Consuls and nations in the Levant from 1570 to 1650

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Consuls and nations in the Levant from 1570 to 1650Niels SteensgaardVersion of record first published: 20 Dec 2011.

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Consuls and Nations in the Levant

from 1570 to 1650

By NIELS STEENSGAARD*

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to compare the consular institutions of four Euro

pean states in the Levant during a specific period, in the hope that this will illu

minate the strengths and weaknesses of the various institutional forms that were

adopted.

A comparison of this kind should be interesting from more than one point of

view. When it was thriving, the Levantine trade was one of the branches of inter

national trade that offered the greatest prospects of profit and the accumulation

of capital. The protection costs always formed a significant part of the total costs

of this trade and are generally considered to have weighed more heavily on some

nations than others; 1 so an analysis of the efficiency of the consular institutions

should contribute significantly to our understanding of commercial history.

A careful investigation of these institutions should also throw light on the

methods which the European states employed during this period, when the eco

nomic importance of the State was growing while that of the towns was in decline.

Government support of national economies is often mentioned as being of abso

lute benefit to the trade of their subjects, in that the greater diplomatic and mili

tary resources available ought to be of benefit to the merchants in difficult mar

kets. However, the active interest which governments took in foreign trade also

gave rise to quite new problems which the towns had not known. The state was

larger and had broader and more widely scattered interests than the towns.

* Niels Steensgaard, M.A. 1959 (History), Research Fellow in the University of Copenhagen,has written about 'Freight Costs in the English East India Trade, 1601-1657', (Scand. Econ.Hist. Rev., vol. xiii: 2). The present article is an expanded and annotated version of a paperread to the Third International Congress of Economic History in Munich in August 1965, section xiii on Instrumentalities of International Trade.

1 Paul Masson, Histoire du commerce [rancais dans le Levant au XVII- siecle, (Paris, 1897),pp.20-22.

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14 NIELS STEENSGAARD

Finally, the article is conceived as a methodological experiment. It has often

been pointed out that we need comparative studies based on primary sources

of the institutions of the European expansion; but as far as I know no such

investigations exist as yet." The demand for comparative studies reflects the diffi

culties the economic historian faces when estimating the importance of the qua

litative factors in a given course. Our principal interest is accordingly to find out

whether, by way of comparison, i.e. by addressing the same questions to different

material, it is at all possible to arrive at a more precise formulation of the positive

and negative effects of the institutional arrangements on a specific complex of

problems.

In the first half of the seventeenth century four European states had consular

representation in the Levant. Venice was alone in carrying on the tradition of the

Italian city-states and, by virtue of her great experience in Levantine affairs, she

became the model for her competitors. True, France could in theory build on the

foundations laid by cities like Marseilles and Narbonne, but the takeover by the

state of the obligations and privileges of representation meant in nearly every

respect a break with tradition. England (from 1583) and the Netherlands (from

1613) had from the beginning no particular experience of the Levant, but on the

other hand it was possible for them to combine the Venetian pattern with insti

tutions developed under different conditions.

The sources are far more abundant for the time after 1600 than for any pre

ceding period, probably because the states took a greater interest in consular

representation. A fairly continuous series of French consular dispatches exists

from about 1610, and from a few years later for Venice and the Netherlands.

With a few exceptions, the English consular dispatches from this period have not

been preserved, a deficiency which is however offset by the existence of other

sources, particularly the chancellery records from Aleppo.a

Although political tasks were to a certain extent imposed on the consuls by the

home authorities-this applies, for instance, to the very careful reports on the

political situation from the Venetian consuls-the consuls' primary task was com

mercial. They were the leaders and representatives of a society of merchants of

2 One exception, Hannah Rabe, 'Aktienkapital und Handelsinvestitionen im Uberseehandeldes 17. Jahrhunderts', Vierteljahrschrift fUr Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, IL (1962), is oflimited interest to the economic historian, being concerned primarily with the legal aspects ofthe problem.

a For practical reasons the investigation has been limited to the consulates in Syria (Tripoli,Aleppo, Alexandretta ) and Egypt (Alexandria, Cairo), by the four nations considered to bethe most important and not seriously rivalled by Smyrna until the end of the period.

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CONSULS AND NATIONS IN THE LEVANT 15

common origin, the so-called 'nation'. The consul's raison d'Btre was the need on

the 'part of the nation for protection and internal jurisdiction; and while the

formal position was stated in the capitulations and in his commission from the

home authorities, in practice-as will be shown-he was more dependent on the

immediate support and co-operation of the nation than on the privileges which

the host country, Turkey, granted to his nation and the force that the home

country might possibly be able to mobilise in support of his claims and decisions.

The consul had no absolute power. The division of authority might vary from

nation to nation, but in all four cases the consul could make no important deci

sions without the co-operation of the nation. Above all, the rule of 'No taxation

without consent' was observed.

Corresponding to this dualism abroad was a dualism at home. The consul re

presented the political authorities of the home country, the nation represented

partly its members' and partly the principals' financial interests. Community of

interest and close communication between consul and nation, home authorities

and principals were essential if the consular institutions were to solve the prob

lems that arose.

Consular Functions

The capitulations formed the consuls' legal basis in their relations with the Tur

kish authorities. These capitulations, which were later to be such a crucial point

in the relations between the European and the non-European countries, have

been the subject of a considerable literature and disagreement both with regard

to their formal character (treaty or charter) and their actual contents.

However, it must be pointed out at once that two essential requirements for

a meaningful debate on these questions have still to be fulfilled. Firstly, we have

virtually no authoritative editions or translations of the Turkish versions which

must be considered as being the originals of the capitulations, and the existing edi

tions of the European versions are rich in contradictions and thus probably also

in inaccuracies." Secondly, with our present knowledge it is absurd to continue

the past practice of analysing the capitulations in the light of the international

law of a later period. Discussion about the formal character of the capitulations

is futile as long as we cannot make a diplomatic analysis of the capitulations

4 A striking example in Karl Lippmann, Die Konsularjurisdiktion im Orient, (Leipzig, 1898),p. 78, n. 1. See also Arthur L. Horniker, 'William Harborne and the Beginning of Anglo-TurkishDiplomatic and Commercial Relations'. Journal of Modern History, XVIII, (1946). ApparentlyHorniker is not aware of the existence of the French capitulation of 1569.

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compared to other Ottoman documents from the same period; only by such a

comparative analysis will it be possible with certainty to place the capitulations

in relation to Turkish administrative practice and Islamic law.

The uncertainty about the famous French capitulation of 1535/36 provides a

sufficient example of how vague our knowledge of the legal basis for the Euro

pean-Turkish relations in this period actually is. Although the 1535/36 capitula

tion has time and again been emphasised as a cornerstone of the capitulatory

system, doubts have justifiably been raised about the legal validity of this capi

tulation. At least it can be established that if the text transmitted to us was valid,

it differs radically from any other known example of Turkish diplomas which

have survived, in good condition or bad. In fact, it seems improbable that this

text ever had any validity in law."

There are, however, many indications that the legal significance of the capitu

lations has been overestimated. A Turkish concession during the negotiations

about privileges made the ambassador's report look better, but that was often

all it meant, at least outside Constantinople. The lack of respect shown by local

authorities for the Europeans' formal rights has often been noted, both by contem

poraries and by the historians who have concerned themselves with the period.

Most frequently this disrespect has been explained by the central authorities'

inadequate control of the local administration in the Ottoman empire and by the

decadence that is supposed to have set in by the end of the sixteenth century.

Where the letter of the law was broken so frequently and so consistently, it seems,

however, reasonable to raise the question whether there might have existed some

discrepancy between the formal rules, the capitulations, and other sources of law.

In this connection it is already suggestive that it can be proved that the formal

model for the capitulations was the privileges that Byzantium had granted to

the Italian city-states as early as the eleventh century while, on the other hand,

5 Negociations de la France dans le Levant, ed. E. Charriere, (Paris, 1848), vol. I, pp. 28894; Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman, ed. Gabriel Noradounghian, (Paris,1897), vol. I, pp. 83-87. As regards the validity in law of the 1535/36 capitulation see N. ]orga,Points de vue sur l'histoire du commerce de l'Orieni, (Paris, 1925), p. 46; Gaston Zeller, 'Unelegende qui a la vie dure: les capitulations de 1535', Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine,II (1955); J. Billioud, 'Capitulations et histoire du commerce', ibid.; and M.E. (merit), 'Lescapitulations de 1535 ne sont pas une legende', Annales E.S.C. 1ge ann. (1964). The known textcannot be regarded as valid in law, partly because we have no knowledge of the ratificationstipulated in the last paragraph, partly because the treaty form given to the document is atvariance with the generally known Ottoman practice to such a degree that without very strongevidence it would not be fair to regard it as anything other than a summary of negotiationsfor use by the French, rendered in the form of a treaty.

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the Islamic legal institution of the amdn cannot have had a decisive influence on

the formal structure." But since the capitulations represent something alien to

Islamic law, it is appropriate to stress the analogy between the European nations

in the Levantine cities and the other groups that made up Ottoman society. In

their very penetrating analysis of the Islamic society Gibb and Bowen have

proved that its fundamental unity was the traditional group, the village, the

gild or the millet, i.e. the society of adherents of a 'protected' religion. At the

head of each group was an elected or nominated person who in all ways re

presented the group in relation to the public authorities, and who was respon

sible for maintaining order within the group and for collecting taxes.' Formally

as well as practically this corresponds to the consul's two most important duties,

representation vis-a-vis the Turkish authorities and internal jurisdiction. But if

this analogy proves to be more than a superficial likeness, the capitulations lose

their fundamental importance and become merely a source of law on an equal

footing with others, among which the local customs were perhaps the most

important.

This point of view is confirmed by a consideration of the practice of inter

national law in the Asiatic states in this period. It was only under very pressing

circumstances that an Asiatic prince was persuaded by treaty to give up part of

his sovereignty. The concessions made to foreign merchants were considered re

vocable on the prince's part, although not on the merchants'. We might even go

a step further. Behind the written capitulations was a customary concession of

certain privileges, particularly internal jurisdiction, to societies of foreign mer

chants. Such conventional concessions can be noticed in all parts of Asia, from

at least the eighth century. The capitulation in a limited sense was only an

embodiment of the privileges, which, however, did not affect their one-sided

6 Willi Heffening, Das islamische Fremdenrecht, (Hannover, 1925), pp. 126-27; d. Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. vol. I, pp.429-30. For another opinion see Martin Hartmann, 'Dieislamisch-frankischen Staatsvertrage (Kapitulationen)', Zeitschrift fur Politik, XI (1918), pp.208 ff.

7 H. A. R. Gibb & Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, vol. I, part I, pp. 208 ff.;vol. I, part II, pp. 211-13. A. H. Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the timeof Soleiman the Magnificent, (Cambridge, Mass., 1913), pp. 34 f., emphasises the parallel between dhimmi (members of one of the protected religions under Islamic authority), and mustamin (members of one of the protected religions only temporarily staying on Islamic territory);while Gibb & Bowen (vol. I part II, p.213) call attention particularly to the difference, referring to the basis in international law for the protection of the latter. 'Such agreements thusfell generally into the sphere of kanun rather than of Seri:«, and, indeed, disregarded the viewsof the legal schools on a number of points'. Such an unambiguous formal distinction does notcorrespond to the actual legal conditions in the Levant.

2 Scand. Econ. Hist, Rev.

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and revocable character." The view that the capitulations were revocable at

least met with some approval on the part of the Ottoman authorities, as appears

from the events in 1614 when the Grand Vizier Nassuf Pasha recalled the capi

tulations of all four nations in order to modify them in several important re

spects. The originals were not returned until the ambassadors of all four nations

had made earnest representations."

This view is supported also by the comparatively late exemption of the consuls

from the jurisdiction of the local authorities. As late as in 1596 the French consul

in Alexandria was hanged, dressed in his formal gown." Probably in conse

quence, diplomatic immunity for the consuls was incorporated for the first time

in the English capitulations of 1601U and in the French of 1604/2 establishing

that the consuls could not be imprisoned on any charge, but that cases against

them should be referred to Constantinople for decision. Nevertheless, there are

several instances from the first half of the seventeenth century of consuls being

imprisoned."

It is clear from the difficulties that often arose when new rights were to be

put into practice that the capitulations were not automatically considered to be

more binding in character than other agreements of the Porte. A typical example

of such a conflict is to be found in connection with the reduction of duty from

5 to 3 per cent which the Dutch obtained in the capitulations of 1612. The

farmer of the customs in Cyprus refused to bow to the reduction, referring to the

fact that he himself had farmed the duty on the basis of 5 per cent. The Dutch

8 Charles H. Alexandrowicz, 'Le droit des nations aux lndes Orientales, (XVle, XVIIe,XVIIle siecles)", Annales E.S.C. 1ge ann. (1964), p. 1077: 'Les "capitulations" ne sont donepas une institution juridique d'origine europeenne; elles ont leur origine dans Ie droit coutumieren vigueur aux lndes Orientales. Les Europeens n'ont joue d'autre role dans cette institutionque de contribuer a sa deformation, en y introduisant des elements d'irrevocabilite et d'inegalite'.

9 Haga to the Statens General, 3/4 1614, K. Heeringa (ed.), Bronnen tot de geschiedenis vanden levantschen handel, vol. l, (Rijks geschiedkundige publicatien, vol. 9, the Hague, 1910),pp.316-19.

10 William Foster (ed.), The Travels of John Sanderson in the Levant 1584-1602, (HakluytSociety, 2nd series, vol. LXVII, London, 1931), p. 13 and passim, Archivio di Stato, Venice,Collegio Cinque, Relazioni Alessandria, Andrea Paruta's relation of 1599: '... et di questaattione (the execution of the consul) ne voleva il bassa esser comrnendato, non come essecutor,rna come supremo Signor, che aveva arnpia et libera potesta di poter condannare i consoli .. .'.

11 Foster, op, cit., p. 284, art. 5.12 Noradounghian, Recueil., vol. l, p.98, art. 25; d. Francois Savary de Breves, Relations

des voyages, (Paris, 1628), p. 23.13 The English consul in Aleppo in 1629, Public Record Office, London, S.P. 110/54, f.96;

and Heeringa, Bronnen., p. 562. The French consul in Aleppo in 1623, Archives de la Chambrede Commerce de Marseille, J. 889.

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succeeded in having the reduction of duty put into force only after protracted

negotiations with the dejterdar, pasha and others in Cyprus."

The conclusion must be that in this period the consuls and the nations did not

occupy a protected and special position in international law within the Ottoman

empire. The capitulations were not the only basis for their status; their rights

and obligations were determined partly by the capitulations, partly by their

customary place among other groups and by their ability in any given situation

to adapt themselves and make the most of the existing power balance.

Complaints about the Turkish judicial system are frequent in the European

sources from this period. If one falls foul, it is a wise thing to do 'to hang your

head down like a Capuchin, and not open your mouth' .15 'If I were to tell about

the injury and unpleasantness that the French, the English and the Venetians,

who after all have been known here through so many years, are exposed to every

day, even in Constantinople, instead of a letter I would have to write a bulky

book'." On the other hand, there is no lack of positive statements either. 'They,

whom they call Franckes or Free-men, live in greater security amongst them than

their owne People .. .' 17 'The omitting of a word cannot frustrate their estates;

nor Quirks of Law prevaile against Conscience .. .' 18 With our present know

ledge of the Turkish judicial system and administration it is impossible to judge

these contradictory statements. It is generally agreed that from the end of the

sixteenth century the Turkish administration entered a long period of disorgani

sation, when ruthless extortion and corruption were far more widespread than

before. If some of the European complaints can be explained in this way by the

insecure conditions in an empire where central supervision of the local admini

stration was lacking, it may nevertheless be worth asking whether part of the

insecurity may not have been connected with the uncertainty about the legal

position of the nations which was discussed above.

This theory, which has so far been disregarded in European research, cannot,

of course, be confirmed or invalidated on the basis of the European material

alone, but it can be supported by an examination of the well-documented ex

amples of conflicts in the European material.

Conflicts between the nations and the local authorities generally involved

14 Haga to the States General, 7/3 1614, Heeringa, Bronnen., pp.442--43.15 Nicolao Manucci, Storia do Mogor, (ed. William Irvine, London, 1907), vol. I, p. 14.16 Haga to the States General, 7/3 1614, Heeringa, Bronnen ..., p. 442.H Biddulph in Purchas his Pi/grimes, (Hakluyt Society, Extra series, Glasgow, 1905), vol.

VIII, p. 277.18 Sandys, ibid., pp. 139--40.

2*

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auantas, i.e. arbitrary payments extorted from the nation as a whole by the

Turkish authorities to meet their own or their clients' claims. The vast majority

of these avanias fall into two groups, firstly unilateral increases of duty, often as

a once-for-all sum to commute an increase of duty, secondly collective responsi

bility for claims that according to European ideas of justice ought properly to

be raised against individuals.

Whether it is considered a result of administrative dishonesty or a consequence

of the ambiguity of the law of the European nations, there is absolutely no doubt

that the provisions laid down in the capitulations about fixed rates of duty and

against collective responsibility were not observed in practice. In fact, they were

so little respected that the nations even asserted reciprocal collective claims. The

protective functions of the consul were determined by this state of affairs. His

position was not that of an advocate, and references to the rights laid down in

the capitulations were of no use in the circumstances. They could, of course,

form the basis of an appeal to Constantinople, but this procedure was generally

considered to be so slow, costly and uncertain that it was applied only in the

case of very serious infringements."

On the other hand, in case of disputes the consul had considerable non-legal

means at his disposal. His own and his nation's prestige were important and his

relations with local officials or other dignitaries might prove invaluable, partic

ularly if he had won them over in time with small presents. In cases where

everything else went wrong, the conflict was reduced to the question about the

size of the avania and the nation's ability and willingness to pay the money

required. In the most serious cases the consul might threaten that he and his

nation would leave the town; however, during the period under review we do

not find any threat, open or disguised, of the use of military force.

In these circumstances it is obvious that a good deal depended on the consul's

personality, his status in the town and particularly on his co-operation with the

nation. For instance, it might weaken the French nation if it was rumoured that

its consul had formerly been a clerk on board ship." A consul never showed him

self in the town without a large train of attendants." Nearly every Venetian con-

19 It was possible to win a case at the Porte, but the expenses involved were often 3--4 timeshigher than the amount in dispute. From time to time they succeeded in having a cadi or apasha dismissed, but it had never happened that an avania was repaid. Memoires du cheualierd'Arvieux, t. V (Paris, 1735), p. 349.

20 Heeringa, Bronnen ..., p. 180.21 A. C. Wood, A History of the Levant Company, (Oxford, 1935), p. 220; Masson, Histoire

du Commerce .. ., pp. 449-50.

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sular report contains smug references to the friendly relations between the con

sul and the top people of the cities-pasha, dejterdar, cadi, etc." But any nego

tiation would, of course, prove barren if it was opposed by the nation or if the

nation refused to approve the results.

In a single instance the French consul in Aleppo tried to mobilise the craft

gilds of the city in support of the nation during negotiations for settlement of the

French debt," but this was an exception and in practically every case prestige,

useful connections and particularly cash were the means of pressure employed.

Very few cases were submitted to Constantinople, but, on the other hand, the

importance of the fact that there was a permanent representative of the nation

at the Porte must not be underrated. His presence, so to speak, put a ceiling on

the harshness of the squeeze. If this went beyond a certain limit, it might be

cheaper to try to achieve one's objective by bribery in the capital. Of course,

this applied particularly to cases where the ambassador was a skilful man with

influence and prestige, as the English ambassadors Barton and Roe were,

whereas some of the French ambassadors-Cecy, for example-did more harm

than good to the merchants. In this connection it should be mentioned that

throughout the whole period the English Levant Company exerted a not in

considerable influence on the appointment of English ambassadors to the Porte,

whereas the French merchants had no influence at all on the appointment of

the corresponding French representatives."

In general, the relations between the European nations were too much in

fluenced by competition between them for co-operation between the nations to

be possible. An additional factor contributing to the difficulties of co-operation

was the fact that the French consul claimed precedence, which might be par

ticularly awkward if, as was often the case, he was of humble origin and installed

only as business manager or farmer by the proprietor. If we are to believe

Gedouyn, in the years up to 1623 co-operation was made impossible by this very

fact."

In principle the idea of Christian co-operation was of course cherished," and

22 Guglielmo Berchet, Relazioni dei consoli veneti nella Siria, (Torino, 1866), passim, forexample, p. 60 and p. 72.

23 Arch. Ch. C. Marseilles. J. 894.24 Wood, op, cii., pp. 80-94; Masson, op, cit., pp. 51 ff.25 Journal et correspondence de Gedouyn 'le Turc' 1623-25, (ed. A. Boppe, Paris, 1909),

p. 217, d. p. 175.26 Arch. Venezia, Collegio Cinque, Relazzioni Alessandria, Antonio Capello's relation of

1623 (?): '... tanto piu vedono Ie natione unite, tanto piu Ie stimano, ed non sono cosi solitia molesterci .. .'.

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in a few cases the principle was successfully carried into effect. Thus in 1617

the consuls of the four nations decided jointly to approach the Grand Vizier,

Halil Pasha, who was expected to arrive in Aleppo at that time, in order to com

plain of the increases in duty and the behaviour of the customs farmers. The

costs involved by this approach were to be shared, the French consul paying two

fifths and the other consuls one-fifth each."

In 1632 a more extensive agreement was made; the background was that

some Turkish dignitaries had bought up galls and silk in Aleppo, intending to

hold the goods off the market and to dispose of them when the demand had

forced up the prices. On the initiative of the English the consuls for the French,

the English and the Venetian nations agreed that their merchants should desist

from buying silk and gals already sold once on the market in Aleppo. However,

it turned out to be a short-lived agreement, and both the English and French

fronts gave way." A similar attempt the next year failed, as at that time the

French were in conflict with the authorities in Aleppo in consequence of their

protection of the Jesuits. As neither the English nor the Venetians wanted to get

mixed up in this conflict, they refused to co-operate 'lest we should be inforced

futurely to support these and the growing multitude of all orders'. 29

As far as the internal jurisdiction of the consuls is concerned it can also be

shown that practice did not conform to the letter of the capitulations. The sur

prising thing is, however, that at this point the foreigners were granted more

privileges than they had on paper. The jurisdiction given in the capitulations

only related to cases among the members of the nations, but in several instances

the consuls pronounced judgments in mixed cases, apparently without causing

any conflict with the Turkish authorities.

In Egypt about 1630 the French consul adjudicated on mixed as well as in

ternal cases. If members of the nation approached the local authorities disavow

ing the consul, they might be fined." At about the same time this was also the

case with the Venetian nation in Egypt. It is even said in this connection that

mixed cases might just as well be conducted before Turkish judges, but that the

27 P.R.O. London, S.P. 110/54 f. 14.2S P.R.O. London, S.P. 110/54 ff. 106-109; Arch. Ch. C. Marseilles, J. 892 (1/8 1632);

Arch. Venezia, Bailo 318 contains a transcript of the treaty between the three consuls, dated28/6 1632 and signed by Delestrade, John Wandesford and Pietro Gritti.

29 P.R.O. London, S.P. 110;54.30 Ceesar Lambert, Relation du sieur C.L. de ce qu'il a vu ..• (Relations ueritables et curieu

ses de l'isle de Madagascar, Paris, 1651), p. 5.

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consul's reputation for justice ensured that the Turkish and Arabian merchants

were willing to have the cases heard before the consul's tribunal."

From 1632 we have a reference to a case from Aleppo indicating that the

conditions there for the French nation were similar. A Jewish merchant had

approached the pasha and received an order from him directing his debtor, a

French merchant, to pay his debt. With this order he then went to the French

consul who at once saw to it that the Frenchman paid. In retaliation the French

merchant now demanded that the Jew should be punished by a boycott (batella

tion) by the French nation, and in order that his own countrymen could tell him

that he had acted wrongly, the batellation 'should include the whole Jewish

nation.aa Thus not only were the Jews in Aleppo regarded as a nation, but it was

also thought feasible to punish an approach from this nation to the Turkish

authorities disregarding the French consul, if the defendant was a Frenchman.

Fairly full information about the normal procedure before the consul's tribunal

is to be found in a letter dating from 1615 from the Dutch consul in Aleppo,

Cornelius Pauw. Pauw's information is the more valuable as he points out that

his procedure is in agreement with that applied by the Venetians and the other

nations."

The majority of cases concerned misunderstandings between buyers and sellers,

caused by the brokers' incorrect translations, or alleged faults in consignments

supplied. At the hearing the parties appeared without legal assistance; they

pleaded their cause, if necessary with the aid of an interpreter, witnesses were

heard, and any documents relating to the case were produced. The consul then

pronounced his decision at once. Pauw admits that such a hearing made heavy

demands on the consul's judgment, for often he only had the parties' statements

to follow. On the other hand, a prompt decision had the great advantages of

avoiding the heavy loss of interest involved in a prolonged tying up of the dis

puted consignment.

As Pauw saw it, the reason why the inhabitants of the country were willing

to have mixed cases settled by the consuls was that the pasha claimed 10 per cent

of the disputed amount for pronouncing the judgment. This can hardly be cor

rect, but it is likely that the consuls' fees were lower than those charged by the

a1 Arch. Venezia, Collegio Cinque, Relazioni Alessandria, Antonio Capello's relation of 1623(?). The bailo, the Venetian ambassador in Constantinople, also acted as judge in mixed cases,Contarini's relation of 1612, N. Barozzi and G. Berchet, Le relazioni dagli ambasciatori Veneziani, Serie V: Turchia, p. 236.

sa Arch. Ch. C. Marseilles, J. 892.sa Heeringa, Brannen . . ., p. 468 ff.

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Turkish officials or judges. The most surprising thing is that at this time there

does not seem to have been any dispute about jurisdiction, even though the con

suls had virtually arrogated to themselves power which the capitulations did not

allow.

For the consuls' duties as judges to be effective they had to have sanctions at

their disposal in case one of the parties should refuse to defer to the decision. The

kind of sanction depended of course on whether the convicted person was a mem

ber of the nation. If the Venetian consul met with opposition to his decisions

he had to make an official report," while from 1616 the Dutch consul could

send a culprit home in irons at his own expense in cases of gross disobedience."

Generally, there were many references to disobedience in the consuls' dispatches,

but no formal complaints have been traced.

If the convicted person was not a member of the nation and declined to con

form to the judgment, the consul might resort to batellation, i.e. the person in

question was financially boycotted by the members of the nation and, wherever

possible, by members of the other European nations. The batellation was decided

on by the consul and proclaimed by a notice in the consul's reception room

and in the other houses belonging to the nation. It was further conveyed by a

messenger to the consuls of the other nations. Normally, it also included the

brokers whom the merchant in question was accustomed to employ, and might

be further extended to include all members of the group or nation to which the

convicted man belonged."

Of course, it was also possible for the consul to appeal to the Turkish authori

ties in order to have his decision executed. Such an appeal is indicated as a pos

sibility in the questionable capitulation of 1535/36, but not in later capitula

tions." Presumably, it was slander when the French ambassador, de Breves, was

said to be behind the execution of the French consul in Alexandria in 1596.3s

On the other hand, there is no doubt that it was the French ambassador, Cecy,

why in 1623 caused the Turkish authorities to arrest the whole French nation in

Aleppo headed by the consul.39 A similar exploitation of the Turkish authorities

is found several times in connection with the complicated intrigues within the

34 Berchet, Relazioni ... Siria, p. 31.35 The States General's resolution of 17/2 1616, Groot Placaetboeck, vol. II, pp. 1334-35.36 Heeringa, Bronnen . . ., pp. 469-70; d. Arch. Ch. C. Marseilles, J. 892.37 Noradounghian, Recueil . . ., p. 84.3S Foster, Sanderson . . ., p. 13; d. Heeringa, Bronnen ..., p. 167.39 Masson, Histoire du commerce . . ., pp. 54 ff.; Gerard Tongas, Les relations de la France

avec l'Empire Ottoman durant la premiere moitie du XVlle siecle, (Toulouse, 1942), pp. 171 ff.

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French nation in Alexandria after 1647.40 That kind of appeal never failed to

result in avanias-the Turkish officials did not work for nothing-but it seems

only to have been the French ambassadors and consuls who resorted to this line

of action.

The Appointment and Emolument of the Consuls

It has been shown above that in principle the consul represented the Crown or

the political authorities of his home country, while the nation represented itself

or the home principals; and it has been suggested that in this dualism lay a

latent cause of conflicts between nation and consul. It appears also that the

various forms of appointing and remunerating the various consuls were decisive

for the relationship between consul and nation. On the terms of the consul's

appointment depended not only the extent of his authority, but also his chances

of identifying himself with the merchants' interests. Whether he could concen

trate on his official duties, or whether he was tempted or compelled to make the

most of the fiscal possibilities of the office, depended on the emoluments.

Venice.-Like the other nations the Venetians distinguished between principal

consuls in the important towns, Aleppo and Alexandria (Cairo), and the consuls

or vice-consuls at the less important places. In the latter the right of patronage

was held by the Venetian ambassador in Constantinople, the baiZa, who could

even set up new consulates on his own initiative, if the merchants so desired."

The exceptional position of the principal consulates was accentuated further by

the fact that these consulates alone were in correspondence with the home

authorities.

While the vice-consulates thus had a fairly informal position, a fixed frame

work was provided for the principal consulates. When he left to take up his post

a consul brought with him a heavy volume of copies of the regulations and

resolutions of the Senate relevant to his office." The consuls, who were to be of

the Venetian nobility, were appointed for three years; this time-limit was ob

served during the period in question with minor exceptions. They must not have

business connections with the places to which they were sent." Formally the ap-

40 Masson, op. cit., p. 81 ff.41 Arch. Venezia, Senato, Dispacci Ambasciatori, Constantinopoli, busta 23 nr.31, d. Ugo

Tucci, 'Mercanti veneziani in India alla fine del secolo XVI', Studi in onore di Armando Sapori, (Milan, n.d.), p. 1092, n.4.

42 Several of these are now to be found in Museo Civico-Correr in Venice.43 Berchet, Relazioni ... Siria, pp. 27-28.

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pointment was made by the Senate, but in the course of the sixteenth century

the department of commerce of the Republic, Cinque Savii, gained an even

greater influence. In 1583 it was formally established that no consul could be

appointed without Cinque Savii having been consulted."

A characteristic feature of the Venetian consuls was that very often they had

served and later again served the Republic in other offices. Andrea Navagero

(Aleppo 1574-78) was a former governatore di galea, Pietro Michele (Aleppo

1581-83) a former provveditore and capitano in Capodistria, Alessandro Mali

piero (Aleppo 1592-96) a former conte in Sebenico, and so forth." The consuls

were not personally attached to the merchants they were to serve, but they were

all familiar with the high traditions of the Venetian administration, and they

belonged to the distinguished families of the town. The dispatches preserved in

the Senate's archives not only sound far more competent than their English,

French and Dutch counterparts but, compared with the Dutch and French dis

patches in particular, they are agreeably free from the squabbles that increas

ingly arose where there was some uncertainty about the distribution of powers

and lines of communication.

The Venetian consuls received a fixed salary and were not allowed to dispose

of the consular duties, the cottimo and the tansa, unless this was done in co

operation with the nation's representatives. Sometimes they were granted an

extra sum on their departure from Venice, and they could probably count on

various perquisites, but apart from that they had no legal sources of extra in

come." If we dare conclude from the silence of the sources, they did not try to

make profits by illegal means during the period under review.

France. The French consular service formed a sharp contrast to the bureau

cratically institutionalised treatment which the Venetians gave this important

office. The origins of the French consulates and their transition to royal offices

are not easily discoverable. We know that the French interests in Egypt about

1500 were represented by a certain Philippe de Paretes (Peretz), who was also

representing Napoli and Catalonia." At that time the consul seems still to have

held the medieval position as a representative of a society of merchants, not of

a state: thus Paretes's successor received privileges on his own behalf from

44 Guglielmo Berchet, La republicca di Venezia e la Persia, (1865), p. 82.4~ Berchet, Relazioni ... Siria, passim.46 ibid., pp. 29-30; and d. p. 100.47 W. Heyd, Histoire du commerce du Levant au Moyen-Age, (Leipzig, 1886), t. II, pp. 539

40 and p. 540, n. 3.

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Soleiman in 1528.4 8 He had, however, been appointed under the Royal Seal in

1523,49 whereas the earliest such appointments known for Aleppo are somewhat

later, namely in 1544.50

The royal interest in protecting the merchants at the same time involved a

reduction of the privileges of the commercial cities. Throughout the whole of

the sixteenth century Marseilles was attempting to claim its right to be con

sulted about appointments to consular offices, but with diminishing success and

declining zeal; the city fathers took more interest in the political game than in

the welfare of the merchants.51

The decisive factor was, however, that the state's assumption of obligations

effected a change in the character of the consulates. Like so many other French

offices in the sixteenth century their primary function now became fiscal; they

were to serve as a source of revenue for the state or the person entrusted with

the office by the state.

The next important stage in development was that the state soon lost control

again, as the consulates were transferred to private persons in payment for real

or assumed services. In 1580 the consul resident in Alexandria had the right of

succession secured for his nephew and heir; from about 1600 this consulate pas

sed to the former ambassador in Constantinople, de Breves, and thereafter to

his heirs.52 A similar development took place in the case of the Syrian consulate.

Through most of the sixteenth century this post was occupied by members of the

Reynier family. 53 In 1596 Henry IV presented Pierre de Libertat with the con

sulate as a reward for his political support. After de Libertat's death the follow

ing year the consulate was run by a consortium, in which the merchant Viguier

took a particularly active part.54

The ownership of the consulate also implied the right to farm it out. While

in the sixteenth century it was still the custom for the consul to reside, this be-

48 Charriere, Negociations ... , vol. I, pp. 122 ff. The form as we know it was not that of atreaty, contrary to what is often maintained in the French literature. See for instance R. Collierand J. Billioud, Histoire du commerce de Marseilles, t. III, pp. 257-58.

49 R. Collier & J. Billioud, op, cii., t. III, p. 258.50 ibid., p. 263.51 Masson, op, cit., pp. xxviii-xxix.52 ibid., pp. 77 ff.; Collier & Billioud, op, cit., p. 260. The view taken of the offices is quite

humorously illustrated by the fact that Breves himself would rather have had a small abbey, laBenisson-Dieu, which was conveniently nearer to his ancestral estate. Ambassade en T'urquie delean de Gontaut-Biron •.. 1605 Ii 1610, t, I, p. 13i.

53 Masson, op, cit., pp. 78-80; Collier & Billioud, op, cit., p. 264-.54 Boppe, 'le Turc', p. xii; and cf. p. 63.

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came exceptional in the seventeenth century. True, the farmers were supposed

to obtain a letter of appointment under the Royal warrant, but this seems only

to have been a formality; 55 indeed it is not even certain that the farmers in all

cases took the trouble to obtain a formal appointment.56

The proprietors' principal interest was quite naturally to find people who were

willing and able to pay a good rent. The result was that the French nation was

often represented by men who in ability and prestige, not to mention their

interests, were not qualified to fill the post satisfactorily. It has already been

said that the consuls' humble birth might be an obstacle to co-operation between

the nations, particularly since the French consul claimed precedence when seve

ral nations worked together.51 Still more dangerous, perhaps, the consuls lost

prestige in the eyes of the Turkish authorities. The Dutch consul tells for instance

that during his visit to Aleppo in 1615 the Grand Vizier would not allow the

consuls to be seated in his presence, because he had heard that the French con

sul had previously been a clerk on board ship. 58

Admittedly, that kind of story was often exaggerated; however, the very fact

that they could circulate and gain credence did tremendous harm to the French

nation under circumstances in which so much depended on status and pre

stige."

Of course the deplorable effects produced by the system of farming did not

escape the attention of contemporaries; complaints from the nation, from the

merchants in Marseilles and from the city government of Marseilles were fre

quent, but the problem confronting the reformer was the classic one of the

ancien regime, namely the clash with legally acquired abuses. On the side of the

proprietors were not only powerful friends and abundant means, but also the

law; 'no nationalisation without compensation' was a rule which also applied to

offices.

A lettre patente of 1618 tried to retrieve the worst absurdities of the system.

It stated that he consuls should reside unless they were explicitly permitted to

be represented. If they were represented, this must not be done by a farmer.

They themselves were not allowed to take part in any kind of trade at the

55 Masson, op, cit., pp. 68-70.56 Lettre Patente of 20/5 1618, Boppe, 'le Turc', pp. 216-19.51 Loc. cit., p. 217.58 Heeringa, Brannen . . ., pp. 479-80.59 The position of the office in this respect is discussed in Masson, op. cii., pp. 77-95; and

Collier & Billioud, op, cit., t. 4, pp. 63 ff.

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town in question, nor to take in partners in the consulate, as had previously

been done.?"

This attempt seems to have had no effect. Anyhow, it was only a few years

before new complaints were received. Viguier and his partners had been re

presented in Aleppo by a certain Pierre Besson who in 1622 was recalled, after

a complaint had been lodged against him. Besson's offence seems to have been

that, with the nation's consent, he had levied more than the fixed 2 per cent

consular fee, while at the same time an arret du conseil of his case enjoins that

since 1562 it was not permissible for 'les marchands et commettans en Alep

d'imposer ou faire imposer aulcune chose al'advenir sur Ie negoce .... sy ce n'est

par permission de Sa Ma: te'-in addition to the 2 per cent of course. It seems

obvious that formally this was a breach of law; however, it is unlikely that Bes

son had acted for the sake of gain, as accounts of the supplementary fee exist

for the years 1619 to 1621. He had more probably levied this supplementary fee

towards the payment of an avania with the agreement of the majority of the

nation, but against a minority who had then taken the case to France for a

decision."

In consequence of the renewed unrest and probably on the initiative of Puy

sieux, the Secretary of State, an attempt was made in 1623 to reorganise the

consular service. All consulates were to be repurchased, and new consuls, ap

pointed under the Royal seal, installed in Aleppo, Alexandria, Smyrna, Seidon

and Jerusalem.

Louis Oedouyn, known to his friends as 'the Turk', was sent out to Aleppo.

His short career as consul is well illustrated by his own letters and journal. While

still on his outward voyage, in Constantinople, he learned that Puysieux had fal

len into disgrace (in March 1624), and he immediately concluded that Mar

seilles' envoys at Court and the interested parties at the consulate would take

this opportunity to have him removed from the consulate." His guess proved to

be correct; almost at the same time as he arrived in Aleppo, Viguier was re

instated in his capacity as consul by an arret du conseil; 63 four months later, in

December 1624, the official statement reached Aleppo, and Gedouyn had to

resign.

With Puysieux's fall the whole attempt to reorganise seems to have come to

60 Boppe, 'Ie Turc', pp. 217-19.61 Arret du conseil of 18/5 1623, Boppe, op. cit., 219-20.62 tu«, p. 99.63 ibid., p. xxiii.

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nothing. A memorandum from 1634 gives the following summary of the situation: 64

Aleppo has belonged since the times of Villeroy to Jean Viguier (the interlude in the years1623 to 1624- is not even mentioned). La Ville aux Clercs has given survivance (reversion ofthe office) in office to M. de Paris.

Seidon has belonged since the times of ViIIeroy to Pierre Viguier and M. Tarquet 'l'un aI'absence de l'autre'.

Alexandria belongs to de Breves, who has inherited it from his father, the old ambassador.Smyrna belonged up to 1621 (sic), when the partnerships were prohibited, to M. Rigon and

M. Guel from Marseilles. In 1634- it belongs to Sr Cadet de Marc dit Bourgignon who hasfarmed it out to Jean Dupuy from Marseilles. (Among the previous farmers only Rigon andGuel seem not to have returned after the attempt to reorganise, possibly because formally theywere the only ones to have overstepped the powers regarding representation given them by theircommission) .65

Jerusalem had again been shut down.

Things were back in the old groove. In 1636 the city government of Mar

seilles (the consuls) lodged another complaint with the king against the burden

of debt and the abuses in the towns: '... et tout cela ne procede que de ce aqui les consulz en chef et titulaires commettent par arrentement et ferme la

fonction de la charge'." No reform took place within the French consular service

during the period dealt with."

Had the consuls, like the Venetian, received fixed salaries, the effects of this

'feudalisation' of the consular offices would still have been comprehensible, but

unfortunately for the French nation no distinction was made between the con

sular fee and the consul's income. The consular fee had originally been a modest

fee of ~ per cent, but rose to 2 per cent in the sixteenth century, though with

the reservation that only 1 per cent was to be regarded as emolument to the

consul, while 1 per cent should cover certain joint expenses, maintenance of the

nation's buildings, dragomans, janissaries, ordinary gifts, etc." The consul, how

ever, does not seem to have been under any obligation to keep books. The system

of farming out inevitably loosened the community of interest between consul

and nation. It was natural that the consul was not interested in killing the goose

that laid the golden eggs, but on the other hand he did not take any particularly

64 Archives des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris, Correspondance politique, Turquie, vol. 4 ff.,406 ff.

65 Tongas, Les relations . . ., p. 186.66 Arch. Aff. Etr, Paris, lac. cit., f.457.61 The first steps towards an effective reorganisation of the French consular service were

taken in 1664-, Masson, op, cit., pp. 14-8 ff.68 tu«, p. 85, n. 1; cf. Arch. Ch. C. Marseilles, J. 1734-.

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long-term interest in the trade, and he might thus easily feel tempted to cut down

expenses such as gifts and the maintenance of buildings.

To this must be added that the farming of a consulate was an extremely

speculative business. With the violent fluctuations in the volume of trade likely

to occur from year to year, and with trade being immensely sensitive to po

litical conditions a farmer might sometimes find it difficult simply to meet the

most essential household expenses and at the same time pay his rent. His only

way out then was to take part in the trade, to the detriment of the ethics and

prestige of his office, or to raise a loan at the murderous rates of interest of the

Levant. The nation was responsible for these loans in the case of bankruptcy or

death. On his death in 1635 the French consul in Aleppo, Delestrade, for in

stance, left a debt of well over 12,000 piastres, which the nation had to pay.

A counter-claim on the owners of the consulate, was of course unsuccessful.69

In 1650 the French consul in Aleppo, Bonin, went bankrupt with a debt of

29,000 piastres. The nation asserted that Bonin had raised this loan in order

to carry on business, while Bonin maintained that he had received such poor

emoluments because of the Franco-Spanish war that he had had to raise the loan

merely to pay the consular expenses. Bonin's creditors summoned the nation

before the cadi, who ruled in favour of the creditors after Bonin had sworn ac

cording to French custom to the truth of his statement."

The Netherlands.-The Netherlands' participation in the Levantine trade

was of considerable dimensions only for a few years within our period, and the

Republic maintained a consulate in Aleppo only for two rather short periods,I

namely 1613-1621 (Cornelius Pauw) and 1626-1627 (Cornelius Witzen).

While, therefore, no established practice for the Dutch consular representation

in the Levant was developed during that time, the Dutch material is never

theless of great interest, not only because it illustrates another attempt to solve

the protection and jurisdiction problems, but also because the Dutch, as be

ginners, were inclined in their dispatches to go into details about things that

the more experienced nations considered to be well-known.

It was the States-General which appointed the Dutch consuls and issued their

commissions. As will be shown later, the States-General made these decisions in

close consultation with the Levant merchants, paying great attention to their

wishes. Both consuls representing the Netherlands in the period under review

came from the Dutch patriciate, they were both the sons of burgomasters, but

69 Arch. Ch. C. Marseilles, J. 894 (28/6 1646).70 Arch. Ch. C. Marseilles, J.929 (3/1 1650).

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Pauw, at least, had been involved in trade before he accompanied the first

Dutch ambassador in Constantinople, Raga, to Turkey in 1611.

While their appointment and conditions of command thus gave the Dutch

consuls the best possible basis for a balanced and unambiguous policy, the

system of payment was a weak point. Like Dutch consuls in less important

places, the consuls in Aleppo were entitled to the consulage, but from this sum

they were also expected to defray the ordinary expenses of the consulate for gifts,

etc.? The system was unsuccessful in most places, but disastrous in the Levant,

where the consular costs tended to be higher and more unpredictable than in the

European ports."

Discussions about the consuls' emoluments and the consequent conflicts oc

cupied a disproportionate place in the Dutch consular correspondence during

the period. From the merchants in Aleppo complaints were soon received about

Pauw's greed, whereas Pauw for his part maintained that the factors were cheat

ing him of a considerable part of his income by under-declaring," The conflict

is very well illustrated by a petition submitted by the Levant merchants in

Amsterdam to the States-General in 1615: 74

1) The consul should be a scrupulous man, and must not carry on business on his ownaccount.

2) A cottimo on the Venetian model ought to be established in the nation.3) The consul should receive a fixed salary.4) Gifts must only be made with the nation's approval, and they should be paid from the

cottimo, as is done by the Venetians.5) Other extraordinary expenses on the nation's behalf should be paid from the cottimo

as well, including the frequent gifts now being neglected on account of the consul'seconomic situation.

6) Should the cottimo not suffice in case of a large extraordinary expense, a tansa (special duty) as large and as protracted as necessary should be imposed on the membersof the nation, only of course with the nation's consent.

7) The consul will be shown due respect.

The merchants undoubtedly put their finger on the sore point when they re

commended a change to the Venetian system, i.e. to pay the consul a fixed salary

and to establish an ordinary duty, a cottimo, for ordinary expenses and an extra

ordinary duty, aiansa, for extraordinary avanias. In this matter, however, the

States-General made a decision that went against the merchants' wishes, probably

71 The States General's resolution of 8/12 1612, Heeringa, Bronnen ..., pp.438-39; d.Pauw's commission, ibid., pp. 445-46.

72 Hermann W1itjen, Die Niederliinder im Mittelmeergebiet zur Zeit ihrer hbchsten Machtstellung, (Abhandlungen zur Verkehrs- und Seegeschichte, Bd. 2, Berlin, 1909), pp. 106-08.

73 ibid., pp. 141-42.74 Heeringa, Bronnen .. " pp.466-68.

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first of all because they did not want to commit themselves to fixed expenses in

volved by a trade which was subject to drastic fluctuations. Pauw's emolument

was not changed to a fixed salary, but the States-General tried instead to in

crease his income by granting him a share of the revenues from the vice-consulate

on Cyprus. At the same time, in order to counter the complaints about too low

declaration, it was prescribed that the merchants and the skippers should pro

duce their papers on demand."

It may be that this arrangement improved Pauw's financial circumstances,

but on the other hand it tended to aggravate further the relationship between

the consul and the nation. In 1618 Pauw obtained the States-General's permis

sion to return at his own expense without resigning office, i.e. he could make a

private arrangement with a vice-consul and continue collecting the revenues

from the consulate. Pauw installed the French consul to act as substitute; and

so a situation had actually arisen whereby the French consul was the farmer

of the offices of two non-resident consuls, the French and the Dutch. It is no

wonder that this settlement soon gave rise to complaints from the Dutch nation.

It was asserted-whether rightly or wrongly remains undecided-that the French

consul took this opportunity to pass on to the Dutch nation auanias due to of

fences committed by Frenchmen."

In 1625 the Levant merchants in Amsterdam approached the States-General

asking for a re-arrangement by which a principal consul would be appointed.

They recommended Cornelius Witzen, the son of a burgomaster named Jonas

Witzen, for the task." The States-General acted upon the merchants' recommen

dation, and Witzen was sent out, but on the same conditions as Pauw. By now,

however, the situation had deteriorated, the factors not only evading payment

as far as possible but the trade had diminished considerably. There is no reason

to question Witzen's assertion that expenditure far exceeded the receipts." In

1627 he returned home with the States-General's permission, but like Pauw he

was allowed to keep the emoluments of office for some years until he had re

couped his outlays." The official duties were at first attended to by a vice-consul,

J an van Peenen, who, however, tried as soon as possible to delegate his powers

75 ibid., p. 447; cf. Groot Placaetboeck, vol. II, pp. 1334-35.76 Heeringa, Brannen .•., pp.504-06; d. P.R.O. London, S.P. 110/54 f. 129. In 1624-25

the Dutch nation made use of the English chancery for registering protests, etc. (Ibid., pp.130ff.).

77 Heeringa, Brannen • . ., p. 506.78 tu«, p. 525 and passim.79 ibid., p. 546.

3 Scand. Eeon. Hist. Rev.

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to one of the consuls of the other nations. The Venetians could not be approa

ched, as the Venetian senate had forbidden its consuls to take any foreign

nation under their protection." The French he would rather avoid, as the Dutch

nation had been in conflict with them since the times of Witzen. So van Peenen,

in the presence of the cadi, assigned the protection of the Dutch nation to the

English consul."1 However, it was soon transferred to France, as the English

Levant Company, like the Venetian senate, did not approve of their consul

protecting third parties."

England. The English consular institution assumed a character of its own

through rights and obligations being centralised with the merchants themselves,

in the Levant Company.

In his commission the first English ambassador to Constantinople, Hareborn,

was authorised wherever it was decided to carryon trade '... to make and create

consuls and governours'.83 The use of the word governors as synonymous with

consuls at once puts one in mind of the regulated companies, and the assumption

is confirmed by Hareborn's instruction to the first English consul in Aleppo,

Richard Forster. The consul was not a representative of England or the English

crown, but of the Levant Company. It was impressed on him that his sole duty

was to protect the members of the company, while interlopers, i.e. countrymen

who were not members of the company, were to be arrested."

It is not clear how the right of patronage was transferred from the ambassador

to the Company. The consuls were not mentioned in the two first charters of

1581 and 1592; 85 at any rate the Company claimed the right of patronage as

early as 1596, but it was only in the charter of 1605 that the Company formally

obtained the right to appoint consuls and vice-consuls in the Levant from it own

members." The Company managed to retain this privilege despite attacks from

two sides-from the nation and from the Crown.

A dispute about the appointment of consuls in 1596 illustrates clearly the

relationship between the Company and the nation on this point. At this time

80 ibid., p. 562.81 van Peenen to the States General, 9/12 1632, ibid., pp. 560 ff.82 Haga to the States General, 21/8 1632, ibid., pp. 568 H.83 Richard Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations . . . (Hakluyt Society, Extra series, Glasgow

1904), vol. V, p. 224.84 ibid., p. 262.85 The Charter of 1581 in Haklyut, op. cit., vol. V, pp. 192 H. The Charter of 1592, ibid.,

pp. 153 H.86 The Charter of 1605 in M. Epstein, The English Levant Company, (London, 1908), pp.

153 H.

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the official duties were attended to by a vice-consul named Dorrington, while

the arrival of a new 'full' consul from England was awaited. This man, however,

died before reaching Aleppo. Now Dorrington requested the ambassador in Con

stantinople, Barton, to appoint him 'full' consul, but Barton refused stating that

in cases of that kind he would prefer not to act without authorisation from the

Company. However, he hinted that he would give the matter sympathetic con

sideration if Dorrington obtained a recommendation from at least 5-6 members

of the nation."

Dorrington was far from being able to obtain such a vote of confidence. At a

meeting of the nation in Aleppo he was requested in sharp terms to give up his

office and join the others in electing a new consul; the reason being partly his

dereliction of duty, and partly the fact that a consul carried more weight than a

vice-consul in the negotiations with the Turkish authorities." Dorrington had to

yield, and in his place the nation chose an experienced merchant named Ralph

Fitch who was evidently well qualified, since before leaving England he had been

invited by the Company to take over the post as consul." The ambassador ap

proved the choice, but the Company in London showed fight although by its

previous invitation it had indicated that it regarded Fitch as well fitted for the

post: '... our orders is that the consull must be made here and here take his

othe and enter into bond for the trewe and upwrighte usinge himself in his

office';" It is quite obvious that what decided the Company was the principle

involved; Fitch was qualified, but it was to be the Company in London, not

the nation on the spot, which appointed the consul.

A similar case arose in Smyrna in 1630. When the then consul died suddenly,

the nation at once elected a successor. The choice was confirmed by the ambas

sador, but was turned down in London on the ground that consuls could only

be appointed by the Company. However, a compromise was reached as the ille

gally elected consul, Greene, was among the three candidates who were nomin

ated before the general assembly, and the result was that Green was formally

elected and was thus allowed to remain in office."

The other party that might try to contest the Company's right of patronage

was the Crown. In fact, Charles I often expressed his opinion when an office

87 Barton to Sanderson, Pera, n.d., but probably of the beginning of September 1596, Foster,op, cit., p. 148.

88 ibid., pp. 151-54.89 ibid., p. 164.90 ibid., p. 167.91 Epstein, op. cit., p. 98.

3*

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was vacant, and on at least one occasion while the office was still occupied. The

king, however, merely submitted that his wishes should be considered and, in

contrast to what happened when ambassadors were appointed, the appointment

of consuls did not give rise to any serious conflict."

In less important posts the consuls were remunerated according to the French

system, i.e. entitled to a 2 per cent fee, but in all places of importance the

English consuls, like the Venetian, received a fixed salary. The consul had no

control at all of the consulage, which was collected, kept and sent on by a trea

surer. 93 From the consular fee were paid the ordinary expenses, wages, main

tenance of buildings, etc., and any surplus was forwarded to Constantinople. If

any extra-ordinary expense arose, for instance an avania, the money was raised

through a supplementary fee, similar to the Venetian tansa decided upon at a

meeting of the nation."

Self-Government of the Nations

As already pointed out, one of the characteristic features of the consulates in this

period was their dualism, the consular authority consisting of consul and nation.

All four nations had clearly organised constitutions. The members of the nations

could not be taxed without consent, and consent had in all cases to be obtained

according to rules which were felt to be law at that time, whether they were

embodied in written regulations or not. One of the most essential conditions

for the functioning of the consular institution was to be found in the co-operation

between consul and nation. The following section deals with the competence of

the nations and the exercise of their rights.

Venice. At least as early as 1331 the Venetian consul in Aleppo had a Council

of XII to assist him;" and in our period such a Council of XII was still operating

both in Aleppo and Alexandria."

The council whose members were appointed by the consul himself from out

side his own family, was supposed to approve all expenditure from the treasury

of the nation." Furthermore, in the event of the death of the consul, it was em

powered to choose a vice-consul to act until another consul had been sent out

92 ibid., pp. 93 f.93 Wood, Levant Company, p. 221; d. Foster, op, cit., passim.94 P.R.O., London, S.P. 110/54, passim.95 Berchet, Relazioni ... Siria, p. 13.96 Syria, Sagredo's relation of 1611, Berchet, Reiazioni ... Siria, p. 134; Egypt, Paruta's re

lation of 1599, Arch. Venezia, Collegia Cinque, Relazioni Alessandria.97 Berchet, Relazioni ... Siria, passim.

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from Venice." Finally, from time to time, the consul and the council together

chose representatives of the nation to attend to special tasks, to audit the nation's

accounts 99 or to act as envoys to Constantinople and plead the nation's cause in

particularly difficult cases.'"?

Since 1518 it had been the rule that decisions of the Council of XII which

involved increased expenses for the merchants were to be finally approved in

Venice by a rather complicated procedure. Cinque Savii and Provveditori ai

Cottimi were to submit a recommendation, which should then be discussed and

decided by Consiglio dei XII in a special session which was expanded to include

a representative of each house trading with Aleppo.':" Considering the frequency

of the extraordinary expenses and the importance of being able to act quickly

in case of need, such a course of action to reach a decision appears to be most

ponderous. In fact, this procedure seems to have become obsolete, at least by the

period in question. In practice the consul and the Council of XII together de

cided which expenses the treasury should meet, without referring the matter to

Venice, even when the decision implied an increase in fees. For instance, it is

said in a report from Aleppo in 1611, '... fino al primo settembre p.p. la tansa estata solamente del 20 per cento . . . e da primo settembre fino al mio partire

si eposta al 4 per deliberazione presa nel consiglio dei XII'. There is no indica

tion from this that the decision had been submitted to Venice.'?" Nor do the

Senate's regulations of 20 August 1624 for the Syrian consulate provide any

rule of that kind. There it is simply emphasised that the merchants are under

no obligation to share expenses not approved by the Council of XII. On the

other hand, these regulations provide rules of procedure in case of disagreement

as to an expense being for the common good or only for the benefit of indivi

duals: these rules have a certain resemblance to those of 1518.103 Finally, it was

apparently the practice when dealing with important decisions in the Council

of XII to send a copy of the council's minutes to Venice and to the bailo in

Constantinople.'?'

The Venetian nation in the Levant had no legal rights to regulate the trade

9S Heyd, Histoire du commerce ... , vol. II, p. 464.99 Berchet, Relazioni ... Siria, p. 134.

100 Heyd, op, cit., vol. II, p.464. A concrete example from Alexandria in 1599 in Arch.Venezia, Collegio Cinque, Relazioni Alessandria, f. 189.

101 Berchet, Relazioni ... Siria, p. 33.1'02 ibid., p. 133. In 1627 the duty was increased to 8 per cent immediately before the ships

left: Alexandretta. Arch. Venezia, Senato, Dispacci Consoli, Aleppo, busta 2, nr.22.103 Berchet, ibid., p. 52.104 Arch. Venezia, Bailo, busta 318; cf, Dispacci Consoli, Egitto busta 3.

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by reciprocal agreements, the lack of regulation and the keen competition were

deplored by the consul in 1596.1 05 However, there are signs of some in a few

cases. At least twice, in 1588 and in 1613, Cinque Savii felt called upon, with

the backing of the Senate, to take action against a decision of the nation that

only Venetian subjects were allowed to load Venetian ships.'!" It is interesting

in this connection that the Venetian consul mentions illegal meetings about 1613,

within the nation but without the council's knowledge.':"

France. It has already been emphasised that the possibility of granting and

assessing supplementary duties was an important condition of the maintenance

of commercial activities in the Levant. But in this respect the French consular

institution was very weak. Formally the consul and the nation had no right to

assess duties (see above p. 29). A voluntary arrangement was, of course, always

feasible, but, as it soon became apparent in practice, there was always the danger

that a single unwilling person might sabotage the arrangement by refusing to

payor by lodging a complaint with the French authorities against the consul

for exceeding his powers. The difficulties, however, can hardly be said to have

originated, as Masson maintains.l'" in the nation having developed as an institu

tion without any formal legal basis. The legal basis of the other nations was not

sharply defined either, and the explanation may rather be sought in the link

with the home authorities, and particularly in the relations with the Crown.

It may be that from time to time the nation resolved a problem of common

concern irrespective of the lack of legal basis. Thus it was maintained in 1612 by

the Venetians that the French factors were secretly withholding a fee of 2 per

cent."?" For very good reasons this piece of information is unverifiable in the

French material; but it may be significant that in 1613 the French nation in

Aleppo approached Marseilles with a request for authority to impose a duty of

2 per cent in settlement of the nation's debts, which at that time amounted to

52,000 piastres.P"

A few years later the problems became far more urgent in connection with a

prolonged conflict about the rates of duty, which affected the other nations in

105 Berchet, Relazioni ... Siria, p. 87.106 1588: Cinque Savii to the consul Syria, Arch. Venezia, Cinque Savii, busta 492, f.52;

1613: same to same, ibid., nuova seria, nr.50; Cf. resolution of the Senate of 30/5 1613 inNuovo Archivio Veneto, nuova seria, anna II, t.4, p.434.

107 Berchet, Relazioni ... Siria, pp. 135-36.108 Masson, op, cii., p. xxxi.11>9 Berchet, Relazioni ... Siria, p. 148.110 Arch. Ch. C. Marseilles, J. 929.

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Aleppo as well; the resulting 'dettes de Cecy' affair was rather a tragi-comic one

for the French. The consul and the nation had spent considerable sums of

money both locally and in Constantinople after 1613 in an attempt to have the

new duties on the import of ready money and the export of silk abolished. 1ll

From 1619 to 1621 a surcharge was collected from the members of the nation

and ships calling at Aleppo by Besson, the consul representing Viguier's con

sortium.t" The procedure was the same as the one used by other nations in

similar circumstances, and given the extent of the French Aleppo trade at that

time it should have made a settlement of the nation's debt possible in the course

of a few years. A minority within the nation, however, took advantage of the

lack of a legal basis and complained to the French authorities. Besson was re

called and accused of having broken the prohibition of 1562 against collecting

more than a 2 per cent consulage. At the same time it was again established by

an arret du conseil that it was not permissible without royal authorisation to

exceed the ordinary 2 per cent, even if this was done with the nation's consent.'!"

The case against Besson implied a cessation of the collection of the surcharge

the last items of the accounts in question are dated September 1621 114-and a

letter from the nation of 1623 states: 'Vous savez, Messieurs, que toutes les autres

nations qui negotient icy ont quelque droict pour subvenir aux despenses qu'il

faut faire pour le bien de leur negoce, et la notre qui a fait et fait ancore plus

d'affaires que toutes les autres ensamble n'a jamais heu aulcune sorte d'imposi

tion,.m This is certainly an exaggeration, since accounts of such a duty exist

from 1619 to 1621, as already mentioned, but it was in accordance with the

immediate situation and with the law.

The law was one thing, but what practical problems made necessary was

quite another. Not many months were to pass after this letter had been written

before the nation in Aleppo again assessed a surcharge on its members, regardless

of its illegality. Cecy, the French ambassador at the Porte, had had to borrow

considerable sums of money for gifts, etc., in connection with his efforts to have

the new customs duties abolished. As the merchants, for some unknown reason,

refused to pay his outlay, Cecy tried as a counsel of despair to collect the money

with the assistance of the Turkish authorities. In December 1623 the whole of

the French nation in Aleppo, including the consul, was arrested, and were

111 Not less than 34,000 piastres according to Pauw. Heeringa, Bronnen ..., p. 747.112 Arch. Ch. C. Marseilles, J. 969; d. J. 888.113 Boppe, op. cit., pp. 219-20.114 Arch. Ch. C. Marseilles, J. 969.115 Arch. Ch. C. Marseilles, J. 889.

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only released after several days' hectic negotiations. The price was the immediate

payment of an instalment of 50,000 piastres to Cecy, which, of course did not

benefit the ambassador as much as it did the Turkish officials. The 50,000

piastres were provided by imposing a surcharge of 12 per cent on all goods on

board the five French ships that were in Alexandretta.P"

Before this happened, the new consul, Gedouyn, had received his instructions

in France, and these upheld the prohibition against surcharges with the almost

pathetic limitation that as the matter might be urgent he could with the nation's

consent impose surcharges of up to 12,000 livres (about 4,000 piastres i.!"On his arrival in Aleppo in August 1624 Gedouyn however at once realised

that a higher scale would have to be applied, if the debt to Cecy was to be settled

and trade set on foot again. After several days' difficult negotiations he managed

to convince the nation that a surcharge of 4 per cent on receipts was required.

The nation's decision further stated that the duty should be collected in a spe

cial fund and administered by two members of the nation. Had this reorganisa

tion plan been carried out, it would have created the permanent reserve that

the nation needed so badly, but it is typical that the validity of the decision was

made conditional upon ratification by no less than four authorities, the am

bassador, the king, the parlement in Aix, and the principals in Marseilles. One

need not reflect for long on the administrative practice of the ancien regime to

realise that in any circumstances this reservation offered enormous possibilities

to the reluctant or the scheming to delay or hinder the execution of the plan.I"

What happened to Gedouyn's reorganisation plan after his recall a few months

later is unknown: in all probability it was shelved. What is certain is that Cecy's

debt was not settled in this way. In the following years the 'dettes de Cecy' affair

went through the stages of being troublesome, embarrassing and farcical. It is

not intended here to go into all the details of this matter, which made life a

burden to a not incompetent diplomat and virtually put French diplomacy at

the Porte out of action for twenty years.':" Some main points will suffice to illu

strate the principal aspect that concerns us here, namely that the French crown's

116 ibid.117 Boppe, op, cit., p. 215.118 ibid., pp. 172-75.119 Tay trouve l'Ambassade deshonoree, descreditee et n'estait plus cognue que de quelques

creanciers qui se vantaient qu'elle leur etait obligee ... Le dit comte de Cecy n'estai passe enConstantinople y ayait deux ans ... Ie logis de l'Ambassadeur estait si infame qu'on ne sepouvait imaginer qu'un Ambassadeur de France effectif y peut demeurer'. Memoire sur rambassade de France a Constantinople en 1634-, Arch. Aff. Etr, Paris, Carr. Pol. Suppl. I, f.239.

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intervention in the consular service was no help, but obstructed the settlement of

the practical problems.

In 1624 an envoy was sent to Constantinople from the Court to obtain re

liable information about the matter, but not until 1628, after enormous interest

payments had been allowed to accumulate over eight years, did the Crown take

any initiative in the matter. A surcharge of 3 per cent was imposed on all goods

exported from the Levant by the French. The duty was farmed out, and in return

the farmer committed himself within a period of 6 years to pay Cecy's debt.

The duty was collected, but the debt was not paid. In 1634 the amount had

grown from the original 142,000 piastres to 310,000 piastres. The farm was

given over to another farmer who showed the same zeal as his predecessor in

collecting the money and the same carelessness in paying. Meanwhile, the matter

was poisoning the situation for the French nation. Cecy's letters were full of

accusations against the merchants who had left him in the lurch, while the

merchants for their part did not have many kind words to say about Cecy. The

nation's prestige suffered from the embarrasing sight of an ambassador who

hardly dared leave his home for fear of his creditors. Royal envoys as well as

envoys from Marseilles came to Constantinople to get to the bottom of the

matter, but the only result was that their intrigues caused still greater confusion.

In 1638 the farming of the customs and the payment of the debt were handed

over to a third farmer. About him it was said four years later that he had made

a profit of 1,399,149 livres on the farm. The debt was still pending, and even in

1672 it had not been settled.l'"

'Les dettes de Cecy' was the worst affair of its kind, but it was not unique.

Another example will illustrate the same decisive weakness, i.e. the consular in

stitution's lack of power to assess surcharges. In 1637 a certain Bermond was

sent out as farmer of the consulate in Aleppo. He found the nation deep in debt,

but he succeeded in getting a deed of arrangement with the creditors, which was

to be financed by a duty of 3 per cent on all goods imported. He at once re

ported this arrangement to Marseilles, but did not receive any reply till more

than a year later, in March 1639. The answer was positive, but unfortunately

for Bermond and for the nation, at the same time he received an arret du conseil

dismissing and recalling him for having collected unauthorised duty.V' His sue-

120 For the whole sad affair see Tongas, Les relations . . . , pp. 171-81.121 Arch. Ch. C. Marseilles, J. 893.

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cessor found the nation with a debt of 140,000 piastres and had to start the

negotiations for reorganisation all over again.f"

In the light of this one feels inclined to agree with the consul who wrote, 'Je

suis oblige de vous faire savoir que la pluspart des malheurs qui arrivent en ce

pays viennent acause de nos desunions' .123 But one must add that disagreement

was found in all nations: it was only the French nation's unfortunate institu

tional forms that offered a potential opposition such ample possibilities for hinder

ing the effective performance of the official functions.

When there was so much disagreement about the major issues, it is no wonder

that the regulation of trade or other tasks of common concern was neglected as

well. For instance, we find the nation summoned in 1632 to make a decision

about a proposal for joint batellation with the English and Venetian nations

(see above p. 22); the proposal was accepted, but typically the only man to vote

against it did not consider himself bound by the decision.F" Shortly after, when

the nation was summoned to negotiate about a batellation of the Jewish nation,

several members of the nation declared that it was wrong to summon the nation

in such a matter because it was for the consul alone to decide upon batellation?"

There is no evidence of cartel arrangements among the members of the French

nation.

The Netherlands. The first Dutch consul in Aleppo, Pauw, obtained in his

commission of 30 June 1614 definite permission to collect money, with the

nation's consent, towards the payment of extraordinary expenses. There does

not seem to have been any formally organised assembly of the members of the

nation, and the commission uses the following expression: '... met goede kennisse

ende communicatie over de coopluyden'P"

It appears, however, from Pauw's letters that like the other nations the Dutch

soon considered the appropriations at meetings which all members of the nations

were entitled to attend. These meetings, however, soon became the forum for

harsh disputes between the consul and the nation. Having been outvoted in an

appropriation matter in 1615, Pauw asked the States-General for their permission

to decide matters of that kind alone, with two to three members of the nation as

assessors.!" In reply the States-General resolved in February 1616 that the costs

122 Arch. Ch. C. Marseilles, J.894 and J. 1731.123 Arch. Ch. C. Marseilles, J.894.124 Arch. Ch. C. Marseilles, J.892 (1/8 1632).125 ibid.126 Heeringa, Brannen ...s p. 446.127 ibid., 472.

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involved in the arrival of newly appointed Turkish officials should be borne

jointly by the members of the nation. If the nation refused to grant money for

such a purpose, the consul was authorised to decide the matter with the assistance

of two assessors, one of whom he could choose for himself, the other to be nomi

nated by the nation.!" No instance is known of Pauw or his successor using this

authority, which so radically reduced the privileges of the nation.

Like the Levant merchants in Amsterdam the Dutch ambassador at the Porte

had on several occasions recommended that a fixed duty like the Venetian cot

timo and tansa be imposed towards the payment of extraordinary expenses.!"

We do not know exactly when this proposal was carried into effect, but it was

certainly before 1627, as it appears that in that year the nation had a special

treasury of that kind at its disposal under the administration of two members of

the nation.F" It was a 2 per cent duty on imported goods,l31 but at the end of

the twenties this proved insufficient to settle the extraordinary expenses, and in

1632 the special treasury had a debt of 6-7,000 piastres, borrowed at 18 per cent

per annum. Though on a smaller scale, the situation was similar to the one that

had hit the French nation again and again. The extra costs had been paid by

loans at high rates of interest which unfortunately proved impossible to settle

later, especially as the TUmour about the debt made the Levant merchants re

luctant to send money to Aleppo for fear of sequestration. The matter was, how

ever, settled fairly soon. The debt of the special treasury was taken over by the

directors of the Levant trade in Amsterdam, in return for which they received the

yield from an import duty of 2 per cent on all Levantine goods exported to the

Netherlands. Similarities can be found between this solution and the French at

tempt to pay Cecy's debt by means of a farmed duty, but there were essential

differences in the practical implementation. Firstly, the debt in Aleppo was im

mediately paid by means of cheaper loans raised in the Netherlands. Secondly,

the enforcement of the duty was eased after four years, and thirdly, a form of

duty had been chosen which shifted part of the burden to the re-exportation by

English competitors of Levantine goods to the Netherlands.':"

England. The assembly of the English nation was formed by all members of

the Company present, even quite inexperienced apprentices. John Wandesford,

128 Groot Placaetboeck, vol. II, pp. 1337-38; d. Watjen, Die Niederliinder ...> p. 142.~29 Watjen, op. cit., p. 150, n.4.~30 Transcript of the nation's minutes, 6/1 1627, Heeringa, Bronnen ...> p. 536.~3~ ibid., p. 546, d. p. 563.132 ibid., pp. 562-69; d. Watjen, op, cit., pp. 151-52.

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who was English consul in Aleppo from 1630, thought on his arrival of excluding

the youngest, creating a more intimate council which could give him and the

nation greater security against young people's irresponsibility in confidential

matters.r" If this idea was carried into effect, it must have happened unofficially,

for according to the minute book the meetings of the members of the nation

continued as before.':"

The consul and the nation together had a completely free hand to grant and

assess surcharges. From 1616 also the English nation was affected by the inten

sified Turkish tariff policy, which caused such great difficulties for all the

nations. The policy pursued by the English in this matter is well illustrated by the

minute book of the nation, and can be regarded as typifying the way in which

the English consular organisation functioned.

When a claim of this kind was made for the first time, the English hoped that

it was a once-for-all claim, and they tried to solve the matter by paying a lump

sum to the farmer and giving his brother a gift. Some months later, however,

the farmer of the customs claimed from two of the English merchants payment

of the total sum according to the new tariff. The two merchants at once reported

the incident to the consul who summoned the nation to a meeting the same day.

After a debate on the matter a committee was appointed consisting of the consul

and four members. They were empowered to negotiate with the farmer of the

customs with a view to exempting the members of the nation from the claim

raised in the tariff. In return they were authorised to offer an amount of up to

2,000 piastres. Another meeting of the nation was to be convened if they were

not successful.

The farmer of the customs would not give way at that price, and another

meeting was summoned. There was discussion about whether they should have

the claim tested by submission to a Turkish court, since it was argued that the

claim conflicted with the capitulation, but this idea was rejected. It was decided

instead to offer the farmer 2,500 piastres, the sum for which he had declared

himself willing to drop the claim. The money was to be provided at once by a

surcharge on money and silk in the possession of the members of the nation.

Two men were chosen by the assembly to assess the levy.':"

The procedure followed by the English nation in this case could be supple

mented with similar examples. There was a clear tendency to attempt to convert

133 P.R.O. London, S.P. 110/10 f. 289.134 P.R.O. London, S.P. 110/54 passim.135 ibid., ff. 6-9.

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new customs duties into a round sum of money on behalf of the nation. The

assessment was then made by the nation itself. For instance, in the period 16281633 the nation assessed a commutation of the 2Y2 per cent imposed on the

export of silk and gals. During that same period we find assessment of sur

charges in settlement of '... the pretence for customs to be paid in chequines',

'... for the pretence of the scale of 2Y2 per cent' or simply'... for a present to

the customer'r"

The striking thing about the procedure followed by the English nation was

the connection between efficiency and the extent of self-government. Represen

tatives of the nation participated at every stage. This applied both to negotiations

with the authorities and the assessment of duties. The Company or the principals

in London do not seem ever to have tried to limit the nation's freedom to make

decisions. Finally it must be mentioned that the money collected was not ad

ministered by the consul, but by the treasurer who was also to be regarded as

the representative of the nation.':"

In all known instances the opposition from the nation to the procedure re

commended in every single case by the consul appears to have been minimal.

Of course there were conflicts: in 1596 Dorrington was accused of intending to

collect the consulage behind the treasurer's back; 13S and in 1616 there was a

minor strife between the consul and the treasurer as to whether or not the con

sulage could be paid in kind.':" But these conflicts were not allowed to impede

the functioning of the consulate and never led to the accumulation of debts in

the name of the nation.

It has been pointed out that in the case of the other nations the regulation of

trade was not within the competence of the assembly of the nation. Only in the

case of the Venetian nation were there signs of a non-legalised regulation. In

the case of the English nation, on the other hand, the regulation of trade formed

part of the ordinary work. In the relations with the Levantine businessmen, for

instance, an attempt was made to lay down rules for the amount of credit which

buyers could be allowed.i" There were also frequent and apparently less success-

136 ibid., passim.137 At least in 1632 the nation itself chose its treasurer (S.P. 110/54). There is no indica

tion that this choice was extraordinary. By reference to the usual practice he was allowed ayearly salary of 200 piastres; this modest sum seems to indicate that there is every probabilitythat he preserved his right to carry on business. For another opinion see Wood, op, cit., pp.220-21.

13S Foster, Sanderson . . .s p. 152.139 P.R.D. London, S.P. 110/54 f. 7.J.40 The Levant: Company to Roe, Constantinople, P.R.D. London, S.P. 105/110 ff. 142-43.

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ful attempts to restrain brokerage. A more significant development, however,

which proved important in practice was the attempt to form cartels between the

members of the nation for the purpose of restraining competition. The cartel

might, for instance, lay down a minimum price for one or more imported goods.

From an English factor's correspondence we learn of such a decision made by

the nation concerning a minimum price for kersey in February 1599. 1 41 The

agreement was made shortly after a ship had arrived from England. We have

no details about the initiative and procedure, but the agreement is mentioned

as being entered in the minute book. There can thus be no doubt about its offi

cial character. However, it did not become a long-term agreement. One of the

English factors bartered his kersey for indigo, a possibility that had not been

considered. As the terms of the transaction indicated a deviation from the mini

mum price, the person in question, Mr. Broadstreet, was called to account before

the nation, but he saved the 200 ducats agreed upon as penalty by swearing that

his actions did not involve any breach of the cartel agreement. Whether Broad

street in this way had endangered his soul, as feared by our informant, or had

acted in good faith, the agreement was considered to have been violated and the

minimum price on kersey was abolished for all members of the nation.

A similar agreement from 1626 was more successful; on this occasion they did

not forget to include barter. The agreement was renewed from time to time

from its first coming into effect in August 1626 until March 1628. It seems to

have been observed, for there were no complaints about violation, although on

a vote in August 1627 ten votes were cast against and ten in favour of its re

newal, only the consul's casting vote ensuring its continuance.r"

In 1628 we find an agreement aimed still more at restraining competition: it

was feared at that time that speculative purchases caused by the presence of the

Turkish army would force up the pirce of raw silk. So it was decided to cen

tralise all purchases so that only five factors, one for each of the five English

houses in Aleppo, were permitted to purchase silk on behalf of everybody. Only

one at a time was allowed to appear on the silk market.v"

141 British Museum, London, Sloane MSS. 867, ff.40-45.142 P.R.O. London, S.P. 110/54 ff. 79, 85.143 ibid., f. 92. 'Houses' here not in the sense of commercial houses, but referring to the

houses, khans, where the foreign merchants lived in Aleppo. Regarding the English nation's regulation of the trade see in particular Erik Amp, Studier i engelsk og tysk handels historic,(Kebenhavn, 1907), pp. 128-29 and passim.

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Consul, Nation) Principals and Horne Authorities

We have tried to describe the four European consular institutions, and in doing

so have demonstrated several dissimilarities in the four solutions to the same

problem-protection and jurisdiction under the alien legal system in the Levant.

The problem was the same for all four nations: the reason for the solutions being

dissimilar and of differing efficiency may be explained by the background in the

home country. Accordingly, we shall attempt in the final section to look at the

consulates in relation to the home institutions.

From the outset it must be assumed that nation and consul were employees of

the corresponding home authorities, members of the nation in respect of their

principals or senior partners, and the consul of the political organs at home who

authorised him to attend to his duties with the backing of the sanctions at its

disposal. On the basis of this assumption we can draw a theoretical diagram

showing communications and the division of competence between the four par

ties in question. Using the consular correspondence, we shall attempt in what

follows to define the actual structure of communications and decision-making

within the four consular institutions by relating them to this diagram.

The relationship between nation and principals does not seem to have pre

sented any great problems. A close analysis of the relationship between factors

and principals exists only for England.r" and in fact the English source material

alone seems to permit of such an analysis. However, it has been established not

only for the English but also for the French and the Dutch nations that trade

on commission was the rule, and partnership the exception. As far as Venice is

concerned, the matter has not to my knowledge been elucidated; there seems to

be evidence of both commission trading and partnerships.us

But even though partnership between those stationed in the Levant and those

at home might at first glance seem to ensure a greater community of interests,

144 Amp, op, cit.145 Masson, op, cit., pp.489-90; Watjen, op. cit., pp. 184-88. For Venice, for instance,

business correspondence in Museo Ciuico-Correr Venice, Cicogna 2698; Ugo Tucci, Lettres d'unmarchand venhien, Andrea Berenga, 1553-56, (Affaires et gens d'affaires, t. X, Paris, 1957).

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it is unlikely, and at any rate it cannot be proved from the sources, that there

was any substantial difference between the effects of the two forms of representa

tion in the present connection, if only because Marseilles, London, Venice and

Amsterdam were small worlds of their own. The factor who was known to

neglect his principal's expense account was sure to get few commissions. Further

more, both the merchant and the factor were professionals and experts. It was

in the long-term interest of both parties to pursue a policy which ensured the

best possible relationship with the Turkish authorities at the least expense.

The Netherlands. As already mentioned, only the States-General was entitled

to appoint the Dutch consuls. The diagram therefore applies pretty well to

the Dutch example. Horizontal co-ordination in the home country was secured

from the first by petitions from the Levant merchants in Amsterdam as 'gemeene

koopliedes, handelende op de Levanten' to the States-General in matters of com

mon interest, including particularly problems concerning diplomatic and con

sular representation.v" It does indeed appear dearly from the States-General's

decisions that petitions from the Levant merchants received the most careful and

exhaustive treatment. The Amsterdam merchants' self-appointed role on behalf

of all Dutch Levant merchants naturally aroused jealousy as always in the other

towns, particularly in Zealand, but this conflict seems to have had no impact on

the functions of the consulate.

From 1625 co-operation between the Levant merchants in Amsterdam was

formalised, in the sense that representatives were nominated from among them

selves as 'directeurs over den handel in de Levant en de navigatie in de Middel

ansche zee'. The Directorate, however, always remained a loose organisation,

even though it appears from the correspondence that it fulfilled an important

task as a co-ordinating link between the various parties.v"

NATION

The Directorate

CONSUL I I

THE STATES GENERAL I I THE LEVANT MERCHANTSIe::::::: :;:::>"j

146 The petitions to the States-General in Heeringa, for instance, when sending out Raga,the first Dutch ambassador to Constantinople, (op. cit., pp. 424 ff.). and the consuls to Aleppo(ibid., pp. 436 ff, 504 ff.).

141 Wiitjen, op. cit., pp. 174 ff.

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The ambassador's correspondence has been of some value as a source of in

formation, but otherwise the ambassador does not seem to have influenced con

ditions in the consulates. However, some pressure was put on the States-General

from another side-the consuls' connections in the Netherlands. These may pos

sibly have exerted an influence on the policy pursued with regard to the awk

ward question of the consuls' emoluments. During Pauw's conflict with the

nation in Aleppo, his brother, Adrian Pauw, negotiated on his behalf with the

States-General, and in this connection he was patronised to a certain extent by

Oldenbarnefeldt. His father being burgomaster in Amsterdam, Adrian made use

of his advice and support, but he had to take account of the fact that some of

the leading Levant merchants also had a voice in the government of the country,

and might thus attempt to thwart Pauw's wishes by direct, informal approaches.r"

Venice. The Venetian consulate could look back on centuries of activity, but

in a form which was little more complicated than the Dutch. Consuls in im

portant places exchanged formally correspondence with the doge, and their dis

patches are preserved in the archives of the Senate. Their relazioni, i.e. the more

exhaustive reports submitted by the consuls on their return, are in the archives of

Cinque Savii. Which of those two authorities, the Senate or Cinque Savii, was the

consuls' legitimate superior has not been established; according to the usual divi

sion of competence between the two organs it is, however, most natural to ascribe

the decisive influence on the day-to-day business to Cinque Savii, while the Se

nate's position was of a formal character except for appointments or decisions

involving principles.r"

In the dispatches, reports and business letters there is practically no reference

to conflicts between consul and nation in contrast to the French and Dutch

material. The only definite example of a conflict which has been found oc

curred about 1609. At that time the factors in the Levant insisted on paying

their duties in debased coinage, while-according to the consul-they debited

their principals with the duty in the better coinage. For a time the strife seems to

have threatened the harmony of the Venetian nation: secret meetings of the

members of the nation took place in the chapel of the consulate, but the consul's

point of view prevailed and there was no serious break.r"

The main reason for the Venetian consular reports being so uninformative

148 Heeringa, Bronnen , pp. 1128-1132.149 Berchet, Relazioni Siria, pp. 27-28.150 ibid., pp. 130 ff.

4 Scand, Econ, Hist, Rev.

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is probably that routine was so well established that relatively little written com

ment was called for. The division of authority is not quite clear to us, but it must

have been to the Venetians, since it was not discussed. The lines of communica

tion were unambiguous and strengthened through many years of use. The Council

of XII, for example, was expressly forbidden to approach the Venetian authorities

except through the consul.l'" On the other hand, there must have been chan

nels, either official or unofficial, through which the Venetian principals could

state their wishes before the Senate and Cinque Savii.

THE PRINCIPALSi

'2

CONSUL I I NATION

Finally, an explanation of the success of the Venetian consulate must also take

into account the civic spirit of the merchants' Republic. The Venetian reports

and dispatches bear the impress of long tradition and a respect for the office

which is seldom found in the other nations. One feels that the discharge of the

duties of his office as a Venetian nobleman was a matter which touched the

consul's honour.''"

England. Here we find the simplest possible organization of the consulate. The

Levant Company alone was responsible for the appointment and emolument of

consuls, and it also supervised and corresponded with the consul. Since the Levant

Company was at the same time a 'democratic' institution-all Levant merchants

voted according to the one-man-one-vote principle at the general assemblies,

which met every few weeks and made all the important decisions153_the group

of principals was identical with the consul's home authorities. The effect of this

very simplified structure, which practically precluded foreign interests from inter-

151 ibid., p. 33.152 The competent Venetian practice of administration is very perceptible and easily traced

in the sources, but the attitude towards the office is somewhat elusive and difficult to establishdirectly in the sources. Perhaps the fact can be illustrated by a remark made by the Venetianbailo to the French ambassador in Constantinople, Salignac, in 1609. The bailo and Salignachad received contradictory information on an issue from their consuls in Aleppo, and thiscaused Salignac to remark genially that one of the consuls must be a big liar. The bailo answered that it could not be the Venetian since he was a Venetian nobleman and chosen bythe Senate. (Ambassade en Turquie de Jean de Gontaut-Biron ... 1605 a 1610, t. II, p. 275.).

153 Wood, Levant Company, p. 209.

SENATE

CONSUL

CINQUE SAVII

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fering, was manifest in both the unity of interests and the smooth communica

tions. As the three parties agreed on basic conditions, the Levant Company

could safely leave more matters to be settled locally than any of its competitors.

Consul and nation were fully authorized to decide questions as important as the

assessment of supplementary duties and fixing of prices, and both benefited from

a clear understanding of the interests they served and of the organisation sup

porting them.

NATION

THE LEVANT COMPANY_.......... z:c:::::::

The obvious explanation of the clear and efficient structure of the English

consulate is to be found in the passive role played by the Crown from the moment

it had delegated part of its sovereignty to the Company through the charter. The

Company had at its disposal such services of a sovereign state as it might need

a foreign service, a fleet and its own administration of justice in case of appeal

from the tribunal of the consulate. The Crown obtained a free ambassador in

Constantinople, but its interference with the affairs of the Company was insigni

ficant.

For their part the merchants were able to exploit the political situation by

virtue of the regulated company. This form of organisation, on the one hand

having to submit to strong hostility to its monopoly, and on the other seeming

atavistic in comparison to the big joint-stock companies founded in the same

period, was actually a very effective instrument for combining free trade with

joint action.

France. The French example offers a sharp contrast to the English. Where the

English organisation was unambiguous and functioned well, the French organisa

tion was complicated and weak.

We have already mentioned how, after the Crown had taken over, the French

consulates passed into private ownership from the end of the sixteenth century.

Normally the consuls did not reside but left the official duties to the farmers.

The result was a failing community of interest between nation and consul, but

still worse perhaps was the blurring of spheres of authority, which manifested it

self particularly in their not being entitled to assess surcharges. To whom were

the consuls actually responsible? To whom were the principals to turn if they

wanted to influence consular policy?

4*

CONSUL

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The consul's authority derived ultimately from the king, and only an arret du

conseil could dismiss him or change the prevailing practice of the performance

of his duties. But direct communication between the Crown and the consul did

not yet exist, and an approach from the principals to the Crown was protracted

and expensive, as protracted and expensive, one is tempted to say, as an approach

to Constantinople.

The support rendered by the city government of Marseilles to the merchants

was limited by the eternal party strife in the city. It made no difference when

the correspondence with the consuls from 1599 was taken over by a special bus

iness expert committee called 'les deputes du commerce', as this committee was

not legally competent to transact business, but was only to prepare items of

business for the city government.?" But neither was the city government legally

competent to transact consular business. For an order to be valid, it had to ob

tain royal confirmation. In some cases, however, it was sufficient for the order

to be confirmed by the parlement (high judicial court) of Provence in Aix or

(from 1632) by the intendant (the administrator of the province), but in all

matters of importance an approach to the king was necessary. Marseilles kept an

avocat permanently at Court, but nearly every year matters of great importance

required the city to send special delegates to Court in order to present its case

with greater weight, but also at greater cost.':"

There were still more difficulties. The chain of command was long and diffi

cult, but was further threatened by competing lines of communication. The

proprietors of the consulates, who had their own interests to look after, were

normally people with useful connections at Court,156 and at least in the days of

P. Joseph the mission created a competing line of communication to the sources

of power.':" The ambassadors also intervened in the conflicts between nation and

consul/58for while they had no legal rights over the consul they did have connec

tions at Court. And finally, from time to time when the state of affairs in the

154 Masson, op. cit., p. 99, n. 3.155 ibid., pp. 96-108.156 Examples given by Masson, op, cit., pp. 80 ff.157 About a certain Contour, whose name frequently occurs in connection with the intrigues

of the French consulate in Aleppo, one of the consuls (Bermond) states that he has omitted topunish him as be deserved, c••• par un respect chrestien et celluy de tres R. P. Joseph desfaveurs duquel il se torque et la cognoissance qu'il en a le rend insolent a tout Ie reste'. (Arch.C.C. Marseilles, J. 893.).

158 Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, Fonds Franc, 16161, passim, contains several letters toCecy from Bermond and Santo Seghezzi during the long conflict about the consulate in Alexandria.

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Levant had become really confused, the Crown sent out special emissaries to

investigate the situation and report.!"

If, as we have done in the case of the other nations, we make a diagram show

ing the ordinary network of communication, it proves to be a very complex one:

proprietor'missionambassadorspecial attorneys

This whole network was not a system of checks and balances, but a safeguard

to protect interests unrelated to the duties of the consulates. There was always an

authority to call upon if one's interests were threatened. The takeover of the con

sular service by the French state did not prove to be of any support to the office,

but a watering down of its functions. The fiscal nature of the office implied a

weakening of responsibility. The state was not yet able to take on the new tasks.

Conclusion

In an early plea for the use of the comparative method in history Marc Bloch

pointed out that one of the advantages to be expected from its use was the dis

covery of hitherto unobserved or neglected phenomena.l'" It would be too much

to claim that any hitherto unobserved or neglected phenomena have been brought

to light in this study. What has been obtained is rather a more precise evaluation

159 1623: Napollon, Masson op, cii., p. 109; 1631-32: 1a Picardiere, ibid., p. 11.160 Marc Bloch, 'Toward a Comparative History of European Societies', in Enterprise and

Secular Change, ed. Frederic C. Lane & Jelle C. Riemersma, (London, 1953), p.498.

THE CROWN I

avocat ordeputes

INTENDANT

PARLEMENT

CITY GOVERNMENTl

deputes de I ITHE PRINCIPALS Icommerce 1---------1

1----------.....,1 NATION I~ ____J/

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of the significance and weight of certain well known phenomena, both in respect

to the institution as a whole and in respect to the variations between the several

nations.

Firstly, in respect to the institution as a whole, it is well known that the legal

position of the merchants in the Levant rarely conformed to the rules laid down

in the capitulations. When the records of the four consulates are compared, how

ever, we find sufficient consistency in the relations between the local authorities

and the nations to suggest that the capitulations were only a minor part of the

legal basis of the consuls and nations, and that historians have tended to over

estimate the importance of the capitulations in the early period, under the in

fluence of the later development.

It is also well known that in certain matters the consuls had to confer with the

nation or its representatives; but it is only by comparing the records that the

significance of this dualism emerges fully. All important decisions, and among

those all decisions that involved extraordinary expenditure, had to be taken by

the consul and nation working together. Any serious conflict between the consul

and the nation simply paralysed the institution. It follows that the appointment

and remuneration of the consuls were matters of prime importance.

Secondly, when the several institutions are compared, the crucial points appear

to be the distribution of powers and the lines of communication between the con

sulates and the home authorities. The city state of Venice and the merchant re

public of the Netherlands had obvious advantages in this respect: the commercial

interests at home were too important to be ignored, and they were close to the

sources of power and patronage. In the large 'national' states the distance be

tween merchant and crown was greater. In France the take-over of the offices

by the crown was even followed by a limitation of the authority of the consulate,

but at the same time no administrative procedure was created to make the deci

sions which the consul and nation were no longer permitted or able to make.

Most important-and this again is a feature which only emerges in its full signi

ficance when the institutions are compared-the French nation, in contradistinc

tion to the other nations, was not allowed to levy any duties above the two per

cent consulage. The crown would scarcely have been able to uphold this pro

hibition against a unanimous nation, but the legal incompetence turned the

nation into a Polish diet, and a minority of one, by lodging a complaint, might

not only stop the levy but paralyse the functioning of the office by having the

consul recalled.

Finally, the comparison reveals the strength and originality of the English

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solution to the problem of the relations between the consulate and the home

authorities. The English merchants were able to avoid the fate of the French,

not only because of the weakness of the Crown, but also because they possessed

a viable alternative to political interference in the regulated company.

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Consuls and nations in the Levant from 1570 to 1650

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