COMMENT Contaminating the Superfund: Arranger Liability and the Evolution of CERCLA’s Not-So-Strict Strict Liability Katrina J. Brown * I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 485 II. BACKGROUND.......................................................................................... 488 A. Overview of CERCLA ..................................................................... 488 B. Arranger Liability: A Snapshot of the Judicial Variance with CERCLA Interpretation................................................................... 493 1. The Strict Liability Approach: A Broad Interpretation of CERCLA Arranger Liability ................................................. 494 2. The Specific-Intent Approach: A Narrow Interpretation of Arranger Liability ................................................................ 497 3. The Totality of the Circumstances Approach: A Middle Ground Interpretation.............................................................. 498 C. Burlington Northern Marks an End to the Judicial Variance ............ 499 1. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissenting Opinion ........................................... 501 III. ANALYSIS ................................................................................................. 502 A. The Court Erred in its Statutory Interpretation of CERCLA .............. 503 B. The Court Misconstrued Amcast and Adopted an Overly Constrictive Definition of Arranger Liability ..................................... 504 C. The Appropriateness of Apportionment.............................................. 506 D. The Impact of Burlington Northern on Future Superfund Cases ....... 507 E. Revision to Traditional Strict Liability via Legislative Amendment ..... 508 IV. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 510 I..INTRODUCTION In response to public outcry over the mismanagement of hazardous waste and the serious environmental and health risks it poses, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) as a strict liability statute in 1980. 1 The statute promotes the prompt * Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2011. I would like to thank my family for their unwavering loyalty, support, and guidance. 1 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006). See Randy Boyer, Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co.: The Third Circuit Establishes a Standard for CERCLA Arranger Liability, 17.TUL..ENVTL..L.J..201,.203.(2003), for an overview of the enactment of CERCLA. CERCLA’s enactment “was largely the result of public outcry to incidents . . . which garnered national media attention and illustrated the consequences of many years of hazardous waste mismanagement.” Boyer, supra. See also Martin A. McCroy, Who’s on First: CERCLA Cost Recovery, Contribution, and Protection, for an explanation of the dangers posed
Transcript
Comment
Contaminating the Superfund: Arranger Liability and the Evolution of CERCLA’s Not-So-Strict Strict Liability
Katrina J. Brown*
I. IntroduCtIon.......................................................................................485II. BaCkground...........................................................................................488
A. Overview of CERCLA.....................................................................488B. Arranger Liability: A Snapshot of the Judicial Variance with
CERCLA Interpretation...................................................................4931. The Strict Liability Approach: A Broad Interpretation
of CERCLA Arranger Liability.................................................4942. The Specific-Intent Approach: A Narrow Interpretation
of Arranger Liability................................................................4973. The Totality of the Circumstances Approach: A Middle
Ground Interpretation..............................................................498C. BurlingtonNorthern Marks an End to the Judicial Variance............499
A. The Court Erred in its Statutory Interpretation of CERCLA..............503B. The Court Misconstrued Amcast and Adopted an Overly
Constrictive Definition of Arranger Liability.....................................504C. The Appropriateness of Apportionment..............................................506D. The Impact of BurlingtonNorthern on Future Superfund Cases.......507E. Revision to Traditional Strict Liability via Legislative Amendment.....508
IV. ConClusIon..........................................................................................510
I..IntroduCtIon
In response topublic outcryover themismanagementofhazardouswasteand the serious environmental and health risks it poses, Congress passed theComprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act(CERCLA)asastrictliabilitystatutein1980.1Thestatutepromotestheprompt
1 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.§§9601–9675(2006).SeeRandyBoyer,MortonInt’l, Inc.v.A.E.StaleyMfg.Co.: The Third Circuit Establishes a Standard for CERCLA Arranger Liability,17.tul..envtl..l.J..201,.203.(2003),foranoverviewoftheenactmentofCERCLA.CERCLA’senactment“waslargelytheresultofpublicoutcrytoincidents...whichgarnerednationalmediaattentionandillustratedtheconsequencesofmanyyearsofhazardouswastemismanagement.”Boyer,supra.SeealsoMartinA.McCroy,Who’s on First: CERCLA Cost Recovery, Contribution, and Protection,foranexplanationofthedangersposed
remediation of hazardous waste sites and functions to ensure all potentiallyresponsibleparties(PRPs)areheldliableforthefullcostofcleanup.2Thetrustfund created by CERCLA, the “Superfund,” finances both the government’simmediateremovalofthewasteandthelong-termremedialcostsassociatedwithcleanup.3Whenno solventPRPmaybe found, theSuperfundcovers all costsassociatedwithremediation.4ExpendedSuperfundmoniesarerecoveredthroughgovernmentlawsuitsbroughtagainstrespectivePRPs.5
Few statutes have ignited more litigation than CERCLA.6 Much of thislitigation centers on government identification and classification of the four
The problem of soil and water contamination by hazardous substances is quiteextensive.Governmentfiguresestimatethatone-thirdoftheUnitedStates’populationliveswithinfourmilesofaCERCLAsite....[T]hatelevenmillionpeoplelivewithinone mile of a . . . site. . . . [And] eighty percent of . . . sites are located in resi-dentialareas.
37.am..Bus..l.J..3,.4.(1999).
2 See NewYork v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985) (“Congressspecificallyrejectedincludingacausationrequirementin[CERCLA]....[and]imposedliabilityon classes of persons without reference to whether they caused or contributed to the release orthreatof release.”);ChathamSteelCorp.v.Brown,858F.Supp.1130,1138 (N.D.Fla.1994)(statingCERCLAisastrictliabilitystatutemakingtheparties’intentirrelevant);see alsoLuciaAnnSilecchia,Judicial Review of CERCLA Cleanup Procedures: Striking a Balance to Prevent Irreparable Harm, 20.Harv..envtl..l..rev.. 339,. 339–40. (1996) (explaining the goal ofCERCLAwas toensureefficientandeffectivecleanupofcontaminatedsitesasquicklyaspossibleandtodosoattheexpenseoftheresponsibleparties,notthetaxpayers);MarkYeboah,CaseComment,UnitedStatesv.AtlanticResearch: Of Settlement and Voluntary Incurred Costs,32.Harv..envtl..l..rev..279,279(2008)(discussingthepurposeofCERCLA);infra note7andaccompanyingtext.
3 Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 359–60 (1986) (“The Act establishes a trustfund, commonly known as ‘Superfund.’”), superseded by statute, Superfund Amendments andReauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42U.S.C.§§9601–9675(2006)), as recognized inAlliedCorp.v.Frola,No.87-462,1993U.S.Dist.LEXIS13343,at*47n.17(D.N.J.Sept.21,1993)(“AftertheSupremeCourtruledinExxon Corp. v. Hunt that section114(c)partiallypreempted theSpillAct,CongressamendedCERCLAandrepealedthepreemptivelanguageinterpretedbytheSupremeCourt.”).But see Allied,1993U.S.Dist.LEXIS13343,at*43 (“AstheCourtnotedearlierinthisOpinion,CongressdesignedthisCERCLAprovisiontofacilitatesettlementsofgovernment-initiatedSuperfundactions.”).
4 See generally42U.S.C.§9611(a)(regulatingtheuseofSuperfundmoney).
5 SeeExxon,475U.S.at360(describingthatgovernmentinitiatedlawsuitsarereallyclaimsfor reimbursement of expended Superfund monies); see also Alfred R. Light, The Importance of “Being Taken”: To Clarify and Confirm the Litigative Reconstruction of CERCLA’s Text, 18. B.C..envtl..aff..l..rev..1,.1n.1(1990)(“[TheSuperfund]isatrustfueledbytaxesontheoilandpetrochemical industries, corporations, and general revenues, to be used to clean up releases ofhazardoussubstancesintotheenvironment.”).
6 SeeMichaelV.Hernandez,Cost Recovery or Contribution?: Resolving the Controversy Over CERCLA Claims Brought by Potentially Responsible Parties,21Harv..envtl..l..rev..83,.83.(1997).(“Fewstatuteshavegeneratedmorecontroversyandlitigationthan...CERCLA....”);.see, e.g.,
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statutorily-identified PRPs.7 PRPs range from the owners and operators ofcontaminated sites to those who transport hazardous substances or otherwisearrange for its disposal.8 Simply stated, if a PRP falls within one of the fourstatutorilydefinedcategories,thePRPmaybeheldstrictlyliablefortheresultingharm.9 In 2009, the United States Supreme Court reversed a decision of theUnited States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in one such Superfundcase.10InBurlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States,theCourtheldShellOilCompany(Shell)notliableforcleanupcostsasan“arranger”afteritknowinglycontributedtocontaminationonalandparcelinArvin,California.11AlthoughShellknewoftheimpropermanagementofhazardousmaterials, theCourtreasonedtheevidencefailedtoshowShellsoldthecontaminatingchemicalswiththeintenttodisposeofthosechemicals.12
UnitedStatesv.SimonWrecking,Inc.,481F.Supp.2d363,368–69(E.D.Pa.2007)(“[F]ederalagencies are also PRPs.”); Differential Dev.-1994, Ltd. v. Harkrider Distrib. Co., 470 F. Supp.2d727,743–45(S.D.Tex.2007)(decidingonePRPmaysueanotherPRPifthePRPhasbeenidentifiedunderCERCLA);AMCALMulti-Hous.,Inc.v.Pac.ClayProds.,457F.Supp.2d1016,1020–22(C.D.Cal.2006)(discussingwhetherapreviouslandownerisaPRPunderCERCLA);Oshtemo v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 898 F. Supp. 506, 508 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (distinguishingbetweensolventPRPsandinsolventPRPsandtheallocationofliabilityaccordingly).See generally Annotation, Governmental Recovery of Costs of Hazardous Waste Removal Under Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601 et seq.),70.a.l.r..fed..329.(1984). (listingandanalyzing federalcases inwhichthegovernmentsought torecovercleanupcostsunderCERCLA)..
(1)theowneroroperatorofavesselorafacility,(2)anypersonwhoatthetimeofdisposal of anyhazardous substanceownedoroperated any facility atwhich suchhazardoussubstancesweredisposedof,(3)anypersonwhobycontract,agreement,orotherwisearrangedfordisposalor treatment,orarrangedwitha transporter fortransportfordisposalortreatment,ofhazardoussubstancesownedorpossessedbysuchperson,byanyotherpartyorentity,atanyfacilityorincinerationvesselownedor operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances,and(4)anypersonwhoacceptsoracceptedanyhazardoussubstancesfortransporttodisposalortreatmentfacilities,incinerationvesselsorsitesselectedbysuchperson,fromwhich there is a release,or threatened releasewhichcauses the incurrenceofresponsecosts,ofahazardoussubstance,shallbeliablefor—(A)allcostsofremovalorremedialactionincurredbytheUnitedStatesGovernmentoraStateoranIndiantribenotinconsistentwiththenationalcontingencyplan....
42U.S.C.§9607(a)(1)–(4).
8 Id.
9 See Pakootasv.TeckComincoMetals,Ltd.,452F.3d1066,1078n.18(9thCir.2006)(“CERCLAisastrictliabilitystatute,andliabilitycanattachevenwhenthegeneratorhasnoideahowitswastecametobelocatedatthefacilityfromwhichtherewasarelease.”);O’Neilv.Picillo,883F.2d176,182n.9(1stCir.1989)(describingthatCERCLAisastrictliabilitystatute).
Burlington Northern effectivelyresolvedanearlythree-decadecircuitsplitbyrequiringanintentelementfortheimpositionofCERCLAarranger liability.13WhilethecasemarksasignificantchangeinSuperfundjurisprudence,itunderscoresalargerjudicialtrendtowardalessdraconianinterpretationofCERCLA.14ThiscommentillustratestheevolutionofCERCLAinterpretation,documentingthetransitionfromtraditionallydefinedstrictliability—theinterpretationCongressintended—tothemuchlessstringentjudicialinterpretationsetforthinBurlington Northern.15 First, this comment explores the legislative history and generalbackgroundof thestatute.16Second, thiscommentuses thestatutorilydefinedcategoryof“arranger”totracethreejudicialinterpretationsofCERCLA.17Third,thiscommentexamineshowthecurrentjudicialtakeonCERCLAinterpretationstandstoimpactfutureSuperfundcases.18Finally,thiscommentrecommendsalegislativeamendmenttoCERCLAinordertoreturnCERCLAtoitstraditionalstrictliabilityroots.19
II..BaCkground
In order to provide a complete explanation of the evolution of CERCLAjudicial interpretation, it is first helpful to provide a general overview of thestatute.20ThissectiondiscussesthefourtypesofPRPsindetail,payingspecificattentiontothejudicialinterpretivehistoryofthearrangercategory.21Next,thesectiondocumentstheshiftfromtheimpositionofjointandseveralliabilitycasestotheapportionmentofliabilityinCERCLAcasesandoffersarationaleforthisoccurrencedespiteCERCLA’sstrictliabilityprovisions.22
14 See Jon-ErikW.Magnus,Comment,Lyon’s Roar, Then a Whimper: The Demise of Broad Arranger Liability in the Ninth Circuit After the Supreme Court’s Decision in BurlingtonNorthern,3golden.gate.u..envtl..l.J.427,427(2010)(“TheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt’sdecisioninBurlingtonNorthern&SantaFeRailwayCo.v.UnitedStateslimitsanexpansiveinterpretationofCERCLAarranger liability found in the jurisprudence of theU.S.Court ofAppeals for theNinthCircuit.”).
Toxicwasteseepingintosoilandgroundwaterthreatenstheenvironmentandthehealthandsafetyofthepublicatlarge.28In1980,CongressenactedCERCLAtoaddressthispublichealththreatandoutlinedtwogoalsforthestatute.29First,CERCLA aimed to ensure prompt remediation of hazardous contamination.30Second,Congresssoughtamechanismtoholdallcontributingpartiesfinancially
23 See K. Jason Northcutt, Reviving CERCLA’s Liability: Why Government Agencies Should Recover Their Attorneys’ Fees in Response Cost Recovery Actions, 27.B.C..envtl..aff..l..rev..779,.784.n.50.(2000).(detailingthedealbetweenthetwoentitiesandexplainingthatwhileCERCLAwasdraftedpriortotheLoveCanalincidentitwasincidentssuchastheLoveCanalthatledtoCERCLA’spassage)..
24 See NormanH.Nosenchuck,Key Events of the New York Solid Waste Management Program: 1970–1995,7alB..l.J..sCI..&.teCH.69,72–74(1996)(describingtheHookerElectroChemicalCompany’spracticeofburyingchemicalwasteintheLoveCanal).
25 See MajorKennethMichaelTheurer,Sharing the Burden: Allocating the Risk of CERCLA Cleanup Costs,50a.f..l..rev.65,77n.102(2001)(listingtheseverehealthproblemsexperiencedbyresidentslivingintheareasurroundingtheLoveCanal).
26 Id.
27 KatherineHausrath,Crossing Borders: The Extraterritorial Application of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”),13U.Balt..J..envtl..l.1,16n.149(2005)(explaininghowthenotorietyoftheLoveCanaltragedysparkedincreasedinterestinenvironmentalconcernsworldwide); see Nosenchuck,supra note24,at73(explainingthattheLoveCanalwasthenameofthelandfillinwhichtheHookerElectroChemicalCompanyburiedchemicalwaste).
28 See SolidStateCircuits,Inc.v.U.S.Env’tProt.Agency,812F.2d383,387(8thCir.1987)(recognizing the“graveconsequencesarising fromdelays incleaninguphazardouswaste sites”);LonePineSteeringComm.v.U.S.Env’tProt.Agency,777F.2d882,886(3dCir.1985)(discussingthedangerhazardouswastesitesposedtopublichealth);see also McCroy,supra note1,at4;B.R.MacKay&Sons,Inc.v.UnitedStates,633F.Supp.1290,1293(D.Utah1986)(describingthattheimproperdisposalofhazardouswastecanhavesevereenvironmentalandpublichealtheffects).
29 See Silecchia,supra note2,at339–40.
30 H.r.. rep.. no.. 99-253, pt. 3, at 15 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038(“CERCLA has two goals: (1) to provide for clean-up if a hazardous substance is released intotheenvironmentorifsuchreleaseisthreatened,and(2)toholdresponsiblepartiesliableforthecostsoftheseclean-ups.”);see Pricev.U.S.Navy,39F.3d1011,1015(9thCir.1994)(“CERCLAwasenactedtofacilitatethecleanupofenvironmentalcontaminationcausedbyhazardouswastereleases.”);UnitedStatesv.Colorado,990F.2d1565,1570(9thCir.1993) (“CongressenactedCERCLAin1980 ‘to initiateandestablishacomprehensive responseandfinancingmechanismtoabateandcontrol thevastproblemsassociatedwithabandonedand inactivehazardouswaste
CERCLAisastrictliabilitystatute.33Traditionally,theelementsofnegligenceand intent are not relevant in assessing liability in strict liability statutes.34
disposal sites.’”); Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1019 (3d Cir. 1991) (“CongressenactedCERCLAsothattheEPAwouldhavetheauthorityandthefundsnecessarytorespondexpeditiouslytoserioushazardswithoutbeingstoppedinitstracksbylegalentanglementbeforeorduringthehazardclean-up.”);UnitedStatesv.M.GenzalePlating,Inc.,723F.Supp.877,883(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (“The purpose of CERCLA is to enable the President to target and clean uphazardouswastesitesinanefficientmanner.”);UnitedStatesv.Rohm&HassCo.,669F.Supp.672,674(D.N.J.1987)(“InCERCLA,Congressestablishedastatutoryschemetoensurepromptandefficientclean-upofhazardouswastedisposalsites.”);Pac.Resins&Chems.,Inc.v.UnitedStates,654F.Supp.249,253(W.D.Wash.1986)(“ThepurposeofCongressinpassingCERCLAwas to establish the authority and funding for the prompt, unhindered clean-up of dangeroushazardouswastesiteswithouttheneedtoawaitajudicialdeterminationofliabilityorevenbeforeanyfinalagencydeterminationofliability.”).
31 See UnitedStatesv.WitcoCorp.,865F.Supp.245,247(E.D.Pa.1994).Witco outlinesthetwoprimarygoalsofCERCLA:
(1)enabling the EPA to respond efficiently and promptly to toxic spills, and (2)holdingpartiesresponsibleforreleasesliableforthecostsofthecleanup.Inthatway,CongressenvisionedtheEPA’scostswouldberecouped,theSuperfundpreserved,andthetaxpayersnotrequiredtoshoulderthefinancialburdenofnationwidecleanup.
Id.;accordB.F.GoodrichCo.v.Murtha,697F.Supp.89,94(D.Conn.1988)(citingthe“twingoals”ofCERCLAasameanstothepromptandeffectiveresponsetohazardouswastecontaminationand to ensure that “those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisonsbear the costs and responsibilities for remedying the harmful conditions they created”); UnitedStates v. ReillyTar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.C. Minn. 1982) (discussingthe twogoalsCongress sought toachievebypassingCERCLA); JamesB.Brown&MichaelV.Sucaet,Environmental Cleanup Efficiency: Private Recovery Actions for Environmental Response Costs,7.Cooley.l..rev..363,.363–71(1990)(analyzingCERCLA’spolluterpaysphilosophy).
33 SeeBellPetroleumServ.,Inc.v.SequaCorp.,3F.3d889,897(5thCir.1993)(recognizingCERCLAasastrictliabilitystatute);UnitedStatesv.AcetoAgric.Chems.Corp.,872F.2d1373,1380 (8th Cir. 1989) (ruling that arranger liability under CERCLA requires intent); ChathamSteelCorp.v.Brown,858F.Supp.1130,1138(N.D.Fla.1994)(findingthatCERCLAisastrictliabilitystatutethusmakingtheparties’intentirrelevant).OnecourtdescribedCongress’sintenttohaveCERCLAbeastrictliabilitystatuteasfollows,
Congress intendedthatresponsiblepartiesbeheldstrictly liable,eventhoughanexplicitprovisionforstrictliabilitywasnotincludedinthecompromise.Section9601(32) provides that “liability” under CERCLA “shall be construed to be thestandardofliability”undersection311oftheCleanWaterAct,33U.S.C.§1321,whichcourtshaveheldtobestrictliability....
34 See Shore Realty,759F.2dat1044(“Congressspecificallyrejectedincludingacausationrequirementin...[CERCLA]....[And]imposedliabilityonclassesofpersonswithoutreferencetowhethertheycausedorcontributedtothereleaseorthreatofrelease.”);see, e.g., Babbitv.Sweet
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Liability under CERCLA follows a “polluter pays” scheme: mandating partiesresponsibleforhazardouswastemismanagementshouldalsobeheldresponsiblefor its cleanup.35 Liability attaches to a party when a plaintiff can prove fourelements:“(1)thatthesiteinquestionisa‘facility’...;(2)thatthedefendantisaresponsibleperson...;(3)thatareleaseorathreatenedreleaseofahazardoussubstancehasoccurred;and(4)thatthereleaseorthreatenedreleasehascausedtheplaintifftoincurresponsecosts.”36Theterm“facility”isdefinedbroadlyunderthestatuteandgenerallyencompassesanyplacewherehazardoussubstancesarelocated.37PRPsaredefinedasfollows:(1)thecurrentownersoroperatorsofacontaminated site;38 (2) thepastownersoroperatorsof a contaminated site;39
HomeChapterofCmtys.foraGreatOr.,515U.S.687,712(1995);NewMexicov.Gen.Elec.Co.,467F.3d1223,1246(10thCir.2006);DeadhamWaterCo.v.CumberlandFarmsDairy,Inc.,889F.2d1146(1stCir.1989);YankeeGasServs.Co.v.UGIUtils.,Inc.,616F.Supp.2d228,270(D.Conn.2009);UnitedStatesv.JG-24,Inc.,331F.Supp.2d14,61(D.P.R.2004);UnitedStatesv.UnionCorp.,259F.Supp.2d356,396(E.D.Pa.2003);Coloradov.IdaradoMiningCo.,707F.Supp.1227,1230–41(D.Colo.1989);see also TommyTuckerHensonII,What a Long, Strange Trip It’s Been: Broader Arranger Liability in the Ninth Circuit and Rethinking the Useful Product Doctrine,38envtl..l.941,941–76(2008)(generallydiscussinghowstrictliabilityisappliedinCERCLAcases);ThomasKearns,An Examination of, and Suggested Revisions to, CERCLA’s Provisions Waiving the Federal Government’s Sovereign Immunity From Actions Based on State Law,5.Buff..envtl..l.J..17,.30.(1997).(“Lackofintent,lackofnegligence,orlackoftheexistenceofadutyofcarearenotdefensestoanactionbaseduponstrict liability.”(quotingW..page.keeton.et.al.,.prosser.and.keeton.on.tHe.laW.of.torts§75(5thed.1984))).
35 See Magnus,supra note14,at430(“TheliabilityschemeunderCERCLAhasoftenbeendescribedasa‘polluterpays’system,withtheultimateresponsibilityforthecleanupofhazardouswasteon‘thoseresponsibleforproblemscausedbythedisposalofchemicalpoison.’”).
Under theplain languageof the statute,anypersonwhooperatesapollutingfacility is directly liable for the costs of cleaning up the pollution. See 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(2).Thisissoregardlessofwhetherthatpersonisthefacility’sowner,theowner’sparentcorporationorbusinesspartner,orevenasaboteurwhosneaksintothefacilityatnighttodischargeitspoisonsoutofmalice.
UnitedStatesv.Bestfoods,524U.S.51,56(1998).
39 See Alliedsignal,Inc.v.AmcastInt’lCorp.,177F.Supp.2d713,729–30(S.D.Ohio2001)(“InadditiontothetextofCERCLA,itslegislativehistoryisindicativeofclearCongressionalintentthatthestatuteshouldbeappliedretroactively.”).
2011 Comment 491
(3) individuals or entities which “arranged for” the disposal or treatment ofhazardoussubstances;40and,(4) individualsorentitieswhichaccepthazardoussubstancesfortransportationtoacontaminatedsite.41
Because Congress designed CERCLA as a strict liability statute, it offersdefendants a limited number of defenses.42 Defendants in CERCLA actionscanarguethecontaminationinquestionresultedfromanactofGodorwar.43Alternatively,defendantsmayarguethatathirdparty,withwhomthedefendanthadnolegalrelationship,causedthecontamination.44
40 See UnitedStatesv.ShellOilCo.,294F.3d1045,1054(9thCir.2002)(“[A]narrangerisa‘coveredperson’andisthusliableforcleanupcosts.”).Therearetwokindsofarrangerliability:(1)directarrangerliabilitywhereinthereisnodoubtthatthearrangercontractedforthedeliveryofthehazardoussubstancetothecontaminatedsite,and(2)broaderarrangerliabilitywhereinliabilityattachesifcontrolovertheprocessthatcreatedthewastemaybeshown.Id.at1054–59.
41 See Tippins,Inc.v.USXCorp.,37F.3d87,95(3dCir.1994).
42 See Gen.Elec.Co.v.LittonIndus.AutomationSys.,920F.2d1415(8thCir.1990)(citingUnitedStatesv.AcetoAgric.Chems.Corp.,872F.2d1373,1377–78(8thCir.1989);NewYorkv.ShoreRealtyCorp.,759F.2d1032,1042(2ndCir.1985))(“CERCLAisastrictliabilitystatute,withonlyalimitednumberofstatutorily-defineddefensesavailable.”).
43 See 42U.S.C.§9607(b)(2006).TheonlydefensesavailableunderCERCLAaredefinedinthestatute:
(1)anactofGod;(2)anactofwar;(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent ofthedefendant,or thanonewhose actoromissionoccurs in connectionwitha contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant(exceptwherethesolecontractualarrangementarisesfromapublishedtariffandacceptanceforcarriagebyacommoncarrierbyrail),ifthedefendantestablishesbyapreponderanceoftheevidencethat(a)heexercisedduecarewithrespecttothehazardoussubstanceconcerned,takingintoconsiderationthecharacteristicsof such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances,and (b)he tookprecautionsagainst foreseeableactsoromissionsofany suchthirdpartyandtheconsequencesthatcouldforeseeablyresultfromsuchactsoromissions;or(4)anycombinationoftheforegoingparagraphs.
Id. But see Alfred R. Light, Restatement for Arranger Liability Under CERCLA: Implications of Burlington Northern for Superfund Jurisprudence, 11vt.. J.. envtl.. l. 371, 384 n.69 (“Thatonlyexpressdefensesarerecognizeddoesnotmeanthatcertainotheruniversallyapplicablelegalprinciples,sometimesdenominatedasaffirmativedefensesbutnotexplicitlyendorsedinCERCLA’slanguage...areunavailable.”).
44 See Gen. Elec. Co.,920F.2dat1418(defendantsmayargue“thatthereleasewascausedsolelybyathirdpartywhoseactionswerenotforeseeablebythedefendant,whowasexercisingduecare....Thethirdpartymustnotbeanemployeeoragentofthedefendant,norhaveenteredintoacontractualrelationshipwiththedefendant”(citationsomitted)).ProvingoneofthesedefensesunderCERCLAisextremelydifficult.See, e.g.,Shore Realty Corp.,759F.2dat1037(holdingthedefendantcouldnotrelyonanyofthedefenseslistedinCERCLA).
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Although CERCLA is a strict liability statute, courts have not mandatedjoint and several liability in everycase.45 InUnited States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.,forexample,theUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheSouthernDistrictofOhioconcluded the congressional intent of assessing liability in CERCLA cases isto“bedetermined fromtraditionalandevolvingprinciplesofcommon law.”46Today,section433AoftheRestatement(Second)ofTortsservesastheuniversalbase forapportionmentanalysis inCERCLAcases,andcourtshaveconcludediftheharminquestionisdivisibleandthereisareasonablemeanstodeterminethe contribution of each respective PRP, then apportionment is an acceptablealternativetojointandseveral liability.47AsperCERCLA’spurposeofholdingcontaminators responsible for their conduct, theburdenofproof lieswith thePRPtodemonstratetheharminquestionisinfactdivisible.48Theplaintiffbearsno such burden.49 When harm is not divisible, each PRP remains subject toliabilityfortheentireharm.50
B. Arranger Liability: A Snapshot of the Judicial Variance with CERCLA Interpretation
45 See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983)(recognizingthatjointandseveralliabilityisnotmandatedunderCERCLAandthattheburdenofprooftosupportapportionmentisbornebythepartyattemptingtoescapeorlimitliability).
46 Id.at808.
47 restatement.(seCond).of.torts§.433a.(1965);see Chem-NuclearSys.,Inc.v.Bush,292F.3d254,259(D.C.Cir.2002);UnitedStatesv.Hercules,Inc.,247F.3d706,717(8thCir.2001);UnitedStatesv.R.W.Meyer,Inc.,889F.2d1497,1507(6thCir.1989);see also supra note33andaccompanyingtext.
48 UnitedStatesv.Bestfoods,524U.S.51,56n.1(1998)(“TheremedythatCongressfeltit needed in CERCLA is sweeping: everyone who is potentially responsible for hazardous-wastecontaminationmaybeforcedtocontributetothecostsofcleanup.”(quotingPennsylvaniav.UnionGasCo.,491U.S.1,21(1989)(pluralityopinion)));see, e.g.,CenteriorServ.Co.v.AcmeScrap& Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 348 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,990F.2d711,721–22 (2dCir.1993);UnitedStatesv.AlcanAluminumCorp.,964F.2d252,268–69(3dCir.1992);UnitedStatesv.AcetoAgric.Chems.Corp.,872F.2d1373,1377(8thCir. 1989); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); supra note 33 andaccompanyingtext.
49 See Purolator Prods. Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 124 (W.D.N.Y. 1991)(holdingthatliabilityinCERCLAcasesisjointandseveralunlessliablepartiescanprovethattheharmisdivisible);see alsoKearns,supra note34,at32n.70(explainingthepresumptionofjointandseveralliability“negatestheexistenceofanyaffirmativeburdenontheplaintifftoshowindivisibilityofharm”).
50 restatement.(seCond).of.torts.§.881.(1979).
51 See, e.g.,UnitedStatesv.ShellOilCo.,294F.3d1045(9thCir.2002);Hercules,247F.3d706;Freemanv.GlaxoWellcome,Inc.,189F.3d160,164(2dCir.1999);CadillacFairview/Cal.,Inc.v.UnitedStates,41F.3d562(9thCir.1994);CatellusDev.Corp.v.UnitedStates,34F.3d
2011 Comment 493
disposalor treatment,orarrangedwitha transporter for transport fordisposalor treatment, of hazardous substances.”52 Courts have varied greatly in theinterpretation of this definition.53 Contentions arise mainly with regard tothemeaningof “arranged for,”whichCongress leftundefined in the statute.54Generally, the circuit courts have relied on one of three approaches: “(1) astrictliabilityapproach;(2)aspecificintentapproach;and(3)a‘totalityofthecircumstances’ or case-by-case approach.”55 These three approaches exemplifytheslowbutsteadyjudicialtrendofdecreasingliabilityunderCERCLA.56Thevarying approaches provide an appropriate lens through which to trace thechangingjudicialattitudetowardsCERCLA’sstrictliabilityapproach.
1. The Strict Liability Approach: A Broad Interpretation of CERCLA Arranger Liability
Courts subscribing to the broadest interpretation of CERCLA’s arrangerprovisionassertthatthosewhoarrangeforhazardouswastedisposalaresubject
748(9thCir.1994);Fla.Power&LightCo.v.AllisChalmersCorp.,893F.2d1313,1318(11thCir. 1990).See generally AnnaMarpleBuboise,Expanding the Scope of Arranger Liability Under CERCLA,43.u..kan..l..rev.469,473(1995)(citing JefferyM.Gaba,Interpreting Section 107(A)(3) of CERCLA: When Has a Person “Arranged for Disposal?”,44sW..l.J.1313,1314(1991))(“Themost problematic component of section 9607(a)(3), and that which is most subject to judicialinterpretation,isthephrase‘orotherwisearrangedfordisposal.’”).
52 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (2006); see United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706,713 (3d Cir. 1996) (defining disposal as including “the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping,spilling,leaking,orplacingofanysolidwasteorhazardouswasteintooronanylandorwatersothatsuch...waste...mayentertheenvironmentor...bedischargedintoanywaters,includinggroundwaters”).
53 Compare Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco Inc., 234 F.3d 917, 929 (5th Cir. 2001)(“‘Arranger’is[a]CERCLAtermthatistobegivenaliberalinterpretation.”),andAceto,872F.2dat1380(rejectingtheargumentthatapesticidecompanycouldonlybeliableifit“intended”todisposeofwaste,andnotingthatsuchanarrowreadingwouldfrustratethegoalsofCERCLA),with PneumoAbexCorp.v.HighPoint,Thomasville&DentonR.R.Co.,142F.3d769,775(4thCir.1998)(holdingCERCLAisnottobebroadlyinterpreted),and UnitedStatesv.Cello-FoilProds.,Inc.,100F.3d1227,1231–32(6thCir.1996)(“Weconcludethattherequisiteinquiryiswhethertheparty intendedtoenter intoa transactionthat includedan ‘arrangement for’ thedisposalofhazardous substances.”).See generally S.Fla.WaterMgmt.Dist. v.Montalvo,84F.3d402,407(11thCir.1996)(adoptinganinterpretationofCERCLAinwhichknowledgeandintentarenotdeterminativeofarrangerliability);AmcastIndus.Corp.v.DetrexCorp.,2F.3d746,751(7thCir.1993)(readingarequirementofintentinorderforarrangerliabilitytoattach);Jones-HamiltonCo.v.BeazerMaterials&Servs.,Inc.,973F.2d688,695(9thCir.1992)(“TheagreementbetweenBeazerandJ-Hcontemplated2%spillageofmaterials.Thus,itisclearthatundertheagreementBeazer‘arrangedfordisposal’oftoxicsubstanceswithinthemeaningofsection9607.”);infra notes57–89andaccompanyingtext.
54 See WalewskaWatkins, Note, Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. UnitedStates:The Supreme Court Arranges for Disposal of CERCLA’s Strict liability,23.tul..envtl..l.J..203,208(2009)(“Thestatute...doesnotdefinethephrases‘arrangedfor’or‘arrangedwith.’”).
55 Boyer,supra note1,at204–05.
56 See infra notes57–115andaccompanyingtext.
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to strict liability, and intent to dispose of hazardous materials need not bedemonstrated for arranger liability to attach.57 Judicial decisions in the yearsimmediatelyfollowingCERCLA’senactmentheavilyfavoredthisinterpretation.58For these courts, the question of liability hinged on whether the arrangercontributed—either knowingly or unknowingly—to the hazardous wastecontamination.59Arrangerliabilitybecametriggeredbymereparticipationinthecontaminationanddidnot includethemorespecific inquiry intowhether thearrangeractedwiththeintenttodisposeofthehazardoussubstancesatissue.60
InUnited States v. Aceto Agricultural Corp.,theUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheEighthCircuitbecamethefirstfederalappellatecourttoexpresslyadoptthisprincipleandenforcestrictliabilityonarrangers.61Historically,Aceto servedastheseminalcaseforthebroadapplicationofarrangerliability.62InAceto,theStateofIowaandtheEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)soughtovertenmillion dollars in response costs following the remediation of a contaminatedpesticidemanufacturingfacilityownedbytheAidexCorporation.63AfterAidex’sbankruptcy, theEPAandIowaarguedsixcompanies thathadcontractedwithAidexforvariouschemicaltreatmentprocessesatthecontaminatedsiteshould
57 See UnitedStatesv.GordonStafford,Inc.,952F.Supp.337,340(N.D.W.Va.1997)(“Infindingthepesticidemanufacturershad‘arrangedfor’thedisposalofwastes,theEighthCircuitdidnotrequiretheUnitedStatestoshowthatthepesticidemanufacturersintendedforthewastestobedisposed.”);see also Aceto,872F.2dat1377–78(citingUnitedStatesv.Ne.Pharm.&Chem.Co.,810F.2d726,732n.3(8thCir.1986));NewYorkv.ShoreRealtyCorp.,759F.2d1032,1042(2dCir.1985);UnitedStatesv.Chem-DyneCorp.,572F.Supp.802,808–10(S.D.Ohio1983).
58 Seesupra note57andaccompanyingtext.
59 See Gordon Stafford,952F.Supp.at339–41.
60 See Aceto,872F.2dat1377;infra notes61–72.
61 Aceto,872F.2dat1377(explainingthatproofaPRPintendedtodisposeofhazardouswasteneednotbeshownforarranger liabilitytoattach).WhiletheEighthCircuitwasthefirstfederalappellatecourttoadopttheexpansiveviewofCERCLAarranger liability, itwasnotthefirstcourt.See generally AnitaLetter,Reasonable Inference of Authority to Control Hazardous Waste Disposal Results in Potential Liability: UnitedStatesv.AcetoAgriculturalChemicalsCorporation,31. nat.. res.. J.. 673. (1991) (documenting the expansion of CERCLA arranger liability); KimRuckdaschel-Haley, Note, “Arranging for Disposal of Hazardous Substances”: Expansive CERCLA Liability for Pesticide Manufacturers AfterU.S.v.AcetoAgriculturalChemicalsCorp,35.s.d..l..rev.251(1990)(discussingthatAceto’sexpansiveviewofarrangerliabilitycomportedwithlowercourtprecedentaswellaswiththegrowingtrendofexpandingarrangerliabilityunderCERCLA).
62 See, e.g.,UnitedStatesv.ShellOilCo.,294F.3d1045,1059(9thCir.2002);Coxv.CityofDallas,256F.3d281,294(5thCir.2001);Freemanv.GlaxoWellcome,Inc.,189F.3d160,163(2dCir.1999);Nurad,Inc.v.WilliamE.Hooper&SonsCo.,966F.2d837,847(4thCir.1992);Fla.Power&LightCo.v.AllisChalmersCorp.,893F.2d1313,1317(11thCir.1990);UnitedStatesv.Valentine,856F.Supp.627,631(D.Wyo.1994);UnitedStatesv.Hardage,761F.Supp.1501,1508(W.D.Okla.1990).
TheEighthCircuitbeganitsanalysisbylookingatthelanguageandgoalsofthestatute.66ThecourtsurmisedthebroadlanguageofCERCLAcombinedwithits“‘overwhelminglyremedial’statutoryscheme”indicatedtheappropriatenessofabroad,“liberaljudicialinterpretation”ofarranger.67Itspecificallyrejectedtheuseofadictionaryderivednarrowdefinitionoftheword“arranger,”adefinitionwhich thedefendant companies arguedmandated a showingof specific intentto dispose of a hazardous substance by the arranger in order for liability toattach.68TheAcetocourtalsonotedCERCLA’slegislativehistoryexpresslystatedliabilitycouldnotbeeasilycircumventedthroughcreativelabelingpracticesand“knowledge or imputed knowledge” of improper disposal could be enough toimposestrictliability.69Further,theAcetocourtrecognizedstrictliabilitymaybeimposedevenwhendefendantshadnoactualknowledgeoftheillegaldisposalofhazardousmaterials.70
64 Id.at1379.
65 Id. The EPA and Iowa argued Aidex’s participation in and knowledge of pesticideproductionwasenoughtodemonstrateitsintenttodispose:
Plaintiffsarguethatbecausethegenerationofpesticide-containingwastesisinherent inthepesticideformulationprocess,Aidexcouldnotformulatedefendants’pesticideswithout wasting and disposing of some portion of them. Thus, plaintiffs argue,defendants could not have hired Aidex to formulate their pesticides without also“arrangingfor”thedisposalofthewaste.
[T]he court emphasizedG.E. allegedly arranged for thedragstrip to take away itsusedtransformeroilwith“knowledgeorimputedknowledge”thattheoilwouldbedepositedonthelandsurroundingthedragstrip....StatingthatCERCLAliabilitycouldnotbe“facilelycircumvented”bycharacterizingarrangementsas“sales,” theG.E. courtcitedCERCLA’slegislativehistory:“[P]ersonscannotescapeliabilityby‘contractingaway’theirresponsibilityorallegingthattheincidentwascausedbytheactoromissionofathirdparty.”
Thus,inAceto, theEighthCircuitheldintenttodisposeofhazardouswasteis not required for the imposition of strict liability under CERCLA’s arrangerprovision.71 The court’s decision to interpret CERCLA’s language with anexpansiveviewandtoturntowardthelegislativehistoryandgoalsofthestatuteforguidancehassubsequentlybeenfollowedbyothercourts.72
2. The Specific-Intent Approach: A Narrow Interpretation of Arranger Liability
IncontrasttothebroadviewadoptedbytheEighthCircuitCourtofAppealsinAceto, theUnitedStatesCourtofAppeals for theSeventhCircuitutilizedamuchnarrowerspecific-intentapproachbeginningin1993.73Courtsfollowingthis approach determine liability based upon the specific reason behind thetransactionofhazardoussubstances.74Generally,thesecourtsrequireproofaPRPactedwiththespecificintenttodisposeofhazardoussubstancesbeforeimposingarrangerliabilityunderCERCLA.75Knowledgeorpotentialknowledgeofcurrentor future contaminationalone is insufficient to trigger arranger liabilityunderthisinterpretation.76
71 Id.at1380.
72 See UnitedStatesv.AlcanAluminumCorp.,990F.2d711,721(2dCir.1993)(holdingthat for the imposition of strict liability under CERCLA the government need only prove:(1) therewasa releaseor threatened release,which (2)caused incurrenceof responsecosts, and(3)thatthedefendantgeneratedhazardouswasteattheclean-upsite);Jones-HamiltonCo.v.BeazerMaterials&Serv.Inc.,973F.2d688,695(9thCir.1992)(agreeingwiththeEightCircuitthatrequiring“intent”wouldfrustrateCERCLA’sgoalofmakingthecompaniesthatwereresponsibleforproducinghazardouswastepayforcleanup);Gen.Elec.Co.v.AamcoTransmissions,Inc.,962F.2d281,286(2dCir.1992)(“[This]courtconcludesthatitistheobligationtoexercisecontroloverhazardouswastedisposal,andnotthemereabilityoropportunitytocontrolthedisposalofhazardoussubstancesthatmakesanentityanarrangerunderCERCLA’sliabilityprovision.”);Fla.Power&LightCo.v.AllisChalmersCorp.,893F.2d1313,1318(11thCir.1990)(“Inlightofthe broad remedial nature ofCERCLA,we conclude, as other courts have, that even though amanufacturer does not make the critical decisions as to how, when, and by whom a hazardoussubstance is to be disposed, the manufacturer may be liable.”); see also Buboise, supra note 51,at 477 (“The Aceto line of cases confirms courts’ willingness to extend CERCLA liability topartiesengagingintransactionsintendedprimarilytoproduceusefulmaterialsthatalsoresultinwastedisposal.”).
73 Amcast Indus.Corp.v.DetrexCorp.,2F.3d746,751 (7thCir.1993) (“Although thestatutedefinesdisposaltoincludespilling,thecriticalwordsforpresentpurposesare‘arrangedfor.’Thewordsimplyintentionalaction.”);seeAaronGershonowitz,Comment,Superfund “Arranger” Liability: Why Ownership of The Hazardous Substance Matters,59.s.C..l..rev..147,.148.(2007).
75 See, e.g.,EkotekSitePRPComm.v.Self,932F.Supp.1328,1336(D.Utah1996)(findingaspecific-intentrequirementforarrangerliabilitytobecompatiblewithCERCLA’sstrictliabilityscheme);G.J.LeasingCo.,Inc.v.UnionElec.Co.,854F.Supp.539,559(S.D.Ill.1994)(“[T]hephrase‘arrangedfor’impliesintentionalaction.”),aff ’d,54F.3d379(7thCir.1995).
76 Vulcan,685F.Supp.at656.
2011 Comment 497
TheSeventhCircuitCourtofAppealsbrokefromprecedentandestablishedthe narrow, specific-intent approach to CERCLA arranger liability in Amcast Industrial Corp. v. Detrex Corp.77 Inthatcase,Elkhart,amanufacturingcompany,sought post-remediation contribution from Detrex Corporation, a chemicalmanufacturer, from whom it had purchased trichloroethylene, a hazardoussubstance.78 Elkhart sought contribution based on evidence suggesting bothDetrexandthecarrierithiredtotransportthetrichloroethylenewereresponsiblefortheenvironmentalharmcausedbyrepeatedspills.79SuchspillsoccurredwhilefillingElkhart’sstoragetanks.80
3. The Totality of the Circumstances Approach: A Middle Ground Interpretation
TheexistingdividebetweenanarrowinterpretationofCERCLA’sarrangerprovision and a broader interpretation led to the development of a middleground, or case-by-case approach, to assessing arranger liability.84 In 1996, in
77 Amcast, 2F.3d746; see Beth A.Caretti, Amcast Industrial Corp. v.Detrex Corp.: The Shippers Exception to CERCLA and How it Compares in “Arranging For” Environmental Liability,41Wayne.l..rev..227,.228(1994)(explaininghowtheAmcastdecisiondiffersfromothercircuitsandgoesagainstthestatute’sbroadlanguageandlegislativehistory);DavidW.Lannetti,“Arranger Liability” Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA): Judicial Retreat from Legislative Intent,40Wm..&.mary.l..rev.279,296n.82(1998)(“ShortlyaftertheAmcast decision,legalscholarsrecognizedPosner’sopinionasadeviationfromoveradecadeofpreviouscaselawupholdingstrictCERCLAarrangerliability.”).
84 See UnitedStates v.TIC Inv.Corp., 68F.3d1082, 1088–90 (8thCir. 1995) (holdingarranger liability requires some level of actual participation in activities connected to thearrangementfordisposal).See generally VincentS.Capone,A Preemptive Limitation of CERCLA
498. WyomIng.laW.revIeW Vol.11
South Florida Water Management District v. Montalvo,theUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheEleventhCircuitadoptedamultifactoranalysisfordeterminingwhetherapartyactuallyarrangedforthedisposalofhazardoussubstances.85Thecourt identifiedknowledgeofdisposal,ownershipofthehazardoussubstances,andintentasrelevantfactorsindeterminingarrangerliability.86
The judicialflexibilityof the totalityof thecircumstancesapproach led toitsswiftappropriationbyothercourts.87IndecidingMathews v. Dow Chemical Co.,theUnitedStatesDistrictCourtofColorado,forexample,exemplifiedthereasoning of courts adopting this approach.88 In that case the court adoptedthetotalityofthecircumstancesapproachoverthetwopolarviewsbecausethecase-by-case basis was “most faithful to the statutory language and purposesofCERCLA.”89
C. BurlingtonNorthern Marks an End to the Judicial Variance
For nearly thirty years, the agricultural chemical distribution business ofBrown and Bryant, Inc. (B&B) purchased large quantities of chemicals fromsuppliers such as Shell and then sold those chemicals to surrounding Arvin,California, farms.90Beginningoperationson itsown3.8acreparcelof land in1960,B&B later expandedonto an adjacent0.9 acreparcel owned jointlybytheAtchison,Topeka&SantaFeRailwayCompanyand theSouthernPacificTransportationCompany(Railroads).91Until1975,bothparcelsdrainedintoanunlinedslumpandpondatthesoutheastcornerofB&B’smainparcel.92
91 Id. The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company, and the Southern PacificTransportationCompanyarenowknownrespectivelyas theBurlingtonNorthernandSantaFeRailwayCompanyandUnionPacificRailroadCompany.UnitedStatesv.BurlingtonN.&SantaFeRy.Co.,502F.3d781(9thCir.2007),rev’d,129S.Ct.1870(2009).
92 Burlington,129S.Ct.at1874–75.
2011 Comment 499
Intheearly1980s,theCaliforniaDepartmentofToxicSubstancesControlandtheEPA(Agencies)commencedinvestigationsoftheB&BArvinfacility.93The levelsof soilandgroundwatercontaminationweresosignificant that,by1989, theEPAdecided to commence cleanup actions.94That same yearB&Bbecameinsolventandceasedalloperations.95Actingunderthepowersprovidedby CERCLA, the Agencies proceeded to spend over eight million dollars inremediationcostsonthecontaminatedsite.96
Seekingreimbursement for theexpendedcosts, theAgenciesfiledrecoveryactionsagainstShell and theRailroads in theUnitedStatesDistrictCourt fortheEasternDistrictofCalifornia.97 TheAgenciesarguedliabilitylaywithbothcompaniesunderCERCLA:Shell as an arranger for thedisposalofhazardousmaterialsthroughitssalestoB&B,andtheRailroadsaslandownersofaportionofthecontaminatedsite.98
FollowingdivergentdecisionsbythedistrictcourtandtheNinthCircuit,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtgrantedcertiorari toresolvethe issue.99OnMay4,2009, theCourt reversed thedecisionof theNinthCircuit andexoneratedShell from liability.100TheCourt reasoned that althoughShellknewofB&B’simpropermanagementofhazardousmaterials,theevidencefailedtoshowthatShellsoldthechemicalstoB&Bwiththeintenttodisposeofthosechemicals.101Congressdidnotspecificallydefine“arrange”inCERCLA,andassuchtheCourtused theplain andordinarymeaningof theword to conclude an entitymusttake intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance in order to triggerarranger liability.102TheCourtdecided itunlikelyShell intendedtodisposeofanunused,usefulproductandprecludedShellfromallliability.103Onthesecond
97 UnitedStatesv.Atchison,Topeka&SantaFeRy.,No.CV-F-92-5068OWW,2003U.S.Dist. LEXIS23130, at *5–6 (E.D.Cal. Jul. 14, 2003), rev’d, 520F.3d918 (2008). Since eachagencyconductedresearchandinvestigationintotheextentofthecontamination,bothcontributedtocleanupcostsasdefinedbyCERCLAin42U.S.C.§§9601–9675. Id.
98 Burlington,129S.Ct.at1876.
99 Id.at1876–77.
100 Id.at1878.
101 Id.at1880.
102 Id.at1879.
103 Id.at1880.
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issue concerning apportionment, the Court found the Ninth Circuit erred inimposingjointandseveralliabilityontheRailroads.104Inanaffirmationofthedistrictcourt’sdecision,theCourtheldapportionmentinthemattercomportedwith precedent and that the nine percent Railroad liability allocation wasevidentiallysupported.105
1. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissenting Opinion
Thedissenttookissuewiththemajority’sviewonboththearrangerliabilityissueandtheapportionmentissue.106Accordingtothedissent,ShellshouldhavequalifiedasanarrangerunderCERCLAbecauseShellarrangedfordisposalofthehazardousmaterials.107ThedissentpointedtothetransferprocessitselfandthatShellspecifiedtheequipmenttobeusedinthetransferandstorageofchemicalsfromShell’struckstoB&B’sstoragefacility.108ItwasShell’sdecision,thedissentnoted,tomovefromtheuseofsmalldrumstobulktanktruckloadsinanefforttosavemoney.109Thismethodoflargervolumeshipping“ledtonumeroustankfailures and spills as the chemical rusted tanks and erodedvalves . . . . In theprocess,spillsandleakswereinevitable,indeedspillsoccurredeverytimedeliveriesweremade.”110BecauseShellknewofandcontinuallycontributedtothespillsfortwentyyears,thedissentargueditshouldbeheldliableunderthetheoryofarrangerliability.111Inaccordancewiththisreasoning,thedissentagreedwiththeNinthCircuit’sobservationthatthefactShellsoldusefulproductstoB&BwasnotenoughtoabsolveShellofliability.112
Ontheissueofapportionment,thedissentbrokewiththerationaleutilizedbyboththedistrictcourtandtheNinthCircuit,however,andfoundfaultnotin the issue of assessing joint and several liability, but rather in whether thedistrict court should have apportioned liability in the manner utilized.113Thedissentpointedout therewasnoprecedentbywhich the court could supporttheirapportionmentcalculationsandthatthecourtshouldnothavepursuedthe
104 Id.at1880–84.
105 Id.at1882–83.
106 Id.at1884–86.
107 Id.at1884–85.
108 Id.at1885.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.at1885–86.
2011 Comment 501
matteronitsown.114ThedissentstressedneithertheAgenciesnorthePRPsweregiven an equitable opportunity to address or rebut the court’s apportionmentscheme,letaloneadvocateforanalternativemethod.115
III..analysIs
Through the adoption of a narrow interpretation of arranger liability, theSupremeCourt’sdecisioninBurlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States, stands indirectconflictwiththeprimarypurposeofCERCLA:toholdallpollutingcontributorsstrictlyliableforremediationcostsratherthanpassingthosecostsontothetax-payingpublic.116Thedecision,however,isnotentirelyunfounded; itrepresentstheculminationofslowbutsteadyjudicial favoritismtowardsalessdraconianinterpretationofCERCLA’sstrict-liabilityprovisions.117FromthetimeofCERCLA’senactmentin1980uptotheBurlington Northern decision in 2009, increasingly narrow judicial interpretation of the statutehas resulted in less extensive punishment for polluting parties.118 Because theBurlington Northern decisionsets forthafinalizedinterpretationofthisnarrowjudicialtrendandmarksanendtothecircuitcourtsplits,itwillunfortunatelyserve as the governing case for all CERCLA cases involving the issue ofarrangerliability.119
InBurlington Northern, theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtmadetwomajorerrors in reversing the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’sdecisiononarrangerliability.120First,theCourterroneouslyfound“arrangefor”unambiguousandundertookasuperficial statutory interpretationofCERCLAarrangerliability.121Second,theCourtmisconstruedtheseminalcaseAmcast and
114 Id. (noting the majority should not have performed the calculations sua sponte); see Castrov.UnitedStates,540U.S.375,386(2003)(“Ouradversarysystemisdesignedaroundthepremisethatthepartiesknowwhatisbestforthem,andareresponsibleforadvancingthefactsandargumentsentitlingthemtorelief.”).
115 Burlington,129S.Ct.at1886.
116 SeeWatkins,supra note54,at217–18;see also supra note2andaccompanyingtext.
117 See supra notes23–116andaccompanyingtext(discussingthenumerouscasesleadingtotheSupremeCourt’sdecisioninBurlington).
118See Watkins,supra note54,at217–18.But seeMarthaL.Judy,Coming Full CERCLA: Why Burlington Northern is Not the Sword of Damocles for Joint and Several Liability, 44 neW. eng..l..rev.249,255(2010)(explaininghowBurlington Northern isnottheendtostrictliabilityinCERCLAcasesinvolvingapportionment).
119 See JohnM.Barkett,BurlingtonNorthern: The Super Quake and Its Aftershocks,CHem..Waste. lItIg.. rep. (InterIm. BulletIn) 16 (May 15, 2009), available at http://www.shb.com/attorneys/Barkett/BurlingtonNorthern.pdf (“Burlington Northern is on its way to becoming themost-citeddecisioninfutureSuperfundjurisprudence.”).
120 See infra notes125–49andaccompanyingtext.
121 See infra notes125–33andaccompanyingtext.
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adoptedanovertlyconstrictinginterpretationofanalreadynarrowapproachtoCERCLAarrangerliability.122Inrulingontheissueofapportionment,however,the Court recognized congressional intent in enacting CERCLA and correctlyheld that apportionment is an appropriate method for distributing liability insimilarCERCLAcases.123TheCourt’sdecisiononapportionmentencouragesthedistribution of liability to all responsible parties, whereas the Court’s adoptedpositiononarrangerliabilityconflictswiththiscoreCERCLAideal.124
A. The Court Erred in its Statutory Interpretation of CERCLA
The Court’s failure to follow the basic canons of statutory interpretationresultedintheadoptionofasuperficialinterpretationof“arranger”andadecisioncontrary to CERCLA’s purpose.125 When faced with questions of statutoryinterpretation,canonsofstatutoryconstructiondirecttheCourttofirstlooktotheplainandordinarymeaningofthestatute’slanguage.126Ifthelanguageisclear,it isconclusiveandbinding.127Ifthestatuteisambiguous,however,theCourtseeksguidancebyturningtothelegislativehistoryofthestatuteandCongress’sintentinenactingit.128
126 See Duncanv.Walker,533U.S.167,172(2001)(“OurtaskistoconstruewhatCongresshasenacted.Webegin,asalways,withthelanguageofthestatute.”);UnitedStatesv.Griffith,455F.3d1339,1342(11thCir.2006)(“Ininterpretingastatutewelookfirsttotheplainmeaningofitswords.”(quotingUnitedStatesv.Maung,267F.3d1113,1121(11thCir.2001));see, e.g.,Williamsv.Taylor,529U.S.420,431(2000);Pub.Emps.Ret.Sys.ofOhiov.Betts,492U.S.158,175(1989);Wattv.EnergyActionEduc.Found.,454U.S.151,162(1981);ConsumerProd.SafetyComm’nv.GTESylvania,Inc.,447U.S.102,108(1980).
127 See UnitedStatesv.Buckland,289F.3d558,564–65(9thCir.2002)(“If thestatutorylanguageisunambiguous,intheabsenceofaclearlyexpressedlegislativeintenttothecontrary,thatlanguagemustordinarilyberegardedasconclusive.”(quotingRevesv.Ernst&Young,507U.S.170,177(1993)));see, e.g., Salinasv.UnitedStates,522U.S.52,57–58(1997);UnitedStatesv.CharlesGeorgeTruckingCo.,823F.2d685,688(1stCir.1987).
128 UnitedStatesv.Kay,359F.3d738,743(5thCir.2004) (“If . . .weconcludethat thestatuteisambiguous,wemayturntolegislativehistory.”);Buckland, 289F.3dat565(“Wherethelanguageisnotdispositive,welooktothecongressionalintent‘revealedinthehistoryandpurposesofthestatutoryscheme.’”(quotingAdamsFruitCo.v.Barrett,494U.S.638,642(1990)));see also ZuniPub.Sch.Dist.No.89v.Dep’tofEduc.,550U.S.81,90(2007)(criticizingthedissentforignoringthehistoryandpurposeofastatutewhenambiguitywasatissue).
of arranger liability.130The three approaches, which emerged from the circuitsplit,developed fromdecadesof case law thatwrestledwith the issue throughin-depth statutory analysis.131 Perplexingly, in Burlington Northern, the UnitedStates Supreme Court disregarded this judicial history and relied on a simpledictionarydefinitionoftheterm“arrange”toprovidemeaningtothehistoricallycontestedphrase“arrangefor.”132Thus,inBurlington Northern,theCourtappliedplainmeaningtoaphrasethatisclearlyambiguousasevidencedbythecircuitsplitontheissue.Theexistenceofthreedistinct,well-developedinterpretationsofarrangerliabilityinthecircuitcourtsexemplifiesstatutoryambiguityandjustifiesanexaminationofcongressionalintentininterpretingthestatute.133
B. The Court Misconstrued Amcast and Adopted an Overly Constrictive Definition of Arranger Liability
TheBurlington Northern Court’smisguidedadoptionofanarrowdefinitionof arranger liability stands in direct conflict with the primary purpose ofCERCLA:toholdallpollutingcontributorsstrictlyliableforremediationcostsratherthanthetax-payingpublic.134Thespecific-intentapproachadoptedbytheCourtwillsignificantlydecreasethenumberofPRPsheldaccountablefortheir
131 See, e.g.,PneumoAbexCorp.v.HighPoint,Thomasville&DentonR.R.Co.,142F.3d769,775–76(4thCir.1998); S.Fla.WaterMgmt.Dist.v.Montalvo,84F.3d402,407–08(11thCir.1996);Cello-Foil,100F.3dat1230–32; Amcast,2F.3dat751;Jones-HamiltonCo.v.BeazerMaterials&Servs.,Inc.,973F.2d688,695(9thCir.1992).
134 See Fla. Power & Light Co., v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir.1990)(“AnessentialpurposeofCERCLAistoplacetheultimateresponsibilityfortheclean-upofhazardouswasteon‘thoseresponsibleforproblemscausedbythedisposalofchemicalpoison.’”(citingUnitedStatesv.AcetoAgric.Chems.Corp.,872F.2d1373,1377(8thCir.1989))(quotingDedhamWaterCo.v.CumberlandFarmsDairy,Inc.,805F.2d1074,1081(1stCir.1986)));see also Watkins,supra note54,at217–18.
504. WyomIng.laW.revIeW Vol.11
actionsunderCERCLAarrangerliability.135Asabyproductofthisapproach,thenumberofPRPsavailabletocontributetoremediationwillbediminished,andtheremainingPRPswillfacehigherper-sharecosts.136Moreover,theeliminationof solventPRPswillultimately leadtoa situationwhere the tax-payingpublicisforcedtobearremediationcosts.137Thus,theCourt’sapproachinBurlington NorthernclearlycircumventsCongress’sintentinenactingCERCLA.138
In United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., the Supreme Court specificallyacknowledgedCongress’sintenttoincludeallpartiespotentiallyresponsibleforcontaminationasPRPsunderCERCLA.139Inthatcase,theCourtacknowledgedthat Congress intended to broadly cast the accountability net and explicitlyrejected a “textually dubious construction” of CERCLA that would limit thecategoriesofidentifiablePRPs.140Nevertheless,inBurlington Northern,theCourtdisregardedthisandsimilarprecedentinitsadoptionofthenarrowandextremelylimitingapproachtoarranger liability.141Furthermore, inadoptingthisnarrow
135 See MarcP.Lawrence,To Arrange or Not to Arrange: Intent is the Question,88mICH..B.J.48,51–52(2009);Watkins,supra note54,at216(“Inleavingtheseissuesunaddressed,notonlydoestheopiniongenerateanamendedstandardofliabilityforarrangers,butitisalsolikelytogenerateasystemicoverhaulofliabilityforallCERCLAPRPs.”).
136 See Lawrence,supra note135,at52.
137 See DanaC.Nifosi,Environmental Law,44u..rICH..l..rev.423,430(2009)(notingthebroadimplicationsforthecleanupofhazardouswastesitesthroughoutthecountryasaresultofBurlington Northern).
138 SeeBoarheadCorp.v.Erickson,923F.2d1011,1019(3dCir.1991)(“CongressenactedCERCLAsothattheEPAwouldhavetheauthorityandthefundsnecessarytorespondexpeditiouslytoserioushazardswithoutbeingstoppedinitstracksbylegalentanglement[s]beforeorduringthehazardclean-up.”);UnitedStatesv.M.GenzalePlating, Inc.,723F.Supp.877,883(E.D.N.Y.1989) (“The purpose of CERCLA is to enable the President to target and clean up hazardouswastesitesinanefficientmanner.”);UnitedStatesv.Rohm&HaasCo.,Inc.,669F.Supp.672,674(D.N.J.1987)(“InCERCLA,Congressestablishedastatutoryschemetoensurepromptandefficientclean-upofhazardouswastedisposalsites.”);PacificResins&Chems.,Inc.v.UnitedStates,654F.Supp.249,253(W.D.Wash.1986)(“ThepurposeofCongressinpassingCERCLAwastoestablishtheauthorityandfundingfortheprompt,unhinderedclean-upofdangeroushazardouswastesiteswithouttheneedtoawaitajudicialdeterminationofliabilityorevenbeforeanyfinalagencydeterminationofliability.”).
140 Id.at136–37(explainingthattheCourtspecificallychosetofollowCongress’sintentwithCERCLAandnot restrict the categoriesofPRPs); see also UnitedStates v.Bestfoods,524U.S.51,71(1998)(explaininghowthecourtinquired“intothemeaningCongresspresumablyhadinmind”whenfacedwithasimilarinterpretiveissuenotdefinedinCERCLA);Nat’lSteelServ.Ctr.v.Gibbons,693F.2d817,818–19(8thCir.1982)(“Wenote...thatwearecommittedtoabroaderapplicationofthestrictliabilitydoctrineof[CERCLA].”).
In Amcast, the court expressly acknowledged how the broad language ofCERCLAallowsfortheimpositionofarrangerliabilityupontransporterswhoaredirectlyresponsibleforaccidentalspills.144InBurlington Northern,theCourtfailedtoaddressanysuchscenarioanderroneouslyallowedShelltoescapeliability.145Had the Court correctly applied the broader view of arranger as expressed inAmcast,Shellwouldhavebeenheldliablebecauseofitsownadmissionsregardingpollution contribution.146 It may well be, as the court stated in Amcast, “anextraordinarythingtomakeshippersstrictlyliableundertheSuperfundstatutefortheconsequencesofaccidents”arisingfromthephysicalexchangeofhazardoussubstances.147Yet, the Court’s faulty reliance on Amcast suggests that it is notanequally extraordinaryphenomenon toholdonlyoneparty (thepurchasers)strictly liable for the consequencesofknowncontaminationarisingoutof thesame two-party transaction.148This situation is especially evident when, as inBurlington Northern,thetransporterfullydictatesboththemethodforexchangeofthehazardoussubstancesaswellasthestorageofthosesubstances.149
145 Watkins,supra note54,at217(“TheadoptionofthisunexplainedextrapolationofprinciplesincongruouswiththeActisrenderedadditionallynoteworthybythemajority’ssilenceregardingtheAmcast panel’s recognition that, notwithstanding its preferred and adopted approach,CERCLA’slanguagedoespermittheimpositionofstrictliabilityuponshippersforaccidentalspillage.”).
146 See id.
147 Amcast,2F.3dat751.
148 See Ind.HarbourBeltR.R.Co.v.Am.CyanamidCo.,916F.2d1174,1181 (7thCir.1990)(determiningthattheappropriateassessmentofliabilitycandependontheclassificationofactiveversuspassivetransporter).
andresponsibilitiesforremedyingtheharmfulconditionstheycreated”);see also Brown&Sucaet,supra note31,at363–71(discussingCERCLA’s“professed‘pollutersshouldpay’philosophy”).
152 GregoryA.Weimer,BurlingtonNorthern&SantaFeRailwayCo.v.UnitedStates: The Supreme Court Provides Guidance on Arranger Liability and Apportionment,35vt..B.J.46,47(2009)(“Creativelitigantswillbeabletofashionargumentsinfavorofapportionmentbasedoncomplexfactsandacombinationof...factors.”).
155 See Benjamin J. Rodkin, Casenote, Deciphering CERCLA’s Vocabulary: United States v.Burlington—“Reasonable” Division and “Arranger” Liability,20vIll..envtl..l.J..275,300(2009)(“[Jointandseveralliability]wasnotCongress’sintent.IfCongresswantedastricterstandard,itwouldhavearticulatedoneinsteadofmerelyexpectingcourtstogleanareasonablenessstandardfromtheRestatement.”).
156 See Henson,supra note34,at952.
157 See Jill Yung, David J. Freeman & Chuck Patrizia, The Supreme Court’s Decision in Burlington: Arranger Liability Under CERCLA Has Limits; Apportionment Claims Do Not Require Precise Evidence,stay.Current. (Paul,Hastings, Janofsky&WalkerLLP,NewYork,NY),May,2009,at4,available at http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1303.pdf.
158 See Lawrence, supra note135,at50.
159 See id.at49–50.
160 See Watkins,supra note54,at214.
courtexplained, the looming threatof jointand several liability leads toPRPstakinga“‘scorchedearth,’all-or-nothingapproachtoliability.”151Apportionmentaidsinthealleviationofsuchanoccurrenceasitpermitsdefendantstoavoidtheharsh realities of joint and several liability through the admissionof a specificportionofliability.152OnepurposeofCERCLAwastoplacethecostofcleanupon all responsible parties instead of on the tax-paying public.153 By ruling infavorofapportionment,theCourtinBurlington Northern correctlyfollowedthisfundamentalpurposeofCERCLA.154ApportionmentfunctionstoensurethatatleastsomeoftheremediationcostsarecollectedfromeachPRP,asopposedtothepossibilityofcollectingnothingfromafew.155
D. The Impact of BurlingtonNorthern on Future Superfund Cases
The impactofBurlington Northern shouldnotbeunderstated.156 Itmarksa major shift in CERCLA jurisprudence.157 The Court’s decision increasesthedifficulty inprovingarranger liability.158No longer is evidenceof aparty’sknowledgeorparticipation in environmental contamination enough to triggerarranger liability.159 With the Court’s adopted interpretation, the only partiesthatmaybeheldliableunderCERCLA’sonce-broadarrangerprovisionarethepartiesthatenterintocommercialtransactionswiththeprovenspecificintenttodisposeofhazardoussubstances.160Inthatrespect,therulingdoesfarmorethan
2011 Comment 507
161 Id.
162 Weimer,supra note152,at47(“TheSupremeCourt’srulingmayprovideimportanttoolsto litigants facing Superfund liability issues. Defendants may now have a more clearly defineddefenseunderarrangerliability.”).
163 Id.; see also Barkett, supranote119,at7(“[T]heburdenofproofmaywellbeoutcomedeterminativesinceaplaintiffwillhavetoprovetheallegedarranger’sintent.”).
170 See, e.g., H.r..rep..no..99-253,pt.1,at15(1986),reprinted in 1986U.S.C.C.A.N.3038,3038(“CERCLAhastwogoals:(1)toprovideforclean-upifahazardoussubstanceisreleasedinto
just change theway evidence ispresented inCERCLAcases; it functions as acomplete“reconstructionofCERCLA’sstrictarrangerliabilityintoanintentionalenvironmentaltortsscheme.”161
LegalpractitionersshouldtakenoteofthemajorchangesBurlington Northern posesforcurrentandfutureCERCLAlitigants.162Withthenarroweddefinitionofarranger,theburdenofproofshiftsfromdefendanttoplaintiff.163InBurlington Northern,theCourtstressedthatin“ordertoqualifyasanarranger,Shellmusthaveentered intothesale . . .withthe intentionthatat leastaportionof theproductbedisposedofduringthetransferprocess.”164PlaintiffsinSuperfundcasesthereforenowbeartheburdenofprovingtheseller’sspecificintenttodisposeofused,unuseful,hazardoussubstancesateachtransaction.165TheCourt’sholdingindicatesadramaticchangefrompreviousdecisionswhereplaintiffswereonceable to impose strict liability against defendants under CERCLA who had noactualknowledgeofthe illegaldisposal.166WiththeCourt’scorrectreversalontheissueofapportionment,theburdenisappropriatelyplacedbackonthePRPssinceit isuptothosepartiesfirsttoprovethattheharminquestionis infactdivisibleandsecondtoaccountfortheirportionofliability.167Thus,therulingin Burlington Northern leaves open the possibility that a PRP may still take ascorchedearthapproach,butthelikelihoodofitdoingsoisdecreasedbecauseofthecontrolitisabletoexertindemonstratingliability.168
E. Revision to Traditional Strict Liability via Legislative Amendment
theenvironmentorifsuchreleaseisthreatened,and(2)toholdresponsiblepartiesliableforthecostsoftheseclean-ups.”).FollowingCERCLA’senactment,numerouscasedecisionshavereinforcedthefirstgoal.See, e.g., Pricev.U.S.Navy,39F.3d1011,1015(9thCir.1994)(“CERCLAwasenactedto facilitate the cleanup of environmental contamination caused by hazardous waste releases.”);UnitedStatesv.Colorado,990F.2d1565,1570(10thCir.1993)(“CongressenactedCERCLAin1980‘toinitiateandestablishacomprehensiveresponseandfinancingmechanismtoabateandcontrolthevastproblemsassociatedwithabandonedandinactivehazardouswastedisposalsites.’”(quoting H.r.. rep.. no.. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 22. (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119,6125),cert. denied,114S.Ct.922(1994));BoarheadCorp.v.Erickson,923F.2d1011,1019(3dCir.1991)(“CongressenactedCERCLAsothattheEPAwouldhavetheauthorityandthefundsnecessarytorespondexpeditiouslytoserioushazardswithoutbeingstoppedinitstracksbylegalentanglementbeforeorduringthehazardclean-up.”);UnitedStatesv.M.GenzalePlating,Inc.,723F.Supp.877,883(E.D.N.Y.1989)(“ThepurposeofCERCLAistoenablethePresidenttotargetandcleanuphazardouswastesitesinanefficientmanner.”);UnitedStatesv.Rohm&HaasCo.,Inc.,669F.Supp.672,674(D.N.J.1987)(“InCERCLA,Congressestablishedastatutoryschemetoensurepromptandefficientclean-upofhazardouswastedisposalsites.”);Pac.Resins&Chems.,Inc.v.UnitedStates,654F.Supp.249,253(W.D.Wash.1986)(“ThepurposeofCongress inpassingCERCLAwastoestablishtheauthorityandfundingfortheprompt,unhinderedclean-upofdangeroushazardouswastesiteswithouttheneedtoawaitajudicialdeterminationofliabilityorevenbeforeanyfinalagencydeterminationofliability.”).
171 See supra note31andaccompanyingtext.
172 See, e.g., 156 Cong.. reC. 5153-05 (2010), 2010 WL 2464942 (“A bill to amend theComprehensiveEnvironmentalResponse,Compensation, andLiabilityActof1980 toestablisha grant program to revitalize brownfield sites for the purpose of locating renewable electricitygenerationfacilitiesonthosesites.”);156Cong..reC.3482-01(2010),2010WL1924557(“AbilltoamendtheComprehensiveEnvironmentalResponse,Compensation,andLiabilityActof1980toreauthorizeandimprovetheBrownfieldsrevitalizationprogram....”).
173 See, e.g., Superfund Recycling Equity Act (SREA) of. 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113,113 Stat. 1501 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9627 (2006)) (eliminating liability forcommercial transactions involving scrap paper, scrap plastic, scrap glass, scrap textiles, or scraprubber, scrap metal, or spent lead-acid, spent nickel-cadmium, and other spent batteries, all inanefforttopromoterecycling); see also145Cong..reC.14,986-03(1999),1999WL1050353(“TheSuperfundRecyclingEquityActof1999...seekstocorrecttheunintendedconsequenceofCERCLAthatactuallydiscourageslegitimaterecycling.TheActrecognizesthatrecyclingisanactivitydistinct fromdisposalor treatment . . . .Removing the threatofCERCLA liability forrecyclerswillencouragemorerecyclingatalllevels.”).
174 See supra note173andaccompanyingtext;see also Barkett,supra note119,at6(discussingwhyCongresspassedSREA).
forthecostofcleanupratherthanthetaxpayingpublic.171SincethepassageofSARA, various amendments to CERCLA have been proposed, but none haveaddressed the issues resolved, albeit incorrectly, by the Court in Burlington Northern—whetheranintentelementisrequiredforarrangerliabilitytoattachunder the strict liability statute and whether apportionment is appropriate insuchcases.172
175 See Barkett, supra note 119, at 7 (discussing how the U.S. Supreme Court effectivelyelevatedanarranger’sstateofmindto“factualprominence”inarrangerliabilitytrialsandasaresultofBurlington Northern theremaybealargerscopegiventotheword“intent”).
176 See Magnus,supra note14,at451(“ThemostsignificantaspectoftheSupremeCourt’sdecision[inBurlington Northern]however,maybetheinterplaybetweentherequirementofintentandtheuseful-productdoctrine,andtheresultantgapinCERCLAliabilitythatiscreated.”).
177 See Barkett, supra note119, at 16 (“CERCLA remains a strict liability statute.”); supra notes23–115andaccompanyingtext.
178 See supra notes116–55andaccompanyingtext.
179 See supra notes116–76andaccompanyingtext.
180 See supra notes169–76andaccompanyingtext.
Before society suffers from the potentially detrimental environmental impactsof the Burlington Northern ruling, Congress should again amend CERCLA toprovideincreasedstrengthforitsstrict-liabilityprovision.Congressmustensurethat intent is not a requisite element for CERCLA’s strict-liability provisionstoattach.
Specifically,Congressneedstoclarifytherootcauseofthejudicialdiscrepancysurroundingtheinterpretationofarrangerliability—namely,Congress’sfailuretoprovidedefinitionsforterms“arrange”and“arrangefor.”Throughamendments,Congressmustdevelopandexplicitlystatedefinitionsforthesecoreterms.175Whiledrafting legislative amendments is unquestionably difficult, Congress must, atminimum,putforthabillclearlystatingthatintentneednotbedemonstratedinorderforstrictliabilitytoattachinCERCLAcasesinvolvingtheissueofarrangerliability.SuchamendmentsarefurtherinlinewithCongress’soriginalintentinpassing CERCLA and would provide for a restructuring and strengthening ofCERCLA’sstrict-liabilityprovisions.176
Iv..ConClusIon
InthethirtyyearsfollowingtheenactmentofCERCLA,undefinedstatutoryterminologycoupledwith improper judicial statutory interpretationhas led tothedevelopmentofarequisiteintentelementinthestrictliabilitystatute.177SuchcharacteristicsareclearlycontradictorytothecongressionalintentofCERCLA.178While Burlington Northern sent shockwaves through the environmental lawcommunity, it fundamentally represents the result of years of varied judicialinterpretation.179A reversion to traditionally-defined strict liability isnecessaryforthestatutetofunctionasCongressintended.180CongressthusshouldamendCERCLAtoensureallpollutingpartiesareheldresponsiblefortheiractions.
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