Consti Cases Police to Taxation

8/13/2019 Consti Cases Police to Taxation

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POLICE POWER

LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ [146 SCRA 323; NO.L-63419; 18 DEC 1986]

Facts:A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners forviolation of the BP 22 was made, contending that no offense was

committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to

the Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the SupremeCourt the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower

court's denial of a motion to quash.

Issue: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State.

Held: The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional

inhibition againstimprisonment for debt.

The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its

presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to

coerce a debtor to pay his debt.

The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but anoffense against public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,

under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by

society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed

and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.

Del Rosario vs. Bengzon (December 21, 1989)

Facts: Philippine Medical Association is the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines. They assail the

constitutionality of some of the provisions of Generics Act of 1988 (Rep. Act 6675) and the implementation of Administrative Order

No. 62.

The law specifically provides that All government health agencies shall use generic terminology orgeneric names in all

transactions related to purchasing, prescribing, dispensing, and administering of drugs and medicines. It also includes medical,

dental and veterinary, private practitioners shall write prescriptions using the generic name.

The petitioners main argument is the alleged unequal treatment of government practitioners and those on the private practice. It is

because the former are required to use only generic terminology in the prescription while the latter may write the brand name of the

drug below the generic name. It is allegedly a specie of invalid class legislation.
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In addition, the petitioners gave a distorted interpretation on RA 6675 and Admin Order No. 62 saying that the salesgirl and or

druggist have the discretion to substitute the doctors prescription. The court says that the salesgirl at the drugstore counter merely

informs the customer, but does not determine all the other drug products or brands that have the same generic name and their

prices.

Issue: Whether or not the Generics Act is constitutional as to theexercise of police power by the government.

Held: Petition Dismissed.

The court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act. It implements the constitutional mandate for the

State to protect and promote the right to health of the people and to make essential goods, health and othersocial

services available toall the people at affordable cost.

The alleged unequal treatment of government physicians, dentists and veterinarians on one hand and those in the private practice

in the other, is a misinterpretation of the law.

The salesgirl at the drugstore counter merely informs the customer of all available products, but does not determine all the other

drug products or brands that have the same generic name and their corresponding process.

The penal sanction in violation of the law is indispensable because they are the teeth of the law. Without them, the law would be

toothless.

The Generics Act and the implementing administrative orders of the Secretary of Health are constitutional.

The purpose of the Generics Act is to promote and require the use ofgeneric drug products that are therapeutically equivalent to

their.

TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ

Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and theCenter for Educational Measurement from enforcing a requirement the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securingcertificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering theNMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition and the NMAT was conducted andadministered as scheduled.


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The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into themedical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the successfulapplicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultationwith the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admissionrequirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate ofeligibility for admission into the medical colleges.

Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 areconstitutional.

Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to

medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable powerand authority of the sovereign to secureand promote all the important interests and needs in a word, the public order of the general community. An importantcomponent of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one candeny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration iswhether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medicalschool on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question isperhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long beenrecognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.

Ermita-Malate Hotel/Motel vs. City of Manila (20 SCRA 849)

Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the following provisions questioned for itsviolation of due process:

refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in open view;

prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;

usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also);

making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and

cancellation of license for subsequent violation.

The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari.

Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution?

Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. There is no violation o

constitutional due process for being reasonable and the ordinance is enjoys the presumption of constitutionality absent any

irregularity on its face. Taxation may be made to implement a police power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is

dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction lifted.

Dela Cruz v ParasG.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983Fernando, CJ:

Facts:1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended that the ordinance is

invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners atthe same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previouslygiven to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.


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2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councilsthe Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within Their RespectiveTerritorial Jurisdictions.'

The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinancethe establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowlingalleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction:On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title,however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.

3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of

night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power grantedremains that of regulation, notprohibition.

4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The lowercourt upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorariby wayof appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid

NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumedpower to prohibit.

1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is nodispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by theMunicipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power"to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code,such competence extending to all "the great public needs.

2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of which itwill be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A constructionthat would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself.

3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may beregulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under reviewwere sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grantlicenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with thelegislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, tocompel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporarytermination of their business.

4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

Velasco vs. Villegas [G.R. No. L-24153 (120 SCRA), February 14, 1983]

Facts: Petitioners herein are members of the Sta. Cruz BarbershopAssociation. This is an appeal from the lower court's(LC) order

dismissing their suit for declatory relief. They are challenging the constitutionality of Ord. No. 4964. They contend that it amounts to

deprivation of properties and their means of livelihood without dueprocess of law.

The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business

of massagingcustomers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the

same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is

conducted is the same person."
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Respondent in its reply, said that the Ordinance No. 4964 is constitutional and such is just an exercise of the state's inherent power

(police power).

Issue: Whether or not the assailed Ordinance violated the petitioner's right to property and their means of livelihood.

Held: Ordinance is Constitutional. Petition is dismissed, LC decision affirmed.

Enactment of such (Ordinance) is a valid exercise of Police Power.

The objectives of the Ordinance are:

(1) To impose payment of license fees for engaging in the business of massage clinics, and;

(2) To forestall possible immorality which might grow from the construction of a separate room for massaging customers.

This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. And for that reas on, the petitioners

rights were not violated and they are not deprived of the due process of law.

Magtajas vs Pryce Properties, Inc. [234 SCRA 255]

(Municipal Corporation Tests of a Valid Ordinance)

Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help

centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In

Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited

the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government.

PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City by leasing a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties

Corporation Inc. for its casino.


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On December 7, 1992, Sangguniang Panlungsod of CDO enacted ordinance 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and

cancelling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the

operation of a casino.

On January 4, 1993, it enacted Ordinance 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for violation therefore.

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the CA, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor.

The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. CDO City and its mayor filed a

petition for review under Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the Sangguniang Panlungsod can prohibit the establishment of casino operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance or

resolution.

Held: No. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in theConstitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. In the exercise of its own

discretion, the Congress may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and

allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient.

Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,

gambling and other prohibited games of chance.

Ordinances should not contravene a statue as municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils

exercise only delegated powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superiorto the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to

the following substantive requirements:

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.


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5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.

6) It must not be unreasonable.

8 (Digests from the Access Ebook)Tano v. Socrates,G.R. No. 110249, Aug. 21, 1997, 278 SCRA 154Facts:The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that certain ordinances, orders and resolutionspassed by the province of Palawan and the city of Puerto Princesa relating to the banning of shipments of live fish andlobster outside Puerto Princesa and the protection of marine coral dwelling, be declared as unconstitutional on the ground that thesaid ordinances deprive them of their right todue process of law and of their only means of livelihood.The re sp on de nt sdef end ed the val idi ty of the ord ina nce s by arg uin g that their issuance was a valid exercise of the Provincial Governmentspower under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).

Issue:Whether the ordinances are unconstitutional.

Ruling:No. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinances.The Supreme Court held that LGUs are directed byth e LGC to en ac t ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia,

ordinances that [p]protectthe environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environmentsuch as dynamite f ishing another forms of destructive f ishing x x x and such other activi t ies which resulti n p o l l u t i o n , a c c e l e r a t i o n o f e u t r o p h i c a t i o n o f r i v e r s a n d l a k e s o r o f e c o l o g i c a l i m b a lance.Furthermore,the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization as expressly mandated by the Constitution. Indispensable thereto isdevolution and the LGC expressly provides that [a]nyprovision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpretedin its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower localgovernment unit. Any fair and reas onabl e doubt as to the exis tenc e of the powe r shall be interpreted in favor of thelocal government unit concerned.Devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers power andauth orit y u pon the vario us loca l gover nmen t unit s to perf orm spec ific functions and responsibilities.

ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC., vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. 100152

Acebedo Optical applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City. After hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Cabili of

Iligan granted the permit but he attached various special conditions which basically made Acebedos dependent upon prescriptionsto be issued by local optometrists. Acebedo is not allowed to practice optometry within the city. Acebedo however acquiesced to the

said conditions and operated under the permit. Later, Acebedo was charged for violating the said conditions and was subsequently

suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then assailed the validity of the attached conditions. The local optometrists argued

that Acebedo is estopped in assailing the said conditions because it acquiesced to the same and that the imposition of the special

conditions is a valid exercise of police power; that such conditions were entered upon by the city in its proprietary function hence the

permit is actually a contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD: NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and not to practice optometry (the latter being

within the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry). The conditions attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be given anylegal application therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid exercise of police power. Though the mayor can definitely

impose conditions in the granting of permits, he must base such conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra

vires. Lastly, the granting of the license is not a contract, it is a special privilege estoppels does not apply.

CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO, JR., digested

GR # 118127, April 12, 2005 (Constitutional LawPolice Power, Regulation by Ordinance)


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FACTS: Manila Ordinance No. 7738, prohibiting the establishment or operation of businesses providing certain forms of

amusement, entertainment, services and facilities in the Ermita-Malate area, to include motels and inns, was enacted by herein

petitioners contending that the said ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power of the State in order to protect the social and

moral welfare of the community.

Respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) assailed the ordinance as an invalid exercise of police power on the

grounds that the Local Government Code grants the City Council only with the power to regulate the establishment, operation and

maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, but not to prohibit them.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 7783 of the City of Manila is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD: Petition denied. The assailed ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use

of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond the regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the

property without just compensation. It is an exercise of police power that is violative of the private property rights of individuals.

White Light Corporation et. al vs City of Manila

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009

Petitioner:White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta. Mesa Tourist & Development Corporation

Respondent:City of Manila

Facts:On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into a law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An OrdinanceProhibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging

Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila. On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and

Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or

temporary restraining order (TRO) impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila represented by Mayor Lim with the

prayer that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and

Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the

Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. The RTC issued a TRO

directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. The City alleges that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of

police power. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. On a petition for review oncertiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.

Issue:Whether Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power

Ruling:Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its

comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions
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warrant.Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its

people.Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. The apparent goal of the

Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These

goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of

these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our

emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people.

That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business

ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the

interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the

means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must

also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More

importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its

accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property

will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as

an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life,

liberty or property is affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose

exercise enjoys the presumption of validity. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

BAUTISTA VS. JUNIO, digested

GR # L-50908 January 31, 1984 (Constitutional LawPolice Power, LOI, No Violation of Equal Protection Clause)

FACTS: The constitutionality of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 869, a response to protracted oil crisis, banning the use of private

motor vehicles with H (heavy) and EH (extra heavy) plates on week-ends and holidays, was assailed for being allegedly violative of

the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution.

Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by herein respondents imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of

the vehicle and cancellation of license of owners of the above specified vehicles found violating such LOI, is likewise

unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of undue delegation of legislative power.

Respondents denied the above allegations.

ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 39 is violative of certain

constitutional rights.

HELD: No, the disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a problem that presses urgently for solution, wherein its

reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus due process is not ignored, much less infringed. The exercise of police power may

cut into the rights to liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. Those adversely affected may invoke the equal

protection clause only if they can show a factual foundation for its invalidity.

Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted pursuant to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code which contains a

specific provision as to penalties, the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth isvalid with the exception of the impounding of a vehicle

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA VS. BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION, digested

GR # L-59234, September 30, 1982 (Constitutional LawPolice Power, Equal Protection)


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FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old on

grounds that it is violative of the constitutional rights of equal protection because it is only enforced in Manila and directed solely

towards the taxi industry.

Respondents contend that the purpose of the regulation is the promotion of safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers

posed by old and dilapidated taxis.

ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD: No, the State in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the safety and general welfare of the

people. In addition, there is no infringement of the equal protection clause because it is common knowledge that taxicabs in Manila

are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use, creating a substantial distinction from taxicabs of other places.

MIRASOL VS. DPWH, digested

GR # 158793, June 8, 2006 (Constitutional LawPolice Power)

FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles at the toll way on the

ground that it is baseless and unwarranted for failure to provide scientific and objective data on the dangers of motorcycles plying

the highways. Respondent avers that the toll ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the

toll ways will compromise safety and traffic considerations.

ISSUE: Whether or not administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles is unconstitutional.

HELD: No, the use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of the police power of the state. The

sole standard in measuring its exercise is reasonableness, not exact definition and scientific formulation. It is evident that assailed

regulation does not impose unreasonable restrictions, but outlines precautionary measures designed to ensure public safety.

Anglo-Fil Trading Corp. v. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 494 (1983) Property Rights Are Subject to the Exercise of Police Power. F: The

petitioners were among 23 stevedoring and arrastre operators at the Mla South Harbor. Their licenses had expired but they were

allowed to continue to operate on the strength of temporary permits. On May 4, 1976, the resp Phil Ports Authority decided to allow

only one org. to operate the arrastre and stevedoring services. On April 28, 1980, based on the report and recommendation of an

evaluation committee, the PPA awarded the exclusive contract for stevedoring services to the Ocean Terminal Services Inc (OTSI).

The petitioners brought suit in the CFI to annul the contract for exclusive service. On motion, Ct issued a TRO enjoining PPA and

OTSI from implementing the exclusive contract. Later, the ct lifted the TRO prompting the petitioners to file an action for

certiorari with the SC contending that: (1) ex parte lifting of TRO constituted grave abuse of discretion; (2) the award would impair

the petitioners'' contracts with foreign customers. HELD: (1) Considering that the previous grant of TRO in favor of pets. was made

ex parte and w/o bond, notice and hearing of the lifting were not necessary, much less mandatory. (2) Stevedoring services are

subject to regulation and control for the public good and in the interest of the general welfare.

A single contractor furnishing the stevedoring requirements of a port has in its favor the economy of scale and the maximum

utilization of equipment and manpower. In return, effective supervision and control as well as collection and accounting of the govt

share of revenues are rendered easier than where there are 23 contractors to oversee. As resp ct found from the evidence, the

multiple contractor system has bred cut-throat competitions in the port . Understandably, most contractors had been unable to

acquire sufficient modern facilities , observe labor standards, maintain efficiency, and pay PPA dues. The contention of pets. that

due process was violated resulting in a confiscation of private property is likewise without merit. In the first place, the pets were

operating merely on "hold over"permits. In the second place, the award of OTSI was the result of a evaluation of performance of

existing contractors made by a special committee created by the PPA


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PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY VS. CIPRES STEVEDORING AND ARRASTRE INC., digested

GR # 145742 July 14, 2010(Constitutional LawPolice Power, Stevedoring)

FACTS: PPA AO No. 03-90 is an administrative order decision to bid out the cargo holding services in the ports around the country,

which is within the province and discretion of the petitioner. Respondent with hold-over permits for the continuance of its

stevedoring business, contends that the administrative order above violated the constitutional provision of non-impairment of

contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not PPA AO No. 03-90 violated the non-impairment clause.

HELD: Petition Granted. Stevedoring services are imbued with public interest and subject to the states police power. In the

legitimate exercise of the police power, all contracts are subject to the overriding demands, needs and interest of the general public

as may be determined by the State.

Note: Contract Clause cannot override Police Power doctrine.

Chavez vs. Romulo

G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004

A mere license is always revocable

FACTS:

This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to deter the rising crime rates.

Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right to property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional

Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a vested property right

HELD:

Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.

In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest exists. The

bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan

vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is

not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor

does it create a vested right. In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that:

Needless to say, alllicenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right

protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.

xxx
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In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the

Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as

determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside

of residence. Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right

protected under our Constitution.

Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an

absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably

imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory

conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a

revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in

the Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: The correlat ive power to revoke or recall

a permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is always revocable.

THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC

G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007

FACTS: The present petition for review on certiorari, rooted in the traffic congestion problem, questions the authority of the

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to order the closure of provincial bus terminals along Epifanio de los Santos

Avenue (EDSA) and major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.

Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179, with the pertinent provisions contain:

WHEREAS, the MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major

Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through

the provision of mass transport terminal facilities that would integrate the existing transport modes, namely the buses, the rail-based

systems of the LRT, MRT and PNR and to facilitate and ensure efficient travel through the improved connectivity of the different

transport modes;

Section 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES.In accordance with the plan proposed by MMDA

Section 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTING AGENCY.The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), is hereby designated

as the implementing Agency for the project.

As the above-quoted portions of the E.O. noted, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous

buses plying the streets and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes; and the MMDA had recommended a plan

to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and

convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal

facilitieswhich plan is referred to under the E.O. as the Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project (the Project).

The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project.

Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking body of the MMDA, issued

Resolution No. 03-07 series of 20037 expressing full support of the Project. Recognizing the imperative to integrate the different

transport modes via the establishment of common bus parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the need to remove the bus terminals

located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.8

On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of public transportation

with a provincial bus operation, filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of Manila. Chairman Fernando, was poised to

issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, or tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole

of the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic regulation. This impending move, it stressed, would mean the closure of its bus

terminal in Sampaloc, Manila and two others in Quezon City.


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The trial court sustained the constitutionality and legality of the E.O. pursuant to R.A. No. 7924, which empowered the MMDA to

administer Metro Manilas basic services including those of transport and traffic management.

ISSUE: W/N EO is unconstitutional

HELD: YES. The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA

as the implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor.

It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is

authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although

authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality

of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and

regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the

Project in question.

By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the

authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.

In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. No. 7924.

SECTION 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. . . .

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory

authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government

units concerning purely local matters

In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as

envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the

MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents terminals

This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in the way of its efforts at solving the pestering problem of traffic

congestion in Metro Manila. These efforts are commendable, to say the least, in the face of the abominable traffic situation of our

roads day in and day out. This Court can only interpret, not change, the law, however. It needs only to be reiterated that it is the

DOTC as the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote,

develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications which has the power to establish and administer a

transportation project like the Project subject of the case at bar

Administrative regulation; void. Executive Order No. 566, which grants the CHED the power to regulate review center, is

unconstitutional as it expands Republic Act No. 7722,. The CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private

institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational institutions. EO

566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities. A review center is not an

institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722. It does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the

jurisdiction of the CHED. Review Center Associations of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretatry Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No.

180046, April 2, 2009.

EMINENT DOMAIN

CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY [40 Phil 349; No. 14355; 31 Oct 1919]

Facts:The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for theexpropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an

extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the

privatecemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.
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Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. They further

claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and

interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.

The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein

assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine

the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.

Held: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise ofeminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities

Municipality of Paraaque vs V.M. Realty Corporation GR 127820 (July 20,1998)

G.R. No. 127820

292 SCRA 676

July 20, 1998

Facts:

Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Paraaque filed a Complaint for

expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation, over two parcels of land. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of

alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project.

Petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously made an offer to enter into a

negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter did not accept. The RTC authorized petitioner to take

possession of the subject property upon its deposit with the clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value.

Private Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a

resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160; and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or

res judicata. On private respondents motion, its answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the complaint

Issue:

Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body.

Held:

Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its

power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution

is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP

337, which was the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the

Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.

Saguitan v . City of Mandaluyong, 328 SCRA 137, GR 135087 (2000)

Facts: On October 13, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City issued a resolution authorizing Mayor Benjamin

S. Abalos to institute expropriation proceeding over the property of Alberto Suguitan located at Boni Avenue and Sto. Rosario

Streets in Mandaluyong City for the expansion of Mandaluyong Medical Center. On January 20, 1995, Mayor Abalos wrote Alberto

Suguitan offering to buy his property, but Suguitan refused to sell. Consequently, the City of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for

expropriation with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the said motion and


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subsequently, it allowed the expropriation of the subject property. Aggrieved by the said order, the heirs of Suguitan asserted that

the City of Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated power of eminent domain by means of an ordinance as required by

Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160, and not by means of a mere resolution.

Issue: WON the city of Mandaluyong has validly exercised its power of expropriation.

Held: NEGATIVE

Ratio: The Court ruled that the basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units is Section 19 of RA

7160 which provides that: "A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise

the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose, or welfare for the benefits of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just

compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent

domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not

accepted; Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the

expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value

of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated; Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid

for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the

property. In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong sought to exercise the power of eminent domain over petitioners' property by

means of a resolution, in contravention of the first requisite. The law in this case is clear and free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the

Code requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Therefore, while the Court remains

conscious of the constitutional policy of promoting local autonomy, it cannot grant judicial sanction to a local government unit's

exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in contravention of the very law giving it such power.

REYES VS. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY [395 SCRA 494; GR NO. 147511; 20 JAN 2003]

Facts:Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands belonging to the

petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project to

accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court

rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed

the judgment of the lower court.

A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the stated public purpose for the expansion of the

Dasmarias Resettlement Project when it failed to relocate the squatters from the Metro Manila area, as borne out by the ocularinspection conducted by the trial court which showed that most of the expropriated properties remain unoccupied. Petitioners

likewise question the public nature of the use by respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for the construction of low

cost housing units, which is allegedly different from the stated public purpose in the expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed

that respondent NHA has forfeited its rights and interests by virtue of the expropriation judgment and the expropriated properties

should now be returned to herein petitioners.
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Issue:Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the light of the failure of respondent NHA to use the

expropriated property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose.

Held:The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA. Accordingly, petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the

eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated

public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use"

has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience." Thus,

whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use."

In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed

area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns.

Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a

continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to

underprivileged and homelesscitizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The expropriation of private property for the purpose

of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of social justice.

APO Fruits Corp. et al vs Court of Appeals, Land Bank of the Philippines

PropertyEminent DomainDetermination of Just Compensation

AFC and Hijo Plantation Inc. were owners of 5 parcels of land (1338.60 has.) located in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao. On 12 October

1995, the two voluntarily offered to sell the properties to the DAR. DAR offered P86.9M for AFCs land and P164.40 for HPIs land.

AFC, HPI and DAR cannot agree on a price hence the Complaint for Determination of Just Compensation was filed before the DAR

Adjudication Board on 14 February 1997. The DARAB failed to render a decision on the valuation of the land for three years. But

nevertheless, the government deposited P26M into AFCs account and P45M into HPIs account as down payment in 1996. The

DAR also caused the titling of the land in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Later, titles were given to farmers under the

CARP.

Due to DARABs failure to adjudicate, AFC and HPI filed a complaint for determination of just compensationbefore the RTC of

Davao which rendered a decision in favor of AFC and HPI. The RTC ruled, based on the reports it gathered from assessors, that

the purchase price should be higher than what was offered by DAR; that the purchase price should be at P103.33/ sq. m; that DAR

is to pay AFC and HPI a total of P1.38B. DAR appealed to the CA, the CA reversed the RTC.

ISSUE:Whether or not there was just compensation.

HELD:No. AFCs and HPIs land were taken in 1996 without just compensation. DARAB, an agency of the DAR which was

commissioned by law to determine just compensation, sat on the cases for three years, which was the reason that AFC and HPI

filed the cases before the RTC. The RTCs finding is to be sustained as it based its ruling on evidence. DAR was g iven chance to

support its ruling on why the purchase price should be at a lower amount but DAR failed to present such evidence. To allow the

taking of landowners properties, and to leave them empty-handed while government withholds compensation is undoubtedly

oppressive.

The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land,

but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be

considered just inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his

land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.


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Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been

repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss.The word just is usedto intensify

the meaning of the word compensation to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken sha ll be

real, substantial, full, and ample.

The power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional

injunction that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation and in the abundant jurisprudence that

has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are:

(1) public use and

(2) just compensation.

Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) provides:

SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction.The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the

determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court

shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act

Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the determination of just

compensation, reads, as follows:

Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current

value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the

assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and

the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any

government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

Note should be taken that in said Appraisal Report, permanent improvements on AFCs and HPIs lands have been introduced and

found existing, e.g., all weather-road network, airstrip, pier, irrigation system, packing houses, among others, wherein substantial

amount of capital funding have been invested in putting them up.

The agricultural properties of AFC and HPI are just a stones throw from the residential and/or industrial sections of Tagum City, a

fact DAR should never ignore. The market value of the property (plus the consequential damages less consequential benefits) is

determined by such factors as the value of like properties, its actual or potential use, its size, shape and location.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT, digested

26 SCRA 620 (1969) (Constitutional LawEminent Domain, Expropriation, Just Compensation)

FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the Bureau of Telecommunications todemand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT, so that the Government Telephone System

could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a

contract where no agreement is had between them.

ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a valid object for

expropriation.


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HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the telephone company to permit

interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation. The use of lines

and services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an

easement of right of way.

Brgy. San Roque, Talisay, Cebu vs Heirs of Franco Pastor

Municipal CorporationEminent DomainExpropriationBP 129

In 1997, Brgy. San Roque filed for an expropriation suit before the MTC of Talisay. The MTC denied the suit because apparently

under BP 129, MTCs do not have jurisdiction over expropriation cases as it is the RTCs that are lodged with the power to try such

cases. So Brgy. San Roque filed it before RTC Talisay but then Judge Pastor denied the suit arguing that the action for eminent

domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should

be filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the

subject property was less than P20,000.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should take cognizance of the expropriation case.

HELD: Yes. Under Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil

actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; . . . . . The present action involves the exercise of

the right to eminent domain, and that such right is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

What are the two phases of expropriation cases?

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the

propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of

condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or

purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the

complaint. An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the action and

leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as

the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or

the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the

property sought to be taken. This is done by the Court with theassistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order

fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would

finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. . . .

It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities

has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government

entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the

governments exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

REPUBLIC VS. CASTELVI [58 SCRA 336; G.R. No. L-20620; 15 Aug 1974]
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Facts:In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement with Castelvi on a

year-to-year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment

proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question.

Issue: Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation should not be

determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.

The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the entry must be for more than a momentary

period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally

appropriated or injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and

deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be

determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to

be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the

complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. In the instantcase, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi property, by authority of court, on August 10, 1959.

The taking of the Castelvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned

as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. There is no basis to the contention of the Republic that a

lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a determinate

time, as was the lease of Castelvi land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand (Art. 1669, New

Civil Code). The Supreme Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of the New Civil Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in times

of extraordinary inflation or deflation because in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises from law independent of

contract.

City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilipino

Police PowerNot Validly Exercised

Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND

OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON

CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of

the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have

been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified

the law by invoking police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at

least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of

health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of

a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or

maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.


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PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO [104 Phil 443; G.R. No. L-12172; 29 Aug 1958]

Facts:The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating amongothers that construction of a building, which will destroy the

view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein

appellant filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline

station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by

a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the

public plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon,

appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly,

their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. Thereafter,

defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.

Held:No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to

permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts

to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the

beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents.

As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned

under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants

would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being

urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be

heard.

NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991) F: For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, Napocor''s lines

have to pass the lands belonging to respondents. Unsuccessful with its negotiations for the acquisition of the right of way

easements, Napocor was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings. ISSUE: W/N petitoner should be made to pay simple

easement fee or full compensation for the land traversed by its transmissin lines. RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that

"Normally, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of the title to, and possession of, the expropriated

property, but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burrden upon the owner of the

condemned property, without loss of title or possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be

subjected to an easement of right of way." In this case, the easement is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain.

Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the transmission lines, the limitations imposed by the NPC against the use of

the land (that no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed below the lines) for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of ts

ordinary use.

For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation which should neither be more nor less,

whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just equiivalent has always been

understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of

the expropriation. The price or value of the land and its character at the time of taking by the Govt. are the criteria for determining

just cmpensation.
http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/people-vs-fajardo-104-phil-443-gr-no-l.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/people-vs-fajardo-104-phil-443-gr-no-l.html


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Source:http://www.shvoong.com/law-and-politics/1767235-case-digest-napocor-gutierrez-193/#ixzz2qqrUsppz

United States v. Causby

Citation.22 Ill.328 U.S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 90 L. Ed. 1206 (1946)

Brief Fact Summary.Respondents claim that their property was taken, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, by the regular

army and navy aircraft flights over their house and chicken farm.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.The airspace is a public highway, but if the landowner is to have the full enjoyment of his land, he must

have exclusive control over the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.

Facts.Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. Respondents property contained a

house and a chicken farm. The end of one of the runways of the airport was 2,220 feet from Respondents property, and the glide

path passed over the property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn, and 18 feet above the highest

tree. The use by the United States of this airport is pursuant to a lease beginning June 1, 1942, and ending June 30, 1942, with

provisions for renewal until June 30, 1967, or six months after the end of the national emergency, whichever is earlier. The United

States four motored bombers make loud noises when flying above the property, and have very bright lights. Respondents chicken

farm production had to stop, because 150 chickens were killed by flying into walls from fright. In the Court of Claims, it was found

that the United States had taken an easement over the property on June 1, 1942, and that the val

ue of the property depreciation as the result of the easement was $2,000.00. The United States petitioned for certiorari, which was

granted.

Issue.Has the Respondents property been taken within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment?

Held.Yes. But the case is remanded for a determination of the value of the easement and whether the easement was permanent or

temporary.

The court noted the common law doctrine of ownership of land extending to the sky above the land. However, the court notes that

an act of Congress had given the United States exclusive national sovereignty over the air space. The court noted that common

sense made the common law doctrine inapplicable.

However, the court found that the common law doctrine did not control the present case. The United States had conceded in oral

argument that if flights over the Respondents property rendered it uninhabitable then there would be a taking compensable under

the Fifth Amendment. The measure of the value of the property taken is the owners loss, not the takers gain.

The airspace is a public highway. But it is obvious that if the landowner is to have the full enjoyment of his land, he must have

exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. If this were not true then landowners could not build

buildings, plant trees or run fences.

The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain. The court does not set the precise

limits of the line of demarcation. Flights over private land are not a taking, unless, like here, they are so low and frequent as to be a

direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment of the land. The Court of Claims must, upon remand, determine the value of

the easement and whether it is a temporary or permanent easement.

Dissent.The dissent would reverse the decision of the Court of Claims and hold that there has been no taking within the meaning

of the Fifth Amendment. This is because of the modern nature of the airplane, and the desire to avoid confusion.
http://www.shvoong.com/law-and-politics/1767235-case-digest-napocor-gutierrez-193/#ixzz2qqrUsppzhttp://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X5C11T?jcsearch=328%2520U.S.%2520256#jcite%22&ORIGINATION_CODE=00344http://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X5C11T?jcsearch=328%2520U.S.%2520256#jcite%22&ORIGINATION_CODE=00344http://www.shvoong.com/law-and-politics/1767235-case-digest-napocor-gutierrez-193/#ixzz2qqrUsppz


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Philippine Press Institute vs. comelec

Phil. Press Institute, Inc. vs. Comelec

244 scra 272

Facts:

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, PPI, a non-stock, non-

profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and

void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against

the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter

directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-

ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech,

of the press and of expression.

On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec

Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does

not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, thequestioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of "Comelec space," the

procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidate's utilization

of the "Comelec space" procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution

and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police

power of the State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the

power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises

during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

Issue:

Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections is valid.

Held:

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2 of Resolution No.

2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the

Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section

8 of Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi:

1. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives,

purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal

constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified.

2. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack

of an actual, justiciable case or controversy.


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Filstream International Incorporated v. CA, 284 SCRA 716, Jan. 23, 1998 [Francisco]

The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to acquire private lands in the city and subdivide

these lands into home lots for sale to bona fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the city.

That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not diminish its public character. It is simply not

possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them.

Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a flexible concept, influenced by changing

conditions. Public use now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land

reform and housing.

Lagcao vs. Labra

FACTS:In 1965 petitioners purchased a lot (1029) on installment basis from the province of Cebu. Consequently, the province

through the City of Cebu tried to annul the sale which prompted the petitioner to file civil action in the court of first instance.On July

9, 1986, the court of first instance ruled that the province execute a deed of salein favor of the petitioner. On June 11, 1992, the

Court of Appeals affirmed the decisionof the trial court wherein this ruling was affirmed by the CA.After the title was acquired,

petitioners discovered that the property was occupied bysquatters which prompted them to institute ejectment proceedings. In this

regard, TheMunicipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cebu City, rendered a decision onApril 1, 1998, ordering the squattersto vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed theMTCC's decision and issued a writ of execution and order of demolitionThe writ of

execution and order of demolition was suspended for 120 days when CebuCity Alvin Garcia wrote a request for the deferment of the

ejection order on the groundthat the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. During the effect of the suspension

order, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City passed a resolution andan Ordinance on Feb 22, 1999 and June 30, 1999

respectively, which identified lot 1029as part of the socialized housing in pursuant of RA 7279. On July 19, 2000, Ordinance No.

1843 was enacted authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings on petitioners property.Issue:Whether or

not Cebu City Ordinance No. 1843 contravenes the Constitution and other applicable lawsRuling:The enactment of Ordinance 1843

contravenes the Constitution and other applicablelaws.First, Ordinance 1843 contravenes the constitution because condemnationof

private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the randomexpropriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a few

tenants or squatters is certainly not the condemnation for public use contemplated by the Constitution. This is depriving a citizen of

his property for theconvenience of a few without perceptible benefit to the publicSecond, the ordinance is violative of the petitioners

right to due process since petitionershad already obtained a favorable judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of their

property. The judgment in this ejectment case had, in fact, already attained finality,with a writ of execution and an order of

demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the trialcourt to suspend the demolition on the pretext that the City was still searching for

arelocation site for the squatters. However, instead of looking for a relocation site duringthe suspension period, the city council

suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for theexpropriation of petitioners' lot. It was trickery and bad faith, pure and simple.Third, RA

7160 itself explicitly states that local appropriation of property must complywith the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.


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Relatively, RA 7279 mandatesthat local expropriation of property must comply on the order of the priorities on theexpropriation of

property under section 10 for which private property ranks last in theorder of priorities provided under section 9.

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. VS. MUNICIPALITY (NOW CITY) OF PASIG, METRO

MANILA, digested

GR # 152230 August 9, 2005 (Constitutional LawEminent Domain, Expropriation, Valid and Definite Offer)

FACTS: Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision of declaring respondent municipality (now city) as having the right to

expropriate petitioners property for the construction of an access road. Petitioner argues that there was no valid and definite offer

made before a complaint for eminent domain was filed as the law requires (Art. 35, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local

Government Code). Respondent contends that a letter to purchase was offered to the previous owners and the same was not

accepted.

ISSUE: Whether or not a letter to purchase is sufficient enough as a definite and valid offer to expropriate.

HELD: No. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite offer will result in the dismissal of the

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