected in the earlier versions of the constitution that guaranteed religious freedom. Muhammad Iqbal, Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah, and Muhammad Assad, amongst many others, articulated an integrative vision that understood faithful religious practice to be reconcilable with developing political systems. Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Indonesia, and many other Muslim majority countries have embraced modern political systems. Some have done very well, but as Allawi observes, there is a languishing sense that these systems do not reflect the perceived needs and preferences of their respective peoples.

Gangohi’s Deoband clerics did not take an active part in the formation of Pakistan. In fact, the core leadership chose not to migrate. The stated reason for this unwillingness was that the leaders, and the proposed form of governance, were not more legitimately Muslim than the British. This generalized sense changes overtime, but only as the tone in Pakistan’s political rhetoric turned increasingly conservative. Deoband affiliated schools and mosques have expanded exponentially in Sunni communities of South and Central Asia. The madrasas associated with the Taliban are pedagogically associated with Deoband. Nevertheless, the diversity of views within this tradition should not be overlooked. The founders and scholarly leaders, from my reading, do not advocate violence or terrorism. There are extremist elements form particular branches and regions that refuse to condemn such action and so legitimize and promote these activities.

However, the most effective tool of this ideology has not been armed conflict, but rather the inception of large scale


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nonparticipation. The representative government is rejected as illegitimate, and the faithful are instructed, both directly and not, to distrust their intentions and programs, and even to not pay taxes. The ensuing situation is readily observable: faltering governance mechanisms, absence of authority, and the reliance upon informal structures to secure basic needs and services. This in turn strengthens reliance upon parallel systems, most notably those derived from social capital and religious affiliation. The compounded effect is a failing state, or one propped by military control, which again amplifies the call for revolution. And, as described above, the ideological answer is the need for a new form of government modeled after the Prophetic example. Several Muslim majority nation-states in South and Central Asia, most notably Pakistan and Afghanistan, are finding it increasingly difficult to convince their constituencies that the present constitution and present political system is reconcilable with the religion they claim to represent, and this dissonance is being exploited by the proponents of religious extremism.

Analysis

Pakistan’s political future will have tremendous impact upon Central Asia. There are strong ties between religious institutions in Pakistan and its neighbors, and this should not be overlooked. The state has endured a rocky journey, and the worst may yet to be come. There are rumors of civil war, or of renewed martial law. Flyers pasted across Karachi enquire: “Do you want Jinnah’s or Taliban’s Pakistan?” For many Muslims in Pakistan this is not a simple question. Jinnah, a highly charismatic leader, was hardly the picture of orthodoxy. There is growing distrust of the liberal vision he put forth and a fundamental questioning of the nature of the state. Yet, while his charisma has faded, the apocalyptic vision has not. The manifest destiny inherent in the Pakistani ideology endures; and this space in public discourse is becoming increasingly filled by Islamist voices. The way to perceive this, and possibly to prevent its


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repetition, is the degree of participation with institutional structures. Pakistan’s formational decades (1950-1980) were characterized

by a liberal ideology that envisioned the nation as an integrative member of the global community. It was a new nation, and considerable strides were made to develop the new governance infrastructure. The pace in which this came about reveals a high degree of participation. The senior leaders were men of action, who had gained experience in the Indian system. And, what was known was applied to the new state as can be clearly traced in Pakistan’s constitution. Influenced by thinkers like Sayyid Ahmad Khan and later Muhammad Assad (d. 1926), the nation’s founders created a constitutional framework to ensure civil liberties for the diverse society. The political vision was stimulated by a religious hermeneutic that emphasized commonalities of simple monotheistic God over and above religious and sectarian particularity. Fidelity to Islam was presented in the broadest possible means as tawhid, simple faith in God. And, as I have discussed above, Western models may have influenced the state system, but the religious foundations for embracing the associated values were indigenous.

There are ample resources for pluralism within the treasures of Persianate Islam expressed in Southwest and Central Asia. Pluralism is a term coined after Sayyid Ahmad’s time, but his writings and ethos reflect two of its principal descriptors. First, by pluralistic one means that Sayyid Ahmad recognizes that other faith traditions also have the potential for leading their faithful into eternal bliss (Thomas, D., 2013: 170). Sayyid Ahmad writes with full conviction that other religious covenants in their present forms remain effectively salvific. He expressly states that ‘neither the covenants nor the legal doctrines (Shari’a) become superseded or abrogated, nor subsumed into the other (Troll, C., 1977). Wisdom found in sound doctrine is beneficial in this life, but its ascription is not impingent upon salvation (nijat). Pluralism implies active engagement with other religious traditions. Amir Hussain, building upon Diana Eck’s definition, emphasizes that a pluralistic perspective does not circumvent difficult questions and profound


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differences, but rather is committed to engage these in order “to gain a deeper sense of each other’s commitments” (Hussain, A., 2006: 252).Thus, he goes beyond the recognition for protection of religious liberties under the law, and advocates the theological validity of other faith traditions, Abrahamic and beyond. This view has strong support in the medieval religious writings of the Persianate Islam historically prevalent in Southwest Asia and in Central Asia (Bashir, S., 2011).

This pluralistic vision can be supported through Qur’anic interpretation. Joseph Lumbard, in his contribution to Pakistan’s Iqbal Academy’s study of “the religious other”, convincingly explains that there is ample support in Islam’s foundational sources to accept the ultimate efficacy of other faiths. He cites several examples from the Qur’an (Q5:69; 5:48; and 22:67) to substantiate the acceptability before God of persons from faiths other than Islam, such as:

Verily those who believe and those who are Jews, and the Sabeans, and the Christians are those who believe in God and the last day and do righteous deeds, so they have their recompense with God. They shall not fear nor shall they sorrow. (Q2:62) However, there are other verses that present a far more

exclusivist stance. These seem to condemn apostasy and demand ascription. Lumbard notes two from amongst various other possible examples. “Verily the religion with God is Islam” (Q3:19), and “Who seeks other than Islam as a religion, it will not be accepted from him” (Q3:85). There seems to be conflicting guidance, he notes, and the reader is confronted with an interpretative dilemma. The reader has to make a choice. And, as Muhammad Suhail has sagely observed, this is precisely the crux of the matter: the legitimacy of a pluralistic society is the battleground within the “crisis of Islamic civilization”.

However, pluralistic theology and secularist politics are increasingly dismissed in public discourse as “un-Islamic”. Passages from the foundational sources are “explained away by the trump card of tradition—taqlid.” And, passages that support a more pluralistic view are “explained away through creative and clever


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philology or are claimed to have been abrogated by later revelations” (Lumbard, J., 2009). Religious political parties, the most prominent being Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, advocate the repealing of the present constitution and the codification of a new document drawn from “Islamic sources”. One consequence of this is that people are openly discouraged from participating in governance system. This creates a gradual and often understated form of sabotage. Gangohi and other Deoband leaders discouraged participation in British ruled society. A parallel economy was created, as were separate systems of education and justice. This creates a state within a state and undermines efforts by the national government to institute change.

The “Islamization” of Pakistan during the Bhutto (1973-1977) and Zia (1977-1988) administrations demonstrates a steady shift away from the universalizing principle towards a more particular and reified view of Muslim fidelity. There are many pragmatic factors involved in this shift that cannot be addressed here due to space. However, the evident consequence is a trend towards particularity, and to ever more exclusive definitions of what is proscribed belief and practice. These sought state mechanisms to turn to society. As noted above, the grass roots Deoband leadership was not significantly represented in this process. However, they have capitalized on this shift so that now an increasingly conservative society is turning the state. And, due to the lack of participation in governance and the payment of tax revenue the state is weakened and overly reliant upon the army.

Conclusion

The interpretation of religious discourse requires specialist

skills. This poses a challenge for policymakers and those seeking to confront extremism in general, and in Central and Southern Asian in particular. Questions of legitimacy revolve around the question of Sunna, the guidance of tradition. This constrains discussion to an extremely tight frame where missteps can result even in prosecution


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under the “Blasphemy Laws”. It is important to recall that these are largely matters internal to a religion, one with a rich and diverse history.

However, there are more than ample resources for successful governance to inform and expand the range of attitudes and values regarded as legitimately Muslim (Bennison, A., 2009). The challenge for those seeking to work for peace and development in this region is to exacerbate communal leadership so that it does not become polarized along the lines described above. The sense of external invasion or societal compulsion will result in the formation of a parallel system that alienates population segments and creates resistance to development efforts. This is a form of civil resistance by non-cooperation. It can result in the formation of a parallel system of service delivery, and it functions as a dragging break. Large infrastructural investments may bring goodwill and facilitate travel, but this will not have its intended impact if there is no broad-based civil society cooperation. This can only be brought about if there is a simultaneous correction of values, particularly within the ethical realm pertaining to the boundaries of violence. As Pakistani historian Ayesha Jalal has argued, religious extremism amongst Muslims can only be confronted once its own people restore “[jihad’s] essential meaning as a struggle to be human and thereby more effectively combat the forces of disequilibrium that plague the contemporary world” (Jalal, A., 2009: 19).

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