Constitutional Law 2

01-ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, G.R. No. L-24693 October 23, 1967302-Taxicab Operators vs. The Board of Transportaion GR L-59234, 30 September 1982, En Banc, Melencio303-Republic vs. Manila Electric Company G.R. No. 141314. November 15, 2002404-LIM vs. PACQUING G.R. 115044, January 27, 1995505-Lutz vs. Araneta G.R. No. L-7859, 22 December 1955606-MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION G.R. No. 111097707-VALENTIN TIO vs. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD G.R. No. L-75697708-RESTITUTO YNOT vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. 74457809-CRISTINA DE KNECHT vs.HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA G.R. No. L-51078910-PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. L-119694911-REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SALEM INVESTMENT CORPORATION G.R. No. 1375691012-REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 146587. July 2, 20021113-THE CITY OF MANILA vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL G.R. No. L-14355 October 31, 19191214-LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE Case Digest G.R. No. L-19201 June 16, 19651315-PHILEX MINING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. G.R. No. 125704 August 28, 19981316-G.R. No. 130716 CHAVEZvs.PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG)1417-SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v.LANTION G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 20001518-SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ,respondents. G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 20001619-GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and MARK . JIMENEZ a.k.a . MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, [G.R.No. 148571. September 24, 2002]1720-ESRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 20011821-PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOTvs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. L-522451922-Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial Relations GR No. 46496, February 27, 19450/ 69 Phil. 6352023-PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, ET AL. vs. PETE PRADO GR No. 105371, November 11, 1993/ 227 SCRA 7032024-GONZALES VS . COMELEC [21 SCRA 774; G.R. No. L-28196; 9 Nov 1967]2125-Ormoc Sugar vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City GR L-23794, 17 February 19682126-PEOPLE v.CAYAT G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 19392227-PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 20002228-PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JIMMY MIJANO y TAMORA G.R. No. 129112. July 23, 19992329-Soliven V. Makasair G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 19882330-Allado V. Diocno G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 19942431-Burgos V. Chief of Staff G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 19842532-People of the Philippines vs. Florencio B. Doria G.R. No. 125299 January 22, 19992633-THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 19922834-THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 19912935-Sammy M. Malacat vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 123595 December 12, 19973036-PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZENAIDA BOLASA Y NAKOBOAN and ROBERTO DELOS REYES, G.R. No. 125754 December 22,1999.3137-Columbia Pictures, Inc., et al. vs. Alfredo C. Flores G.R. No. 78631 June 29, 19933338-Ricardo C. Valmonte vs. Renato De Villa G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 19893439-HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, PEDRO PACIS, and MARTIN ALAGAO, vs. REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO39 G.R. No. L-27360 February 28, 19683540-PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRE MARTI G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 19913741-Generoso Esmea vs. Judge Julian B. Pogoy G.R. No. L-54110 February 20, 19813842-Arsenio P. Lumiqued, et al. vs. Apolonio G. Exevea, et al, G.R. No. 117565 November 18, 19973943-Clemente Magtoto vs.Miguel M. Manguera G.R. Nos. L-37201-02 March 3, 19754044-People of the Philippines vs. John Gabriel Gamboa G.R. No. 91374 February 25, 19914045-People of the Philippines vs. Jaime Agustin, et al. G.R. No. 110290 January 25, 19954146-People of the Philippines vs. Ernesto Base G.R. No. 109773 March 30, 20004147-People of the Philippines, vs. EDWARD ENDINO&Gerry Galgarin G.R. No. 133026February 20, 20014248-People of the Philippines vs. David S. Loveria G.R. No. 79138 July 2, 19904349-PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LARRY MAHINAY Y AMPARADO, G.R. No. 122485 February 1, 19994450-People of the Philippines vs. Jose Encarnacion Malimit G.R. No. 109775 November 14, 19964751-People of the Philippines vs. Dindo Mojello G.R. No. 145566 March 9, 20044852-People of the Philippines vs. Anacleto Q. Olvis G.R. No. 71092 September 30, 19874953-People of the Philippines vs. Ronilo L. Pinlac G.R. Nos. 74123-24 September 26, 19885154-PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. WILFREDO ROJAS, TEODORO VILLARIN, SOLOMON TOTOY, GREGORIO TUNDAG and SINFROSO MASONG, defendants G.R. Nos. L-46960-62 January 8, 19875255-The People of the Philippines vs. Jimmy Obrero y Corla. G.R. No. 122142 May 17, 20005356-Generoso Esmea vs. Judge Julian B. Pogoy G.R. No. L-54110 February 20, 19815457-People of the Philippines vs. Aurelio Balisacan G.R. No. L-26376 August 31, 19665558-People of the Philippines vs. Leo P. Echegaray G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 19975659-People of the Philippines vs. Benjamin Relova G.R. No. L-45129 March 6, 19875760-People of the Philippines vs. City Court of Manila, Branch Vi, et al. G.R. No. L-36528 September 24, 19875961-Jason Ivler y Aguilar vs. Hon. Maria Rowena Modesto-San Pedro, etc. and Evangeline Ponce CARPIO, G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 20106062-Valerio Tacas vs. Florentino C. Cariaso G.R. No. L-37406 August 31, 19766163-Garces vs. Estenzo GR. No. L-53487, May 25, 19816264-ERNESTO G. GONZALES vs.CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC LABOR UNION G.R. No. L-38178 October 3, 19856265-Marcos vs. Manglapus G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 19896366-Yap vs. CA GR. No. 141529 June 6, 20016467-IGLESIA NI CRISTO, (INC.)vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 119673 July 26, 19966468-PASTOR DIONISIO V. AUSTRIA vs.HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS G.R. No. 1243826569-PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON G.R. No. 819586670-RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., vs.THE COURT OF APPEALSFERNAN G.R. No. L-621006771-BLO UMPAR ADIONG vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 1039566872-AYER PRODUCTIONS vs. HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE ENRILE G.R. No. 823806973-CHAVEZvs.PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) G.R. No. 1307167074-MANUEL LAGUNZAD vs. MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES and THE COURT OF APPEALS,G.R. No. L-32066 August 6, 19797175-AMELITO R. MUTUC vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS75 G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 19707276-NATIONAL PRESS CLUB vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 102653 March 5, 19927377-CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS vs.VALERIANO E. FUGOSO G.R. No. L-18007378-JOSE B.L. REYES vs. RAMON BAGATSING, as Mayor of the City of Manila G.R. No. L-653667479-ABELARDO SUBIDO, vs.ROMAN OZAETA G.R. No. L-1631 February 27, 19487580-Lozano vs. Martinez GR L-63419, 18 December 19867681-ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIPvs.FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO.,G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979.7682-ENEDINA PRESLEY vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,G.R. No. 86774 August 21, 19917783-TERRY LYN MAGNO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 101148, August 05, 19927884-LT. GENERAL LISANDRO ABADIA in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the AFP, MAJ. GENERAL ARTURO ENRILE vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 1055977885-BAYOT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN .G.R. NO.L-61776 TO NO.L-61861; 23 MAR 19848086-Cristopher Gamboa vs. J. Alfredo Cruz G.R. No. L-56291 June 27, 19888087-ISABELA SUGAR vs. MACADAEG 98 Phil. 9958188-PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES vs. MALIMIT GR No. 190775, November 14, 19968189-PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GALLARDE GR No. 13302, February 17, 20008290-CATALINO N. SARMIENTO v.s THE HON. JUDGE ORLANDO R. TUICO G.R. No. 75271-73 June 27, 1988.8291-THE UNITED STATES vs. J. VALENTINE KARELSEN, G.R. No. 1376 January 21, 19048392-PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE LEGASPI y RAMIREZ G.R. Nos. 92167-688493-EFREN C. MONCUPAvs.JUAN PONCE ENRILE 93. G.R. No. L-633458594-MANUEL Q. CABALLERO and LELITA A. CABALLERO,-versus- HON. FEDERICO B. ALFONSO, JR., HON. CONRADO ESTRELLA, FERNANDO ESCONDE, GREGORIO BAKEREL, CESAR NAVARRO, AND FRANK RODRIGUEZ, G.R. No. L-45647 August 21, 19878695-EMETERIA VILLAFLOR vs. RICARDO SUMMERS G.R. No. 164448796-People v. Duero G.R. No. L-52016 May 13, 19818797-Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)8898-ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [GR 107383, 20 FEBRUARY 1996]8999-Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board G.R. No. L-10280 September 30, 196390

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA,G.R. No. L-24693October 23, 1967Facts:On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ordinance No. 4760 and the same was approved by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. It classified them into 1stclass (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2ndclass (taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled hotels/motels to get the demographics of anyone who checks in to their rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due process. The lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate.ISSUE:Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.HELD:The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the revenue of the lgu concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The due process contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has reason as a standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague.Taxicab Operators vs. The Board of TransportationGR L-59234, 30 September 1982, En Banc, MelencioFACTS: To insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as public conveyances and in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort, convenience, and safety, the Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular phasing out the old and dilapidated taxis. Pursuant to OT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. The Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation filed a petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order", to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular of the BOT and Memorandum Circular of the BLT.ISSUES: Whether or not the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to (1) Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due process; and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard.HELD: On Procedural and Substantive Due Process: Petitioners cannot justifiably claim that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars for the Board gave a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Furthermore, as public contend it is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met. On Equal Protection of the Law: The law being enforced in Metro Manila only and was directed solely towards the taxi industry does not violate their right to equal protection of the law for the traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed. The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria. Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and undeniable. Hence, the Writs prayed for are denied and was dismissed.Republic vs. Manila Electric CompanyG.R. No. 141314. November 15, 2002FACTS:On 23 December 1993, Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the revision of its rate schedules. The application reflected an average increase of P0.21/kwh in its distribution charge. The application also included a prayer for provisional approval of the increase pursuant to Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act and Section 8 of Executive Order 172. On 28 January 1994, the ERB issued an Order granting a provisional increase of P0.184/kwh, subject to the condition that in the event that the Board finds that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser increase in rates, all excess amounts collected from the applicants customers as a result of this Order shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly credited in their favor for application to electric bills covering future consumptions. Subsequent to an audit by the Commission on Audit (COA), the ERB rendered its decision adopting COAs recommendations and authorized MERALCO to implement a rate adjustment in the average amount of P0.017/kwh, effective with respect to MERALCOs billing cycles beginning February 1994. The ERB further ordered that the provisional relief in the amount of P0.184/kwh granted under the Boards Order dated 28 January 1994 is hereby superseded and modified and the excess average amount of P0.167/kwh starting with MERALCOs billing cycles beginning February 1994 until its billing cycles beginning February 1998, be refunded to MERALCOs customers or correspondingly credited in their favor for future consumption. The ERB held that income tax should not be treated as operating expense as this should be borne by the stockholders who are recipients of the income or profits realized from the operation of their business hence, should not be passed on to the consumers. Further, in applying the net average investment method, the ERB adopted the recommendation of COA that in computing the rate base, only the proportionate value of the property should be included, determined in accordance with the number of months the same was actually used in service during the test year. On appeal (CA GR SP 46888), the Court of Appeals set aside the ERB decision insofar as it directed the reduction of the MERALCO rates by an average of P0.167/ kwh and the refund of such amount to MERALCOs customers beginning February 1994 and until its billing cycle beginning February 1998. Separate Motions for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners were denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petition before the Supreme Court. ISSUE:Whether or not the public interest should prevail over private profits.HELD:In third world countries like the Philippines, equal justice will have a synthetic ring unless the economic rights of the people, especially the poor, are protected with the same resoluteness as their right to liberty. The cases at bar are of utmost significance for they concern the right of our people to electricity and to be reasonably charged for their consumption. In configuring the contours of this economic right to a basic necessity of life, the Court shall define the limits of the power of respondent MERALCO, a giant public utility and a monopoly, to charge our people for their electric consumption.Regulation of rates by public utilities founded on the States police powers. The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public regulation.

LIM vs. PACQUINGG.R. 115044, January 27, 1995Facts:The petition in G.R. No. 115044 was dismissed by the First Division of this Court on 01 September 1994 based on a finding that there was "no abuse of discretion, much less lack of or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of respondent judge [Pacquing]", in issuing the questioned orders. Judge Pacquing had earlier issued in Civil Case No. 88-45660, RTC of Manila, Branch 40, the following orders which were assailed by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim, in said G.R. No. 115044:a. order dated 28 March 1994 directing Manila mayor Alfredo S. Lim to issue thepermit/licenseto operate the jai-alai in favor of Associated Development Corporation (ADC).b. order dated 11 April 1994 directing mayor Lim to explain why he should not be cited for contempt for non-compliance with the order dated 28 March 1994.c. order dated 20 April 1994 reiterating the previous order directing Mayor Lim to immediately issue thepermit/licenseto Associated Development Corporation (ADC).The order dated 28 march 1994 was in turn issued upon motion by ADC for execution of a final judgment rendered on 9 September 1988 which ordered the Manila Mayor to immediately issue to ADC thepermit/licenseto operate the jai-alai in Manila, under Manila Ordinance No. 7065.On 13 September 1994, petitioner Guingona (as executive secretary) issued a directive to then chairman of the Games and Amusements Board (GAB) Francisco R. Sumulong, jr. to hold in abeyance the grant of authority, or if any had been issued, to withdraw such grant of authority, to Associated Development Corporation to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila, inter alia, resolve the legal question,1. Whether P.D. 771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai franchisers issued by local governments as of 20 August 1975 is unconstitutional.Issue:1. Whether or not PD No. 771 is a valid exercise of theinherentpolice power of the State, as the government contends, or2. Whether or not PD No. 771 is unconstitutional for being Violative of the equal protection and non-impairment provisions of the Constitution, as ADC argues.Held:1. Police power has been described as the least limitable of the inherent powers of the State. It is based on the ancient doctrine salus populi est suprema lex(the welfare of the people is the supreme law.) In the early case ofRubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro(39 Phil. 660), this Court through Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm stated thus:The police power of the State . . . is a power co-extensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the "law of overruling necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.In the matter of PD No. 771, the purpose of the law is clearly stated in the "whereas clause" as follows:WHEREAS, it has been reported that in spite of the current drive of our law enforcement agencies against vices and illegal gambling, these social ills are still prevalent in many areas of the country;WHEREAS, there is need to consolidate all the efforts of the government to eradicate and minimize vices and other forms of social ills in pursuance of the social and economic development program under the new society;WHEREAS, in order to effectively control and regulate wagers or betting by the public on horse and dog races, jai-alai and other forms of gambling there is a necessity to transfer the issuance of permit and/or franchise from local government to the National Government.It cannot be argued that the control and regulation of gambling do not promote public morals and welfare. Gambling is essentially antagonistic and self-reliance. It breeds indolence and erodes the value of good, honest and hard work. It is, as very aptly stated by PD No. 771, a vice and a social ill which government must minimize (if not eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic development.InMagtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation(20 July 1994, G.R. No. 111097), this Court stated thru Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz:In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislative power may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibitedjuetengandmontebut permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court hasno authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding wisdom, morality and practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the executive and legislative departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. (Emphasis supplied)It should also be remembered that PD No. 771 provides that thenational governmentcan subsequently grant franchises "upon proper application and verification of the qualifications of the applicant." ADC has not alleged that it filed an application for a franchise with the national government subsequent to the enactment of PD No. 771; thus, the allegations abovementioned (of preference to a select group) are based on conjectures, speculations and imagined biases which do not warrant the consideration of this Court.On the other hand, it is noteworthy that while then president Aquino issued Executive Order No. 169 revoking PD No. 810 (which granted a franchise to a Marcos-crony to operate the jai-alai), she did not scrap or repeal PD No. 771 which had revoked all franchises to operate jai-alais issued by local governments, thereby re-affirming the government policy that franchises to operate jai-alais are for the national government (not local governments) to consider and approve.2. On the alleged violation of the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, it should be remembered that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simple contract but rather it is more importantly, a mere privilege specially in matters which are within the government's power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the police power. Thus, a gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of police power for the public welfare.InRCPI v.NTC(150 SCRA 450), we held that:A franchise started out as a "royal privilege or (a) branch of the King's prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a subject." This definition was given by Finch, adopted by Blackstone, and accepted by every authority since . . . Today, a franchise being merely a privilege emanating from the sovereign power of the state and owing its existence to a grant, is subject to regulation by the state itself by virtue of its police power through its administrative agencies.There is a stronger reason for holding ADC's permit to be a mere privilege because jai-alai, when played for bets, is pure and simple gambling. To analogize a gambling franchise for the operation of a public utility, such as public transportation company, is to trivialize the great historic origin of this branch of royal privilege.As earlier noted, ADC has not alleged ever applying for a franchise under the provisions of PD No. 771. and yet, the purpose of PD No. 771 is quite clear from its provisions, i.e., to give to thenational governmentthe exclusive power to grant gambling franchises. Thus, all franchises then existing were revoked but were made subject to reissuance by the national government upon compliance by the applicant with government-set qualifications and requirements.There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause since the decree revokedallfranchises issued by local governments without qualification or exception. ADC cannot allege violation of the equal protection clause simply because it was the only one affected by the decree, for as correctly pointed out by the government, ADC was not singled out when all jai-alai franchises were revoked. Besides, it is too late in the day for ADC to seek redress for alleged violation of its constitutional rights for it could have raised these issues as early as 1975, almost twenty 920) years ago. Lutz vs. Araneta G.R. No. L-7859, 22 December 1955FACTS:Due to the threat to industry by the imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar as provided in the Tydings-McDuffe Act, and the "eventual loss of its preferential position in the United States market"; the National Assembly promulgated Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment Act "to obtain a readjustment of the benefits derived from the sugar industry by the component elements thereof" and "to stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its preferential position in the United States market and the imposition of the export taxes." Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma challenged the legality of the taxes imposed by the said Act. In plaintiff's opinion such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action having been dismissed by the Court of First Instance, the plaintiff appealed the case directly to the Supreme Court.ISSUE: Whether or not the CA No. 567 is primarily an exercise of the police power.HELD: The basic defect in the plaintiff's position is his assumption that the tax provided for in the said Act is a pure exercise of the taxing power. However, the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily an exercise of the police power. The protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of public concern, it follows that the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. Here, the legislative discretion must be allowed fully play, subject only to the test of reasonableness; and it is not contended that the means provided of the law bear no relation to the objective pursued or are oppressive in character. If objective and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police power. That the tax to be levied should burden the sugar producers themselves can hardly be a ground of complaint; indeed, it appears rational that the tax be obtained precisely from those who are to be benefited from the expenditure of the funds derived from it. The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATIONG.R. No. 111097 Facts:The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. InBasco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation,this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government.PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City by leasing a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc. for its casino.On December 7, 1992, Sangguniang Panlungsod of CDO enacted ordinance 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of a casino.On January 4, 1993, it enacted Ordinance 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for violation therefore.Pryce assailed the ordinances before the CA, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor.The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. CDO City and its mayor filed a petition for review under Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.Issue:Whether or not the Sangguniang Panlungsod can prohibit the establishment of casino operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance or resolution.Held:No. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. In the exercise of its own discretion, the Congress may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient.Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, gambling andotherprohibited games of chance.Ordinances should not contravene a statue as municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisionshas held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.6) It must not be unreasonable.VALENTIN TIO vs. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD G.R. No. L-75697Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal Revenue Code provided that:"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.""Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program.Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues.Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year.The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry.Issues: 1. Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power. 2. Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business." RESTITUTO YNOT vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTG.R. No. 74457Facts:There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.Issue: Whether or not the law is valid.Held: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

CRISTINA DE KNECHT vs.HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA G.R. No. L-51078 Facts:The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road Project, originally called for the expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. Later on, however, the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Because of the protests of residents of the latter, the Commission on Human Settlements recommended the reversion to the original plan, but the Ministry argued the new route withh save the government P2 million. The government filed expropriation proceedings against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, among whom was petitioner.Issue: Is the choice of Fernando Rein and del Pan Streets valid?Held: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so minimal that it can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines. The factor of functionality strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, while the factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice between people, on one hand, and progress and development, on the other, it is to be remembered that progress and development are carried out for the benefit of the people. PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. L-119694 Facts: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. PPI, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free Comelec Space and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, the questioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of Comelec space, the procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidates utilization of the Comelec space procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.Issue:Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections is valid.Held: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs.Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to donate free print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SALEM INVESTMENT CORPORATION G.R. No. 137569 Facts:The De la Ramas and Guerrero entered into a contract to sell for an amount of P11,800,000.00 , Lot 834. This lot has an area of 4,075 square meters. This contract was executed on December 14, 1988, after B.P. Blg. 340 was passed authorizing the expropriation of a portion of the land, consisting of 1,380 square meters, of the De la Ramas. The De la Ramas received the sum of P2,200,000.00 as partial payment of the purchase price, the balance thereof to be paid upon release of the title by the Philippine Veterans Bank. Guerrero filed in the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City a complaint for specific performance to compel the De la Ramas to proceed with the sale. While this case for specific performance was pending, the Republic of the Philippines filed the present case for expropriation. Among the defendants named in the complaint were Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama as registered owners of Lot 834, a portion of which (Lot 834-A) was part of the expropriated property. Upon the deposit of P12,970,350.00 representing 10 percent of the approximate market value of the subject lands, a writ of possession was issued on August 29, 1990 in favor of the government. Guerrero filed a motion for intervention alleging that the De la Ramas had agreed to sell to him the entire Lot 834 on December 14, l988 and that a case for specific performance had been filed by him against the De la Ramas.The trial court approved payment to the De la Ramas at the rate of P23,976.00 per square meter for the taking of 920 square meters out of the 1,380 square meters to be expropriated Meanwhile, the trial court upheld the validity of the contract to sell and ordering the De la Ramas to execute the corresponding deed of sale covering the subject property in favor of Guerrero. Guerrero filed an Omnibus Motions praying that the just compensation for the land be deposited in .As his motion for intervention and omnibus motion had not yet been resolved, Guerrero filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus, certiorari, and injunction with temporary restraining order to enjoin the Republic from releasing or paying to the De la Ramas any amount corresponding to the payment of the expropriated property and to compel the trial court to resolve his two motions.The Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writ of mandamus. De la Ramas filed on March 17, 1993 a Motion for Authority to withdraw the deposit made by the Republic in 1991.The trial court denied the motion of the De la Ramas.In its order dated October 7, 1993, the trial court clarified that the area of land covered by the contract to sell included the portion expropriated by the Republic and that the Contract to Sell dated December 14, 1988 executed by the parties is a valid document that authorizes the plaintiff to step into the shoes of the defendants in relation to the property covered by TCT No. 16213; and that the transfer shall be free from all liens and encumbrances except for the expropriated portion of 1,380 square meters.As a result of which, a deed of absolute sale was executed by the Branch Clerk of Court in favor of Guerrero upon payment by him of the sum of P8,808,000.00 on January 11, 1994 and the further sum of P1,608,900.00 on February 1, 1994 as full payment for the balance of the purchase price under the contract to sell of December 14, 1988. The entire amount was withdrawn and duly received by the De la Ramas.Pasay City Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, declared Guerrero the rightful owner of the 920-square meter expropriated property and ordered payment to him of just compensation for the taking of the land.This decision was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals Hence, this petition.Issues:Who, between the De la Ramas and Guerrero, is/are entitled to receive payment of just compensation for the taking of 920 square meters of the land in question?Held:Guerrerois entitled to receive payment of just compensation for the taking of 920 square meters of the land in question.The title to the expropriated portion of Lot 834 did not immediately pass to the government upon the enactment of B.P. Blg. 340 in 1983, as payment of just compensation was yet to be made before ownership of the land was transferred to the government. As a result, petitioners still owned the entire Lot 834 at the time they agreed to sell it to Guerrero. Therefore, since Guerrero obtained ownership of Lot 834, including the 920 square meters expropriated by the government, he has the right to receive the just compensation over the said property.It is true that the contract to sell did not convey to Guerrero the subject parcel of land described therein. However, it created an obligation on the part of the De la Ramas to convey the land, subject to the fulfillment of the suspensive conditions therein stated. The declaration of this contract's validity, which paved the way for the subsequent execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on March 8, 1994, following the order of the Regional Trial Court for its execution, by the Clerk of Court, Branch 113, Pasay City, effectively conveyed ownership of said parcel of land to Guerrero. Stated in another way, Guerrero was buying the entire property free from all claims of third persons except those of the government.Evidently, Lot 834 was conveyed in 1994 to Guerrero by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale. The fact that the De la Ramas have withdrawn and appropriated for themselves the amount paid by Guerrero. This amount represented the purchase price of the entire 4,075 square meters of land, including the expropriated portion, which was the subject of their agreement. The payment, therefore, to them of the value of the expropriated portion would unjustly enrich them.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 146587. July 2, 2002 Facts:Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19 September 1969 before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Bulacan, docketed Civil Cases No. 3839-M, No. 3840-M, No. 3841-M and No. 3842-M, covering a total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the Voice of the Philippines project. Petitioner, through the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), took over the premises after the previous lessee, the Voice of America, had ceased its operations thereat. Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979, or more than nine years after the institution of the expropriation proceedings, the trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendants the just compensation for said property which is the fair market value of the land condemned, computed at the rate of six pesos (P6.00) per square meter, with legal rate of interest from September 19, 1969, until fully paid.The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square meter property previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents, which forms part of the expropriated area. It would appear that the national government failed to pay to herein respondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision, such that a little over five years later, or on 09 May 1984, respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. On 07 June 1984, the Bulacan RTC, after ascertaining that the heirs remained unpaid in the sum of P1,058,655.05, issued a writ of execution served on the plaintiff, through the Office of the Solicitor General, for the implementation thereof. When the order was not complied with, respondents again filed a motion urging the trial court to direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to release to them the amount of P72,683.55, a portion of the sum deposited by petitioner at the inception of the expropriation proceedings in 1969, corresponding to their share of the deposit. The trial court, in its order of 10 July 1984, granted the motion. In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining portion was retained by the PIA. Santos heirs remained unpaid, and no action was taken on their case until 16 September 1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis Santos subject to such final computation as might be approved by the court. This time, the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and motion, submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6.00 per square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the alternative, to cause the return to them of the expropriated property. On 01 March 2000, the Bulacan RTC ruled in favor of respondents ordering the return of the expropriated property of the late defendant Luis Santos to his heirs conformably with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De Villaroya.Assailing the finding of prescription by the trial court, petitioner here posited that a motion which respondents had filed on 17 February 1984, followed up by other motions subsequent thereto, was made within the reglementary period that thereby interrupted the 5-year prescriptive period within which to enforce the 1979 judgment. Furthermore, petitioner claimed, the receipt by respondents of partial compensation in the sum of P72,683.55 on 23 July 1984 constituted partial compliance on the part of petitioners and effectively estopped respondents from invoking prescription expressed in Section 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court.In opposing the petition, respondents advanced the view that pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, the failure of petitioner to execute the judgment, dated 26 February 1979, within five years after it had become final and executory, rendered it unenforceable by mere motion. The motion for payment, dated 09 May 1984, as well as the subsequent disbursement to them of the sum of P72,683.55 by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan, could not be considered as having interrupted the five-year period, since a motion, to be considered otherwise, should instead be made by the prevailing party, in this case by petitioner. Respondents maintained that the P72,683.55 paid to them by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan pursuant to the 1984 order of the trial court was part of the initial deposit made by petitioner when it first entered possession of the property in 1969 and should not be so regarded as a partial payment. Respondents further questioned the right of PIA to transfer ownership of a portion of the property to the Bulacan State University even while the just compensation due the heirs had yet to be finally settled.Issue:Whether or not the trial court of Bulacan erred in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000Held:The trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority left to it being to order its execution. Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount shall have been fully paid.The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. THE CITY OF MANILA vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL G.R. No. L-14355 October 31, 1919Facts: On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement. The petitioner, in the second paragraph of the petition, alleged: That for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila,it is necessary for the plaintiff to acquire ownership in fee simpleof certain parcels of land situated in the district of Binondo of said city within Block 83 of said district, and within the jurisdiction of this court.Issue:Whether or not the Cemetery being the subject of the expropriation proceedings by the City of Manila is public or private property and whether or not such expropriation necessary by standards of exercise of the power of eminent domain.Held: It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church, while the latter is used only by a family, or a small portion of the community or neighborhood. (11 C. J., 50.) Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts which are held in good faith for future use. (Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec. 434, and cases cited.) The cemetery in question seems to have been established under governmental authority. The Spanish Governor-General, in an order creating the same, used the following language: The cemetery and general hospital for indigent Chinese having been founded and maintained by the spontaneous and fraternal contribution of their protector, merchants and industrials, benefactors of mankind, in consideration of their services to the Government of the Islands its internal administration, government and regime must necessarily be adjusted to the taste and traditional practices of those born and educated in China in order that the sentiments which animated the founders may be perpetually effectuated. It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. In such an appropriation, what, we may ask, would be the measure of damages at law, for the wounded sensibilities of the living, in having the graves of kindred and loved ones blotted out and desecrated by a common highway or street for public travel? The impossibility of measuring the damage and inadequacy of a remedy at law is too apparent to admit of argument. To disturb the mortal remains of those endeared to us in life sometimes becomes the sad duty of the living; but, except in cases ofnecessity, or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the last resting place of our friends, should be maintained, and the preventative aid of the courts should be invoked for that object. (Railroad Companyvs.Cemetery Co., 116 Tenn., 400; Evergreen Cemetery Associationvs.The City of New Haven, 43 Conn., 234; Andersonvs.Acheson, 132 Iowa, 744; Beattyvs.Kurtz, 2 Peters, 566.) In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff.LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE Case Digest G.R. No. L-19201 June 16, 1965FACTS:Sometime in 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc., of Bacolod City, donated P10,000.00 in cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, then parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of herein petitioner, for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. The total amount was actually spent for the purpose intended.On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the donors gift tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960, the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for donees gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00 including surcharges, interests of 1% monthly from May 15, 1958 to June 15, 1960, and the compromise for the late filing of the return.ISSUE: Whether or not the donation to a religious organization is subject to donors tax?HELD:Constitutional exemption for religious purpose refers only to property taxes.Section 22(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from taxation cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra-distinguished from excise taxes.Imposition of gift tax on property used for religious purposes not violation of Constitution.A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment of the Constitution.PHILEX MINING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. G.R. No. 125704 August 28, 1998Facts:Petitioner Philex Mining Corp. assails the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 8, 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36975affirming the Court of Tax Appeals decision in CTA Case No. 4872 dated March 16, 1995ordering it to pay the amount of P110,677,668.52 as excise tax liability for the period from the 2nd quarter of 1991 to the 2nd quarter of 1992 plus 20% annual interest from August 6, 1994 until fully paid pursuant to Sections 248 and 249 of the Tax Code of 1977.The facts show that on August 5, 1992, the BIR sent a letter to Philex asking it to settle its tax liabilities for the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quarter of 1991 as well as the 1st and 2nd quarter of 1992 in the total amount of P123,821.982.52 Issue:Whether or not the contention of Philex that In view of the grant of its VAT input credit/refund, the same should,ipso jure, off-set its excise tax liabilitiessince both had already become "due and demandable, as well as fully liquidated;"hence, legal compensation can properly take place. Held:We see no merit in this contention.In several instances prior to the instant case, we have already made the pronouncement that taxes cannot be subject to compensation for the simple reason that the government and the taxpayer are not creditors and debtors of each other.There is a material distinction between a tax and debt. Debts are due to the Government in its corporate capacity, while taxes are due to the Government in its sovereign capacity.We find no cogent reason to deviate from the aforementioned distinction.Prescinding from this premise, inFrancia v. Intermediate Appellate Court,we categorically held that taxes cannot be subject to set-off or compensation, thus:We have consistently ruled that there can be no off-setting of taxes against the claims that the taxpayer may have against the government. A person cannot refuse to pay a tax on the ground that the government owes him an amount equal to or greater than the tax being collected. The collection of a tax cannot await the results of a lawsuit against the government.The ruling inFranciahas been applied to the subsequent case ofCaltex Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Audit,which reiterated that:. . . a taxpayer may not offset taxes due from the claims that he may have against the government. Taxes cannot be the subject of compensation because the government and taxpayer are not mutually creditors and debtors of each other and a claim for taxes is not such a debt, demand, contract or judgment as is allowed to be set-off.Further, Philex's reliance on our holding inCommissioner of Internal Revenue v. Itogon-Suyoc Mines Inc., wherein we ruled that a pending refund may be set off against an existing tax liability even though the refund has not yet been approved by the Commissioner,is no longer without any support in statutory law.It is important to note, that the premise of our ruling in the aforementioned case was anchored on Section 51 (d) of the National Revenue Code of 1939. However, when the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 was enacted, the same provision upon which theItogon-Suyocpronouncement was based was omitted.Accordingly, the doctrine enunciated inItogon-Suyoccannot be invoked by Philex.Despite the foregoing rulings clearly adverse to Philex's position, it asserts that the imposition of surcharge and interest for the non-payment of the excise taxes within the time prescribed was unjustified. Philex posits the theory that it had no obligation to pay the excise tax liabilities within the prescribed period since, after all, it still has pending claims for VAT input credit/refund with BIR.We fail to see the logic of Philex's claim for this is an outright disregard of the basic principle in tax law that taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance.Evidently, to countenance Philex's whimsical reason would render ineffective our tax collection system. Too simplistic, it finds no support in law or in jurisprudence.To be sure, we cannot allow Philex to refuse the payment of its tax liabilities on the ground that it has a pending tax claim for refund or credit against the government which has not yet been granted. It must be noted that a distinguishing feature of a tax is that it is compulsory rather than a matter of bargain.Hence, a tax does not depend upon the consent of the taxpayer.If any taxpayer can defer the payment of taxes by raising the defense that it still has a pending claim for refund or credit, this would adversely affect the government revenue system. A taxpayer cannot refuse to pay his taxes when they fall due simply because he has a claim against the government or that the collection of the tax is contingent on the result of the lawsuit it filed against the government.Moreover, Philex's theory that would automatically apply its VAT input credit/refund against its tax liabilities can easily give rise to confusion and abuse, depriving the government of authority over the manner by which taxpayers credit and offset their tax liabilities.Corollarily, the fact that Philex has pending claims for VAT input claim/refund with the government is immaterial for the imposition of charges and penalties prescribed under Section 248 and 249 of the Tax Code of 1977. The payment of the surcharge is mandatory and the BIR is not vested with any authority to waive the collection thereof.The same cannot be condoned for flimsy reasons,similar to the one advanced by Philex in justifying its non-payment of its tax liabilities.

G.R. No. 130716 CHAVEZvs.PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG)Facts:Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's economy," alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reportsbannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets. He also claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people.Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.Respondents further aver that the Marcos heirs have submitted the subject Agreements to the Sandiganbayan for its approval in Civil Case No. 141, entitledRepublic v. Heirs of Ferdinand E. Marcos, and that the Republic opposed such move on the principal grounds that (1) said Agreements have not been ratified by or even submitted to the President for approval, pursuant to Item No. 8 of the General Agreement; and (2) the Marcos heirs have failed to comply with their undertakings therein, particularly the collation and submission of an inventory of their assets. The Republic also cited an April 11, 1995 Resolution in Civil Case No. 0165, in which the Sandiganbayan dismissed a similar petition filed by the Marcoses' attorney-in-fact.

The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Orderenjoining respondents, their agents and/or representatives from "entering into, or perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos relating to and concerning their ill-gotten wealth."

Issue:1. Whether or not the petitioner has the legal standing to bring the action.2. Whether the General and Supplemental Agreements, both dated December 28, 1993, which the PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs, are violative of the ConstitutionHeld:On the first issue, petitioner, on the one hand, explains that as a taxpayer and citizen, he has the legal personality to file the instant petition. He submits that since ill-gotten wealth "belongs to the Filipino people and [is], in truth hand in fact, part of the public treasury," any compromise in relation to it would constitute a diminution of the public funds, which can be enjoined by a taxpayer whose interest is for a full, if not substantial, recovery of such assets.On the second issue, General and Supplemental Agreements, both dated December 28, 1993, which the PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs, are violative of the Constitution.In general, the law encourages compromises incivilcases, except with regard to the following matters: (1) the civil status of persons, (2) the validity of a marriage or a legal separation, (3) any ground for legal separation, (4) future support, (5) the jurisdiction of courts, and (6) future legitimate.And like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order.A compromise is binding and has the force of law between the parties,unless the consent of a party is vitiated such as by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence or when there is forgery, or if the terms of the settlement are so palpably unconscionable. In the latter instances, the agreement may be invalidated by the courts.Going now to the subject General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs, a cursory perusal thereof reveals serious legal flaws. We believe that criminal immunity under Section 5 cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal defendants in the spate of ill-gotten wealth cases now pending before the Sandigan bayan. As stated earlier, the provision is applicable mainly to witnesses who provide information or testify against a respondent, defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth case.The absence of then President Ramos' approval of the principal Agreement, an express condition therein, renders the compromise incomplete and unenforceable. Nevertheless, as detailed above, even if such approval were obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid.SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v.LANTIONG.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000FACTS:Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to theUnited States.On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty.RULING:Petition dismissed.The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitutionSECRETARY OF JUSTICE,petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ,respondents. G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000FACTS:Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States pursuant to RP-US extradition treaty and Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country" which was founded upon the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with violation of provisions of the United States Code.Private respondent addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government, and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers.In response to private respondent, petitioner, denied the foregoing requests. Respondent then claims his procedural right to due notice and hearing of his case which is indispensable of the right to due process.ISSUE:Whether or not private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is there any conflict between the due process clause in the Constitution and theRP-US Extradition Treaty?HELD:The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent.Categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations. The rule ofpacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances. The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principlelex posterior derogat prioritakes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.These two components law of the land, international law and municipal or national law, are not pitted against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by PD No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to theU.S.extradition procedures also manifests this silence. In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right.

The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and MARK . JIMENEZ a.k.a . MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, [G.R.No. 148571. September 24, 2002]FACTS:The United States Government sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No.0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a TROby the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the DOJ from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001.After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought analternativeprayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100, 000.Thealternativeprayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.ISSUES:1. Whether or not Jimenez is entitled tonotice and hearing before a warrantfor his arrest can be issued, and2. Whether or not heis entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending.HELD:1. No. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance ofwarrants of arrest. The case under consideration is an extradition and not acriminal action; therefore it is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set ofprocedures more protective of the accused.No. The constitutional provision on bail applies only when a person has beenarrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not applyto extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments ofconviction or acquittal.

ESRADA v SANDIGANBAYANG.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001Facts:Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the president of the republic of the Philippines, by himself and/or in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused, who are members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates and/or other persons, by taking undue advantage of his official position, authority, relationship, connection, or influence, did then and therewillfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire by himself directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of four billion ninety seven million eight hundred four thousand one hundred seventy three and seventeen centavos (p4,097,804,173.17), more or less, thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the republic of Philippines through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means.Respectively or a total of more or less one billion eight hundred forty seven million five hundred seventy eight thousand fifty seven pesos and fifty centavos (p1,847,578,057.50); and by collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by himself and/or in connivance with john does jane does, commissions r percentages by reason of said purchases of shares of stock in the amount of one hundred eighty nine million seven hundred thousand pesos (p189,700,000.00) more or less, from the Belle corporation which became part of the deposit in the equitable bank under the account name 'jose velarde'.Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds:1. it violates the due process clause for its vagueness2. it violates the constitutional right of the accused to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him 3. it violates the due process clause and the constitutional presumption of innocence by lowering the quantum of evidence necessary for proving the component elements of plunder4. it is beyond the constitutional power of the legislature to delimit the reasonable doubt standard and to abolish the element of mens rea in mala in se crimes by converting these to mala prohibita, in violation of the due process concept of criminal responsibility.Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of meritRatio:In view of vagueness and ambiguity - Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.On how the law uses t