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2009 BAR (TRUE or FALSE): A law fixing the passing grade in the Bar examinations at
70%, with no grade lower than 40% in any subject, is constitutional.
FALSE. Although law making is inherent in the Legislative, such law would infringe with
the Supreme Court's constitutional right to promulgate rules concerning the admission
to the practice of law and the Integrated Bar.
2008 BAR
Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution states that The Congress shall have the
power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may
not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5
hereof. No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the
security of tenure of its members.
With the Congress establishing the right to trial by jury, it violates the basic principle of
the Separation of Powers. Clearly, the Congress, through this enactment, had
encroached upon the sphere of the judiciary. The act of the Congress in changing the
procedural system of courts without the concurrence or advice of the Supreme Court
renders the legislation unconstitutional.
2004 BAR
The effect of the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is
to limit resort to the political question doctrine and to broaden the scope of judicial
inquiry into areas which the Judiciary, ended? The previous Constitution, would have
left to the political departments to decide. If a political question is involved, the Judiciary
can determine whether or not the official whose action is being question acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Marcos vs
Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1981]) Thus, although the house of Representatives
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Electoral Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to decide election contents involving
Members of the House of Representatives, the Supreme Court nullified the removal of
one of its members for voting in favor of the protestant, who belongs to a difference
party. (Bondoc vs Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 [1991])
CREBA vs ERC
GR no. 174697 July 8, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, inc. (CREBA) averts that
Section 2-6 of the Distribution services and Open access Rule (DSOAR), which obligate
certain elections to advance the amount needed to cover expenses of extending lines
and installing additional facilities, promulgated by respondent Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC), is unconstitutional and contrary to Republic Act No. 9136,
otherwise known as The Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA).
Issue: is the challenge on unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise knownas the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) of transcendental
importance? Does the petitioner have legal standing?
Ruling:
No. The Court provided the following instruction as guides for determining whether a
matter is of transcendental importance: (1) the character of the funds or other assets
involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest
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prescribed procedures to amend the Constitution by excluding the Senate of the
Philippines from the complete process of proposing amendments to the Constitution
and for lack of thorough debates and consultations.
ISSUE------
RULING: In the present case, the fitness of petitioners case for the exercise of judicial
review is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any
adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the second place, House
Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at afuture time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been
adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation
of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution
No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that
may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet
performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court.
De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council
GR No. 191002, March 17, 2010
Facts:
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The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs
just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the
event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas.This dilemma is rooted
in consideration of Section 15, Art VII of the Constitution prohibiting the President
orActing President from making appointments within two months immediately before the
next presidential election and up to the end of his term, except when temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety. However, Section 4 (1), Art VIII of the Constitution
also provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from
occurrence. The question leads to who should appoint the next Chief Justice and may
the JBC resume the process of screening candidates should the incumbent president
not prohibited to do so.
Issue:------
Ruling:
We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the
process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide
whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the
next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next
steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of
candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed. We need
not await the occurrence of the vacancy by May 17, 2010 in order for the principal issue
to ripe for judicial determination by the Court. It is enough that one alleges conduct
arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but seemingly proscribed by the
Constitution. A reasonable certainty of the occurrence of the perceived threat to aconstitutional interest is sufficient to afford a basis for bringing a challenge, provided the
Court has sufficient facts before it to enable it to intelligently adjudicate the issues.[65]
Herein, the facts are not in doubt, for only legal issues remain.
.
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Re: Entitlement to Hazard Pay of SC Medical and Dental Clinic Personnel
A.M. No. 03-9-0
November 27, 2008
572 SCRA 1
FACTS
The Supreme Court Medical and Dental Services (SCMDS) Division were entitled to
hazard pay through Republic Act (RA) 7305, also known as The Magna Carta of Public
Health Workers. This paved the way to the issuance of Administrative Circular No. 57-
2004 which prescribed the guidelines of the grant of hazard allowance in favor of the
SCMDS personnel. The circular initially classified SCMDS employees according to level
of exposure to health hazards, and not on salary grades alone. But the Department of
Health (DOH) abolished the classification, and declared that a uniform hazard pay rate
should be given, without regard for the nature of the risks and hazards to which they are
exposed. Thus, 11 SCMDS personnel requested that the hazard grant must be based
not on the salary grade, but on the degree of hazard. However, before the request could
be acted upon, AO 2006-011 was issued with the amended guidelines in the payment of
hazard pay, regardless of the nature of their appointment. Hence, some concerned
personnel requested that the subject circular be amended to conform AO 2006-011,
which was found reasonable by Chief Administrative Officer Atty. Eden Candelaria. She
issued a memorandum recommending that the classification as whether employees are
exposed to high or low risk be abolished, and that the payment of the adjusted hazard
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allowance be charged against the regular savings of the Court. The Court referred the
memorandum to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO) and to the Office of
the Chief Attorney (OCAT) for comment. OCAT posits that the subject Circular be
amended in accordance to AO 2006-0011. But FMBO advances a contrary position.
ISSUE
Does the DBM have authority to review Supreme Court issuances relative to court
personnel on matters of compensation?
HELD
The role of the DBM is "supervisorial in nature, its main duty being to ascertain that the
proposed compensation, benefits and other incentives to be given to (government)
officials and employees adhere to the policies and guidelines issued in accordance with
applicable laws." Thus, its authority to review Supreme Court issuances relative to court
personnel on matters of compensation is very limited, circumscribed as it is by the
provisions of the Constitution, specifically Article VIII, Section 3 on fiscal autonomy.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. The Court, in its ruling, has to
deny the request because the subject Circular cannot be amended according to the
mechanism of hazard pay allocation under AO 2006-0011. Moreover, AO 2006-0011
reveals that DOH has exceeded its powers in implementing the provisions of RA 7305,
for it tried to modify the rates of hazard pay and the mechanism for its allocation. It was
an attempt to amend the rates of hazard allowance and mechanism as provided for in
RA 7305. With this, the Court finds that the administrative order violates the established
principle that administrative issuances cannot amend and act of Congress. The request
of the Supreme Court Medical and Dental Services Division to amend AO 57-2004 to
the provisions of DOH AO 2006-0011 is DENIED.
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Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside
for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
1. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are
thus unconstitutional.
2. Yes. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood
bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to
distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement.The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the
level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th
Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have
pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law
which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.
Canlas v. NHA
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G.R. No. 182795
June 5, 2008
FACTS
The petitioners, settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay Manggahan,
Pasig City, filed and sought for the issuance of a "Writ of Amparo" on the premise that
they were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter as embodied in our
Constitution. Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of filing
of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment. With the claim
that land titles were fraudulent and spurious, they expressed willingness to help thegovernment to unearth the so called "syndicates" clothed with governmental functions,
and by way of the said prayer for the issuance of the "Writ of Amparo, the petitioners
request that the unprincipled Land Officials be summoned to answer their participation
in the issuances of fraudulent and spurious titles, which are now in the hands of the
private respondents. The petition was actually made to seek the reversal of the Court's
dismissal of previous petitions in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038,
considering that no motion for reconsideration can be filed for the second or third time in
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Is the Writ of Amparo available against a threatened demolition of a dwelling?
HELD
"The Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal
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Ruling:
The restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the
criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish
that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to aserious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily
available legal recourse or remedy. Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary
writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the
HDO. Petitioners apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to
show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of
amparo. The absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on
this occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998.
BOAC vs CADAPAN
G.R. Nos. 184461-62 May 31, 2011
Facts:
Armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeo (Karen) and Manuel
Merino (Merino) from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan. The three were herded
onto a jeep bearing license plate RTF 597 that sped towards an undisclosed location.
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Spouses Asher and Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed a petition for
habeas corpus1 before the Court impleading then Generals Romeo Tolentino and
Jovito Palparan (Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac (Lt. Col. Boac), Arnel Enriquez
and Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents. The Court issued a
writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas corpus petition. Petitioners in moved for a
reconsideration of the appellate courts decision. During the pendency of the motion for
reconsideration in, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed before this Court a
Petition for Writ of Amparo.
Issue: refer to syllabus...=P
Ruling:
An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability
of individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative
suit.46 Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of action to
government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of
aggrieved individuals.The appellate court deemed it a superfluity to issue any inspection
order or production order in light of the release order. As it earlier ruled in the habeas
corpus case, it found that the three detainees right to life , liberty and security was being
violated, hence, the need to immediately release them, or cause their release. The
appellate court went on to direct the PNP to proceed further with its investigation since
there were enough leads as indicated in the records to ascertain the truth and file the
appropriate charges against those responsible for the abduction and detention of the
three.
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OCA vs. Judge Floro
Facts: It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-
requisite psychological evaluation on him then by the Supreme Court Clinic Services
(SC Clinic) revealed "(e)vidence of ego disintegration" and "developing psychotic
process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June 1998, when he
applied anew, the required psychological evaluation exposed problems with self-
esteem, mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations,
suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that
Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge.
Because of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) allowed Atty. Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. The
second opinion appeared favorable thus paving the way to Atty. Floros appointment as
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch 73, Malabon City, on 4 November 1998.
Upon Judge Floros personal request, an audit on his sala was conducted by the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) from 2 to 3 March 1999.2
After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, reported its findings to erstwhile Court Administrator, Alfredo L.
Benipayo, who submitted his own report/memorandum 3 to then Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. dated 13 July 1999 recommending, among other things, that his report be
considered as an administrative complaint against Judge Floro and that Judge Floro be
subjected to an appropriate psychological or mental examination. Court Administrator
Benipayo recommended as well that Judge Floro be placed under preventive
suspension for the duration of the investigation against him.
Issue: is Judge Floro guilty of conduct unbecoming necessitating his dismissal?
Ruling: "Misconduct" is defined as wrong or improper conduct while "gross" connotes
something "out of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant;
shameful." 40 For serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be
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corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-
known legal rules. 41With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge Floro in
circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple
misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it
appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but, from what we
can see from the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable thirst for recognition.
Concededly, the need for recognition is an all too human flaw and judges do not cease
to be human upon donning the judicial robe. Considering, however, the proscription
against judges seeking publicity for personal vainglory, they are held to a higher
standard as they must act within the confines of the code they swore to observe.
RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Malabon City and consider him SEPARATED from the service due to a medically
disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his
office, effective immediately.
CSC v. Andal
G.R. No. 185749
December 16, 2009
FACTS
Herminigildo L. Andal, respondent, holds the position of Security Guard II in the
Sandiganbayan. He filed an application to take the Career Service Professional
Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSPE-CAT), was admitted to take the
examination, and the result showed that he passed with the rate of 81.03%. However,
when Arlene S. Vito who claimed to have been authorized by respondent to secure the
results of the examination went to do so, verification and comparison of the pictures
attached to the Picture Seat Plan and the identification card of Andal brought by Vito
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showed dissimilarity in the facial features. Civil Service Commission National Capital
Region (CSC-NCR) rendered judgment finding the respondent guilty of dishonesty and
imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service. Aggrieved, the respondent
appealed, however, it was denied. He then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
(CA), in which the CA ruled in favor of the respondent. The CSC filed a motion for
reconsideration in the CA but was denied. Hence, the present petition for reversal of the
decision of the CA.
ISSUE
Does the CSC's disciplinary jurisdiction extend to court personnel?
HELD
The Court of Appeals ruled that the CSC encroached upon the Supreme Courts power
of administrative supervision over court personnel. In reversing the CSC resolutions, the
Court of Appeals cited Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that the Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof. The Court of Appeals further stated that what the CSC should have
done was to refer the administrative case for dishonesty against respondent to the
Office of the Court Administrator for appropriate action instead of resolving the case.
The CSCs authority and power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases are
not in disp ute. The question is whether the CSCs disciplinary jurisdiction extends to
court personnel in view of Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. In the present
case, while respondent may have filed his Answer to the formal charge of dishonesty
after having been directed to do so, he denied having taken the civil service
examination and did not even appear at the formal investigation conducted by the CSC-
NCR. He appealed to the CSC after the adverse decision of the CSC-NCR was
rendered but raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person. He argued that as
an employee in the Judiciary, the jurisdiction to hear disciplinary action against him
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borrowing money from her staff and other court officers , reports to court only twice a
week, obtained loans from court personnel and lawyers during the pendency of a case.
ISSUE:
Will debt-condonation admibnistratively absolved a judge for =boorowing
money from a lawyer-creditor who has pending cases before his sala?
RULING:
Judge Victoria Villalon-Pornillos is found guilty of violating paragraph 7, Section8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court (borrowing money from a lawyer in a case pending
before her court) which is also a gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. The impression that respondent would rule in favor of complainant
because the former is indebted to the latter is what the Court seeks to avoid. She is
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any government agency or
instrumentality.
.
in the matter of the charges of Justice Del Cstillo
Facts:
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Suplico vs. NEDA, GR 178830, July 14, 2008
FACTS: Respondent avers that there is no more justiciable controversy with the ZTE
National Broadband Network Project controversy for the Court to resolve. Petitioners
contend that because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised in the
petition, which among others, included the Presidents use of the power to borrow, i.e.,
to enter into foreign loan agreements, this Court should take cognizance of this case
despite its apparent mootness.
ISSUE: Is the moot and academic principle a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case?
RULING: Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of
mootness. In the absence of actual justiciable controversies or disputes, the Court
generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where there is no more live subjectof controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or make any
pronouncement. For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an
actual case or controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
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academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a
court of justice. Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable
controversy, and an adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or value as courts
do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging.
While there were occasions when the Court passed upon issues although supervening
events had rendered those petitions moot and academic, the instant case does not fallunder the exceptional cases. In those cases, the Court was persuaded to resolve moot
and academic issues to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines or rules for future guidance of both bench and bar.
De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council
GR No. 191002, March 17, 2010
Facts:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs
just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the
event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas.This dilemma is rooted
in consideration of Section 15, Art VII of the Constitution prohibiting the President
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