CONSTI Page 9-10 Right Against Self-Incrimination - Scope of Constitutional Protection

7/29/2019 CONSTI Page 9-10 Right Against Self-Incrimination - Scope of Constitutional Protection

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I. RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

US vs. NAVARRO

Complainant-Appellee: The United States

Defendants-Appellants: Baldomero Navarro et al.

January 11, 1904

McDonough, J.

Facts:

The defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de Leon, and Fidel Feliciano are convicted of

the crime of illegal detention under Article 481 and of 483 of the Penal Code. They were

sentenced to life imprisonment.

Article 481 of the Penal Code provides that a private person who shall lock up or detain

another, or in any way deprive him of his liberty shall be punished with the penalty of prision

mayor.

The second paragraph of article 483 provides that one who illegally detains another and fails

to give information concerning his whereabouts, or does not prove that he set him at liberty,

shall be punished with cadena temporal in its maximum degree to life imprisonment.

The punishment for the crime mentioned in article 483 of the Penal Code is the penalty of

cadena temporal in its maximum degree to cadena perpetua, or in other words one

convicted of simply depriving a person of his liberty may be imprisoned for a term of from six

to twelve years and one convicted of depriving a person of his liberty and who shall not state

his whereabouts or prove that he had set said person at liberty may be punished by

imprisonment for a term of seventeen years four months and one day, to life, as in this case.

In other words, for failure on the part of the defendant to testify regarding the whereaboutsof the person deprived of his liberty, or to prove that he was set at liberty, the punishment

may be increased from imprisonment for a term of six years to life imprisonment.

On appeal, counsel for the defendants argued that the provisions of the law has the effect of

forcing a defendant to become a witness in his own behalf or to take a much severer

punishment. The burden is put upon him of giving evidence if he desires to lessen the

penalty, or, in other words, of incriminating himself, for the very statement of the

whereabouts of the victim or the proof that the defendant set him at liberty amounts to a

confession that the defendant unlawfully detained the person. So the evidence necessary to

clear the defendant, under article 483 of the Penal Code, would have the effect of convincing

him under article 481. It is claimed that such practice is illegal, since section 5 of the

Philippine Bill provides that ". . . no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a

witness against himself."

Issue: WON the defendants' rights against self-incrimination were violated.

Held:

Yes.

The right against self-incrimination was established on the grounds of public policy and

humanity - of policy, because if the party were required to testify, it would place the witness

under the strongest temptation to commit the crime of perjury, and of humanity, because it

would prevent the extorting of confessions by duress.

Under the present system, the information must charge the accused with acts committed by

him prior to the filing of the information and which of themselves constitute an offense

against the law. The Government can not charge a man with one of the necessary elements

of an offense and trust to his making out the rest by availing himself of his right to leave the

entire burden of prosecuting on the prosecution from beginning to end.

If the disclosure thus made would be capable of being used against him as a confession of

crime, or an admission of facts tending to prove the commission of an offense, such

disclosure would be an accusation against himself.

In the present case, if the defendant disclosed the whereabouts of the person taken, or

shows that he was given his liberty, this disclosure may be used to obtain a conviction under

article 481 of the Penal Code.

It is the duty of the prosecution, in order to convict o ne of a crime, to produce evidence

showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and the accused cannot be called upon either by

express words or acts to assist in the production of such evidence; nor should his silence be

taken as proof against him. He has a right to rely on the presumption of innocence until the

prosecution proves him guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged.

On Self-Incrimination:

The provision that no one is bound to criminate himself is older than the Government of the

United States. At an early day it became a part o f the common law of England.

It was established on the grounds of public policy and humanity of policy, because if the

party were required to testify, it would place the witness under the strongest temptation to


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commit the crime of perjury, and of humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of

confessions by duress.

It had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused

person, which had long obtained in the continental system.

In other words, the very object of adopting this provision of law was to wipe out such

practices as formerly prevailed in these Islands of requiring accused persons to submit to

judicial examinations, and to get testimony regarding the offense with which they werecharged.

VILLAFLOR vs. SUMMERS

Sept. 8, 1920

Malcolm, J.

Facts:

- EmetriaVillaflor was charged with adultery.- She was then asked to submit to a physical examination to determine is she was

pregnant or not. She challenged the order on the ground that it was violating the

constitutional provision to self-incrimination.

Issue:

- WON Villaflor can be compelled to permit her body to be examined is a violation ofthe Bill of Rights and the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Held:

- No. It does not violate both. Prayer for writ of habeas corpus is denied.- People vs McCoy: court deemed it a violation of the Constitution to compel the

defendant to submit her body to examination

- State vs Height, J. McClain said that a defendant can be compelled to disclose onlythose parts of the body which are not usually covered.

- Court looked for more progressive decisions. Holt vs US, J. Holmes said that theprohibition is to the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication.

The body is excluded from it as evidence.

- The Philippine SC also said that the limitation is a prohibition against legal processto extract an admission of his guilt.

- Under the due process of law, every person has a natural and inherent right to thepossession and control of his own body. HOWEVER, superior to the complete

immunity of a person to be let alone is the inherent characteristic which the public

has to properly administer justice.

BELTRAN vs. SAMSON and JOSE

Date: September 23, 1929

Ponente: Romualdez, J.

Parties:

Plaintiff: Francisco Beltran

Respondents: Felix Samson (Judge of the Second Judicial District) and Francisco Jose

(Provincial Fiscal of Isabela)

Facts:

Fiscal Francisco Jose petitioned to have Francisco Beltran to appear before theprovincial fiscal to write in his own handwriting what will be dictated to him.

o for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting anddetermining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents

supposed to be falsified.

Judge Felix Samson granted the motion. Petitioner Beltran refused to perform what was demanded and appealed the order

of the lower court.

Fiscal Jose and Judge Samson contend that the petitioner is not entitled to theremedy applied for, inasmuch as the order prayed for by the provincial fiscal and

later granted by the lower court is based on the provisions of section 1687 of the

Administrative Code and on jurisprudence

o the fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the properjudge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at

the investigation of any crime or misdemeanor.


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In refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, Beltran seeks refuge in theconstitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General

Orders, No. 58 which provides: "Nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a

witness against himself."

Issue/s:

Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of

comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documentssupposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning

of the constitutional prohibition?

Held/Ratio per Issue:

YES.

As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to allgiving or furnishing of evidence.

In Bradford vs. People, it was held that whenever the defendant, at the trial of hiscase, testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain writing or signature is i n his

own hand, he may on cross-examination be compelled to write in open court. Of

similar tenor is the ruling in Sprouse v. Com

The said rulings however does not apply to the instant case since the instant case isonly an investigation prior to the information and with a view to filing it and the

defendant performed the act voluntarily.

In People v. Molineux, the court declared that a defendant has the right to declineto write. In First National Bank vs. Robert, the court declared that a defendant

could not be compelled to write his name.

Writing something is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one'spossession and, with regard to producing document or chattels, Professor Wigmore

wrote: the production of documents or chattels by a person... may be refused

under the protection of the privilege; and this is universally conceded.

For the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between onewho is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a

specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness i s required to furnish

evidence against himself.

Compelling one to produce a specimen of his handwriting is more serious than thatof compelling the production of documents or chattels, because here the witness is

compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does

not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier.

THUS, the respondents are enjoined fromcompelling the petitioner to take downdictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for

comparison.

CABAL vs. CAPUNAN

1962

J. Concepcion

Facts:

On or about August 1961, Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed withthe Secretary of Nation Defense a letter-complaint charging petitioner ManuelCabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the P hilippines, with "graft,

corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an officer and

gentleman dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his assets and liabilities

in 1958 and other equally reprehensible acts"

The President of the Philippines then created a committee to investigate thecharge of unexplained wealth contained in said letter-complaint and submit its

report and recommendations as soon as possible

At the beginning of the investigation, the Committee, upon request of complainantCol. Maristela, ordered the petitioner Cabal to take the witness stand and be

sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of

unexplained wealth

Cabal objected, invoking his constitutional r ight against self-incrimination The Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to,

subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory

This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to be sworn to as a witness totake the witness stand

The Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of Manila, for such action as hemay deem proper


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The City Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a charge of contemptfor failing to obey the order of the Committee to take the witness stand. It prayed

that respondent be summarily adjudged guilty of contempt of the Presidential

Committee and accordingly disciplined as in contempt of court imprisonment until

such time as he shall obey the subject order of said committee

Petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash, which was denied. Hencethis petition for certiorari and prohibition

It is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answerincriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand.

In this case, respondents allege that the investigation being conducted by theCommittee above referred to is administrative, not criminal, in nature and because

of this, under the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination, petitioner

may only refuse to answer incriminatory questions BUT cannot refuse to take the

witness stand. In this case, the issue is whether the proceedings before the

aforementioned Committee is civil or criminal in character

ISSUE:

WON the proceedings before the Committee is civil or criminal, and in turn, WON Cabal may

invoke his right against self-incrimination

Held:

Although the said Committee was created to investigate the administrativecharge of unexplained wealth, it seems that the purpose of the charge against

petitioner is to apply the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes

the forfeiture to the State of pro perty of a public officer or employee which is

manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee

and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquiredproperty. Such forfeiture has been held to partake of the nature of a penalty.

As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed

criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case

from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable

thereto

No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness againsthimself. This prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a

witness against himself applies to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal

proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by

reason of the commission of an offense

Where the position of the witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, itwould appear that he may invoke the privilege in support of a blanket refusal

to answer any and all questions

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted and respondent Judge herebyenjoined permanently from proceeding further in Criminal Case No. 60111 of

the Court of First Instance of Manila. It is so ordered.

BENGZON vs. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE

DATE: November 1991

PONENTE: Padilla, J.

[from Magic Notes]

PARTIES:

JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE MILLS JR.,LEONARDO GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO CALUYA,

AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS, ELVIE CASTILLO, and CYNTHIA SABIDO

LIMJAP, petitioners,

THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by and throughthe CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAADA, respondents, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, intervenor.

FACTS:

July 30, 1987: the Phil. Represented by the Presidential Commission on GoodGovernance [PCGG] filed a complaint with he Sandiganbayan against the petitioners.

PCGG allege that Petitioners Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and Juliette Gomez

Romualdez, alleged cronies of forms Pres. Marcos and First Lady Imelda Romualdez

Marcos, engaged in schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the

expense of the Filipino People.

o Among these strategemsare : 1] control of some big business enterprises suchas MERALCO, Pilipinas Shell, and PCI Bank, 2] manipulation of the formation of

Erectors Holding Inc., to appeard viable and borrow more capital, reaching a

total of more than P2 billion, 3] collaboration with lawyers (petitioners therin)

of the Bengzon Law Offices in concealing funds and properties, in

maneuvering the purported sale of interests in certain corps, in misusing the

Meralco Pension Fund worth P25M and in hiding behind the veil of corporateentity.


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Sept 13, 1988: Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on thealleged take-over of SolOil Inc. by Ricardo Lopa [died during pendency of the case] and

called upon the Senate to look into possible violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act or RA 3019. The Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or

Blue Ribbon Committee [SBRC] started its investigation through a hearing on May 23,

1989. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear

before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36)

corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez",but Lopa and Bengzon

declined to testify.

The SBRC rejected petitioner Bengzons plea and voted to pursue its investigation.Petitioner claims that the SBRC, in requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in

excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE(S):

1. WON the court has jurisdiction over this case.YES2. WON the SBRCs inquiry has a valid legislative purpose.NO3. WON the sale or disposition of the Ro mualdezcorp is a purely private transaction which

is beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into.YES

4. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process.NO

HELD/RATIO (per issue):

1. As the Court held in Angara vs Electoral Commission, the Consti provided for anelaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the

depts. of the thegovt, and it is the judiciary that was vested of the powers to determine

the scope, nature, and extent of such powers

2 & 3. Sec. 21, ART 6 of the Consti provides The Senate may conduct inquiries in aid of

legislation in accordance with its

duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by

such inquiries shall be respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislationisnt, therefore, absolute or unlimited. With regard to the rights that shall be

respected, it should be considered to refer to the Bill of Rights, particularly to the

right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against ones

self.

The speech of Sen. Enrile contained no suggestion on contemplated legislation;he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA

3019. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent SBRC was tofind out WON the relatives of Pres. Aquino, particularly Ricardo Lopa, had

violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36/39 corps of

KokoyRomualdez to the Lopa Group. There appears no intended legislation

involved.

The inquiry also isnt conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution 212, as thecommittee alleges. The inquiry under SR212 is to look into the charges against

PCGG filed by stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the

implementation of Sec. 26 ART 18 of the Consti. Mr. Lo pa and the petitioners

arent connected with the govt and did th eir acts as private citizens, hence, such a

case of alleged graft and corruption is within the jurisdiction of the courts---notthe SBRC. In fact, the Sandiganbayan already took jurisdiction of this issue before

the SBRC did. The inquiry of the respondent committee into the same justiciable

controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment into

the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction.

4. One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Consti is the right against self-

incrimination. This right, construed as the right to remain completely silent, may be availed

of by the accused in a criminal case; but it may invoked by other witnesses only as questions

are asked of them. This extends also to respondents in administrative investigation, but only

if they partake of the nature of a crim proceeding.

This isnt so in this case. But since the court already held that t he inquiry isnt in aidof legislation, the petitioners therein cant be compelled to testify.

Petition is GRANTED. The SBRC is enjoined from compelling the petitioners and intervenor to

testify before it and produce evidence at the said inquiry.

GALMAN vs. PAMARAN


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Cuevas, JR, J.

Parties:

Petitioner: Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman

Respondents: Hon. Justice Manuel Pamaran, Associate justices Amores, Vera Cruz of

Sandiganbayan, Hon. Fernandez, Tanodbayan, etc.

FACTS:

The case is essential about the events that occurred on august 21, 1983, whenNinoy Aquino was assassinated. Due to popular demand, a fact finding board was

created (PD 1886), aka Agrava Board. Its duties and powers were to conduct

hearings and gather witnesses and evidence. Some of those who were asked to

appear before the board were General Ver, Major Olivas, etc.

After the reports were submitted to the President and eventually the TanodBayan,two criminal cases were instigated with the private respondents charged asprincipals and accessories, and one accomplice. All p leaded not guilty.

The Tanodbayan offered as part of its evidence the individual testimonies of theprivate respondents before the Agrava board. The Respondents objected to the use

of their admissions because it would violate of their constitutional right against

self-incrimination and of the immunity granted to them by PD 1886. The

Tanodbayan claimed that such immunity was not available to them because they

did not invoke their right against self-incrimination before the Agrava Board.

On June 13, 1985, respondent SANDIGANBAYAN issued a Resolution, now assailedin these two (2) petitions, admitting all the evidences offered by the prosecution

except the testimonies and/or other evidence produced by the private respondents

in view of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. 13

Hence, these two petitions assailing the resolution. Arguments of the Petitioner:

o Did not invoke the immunity before the Agrava Board, hence theimmunity did not attach and such failure to claim said privilege amounts

to a waiver

Arguments of the Respondent:

o Their testimonies cannot be used against them because of Sec. 5 o f PD1886 (granting them immunity) and because of their constitutional right

against self incrimination

ISSUE:

WON the testimonies given by the 8 respondents who did not invoke their rights against self-

incrimination before the Agrava board are admissible as evidence? NO!

HELD:

The testimonies cannot be used. Case is dismissed.

Agrava Board was created to find out the facts of the killing and to determine thepersons criminally responsible. PD sec. 12: board may initiate the filing of proper

complaint before the appropriate government agency. Furthermore, the PD

guarantees that persons called to testify have the right to counsel at any stageproceeding. Hence, it was clear that not only witnesses but also suspects to the

killing were called to testify before the board.

PD 1886 actually denied all the respondents the right to remain silent. Section 5 ofP.D. 1886 left them with no choice since they had to take the witness stand, testify

or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or refused to do so.

Both these constitutional rights (to remain silent and not to be compelled to be awitness against himself) were right away totally foreclosed by P.D. 1886. And yet

when they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune

from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them.

Furthermore, the right to remain silent is available to all persons underinvestigation and for all confessions or admissions (Any person under investigation

for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain and to counsel, and

to be informed of such right).

The right against self-incrimination is to avoid the evil of extorting from the verymouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense,

the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him.

Based on the facts, it is not far-fetched to conclude that the respondents werecalled to stand to determine their probably involvement in the crime beinginvestigated. Yet they have not been informed or at the very least even warned


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while so testifying even at that particular stage of their testimonies, of their right to

remain silent and that any statement given by them may be used against them

It is true that if such right is waived, then the evidence could be used. However, inthe light of PD 1886 sec. 5 and the awesome contempt power of the board to

punish any refusal to testify or produce evidence, We are not persuaded that when

they testified, they voluntarily waived their constitutional rights not to be

compelled to be a witness against themselves much less their right to remain silent.

We believe that they were compelled (pressured to commit an act disabled himfrom making a free and rational choice) to comply and testify before the board.

Whether or not the case is a criminal one or not, it is the nature of the proceedingsthat control and not the character of the suit. The privilege (right against self-

incrimination/sec. 20 art. IV) has consistently been held to extend to all

proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be

visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.

Therefore, the rights of the respondents should still be honored. By using the testimonies which violates the exclusionary rule (art. III sec. 20), the

right to due process was also denied to the respondents.

Now, considering the immunity granted to the respondents through the PD sec. 5(transactional immunity which grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for

an offense to which his compelled testimony relates): his testimony or any

evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any

transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled. Hence, due to this

immunity, he is not immune from prosecution but he is saved from the use of his

testimony against him.

Hence, for due process, it demands that private respondents should have beeninformed of their rights to remain silent and warned that any and all statements to

be given by them may be used against them. This, they were denied, under the

pretense that they are not entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so

inform them.

Hence, because of this, we cannot agree with the view of the petitioner that theright against self-incrimination must be invoked before the Board in order to

prevent use of any given statement against the testifying witness in a subsequent

criminal prosecution.

Art. III Sec. 20: Renders inadmissible any confession (and admission) obtained inviolation thereof.

Hence, because of the powers (giving out harsh penalties when not testifying) thatthe PD grants the board, it is only understandable and fair that the PD grants the

respondents immunity for their testimonies, so as to safeguard his constitutional

right.

But in this case, the compulsion has already produced its desired results the privaterespondents had all testified without offer of immunity. Their constitutional rights

are therefore, in jeopardy. The only way to cure the law of its unconstitutional

effects is to construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in fact been offered.

We hold, therefore, that in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal totestify or to answer questions under Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies compelled

thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same law.

II. UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE

STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO

1967.06.19

Concepcion

Topic: Unlawful Search and Seizure

Parties:

PetitionersHarry S. Stonehill(Prominent Businessman in the 60s)

Respondents Jose W. Diokno (Secretary of Justice)

Background on the Parties: (optional reading hehehe)

- Harry Stonehill was one of the most prominent businessmen in the 1960s. He was aformer US military man who struck gold in the Philippines. He started his business

with a tobacco company which soon paved the way for other businesses like

newspaper, insurance, cotton, glass, oil etc He became infamous for allegedly

bribing officials in the government, which included low ranking officials to senators.

- Stonehills wheeling and dealing piqued the interest of then DOJ Secretary Dioknobecause of his alleged corrupt practices. Stonehill was known to have a certain


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bluebook, which contained a list of government officials who were under his

payroll. Secretary Diokno was an up and rising lawyer who topped the bar and was

known for his integrity. After his stint in the DOJ, Macapagal allegedly fired him for

his raids of Stonehills warehouses. He then became a lauded Senator of the

Republic. During the Martial Law years, he along with Ninoy Aquino, were some of

the most vocal enemies of the state. It was the Stonehill v. Diokno case, which

propelled the young lawyer to greater heights.

Facts: (eto hindi na optional)

- 42 search warrants were issued against the petitioners and their co rporations tosearch and seize the following pro perties: Books of accounts, financial records,

vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,

typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions

including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements

and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

- The subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of theoffense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,"

which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central

Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised

Penal Code."

- Petitioners: search warrants are null and void, contravened the constitution andthe rules of court. They aver that the warrants (1) do not describe with particularity

the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in

the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence

against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4)

the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents,

papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued thewarrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.

- Respondents: (1) the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued inaccordance with law; (2) the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by

petitioners' consent; and (3) in any event, the effects seized are admissible in

evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the

aforementioned searches and seizures.

-Issue: WON the searches and seizures were illegal and the items inadmissible in court. YES

Ratio:

- The documents and papers seized are split into two categories: (a) those found andseized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and

seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

- (a) As regards the first group, the petitioners cannot validly assail the legality of thewarrants because the corporations are distinct from the petitioners. The party

whose rights have been impaired can only contest the legality of the seizure.

Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence

against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and

premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the

admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusivelyto the corporations, to

whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers

in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

- (b) Regarding the second group, two important questions need be settled, namely:(1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made

under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding

question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be

used in evidence against petitioners herein.

- Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate,namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined

by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall

particularlydescribe the things to be seized. As regards to the warrants, none of

the requirements have been complied with. No specific offense had been alleged in

the said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the o ffense

committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who

issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the samepresupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party a gainst whom it is

sought has performedparticularacts, or committed specific omissions, violating a

given provision of our criminal laws.

- To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe outcompletely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution,

for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication

and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace

officers.

-Dispositive: We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado casemust be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3)


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EO 398 is declared illegal insofar as it allows the Deportation Board to issuewarrants of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against the alien, and requires

the fixing of a bond for temporary release of the alien.

Ratio:

1)

Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940) authorized theCommissioner of Immigration to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after

previous determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of grounds

for such charges.

But with the enactment of this Act however, the Legislature did not intend toconcentrate the exercise of the power to deport on the Immigration Commissioner

alone. In Sec. 52 of the Act, it is stated that the Act supersedes any previous law

relating to the entry of aliens and their deportation, EXCEPT Sec. 69 of Act No.

2711, which will continue in effect.

Sec. 69 of Act No. 2711 (Revised Administration Code), states that an alienresiding in the country shall not be deported by the President of the Philippines

except upon prior investigation conducted by said Executive, or by his authorized

agent.

Sec. 69 of Act 2711 did not expressly confer authority to deport aliens upon thePresident, unlike the express grant to the Commissioner of Immigration in

Commonwealth Act No. 613. But, the said provision was expressly declared

exempted from the repealing effect of Commonwealth Act No. 613. This clearly

indicates the Legislatures ratification of the Chief Executives power to deport.

Moreover, that power has been sanctioned by the Courts in many cases.

Deportation of an undesirable alien may therefore be effected in 2 ways:1) By order of the President after due investigation (pursuant to Sec. 69 of Act No.

2711);

2) By the Commissioner of Immigration upon recommendation by the Board of

Commissioners (pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 613)

2)

Pursuant to EO No. 33 of President Quezon, the Deportation Board was created.Under Sec. 69 of Act No. 2711, the power to deport may be delegated to the

Presidents authorized agent. The Deportation Board has been conducting

investigations as the authorized agent of the President.

Commonwealth Act No. 613 expressly grants the Commissioner of Immigration thepower to make arrests. However, Act No. 2711 is silent as to whether the President

has the power to order the arrest an alien.

Solution to this: President Quirino issued EO No. 398 on Jan. 5, 1951, whichreorganized the Deportation Board. It provided that upon the filing of fo rmal

charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, the Deportation Board was

authorized to issue warrants of arrest of the aliens complained of, and to hold

them under detention during investigation unless they file bonds for temporary

release.

3)

However, the court notes that EO 398 is incompatible with Sec. 1, Art. III of the Billof Rights, which provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effectsagainst unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants

shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after

examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he

may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons

or things to be seized.

Justice Laurel stated in his concurring opinion of Rodriguez, et. al. v. Villamiel, thatthis right is not the same as the guarantee afforded to the accused under the Jones

Law. Instead, this is a right equally afforded to all people, meaning to citizens and

also to aliens in our country.

Moreover, the provision of the Bill of Rights explicitly mentions that no warrantsshall issue but upon probable cause. Therefore warrants will be issued by the

authority according to his discretion and discernment on whether probable cause

exists or not. Moreover, the issuance of warrants must be viewed with care, as

their order will curtail a persons liberty, and is dependent on the conditions

determined by the discretion of the authorized person issuing the warrant.

It is followed as a rule that ministerial duties may be delegated, but not thosewhich require the exercise of discretion and judgment, such as in this case. Thus, an


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implied grant of power to curtail a persons liberty and fundamental rights of a

person must also be viewed with caution. The guarantees of human rights and

freedom cannot be made to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation.

Dispositive:

EO 398 series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue

warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens, and tofix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is

declared illegal.

The order of arrest issued by the Deportation Board is declared null and void and

the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled.

With the foregoing modification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.

LABO, JR. vs, COMELEC

Aug 1, 1989

Cruz

Facts:

Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the Philippines. He was grantedAustralian citizenship in 1976. In 1980, the marriage was declared void for being

bigamous.

Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980, using an Australian passport, andobtained an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). He later applied for a change instatus from immigrant to returning Filipino citizen. However, the Commission on

Immigration and Deportation denied his application for the cancellation of his ACR

since he has not applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship.

According to the records of the Australian Embassy (as certified by the AustralianConsul),Labo was still an Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although no direct

evidence was presented to prove that he took an oath o f allegiance as a naturalized

Australian citizen, the laws of Australia at the time required any person over the

age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance.

The wording/text of this oath includes a renunciation of all other allegiance.

Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City in the local elections held on January 18,1988. The second-placer, Luis Lardizabal, filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging

that Labo is disqualified from holding public office on the grounds of alienage, and

asking that the latters proclamation as Mayor be annulled. ISSUES:*The original

issue raised before the Supreme Court concerned only the COMELEC's jurisdiction

over Lardizabal's petition. Labo contended that the petition for quo warranto was

not filed on time, hence the COMELEC lacks the jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry

regarding his citizenship. However, the SC decided to rule on the merits of the case,

given that the issue is also of considerable importance (a foreign citizen holdingpublic office in the Philippines), and in the interest of the speedy administration of

justice.

Issues:

Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire into Labo's citizenship? Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen Is he qualified to hold public o ffice in the Philippines? If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor, can Lardizabal, as the runner-up in the

elections, replacehim?

Held:

Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition for quo warranto was filed on time.Lardizabal did not immediately pay the filing fee because the COMELEC had at first

considered the petition as a pre-proclamation proceeding, which does not require

the payment of such a fee. When the COMELEC reclassified the petition, Lardizabal

immediately paid the filing fee -- thus, he still complied with the prescribed 10-day

period. Furthermore, the Court held that such technicalities should not

hinder judicial decisions on significant issues, such as the one being decided in thiscase.

Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his Philippine citizenship by all 3 modesspecified in the Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express

renunciation of citizenship, and (3)subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support

the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. He has not reacquired Philippine

citizenship by any of the 3 methods prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct actor

Congress, (2) naturalization, and (3) repatriation.- Contrary to Labo's claim, his

naturalization in Australia did not confer him with dual citizenship. The Constitution

explicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to national interest.- The contention

that his marriage to an Australian national did not automatically divest him ofFilipino citizenship is irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo had automatically


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ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. Also, his Filipino citizenship has

not been automatically restored upon the annulment of his Australian citizenship,

when his marriage was declared void on the grounds of bigamy.- The Commission

on Immigration and Deportation held in 1988 that Labo was not a Filipino citizen.

The earlier contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is totally baseless, and is

even alleged to have been politically motivated. The latter can be reversed because

the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship.

Labo is not eligible to hold public o ffice in the Philippines. He was not even aqualified voter when he was elected

Despite getting the second highest number of votes, Lardizabal cannot assume theposition of Mayor because he has not been duly elected by the people of Baguio

City. Labo's disqualification alone does not entitle him to take office. Instead, the

elected Vice Mayor shall replace Labo

AZNAR vs. COMELEC

May 25, 1990

FACTS:

On November 19, 1987, respondent Emilio Lito Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy

with the COMLEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18,

1988 elections.

On January 22, 1988, Aznar, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of

respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the

United States.

January 27, 1988 petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation and presented evidence that

respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-21448

and Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 133911.

On January 28, 1988 the COMELEC resolved to order the Board to co ntinue canvassing but to

suspend the proclamation.

On March 3, 1988 the COMELEC directed the Board to proclaim the winning candidate and

the respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.

On June 11, 1988 COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been

timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that respondent is not a Filipino citizen.

ISSUE:

WON the petition was timely filed.

WON the respondent is not a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

First Issue

The petition was filed out of time.

A petition can be filed before election, pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

- The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from thetime of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after the

notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days b efore the election.

A petition can be filed after election, pursuant to Section 253.

- Any voter contesting the election o f any Member of the Batasang Pambansa,regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to

the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the

Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.

Evidence shows that respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on November 19, 1987 and

that the petitioner filed his petition for disqualification on January 222, 1988. It went past the

25-day period; clearly the petition was filed out of time.

The petition may be considered as a petition for quo warranto under section 253. However,

the respondent was proclaimed only on March 3, 1988 and the petition was filed on January

22, 1988. Clearly, the petition was premature.

Second Issue

In the proceedings, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that respondent has lost his

Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided.

1. By naturalization in a foreign country2. By express renunciation of citizenship3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a

foreign country.


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The prosecution relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate of

registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines. Petitioner

assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and being an

American, the respondent must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by

the U.S. Naturalization Laws.

Whether or not the respondent is an American citizen does not concern us here.

In the instant case, respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of theUnited States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has

continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the

present, both as a voter and as a candidate. The mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he

is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino.

Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that dual allegiance of citizens is

inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law has no retroactive effect. And

while it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, our country already frowned upon the

concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further that

under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt

with by a future law. Said law has not yet been enacted.

WHEREFORE, petition DISMISSED.

CENTRAL BANK vs. MORFE

Date: June 30, 1967

Ponente: Concepcion, CJ.

Parties: Pet: Central Bank of the Philippines

Res: Hon. Judge Jesus P. Morfe and First Mutual Savings and Loan

Nature: Original action for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, with preliminary injunction.

Relevant Law: RA 337

Facts:

First Mutual Savings and Loan Organization, Inc. is a registered non-stock corporation, the

main purpose of which, according to its Articles of Incorporation i s "to encourage . . . and

implement savings and thrift among its members, and to extend financial assistance in the

form of loans," to them. The Organization has three (3) classes of "members,"1 namely: (a)

founder members who originally joined the organization and have signed the pre-

incorporation papers with the exclusive right to vote and be voted for ; (b) participating

members with "no right to vote or be voted for" to which category all o ther members

belong; except (c) honorary members, so made by the board of trustees, "at the exclusive

discretion" thereof due to "assistance, honor, prestige or help extended in the

propagation" of the objectives of the Organization without any pecuniary expenses on the

part of said honorary members.

Feb 14, 1962 - the legal department of the Central Bank of the Philippines rendered anopinion to the effect that First Mutual Saving and others of similar nature are banking

institutions, falling within the purview of the Central Bank Act.

April 1 & 3, 1963 - the Bank had an announcement published in the newspaper, stating that

all "savings and loan associations" now in operation and other organizations using different

corporate names, but engaged in operations similar in nature to said "associations" HAVE

NEVER BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINES TO ACCEPT DEPOSIT OF FUNDS FROM THE PUBLIC NOR TO ENGAGE IN THE

BANKING BUSINESS NOR TO PERFORM ANY BANKING ACTIVITY OR FUNCTION IN THE

PHILIPPINES., and that such institutions were in violation of Section. 2 of the General

Banking Act, Republic Act No. 337, should they engage in the "lending of funds obtained fromthe public through the receipts of deposits or the sale of bonds, securities or obligations of

any kind" without authority from the Monetary Board.

April 23, 1962 - The Governor of Central Bank ordered for "the investigation and gathering of

evidence on the activities of the savings and loan associations which are operating contrary

to law."

c. May 18, 1962 - a member of the intelligence division of the Bank filed a verifiedapplication for a search warrant against the First Mutual, alleging that the premises at

No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila" (where First Mutual held office) "are being used

unlawfully," because said Organization is illegally engaged in banking activities. . .

without having first complied with the provisions of Republic Act No. 337" and that the

articles, papers, or effects enumerated in a list attached to said application, (various

journals, cash books, ledgers, other accounting records and financial statements) are

kept in said premises, and "being used or intended to be used in the commission of a

felony, to wit: violation of Sections 2 and 6 of Republic Act No. 337."

Upon the filing of said application, Hon. Roman Cancino, issued the warrant, commanding

the search of the aforesaid premises and the seizure of the foregoing articles, there being

"good and sufficient reasons to believe" that the Organization has under its control, in the

address given, the aforementioned articles, which are the subject of the offense adverted to

above or intended to be used as means for the commission of said off offense.


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First Mutual Savings then filed for an original action for "certiorari, prohibition, with writ o f

preliminary injunction and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction," to annul the search

warrant, upon the ground that, the municipal court had acted "with grave abuse of

discretion, without jurisdiction and/or in excess of jurisdiction" because: (a) "said search

warrant is a roving commission general in its terms . . .;" (b) "the use of the word 'and others'

in the search warrant . . . permits the unreasonable search and seizure of documents which

have no relation whatsoever to any specific criminal act . . .;" and ( c) "no court in the

Philippines has any jurisdiction to try a criminal case against a corporation . . ." First Mutual

also prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte restraining theaforementioned search and seizure, as well as for the immediate return of the documents

and papers so far seized from them. Hon. Jesus P. Morfe, Judge, who presided over the

branch of the Court of First Instance o f Manila issued the order complained of.

Central Bank moved for a reconsideration thereof, which was denied. Accordingly, the Bank

commenced, in the Supreme Court, the present action, against Judge Morfe and the

Organization, alleging that respondent Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion and in

excess of his jurisdiction in issuing the order in question.

Issues:

1. Did the respondent judge err in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction? YES

2. Did the respondent judge commit a grave abuse of discretion? NO

Held: The order of respondent Judge and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction

issued in compliance therewith are hereby annulled, and the writ of preliminary injunction

issued by this Court on August 14, 1962, is accordingly, made permanent.

Ratio:

1. The action taken by the Bank, in causing the aforementioned search to be made and the

articles above listed to be seized, was predicated upon the theory that the Organization wasillegally engaged in banking by receiving money for deposit, disbursement, safekeeping or

otherwise, or transacting the business of a savings and mortgage bank and/or building and

loan association, without first complying with the provisions of R.A. No. 337, and that the

order complained of assumes that the Organization had violated sections 2 and 6 of said Act.

Yet respondent Judge found the searches and, seizures in question to be unreasonable

because the deponent ". . . could have, if he really knew of actual violation of the law,

applied for a warrant to search and seize only books" or records:

covering the specific purportedly illegal banking transactions of the petitioner with specific

persons who are the supposed victims of said illegal banking transactions according to his

knowledge. To authorize and seize all the records without reference to specific alleged

victims of the purported illegal banking transactions, would be to harass the petitioner, and

its officers with a roving commission or fishing expedition for evidence which could be

discovered by normal intelligence operations or inspections (not seizure) of books and

records

It cannot be gainsaid the Constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and

seizures seeks to forestall, not purely abstract or imaginary evils, but specific and concrete

ones.

A mere disagreement with Judge Cancino, who issued the warrant, on the credibility ofsaid statement, would not justify the conclusion that said municipal Judge had

committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction or excess of

jurisdiction.

The failure of the witness to mention particular individuals does not necessarily provethat he had no personal knowledge of specific illegal transactions of the Organization,

for the witness might be acquainted with specific transactions, even if the names of the

individuals concerned were unknown to him.

The records suggest clearly that the transactions objected to by the Bank constitute the

general pattern of the business of the Organization. Indeed, the main purpose thereof,

according to its By-laws, is "to extend financial assistance, in the form of loans, to its

members," with funds deposited by them.

It is true, that such funds are referred to in the Articles of Incorporation and the By-laws

as their "savings." and that the depositors thereof are designated as "members," but, even a

cursory examination of said documents will readily show that anybody can be a depositor

and thus be a "participating member." In other words, the Organization is, in effect, open to

the "public" for deposit accounts, and the funds so raised may be lent by the Organization.

Moreover, the power to so dispose of said funds is placed under the exclusive authority of

the "founder members," and "participating members" are expressly denied the right to vote

or be voted for, their "privileges and benefits," if any, being limited to those which the boardof trustees may, in its discretion, determine from time to time. As a consequence, the

"membership" of the "participating members" is purely nominal in nature. This situation is

fraught, precisely, with the very dangers or evils which Republic Act No. 337 seeks to

forestall, by exacting compliance with the requirements of said Act, before the transactions

in question could be undertaken.

2. The Organization does not seriously contest the main facts, upon which the action of the

Bank is based. The principal issue raised by the Organization is predicated upon the theory

that the aforementioned transactions of the Organization do not amount to " banking," as

the term is used in Republic Act No. 337. We are satisfied, however, in the light of the

circumstance obtaining in this case, that the Municipal Judge did not commit a grave abuse


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of discretion and that, the search and seizure complained of have not been proven to be

unreasonable.

IV. WHO ARE SUBJECT TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARTI

Date: Jan. 18, 1991

Ponente: Bidin

Parties:

Petitioner: People of the Philippines

Respondent: Andre Marti

Relevant Laws:

Art 4 Sec 21(b), Art 11 Sec 4, Art 1 Sec 2(e)(i) of RA 6425 aka Dangerous Drugs Act

VS

Sec 2 aka Right against Illegal Searches and Seizures, and Sec 3 aka Privacy of Communication

and Correspondence of Art 3, 1987 Constitution

Facts:

The appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the

"Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" with four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes

(the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed

Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.

Appellant filled up the contract for the transaction, writing his name, passport

number, date of shipment as well as the name and address of the consignee; "WALTER FIERZ,

Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland"

Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the

packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained

books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's

representation, Anita no longer insisted on inspecting the packages.

Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of

Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating

procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a

peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles

allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside which were later discovered to be

marijuana.

Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's

stated address in his passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested

assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his

mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted

shipment of the seized dried leaves.

Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425.

Issues:

WON the evidence admitted by the lower court was obtained through

unreasonable search and seizure and thus inadmissible (NO)

WON the evidence was protected by the constitutional right of privacy of

communication and correspondence (NO)

Held:

Following the exclusionary rule laid down in various US cases, the Court declared

that any evidence obtained in a defective search and seizure warrant is inadmissible. It must

be noted that in all those cases, the evidence obtained were invariably procured by the State

acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies.

The case at bar assumes a particular character since the evidence sought to be

excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in private

capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. So can the

accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable search and

seizure has been violated?

The court held in the negative. In absence of governmental interference, the

liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.

This constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the

immunity of ones person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by the government,

included in which is his residence papers, and other possessions...

According to past jurisprudence where a parking attendant who searched an

automobile to ascertain the owner and found drugs instead, without the knowledge and

participation of police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal

possession of drugs.


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The contraband in the present case having come into possession of the

Government without the latter transgressing appellants rights against unreasonable search

and seizure, the Court does not see why the same should not be admitted against him in the

prosecution of the offense charged.

The factual considerations of the case readily foreclose the proposition that the NBI

agents conducted an illegal search and seizure. Mr. Reyes conducted a reasonable search

since it was the SOP on his part as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to

the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Ports.

The mere presence of NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search by Reyes

into a warrantless search and seizure prohibited by the Constitution. Merely to observe and

look at that which is in plain sight is NOT a search.

The Constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a

restraint directed against the government and its agencies tasked with law enforcement. For

law enforcers to conduct a search, a warrant must be issued first. However, if the search is

made at the initiative of a private establishment, there is no need for a warrant.

Appellant argues that the illegal search and seizure meant by the statute is not only

limited to government authorities, but also to private individuals conducting such. The

argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the

government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between

individuals.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

PRUNEYARD SHOPPING CENTER vs. ROBINS

1980

J. Rehnquist

Facts:

Appellant Prune Yard is a privately owned shopping center in the city of Campbell,California

It has a policy not to permit any visitor or tenant to engage in any publiclyexpressive activity, including the circulation of petitions, that is not directly related

to its commercial purposes

Appellees are high school students who sought to solicit support for theiropposition to a United Nations resolution against "Zionism." On a Saturday

afternoon they set up a card table in a corner of PruneYard's central courtyard.

They distributed pamphlets and asked passersby to sign petitions, which were to

be sent to the President and Members of Congress. Their activity was peaceful and

orderly and so far as the record indicates was not objected to by PruneYard's

patrons.

Soon after appellees had begun soliciting signatures, a security guard informedthem that they would have to leave because their activity violated PruneYard

regulations

Appellees immediately left the premises and later filed this lawsuit in the CaliforniaSuperior Court of Santa Clara County. They sought to enjoin appellants from

denying them access to the PruneYard for the purpose of circulating their petitions

The Superior Court held that appellees were not entitled under either the Federalor California Constitution to exercise their asserted rights on the shopping center

property

The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the California Constitutionprotects "speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even

when the centers are privately owned."

Before this Court, appellants PruneYard contend that their constitutionallyestablished rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to exclude appellees from

adverse use of appellants' private property cannot be denied by invocation of a

state constitutional provision or by judicial reconstruction of a State's laws of

private property

Issue:

WON state constitutional provisions,construed to permit individuals to exercise free speech

and petition rights on the property of a privately owned shopping center, to which the public

is invited, violate the centers property rights a nd his free speech right therefore constituting

a taking

Held:


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NO. When regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. In this case,though, there is nothing to suggest that preventing appellants from

prohibiting this sort of activity will unreasonably impair the value or use of

their property as a shopping center

The decision of the California Supreme Court makes it clear that thePruneYard may restrict expressive activity by adopting time, place, and

manner regulations that will minimize any interference with its commercial

functions. Appellees were orderly, and they limited their activity tothe common areas of the shopping center. In these circumstances, the fact

that they may have "physically invaded" appellants' property cannot be

viewed as determinative

Appellants have failed to demonstrate that the "right to exclude others" is soessential to the use or economic value of their property that the state-

authorized limitation of it amounted to a "taking"

Appellants also argue that their First Amendment rights(free speech) havebeen infringed but in this case, they are not being compelled to affirm their

belief in any governmentally prescribed position or view, and they are free to

publicly dissociate themselves from the views of the speakers or handbillers

We conclude that neither appellants' federally recognized property rights northeir First Amendment rights have been infringed by the California Supreme

Court's decision recognizing a right of appellees to exercise state-protected

rights of expression and petition on appellants' property. Judgment of the

Supreme Court of California is therefore affirmed

KILOSBAYAN vs. MORATO

(July 17, 1995)

Mendoza, J.

Petition for prohibition, review and/or Injunction

FACTS:

In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein

PGMC leasedonline lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross

amount of ticket or atleast P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted

to charity. Term of lease is for 8years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible

for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25

million.

Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the

Contract of Lease

Petitioners Contention:

1. ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.

2. It is still v iolative of PCSOs charter.

3. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding.

4. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution5. Standing can no longer be

questioned because it has become the law of the case

Respondents reply:

1. ELA is different from the Contract of Lease

2. There is no bidding required

3. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO

4. PCSO does not have funds

5. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade

6. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have standing? NO STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the

petitioners is adeparture from the settled rulings o n real parties in interest

because no constitutional issues wereactually involved.

LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same onelitigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in

any sense be regarded as the lawof this case. The parties are the same but the

cases are not.

RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passedupon anddetermined in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any


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future action between the sameparties involving a different cause of action. But

the rule does not apply to issues of law at least whensubstantially unrelated claims

are involved.When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction

identical with, but in a formseparable from the one dealt with in the first

proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding tomake an independent

examination of the legal matters at issue.

Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not precludedetermination of the petitioners standing.

STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question isactually involved.The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL

PARTIES in INTEREST.

o Standing: maybe brought by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters whosue in public interest- Whether such parties have alleged such a personal

stake in the outcome of the controversy

Valmonte v. PCSO: 1) direct and personal interest; 2) hassustained or is in immediate dangerof sustained some direct

injury and 3) has been or is about to be denied some right or

privilege.

In the case at bar, there is no showing of particularized interestor an allegation of public fundsbeing misspent to make the

action of public interest.

o Real party in interest: Whether he is the party who would be benefitedor injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit

Petitioners invoke Sec. 5, 7 and 12 of the Constitution. But theydo not embody judiciallyenforceable constitutional rights butguidelines for legislation. They cannot give rise to a causeof

action in the courts.

QUESTION of CONTRACT LAW: The real parties are those who are parties to theagreement orarebound either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their

rights with respect to one of thecontracting parties and can show the detriment

which would positively result to them from the contract.

Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest. Questions to the natureor validity of publiccontracts maybe made before COA o r before the Ombudsman.

2. WON ELA is valid?YES

Fixing the rental rate to a minimum is a matter of business judgment and the Courtis not inclined toreview.

In the contract, it stated that the parties can change their agreement. Petitionerstates that thiswould allow PGMC to control and operate the on-line lottery

system. The Court held that the claim isspeculative. In any case, in the construction

of statutes, the presumption is that in making contracts, thegovernment has acted

in good faith. The doctrine that the possibility of abuse is not a reason fordenying

power.

It is also claimed that ELA is a joint venture agreement. The Court held that is alsobased onspeculation. Evidence is needed to show that the transfer of technology

would involve the PCSO and itspersonnel in prohibited association with the PGMC.

Petitioners have no standing. ELA is a valid lease contract. Petition for prohibition,review and/or injunction is dismissed.

Note:Its important to also mention that the SC, through this case, reversed its Decision in

Kilosbayan, IncvsGuingona. It has to do with the Courts application/interpretation of

theexceptionclausein par B, Sec1 of the PCSO Charter (RA 1169, as amended by BP 442) and

the locus standiof thepetitioners.

Recall that Davide justified, inKilosbayanvsGuingona, the locus standi of the petitioners by

saying thatthe issue is of public interest. These issues affect the social, economic, and moral

well-being of thepeople and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the

envisioned online lottery are asstaggering as the billions of pesos it is expected to raise.

Justice Feliciano also further strengthens the locus standi of the petitioners through the ff:

the public character of the funds involved in the lease PCSOs disregard of the Constitutional provision lack of other parties in raising the questions that Kilosbayan has raised wide range impact of the lease

STEFFEL vs. THOMPSON


19/28

Date: March 19, 1974

Ponente: Justice Brennan

FACTS:

October 8, 1970: Petitioner and other individuals were distributing handbillsprotesting American involvement in Vietnam on an exterior sidewalk of the North

De Kalb Shopping Center.

o The shopping center employees asked them to stop handbilling andleave. They declined so police officers were summoned and were told

that they would be arrested if they wouldnt stop. The group then left to

avoid arrest.

o 2 days later, petitioner and a companion returned to the shopping centerand began handbilling. They were again told by the police, called by the

manager, to stop and would be arrested if they do not. Petitioner left but

his companion stayed. His companion was arrested and arraigned on acharge of criminal trespass in violation of 26-1503 (a Georgia criminal

trespass law).

o Petitioner alleged in his complaint (action for injunctive and declaratoryrelief in the District Court)that he desired to return also but did not

because of his concern that he would be arrested too. The parties

stipulated that if petitioner returned and refused upon request to stop

handbilling, a warrant would be sworn out and he might be arrested and

charged with a violation of the Georgia statute.

o Petitioner also alleged that the respondents (solicitor of the Civil andCriminal Court of DeKalb County, chief of police, owner of the shopping

center, manager of the shopping center) should restrain from enforcing

the statute so as to interfere with petitioners constitutionally protected

activities (specifically relating to the First and Fourteenth Amendment

Rights).

District Court: dismissed the action, finding that "no meaningful contention can bemade that the state has [acted] or will . . . act in bad faith," and therefore "the

rudiments of an active controversy between the parties . . . [are] lacking."

CA: affirmed, being of the view that Younger v. Harris made it clear that irreparableinjury must be measured by bad-faith harassment and such a test must be applied

to a request for injunctive relief against threatened, as well as pending, state court

criminal prosecution; and that it followed from the reasoning ofSamuels v. Mackell

that the same test of bad-faith harassment is a prerequisite for declaratory relief

with respect to a threatened prosecution.

A petition for rehearing en banc was denied. Thus, the present case.

ISSUE:

WON declaratory relief is precluded when a state prosecution has been threatened

but is not pending, and a showing of bad-faith enforcement or other special circumstances

has not been made.

HELD:

NO. CA reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with

the opinion. Petitioner can avail of a judgment for declaratory relief. The court held that,

regardless of whether injunctive relief may be appropriate, federal declaratory relief is not

precluded when no state prosecution is pending and a federal plaintiff demonstrates a

genuine threat of enforcement of a disputed state criminal statute, whether an attack is

made on the constitutionality of the statute on its face or as applied.

1. This case presents an "actual controversy" under Art. III of the Constitution and theFederal Declaratory Judgment Act, the alleged threats of prosecution in the

circumstances alleged not being "imaginary or speculative" and it being

unnecessary for petitioner to expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to

make his constitutional challenge. Whether the controversy remains substantialand continuing in the light of the effect of the recent reduction of the Nation's

involvement in Vietnam on petitioner's desire to engage in the handbilling at the

shopping center must be resolved by the District Court on remand.

2. Federal declaratory relief is not precluded when a prosecution based upon anassertedly unconstitutional state statute has been threatened, but is not pending,

even if a showing of bad-faith enforcement or other special circumstances has

not been made.


20/28

(a) When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time thefederal complaint is filed, considerations of equity, comity, and

federalism on which Younger v. Harris, and Samuels v. Mackell, both

supra, were based, have little vitality: federal intervention does not

result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption of the state

criminal justice system; nor can f ederal intervention, in that

circumstance, be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state

courts' ability to enforce constitutional principles.

(b) Even if the Court of Appeals correctly viewed injunctive relief asinappropriate (a question not reached here, petitioner having

abandoned his request for that remedy), the court erred in treating

the requests for injunctive and declaratory relief as a single issue

and in holding that a failure to demonstrate irreparable injury

precluded the granting of declaratory relief. Congress plainly

intended that a declaratory judgment be available as a milder

alternative than the injunction to test the constitutionality of state

criminal statutes.

3. In determining whether it is appropriate to grant declaratory relief when no statecriminal proceeding is pending, it is immaterial whether the attack is made on the

constitutionality of a state criminal statute on its face or as applied.

While the federal interest may be greater when a state statute is attackedon its face, since there exists the potential for eliminating any broad-

ranging deterrent effect on would-be actors, we do not find this

consideration controlling. The solitary individual who suffers a deprivation

of his constitutional rights is no less deserving of redress than one who

suffers together with others.


21/28

FRANCISCO, JR. vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Carpio- Morales

LegMeth Group Note: Before looking at the facts of the case, it may first be helpful to familiarize yourself with

Section 16 and 17 of the Rules of Impeachment Proceedings adopted by the 12th Congress:

Rule V

Bar against Initiatiation of Impeachment Proceedings against the Same Official

Section 16 - Impeachment Proceedings Deemed InitiatedIn cases where a member of the House files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files verified

complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement against animpeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed initiated on the day the

Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution against such official, as the case maybe, is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the findings of the said

Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in substance.

In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case may be,

at least 1/3 of the Members of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time if the

filing of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General.

Section 17 - Bar against Initiation of Impeachment ProceedingsWithin a period of one year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed initatiated as provided in

Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings as such, can be initiated against the same official]


22/28

FACTS

22 July 2002

HOR adopted Rep. Fuentebella's resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to

conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and

expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund

2 June 2003

Former Pres, Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (1st) against then CJ Davide and 7

Associate Justices for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and

other high crimes"

22 Oct 2003

House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the impeachment complaint for being

insufficient in substance

23 Oct 2003

[4 mos. and 3 wks. after the filing o f the 1st impeachment complaint]

Reps. Teodoro and Fuentebella filed a 2nd impeachment complaint against CJ Davide

founded on the results of the l egislative inquiry by abovementioned HOR resolution

28 Oct 2003

- A motion was put forth in the HOR that the 2nd impeachment complaint be formally

transmitted to the Senate but it was not carried because the HOR adjourned for lack of

quorum

- SC resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions, (b) require respondent HOR and the Senate plus

the Solicitor General to comment on the petitions not later than 430pm on 3 Nov 2003, (c)

set the petitions for oral arguments on 5 Nov 2003 at 10am, and (d) appointed distinguished

legal experts as amici curiae

- HOR asserted that the SC has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the HOR,

which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, fromthe performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to inititate impeachment cases

29 Oct 2003

Senate asserted that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was

presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment

court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and

(2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to

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