Conolonial Land Divison in Swaziland

8/7/2019 Conolonial Land Divison in Swaziland

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The Colonial Division of Space: The Significance of the Swaziland Land Partition

Author(s): Jonathan CrushSource: The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1980), pp. 71-86Published by: Boston University African Studies CenterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/218373

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THE COLONIAL DIVISION OF SPACE:THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SWAZILANDLAND PARTITIONJonathan Crush

The questionof land alienationin the settlerstate has recentlyexperienced omething f aresurgence f interestamong tudentsofthe Africanpast. While some are contentwith the orthodoxyofconventionalhistoricalanalytical frameworks,others seek newinsightswithinpoliticaleconomyparadigms.1 he latterapproachandits attendant onceptual ormulations as not, as yet, diffusedsufficiently o shednewlighton the Swazilandcase.2Notwithstandingheuniversality f landalienationn the settlerstate, the mechanismsof alienationowe much to the particularhistoricalcircumstances revailingwithineach state.A monopolyon complexityof mechanismhas over the years been repeatedlyclaimed ortheSwaziland ituation,notwithout ome ustification.3'More conventional perspectives are exemplified by A. J. Christopher,"Colonial Land

Policy inNatal,"AnnalsAssociation ofAmerican Geographers, 61,3 (1971), 560-575; andB. Pachai, "Land Policies in Malawi: An Examination of the Colonial Legacy," Journal ofAfrica History, 14 (1973), 681-698. Challenges to conventional wisdom are issued inH. Slater, "The Changing Pattern of Economic Relations in Rural Natal, 1838-1914,"I.C.S. SeminarSeries, Vol. 3 (London, 1972), 38-52; E. Friedland, "The Political Economyof Colonialism in South Africa and Mogambique," Journal of Southern African Affairs, 2(1977), 61-76; and R. Palmer and N. Parsons, eds., TheRoots of Rural Poverty in Centraland Southern Africa (Berkeley, 1977).2Works on Swaziland which clearly reveal some of the ideological shortcomings oforthodoxy include P. Scott, "Land Policy and the Native Population in Swaziland,"Geographical Journal, 17 (1951); G. W. Whittington and J. B. M. Daniel, "Problems ofLand Tenure and Ownership in Swaziland," in G. W. Whittington and M. F. Thomas, eds.,Environment and Land Use in Africa (London 1969), 447-461; and A. C. G. Best,"Development of CommercialAgriculturein Swaziland, 1946-63," Papers of the MichiganAcademy of Science, Arts and Letters, 52 (1967), 269-287. A recent rejoinder s R. Palmerand N. Parsons, "Dualism Theory and Swaziland's Economic History," in Palmer andParsons, Roots of Rural Poverty, 16-20.3Most recently in J. S. M. Matsebula, History of Swaziland (Cape Town, 1976). Asuitable point for regional comparison is D. Lincoln, "The Genesis of Kwazulu," (M.A.thesis, Wilfrid LaurierUniversity, 1977).The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 13, 1 (1980) 71


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72 JONATHANCRUSHResolution of a tangled morass of spatially and functionally con-flicting land rights held by white settlers certainly called for a highdegree of dexterity on the part of the British colonial state. Swaziprotestwas skillfullymanipulated ndminimized,and,in the finalanalysis, colonial officials appearedwell satisfied that they hadresolvedan intractable roblemnajustmanner,eavingadefinitivelandpartitionas a testimony o theirresolutenessandimpartiality.4Prizingthe lid off colonial state ideology reveals a somewhatdifferentpicture.5Underlyinga guise of claimedprotectionism fthe Swazilay fundamentalommitmentso therestructuringf theindigenousmode of production, o confirmingwhite settlersandBritishcapitalin majoritycontrolover landandresources,andtopromoting he provisionof labor power for capitalistenterprisethroughaxationand hesanctioning ftenancyrelations.6Nowhereis this ideologicalglossexposedmoreeffectively hanin the imple-mentation f the Swaziland andpartitionbetween1907 and 1910.This paper constitutes a contribution o a discussion of thesignificanceof the landpartitionn Swaziland. t is argued hat anexamination f thebackgroundo thepartitionand theexplicitandimplicitprinciplesdeployed n its implementation ighlighthefactthat the superficialgeometryof the partition s historicallystruc-turedby a set of criteriadeeplyempathetico the notionsof whitesettlerandmetropolitan apitalcontroloverSwazilandandlabor.The Background o PartitionSwazilandwas isolatedfromthe mainstream f whitemigrationnsouthernAfrica, and Swazi contact with whites was generallysporadicbefore 1850.7Thereafter, apidpenetration f thecountry

4For tudiesof theSwazipolitical esponse o British ontrolandaspectsof thecolonialmodeof defusingSwaziprotest, ee B. Nyeko,"Prenationalist esistance o ColonialRule:Swaziland nthe Eve of theImpositionf BritishAdministration,"ransafricanournalofHistory,5 (1976), 66-84; F. J.Mashasha,"TheRoad o Colonialism:Concessionsand heCollapseof SwaziIndependence,875-1926,"(Ph.D.thesis,University f Oxford,1977);andC. P. You6,"ImperialLandPolicyin Swaziland nd he SwaziResponse," ournalofImperialand Commonwealthtudies,7 (1978), 56-70.5Thishasbeen achieved eryeffectivelyntheKenyan asebyE. A. Brett,Colonialismand Underdevelopmentn East Africa(London,1974); C. Leys, UnderdevelopmentnKenya (Berkeley, 975);andG.Wasserman, oliticsofDecolonization Cambridge,976).6The nature of the indigenousmode of productions reconstructedwithina classframeworkn A. Kruger,"The Myth of AfricanClasslessness,"AfricanPerspective,4(1976); and P. Bonner,"Classes,the Mode of Production ndthe State in Pre-colonialSwaziland,".C.S. SeminarSeries,Vol.8 (London,1977), 31-41.7But see P. Bonner,"Factions and Fissions:Transvaal/SwaziPolitics in the Mid-NineteenthCentury,"ournalof AfricanHistory,19(1978), 219-238.


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THE COLONIALDIVISION OF SPACEwas a function of the utilitariandesires of Boer pastoralists from theneighboringTransvaal and the profit-seekingdrive of Britishminingprospectors, traders and farmers. This two-pronged immigrationthrust was perceived by contemporary observers in the followingmanner:

For a good many years Swazilandhas been the favouritegrazingground or the Boers. In wintera numberof them with their flocksmove to the lowercountryandhavebeen allowed o squat herebythe SwazieKing.Someof themhave obtainedgrazingicensesfromtheKing.Granting f licenses hasgoneon foreightyearsbutonlyinthe last fourhavethe Boers comein anynumber.8and later,Thenewsthatgoldwas found iredmen'simaginationwiththe ideathat Swazilandwas a veritableEldorado.Thefindingof a few smallreefs and some alluvialtin sufficedto send adventurers nto thecountryin swarms and there was a constant stream of potentialconcessionaires oing o andreturningrom heRoyalKraal.9

By 1980 there were 500 permanentand over 1000 temporarywhiteresidents of the country.As the above excerpts suggest, both soughtSwazi acquiesence in their exploitation through the medium ofconcessions. Between 1885 and 1889, over 400 concessions wereobtained from the Swazi king, Mbandzeni; of these, 245 conferredsome form of agriculturalright.10Figure 1, which was constructedfrom concession-grant dates, is a surrogatefor white mobility. Thepredominance of grants to the Boers in the winter months, May toAugust, is consistent with the Boer pattern of temporaryresidenceand contrasts sharplywith the more even distribution of permanentresident acquisition. Most agriculturalconcessions contained ex-plicit, though invariably conflicting, spatial clauses.During the 1890s the Boers continued with their transhumancewhile the British faction established links with British investors toprovide capital backing for their projected mining and agriculturalundertakings. Twenty companies were floated in Britain before1894 on the basis of acquired concessions.1 Nevertheless broader

8"SpecialReporton Swaziland,"TheNatal Witness,11 May1887.9C.C. Watts,Dawn in Swaziland Witherly,1922).'?Otheroncession ights btainedncludedmining, rading,evenue ollectionanda hostof speculativemanufacturingndimportationmonopolies.The excesses of the Swazilandconcessions ra aredocumentedy contemporaryeports,ncluding . deWinton,ReportonSwaziland (Cmd. 6200, 1890); and J. Rubie, Swaziland Concessions Report (Pretoria,1903)."Corporateactivity in Swazilandduringthis periodin examined n J. S. Crush,

73


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74 JONATHAN CRUSH

0uizcrmtl:

Q

zgoUX

{3

wm.5

:>s3r.:.:B:~::~~r;?i?:::ir rr

FM A M iJ:~J A ON

MONTHS

Fig. 1: MonthlyDistribution of Concession Grants, 1884-1890political and economic uncertainties and the annexation of Swazi-land in 1894 by the South African Republic under Kruger, in theinterests of British capital in central Africa, precluded any sub-stantial inflow of foreign capital before 1900.A situation of untrammelled complexity confronted the Britishcolonial state at the outset of colonial rule in Swaziland in 1903-the spatial legacy of capitalist and settlerpenetrationof the previoustwenty-five years.'2 As Coryndon later wrote in 1909:

Practicallyhe wholecountrywas covered hreeor even fourdeepbyconcessionsof all sizes, fordifferent eriodsandforgreatlydifferingtime periods.In but few cases were even the boundariesdefined,manyof the areashad been subdivided nd seldomwere thebound-ariesof superimposedreascoterminous.13"Monopoly Control and the Imperial Response: The Case of the Swaziland CorporationLtd.," African Economic History (Fall, 1969).

'2Chargedwith the resolution of the perceived problem by the Colonial Office and byvirtue of colonial appointments were High Commissioners Milner (1903-1905) andSelborne (1905-1910) and Resident Commissioners Moony (1903-1907) and Coryndon(1907-1914). Coryndon was later heavily involved in the Rhodesian land question; seeR Palmer, Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia (Berkeley, 1977)."Swaziland, Annual Colonial Report, 1907-8, (Cmd. 448-5, 1909), 13.

1


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THECOLONIALDIVISIONOF SPACECoryndonwasundoubtedlyxaggeratinghe extentoftheconfusionfor effect, but there was certainly more than a germ of truth in hisstatement. The permanent settlers particularlywanted a settlementof conflicting rightsto facilitate the influx of metropolitancapital.14As disillusionment set in about the mining potential of the country,there was an increasingawarenessof the environmentalpotential forsettler-estate production and large-scale agricultural plantationproduction. 5Integral to the realization of profits was the perceivednecessity for a coastal rail link, the introduction of a white settlerclass, the creation of a cheap labor force, and unfettered and secureprivate ownership of land.16As a direct response, and despite virulent Swazi opposition, theBritish colonial state commissioned a general survey to delineatespatial rights and produce a single network of basal (or prior-granted)land concessions to resolve the overlap confusion.17 After aperiod of considerable vacillation, from 1904 to 1907, colonialofficials determined that partitionwas the most satisfactory meansof creating Swazi labor reserves and of according settlers directcontrol over land and Swazi labor. Partition was also openlyrecognized as being a concrete means to effect basic changes in theindigenous mode of agriculturalproduction:

By limiting he area availablefor native agriculture,and will beimprovedby the necessity for close grazingand less primitivemethodsof cultivation;... thepresentpracticeof shiftingagricultureand mpoverishinghe soil will thencease,18and as a means to provide reserves along the lines of the SouthAfrican model, pending any future transferof Swaziland to South

14In 1904 therewere890 permanentettlersnthecountry.By 1910 thisfigurehadrisento 1100. The companieswithmajor andedinterests n Swazilandwere the HendersonConsolidatedCorporationnd he SwazilandCorporation td."5Thishangenawarenesss exemplifiednseveral ontemporaryublicationsncludingSwazilandCorporation,Swaziland and the Swaziland Corporation London, 1903);SwazilandChamber f Mines,CommerceandIndustry,Swaziland,Californiaof SouthAfrica (Mbabane,1906);andA. Miller,"Swaziland:tsAgriculturalndPastoralFuture,"TransvaalAgriculturalournal,4 (1906).16See R. T. Coryndon,"Swaziland," ournal of the African Society, 14 (1914),250-265; A. Miller,TheSouthEast CoastofAfricaand Its DevelopmentLondon,1920);andA. C.G. Best,TheSwazilandRailway:A Study nPolitico-EconomicGeographyEastLansing,Mich.,1965)."See SwazilandConcessionsCommission,Reportof DetailedDecisions Relative toBoundaries,Registration f Servitudes,Periodsof Servitude nd Periodsof Employment(Pretoria,1908)."8Swaziland oncessionsCommissiono Selbome,7 July 1905, SwazilandNationalArchives S.N.A.) J 190/05.

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76 JONATHAN CRUSHAfrica.19Intense lobbying and reactive clamour by individual andcorporate settler interests presaged a state decision to partitiononethird of the land surface for reserves and retain the remainingtwothirds for settlers and the crown. This was to be effected bysubtracting one third of the area of each defined concession, andadding as much crown land as was necessary to make the area ofreserves up to one thirdof the country.20The Swazi were accordedlittle say in the policy makingof the state: "Their history has nevertaught them the futility of resistance to the unyielding decrees of aconsistent administration."'21Five alternative partition schemes were advocated and rejectedby the state between 1905 and 1907.22 The partition itself waseventually implemented by a single commissioner, George Grey,between January and December 1908.23Thirty-two reserves weredemarcated after an intensive field survey:

Armedwith districtmaps,,cut up into sheets suitablefor use onhorseback, e coveredwithouthastethe whole areaof thecountryna close examination f the character f the soil anddensityof nativepopulation.Therewerefewlargevalleysuponwhichhiseyeshadnotrested,and few dominantmountainsromthe topsof whichhe hadnot searchedout the native kraals, the cultivated land and theconcessionboundaries.The examination ausedhimto markon hismapsalmosteverykraal n the country,andhis acquaintancewitheverycomerwas so close that t no doubtenabledhimto arrange nacceptable solution.24

Figure 2 portrays these reserves with Grey's own nomenclature.This apparently haphazard patchwork, which persists with onlyminor modifications to the present, has little obvious order.25 t istherefore expedient at this stage to identify the set of procedural

'9Eventual transfer was summarily assumed although no date was ever set; Selbore toElgin, n.d., Lagden Papers, Rhodes House Library, Oxford (RH.L.) Mss Afr S 209. SeeA. R. Booth, "Lord Selbome and the British Protectorates,"Journal of African History, 10(1969), 133-148; and a rejoinder, R. Hyam, "African Interests and the South Africa Act,1908-10," Historical Journal, 13 (1970), 85-105.20HighCommissioner's Proclamation No. 28 of 1907, Article 4.

21Coryndon o Selbome, 6 May 1907, S.N.A. 45/07/640.22Fora discussion of these various schemes, see J. S. Crush, "The Spatial Impress ofCapital and the Colonial State in Swaziland, 1903-14," (M.A. thesis, Wilfrid LaurierUniversity, 1978), ch. 5.23The partition commissioner, Grey, spent sixteen years in the employ of capital incentral Africa before this, his only colonial commission. He is credited with the discovery ofthe Katanga copper mines in W. V. Brelsford, Generation of Men (Salisbury, 1965). Thepartitionwas effected by Grey in continuous consultation with both Selbore and Coryndon.24R.T. Coryndon,SomeAccount ofGeorge Greyand His Work nAfrica (London, 1914).25Persistence in the postcolonial period is described most recently in G. Maasdorp,"Modernization in Swaziland," in C. G. Knight and J. L. Newman, eds., Contemporary


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THE COLONIAL DIVISION OF SPACE

o 10o 20miles0 10 20 3' kms

Fig.2: DemarcatedSwazi Reserves, 1908criteriaon whichthe partitionwas based. We can then assess towhat extentthe partitionattemptedo lay the groundworkor theintegration f thecountry ntocapitalistmodesof production.ProceduralCriteriaThepartition riteriausedby Greywere a mixtureof principleandpraxisand were sufficiently lexibleto allow modificationas thepartitionproceeded.26he initialquestionwhichpreoccupiedGreywashowtoprovideexplicitand ndisputable oundaryines aroundAfrica: Geography and Change (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1976), 408-422. The reasons aresuggested within a political economy paradigm n I. Winter, "The Post Colonial State andtheForces andRelations of Production,"Review ofAfrican PoliticalEconomy, 9 (1978), 27-43.26This account is based on a number of sources, both official and private, but seeparticularly partition instructionsto Grey, 18 November 1907, CO 417/441, Enclosure 1.

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78 JONATHAN CRUSHreservesto mitigateblack-white riction,blacktrespasson whiteproperty,and the expense of fencingall reserves.As a solution,Grey attempted n the main to use rivers and streams as cleardemarcation ines. He commented,"Whereverpossible I haveadoptedwell definedwatersheds,watercourses r riversas bound-ariesof nativeareas;suchboundarieswillbe easily recognisedandunderstoodby natives."27Rightsto wateralonga riverwereto besharedequally.An analysisof boundaryines reveals hatof a totallengthof 1690 miles,36 percentwasperennial iver.Theremaining64 percentwas madeupof concessionboundaries ndwatersheds.

By the inclusionof landalreadybeingusedby the Swaziwithinthereserves, twas assumedbythestate hatpartitionwouldproducea situation nwhichmorethan one thirdof "fertile and"would bein the reserves.Grey afterwardsmade the auspiciousclaim that"fiftypercentof themostfertileportionsof Swazilandareinnativearea."28 othsettlerand Swazi laterclaimed hat the otherhad thebetterof the division.An analysisbasedon Murdoch'sandcapa-bilitysurveyreveals the following.29 pproximately 9 percentofthe total areaof the reserveswas comprisedof soil types rangingfrompoorto untillable.Of theremaining 1 percent,6 percentwasonslopesofgreaterhan14?; eavinga mere15percenton which hesoil andslopesmighthavebeensuitedforcrop production.On theotherhand,69 percentof allgoodsoil onslopesof less than 14?wasexpropriatedromthe Swazifor settlers.Grey's claimhas proveddifficulto substantiate nd f anything,he Swazi claim s the morejustified.In the field Grey attempted o elicit information rom Swazichiefs about he landtheyconsideredmostdesirable oragriculture,for inclusionin the reserves, as an appeasementexercise. Theresponse o Grey was uniformlynegative:"GenerallyI was givenlittle or no informationby the chiefs I visited. Usually they ex-plained hatwithout he ChiefRegent'sorders heywereunable opoint out the land they most required."30 espite a numberofattemptsby the stateto obtain hisauthorizationor thechiefsfromthe Regent,the conspiracyof silence persisted.31Grey was con-sequentlyforcedto make his own evaluationof land the Swazi

27HighCommissioner'soticeNo. 119of 1908,Grey'sOfficialReport,Section6.28Greyo Selbore, 31 December1908, S.N.A. D 09/2 andCO417/469/7.29G.Murdoch, oils andLand Capabilityn Swaziland Mbabane,1972).30Greyo Selbore, 3 May1908, S.N.A. D 09/2."Coryndon's nsuccessfulttemptso gettheregento order hechiefs o cooperatewithGreyarerecordednCO417/456/86.


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THE COLONIAL DIVISION OF SPACEconsidered desirable, since the overall design of the state was not tobe thwartedby such protest. Hence the network contains no overtexpression of land desirability by the Swazi.The partitionis also related to Grey's perception of Swaziland'sfour environmentalprovinces (the Highveld, Middleveld, Lowveld,andLebombo) which have been identified on numerous occasions insecondary texts.32As a result,

The Middleveld s the most thickly inhabiteddistrict and has agreater apacity orcarrying largenativepopulationhananyotherportionof Swaziland... While the natives appreciate he fertilemiddleveld,he concessionaires alue morethananyotherarea, hehighveldgrassfor wintergrazing.33

The Middleveld was consequently the favored zone for reservedemarcation;44 percent of the total area demarcated as reserve waslocated in the Middleveld, and only 23 percent, 28 percent and 5percent was in the Highveld, Lowveld and Lebombo respectively.The Middleveld was not the exclusive preserve of the Swazi,however, since settler interests were generally paramount and thepotential of this zone for settler-estate production was coming tolight: "In the middleveld I have succeeded in keeping out of nativeareatwo large stretches in which a considerable farmingpopulationmightfind settlement."34 n the final analysis, settlers were left with70 percentof the Highveld, 51 percentof the Middleveld, 66 percentof the Lowveld and 73 percent of the Lebombo region.Any land already under settler occupation and cultivation in1908 was automatically precludedfrom the reserves. An examina-tion of Grey's field notes reveals such comments as:

Thebest landandmuchgoodgrazings lefttothewhiteowner;... thewhite owner shouldbe well satisfiedwith his portions; he moreaccessibleare left to him. .. .the portion eft to the concessionairecontains omeof thefinestcountrynSwaziland,s well-wateredndcontainsgood agriculturaland.35Land being thus "beneficially occupied" was automatically ex-empted from the so-called "primitive agricultural technique" ofthe Swazi.

32Forexample in H. J. De Blij, "The Concept of the Physiographic Province Applied toSwaziland," Journal for Geography, 1 (1960), 7-20; and Murdoch, Soils and LandCapability.3Greyto Selborne, 1 December1908, S.N.A. D 09/2 andCO417/469/7.34Ibid.3Extracts romGrey's ieldnotes,ocated n S.N.A.D 09/2.

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80 JONATHANCRUSHThe basicnetwork f definedconcessionsundoubtedlyxerciseda pre-existent et of spatialconstraintson the possibilityforpro-

ducing consolidatedor symmetricalreserves. Grey exercised aprerogativenot to deduct a rigidone-thirdportionof every con-cession and this represents,in part, an attemptto circumventnetwork onstraints.The deductedportions, ogetherwiththesmallquantityof crown andbeingused,werearrangedo formcompactblocks wherever hese constraintspermitted."I have attemptedomake henativeareasaslargeaspossibleandatthe sametimetocutoff exactlya thirdof all landconcessions."36 he 32 reserveswereconsolidated rom the portionsof 181 concessions,thoughwithaconsiderableizerange 2,900 to 259,000 acres)andameansize of45,700 acres.The stated rationale orthe consolidationof reserves s of somesignificance o the argumenthere. Consolidationwas designed ominimizeprospective acialfriction, o preserveaggregated locksof landforunencumberedapitalistproduction,o sustaina marketvalueforsettlerproperty,andto provide he Swaziwitha degreeofmaneuverabilityn the shortterm, despitethe longer-termdesir-abilityof puttingan endto shiftingcultivation.37hus on the onehand herewasaconcern o reinforce ndpreserve heinstitution fprivateproperty,andon the other o ensure hat the massof Swaziwould not feel any immediatepsychologicaldeprivationor con-striction frights.Themystificationmplicitnthelatterpointdrawsattention,n fact,to an overridingoncernof the stateto minimizeSwazi reactiveresponseto the partition.As Selbome noted, "Iwanted to runno riskof any disturbance nrespectof thispartition."38Partition itself was from the first perceived by.the state as apotentially disruptive, though necessary, act which might engenderviolent protest from the indigenous population. The desire of thestate to minimize the possibilities of social and political unrestamongthe Swazi, and to fulfilits role as apolitically repressive force,was heightened by the proximate Natal uprisings of 1906-1908.39At an early stageit was determined hat in pursuitof this goal, apartition should incorporate two basic principles. First, that there

36Greyo Selbome,18February 908,S.N.A.D09/2. Inthefinalpartitionne thirdwasdeductedrom62 concessions,ess thanone third rom68 concessions,andmore hanonethird rom51 concessions.37Theseointsareallmade nSelbore toGrey,18November1907,S.N.A.45/07/2129and CO 417/441/Enclosure 1. See also Selbore to Elgin, 29 October 1906, CO879/955/61.38Selborememorandum,February 908,CO417/456/71.39For n excellentstudyof the Nataluprisings,ee S. Marks,ReluctantRebellion:The1906-8 DisturbancesnNatal (Oxford,1970).


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82 JONATHAN CRUSH

N

lE[ SwaziAreas* Chief's Homestead *A Royal Household /o Royal Cattle Post

o 10 2omiles0 o1 20 3kmsFig. 3: Distribution of Reserves Around Indigenous Structure Elementschooses his master and looks up to him for help, advice andprotection.46

There is evidence to suggest, however, that landowners residentoutside Swaziland used their holdings to channel alienated Swazilabor to their estates in the eastern Transvaal. "The whole interestof the Boers of the Eastern Transvaal lies in the direction ofSwaziland since all of them want to... increase their supply ofSwazi labour."47This scenario, while an unavoidable byproduct ofpartition,was not particularlydesired by the state.Colonial officials were invariably conscious of the strong hier-archical social structure of the Swazi and the concentration of46Selbomememorandum,.N.A. 45/07/1464.47Selbore to Maydon, 3 April 1906, Bodleian Library,MS Selbore, Box 170.


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THE COLONIAL DIVISION OF SPACE

politicalpowerin the upperechelons of the hierarchy.48 ppease-mentof the Swazirulerswasthusa basic tenetof colonialpolicyinthepartition.This conformedothesecuritydriveofthe stateand sbuiltintothepartitionn an intriguingmanner.At one stageit wasargued hat such an appeasement ouldbe achievedby grantinglarge "farms"to the chiefs, but this quickly gave way to thepresuppositionhat if neitherroyals nor regionalchiefs were re-quired o movetheir residentialocations,Swaziprotestwould beconsiderablymuted-a correctassumption, s it transpired.Greywas furthernstructedoensure hateveryroyalhomestead,chiefly homestead,royal cattlepost, androyalburialgroundwasincluded within the reserves.49Identification of these elements onthegroundoomslarge nGrey'sfieldnotes.Thesuccesswithwhichthiscriterionwas fulfilleds illustratednFigure3, whichshowshowclosely the distribution f elementsof the Swazi social structurewas correlatedwiththedemarcation f reserves.Of 124 chiefs,forinstance, only one was left outside the reserves, and all royalhouseholds,cattleposts, andburialgroundswere incorporated.none instance,aroyalburialgroundwastoo remote obe includedna reserve withoutcuttingout "thousandsof morgenof valuableground," o a small enclave was declaredaround he grave.Thearrangement f the partitionaroundelements of the traditionalpoliticalandsacerdotal tructure y the colonial state was a primi-tive formof cooptationwith a strongspatialdimension.The partitionwas also arrangedaroundan incipientcolonialinfrastructure,gainto settler advantage.In the early periodofBritishcolonialrule,boththetransportationetworkandtheurbansystemwere at a rudimentarytageof development.Neverthelesstheprospectof anintegratednfrastructureid exerciseaninfluenceon the spatial arrayof the partition Figure 4). Potentialurbancenters-at thisstageno morethansmall settlersettlements-wereallclearlysurroundedy landunder ettlercontrol o afford ettlersacompetitiveadvantagenproductionorurbanmarkets.However,the reserveswere all proximateenough o ensurethe readyavail-abilityofanurban abor orce oranyfuture ommerce nd ndustry.The small numberof mines being workedin 1908 were clearlyincludedwithinsettler and.No positiverelationshipwasproposedby the state betweenthe existingprimitiveroad networkand thepartition,but therewas a definitecorrelationwith a prospective

48See B. Marwick, The Swazi (Cambridge, 1949); H. Kuper, An African Aristocracy(Oxford, 1961).49Selbometo Grey, 18 November 1907, CO 417/441/Enclosure 1.

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84 JONATHAN CRUSH

Ls SWAZI REASO TOWNS

"-+.t-1--PLANNEDRAILROUTE0 10 2omiles

10 '20 i kmsFig. 4: Reserves and the Colonial Infrastructure

railway ine.Greyassumed hatthefuture ailwaywouldbeof littlerelevanceto the Swazi, and he thereforemaximizedwhite settleraccessibilityotheproposedine ofrail.50As henoted n 1908, "Myplanof partitionplacesno native areain the middleor lowveld onthe whole routeof the proposedrailway."95n the long run,thisfactordidnotturnout to be of critical mportance, s theproposedrailwayschemewas soon abandoned.Grey's final exercise afterpartitionwas to estimatecarryingcapacity igures or the reserves n order o determinehowgreatanincrease n Swazipopulationhetotal amountof reserve andcouldbear. Based on a numberof theoreticalassumptionsconcerning"?Grey o Selbore, 31 December 1908, S.N.A. D09/2 and CO 417/469/7."Ibid.


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THE COLONIAL DIVISION OF SPACESwazi land requirements,he estimated that the reserves couldaccommodatean increaseof 52 percentof the totalpopulation. twas assumed,albeit implicitly,that new land would have to beaddedto the reserveswhenever his figurewas finallyreached.Inthe 1940senvironmental eteriorationnthe reservesand hefailureof the stateto spontaneouslygenerateany large-scaleexport cropproduction mong he Swaziled to the instigationof the first ruraldevelopmentprogramand to the increasingof reservesize by thestate.52ConclusionThe spatial patternof landholdinggeneratedn Swazilandby the1908 partitionwas a functionof a policy whichpresupposedheexpediencyof cultural,social, and economic dominationof theSwaziby a whitesettlerclass. Examinationof the historicalback-drop o thepartition evealshowthespatialarrays structured y aset of procedural riteria mplemented y the colonial Statewhichclosely accordswiththe interestsof promoting apitalist ormsofagriculturalroduction,and with the integration f the Swazi intosuch modes. As one colonial officialpoignantlyobserved,"TheEuropeandesires o expropriatehebestgroundorhimself, o stopindiscriminateultivationandto displaceanynativesnot requiredfor his own purpose "953The colonial state-through Selbome,CoryndonandGrey--complementedhese desiresat virtuallyallpoints.Thepatent nequityof alienatingwothirdsof thelandsurface othe crown and less than six hundredsettlers while providing heSwaziwiththe remairngonethird s explicableboth ntermsofthedesireto expropriateandfordirectwhitesettlementandcapitalistproduction,and secondarily,as being a concrete means to re-structure he self-sufficientndigenousagriculturalase in order oacquire control over Swazi labor power while simultaneouslyprovidinghe Swaziwithenough andto reproducehe short-termmeansof subsistence.This paperhas identifiedhow the physicalarrangementfspaceembodiesan interlinkedetof criteriadesignedto facilitateexploitationof both landand labor.The desireof the

52See D. M. Doveton, The Human Geography of Swaziland (London, 1937); andA. Hughes,Land Tenure,Land Rightsand Land Communities n Swazi Nation Land(Durban,1972)."Lagdenmemorandum,September 906, CO291/107/Enclosure4.

85


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86 JONATHAN CRUSHstatefor the consolidation f reserves s seento be a functionof anintentionto create an optimal patternfor minimizingreactivepoliticalresponsefrom the Swazi, and hence to ensurethe con-ditionsfor the furtherpenetrationof white settlementand metro-politancapital.The manipulationof the indigenouspoliticalandsacerdotal structureby the colonial state to promotepoliticalstability, and the linkingof the land patternwith the incipientcolonial nfrastructure erefurthernducementso capitalismnthesettlerstate.It shouldbe noted hatthepolicymaking fthecolonialstatewasbotha functionof andamedium or theongoingprocessof externalsocial and economic domination of the country.Many of thedecisionswerebasedonprospectivedevelopments ndercapitalismwhicheventually ailedto materializeas SouthAfricandominationin the regionalsocial formation ncreased.But in the year 1908whenspatialpatternswere inerasably mprinted n the landscape,the ideologicalbaseof colonialstatepolicywas aptly exposedin alamentbyGreyhimself:"Ihavebeenthe instrumenthathaslockedupmuchbeautifulandfertilecountry romwhich heEuropeans tobe foreverexcluded."54 his is surelyan appositepostscripton thesocialandeconomicrationale orthe Swazilandandpartition.

54Greyto Selbore, 31 December 1908, S.N.A. D09/2 and CO 417/469/7.

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Conolonial Land Divison in Swaziland

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