Constitutional Law II Case Digests (Due Process onwards)

1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

Case:

Villegas v. Hiu Chong (November 10, 1978)Fernandez, J.

FACTS:-Mayor Antonio Villegas seek the review of the decision of the CFI when it ordered the ordinance 637 of Manila as null and void.-The ordinance requires aliens to seek a permit of the mayor before they can be employed. (*With permit fee of 50 pesos)-Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho alleges that the ordinance is discriminatory, violative of uniformity in taxation, violative of delegation of powers, oppressive, unreasonable, violative of due process and equal protection of the laws.-Villegas argued that it is not a tax measure but an exercise of police power.

ISSUE: 1. WON the ordinance is valid?2. WON the ordinance violates due

process?

HELD:1. -No. It is clearly a tax measure because there is no justification for imposing the 50 peso fee from aliens who have been cleared from employment.-It is unreasonable because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situations among individual aliens. (The same fee for permanent, casual, high-end or low income aliens)

-Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion.2. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. -While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

Smith Bell & Company vs. Joaquin Natividad (CoC of Cebu) (September 17, 1919)Malcolm, J.

FACTS:-Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands-It is the owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato built for it in the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more than fifteen tons gross The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year for the purpose of transporting plaintiff's merchandise between ports in the Islands. Application was made at Cebu, the home port of the vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a certificate of Philippine registry. -The Collector refused to issue the certificate, giving as his reason that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were not citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. The instant action is the result.

Imbongs vs Ochoa (April 8, 2014)Mendoza, J.

FACTS-Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.-Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society allege it to be unconstitutional.-According to the petitioners (14 petitions and 2 intervenors), the RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn as it authorizes the purchase of hormonal contraceptives which are abortives and dangerous, contrary to the constitution. (Protection of the life of the mother and the unborn). It also violated the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products, as it causes cancer and other health problems. Also, it violates the right to religious freedom as it authorizes public funds to be used for purposes contrary to their religious belief.-Also, they allege it amounts to involuntary servitude as it require medical practitioners to render 48 hrs of pro bona services to indigent that are prosecuted, to be accredited to PhilHealth program. -Also it is violative of equal protection clause since it is primarily targeted to the poor by introducing contraceptives and reducing their number. Also, it is claimed to be a violation of void-for-vagueness rule in violation of due process since it penalizes “any violation” of the law without defining what such violation is.-In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them

(the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer."-The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service provider."-They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."-The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).-Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."

ISSUE: WON the RH bill is violative of due process?

HELD:-No. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it

leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.-Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.-From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. -On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional. Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care service providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice.-"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." -To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of

the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people.-Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.

Buck vs. Bell (May 2, 1927)Holmes, J.

FACTS:-The defendant, the superintendent of the State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble Minded, was ordered to perform the operation of salpingectomy (removal of fallopian tube) upon Carrie Buck, the plaintiff.-The case comes here upon the contention that the statute authorizing the judgment is void under the Fourteenth Amendment as denying to the plaintiff in error due process of law and the equal protection of the laws.-Carrie Buck is a feeble-minded white woman who was committed to the State Colony above mentioned in due form. She is the daughter of a feeble- minded mother in the same institution, and the mother of an illegitimate feeble-minded child.

-An Act of Virginia approved March 20, 1924 (Laws 1924, c. 394) recites that the health of the patient and the welfare of society may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of mental defectives, under careful safeguard, etc.; that the sterilization may be effected in males by vasectomy and in females by salpingectomy, without serious pain or substantial danger to life-The statute then enacts that whenever the superintendent of certain institutions including the above named State Colony shall be of opinion that it is for the best interest of the patients and of society that an inmate under his care should be sexually sterilized, he may have the operation performed upon any patient afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity, imbecility, etc., on complying with the very careful provisions by which the act protects the patients from possible abuse.-Plaintiff contends that it is illegal because it violates her constitutional right to bodily integrity and a violation of due process. Citing Munn v. Illinois, deprivation of life includes all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed.-Respondent argues that it is a valid exercise of police power and not degrading or unusual punishment.

ISSUE: WON the plaintiff has been afforded due process?

HELD:-The judgment finds the facts that have been recited and that Carrie Buck 'is the probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring, likewise afflicted, that she may be sexually sterilized without detriment to her general health and that her welfare and that of society will be promoted by her sterilization,' and thereupon makes the order.-It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring

for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.-But the answer is that the law does all that is needed when it does all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines, and seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as its means allow. Of course so far as the operations enable those who otherwise must be kept confined to be returned to the world, and thus open the asylum to others, the equality aimed at will be more nearly reached.

3. ASPECTS

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

CASE:

Kwong Sing v. Manila, 41 Phil 103 (October 11, 1920)Malcolm, J.

FACTS:-The validity of Ordinance No. 532 of the city of Manila requiring receipts in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments, must be decided on this appeal.-Every person, firm or corporation in the city of Manila engaged in laundering, dyeing, or cleaning by any process, cloths or clothes for compensation, shall issue dyed, or cleaned are received a receipt in duplicate, in English and Spanish, duly signed, showing the kind and number of articles delivered, and the duplicate copy of the receipt shall be kept by the owner

of the establishment or person issuing same.-The purpose of the municipal authorities in adopting the ordinance is fairly evident. Ordinance No. 532 was enacted, it is said, to avoid disputes between laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese characters from being defrauded. The object of the ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion of peace and good order and the prevention of fraud, deceit, cheating, and imposition.-Plaintiff's contention is also that the ordinance is invalid, because it is arbitrary, unreasonable, and not justified under the police power of the city.

ISSUE: WON the ordinance violates due process of law?

HELD:-Our holding is, that the government of the city of Manila had the power to enact Ordinance No. 532 and that as said ordinance is found not to be oppressive, nor unequal, nor unjust, it is valid.-The oppressiveness of the ordinance may have been somewhat exaggerated. The printing of the laundry receipts need not be expensive. The names of the several kinds of clothing may be printed in English and Spanish with the equivalent in Chinese below. With such knowledge of English and Spanish as laundrymen and their employees now possess, and, certainly, at least one person in every Chinese laundry must have a vocabulary of a few words, and with ability to read and write arabic numbers, no great difficulty should be experienced, especially after some practice, in preparing the receipts required by Ordinance No. 532. It may be conceded that an additional burden will be imposed

on the business and occupation affected by the ordinance. -Yet, even if private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the hands of the legislative body. The very foundation of the police power is the control of private interests for the public welfare.

Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 (June 7, 1926)Taft, J.

FACTS:-This case comes here on a writ of certiorari to review a decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands denying an original petition for prohibition against the enforcement by criminal prosecution of Act No. 2972 of the Philippine Legislature, known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Act, on the ground of its invalidity. -No. 2972. An act to provide in what languages account books shall be kept, and to establish penalties for its violation. -'Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, company, or partnership or corporation engaged in commerce, industry or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with existing law, to keep its account books in any language other than English, Spanish or any local dialect. -The petition, after setting out the prosecution in the court of first instance, and the text of the act, avers that the petitioner Yu Cong Eng is a Chinese merchant engaged in the wholesale lumber business in Manila; that he neither reads, writes nor understands the English or Spanish language or any local dialect.

-Even if he should employ a bookkeeper capable of keeping his books in the English or Spanish language, he would have no means of personally revising or ascertaining the contents or correctness of the books.-Under the provisions of the act he is prohibited from even keeping a duplicate set of accounts in his own language, and would, in the event of the enforcement of the law, be compelled to remain in total ignorance of the status of his business.-The petitioners aver that the act, if enforced, will deprive the petitioners, and the 12,000 Chinese merchants whom they represent, of their liberty and property without due process of law, and deny them the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Philippine Autonomy Act of Congress.-The defendants on the other hand aver that it is valid and necessary exercise of legislative power, and that due to the inability of the officials of the internal revenue to revise and check up properly the correctness of the books of account which the Chinese merchants keep in their own language, the public treasury loses every year very large sums.

ISSUE: WON the law is violative of due process?

HELD:-We fully concede that it is the duty of a court in considering the validity of an act to give it such reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within the fundamental law. But it is very clear that amendment may not be substituted for construction, and that a court may not exercise legislative functions to save the law from conflict with constitutional limitation.-If we change it to meet the needs suggested by other laws and fiscal regulations and by the supposed general

purpose of the legislation, we are creating by construction a vague requirement, and one objectionable in a criminal statute.-In view of the history of the Islands and of the conditions there prevailing, we think the law to be invalid, because it deprives Chinese persons situated as they are, with their extensive and important business long established, of their liberty and property without due process of law, and denies them the equal protection of the laws.-Without them such merchants would be a prey to all kinds of fraud and without possibility of adopting any safe policy. It would greatly and disastrously curtail their liberty of action, and be oppressive and damaging in the preservation of their property. We agree with the Philippine Supreme Court in thinking that the statute construed as we think it must be construed is invalid.-To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.-While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to

the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.

Ichong vs Hernandez 11 Phil 1155 (May 31, 1957)Labrador, J.

FACTS:-Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade.-Exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons;-Petitioner argues that it violated the equal protection clause, their right to due process, one-subject-one-title rule, violated int’l treaty obligations.-Respondent argues that the law is a valid exercise of police power and in line with the constitution—national interest and survival.

ISSUE: WON the law is a violation of due process?

HELD:-It is not a violation of equal protection clause. The mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting them.-The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.-The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness. The approval

of the bill is necessary for the national survival.-A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the Court on this case, attention was called to the fact that the privilege should not have been denied to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law itself, its aims and purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review-Many of these arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

A. TWIN REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE AND HEARING

CASE:

Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 284 SCRA 656 (January 23, 1998)Panganiban, J.

FACTS:-Leonides C. Basconcillo, herein private respondent, filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office for illegal dismissal against Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. and Elkano Ship Management, Inc., herein

petitioners. In their answer, petitioners alleged that private respondent was dismissed for his gross negligence and incompetent performance as chief engineer of the M/V Boracay.-He closed off the air valve (*despite the sign), failed to change the sea suctions resulting to overheating, false assurance of the fuel situation and failure to discipline his subordinates. Contrary to [private respondents] allegations, he was given fair warning and enough opportunity to explain his side in the foregoing incidents, not to mention all the chances given to him to improve his substandard work performance before he was dismissed.- He denied having been given a chance to explain his side regarding the mentioned incidents, the truth being that he was surprised when he was told of his dismissal. Petitioners filed their position paper and supporting documents which however failed to rebut private respondent’s allegations. Moreover, he argued that it was not his fault because the air valve incident was the pilot’s error, the overheating was caused by ice clogging in the inlet, the stopping of operation was caused by another, denied the false fuel assurance, and denied that there was unrest in his subordinates.-No inquiry or investigation, however, regarding his supposed incompetence or negligence was ever conducted; neither was private respondent furnished with a notice or memorandum regarding the cause of his dismissal. They argue that hearing was indispensable.-POEA ruled that respondent was illegally dismissed, entitled to payment of 17, 875 dollars. NLRC affirmed the decision and denied the MR.

ISSUE: WON the respondent was afforded due process?

HELD:- Although bound by law and practice to observe due process, administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers are nonetheless free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements. As applied to these proceedings, due process requires only an opportunity to explain one’s side- For an employee’s dismissal to be valid, (1) the dismissal must be for a valid cause and (2) the employee must be afforded due process. Article 282 of the Labor Code lists the following causes for termination of employment by the employer: (1) serious misconduct or willful disobedience of lawful orders in connection with his or her work, (2) gross and habitual neglect of duties, (3) fraud or willful breach of trust, (4) commission of a crime or an offense against the person of the employer or his immediate family member or representative, and (5) analogous cases.- There has been no valid cause of the respondent’s dismissal because the allegations were not supported by evidence due to the high ratings of the respondent in the books.-Moreover, the twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process, and neither of these elements can be eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional guaranty.-Using these legal criteria, we hold that private respondent was illegally dismissed. No notice was ever given to him prior to his dismissal. This fact alone disproves petitioner’s allegation that private respondent was given fair warning and enough opportunity to explain his side [regarding] the incidents that led to his dismissal.

B. NO AWARD OF RELIEF NOT PRAYED FOR

-If not prayed in the pleadings of the parties, the courts cannot add or delve on that matter except when it is necessary for the determination of the case.-An award may not be given if it is not prayed for by the parties, and the courts cannot have discretion in this.

C. JUDICIAL DUE PROCESS

1. Impartial and Competent Court

Cases:

Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (March 20, 1987)Cruz, J.

FACTS:-There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb

down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.- His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process

ISSUE: WON EO 626 constitute a violation of due process?

HELD:- The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. -In the exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.-In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution.

Javier v. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194 (September 22, 1986)Cruz, J.

FACTS:

-Petitioner challenges the proclamation of Respondent Pacificador, a member of KBL under Marcos, for the allegedly massive terrorism, vote-buying, fraud, duress and intimidation of the latter’s men.-Comelec then referred the complaints to the AFP and the 2nd Division ordered the proclamation to be stayed but proceed with the canvassing, then later on ordered the proclamation.-Commissioner Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2ndDivision but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. Then later on the Petitioner was killed.-The OSG moved to dismiss the case for being moot and academic because of the abolition of Batasang Pambansa and the office dispute between the two, however it was denied due to the importance of the subject matter and necessity of deciding the case.- The petitioner complains that the Proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid because all contests involving the members of the Batasang Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections en banc.- The respondents, for their part, argue that only contests need to be heard and decided en banc and all other cases can be-in fact, should be-filed with and decided only by any of the three divisions-The OSG argues that since there was no proclamation yet, there was no “contest” yet since it involves contention for the same office.- This decision was signed by Chairman Victoriano Savellano and Commissioners Jaime Opinion and Froilan M. Bacungan. Previously asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was a former law partner of private respondent Pacificador, Opinion had refused

ISSUES: WON the petitioner was denied due process?

HELD:- This interpretation would give to the part more powers than were enjoyed by the whole, granting to the division while denying to the banc. We do not think this was the intention of the Constitution.- As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving members of the Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful consideration of such cases.- It may be argued that in conferring the initial power to decide the pre- proclamation question upon the division, the Constitution did not intend to prevent the Commission en banc from exercising the power directly, on the theory that the greater power embraces the lesser-Yes. Asked to inhibit himself (Commissioner Opinion) on the ground that he was formerly a law partner of the private respondent, he obstinately insisted on participating in the case, denying he was biased.- This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process.To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. 16 The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment.- Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with

what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

Paderanga v. Azura, 136 SCRA 266 (April 30, 1985)Melencio-Herrera, J.

FACTS:- Petitioner, as City Mayor of Gingoog City, seeks to annul respondent Judge's Order denying the Motion for Inhibition which he (petitioner) had filed.-The grounds were:1. Loss of trust and confidence in the competence and impartiality of respondent Judge, particularly in view of the administrative complaints filed against him by petitioner and others before this Court.2. Entertaining suits assailing the validity of auction sales of tax delinquent properties by issuing restraining orders enjoining the City Treasurer of Gingoog City from proceeding with the auction sales of said properties when under Sec. 64 and 83 of P.D. 464, the remedy to stay execution of auction sales of tax delinquent properties is by paying the tax,

pursuant to Sec. 74 of P.D. 464, supra, and not by issuance of restraining orders;3. Bias, oppressive dispensation of justice, and abuse of his power of contempt in ordering the arrest of petitioner and the members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Gingoog City and imposing upon them an excessive fine of P10,000.00 and an excessive bond of P50,000.00 when the claim for salary was only for P5,000.00, and by sensationalizing their arrest with the aid of the Provincial Commander at Campa Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City, as if they were hardened criminals and fugitives from justice, for the purpose of embarrassing them before the public.4. Issuing of Orders against the interests of the City of Gingoog

-Respondent argues that the loss of trust of petitioner was unfounded and the inhibition was prompted more because the petitioner’s counsel was persisting on his grotesque arguments and haughty conduct. Moreover, the punishments or contempt was just imposed in obedience the rules which were violated.

ISSUE: WON the judge should inhibit himself?

HELD:-A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self- examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired-The reminder is also apropos that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion

of the fairness and integrity of the judge ...

-ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge is hereby ordered to inhibit himself from hearing the cases enumerated in paragraph 4 of the Petition involving the City of Gingoog or its officials, including petitioner. The venue of said cases is hereby transferred to Cagayan de Oro City each to be assigned by raffle to the Regional Trial Courts thereat.

2. Jurisdictiona. How acquired:

i. In actions in personam

ii. In actions in rem or quasi in rem

3. Notice and Hearing

Cases:

David v. Aquilizan, 94 SCRA 707(December 14, 1979)Santos, J.

FACTS:- Earlier or on February 17, 1976, the herein private respondents, Felomeno and Ricardo Jugar brothers, filed against Felimon C. David, herein petitioner, a "Petition for Reinstatement" in the CAR, 15th Regional District, Branch II, Cotabato City.- They alleged, inter alia, that sometime in 1971, they were installed as share tenants by petitioner over separate portions of the latter's landholding situated at Polomolok, South Cotabato, each portion having a seeding (corn) capacity of two (2) hectares, more or less, their sharing agreement being 50-50% of the net produce.- In the middle part of 1973, private respondents were no longer allowed to continue their cultivation of the subject lots as petitioner-landholder prohibited them from doing so and took possession of said lots for no reason at all.- And despite the intervention of the DAR petitioner-landholder refused and still refuses to reinstate them.-Petitioner alleges that private respondents voluntarily surrendered their landholdings as follows: "...Ricardo, in September, 1972, after he resigned as tractor driver of respondent (now petitioner), due to ill health; and later on as farm tenant of his father; Felomeno Jugar voluntarily surrendered his landholdings after he sold his working animals, and later, he continued his religious faith healing occupation and as farm tenant of his father- Three months later, or on September 29, 1979, respondent Judge without conducting any hearing rendered judgment for private respondents and against herein petitioner finding that "...plaintiffs Ricardo and Felomeno, both surnamed Jugar (now private respondents) were tenants of defendant Filemon C. David (petitioner herein) at the

time PD 27 was promulgated on October 21, 1972," 10 and thereafter declared them "owners" thereof-Petitioner allege that he has been denied due process and that the judge has no jurisdiction and the facts were arrived without hearing.- respondent Judge Aquilizan did not deny the lack of hearings alleged in the petition, but interposed the defense that the subject decision has already become "... final and executory after the lapse of the period for the perfection of an appeal ..." and "... there is no showing that an appeal was brought to the Appellate Court

ISSUE: WON the petitioner has been denied due process?

HELD:- Respondent judge did not conduct any hearing in the case prior to issuance of the challenged decision, the ineluctible conclusion is that the challenged decision is null and void for want of due process. The following requisites, as set forth in a leading case before the 1935 Constitution took effect, must concur for procedural due process in civil cases: "(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4)judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing."- Being null and void from its inception, the decision sought to be set aside does not exist in the eyes of the law because it is "as though it had not been done. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. "By it, no rights are divested. From it, no rights can be obtained. Being worthless

in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. - WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED and the challenged order and decision are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent judge is hereby directed to conduct appropriate proceedings in the case. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

DBP v. Bautista, 26 SCRA 366 (November 29, 1968)Fernando, J.

FACTS:- The Development Bank of the Philippines now appellant, filed a complaint against one of its debtors, Lourdes Gaspar Bautista, now appellee, for the recovery of a sum of money representing the unpaid mortgage indebtedness. After the bank had acquired title, it was nullified as it belonged to another claimant without however, the debtor being cited to appear in the court action.- "On July 16, 1949, Bautista applied for a loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor in interest of the plaintiff-appellee Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), offering as security the parcel of land. It was approved and later on the land was extrajudicially foreclosed, without citing Bautista.- an action (Civil Case No. 870) was filed by Rufino Ramos and Juan Ramos in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the RFC (as successor in interest of Bautista) claiming ownership of the land in question and seeking the annulment of T.C.T. No. 2336 in the name of the Government, O.C.T. No. P-389 in the name of Bautista and T.C.TG. No. NT-12108 in the name of the RFC.

- The lower court dismissed the complaint, stating that the annulment of Lourdes' title was a proceeding ex parte as far as she was concerned and could not bind her at all;

ISSUE: WON the nullification of title was valid?

HELD:-Yes. The fundamental due process requirement having been disregarded, appellee Bautista could not in any wise be made to suffer, whether directly or indirectly, from the effects of such decision. After appellant bank had acquired her title by such extrajudicial foreclosure sale and thus, through its own act, seen to it that her obligation had been satisfied, it could not thereafter, seek to revive the same on the allegation that the title in question was subsequently annulled, considering that she was not made a party on the occasion of such nullification.- If it were otherwise, then the cardinal requirement that no party should be made to suffer in person or property without being given a hearing would be brushed aside. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court whenever such a question arises in a series of decisions is that a denial of due process suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the government the impress of nullity- In such a case, it is wisely provided by the Civil Code that appellee Bautista, as vendor, should have been summoned and given the opportunity to defend herself. In view of her being denied her day in court, it would to be respected, that she is not "obliged to made good the proper warranty."

Lorenzana v. Cayetano, 78 SCRA 485 (August 31, 1977)1

Guerrero, J.

FACTS:- In 1958, petitioner filled in the Municipal Court of Manila ejectment cases for non-payment of rentals against her tenants occupying different stalls in that quonset hut situated in the San Lazaro Estate (corner of C.M. Recto St. and Quezon Blvd., Manila- The private respondent, on the other hand, occupied the area north of the quonset hut which area was also leased by her from the Manila Railroad Company and subsequently from the Bureau of Lands, and on which her house stood. Hence, the areas occupied by the two principal protagonists are adjacent to each other.-RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC in favor of petitioners. and ordered the defendants-tenants to vacate the premises leased. Upon refusal of the tenants to vacate the premises, the court granted a partial execution of the judgment and on July 20, 1959, a writ of demolition was issued, specifically commanding the Sheriff of Manila "to demolish the premises subject of the above-name cases" - Petitioner together with her counsel, Atty. Nereo Paculdo and Deputy Sheriff Jose L. Cruz proceeded and entered the premises of the respondent and in spite of her protests that she was not a party to the ejectment cases in which the demolition order was secured and that her premises was not subject of said ejectment cases, they destroyed the

1 A man's house is his castle where the wind may enter, the rain may enter but neither the King nor the King's men may enter without the consent of the owner.

latter's fence including flower pots trellises and electric installations and carted away the materials thereof and built another fence 5 meters into the premises of the respondent, boring holes into the cemented garden or patio of her house. After the petitioner went to the house of the respondent twice, moving the fence, the respondent filed a complaint in court.- The respondent Polly Cayetano filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the petitioner Anita U. Lorenzana, Atty. Nereo J. Paculdo and Deputy Sheriff Jose L. Cruz for damages with mandatory injunction. Defendants moved to dismiss. It was dismissed, as well as the MR but the CA reversed the decision and ordered the petitioners to pay, 5,500 for actual and moral damages.- The petitioner contends that the respondent having voluntarily appeared before the court and invoked its jurisdiction seeking affirmative relief by filing on August 3, 1959, a petition to declare Lorenzana, Atty. Paculdo and Sheriff Cruz in contempt and holding them liable in damages, thus she could no longer question the validity of the writ. And that because she was heard in court, she was not deprived of due process.

ISSUE: WON the respondents were afforded due process, being heard in court?

HELD:-No. It must be noted that respondent was not a party to any of the 12 ejectment cases wherein the writs of demolition had been issued; she did not make her appearance in and during the pendency of these ejectment cases. Respondent only went to court to protect her property from demolition after the judgment in the ejectment cases had become final and executory. Hence, with respect to the

judgment in said ejectment cases, respondent remains a third person to such judgment, which does not bind her. - Indeed, respondent was heard but simply hearing her did not fulfill the basic conditions of procedural due process in courts. When respondent appeared before the court to protect and preserve her property, the Court had not lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the property of the respondent because the premises of the respondent was not included in the ejectment cases and the judgment in said cases could not affect her property, much less demolish the same- It may be laid down with certainty that the requirements of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present namely: (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceedings: (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.- The judgment and the demolition orders were valid and binding to the tenants but not to the respondent and her property. Fundamentally, it is the wrongful execution of the judgment and the writ that is the basis of the claim for damages.

Pp. v Beriales, 70 SCRA 361 (April 7, 1976)Concepcion, Jr., J.

FACTS:- Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch V, Ormoc City, in Criminal Case No. 562-0, convicting the accused Ricardo Beriales Benedicto

Custodio and Pablito Custodio of the crime of murder, for killing Saturnina Porcadilla.- At the hearing of November 26, 1974, appellants' counsel moved for a reinvestigation of said case, along with two other related cases which the court a quo granted.- On December 3, 1974, the trial court postponed the hearing of the case to December 17 and 18, 1974. 5 in view of the City Fiscal's motion "for a deferment of the hearing or trial set for December 5 and 6, 1974 until such time the REINVESTIGATION shall have been terminated for which the result of said reinvestigation will be submitted to this Honorable Court for its resolution in the premises.- When the case was called for hearing on December 13, 1974, counsel for the appellant asked the court to wait for the City Fiscal to appear, since the reinvestigation of the case had already been terminated and the Fiscal, if given a chance, might be able to report on said reinvestigation. The trial court, however, insisted in arraigning the appellants. When arraigned, the three appellants declined to plead, saying: "I am not going to answer the question because the Fiscal is not yet around." Thereupon, the trial court entered a plea of "Not Guilty" for each of them.-Without the fiscal the presentation of evidence was ordered by the court through the private prosecutor. The refusal of the counsel for the defense to cross-examine due to the absence of the Fiscal was taken by the court as a waiver of such right. Even in the presentation of the evidence for the defense, they still reiterated their position that it is necessary for them to see the result of the reinvestigation of the fiscal. Then the case was submitted for decision.

-The appellants argued that they were denied of due process because they did not consent to the trial.

ISSUE: WON the appellants were denied due process?

HELD:-Yes. After the trial court granted the appellants' motion for reinvestigation, it became incumbent upon the court to hold in abeyance the arraignment and trial of the case until the City Fiscal shall have conducted and made his report on the result of such reinvestigation.- That was a matter of duty on its part, not only to be consistent with its own order but also to do justice aid at the same time to avoid a possible miscarriage of justice. It should be borne in mind, that the appellants herein were charged with the serious crime of murder, and considering that their motion for reinvestigation is based upon the ground that it was Felipe Porcadilla (husband and father, respectively, of the two deceased, Saturnina Porcadilla and Quirino Porcadilla) who was the aggressor for having attacked and seriously wounded appellant Pablito Custodio. It committed a serious irregularity which nullifies the proceedings below because such a procedure is repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution.- "to permit such prosecution of a criminal case by the private prosecutor with the fiscal in absentia can set an obnoxious precedent that can be taken advantage of by some indolent members of the prosecuting arm of the government.”

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 239 SCRA 529 (December 28, 1994)Bellosillo, J.

FACTS:- Challenged in this petition for certiorari (with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order) is the resolution of public respondent Sandiganbayan (Second Division) dated 28 October 1992 which lifted its order of default of 6 April 1989 against private respondent Imelda R. Marcos in connection with the now well-known "ill-gotten wealth" cases pending before said court as well as the resolution of 6 January 1993 denying the motion to reconsider the order of 28 October 1992.- The propriety of the grounds and circumstances set forth by private respondent to justify her failure to file her answers, which the Sandiganbayan considered as meritorious when it lifted the default order on 28 October 1992. As the causes of action are different, res judicata cannot be invoked.-The propriety of the grounds and circumstances set forth by private respondent to justify her failure to file her answers, which the Sandiganbayan considered as meritorious when it lifted the default order on 28 October 1992. As the causes of action are different, res judicata cannot be invoked.

ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan erred in its decision?

HELD:- No. Aside from the foregoing considerations, the most elementary sense of fairness and liberality appears to have prompted the Sandiganbayan to lift the order of default. Significantly, it is the avowed policy of the law to accord both parties every opportunity to pursue and defend their cases in the open and relegate technicality to the background in the interest of substantial justice. After all, petitioner had applied, on several occasions, for leave to file amended or

expanded complaints which applications were invariably granted, notwithstanding the resulting delay. Perhaps, it is now the turn of private respondent to be the recipient of and enjoy the same procedural liberality if not compassion.

1. Right to Appeala. Not Essential to the Right

to a Hearingb. Exception:

i. If the law allows appeal

ii. Cases under the minimum appellate jurisdiction of the SC

Case:

Calano v. Cruz, 94 Phil. 230 (January 12, 1954)Montemayor, J.

FACTS:

- As a result of the 1951 elections respondent Pedro Cruz was proclaimed a councilor-elect in the municipality of Orion, Bataan, by the Municipal Board of Canvasser. Petitioner Pedro Calano filed a complaint or petition for quo warranto under section 173 of the Revised election code (Republic Act No. 180), contesting the right of Cruz to the office on the ground that Cruz was not eligible for the office of municipal councilor.- Although the petition might be regarded as somewhat defective for failure to state a sufficient cause of action, said question was not raised in the motion to dismiss because the ground relied upon, namely, that petitioner had no legal capacity to sue, did not refer to the failure to state a sufficient cause of action but rather to minority, insanity, coverture, lack of juridical personality, or nay other disqualification of a party. As a result, the order of dismissal was reversed and the case was remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.

-However it was dismissed because it was filed out of time and petitioner has no legal capacity as contended by respondent. The higher court held that it was filed within the specified time and was remanded. -Respondent moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action. It was sustained by the CFI, then the petitioners appealed. However, Respondent argues that under the law there is no appeal from a decision of a court of First Instance in protests against the eligibility or election of a municipal councilor, the appeal being limited to election contests involving the offices of Provincial governor, Members of the Provincial Board, City Councilors and City Mayors, this under section 178 of the Revised Election Code.

ISSUE: WON the contention of respondent is correct?

HELD:-Yes. section 178 of the Revised election code limiting appeals from decisions of Courts of First Instance in election contests over the offices of Provincial Governor, members of the Provincial Board, City Councilors and City Mayors, did not intend to prohibit or prevent the appeal to the Supreme Court in protests involving purely questions of law, that is to say, that protests involving other officers such as municipal councilor may be appealed provided that only legal questions are involved in the appeal. Consequently, the appeal in the present case involving as it does purely questions of law is proper.- In view of the foregoing, the failure of Calano to allege that he is entitled to the office of councilor now occupied by the respondent Cruz does not effect the sufficiency of his cause of action. Reversing the order of dismissal, the case is hereby remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

2. Exceptions to Requirements of Hearing

a. Abatement of nuisance per se

b. In cases where statutory presumptions are applicable

Judgment

1. Must be based on the facts and the law (Sec. 14, Article 8 of the Constitution2)

2. Must conform to and be supported by pleadings and evidence

Case:

Diona v. Balangue, GR No. 173559 (Jan 7, 2013)Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:- This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the November 24, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals which annulled a portion of the decision of the RTC granting 5% monthly interest.- On March 2, 1991, respondents obtained a loan of P45,000.00 from petitioner payable in six months and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their 202-square meter property located in Marulas, Valenzuela and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-12296. When the debt became due, respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand. Petitioner then asked for foreclosure with other damages prayed for. -Due to the failure of respondents to answer, the case was set ex parte.-Respondent seek to annul the judgment because not all of them (Sonny) have been served summons.-Since the writ of execution could not be satisfied, petitioner asked the court that

2 Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

the property be auctioned (*which was granted). The petitioner was the only bidder (420k), hence the title was in his favor.- Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale dated December 17, 2001, claiming that the parties did not agree in writing on any rate of interest and that petitioner merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in her Complaint. Surprisingly, the RTC awarded 5% monthly interest (or 60% per annum) from March 2, 1991 until full payment. Resultantly, their indebtedness inclusive of the exorbitant interest from March 2, 1991 to May 22, 2001 ballooned from P124,400.00 to P652,000.00. Then it was granted.-CA reversed the decision holding that the RTC has no jurisdiction.- They contended that the portion of the RTC Decision granting petitioner 5% monthly interest rate is in gross violation of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and of their right to due process. And there was no interest in the verbal agreement of parties-Petitioners argue that annulment of judgment could only be availed of if there are no other remedies available, and that the remedies were not availed of due to negligence of the party’s counsel. Moreover, they allege the immutability of judgment.

ISSUE: WON the respondent have been denied due process?

HELD:- We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to due process and, hence, the same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.- The rule on Annulment of Judgment explicitly provides that it is not available

as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party’s own neglect in promptly availing of the same.- It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process considerations require that judgments must conform to and be supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in court- The raison d’être in limiting the extent of relief that may be granted is that it cannot be presumed that the defendant would not file an Answer and allow himself to be declared in default had he known that the plaintiff will be accorded a relief greater than or different in kind from that sought in the Complaint. No doubt, the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is to safeguard defendant’s right to due process against unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment- Ordinarily, the mistake, negligence or lack of competence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. A recognized exception to the rule is when the lawyers were grossly negligent in their duty to maintain their client’s cause and such amounted to a deprivation of their client’s property without due process of law- In fine, respondents did not lose the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other remedies through their own fault. It can only be attributed to the gross negligence of their erstwhile counsel which prevented them from pursuing such remedies. We cannot also blame respondents for relying too much on their former counsel. Clients have reasonable expectations that their lawyer would

amply protect their interest during the trial of the case.

Administrative Due ProcessRequisites:

Case:

Ang Tibay v. CIR, 60 Phil 635 (February 27, 1940)Laurel, J.

FACTS:- The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial.- We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity-Respondent avers that Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.- That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.- That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.

ISSUE: WON Toribio Teodoro validly observed principles of due process in its termination?

HELD:- No. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:1. the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof2. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented3. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.4. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be "substantial." It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion."5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.6. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the

law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.7. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered

- By and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved.

Review of decision by the same officer who rendered it previously in a different capacity

Cases:

Zambales Chromite v. CA, G.R. No. L-49711 (Nov 7, 1979)Aquino, J.

FACTS:- The petitioners appealed from the second decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing its first decision and holding that it was improper from

Benjamin M. Gozon, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, to affirm his own decision as Director of Mines.- In Mines Administrative Case No. V-227, Director Gozon issued an order dated October 5, 1960 wherein he dismissed the case filed by the petitioners or protestants (Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. or the group of Gonzalo P. Nava). In that case, they sought to be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of sixty-nine mining claims located in Santa Cruz, Zambales.- The petitioners appealed from that order to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. While the appeal was pending, Director Gozon was appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Instead of inhibiting himself, he decided the appeal, DANR Case No. 2151, on August 16, 1963 as it he was adjudicating the case for the first time. 'Thus, Secretary Gozon exercised appellate jurisdiction over a case which he had decided as Director of Mines. He acted as reviewing authority in the appeal from his own decision- On September 20, 1963, the petitioners filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Zambales, assailing Secretary Gozon's decision and praying that they be declared the prior locators and possessors of the sixty-nine mineral claims in question. It was dismissed and the lower court held that the rule on a judge reviewing his own decision does not apply to administrative bodies and there was no evidence that it was with bias or hostility.-CA reversed the decision of the lower court found that the petitioners (Nava group) had discovered minerals and had validly located the said sixty-nine mining claims and that there was no sufficient basis for Secretary Gozon's findings.

ISSUE: WON Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion?

HELD:-Yes. The palpably flagrant anomaly of a Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines is a mockery of administrative justice- In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different viewor there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.- Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due process, meaning fundamental fairness, when Secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director of Mines

Anzaldo v. Clave, G.R. No. L-54597 (Dec 15, 1982)Aquino, J.

FACTS:- Doctor Felicidad Estores-Anzaldo 55, seeks to annul the decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave dated March 20, 1980, revoking her appointment dated January 5, 1978 as Science Research Supervisor IIand directing the appointment to that position of Doctor Eulalia L. Venzon.- At the time the vacancy occurred, or on June 30, 1974, both Doctors Anzaldo and Venzon were holding similar positions in the Medical Research Department: that of Scientist Research Associate IV- Later, Doctor Pedro G. Afable, Vice-Chairman, became the Officer-in-Charge

of the NIST. Effective January 5, 1978, he appointed Doctor Anzaldo to the contested position. The appointment was approved by the Civil Service Commission.-Dr. Venzon then appealed to the office of the President. -Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission and Commissioner Jose A. R. Melo recommended in Resolution No. 1178 dated August 23, 1979 that Doctor Venzon be appointed to the contested position, a recommendation which is in conflict with the 1978 appointment of Doctor Anzaldo which was duly attested and approved by the Civil Service Commission.-The appeal and MR of Dr. Anzaldo was both denied by the CSC. Then he appealed to the Office of the President then Presidential Executive Assistant Clave (who was concurrently Chairman of the Civil Service Commission) in his decision of March 20, 1980 revoked Doctor Anzaldo's appointment and ruled that, "as recommended by the Civil Service Commission" (meaning Chairman Clave himself and Commissioner Melo), Doctor Venzon should be appointed to the contested position but that Doctor Anzaldo's appointment to the said position should be considered "valid and effective during the pendency" of Doctor Venzon's protest.

ISSUE: WON Dr. Anzaldo has been denied due process?

HELD:-Yes. Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that Presidential Executive Assistant Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, as to who between Doctor Anzaldo and Doctor Venzon should be appointed Science

Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines.-Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil Service Commission, who should be consulted by the Office of the President, should be a person different from the person in the Office of the President who would decide the appeal of the protestant in a contested appointment.

Better Buildings v. NLRC, G.R. No. 109714 (Dec 15, 1997)Romero, J.

FACTS:- This petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction seeks to annul the decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission which reinstates private respondents Halim Ysmael and Eliseo Feliciano to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and benefits and to pay them backwages.- Private respondent Halim Ysmael (Ysmael) was hired as a Sales Manager by petitioner Better Building, Inc. (BBI) on March 16, 1985. In addition to his monthly salary, he was given the free use of the company car, free gasoline and commission from sales. Private respondent Eliseo Feliciano (Feliciano), on the other hand, was employed as Chief Supervisor by the petitioner since January 1966. Then later on a memo stating their dismissal was circulated.-The Labor arbiter ruled it as a case of illegal dismissal and ordered reinstatement with damages. The NLRC affirmed it except to the portion of damages.- Petitioner argues that the private respondent was validly dismissed for engaging in the same line of business as

that of his employer (petitioner). Thus, his act of engaging in a business in direct competition with his employer was, not only an act of disloyalty, but more specifically a willful breach of trust and confidence.

ISSUE: WON the respondents were illegally dismissed?

HELD:-Yes although he was dismissed for a cause. In the case at bar, petitioner has clearly established private respondent’s culpability by convincing evidence. First, it was never disputed that private respondent established another corporation, Reachout General Services, engaged in the maintenance/janitorial service, the same line of business as that of petitioner. In this regard, private respondent failed to adduce substantial evidence to disprove this allegation.-It was without the requirements of due process.- In this jurisdiction, we have consistently ruled that in terminating an employee, it is essential that the twin requirements of notice and hearing must be observed. The written notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and at the same informs the employee concerned of the employer’s decision to dismiss him.-In the case at bar, the record is bereft of any showing that private respondent was given notice of the charge against him. Nor was he ever given the opportunity under the circumstances to answer the charge; his termination was quick, swift and sudden.- Evidently, the decision to dismiss respondent was merely based on the fact that petitioner was already convinced at the time that the private respondents were engaged in disloyal acts. As regards the procedural aspect, the failure to

observe the twin requirements of notice and hearing taints the dismissal with illegality.-Payment of nominal damages was then ordered.

Carag v. NLRC, G.R. No. 147590 (April 2, 2007)Carpio, J.

FACTS:-The petition assails the decision of labor arbiter which held that Mariveles Apparel Corporation (MAC), MAC's Chairman of the Board Antonio Carag (Carag), and MAC's President Armando David (David) (collectively, respondents) are guilty of illegal closure and are solidarily liable for the separation pay of MAC's rank and file employees- National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) and Mariveles Apparel Corporation Labor Union (MACLU) (collectively, complainants), on behalf of all of MAC's rank and file employees, filed a complaint against MAC for illegal dismissal brought about by its illegal closure of business-They allege that the termination was without notice and non-payment of salaries. The non-appearance of respondents prompted Arbiter Ortiguerra to declare the case submitted for resolution "based on the extant pleadings."-The corporation however, stopped business operation on July 8, 1993 and nder this given circumstance, the complainants have no option left but to implead Atty. ANTONIO CARAG, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Board along with MR. ARMANDO DAVID as President.- The respondents on the other hand by way of controversion maintain that the present complaint was filed prematurely. The respondents deny having totally

closed and insist that respondent company is only on a temporary shut-down occasioned by the pending labor unrest. There being no permanent closure any claim for separation pay must not be given due course.- Respondents opposed the impleader of Atty. Antonio C. Carag and Mr. Armando David saying that they are not the owners of Mariveles Apparel Corporation and they are only minority stockholders holding qualifying shares. Piercing the veil of corporate fiction cannot be done in the present case for such remedy can only be availed of in case of closed or family owned corporations.

ISSUE: WON petitioner Carag's right to due process been blatantly violated by holding him personally liable for over P50 million of the corporation's liability, merely as board chairman and solely on the basis of the motion to implead him in midstream of the proceedings as additional respondent, without affording him the right to present evidence and in violation of the accepted procedure prescribed by Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, as to render the ruling null and void?

HELD:- Arbiter Ortiguerra never issued summons to Carag, never called him to a conference for possible settlement, never required him to submit a position paper, never set the case for hearing, never notified him to present his evidence, and never informed him that the case was submitted for decision - all in violation of Sections 2, 3, 4, 5(b), and 11(c) of Rule V of The New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.- Indisputably, there was utter absence of due process to Carag at the arbitration level. The procedure adopted by Arbiter

Ortiguerra completely prevented Carag from explaining his side and presenting his evidence. This alone renders Arbiter Ortiguerra's Decision a nullity insofar as Carag is concerned. While labor arbiters are not required to conduct a formal hearing or trial, they have no license to dispense with the basic requirements of due process such as affording respondents the opportunity to be heard.- The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense. Where, as in this case, sufficient opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or position paper and other pleadings is not accorded a party to a case, there is undoubtedly a denial of due process.- For a wrongdoing to make a director personally liable for debts of the corporation, the wrongdoing approved or assented to by the director must be a patently unlawful act. Mere failure to comply with the notice requirement of labor laws on company closure or dismissal of employees does not amount to a patently unlawful act. Patently unlawful acts are those declared unlawful by law which imposes penalties for commission of such unlawful acts. There must be a law declaring the act unlawful and penalizing the act.- Thus, the rule is still that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only when the corporate fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime. In the absence of malice, bad faith, or a specific provision of law making a corporate officer liable, such corporate officer cannot be made personally liable for corporate liabilities