Confucius Goes Global Samuel Tsoi UMB IRMastersCapstone May2012

8/13/2019 Confucius Goes Global Samuel Tsoi UMB IRMastersCapstone May2012

1/65

Chin

revival orise. Desabroadassistancinternatiof rules?convertcontestaincreaseHowevemore glincreasina moreits policyvalues a

consens

se Soft

hinas histo Confucianite its impethrough ce. Given inal influen

This paperd into inflution over h its soft po, world govbally-orientg role in craiffused po

preferencend govern

s around u

ohn W. M

Con Power

ric return toism, and sofrfect assetsltural exchs embracee, demand

addressesence in taman rightswer, it alsornance willd China. N

fting effectier dynamics, selectivelnce ideals

iversal nor

MaI

cCormacUni

uciusnd Im

SaMaste

16

prominenct power proof attractioanges, anof soft po

s and aspir the questiogeted regiorms, andlearns inte

still requireon-governm

e institutio among sta contribute

that could

s.

ter of Sciternation Graduatersity of

Goelicatio

uel Tsos Capst

ay 201

bstract

e is increasi jection to an, the Peop

enviableer as a ketions lead t by assessins and intultilateral

national nUS leadershental orgas and keepites and be to multilatpotentially

nce in Pual Relatio

Schoolassachus

Glos for Gl

one

ngly manasure the re

les Republievelopme

y strategy,o a new bng how Chernationalooperatio

rms and taip in the for izations an

ing states aond states,ral cooper

re-prioritize

blic Affairs Trackf Policy aetts Bosto

al:obal G

ed via pubt of the wor c (PRC) is st

t modelin what walance of pinas soft parenas, suc. It conclukes on moseeable fu

civil societcountable.China willtion, and p

global pro

nd Global

verna

lic diplomald of its peaill winning fr nd South-

ys will thewer or re-

ower curreh as Africaes that ase responsibture, even

will also pl In the contontinue toroject its clem-solving

Studies

ce

cy, acefuliendsouthRCsritingcy is, thehina

ilities.ith ay an xt ofssert

lturalover


2/65

Tsoi, Samuel

1

Table of Contents

Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 2

Soft Power Discourse ............................................................................................................ 5

Definitions ........................................................................................................................................... 5 Theoretical Underpinnings ............................................................................................................. 8 Chinese Characteristics ................................................................................................................ 13

Assets & Liabilities .............................................................................................................. 20

Governor Confucius: The China Model ............................................................................... 21 Director Confucius: Cultural, Educational and Public Diplomacy ................................ 31 Diplomat Confucius: Multilateralism and Foreign Aid ........................................................ 39

Impact on Global Governance ........................................................................................ 49

Policy Recommendations ................................................................................................. 57

China ................................................................................................................................................. 57 United States .................................................................................................................................... 58 NGOs/Civil Society ......................................................................................................................... 59

Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 60

Bibliography ....................................................................................................................... 62


3/65

Tsoi, Samuel

2

Introduction

Duke Ye asked about governance. Confucius said: Those who are close to you are pleased, those who are far away are attracted by your reputation." - Analects 16:13

It was the biggest party the world has ever seen. When the clock struck 8:08 PM on August

8, 2008, the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony fulfilled a milestone in modern Chinese history,

and displayed the Peoples Republic as an optimistic, attractive and rejuvenated force to be

reckoned with. The moment was marked not only with the numerical symbolism of good fortune in

Chinese, but an orchestrated showcase of soft power, an ancient and refashioned concept of

achieving outcomes through attraction that also parallels modern Chinas reemergence onto theworld stage.

It is glorious to receive friends from afar, chanted the ceremony performers, quoting the

Confuciuss Analects . The world watched Beijings spectacle of an unprecedented national

aesthetic 1 through a tour of Chinese culture via both the traditions of music, martial arts and dance

and the technological execution of digital displays, fireworks and architecture to demonstrate

Chinas rich history and modern achievements. The 2008 Olympic Games, indeed, serves as both a

momentous occasion for many Chinese and a lens into Chinese Communist Partys embrace of soft

power projection. Chinas charm offensive is also launched to assuage fears of its economic and

military ambitions and to assert its preferences in an ever more complex international

environment.

After what the Chinese call a hundred years of humiliation, through tumultuous periods of

famine, foreign invasion, and political upheavals, the economic reforms in the last three decades

catapulted the worlds most populous nation to an unprecedented comeback. The opening up

policy lifted the equivalent of the US population out of abject poverty, achieved unprecedented

scales of urbanization, and created a burgeoning middleclass. Chinas meteoric ascent also begs a

1 Callahan 2010: pg. 2


4/65

Tsoi, Samuel

3

significant geopolitical question: how is Chinas global influence affecting the norms of international

development and global cooperation processes?

The traditional analytical frameworks of contemporary international politics have centered

around hard power assets such as economic inducements and military force, both of which have

spawned a series of debates about Chinas looming threat to its region, the international system and

the West, particularly the United States. Another salient paradigm for understanding what Chinas

development means for the world is soft power, which is the ability for one to shape the

preferences and opinions of a target to achieve the outcomes one desires. 2 By assessing and

evaluating the use soft power in relations to hard power, the combination of both in the approach of

smart power will be the key to success in an ever more complex international arena, especially for

the Chinas trajectory visvis the West.

Employing a soft power analysis enables analysts to observe Beijings strategy to maintain

legitimacy, both domestically and abroad, and to influence international agendasetting to fit its

interests. Soft power analysis will also inform the evolution of global norms and global governance

as China asserts its interests and goals through public diplomacy, foreign aid, cultural exports,

educational exchanges and its model of combining market economics with autocratic politics. There

is a growing perception that the conventional wisdom of the end of history, that capitalism begets

democracy, has faded if not put on hold as China stresses state sovereignty and noninterference of

domestic affairs. At the same time, China has reorientated its foreign policy to become

increasingly cooperative toward the multilateral institutions and norms of the international system.

For example, China has increased its membership in international governmental

organizations from just over 30 in 1986 to 53 in 2009, with entry into the WTO in 2001 being the

most prominent. It has also doubled the number of international arms control, disarmament, and

nonproliferation treaties that it has joined between 1990 and 2008, and increased its UN

2 Nye 2004: pg. 6


5/65

Tsoi, Samuel

4

Peacekeeping forces from 5 to over 2,000 between 1990 and 2010. 3 Based on this trend, some

analysts have suggested that China is not a revisionist power, but rather, its diplomatic

engagements are transformed by the socialization effects of international organizations heavily

influenced by Americas sticky power the liberal economic world order led by Westernled

institutions and business interests and underscored by American military power. 4

However, there are also signs that an embedded China could establish counternorms by

working through the system to change international rules and institutions to suit its interests.

Chinas soft power affects a range of areas such as humanitarian assistance, foreign aid, and

ecological conservation. On the cultural and ideational realm, China is relentlessly reviving its

classical thinkers and revered values, by expounding on virtues such as harmony. China sees

culture as its biggest toolset in its soft power arsenal, as well as the driving force behind its agenda

setting ambitions. It is on a mission to rebrand its ancient sage Confucius, teaching Mandarin, and

welcoming students and dignitaries from the developing world. These types of efforts are how

Beijing hopes to counter the China threat theory.

This paper examines examine the three main sources of soft power, namely cultural

attraction, political model, and foreign policy. The main body of the paper will assess Beijings use

of culture and other toolsets such as diplomacy and governance, and their strengths and

weaknesses. The central role that the PRC government plays in constructing soft power will also be

critiqued. It will especially home in on the efficacy of culture as an inherent soft power resource,

but also as a branding of its domestic and foreign policies, embodied in the rejuvenation of

Confucianism.

A literature review of soft power discourse, both in the origins of Joseph Nyes definition

and the usage by Chinese policymakers and scholars, coupled with the placing of soft power in the

context of international relations theories and the practice of public diplomacy, will precede the

3 Cho, H. 20114 Mead 2004


6/65

Tsoi, Samuel

5

analysis. By examining the trajectory of Chinese soft power, this paper will begin to illuminate on

whether Chinas rise will pose potential challenges to international norms and global governance.

Lastly, a set of policy recommendations for China, the U.S. and nongovernmental organizations will

be presented. Finally, this paper selects several scenarios from the analysis to offer options for

stakeholders to respond to these challenges and identify problemsolving opportunities with China.

Soft Power Discourse: Definitions

Joseph Nye first coined the term soft power as the ability to influence others to get them to

do what you want. As a departure from conventional framework of power in hard terms, Nye

posits soft power as an alternative way to achieve objectives that is at times superior to using

military force or economic sanctions (sticks) to threaten the other, or to use payments or even

bribes to coerce the other (carrots). Soft power is also presented by Nye as the ability to structure a

situation so that other nations develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with

ones own nation. The attraction or coopting can occur through culture, political values, and

diplomacy. In an informational age, with power more diffused among nations and actors, Nye

believes that achieving objectives via soft power is a more costeffective and peaceful approach to

international politics. 5

The power via attraction approach has several manifestations, including normative values,

public diplomacy, cultural output, education, news media, and business practices. Nye also offers a

spectrum of behavior that differentiates hard power at one end and soft power at the other. The

spectrum runs from command and coercion, through inducements, agendasetting, and attraction,

to end with a successful deployment of soft power: cooptation. When this is accomplished, the

target of soft power does not feel threatened or persuaded into supporting an agenda. Instead, the

5 Nye 2004: pg. 6


7/65

Tsoi, Samuel

6

targeted actor could become a reliable ally and supporter of the exponent of soft power, because it

feels a sense of shared outlook. 6

Soft power, therefore, is often more difficult than hard power to measure, and success is

dependent on the targets response. Using soft power to accomplish goals is often a longerterm

investment, and many politicians and citizens are unable to grasp the efficacy of using soft power.

Lastly, Nye believes soft power instruments are not possessed solely by the government. In fact, it

is most robust when attractiveness is embedded in the people, civil society and innovative

environments. This is a critical aspect for analyzing the role the Chinese government plays in

growing its nations soft power, which is often in a topdown central planning approach, much like

its grip on key industries and institutions.

Thus, nations might deploy a variety of other resources to achieve the same goals, and some

will not involve strictly governmental resources or policies at all. For example, hard power is

accomplished mainly by military force, or at least credible threat of it; other coercive techniques

might be payments or institutional pressures; and soft power is developed by promoting cultural

values and sympathy. 7 Examples that Nye gives of US soft power include global brands, films and TV

shows, universities, technological innovation and free markets. With America as the example, Nye

also notes the negative relationship between hard power and soft power that occurs when America

squandered its soft power after 9/11 because of its aggressive military excursions for the War on

Terror. 8

Nyes definitions are built upon, tweaked and also contextualized in various ways by other

theorists of power. Steven Lukes sees hard power as the changing of the incentive structures of

actors whose interest are taken as given and soft power as the shaping of those very interests. He

also notes that Nye does not make the distinction between different ways in which soft power can

6 Nye 2004: pg. 87 Nye 2004: pg. 98 Nye 2010: pg. 25


8/65

Tsoi, Samuel

7

coopt, attract and entice those subject to it. 9 Lukes also argues that since power shapes the

formation shapes the formation of actors consciousness, no interest formation can be objective;

defining what an actors real interests are is not free of power relations. 10 Thus, Lukes expands

the soft power analysis to explain and unpack the sources behind how actor A gets actor B to do

what it wants, mainly by constituting the field of knowledge through which B realizes its

subjectivity. Alexander Vuving, who also expands Nyes definition by sharpen the distinction

between soft power resources and soft power currencies, since hard power resources (economic

and military) can also produce soft power in difference contexts. Vuving refines Nyes soft power

resources by offering three generic power currencies, which he terms beauty, the resonance of

share norms and goals; brilliance, the shine of capabilities and successes; and benignity, the

kindness of behavior and attitude. 11

David Lampton also expands Nyes definition of soft power in the Three Faces of Chinese

Power, one of the most comprehensive analyses of contemporary Chinese power to date. Instead of

soft power, Lampton calls the ability ideational power, which derives from the intellectual,

cultural, spiritual, leadership, and legitimacy resources that enhance a nations capacity to

efficiently define and achieve national objectives. Lampton, in his particular investigation of China,

puts the emphasis on political and diplomatic leadership, innovation and human resources, beyond

Nyes sources of culture, political system and foreign policies. 12 Both Nye and Lampton assumes

that soft power is often the more costeffective way to nudge another country into compliance by

instilling a wish to behave in a desired fashion or the belief that such behavior is right than by

using force or bribes.

I will generally be using Nyes definition and sources for the assessment of Chinas soft

power projection, with the discussion on Chinese characteristics of political values and the

9 Lukes 2005: pg.90-9210 Bilgin & Elis 2008: pg. 1511 Vuving 2009: pg. 812 Lampton 2008: pg. 118


9/65


10/65

Tsoi, Samuel

9

common power above actors to keep them in awe, leads actors to optimize hard power resources

only because such resources are more certain to provide protection (whether it be defensive or

offensive in nature). While even perceptions of power may reduce the vulnerability of an actor, they

are no guarantee against victimization by force, nor are they guaranteed to be able to deter and/or

compel actors to behave in ways that make one less vulnerable. Tangible power resources, both in

their manifest and symbolic (i.e., threat) use, can be employed to repel acts of force, and they can be

used to compel actors into submission. All intangible sources of power, such as good will, attraction,

values and culture carry no such assurances. Therefore, soft power carries no guarantees that an

act of aggression can, either be confronted or perpetrated to e liminate a menacing actor. Thus,

many skeptics of soft power portray the concept as merely one end of a spectrum between realism

and idealism. At best, they see soft power as a lofty and impractical paraphrase of liberal

institutionalist vision and policies. 15 Although many soft power instruments are taken more

seriously in constructivists and liberal frameworks, classical realist thinkers have also

acknowledged the salience of attraction and ideational persuasion. Even classical realist thinker E.

H. Carr categorized international power as military, economic and power over opinion. 16

Broadly speaking, soft power is simply a form of power, and the concept crosses theoretical

boundaries when it comes to analyzing state behavior and international politics; although it is

tempting to either understate it in the age of weapons of mass destruction, or overstate it in an

informational age. Nye himself does not dismiss realisms fundamental concern for tangible

sources of power, however he claims that the stage of world politics is becoming more crowded

with additional actors, the distinction between domestic and international is not so neat, and the

politics of transnational relations and complex interdependence need an understanding of liberal

and constructivist approaches as well as classical realism. 17 Moreover, Nye believes the analysis

15 Layne 2010: pg. 7316 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 2nd edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p.120.17 Nye 2008


11/65

Tsoi, Samuel

10

and utilization of soft power is not necessarily incompatible with realism, but in fact embedded in

classical realist thought. Classical realists like Machiavelli and Morgenthau understood [soft

power], but in its search for parsimony, structural realism settled on a truncated and impoverished

materialist view of power. 18 Nye and fellow neoliberal thinker Robert Keohane explored different

models of power and interdependence including the mixed coalitions typical of the ideal type they

labeled complex interdependence. It complicates traditional Westphalian dynamics of stateto

state relations and conflict, toward a more diffused set of actors that requires diplomacy on

multiple levels; from one government to another states population, from nonstate actors such as

transnational corporations and civil society organizations to government, and so forth. This

mixture of a Westphalian statecentric world of hard power politics and the emerging reality of

more diffused power between states and among other nonstate actors, the salience of norms and

the global governance, all of which dilutes realist notions of state sovereignty and anarchy. It is in

this context that China soft power is operationalized. In areas of the world where Chinas influence

is most dramatically felt, such as Africa, there are nongovernmental actors such as development

and humanitarian organizations. Chinas friendly relations with some of the more troubled regimes

will increasingly alter the political waters in which NGOs and other civil society groups operate,

from the permission to operate for international NGOs, to grassroots organizations role in

representing the interests of communities and the environment affected by largescale

infrastructure extractive projects that China is funding.

With the growth of informational technology, globalizations cultural and ideational

dimensions have also ushered a new age in world politics which elevated the importance of soft

power relative to hard power. In the current international system, soft power will be a crucial

element in enhancing influence over international outcomes because it has become more difficult to

compel nations and nonstate actors through the weapons of hard power. Furthermore, the

18 Nye 2008


12/65

Tsoi, Samuel

11

spread of ideas, projection culture and promotion of global norms are opening up theoretical space

for the salience of constructivism in soft power analysis. In this new arrangement, NGOs will also

play a role beyond the governments in both building soft power and countering public relations

campaigns by states by exposing shortcomings of governments or influencing the publics

perception of the influence of states.

Optimally, soft power is most influential when target nations voluntarily do what soft

powerwielding nations prefer, as in coopting instead of coercing. The structure of power relations

and negotiations is embedded within some greater constellation of social relations that influence

those relations and thereby influence final outcomes that derive from the interactions among

actors. 19

Another subconcept of soft power that has become fertile ground for constructivism is

agendasetting and agenda control, which are crucial elements in global governance. Nye refers to

soft power as a control over the political agenda. 20 Within a collective negotiation process, be in

regional or international forums, there are said and unsaid ideas and values that form a guiding

agenda, outcomes are circumscribed by the range of issues and strategic possibilities configured by

the agendasetter, in the case of many global governance endeavors, Western powers. The agenda

has influence over which issues are prioritized, discussed and worked on which has fundamental

implications on how policy is shaped and by how actors assert soft power. 21

Constructivisms emphasis on identity and the sociallyconstructed nature of interstate

relations provides a lens into how Chinas soft power, especially in its recent revitalization in

theorizing on world order base on Confucianism. 22 Constructivism questions the assumed structure

of power that determines the adversarial posture of states, especially rising powers such as China

19 Gallarotti 2011: pg. 1120 Nye 2004: pg. 921 Gallarotti 2011: pg. 1222 Bell 2008: pg. 27


13/65

Tsoi, Samuel

12

visvis the hegemonic power, the United States. 23 In terms of global governance, which is the

increasingly necessary endeavor to solve transnational problems, it is still deeply hampered by the

rigid nationstate system governed by nationstate level interests and great power politics. A

constructivist framework has the potential to make sense of a global dynamic in which Chinas rise

is not necessarily going to be at the expense of existing great powers, and how Chinas identity as a

fragile superpower 24 (a nascent nationstate with tremendous economic and military power) will

affect the community of states and the ability for international institutions to solve global problems.

The Peoples Republic of China (PRC), being a relatively new Westphalian entity, carries

paradoxical identities of being a civilization and a nationstate, a rich and a poor country, and an

economically liberal yet politically autocratic system. This is manifested in Chinas projection of soft

power, and its ideas are reasserting the emphasis on both sovereignty and noninterference,

thereby halting the trend towards global norms and humanitarian law. On the other hand, the PRC

has reformed its domestic policies in compliance with global institutions and agendas. The analysis

section of this paper will delve further into this dynamic. On a theoretical level, understanding how

China utilizes soft power will inform how Chinese ideas and political values spread, and how its

influence on multilateral bodies, where constructivism will shed light into the prospects of Chinas

agendasetting capabilities and norms entrepreneurship. The socialization dynamics of

international relations and national identity will also be useful in that a state's behavior is in part a

product of the interaction between nationstates. 25 Thus, current Chinese notions of power and

national identity are deeply influenced by interactions between China and the outside world

which are historical geopolitical processes as well as ongoing social and cultural interactivities.

These processes will be discussed following the analysis of Chinas soft power resources.

23 Wend 1992: pg.39624 Shirk 200725 Cheung 2008: pg. 6


14/65

Tsoi, Samuel

13

In Nyes latest iteration, smart power as the ideal mixture of hard and soft power, he

articulates that analyzing United States grand strategy necessitate a liberal realist approach. 26

For China, the following sections will illuminate Chinas motivation for utilizing soft power

resources, from teaching Mandarin to the world to training savvy diplomats to participate

assertively in international forums, grounded in a realpolitik posture. To begin understanding

Chinas motivations, interests and preferences, a view from the Chinese mindset on power,

international relations and global governance is in order.

Soft Power Discourse: Chinese Characteristics

A leader is best not when people obey his commands, but when they barely know he exists. Lao Tzu

The behavior of leaders and states that denote soft power is as old as human history, and it

is filled in classical Chinese texts such as military strategist Sun Tzu and sages Confucius and Lao

Tzu. However, the concept of soft power in Asia is recently revived, and not extensively researched

by Western scholars. A recent paper by Gill and Huang highlights important aspects of Chinas

recent diplomacy in the wider sense, including its education, developmental model, and growing

participation in international institutions. Joshua Kurlantzicks Charm Offensive: how Chinas Soft

Power Is Transforming the World is first of its kind Englishlanguage attempt at mapping Chinese

notions and engagement in soft power to win friends and build alliances through education and

cultural exports. Kurlantzick sees Chinas relative success using soft power assets in the geopolitical

chessboard as directly related to the United States unilateral foreign policy, political gridlock and

domestic inequalities. 27 There are also neoConfucian scholars both within the Chinesespeaking

world, and from outside, that have described how the renaissance in Confucian thought is

26 Nye 2011: pg. 23127 Kurlantzick 2007


15/65

Tsoi, Samuel

14

contributing to Chinese political life and approach to global affairs, such as the late Kang Youwei,

and contemporary analysts such as Daniel Bell, Joseph Chan, and Roger Ames.

Chinese traditions have in fact been updated to inform contemporary relations, and the

concept of soft power is understood to be fundamentally part of society, politics and the military

thinking over 2000 years. In fact, because of its durability, and its popularity in Western

management literature, the government has actively promoted the one of the original proponents

of soft power, Sun Tzu. In Suns seminal work, Art of War, written over a thousand years ago, the

stratagems formed a key element of statecraft beyond military tactics, such as: a carefully crafted

strategy to confuse putative rivals, throw them off balance, and hopefully win victories without

striking a blow. Indeed, so popular are many of the maxims that they have become part of Chinese

folklore and popular narrative, enshrined in literary epics such as the Tale of the Three Kingdoms

akin to what Machiavellis Prince s contribution to Western political philosophy. 28

Sun Tzu argues that military action is only important as part of an integrated approach to

security; one in which diplomatic alliances, with emphasis on such stratagems as deceiving enemies

and undermining their home fronts; secret logistical preparations; winning over enemy civilians,

soldiers, and leaders; avoiding defeats and casualties; maximizing victories; and predicting the

aftermath of war before engagement, are more crucial than mere fighting. Many of Sun Tzus

phrases made their way into daily language; for example bing yi zha li (war is based on deception);

yiruo kegang (use gentle means to overcome the hard and strong); and bishi jixu (avoid the enemys

strengths and strike at his weak point). 29

Moral leadership by exemplar is another component of soft power in the Confucian mindset.

Even if claims to moral integrity have little basis in fact, they can nevertheless be expressed via

propaganda, as in the Cold War rhetorical assertions that America was a beacon of freedom and

democracy; or that the Soviet Union was a paradise of equality and public goods. Again, this concept

28 Hunter 2009: pg. 378-379 29 Ibid.


16/65

Tsoi, Samuel

15

resonates in Chinese tradition. Confucianism is a main paradigm of Chinese governance which

although hierarchical, is ideally reciprocal and ethics based. The ruler is expected to demonstrate

moral excellence, taking wise decisions on behalf of his subjects to keep the state secure and

prosperous. As long as he does so, he holds a heavenly mandate and should be supported by all. If

he should deviate significantly from moral norms, he will sooner or later lose the mandate.

30Widespread and justified popular opposition and a change of ruler will follow. One often finds,

even at ordinary levels of Chinese institutional life, a strong sense of obligation on the part of

seniors to respect the interests of their subordinates, towards whom they are expected to act fairly

and generously. They expect in return loyalty and hard work.

With that rich intellectual history in conceptualizing power and the Confucian heritage of

relational harmony, it was only a matter of time that China evolves its soft power discourse. When

Nyes book Bound to Lead was published in Chinese in 1992, thenPresident Jiang Zemins chief

foreign policy advisor Wang Huning published an article in the Fudan University Journal, stressing

the need for China to strengthen its soft power. 31 A Chinese researcher also found that interest in

soft power has increased dramatically among scholars and policymakers in China since, even

toward a fever pitch of fascination that exceeded interest among US scholars. In August 2002, the

China Institute of International Studies held a conference on The Importance and Influence of Soft

Power in U.S. Foreign Policy. Recently, criticisms of Nyes theory have surfaced, asserting that

Nyes soft power pertains mainly to the American experience and arguing for a soft power theory

more acclimated to Chinas situation. 32 This is one of the most discursive aspects of analyzing

Chinas soft power, since Nye, as an American stresses civil society as the core resource for a

nations soft power and has argued that China is weak on soft power because of a political

30 Chan 2007: pg. 17931 Wang 200832 Ibid.


17/65

Tsoi, Samuel

16

environment that stifles many aspects of media, religion, innovation, and selfcriticism. 33

Nevertheless, as Nye would suggest, success of soft power projection depends on the target state, of

which China has many fans, if not with the American elite. Furthermore, Chinas investment into

soft power instruments is a significant part of its foreign policy strategy and the trajectory of its

rise.

Contemporary discourse in China is generally twofold: soft power as nationbuilding and

soft power as foreign policy. As grand strategy, soft power is relevant for the Chinese government

in both internal and external affairs. Throughout Hu Jintaos tenure as president in the 2000s, the

political elite in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have also started to take greater interest in

strengthening Chinas soft power. In May 2004, the CCP Politburo held its 13th collective seminar

on Development and Prosperity of Chinese Philosophy and Social Science. This was held shortly

after American analyst Joshua Ramos Cooper coined the term Beijing Consensus, which sparked

an international debate about the Chinese development model that counters the dominant forms of

promoted by the Washington D.C.based neoliberal order anchored by the White House, Treasury

Department and the IMF and World Bank, dubbed the Washington Consensus.

The Chinese never exactly embraced the Beijing Consensus, but rather prefer the term

China Model, since the CCP claims it has no intentions of promoting the model widely around the

world, but that its successes might be an example for other developing nations that there are

alternatives to neoliberalism. In fact, this topdown economic reform that stresses gradualism has

become an important soft power resources for winning influence abroad, particularly those with

authoritarian regimes or those disillusioned by the Washington Consensus. Nevertheless, China

sees the need to complement its expansion with a peaceful development discourse as part of its

grand strategy. International opinion on China also improved at the outset of its soft power

strategy, with Chinas renminbi (RMB) acted as a fixed currency to stabilize funds for afflicted

33 Nye 2011


18/65

Tsoi, Samuel

17

countries throughout the 199798 Asian economic crises. Today, it is flirting with applying the

same logic in the Euro zone.

Unlike in the past, mainstream media in China began reporting extensively on global issues

in the last decade. As a result, active discussions of development issues and on foreign policy

occurred not only on the government level, but also within civil society. At the same time, the

Confucius lens is employed as the new patriotic viewpoint from which Chinas identity and

approach to global affairs is based. For example, commentator Yu Dan drew record viewership to

the Lecture Room show on Chinese television that discussed how Confucian philosophy resonates

with contemporary Chinese policies. 34 This increased discourse patterns influenced the self

consciousness of Chinese people and in the way the Chinese government conducted self

evaluations. 35

One of the most significant contribution to soft power discourse by Chinese thoughtleaders

is the concept of comprehensive national power ( zonghe guoli ), which emerged alongside

the interpretation and adaptation of Nyes soft power. As soft power become ever more salient,

Chinese scholars regarded the strengthening of Chinas soft power as a top national objective. In his

landmark book Theory on Comprehensive National Power , Huang Shuofeng describes

comprehensive national power as comprising hard power, soft power and coordinating power,

which includes political structures, government leadership, organizational decisionmaking power,

management capabilities, and reform coordination capabilities components of which highlight

some of the more pragmatic steps of utilizing soft power. (Figure 1) 36

34 Callahan 2011: pg. 1035 Cho & Jeong 2008: pg. 25536 Callahan 2011: Figure 4.7


19/65

Tsoi, Samuel

18

For domestic political issues, some Chinese scholars stress the strengthening of soft power

as well. As a comprehensive approach to national development beyond the onedimensional

fixation on economic growth in recent decades, they reflect on the lesson of the Soviet Unions

collapse. The Kremlins dramatic fall was attributable to its rapid decrease in international

influence despite having military might on par with the U.S. 37 Thus, Chinese scholars called for a

plan to increase their countrys soft power through institutional advancement in culture, education

and governance. Others with reformist impulses have also weighed in on soft power to advocate

for protection of private property and strengthening the rule of law, for example. 38

As noted, the discourse on soft power has reinvigorated some areas of policy and political

debates about Chinas internal governance. However, there is an eagerness to apply it externally, as

the China threat mounts amongst its Asia Pacific neighbors, via its expansive investments in Africa

and Latin America, and as the ideological challenge to Western neoliberalism. Under Hu Jintao and

Wen Jiabaos leadership, the most deliberate development of soft power as foreign policy strategy

include the new concept of international politicoeconomic order, with language borrowed from

the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence during the Mao era, which resisted the Americanled

international order, which will be examined further in the analysis. In espousing nowubiquitous

terms such as harmonious world and peaceful development, Hu and others attempted to strike a

balance between assuring the world that Chinas successes are not zerosum gains. The Chinese

37 Cho & Jeong 2008: pg. 45838 Men & Barton 2011: pg.179

Figure 1: Comprehensive National Power

Hard Power Soft Power

Comprehensive national power = (military power + economic power + cultural power) x political power

Material Power Operational Power


20/65

Tsoi, Samuel

19

leadership is mindful of the importance of mitigating the fears of China as a security threat,

neocolonial power or unsustainable bubble. Other examples include the new security concept,

which criticized traditional security measures (e.g., NATO and the U.S.Japan alliance), and the

responsible power theory, which argued against the view that China was destructive to the

international system and claimed that China was a responsible power accountable for its actions in

international society. 39

Beyond the image they wants to project, strategists in China see soft power development as

both a defensive response to American soft power and as a proactive path toward becoming a great

power. Many Chinese analysts regard Americas soft power strategy as instrumental in the

disintegration of the Soviet Union via public diplomacy, broadcast, cultural exports and alienating

the Soviets in multilateral forums. These scholars saw this as Americas attempt at peaceful

evolution ( heping yanbian ), and casts China as a vulnerable victim of the heavy hand of

American cultural hegemony. A similar impulse is exhibited most recently in the events of the Arab

Spring, during which the Chinese Communist Party ratcheted up censors, clamped down on

dissidents, and criticized Western culture. 40 As a countermeasure, they urge the Chinese

government to strengthen education in socialist ideology and to protect Chinas traditional culture.

This defensive posture is common among many Chinese intellectuals, especially those with

nationalist tendencies. In the response to Nyes opinion article published in the Wall Street Journal

in 2005, Chinese critics see Nye as perpetuating a soft power version of the China threat, and

justifies Chinas involvement in multilateral institutions and influence abroad is commensurate

with its development trajectory, and it has the responsibility and right to make global politics more

democratic and less Westerncentric. 41

39 Cho & Jeong 2008: pg. 45940 Wong, New York Times 3-Jan-201241 Cho & Jeong 2008: pg. 460


21/65

Tsoi, Samuel

20

Since its inception in the 1990s in political discourse, soft power is now squarely embedded

in Chinas grand strategy. First, the PRCs leaders are actively demonstrating to its neighbors and

the international community that Chinas historical comeback is not to be feared, but even desired.

Secondly, its cadre of globallysavvy leaders and diplomats are beginning to assert its voice in all

major areas (Security Council, WTO, IMF), even shouldering some responsibilities (peacekeeping,

mediation, N. Korea nonproliferation), and to challenge the Westernled world order so

international community accepts Chinese influence in global governance. In this context, the

Chinese elite has reached consensus on developing soft power as China reaches to become a global

power. How far will that take China? The assets, liabilities and impact on world politics are

examined ahead.

Soft Power Assets & Liabilities

Of the three general sources of soft power for nationstates, culture, political system and

values, and foreign policies, most mainstream intellectuals and leaders in China regards culture as

its focal point. 42 The Chinese see culture both as the core of its charm offensive via the promotion

of its language, art and civilizational traditions, as well as a way to validate its political legitimacy at

home and deter the China threat theories abroad. This is synthesized in the notion of harmonious

society championed by current President Hu Jintao which is pregnant with romanticized Confucius

overtones. This section will examine the three sources in sequence, from the most passively

attractive (internal political system and values), to the cultural promotion that has both passive and

assertive elements, to the most outwardlyfocused overtures (foreign policies and cooperation). Ateach turn, the states motivations and actions in exerting soft power yield assets and liabilities. For

the first source, political system, an overview of Chinas economic development, authoritarian

governance and pragmatism will show how Chinas model has become increasingly attractive as

42 Men & Barton 2011: pg. 178


22/65

well as c

Chinese

exported

educatio

bilateral

interacti

F

Gover D

remarke

served a

Marxist

kinds, oft

infrastru

expense

this adap

Passi

Political & inter

governsyste

ntradictory

iews on aut

and broadc

al exchang

relations an

ity betwee

igure 2: Sou

nor Coneng Xiaopin

: It doesn't

a comman

nd Maoist i

en market r

cture develo

f democrati

tability and

ve attraction

alues nal nce

m

with an em

ority and d

sted aroun

s and media

foreign ass

hard powe

rces of Soft

fucius: g, the pragm

matter whe

to embark

eologies. T

forms, with

pment all t

zation that

lexibility th

force

ed

hasis on ho

mocracy. I

the world

. Finally, Ch

istance will

(economic i

ower

he Chiatic leader

her a cat is

n a frantic r

e following

unprecede

he while co

any Weste

t sets it apa

Cultural, ucational

public iplomacy

w classical

will follow

ia a buildu

nas growin

lluminate t

nducement)

a Modeho opened

hite or bla

ush to get ri

decades we

ted results i

solidating t

n theorists

rt from its s

olitical thou

y how cult

of public di

g engageme

e often mud

and soft po

lp China to t

k, as long a

ch and an im

e full of poli

n growth, p

e Communi

osit accom

cialist bret

Creatin

Foreig& intercoop

ght informs

ral assets a

plomacy too

t in multila

dled analysi

er.

he world in

it catches

plicit conse

cy experime

verty allevi

st Partys po

anies mode

ren, such as

Direct enga avorable c

Tsoi, S

policies national ration

contempora

e packaged,

ls such as

eral institut

s of the

he 1980s, o

ice. His dic

t to leave b

nts of vario

tion and

wer at the

nization. It

the former

gement / nditions

amuel

21

ry

ions,

ce

um

hind

s

is


23/65

Tsoi, Samuel

22

Soviet Union, North Korea and Cuba, and which other socialist states such as Vietnam are

emulating.

The PRCs statedriven capitalistic model, with limited civil liberties, political rights and

press freedom has emerged as an alternative to the neoliberal model institutionalized in the

Bretton Woods system, especially among other autocratic governments. However, Chinese leaders

never asserted that there is an exportable China Model because of internal debates and massive

challenges still ahead. Regardless, its results in economic development and regime stability thus far

have undoubtedly charmed many policymakers in other developing nations. This growthatall

cost modernization pathway has led to a contemporary society and polity that is in search of a

unifying ideology in the absence of any conventional form of socialism or anything close to

democratic liberalism. This postideological vacuum opened up for Chinese intellectuals and

policymakers alike to construct a NeoConfucianism as one way to legitimate its lack of

democratization. 43 Just as the Party once attempted to purge all ancient thought during the Cultural

Revolution to seduce the populace into Maoism, it is now using Confucianism largely for political

purposes. There is, however, serious scholarship and analysis on how classical Chinese thought

does explain the countrys trajectory in governance, without making normative claims.

Nevertheless, any comprehension of a China model is still largely a work in progress, as society

itself grapples with identity issues, and the government is still finding ways to utilize culture as a

unifier even as its corruption, censorship and corporatism stifle many sociallydriven soft power

sources such as civil society, art and innovation.

Chinas economic renaissance is also an eyecatching exemplar for many countries,

especially those who have failed to overcome deepseated barriers toward development under the

Westerncentric economic system. As noted previously, former TIME editor Joshua Cooper Ramo

claims that Chinas economic marvel offers the developing world a blueprint for success, and coined

43 Bell 2008: pg.24


24/65

Tsoi, Samuel

23

the term Beijing Consensus, as the alternative if not the antithesis to the Washington Consensus.

Instead of a postcolonial pattern of international development which favors a standardized shock

therapy approach to implement capitalistic policies such as market reform, austerity and free trade,

the compelling achievements of China show that operating outside of the Washington Consensus is

possible if not preferable. The Beijing Consensus achieves success through experimentation,

maintaining political stability, and exercising selfdetermination in domestic and foreign affairs. 44

Measuring how this attractiveness translates on the ground is elusive. Global attitudes

polling only reveals a glimpse of the popularity of the Beijing Consensus of the China Model,

although public opinion plus statements by leaders and public intellectuals can be telling. More

notably, the Chinese government never officially embraced this term, instead emphasizes

development based on a countrys own characteristics and willingness to innovate and experiment,

gradually integrating with the global system while keeping foreign interference at bay.

Nevertheless, it is clear that Chinas astonishing progress in the past decades is leading to a

rethinking of both development economics and the relationship between economic and political

freedoms. 45

The Chinese developmental recipe of combining exportled growth, stateled industrial

planning, massive investment in infrastructure and monetary and fiscal selfdetermination, has

cultivated legitimacy for the Communist Party. The crackdown on the 1989 Tiananmen Square

protests that left hundreds dead at the hands of Chinas own military, which was a lowpoint in the

governments soft power at home and abroad, is a memory that is now buried, revised and

forgotten in official rhetoric and propaganda. Instead, the government reminds people that the past

three decades of reform has lifted more than half a billion people out of poverty, improved life

expectancy rates, health and educational outcomes. Literacy rates have improved from 66 percent

44 Ramo 2004, pg.3-4 45 Halper 2010: pg. 7


25/65

Tsoi, Samuel

24

to 94 percent between 1982 and 2008. 46 Infant mortality fell from 80 deaths per 1,000 births to 17

deaths in a comparable period. 47 In the last few years, China has become the largest market for

mobile phones and cars, and also the country with the most internet users. This remarkable change

in one generation has given the Chinese model tremendous attraction abroad and relative stability

at home. However, the equation is shifting and the model itself is at a crossroad which could undo

its gains and require serious political reforms.

The Beijing Consensus, as some analysts have noted, is neither unique to China nor does it

enjoy unanimous agreement among all of its political and intellectual elite, albeit a centralized and

highly conformist leadership. It is also vulnerable as some of the conditions for Chinas economic

miracle wane, such as a wellspring of lowskilled labor and an insatiable global consumer market. 48

When Deng Xiaoping ushered in the opening and reform era in 1978, China was not the

firstmover in adopting a strategy of prioritizing stateled economic growth over corresponding

democratic reforms. In fact, it was the Asian Tigers of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore

who had liberalized their markets without immediately or simultaneous undergoing

democratization. In fact, in a conversation with Jerry Rawlings, a former Ghanaian president, Deng

sated, Please do not copy our model. If we have any experience to introduce, that is that we make

polices according to our own conditions. 49 Furthermore, the Asian Tigers governments played a

central role in key industries and picked which sectors to grow and protect. One can certainly

identify multiparty elections in places such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan as vindication for the

Western modernization theory of democratization and economic development, but there were

significant periods of statecontrol of infant industries that came at the expense of free markets and

civil society development. Perhaps China, with its sheer size, diversity and scale, explains its slower

path relative with its smaller and more homogenous Asian neighbors in terms of democratic

46 China.org.cn 9/14/200947 CIA World Factbook 48 The Economist 1/21/201249 Men & Barton 2011: pg. 180


26/65

Tsoi, Samuel

25

reform, but it is indeed not unique in its approach so far relative to the crucial early years of

development in the Asian Tigers nations. Perhaps most interestingly, this also spawned a heated

debate over the exceptionality of Asian Values, led by leaders such as Singapores Lee Kuan Yew

(whos ethnically Chinese), who argued that the region possesses a unique set of institutions and

political ideologies which reflected Confucian culture of hierarchy and topdown governance. In

other words, the China model appeared in discourse outside of China before the Beijing Consensus

became relevant. Despite not being the firstmover, the transformation of a society of a billionplus

people with such continuity in history and geopolitical importance makes China unique in scale if

not in substance.

Within China, the exceptionality of its development model is also debated. When the Beijing

Consensus first emerged as a salient discussion, it garnered widespread media coverage and

academic investigations in China. Overall, a mainstream opinion emerged that welcomed the notion

of a Beijing Consensus as a complement to Chinas achievements and its possibility of international

applicability. Chinese scholars have tended to regard these receptive evaluations as a sign of

Chinas increasing soft power. 50 Some also point to the fact that the relatively high approval ratings

of the central government bodes well for Chinas increasingly moral authority via its political

leadership.

Lately, Chinese scholars are attempting to distance the China model from the Asian Tigers

by highlighting nuances such as Chinas active pursuit of foreign direct investment, initial public

offerings of Chinese companies and significant market liberalizations as preconditions for joining

the WTO. In contrast to its fear of affirming a China threat theory abroad, some elites in China are

motivated to embrace the Beijing Consensus to pacify the claims of Chinas inevitable pathway

toward democratization, similar to South Korea, Japan and most controversially, its breakaway

province Taiwan. Moreover, the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis during 19971998 spurred

50 Cho & Jeong 2008: pg. 463


27/65

Tsoi, Samuel

26

severe criticisms over the East Asian stateled capitalism model. It is the Chinese governments

interest to drum up the adaptability of Chinas development model to preempt the claims that

Chinas trajectory is unsustainable.

On the other hand, as Beijing amasses hard power based on the current political

arrangement, the collateral damage in society such as the crushing of dissidents is increasingly

recognized by the grassroots, especially proliferated via the internet despite heavy censorship. A

growing number of grievances against corruption of local officials, jailing of wellknown activists

and publicinterest lawyers, and censorship of politicallysensitive topics are reaching a boiling

point. There is even a debate within the political elite that is challenging the notion of a unified

consent of oneparty dominance. Shortly after the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the first

ever Chinese recipient, Liu Xiaobo, who was already jailed by the government, a rare show of

defiance erupted in the public dialog. Twentythree former senior officials with reformist

reputations signed an open letter shaming the Partys suppression of dissent and fierce censorship

as disrespect to the Chinese Constitution and the freedom of speech. 51 In this context of substantial

discontent, the Confucian ideal of attraction via moral authority and political leadership has mixed

results internally, although as we will see, yet continues to attracts some societies and governments

abroad.

Still, there are some who believe in Chinas potential as a great power by exemplar. This

ideal, inspired by ancient Chinese thought, is promoted by the influential scholar, Yan Xuetong of

Tsinghua University. Yan, also a wellregarded political commentator in China and the West, argues

that political leadership is the key to national power and that morality is an essential part of

political leadership. 52 Drawing from groundbreaking research on Chinese philosophy of ancient

thinkers such as Mencius, Confucius and Sun Tzu, Yan believes that while economic and military

power is what makes a nation strong, dominance is achieved mainly by morallyinformed political

51 Barr 2011, pg. 1452 Yan 2010: pg. 2


28/65

Tsoi, Samuel

27

leadership. The selfproclaimed realist combines the Chinese emphasis on morality in political

leadership over institutional virtues or ideological tenets. Echoing Confucius and Sun Tzu, Yan

argues that humane authority (as opposed to hegemony or tyranny) begins by creating a desirable

model at home that inspires people abroad. 53 He does not spell out whether China should

democratize, but urges both China and the U.S. to exercise moral leadership in addressing

materialism, inequality and corruption. Instead of competing with the U.S. on economic or military

terms, where Yan acknowledges China is far behind on, he believes China can be competitive with

the U.S. on moral leadership. Essentially, this contest is a race to the top, but only with one winner

of humanitys hearts and minds that can exhibit the highest quality of human authority. Again, Yan

does not favor democracy or autocratic systems, but stresses that leaders should be chosen

according to virtue or wisdom. This is a serious challenge for any system, but Yan also does not

dismiss democracy as unChinese.

As revealed through the analysis of Chinese classics, democracy is not categorically

discredited, but neither is it a core virtue. The legitimacy of the governing elite, whether they are

elected via a oneman onevote system, or a selection process by a few, still depends on the

relationship between rulers and the ruled marked by mutual commitment and trust. 54 Political

authority, therefore, must be justified by its service to the wellbeing of people. Chinese governance

ideals, as seen through ancient lenses, does not address the relationship between the individual and

public institutions such as government and democracy, but it makes a very important distinction

apart from Western notion of rights. The recruitment of leaders, whether through grassroots

election or topdown selection, must recruit the most virtuous people, something China, the U.S.

and virtually every nation will be competing for a long time.

53 Yan 2011 54 Chan J. 2007


29/65


30/65

Tsoi, Samuel

29

positive views of China are Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt, Ghana and Pakistan. The United States was

among those with mostly negative views toward China while some in Europe, Asia and Latin

America had mixed views.

Figure 4: 2010 BBC Poll: Global Views

Anecdotally, some leaders in other countries are taking actions akin to Chinas, while others

have praised or criticized the China Model. Russian President Putin seems to be following the

Chinese path by censoring journalists, harassing activists and undermining democracy while giving

the state increased power over key industries. Other former Soviet republics, such as Kazakhstan,

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, are inspired by China, and increasingly rejecting economic

developing ideas from the World Bank and IMF. 56 This affinity toward the China Model by some of

its most immediate neighbors has shaped a favorable condition for China to lead a multilateral

56 French, New York Times, 3/24/2004


31/65

Tsoi, Samuel

30

organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, one of the few in Asia without significant US

participation, a trend to be examined in section on foreign policy.

The China Model has its appeal as well in South Asia. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan

Singh said that India should look to China as a role model for economic growth and global trade. 57

Further overseas, policymakers in Latin America are also captivated by the China Model. Former

Brazilian President Lula da Silva sent study teams to Beijing to learn from the Chinese states

implementation of economic policies, urban planning and infrastructure projects. In Africa,

authoritarian leaders seek to maintain their control through market mechanisms to alleviate

poverty. 58

In the Middle East, the Chinese model has been embraced by Iranian leaders, even

becoming one of the main themes of a major candidate, former president Akbar Hashemi

Rafsanjani, in the 2005 presidential elections. Even North Korea has cautiously adopted certain

reforms of China, one of its few allies. In 2002, Kim Jongil introduced limited marketstyle

incentives into its planned economy that allowed export processing zones at its borders. Perhaps

one of the most evident cases of the attractiveness of the China Model is located across the PRCs

southeastern borders. Laos and Vietnam are full adopting the Beijing Consensus. While Laos

moves toward the Chinese model of marketbased authoritarianism, Vietnam insists on placing

stability before political reform after its adoption of Chinesestyle economic reform.

There is evidence that the China Model, although not unique, is attractive enough to be

considered an alternative for many developing countries, as captured in global opinion polls and a

cursory look at policy decisions of nations that have implicitly or explicitly credited the China Model

as an inspiration. Of course, opinion polls and the anecdotes are also influenced by soft and hard

power variables such as cultural exports, educational exchanges, military assistance or business

ties. It is also dependent on critical variables such as the other countrys political system or

57 India Daily 1/23/200558 McLaughlin & Truscott 2005


32/65

Tsoi, Samuel

31

relationship with the West. The neteffect of the attraction force of the China Model is difficult to

capture, and it is at best positively distributed in certain regions, with predictable repulsions

elsewhere. Joseph Nye, for example, recently contended that China is weak on soft power, mainly

calling out its insecurities about Western cultural hegemony, dismissing its attraction in autocratic

or corrupt states as well as pointing to Chinas stranglehold on its civil society as the biggest

liability. 59 The China Model has obvious admirable components, and they are garnering support

and business deals from places where Americas standing is negative, which in turn fuels Chinas

economic engine. However, this set of influences are increasingly being undermined or

overshadowed by deficits and internal contradictions of the China Model. The Chinese leadership

understands the sustainability of the China Model and that the soft power assets it gained are

hanging in the balance. Moral authority and political leadership will depend on how the Party

restructures its monopoly on power and begin to let civil society create or convert those assets into

persuasive influence, much akin to the US social movements and culture that generate global

admiration and imitation despite all of its flaws and contradictions in its polity.

Director Confucius: Culture, Education and Public Diplomacy

"Culture has become a more and more important source of national cohesion and creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in overall national strengthWe must enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the people's basic cultural rights and interests.

President Hu Jintao at the 16th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee

As we see in the soft power assessment of Chinas governance, the mixed results show theneed for Beijing to justify the China Model via cultural values, pacify fears foreign countries have of

China, or to utilize culture to compensate for the deficits of its inherent system and build new

sources. Since culture is at the core of Chinese conception of soft power, public diplomacy becomes

59 Nye 2012


33/65

a major

Public di

opinion i

pursue t

and desc

force, dip

other no

as well a

illustrate

Figure

Govt

Societ

T

another

exhibitin

driving, c

publicity

involved

diploma 60 Kurlant61 Nye 20

art of its gr

lomacy, acc

other nati

eir national

ibes public

lomacy and

state actor

NGOsociet

d in the ba

5: Two Mod

Cabinet

IOs/non

A

he logic of p

ountry will

g the soft po

ontrolling a

culture, an

the govern

y efforts an zick 2005: p11: pg. 102

nd strategy

ording to on

ns; by culti

interests. 60

diplomacy a

communicat

s, and a glob

y communic

versus star

ls of Diplo

Diplomacy

state actors

S

blic diplom

ressure the

wer of the s

d facilitatin

education.

ent is in dri

learning th . 61

to build soft

e accepted

ating this p

Joseph Nye

a key comp

ions. Nye al

al informati

ations beyo

diagram. (

acy 61

ovt B

ociety B

acy is that

ir governm

urce countr

g these exch

This presen

ing culture.

ways of gl

power asset

efinition, is

blic opinio

sees this as

onent of an

so describe

nal age faci

d the gover

igure 5)

hen a count

nt to act in t

y. For Chin

anges acros

s both soft

On one ha

bal commu

s and conve

he cultivat

abroad, sta

onverting s

nations gr

power as e

itate societ

ment to go

IO

Gov

Soci

rys culture i

he interests

, the state st

societies t

ower asset

d, China is p

ications. O

t them into

on by gover

es can mor

oft power as

nd strategy

ermore diff

tosociety

ernment di

Public Dip

/NGOs/non

A

ety A

s appealing,

of the popul

ill plays a ce

rough the d

and liabiliti

ouring fund i

the other h

Tsoi, S

useful tools.

nments of p

effectively

sets into act

that include

sed among

ommunicati

lomacy, as

lomacy

state actors

Gov

Societ

citizens of

ar nation,

ntral role in

partments

es in how

ng into publ

and, it is als

amuel

32

blic

ons,

s

ons

B

B

f

ic


34/65

Tsoi, Samuel

33

ultrasensitive about the message it wants to send, which sometimes backfires and stifles the soft

power potential of selfcriticism, civil society and ordinary citizens.

The very concept of public diplomacy has only been recently embraced by the Chinese

government from what was known as wai xuan ( ), or external propaganda. Chinas Publicity

Department, known throughout the Cold War as the Propaganda Department, seeks five main

objectives: publicizing Chinas assertions to the outside world, forming a desirable image of the

state, issuing rebuttals to distorted overseas reports about China, improving the international

environment surrounding China, and exerting influence on the policy decisions of foreign countries.

To promote Chinese culture, the PRC also facilitated cultural exchanges, especially in the

developing world. Chinese officials are pulling out the red carpet for officials from across the world,

and hosting events to gather people from other walks of life to best understand the inner workings

of each others countries. Thailand provides an example of this public diplomatic strategy. China has

illustrated its understanding of Thailand by inviting artists, educators, businessmen from Thai

society to China to foster continual relationships. Beijing has created its version of the Peace Corps,

known as the China Association of Youth Volunteers, sending these young ambassadors to places

such as Laos, Ethiopia, Burma, and many others to spread the attraction of the Chinese culture. 62

Educational Exchanges

China has been aggressive in promoting the study of Chinese all over the world. With an

annual budget of $200 million, the China National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign

Language commonly known as Hanban ( ) has launched a languagepromotion network to

dramatically increase the number of foreigners studying Chinese.

62 Kurlantzick 2007: pg. 8


35/65

Tsoi, Samuel

34

The centerpiece of spreading culture through education is the proliferation of Confucius

Institutes. Departing from its predecessor, the Confucius Foundation, which targets elites in other

countries, the Confucius Institutes promote Chinese language and culture at a popular level

By the end of 2010, there have been 322 Confucius Institutes and 369 Confucius Classrooms

established in 96 countries. The Confucius Institutes provide Chinese language and cultural

resources learning, although often not in conjunction to host institutions curriculum. Modeled after

the British Council, the Goethe Institute of Germany and the Alliance Francaise, the new network of

Confucius Institutes operate via a wide range of arrangements with other governments or host

universities (private or public), and has considerable amounts of financial independence after the

initial period funded by the Hanban or jointfunded with foreign agencies. Although the Institutes

have the sincere purpose of teaching Chinese language and culture, they have been accused of

implementing a political agenda. Certainly, being largely funded through the Communist Party,

these institutes are often seen as the PRCs charm offensive to present a kinder and gentler image of

China to the outside world. By teaching the Mainlands simplified characters, using Beijings

preferred accent of Mandarin Chinese and utilizing textbooks from a proBeijing perspective, rather

than the traditional Chinese characters used in Taiwan, Hong Kong or other Diaspora communities,

the institutes serve to expand the idea of one China and Beijings centrality.

Foreign student enrolment has also seen dramatic growth, with the help of strategic and

generous scholarships offered by the Chinese government, totaling $800 RMB, or $122 USD.

Students came from 194 countries came to study in China's 620 universities, research institutes

and educational institutions in China, hitting a record high of more than 260,000 in 2010 (excluding

those from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau). Over 75% of students are from Asia, with South Korea

and Japan consistently sending the most. 63 A growing number of students, though, are from

Southeast Asia, a region that accommodates the majority of overseas Chinese and has a centuries

63 The China Daily 3/4/2011


36/65

Tsoi, Samuel

35

old history of Chineselanguage education. Students from Vietnam, for example, have increased

dramatically. While a major influx of international students in China is driven by the countrys

booming economy, this dramatic growth in foreign enrolments also reflects Chinas role as the

cultural epicenter of Asia. According to the Ministry of Education, over threequarters of foreign

students went to China to study academic disciplines of general cultural concern (Chinese language,

arts, history, philosophy and traditional Chinese medicine). 64

It is too early to gauge the influence of this academic training on future generations of

foreign elites, but their experience in China will likely open their minds to Chinese worldviews and

interests, just as US universities have trained countless foreign heads of state and are still the

preferred destination for children of foreign dignitaries, especially in academic prestigeobsessed

China. As of 2005, there were 30 former international students in China who now hold minister

level positions in their home countries, with more than 10 serving as ambassadors to China. In

addition, more than 120 are senior faculty members at universities in their home countries. While

those who enter officialdom are expected to have a better understanding of Chinese interests,

senior scholars are more likely to nurture the interest of their students in China. 65

The Hanban has in the past years launched relentless campaigns to propagate its great

achievements in reaching out to the world through cultural exchanges. It has been claimed that

through its Confucius Institutes and partnership with foreign universities, over one million people

are learning Chinese; in many Asian countries, Chinese has become the second largest foreign

language next to English. An internetbased Confucius Institute has also launched recently, and the

Hanban is dispatching a delegation of highprofile academics to tour the world giving lectures about

Chinese culture.

64 Gill & Huang 2006: pg. 1865 Nye2004: pg. 15


37/65

Tsoi, Samuel

36

Media & Broadcasting

One of the charges of Western cultural intrusion in China was the Voice of America radio

station, upsetting many officials that procapitalist and proAmerican agendas are being pushed

through the airwaves. In the backdrop of that suspicion, the Chinese are now launching their own

newsmedia and broadcasting campaign to compete with the likes of CNN, BBC and Al Jazeera. The

government is investing in this media system to spread the Chinese culture and points of view in an

interconnected world. Starting with the Xinhua news agency, which provides newsfeeds to multiple

print, online and broadcast outlets, the stateowned outfit has expanded its international coverage.

The Peoples Daily also prints overseas editions in multiple languages, and the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs has expanded and made the appeal of Chinese state television CCTV more sophisticated, and

China Radio International has increased its broadcasting in English to 24 hours a day. This media

diplomacy apparatus, although wellfunded, will face challenges in winning significant audiences

abroad because of strict government restrictions. For those who are tuning in, Chinese media has

been useful for the PRC government to introduce Chinese development and policies to the world,

and explain to others the China Model of modernization and its claims of a peaceful rise. It is also

valuable in helping introduce new audiences to the virtues of Chinese civilization. Perhaps the most

daunting challenge for Chinese medias global ambitions, which also speaks to its vulnerabilities

and liabilities, is that the message is hard to sell even when there is an army of messengers. Being

in a competitive environment, with other nations engaging in the same effort to control narratives,

any negative events in China will also be magnified via outlets outside of Chinese control.

Moreover, China faces an Englishdominated framework and discourse that focuses more on

controversies and less on longterm achievements. Leading up to the 2008 Olympics, the torch relay

that attracted proTibet protestors, activists for Darfur and others was widely covered in the

Western press, which galvanized a call for boycotting the games hosted in Beijing. Similarly,

coverage of Chinas engagement with the notorious regime of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe also


38/65

Tsoi, Samuel

37

generated significant foreign criticism. The latest attention over the Communist Partys political in

fighting that resulted in a purging of a top official, Bo Xilai, and the escape of the muchrespected

activist Chen Guangcheng shows Chinas inability to control global public opinion. 66

Art, Architecture and Cinema

As with news broadcasts, the Chinese posture in using media to primarily promote a

positive image and protect the Partys interests. It tries to balance both the ambition to create high

quality productions and the necessity to control the message. In cinema, Chinese language films

have achieved prominence and recognition abroad. However, successful films abroad often do not

translate to success at home, or even acceptance. Many prominent filmmakers have either

produced films that were censored at home but praised abroad, or have been collaborating with

artists outside of China. Chinese films, especially those depicting ancient China, have opened up

Chinese culture to a broad base of audiences, most notably the success of Crouching Tiger, Hidden

Dragon , which is the highest grossing nonEnglish film. However, the film presented a telling lens

into the soft power dilemmas of China. The film was directed by Ang Lee from Taiwan, with actors

and producers from Hong Kong, and has a perfect blend of martial arts theatrics, ancient civilization

and noncontroversial narrative. Besides that blockbuster success, there were many art house hits

with hardhitting portrayals of social issues that were immediately censored (but available in the

domestic underground market) and often recognized in foreign film festivals. Meanwhile, many

filmmakers are pushing the boundary by creating films that have hidden political meaning but

circumvent censors. Examples include Zhang Yimou, who directed criticallyacclaimed films that

were censored, but also was invited to direct the Olympics opening ceremonies.

The structure that enclosed the ceremonies, dubbed the Birds Nest, was codesigned by

Ai Weiwei, by far Chinas most famous and vivacious artist. Ai also produces edgy photographs,

66 Beech 2012


39/65


40/65

Tsoi, Samuel

39

to 10 scale (Americans rate it at a mean score of 4.6, Japanese at 5.1, South Koreans at 4.8,

Indonesians at 6.5, and Vietnamese at 7.6). Another measure by the Institute of Government in the

U.K. shows that Chinas investment in cultural and public diplomacy has positive returns, albeit

relatively lags behind Japan and U.S. This study aggregates the final score (2 highest, 0 lowest)

based on a range of indicators such as number of tourists, sporting success in world competitions,

number of listeners of statesponsored media and the number of speakers of its language. The

study finds Chinas recent soft power campaign correlates with an uptick of cultural influence.

Figure 7: Net Index of Soft Power ResultsThe New Persuaders, Institute of Government/Monocle, 2010

Diplomat Confucius: Multilateralism and Foreign Aid

Six hundred years ago, Zheng He, a famed Chinese navigator of the Ming Dynasty, headed a large convoy which sailed across the ocean and reached the east coast of Africa four times. They brought to the African people a message of peace and goodwill, not swords, guns, plunder or slavery. For more than one hundred years in Chinas modern history, the Chinese people were subjected to colonial aggression and oppression by foreign powers and went through similar suffering and agony that the majority of African countries endured.

President Hu Jintao, University of Pretoria, South Africa, 2007

As China continues to drum up the notion of harmonious society as the ideal in domestic

affairs, peaceful rise or peaceful development has become the catchall mantra for Chinas

foreign policy, the opposite face of the same national interest coin. Together, the projection of

virtues of harmony and peace are what characterizes Chinas soft power strategy. However, Chinas


41/65

Tsoi, Samuel

40

direct diplomatic engagement with the world is by far the most deliberate and controversial use of

soft power, which often muddles with hard power assets such as economic inducement instead of

cooptation and ideational influence. Similarly, the upward spending of Chinas military and its

permanent seat on the UN Security Council have also complicates how difficult it is to disaggregate

influence based on hard or soft power when it comes to Chinas foreign policies.

Overall, consistent with the classical Chinese notion of power, foreign policies can

contribute to soft power when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority, and when

they enhance the ability to set agendas in a manner that is conducive to solving the worlds most

pressing problems. Under Mao Zedong, Chinese foreign policy was often framed in controversial

and unappealing terms in an attempt to export revolution to the Third World, it also sees itself as a

victim of Western imperialism and an agent to overturn Western dominance. In fact, much of the

affinity toward China, especially in parts of Africa and Latin America, was based on the post

colonial notion of Third World solidarity, of which many see China as an ideological beacon. This

radical foreign policy culminated in the 1960s, when Red Guards burned down the British Embassy

and humiliated Soviet diplomats in Beijing, while many of Chinas Asian neighbors brutally crushed

Beijingsupported movements. Such radicalized foreign policy confirmed the image of an

ideologically threatening China. This foreign policy radic

Date post:	04-Jun-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	marcel-henri-proust-bergson
View:	223 times
Download:	0 times

Confucius Goes Global Samuel Tsoi UMB IRMastersCapstone May2012

Documents