Urban Reform Project
www.thewarrencentre.org.au
CONNECTIVITY CASE STUDY
Lessons from the Connectivity Case Studies
“Australia will need to pull every lever – new funding mechanisms, new technology, and new deliverymechanisms – to get anywhere near reaching its future infrastructure targets...” ~ CEDA 20 JULY 2010
SUCCESSFULLY DELIVERING RESILIENT INFRASTRUCTURELessons for Australia
All projects require extensive inter-government and inter-agency cooperation and strong political leadership.Successful projects show strong and highly visible government leadership assisted by a professional and independent publicservice, free from short term political interference. Both the M7 and the SEQ case studies demonstrate the importance andeffectiveness of strong leadership & inter-governmental cooperation.
A long term vision and commitment, focussed on outcomes not outputs, is essential. The project's objectives must be clearly understood and articulated.
A clearly communicated shared vision for the future, supported by strong and independent advice in policy formulation isessential. Vision and policy need to address change over the life of the project with bipartisan support. Unclear objectivesand lack of vision have impeded both the High Speed Rail and Greater Sydney Airport projects.
The project must be part of a strategic plan which incorporates land use and community requirements, and recognises their importance in shaping sustainable communities and the economy.
Integrated planning, effective funding frameworks, detailed project briefs and alignment with project deliverables, quality data andspecial skills are essential. But strategic planning should be responsive to changes in demand, context, technology and standardsover the life of the project. Regional Rail, M7 and SEQ all have a strong strategic planning base and have had a significant impacton the future.
Continuous and extensive community and stakeholder consultation is required as well as the flexibility to modify the projectin response to submissions.
Successful projects are characterised by genuine consultation which incorporates appropriate information to ensure informeddebate, as demonstrated by the M7.
Most major projects are long term and multi-jurisdictional, so the policy and regulatory framework needs to be established at an early stage and be able to adjust to changing circumstances.
SEQ has shown the benefits of establishing long term plans which provide for regular reviews and updates. The GreaterSydney Airport and High Speed Rail have both suffered from the absence of an adequate policy and regulatory framework.
Alternative procurement processes should be widely considered and, once decided, be adaptable. The M7, SEQ and Regional Rail all have used a variety of procurement and funding mechanisms. Whilst the SEQ debt fundingwas criticised, its use has created economic wealth and delivered economic infrastructure which will benefit future generations,replacing the legacy that our current generation has enjoyed.
ConnectivitySuccessful cities effectively connect people, jobs, goodsand services.
Five infrastructure case studies emphasising CONNECTIVITY havebeen assessed by teams of experts in planning, engineering andfinance. The case studies included:• Two major proposals as yet unrealised – a Greater Sydney Airport
and a High Speed Rail service connecting the major eastern cities• Two regional infrastructure initiatives – the Regional Rail Plan in
Victoria and the South East Queensland (SEQ) Regional Plan• The completed WestLink (M7) Motorway project in Sydney's west.
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GREATER SYDNEY AIRPORT HIGH SPEED RAILWHAT WE NEED
GOVERNANCE• Strong and visible leadership• Robust local government• A strong Public Service
FAILLack of agreement and coordination continuesto undermine the project. Responding to the recent joint study on aviation capacity the Commonwealth and State Governments reaffirmed their oppositionto Badgery's Creek, notwithstanding that it was clearly recommended in the report andthat the report's steering committee includedthe Heads of the Governments’ transport and infrastructure departments.
FAILAustralia's HSR initiatives have lacked thestrong national sponsorship & bi-partisan leadership that has been at the fore on successful infrastructure projects. Federal & State engagement has been sporadic and there has beenan overwhelming lack of commitmentto the project, including unrealisticexpectations as to private sectorparticipation.
VISION AND POLICY• A shared vision for the future• Strong and independent advice in
policy formulation• Empowered delivery of the vision
FAILThere is no shared vision. The two governmentsare at loggerheads, with the Commonwealthsupporting a second major airport in the SydneyBasin at Wilton and the NSW Governmentopposing a second airport in the Sydney Basin.The two governments have disagreed withthe most recent Independent Study, the latestin a 50 year history of studies, debate andindecision.The recent Infrastructure NSW report supportsthe retention of land already acquired for theBadgery's Creek site.
FAILHSR projects are highly transformational innature and must be founded on a broader visionthat conveys a credible longer term picture ofpopulation settlement priorities and the role ofHSR to that end. HSR evaluation must “rise above” more narrowlydefined “value for money”, “whole of life”, discounted cost benefit analysis etc.As local studies have shown, benefits of HSRare primarily strategic (social, regional & macro-economic) and not readily quantifiable in theabove terms.
STRATEGIC PLANNING• Integrated planning• Effective funding frameworks• Detailed project briefs• Quality data• Early engagement of expertise & skills
FAILThe March 2012 study has clearly identified a long term need for a second Sydney airport. It will be a key land use driver in the metropolitan / regional context. Its planning must acknowledge and becompatible with the strategic planningdirection for the metropolitan region, butalso will itself ultimately shape land useand infrastructure.A second Sydney airport has not been considered in the NSW Government 2012Long Term Transport Master Plan.
FAILHSR planning must be technically rigorous,highly developed (based on route specific EIS)and well-reasoned to “win” the requisite support.Lack of integration with regional plans inMelbourne, Canberra and Sydney is a majorfailure, and opportunities for the project tobe a catalyst for regional growth have notbeen realised.Efforts to date have overlooked secondSydney Airport integration, have not producedcredible demand forecasts and have beenunrealistic as to the level of government financial support required.
IMPLEMENTATION AT REGIONAL,PRECINCT AND PROJECT SCALES• Empowerment to deliver• Coordinated and integrated management• Project certainty with realistic
long term funding• Appropriate project assessment and
approvals process• Measurement of the implementation
against the vision and the plan
FAILIn 1995 work commenced on securing theBadgery's Creek site following a $600 millionbudget allocation for land acquisition, planningand construction.Over the next decade the Howard, Rudd,NSW and Local Governments all progressively rejected Badgery's Creek. For the airport to proceed it must beaccepted as a national project and beimplemented through a single authoritymanaged jointly by Federal, State andLocal Governments.
FAILIn the absence of a National Transport Plan, the lack of a broader HSR mandate has meantproject leadership has been powerless & weak.There has been no “champion of influence” to galvanise opinion and to keep shorterterm political / sectorial distractions at bay.Funding has never been realistically addressed.As a result, the project suffers from a high levelof public & business scepticism.
STALLED STALLED
Project Timelines
Urban Reform Project: CONNECTIVITY CASE STUDY
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VICTORIAN REGIONAL RAIL LINK SOUTH EAST QLD ROAD & RAILSYDNEY M7 WESTLINK
IN PROGRESS IN PROGRESSBUILT
DISTINCTIONNotwithstanding the complicated relationshipsbetween Federal and State Governments, thesuccess of the M7 Motorway shows the greatbenefits that result when governments and the community work together. There was multi-government and multi-agency involvement including jointCommonwealth / State and multi-agencyreview panels and steering committees, as well as extensive stakeholder communication and consultation.
DISTINCTIONStrong leadership from the State Governmentwith Federal Government support has led to theproject being conceived and implemented over a very short period of four years.
This is a rare example of collaborativesuccess at this level of government.Counterbalancing this are the criticisms from the local affected communities and some interest groups.
DISTINCTIONIn response to ongoing strong populationgrowth in South East Queensland, the State Government along with the support of LocalGovernments, prepared a regional frameworkfor growth management culminating in the2005 SEQ Regional Plan and the supportingSouth East Queensland Infrastructure Planand Program (SEQIPP).Importantly, there has been a long termcommitment to delivery with $22.2 billion inprojects delivered or under construction sinceit was first launched.
DISTINCTIONThe importance of a major route through western Sydney was recognised early and the visionary step was to create the M7 out of the plans for the National Highway and the Sydney Orbital Network. Significant sections of the route were identified and corridors were resumed aspart of the County of Cumberland Plan inthe 1950s.These initiatives demonstrate the long termvision and consistent planning which laid thegroundwork for the project's success.
DISTINCTIONThe project was included in the 2008 VictorianTransport Plan and formed part of a wider strategy that delivered a transport vision for the long term. Federal funding of $3.4 billion in May 2009 was the key success factor in getting the project going. Despite significantly increased costs and anextended construction programme, the projectsurvived a change in State Government in 2010and continues to have the support of the new State Government.
DISTINCTIONA major strength has been the clarity ofthe vision for South East Queensland.The plan strives to provide for “a region ofinterconnected communities, with excellentaccessibility and an extensive and efficientpublic transport system to assist in reducinggreenhouse gas emissions”.
CREDITConceptual planning over several decadesintegrated with broader metro strategies weresuccess drivers here. The community was consulted earlyand continuously, leading to a numberof changes to the original concepts that took into account patterns of urban andcommercial development, particularlyindustrial and employment zones.It provided the catalyst for major employmentgrowth in western Sydney. One negative wasthat the road alignment did not make provisionfor a future orbital railway.
PASSAs a project ready to proceed that formed partof a clear strategy, it became a reality at thetime the Federal Government wanted tostimulate the economy following the GlobalFinancial Crisis. At commencement in Aug 2009, this wassomewhat ill-defined and still needed toaddress a number of important communityconcerns, technical challenges andregulatory hurdles. In addressing these, the project's originalbudget and construction programme hadto change.
DISTINCTIONThe SEQ planning process has demonstratedthe power and importance of both continuousreview and commitment, clearly displaying thesignificance and success of integrated land useand infrastructure planning. The 2005 SEQ Regional Plan had its genesisin the SEQ2001 planning process beginningin 1990, and provided a coordinatedapproach to managing growth.The first SEQIPP was prepared in conjunctionwith the Regional Plan in 2005, and has beenupdated annually to align with revised planningand budget commitments.
DISTINCTIONWith insufficient government funding, the M7 was procured as a BOOT PPP with a comprehensive and detailed procurementprocess.The project had a sound business case as acommercially viable toll road with equitabledistance tolling being used for the first time.It has delivered high benefits to road userswith significant travel time and distancesavings. The M7 has been recognised both by the Federal Government and the privatesector as an example of best practice.
DISTINCTIONNotwithstanding some local community andpolitical opposition, the project has continued to progress under the control of the VictorianDepartment of Transport with all constructioncontracts now let. The necessary environmental andconstruction approvals have beenforthcoming with strong support fromthe State and Federal Governments.
PASSSEQIPP addresses all infrastructure needsincluding transport, health, education, energy,water and community services, and clearlyoutlines a program of infrastructure prioritiesdeliverable now and in the longer term.Since 2005, 119 projects have beencompleted, 152 projects are currentlyunderway and a further 128 projects areplanned between now and 2031.However, due to the level of debt and changedgovernment policy, the future of the plan andthe rate of delivery is under a cloud.
CASE STUDY SNAPSHOTSGreater Sydney AirportAn expansion of Sydney Airport has been proposed since 1946. Since then there have been numerous studies and manysites have been investigated. However, the project has not progressed beyond an allocation of land at Badgerys Creek in Sydney's southwest. This site is no longer supported by the Federal or State Governments despite it being favoured in the most recent Study released in 2012. The Federal Government is continuing its studies without StateGovernment support. The project is stalled, lacking a championand a common vision, and cooperation between Federal, Stateand Local Government bodies.
High Speed RailFive proposals have been put forward since 1984 for a highspeed rail service in the southeast of Australia. Advocates haveidentified the benefits of high speed rail in developing dormitorytowns, as well as being an alternative to air travel betweencity centres.To date, none of these proposals have gained full support fromthe Federal and State Governments or have been economicallyviable for the private sector to invest in. The project lackspolitical leadership and a strategic vision, such as integratingthe project with a Greater Sydney Airport.
Regional Rail Link, VictoriaThe Regional Rail Link project provides a new route for the westernregional rail services into Melbourne, thus separating them fromexisting metropolitan lines and significantly improving the efficiencyof all routes. A key element of the 2009 Transport Plan, it will also lay the foundations for the future expansion of the rail network.The project was conceived before the Victorian Governmentsought public comment on an expansion of urban growth andon related transport projects in 2008, but this was the catalystfor developing details sufficient for it to become a joint Federaland State funded project in 2009.
South East Queensland Roads and RailFollowing substantial growth in south east Queensland, a regionalplan (SEQ 2005) was developed based on numerous specialistinvestigations and reports that provided a coordinated approachto managing future growth.Uniquely for the time, the first SEQ Infrastructure Plan andProgram was prepared in conjunction with the Regional Plan in 2005. The plan has been updated annually since then toalign with revised planning and budget commitmentsThis approach was supported by Local and State Governments,providing clarity of vision and resulting in the successful deliveryof many urban infrastructure projects over the past six years.
Sydney M7 WestLinkThe M7 is a major expressway linking a number of Sydneyroads to create the Western Sydney Orbital. The 40km four-laneexpressway, opened in December 2005, involved the investmentof $2.23 billion of private funds into public infrastructure, andincludes a separated 40km cycleway and walking track.Elements of the project were identified in the 1950s and plansevolved over subsequent decades, with a number of governmentsand agencies involved. The project received strong cooperativegovernment leadership and extensive direct community consultation was maintained throughout the project.The project has been recognised both by the Federal Governmentand the private sector as an example of best practice.
THE WARREN CENTREURBAN REFORM PROJECT
The 2011 Handbook for Reform examined good infrastructure decision making and identified a number of key drivers which were required for
successful infrastructure outcomes. ThisConnectivity Study has tested these factors
against a range of Transport Projects and demonstrated that strength in good GOVERNANCE
not political expediency, VISION AND POLICYwith commitment, long term and integrated
STRATEGIC PLANNING, and IMPLEMENTATION withauthority, were essential for success.
AN AGENDA FOR REFORMAn agenda was developed through an industry wide consultationwhich identified a number of “drivers for change” under theheadings of: GOVERNANCE; VISION & POLICY; STRATEGICPLANNING and IMPLEMENTATION.
THE FRAMEWORK FOR REFORMThe framework for reform will provide the principle elementsrequired to deliver successful infrastructure outcomes. These elements were identified in the Handbook for Reform and thentested through a series of studies examining the processes anddrivers for change in the implementation of projects. The studieswill cover the following key areas of urban thought:• CONNECTIVITY
Major intercity transport and freight• PLANNING FOR GROWTH
Reviewing past planning strategies to identify lessonsfor the future
• RESILIENCEThe capacity of urban systems to respond to impacts
• UTILITIES & ESSENTIAL SERVICESEnergy, water and waste management are all critical servicesaround which major infrastructure plays a vital role
• OTHER CASE STUDIESThe Warren Centre will continue to explore case studies in a sequence of investigations and publications so as to providegreater insight into successful infrastructure strategies.
Urban Reform Project: CONNECTIVITY CASE STUDY
The Warren Centre for Advanced Engineering LtdEngineering Link Building, J13 UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY NSW 2006 • Telephone: (02) 9351 3752 • Facsimile: (02) 9351 2012
Email: [email protected] • Internet: www.thewarrencentre.org.au • ABN: 27 132 821 688Established within the Faculty of Engineering in 1983 to mark 100 years of engineering education at The University of Sydney
For more information about the connectivity case studies and the Urban Reform Project please visit
http://thewarrencentre.org.au/urbanreform/
PLANNINGFOR GROWTH RESILIENCE UTILITIES:
ENERGY, WATER,...CONNECTIVITY OTHER
CASE STUDIES
VISION & POLICYGOVERNANCE
IMPLEMENTATIONSTRATEGIC PLANNING
PROGRAM OF ENGAGEMENT
DEMONSTRATING THE ESSENTIAL SUCCESS FACTORS