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УДК 316.61
Jolanta Kociuba, Maria Curie-Sklodowska University,
Poland
CONTEMPORARY IDENTITY – NATIONAL, TRANS-CULTURAL,
GLOBAL OR INDIVIDUALISTIC?
The category “identity” is a factor describing different levels of the
organization of social life and the phenomena of various ranges, as identity is not
reserved for an individual but is also a feature of other systems: social groups,
institutions and any other whole of certain “systemic” property or function.
Bokszański (2005) indicates that with relation to the dynamics of change in
traditional forms of social life and the creation of new communities, social
movements, political, economic or cultural groups, a new definition of collective
identity was formed. The notion refers to the category of individual identity, the
category that emphasizes the subjectivity of a social actor and the significance of
self-definition in his/her actions (ibid. p. 62). Sociological publications note the
whole range of identity terms referring to the community (ibid. p. 59). These terms
are the following: ethnic identity, social identity, cultural identity, religious
identity, national identity, gender identity, European identity, the identity of a
social movement and after-modern identity.
In sociology, the term identity appeared not only as a new category that
serves the purpose of explaining the phenomena related to new worldviews,
lifestyles, political orientations or social movements. It proved necessary to
implement the term identity of an individual and the research of the sociology of
ego (Kaufmann, 2004) as a new notional instrument in an over-sociologized
conception of a human. Consequently, the identity of a social actor becomes an
indispensible supplement to the notional instrumentarium of sociology
(Bokszański, op. cit., p. 9).
The conception of collective identities in sociology also emphasises the
subjectivity of the community, therefore it employs the idea of subjectivity to the
community and underlines the activities and attitudes undertaken by the
community. Classic sociological theory used demographic, economic and
geopolitical categories, not the categories of subjectivity. Currently, the altered
psychosocial situation of an individual, i.e. increasing significance of its
subjectivity as a social change factor “exerted” noticing the subjectivity of the
collective actor (ibid. p. 50). In the present society, the determination / “creaton” of
a social actor, both individual and group, became an important process.
The notion of identity –conceptualization of dynamism
f contemporary social phenomena The notion of identity allows for comprehensive analysis of contemporary
dynamism of social phenomena (Bokszański, op. cit.). It introduces the perspective
of subjectivity which takes the self-awareness of contemporary society into
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consideration. One of its elements is the conviction that contemporary society is
not subjected to “meta-social guarantees of social order” (religion, history, law and
economy) to such an extend as it used to. The social order is constituted by the
main network of relations and social movements which an individual social actor
contributed to with his/her identity i.e. self-definitions that generate their actions
(comp. ibid, p. 29).
The source of interest in the problem of identity is the processes of
transformations of contemporary societies: individualization, globalization,
multiculturalism, etc. A new category of describing the phenomena appeared to be
necessary because such categories of describing psychosocial reality that concern
mainly individual and collective identifications as: “social roles”, “cultural role
models” or “social structure” are no longer sufficient. The mechanisms of social
change result in the valorisation of autonomy, subjectivity and individual freedom.
The process of ideologisation of individualism, which appeared particularly in the
doctrines of liberalism and neoliberalism, causes an individual subject to become
increasingly real in social ontology in this way (ibid, p. 9). The autonomy and
independence to construct individual identity projects and to select the constituents
of his/her identity increase. Burszta (2004) calls this danger - looking for your
identity at your own cost and the individualization of life strategies.
Globalization and individualization
Some people associate the process of creating their own identity by
individuals and new patterns of group affiliations (Misztal, 2000) with
globalization (with no relation to institutions and social structure). Globalization, I
believe, has changed the nature of “identity”, uncovered it, shelled it out from the
context of a social role, liberated from the determining influence and stripped off
the uncertainty (ibid. p. 144). Neither the social role, nor the professional group, or
the local territory determines the identity to such an extend as 20 years ago (comp.
Bokszański, op. cit., p. 25). Today the boundaries of categorization are fuzzy,
structural changes and the change of people’s social situations are quick, the
strength of class, strata and sometimes even national affiliations deteriorate among
the members of contemporary societies. The social universum has become more
individualized and atomized and the believes and norms of social and community
life whittle away together with the institution , therefore the reference of an
individual to the community alone is outdated and insufficient.
Paradoxically, the differentiation takes place as a result of globalization. The
renaissance of localism and regionalism, ethnic revival i.e. the turn to local identity
appears as a reaction to centralism and cultural-economic uniformity (Synak, 2003,
p. 246). The source and indicator of a contemporary man in the globalizing world
are local societies, local motherlands, family environment and different community
groups. The tendency to globalize is contrasted with the tendency to maintain the
identity.
Globalization is a tool for transforming identity; it extracts the identity from
its previous, local context (Misztal, 2000). Individuals are defined between what is
local and what is global. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate new individual
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identity within the framework of wider identity, i.e. within new, wider entirety. An
individual must rebuild a new sense as an individual within a new entirety and
within local identity (Synak, op. cit., p. 251). This new identity may be defined as
glocalisational and be understood as a resultant of two processes. The revival of
identity-based cultures (local, i.e. ethnic, regional, national and family-wide) is
observed. These cultures adapt to the realities of social environment which is
formed by the processes of globalization.
In the field of identity (also in Poland?), there is certain dialectics that is
based, among other factors, on the existence of two contradictory trends: along
with globalization and broadening the identity (as a result of making contacts with
different cultures and civilizations, e.g. the appearance of supranational identity in
Europe), its differentiation and limiting to local context can be observed (e.g. Scots
consider themselves Scottish, rather than British by nationality). Huntington
writes: The issue seems to look similar in Poland. Joining the European Union
strengthened, not weakened, national identity among Poles (Huntington 2007, p.
26). The similarity seems only apparent. In Poland, the reinforcement of national
identity resulted from satisfying the ambition to join united Europe, while in
Scotland, for instance (Lombardy, Catalonia or the Basque country), Scottish
identity has been rooted in European identity. Scots are certain of their
Europeanism, therefore, they can afford “the luxury” of Scottish identity, while
Poles have a feeling of being “inferior” or “younger” Europeans, that is why the
foundations of their identity is being Polish, rather than being European. In other
words: in Poland, European identity arises from Polish identity, and in Scotland,
Scottish identity arises from European one.
The stage at which Western European countries are might be defined as
post-identification stage (Jan Paweł II, 2005, p. 91). This means that such countries
are at the stage “after” being shaped by the culture of identity and have reached the
unity of internal elements (languages, tribes). While defining their own identity,
gradual come-out beyond national categories takes place (this type may be called
supranational identity). The nations of Western Europe are not afraid of losing
their identity (e.g. by the fact of joining European Union). However, the history of
Polish national identity is much more complex and shows how “Piast Polishness”
which was a unifying force that bounded the multiplicity of tribes was substituted
by Jagiellonian framework of Polishness. Its multiplicity and pluralism allowed for
“the formation of the republic of many nations, cultures and religions (ibid. p. 92)
Differentiation of identities
Globalization tendencies in a world-wide range overlap with destabilization
of social, economic and political situation and generate difficulties in self-
identification of individuals and groups. Presently, the transformation of mentality
takes place in Poland (Grotowska, 2007, p. 120). National, family, religious or
gender identities are regarded much higher than European or global identity.
Certain changes are visible within cultural identity. For example, young people
distance themselves from cultural self-identification that is measured by weak
attachment to national traditions only. On the other hand, the tendencies appear to
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seek the forms of distinction at all costs in order to preserve and develop one’s
own tradition, language, culture and music.
Dariusz Niedźwiedzki (2007, p. 79) writes on social identity created as a
result of political transformation in Poland. Due to the shift of political, economic
and cultural system, specific identity schemes are created. They are based on
forming heterogeneous self-contradictory identity that is suspended between the
old and the new system, based on contradictory axiological and structural
elements of the old and the new order (ibidem, p. 87). Such self-identification,
which is called liminal, i.e. border or transitory, does not concern all Poles. It uses
dual system of values, perceives the world in a dichotomous way (rich and poor,
society and power) and is dominated by the orientation for the presence.
The crisis of national identity
Contemporary identity seems to be built on the basis of the nation and
culture, rather than the state and its institutions. According to Huntington, the
discussions on national identity have become an omnipresent sign of the times
(Huntington, op. cit., p. 25). The author considers the crises of national identity,
present in many European, Asian, African and American countries to be a
worldwide phenomenon. Huntington lists neither Poland nor the majority of
European countries. (Apart from the United States, he lists Japan, Iran, South
Africa, China, Taiwan, Syria, Brazil. Canada, Denmark, Turkey, Russia, Mexico,
Germany and Great Britain). According to Huntington, universality and
simultaneousness of the appearance of these crises in many countries imply
common factors such as global economy, communication, transport, migration,
expansion of democracy, the end of cold war and communism, modernization
(modernity, pluralism, multiculturalism, globalization of cultures), economic
development and urbanization. The presence of these factors in Poland is beyond
discussion, yet they did not impair national identity in our country. Therefore,
other factors responsible for strong national identity need to be searched for, or our
national identity is explainable on the basis of the conglomeration or proportion of
factors. National identity is a “derivative identity” whose strength origins from
other sources and includes a number of components: territorial, attributive (race,
ethnic group), cultural (religion, language), political (state, ideology) and
sometimes also economic (agriculture) or social (networks) (ibidem, p. 38). With
reference to two types of national identity: civic (political, revolutionary, rational
and liberal) and ethnic (cultural, tribal and mystical) based upon peasant cultures
and blood relationship (Brubaker, 1998) reminded by Huntington (op. cit., p. 38) it
should be accepted that Poland refers mainly to the latter, ethnic/cultural, type of
identity. According to Anthony D. Smith, ethnic identity (Smith, 1996, p. 98,
Burszta, 2004, p. 149) is a group of people whose members share a common myth
of origin (blood relationship), historic memory, language, cultural role models,
norms, values, behavior and thinking, historic territory which the member of a
community identifies with and which they belong to and the group solidarity based
on common origin, local language, customs and traditions. However, it is
collective memory, sense of belonging and the awareness of values that bind the
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group, the sense of national dignity and uniqueness that have a key meaning for the
group identity. The thesis refers to the criteria of the typology of nations and
national states and analogous criteria of the topology involving the origin and the
existence of individual and group identities. Such a country as Poland is an
example of cultural, rather than ethnic type of nations which derives its existence
and identity from natural factors that are at the foundations of their origin. Identity
is here a function of primary, inherent, biological properties (blood, consanguinity)
and/or socio-cultural (personality, culture, religion, language, tradition), not a
function of collective will of the citizens whose cohesion results from consciously
shared by citizens rules and political institutions (comp. Szwed, 2005, p. 314).
European identity? The basic and predominant form of the identity of European countries is
national identity. It concerns the countries of both the “old” and the “new” Europe.
The sense of relation to one’s own country is even twice as strong as the relation to
Europe; moreover, it stays at a constant level. The surveys by Eurobarometer from
2002 and 2003 confirm this thesis . Therefore, the category of Europeaness has not
gained significance, even in the countries in which strong identification with
Europe exists, such as Germany and France. It turns out that identification with
Europe does not imply the decrease of the level of national or local identity in the
society. On the contrary, higher sense of local identity implies higher sense of
belonging to Europe.
Therefore, national identity has not finished. It was substituted by
cosmopolitan or civic identity. Despite the efforts of euro-enthusiasts, as a result of
objective processes of reorganizations in the socio-political sphere, the drift
towards “European identity” has not occurred. The so called “European identity”
seems to be an idea generated by European elites (comp. ibidem, p. 314). Despite
the existence of the „policy of identity”, whose aim was to redefine the sphere of
individual and group identifications, there has not been a dramatic slump of
national identity in favour of a form of supranational identity. It seems that the
process of the transformation of group identities in Europe does follow the
scenario proposed by Gerard Delanty (1999 and 2000). Delanty constructed three
models of European identity, which may become a basis for building a new group
identity in Europe. The first model of “European heritage” is based on universal
values, philosophical and legislative achievements and culture. The second one is a
model of identification with European institutions, norms, public and legal order.
The third one is a model of pragmatic identity, concentrated around the practical
way of life. None of these theoretical models of new European identity has gained
appreciation and significance. After transformation processes in Eastern Europe
and changes in Western Europe, around 40% of Europeans have still been
declaring “national” type as the only kind of their identity.
European, cosmopolitan identity, as an exceptional category of social
identifications is a rarely recognized type of identity (comp. ibidem, p. 336).
Therefore, even the observers of social life draw attention to the occurring
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phenomenon of “the revival of national identities” which is rooted in culture and
ethnicity.
Cultural or multicultural identity
Universal transcultural identity
Modern identity is mostly the cultural identity composed of multiple
elements. The observation of social trends at the end of 20st century and the
beginning of the new one shows the power of cultural identity, especially the role
of national identity in the social life of modern world. Manuel Castells (2008)
defines the role of cultural identity, including national identity, in the categories of
“the authorisation” of the societies in the global world: cultural identity in its
various manifestations is one of the major authorisations of the opposition against
the values and interests that lie at the basis of global web of wealth, information
and knowledge (ibidem, p. 9). It is, therefore, justified to accept Castellas’ view
that the increase of the importance of national identity associated with the increase
of the opposition against the phenomena of global web society.
The power of cultural identity is then a response to the technical and
economic transformation of the society that took place in the 1990’s and, to put it
briefly, is a reaction to globalization, an opposition to the disorder of globalization.
Identity is a trend that is contradictory to globalization. Castells writes: Our world
and our life are shaped by two opposing trends of globalization and identity
(ibidem, p. 17). Universal and sudden increase of the expression of national
identity challenges globalization and cosmopolitanism in the name of cultural
uniqueness and in the name of taking control by people over their own lives and
the environment (ibid). Diversified forms of the expression of identity are the
profile of a given culture and the historic sources and realities of the creation of a
given identity. Various manifestations of cultural identity and identity challenges
may be listed. Castells discusses the power of religious, national, ethnic, territorial,
gender and socio-biological identities. Some movements aim at transforming
human relationships at their most fundamental level, e.g. feminism and
environment protection movements; other movements are – according to Castells –
reverse movements which build the resistance entrenchment in the names of god,
nation, ethnicity, family, local community i.e. the basic categories of a thousand-
year-old existence.
Identity is a process of constructing sense on the basis of certain cultural
attribute which is considered prior to other sources of sense and experience. An
individual or a group actor may have numerous identities. Such multiplicity is a
source of not only sense but also stress, contradictions in both self-presentation and
social activities. Identities are the source of sense for actors themselves, they are
also the source of sense on their own, constructed through the process of
individualization (ibidem, p. 22). This is their characteristic feature which makes
them different from what is called the role and the set of roles in sociology. Roles
are defined by the norm structured by institutions and social organizations and
their influence on human behaviour depends on the negotiations between these
institutions and organizations. Self-knowledge is, on the other hand, a construction,
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a process of individuation, the construction of one’s own sense. The roles (being a
mother, daughter, worker, believer and a smoker at the same time) are defined
from outside, and the identities – from the inside, from the subject. Some
definitions may coincide with social roles, e.g. if being a mother is the most
important form of self-definition, from a point of view of a given person, however
identities are stronger sources of sense than roles because they cover the processes
of defining the self and individualization. In short, identities organize the sense,
while roles organize functions. The sense is understood as a symbolic
identification of the objectives of a social actor, organized around the basic
identity, which is the identity that constitutes the framework for other identities
and which sustains itself in time and space (comp. ibidem, p. 23). Castells’
approach makes reference to the understanding of identity by Erik Erikson,
although it is concentrated on a group, rather than an individual identity.
According to Castells from the sociological perspective, all identities are
constructed (ibid. 23). To construct identities, the materials from history,
geography, biology, production and reproduction facilities, group and individual
memories, the apparatus of power and religious revelations are used as building
blocks (ibid).
The types of identity construction process Castells lists three types of the process of identity construction. The first
type – legitimizing identity forms a civic society and rationalizes the sources of
structural domination. It is implemented by dominating institutions. The second
type of identity is the identity of resistance, which leads to the creation of the
communities (or community societies). This may be the most important type of
identity formation in our society (ibidem, p. 24). This identity is formed by those
who are in an inferior position, who are stigmatized and devaluated, who are
excluded by the dominant social actors. This is building a defensive identity in the
categories of dominant institution/ideology by reversing the apprising judgement
and strengthening the boundaries, at the same time (ibidem, p. 25). It seems that in
the present times, societies are getting divided and they collapse into societies-
tribes, constituted by a number of resistance identities. Castells calls this type of
identity formation, quite rightly, the exclusion of the excluding by the excluded.
The expressions of this phenomenon are – according to Castells – religious
fundamentalism, territorial societies, nationalistic movements or self-slandering in
certain gay movements. Social change is politicized in this way and the policy if
identity that Calhoun writes about emerges (ibidem, p. 23).
The third type of identity formation called a project identity is a further
chain of resistance and appears when individuals and communities build a new
identity on the basis of the available cultural materials, redefine their position in
the society and transform the whole social structure as an extension of their own
project of identity. Building the identity is thus a project of a different life, based
on the oppressed identity (e.g. the identity of women). Castells gives an example of
a post-patriarchal society in which feminism leaves the entrenchment of resistance
created by female identity and questions patriarchal family but also sexuality,
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personality, the structure of production on which the society was based so far.
Project identity in a web society (unlike in a civic society) derives from the group
resistance, if it appears at all (ibidem, p. 26). Castells points out earlier that ...web-
based society is grounded on a systemic separation of what is local from what is
global for most of individuals (ibid.). In new conditions, civic societies shrink and
collapse because there is no continuum between the logic of executing power and
the logic of affiliation and representation in particular societies and cultures. The
quest for sense happens in the situation of rebuilding defensive identities around
shared rules.
Castells analyses social movements of various social and cultural
backgrounds which, in the name of their constituted identities, question
contemporary processes of globalization and object social, economic, cultural and
environmental effects of globalization. These social movements are based on an
identity and started as resistance movements. Even though, each of the movements
discussed by Castells is based on different rule of identity (comp. ibidem, p. 151).
Hybrid and mosaic identity type
A new type of identity in contemporary society (apart from national and
European), which appeared in the last few years, is a hybrid identity (“bricolage
identity”). This identity is formed as a result of hybridizing different cultural
content and mixing them in the cultural melting pot (Kempny, 2000, p. 16). It is
developed as a result of the flow of new cultural models, foreign norms and values
that origin from different cultures and systems. This identity is created in post-
civic societies (Marody, 2005) or in the types of communes where “us” means a
group of people who share common features or objectives, not formed on the basis
of objective belonging to a given category or defined social groups. This type of
identity is also called the type of multi-level identity and has been present since
1993. It assumes that people simultaneously identify themselves with their national
society and European one. However, interesting individual and group differences
may be observed here; they are illustrated by the phrase: “We the Polish people but
me European”.
Another type of identity is a mosaic identity which has been present in the
communications of Euronet since 2003. It is an identity of choice, non-
comprehensive, impermanent that is a creation of reaction on the present situation
and an interaction resulting from an internal dialog. This type of identity seems to
be the product of globalization, universality and the result of free of strict norms
flow of people and goods, a consequence of individual choices, finally it
transcends local and national conditions.
Within this type if identity one may talk about professional (occupational)
identity. However, it is not a durable prototype of identity and it “loses” with
cultural programming of an individual reared in a given national culture. Cultural
identity is increasingly strong and persistent than the identity of role, function,
profession or even occupation (Magala, 2005, p. 209). Within the framework of
professional identity, two other identities appear: double and multiple (e.g. a
sociologist, economist and therapist) and along with an institutional identity (e.g. a
9
dean of many years’ standing) there are partial and temporary identities (e.g. for a
period of project implementation) (Magala, 2005, p. 191). This evokes an ability to
manoeuvre among identities (Melucci, 1996, p. 53) or the necessity to “chisel”
identities. Mosaic identity is therefore an identity “under construction”, rather than
a durable structure identification with oneself and the world.
The question concerning one’s own identity is raised by macro-structural
changes, the frequency of changes in social processes and the complexity of new
forms of social life. These processes provoke people to ask themselves continually
about their own identity and form it (Magala, 2005, p. 209). The fiasco o forming
one’s own identity, global or even European, forces to accept cultural theory of the
identity by G. Hofstede. (As Magala vividly presents it: Projecting and forming
new identity for whole societies and nations got stuck in the sands of Iraq).
However, cultural identity seems to undergo changes due to the necessity to
compare our identities with other and due to intercultural confrontations.
Moreover, life in the time of late modernity broadens the limits of cultural
identity through the possibility of contact with other lifestyles, new myths and
symbols. It knocks down the borders of group identity (class or national) and
reduces binds to a place. In the society of choice there is not much place left for
strangeness and otherness (comp. Burszta, 2004, p. 88). The temptation to liberate
from group identity is becoming a threat, a particular escape to freedom for the
cost of impairing group identity (Burszta, 2004, p. 176).
The category of complex identities seems adequate to describe the identities
of contemporary people (after Burszta, 2004, p. 176). There is no singular identity
or identity in singular mode, but identities in plural, i.e. complex identities, not the
identity. Thus, a question arises if the lack of a single identity (with the presence of
complex and multiple identities) does not imply the lack of identity at all? Is
complex and impermanent identity that is “under construction” still an identity or
is it lack of identity? After all, identity is, by definition, something relatively
persistent, defined, what is a condition of similarity to itself and a condition of
distinction from others.
It may be assumed that in contemporary society there are a few levels of
identity (analogous to the levels of culture distinguished by Hofstede (2007, p.
24)). The first level is the level of national identity, the second – a level of regional
and religious identity, the third one – the level of gender identity, another one is
the level of generation identity, then – a level of social class identity related to the
profession and occupation, and the last level of organizational or corporation
identity that is related to the position in their work place.
There are no external, objective points of reference to identity today. The
importance of such attitudes and markers as community, territory, tradition, origin,
race and social class is lower and lower. This new socio-cultural situation resulted
in the increase of the importance of internal, subjective and individual factors in
identity forming. The role of individuals in forming their own identity is presently
higher. The existence of contemporary identities is sustained by individual acts
and self-identification (Appadurai, 2000, p. 237), created and supported by the
media and culture industry.
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Identity is not a subject of continuum and tradition (comp. Kapralski, p. 39),
however, it is expressed in currently available, and even fashionable, frequently
coincidental and heterogeneous cultural codes. Kapralski writes: it is easy to form
identity; there is a variety of options, instructions, encouragements and
prefabricated elements around (ibid).
Towards global identity? The most frequently mentioned negative result of cultural globalization is,
however, the loss of individual identity for global identity (Synak, p. 246).
Modernization processes, globalization tendencies and liberalization of social life
may pose a danger to national and personal identity, which may presently be the
freely chosen by not only the elites but also young unemployed in their own
country. On the contrary, these processes may facilitate the sense of national
identity (Scots, Flemish, Quebecers). It is noticeable that national identity whose
element is common culture allows an individual for self-identification in a simple
and safe way, without one’s own activity. The context of national identity gives a
sense of community, satisfies the need of belonging and defines axiological
horizon. Globalization does not facilitate maintaining the sense of national identity.
This concerns two aspects of identity: being the same (sameness) and being
different from other subjects of individual or collective identity (distinctiveness).
Contemporary man must face at least four dilemmas concerning identity.
They are the condition maintaining coherent identity narration (Giddens, 2004,
2006). They are the conflicts between: unification and fragmentation, impotence
and control, authority and uncertainty, personal and marketed experience.
Even if it is assumed that global culture is material, has superficial character
and does not penetrate deeper layers of cultural identity, it still modifies the
identity of an individual. Even though global culture is not a spiritual one because
it fails to have a unified system of meanings for all societies, it corrupts the
cultures of identity. Global culture is first and foremost the culture of
consumptionism: it imposes the models of consumption and drills people into their
social roles. It cures an individual from nationalism or takes him/her out from a
family and transforms young people into consumers for whom consumption is a
common cultural code of conduct, according to the idea: progress is consumption
(Krzysztofek, 1998). Market and consumption, also the consumption of culture,
become the regulators of identity. Multinational corporations are said to be
demanding a homo mundialis – a man of global mentality who aimed at the
motivation of achievements, cured from collective identity, depoliticised and
unified in a role of a consumer.
Globalization in culture may lead to the decrease of diversity in culture and
to cultural chaos which are demonstrated in homogenization, standardization and
the creation of unified mass identity. An individual loses his/her own identity and
is also deprived of his/her collective identity (people are separated from their
family, homeland, village or nation). Such out-rooting causes disorientation in
people’s own “self”, difficulties in defining who they are as an individual and a
11
person. A sense of thread appears because they cannot define themselves – a
particular fear of the identity loss. At the same time, (possibly because of this
reason) a strong identity motivation appears in a form of the need for identification
and belonging to a group (national, ethnic), i.e. the search for social identity by an
individual (national, ethnic, sub-cultural, communal – sects, clubs, pseudo-
fanclubs, companies). Such a community, a group defines my “self”. It is group
identity that gives me the sense of individual identity.
Global control over the patterns of culture promotes the externally imposed
identity and personality pattern, depriving the individual of the sense of
distinctiveness. Top-down resemblance, deprivation of individualism, emphasizing
external similarity breeds pseudo-identity. The loss of the sense of distinctiveness
and the thread of becoming similar are the result of escaping from the impact of
micro-systems and increasing the influence of macro-systems. Consequently, there
are more and more human copies who are increasingly similar to one another in
terms of behaviour, preferences and attitudes (Hirszowicz, 1998, p. 179).
Two types of cultural identities: collective and individualistic
Two types of identity are related to psycho-cultural dimension of
individualism-collectivism. Tadeusz Paleczny distinguishes collectivistic type of
cultural identity (Paleczny, 2007, p. 63) and individualistic identity. Collectivistic
identity takes a form of nationalistic or patriotic orientation. Nationalistic type of
identity excludes any type of heterogeneous, complex or dual identity, while
patriotic type of identity notices the attractiveness of other cultures (with positively
valued fact of belonging to one’s own cultural group). Collectivistic identity bases
on collective treatment of the members of one’s own group and other cultures. It
does not account for individualism of individuals. The well-being of the cultural
group is superior to the interests of its members (ibid. p. 61). This type of identity
leads to the standardization of attitudes, closing the individuals within precisely
defined borders, in the area of contacts and communication with the people from
outside their own culture. This type of identity leads to restrictions of intercultural
contacts and succumbing to their control (ibid. p. 63). Direct contacts with the
representatives of other cultures are considered a threat to the “purity” of their own
culture, “sullying” in terms of religion, morally “tarnishing”, culturally
humiliating, e.g touching a pariah by a Brahmin, uncovering a face by a Muslim
woman before an infidel, sitting at one table with goy in Sabbath (ibid. p. 63).
Collective, ideological, religious rules are predominant in this type of identity.
Collectivistic identity is most frequently shaped on the basis of “objective” criteria
of identification with the group, such as: place of birth, mother tongue, origin,
blood relationships.
Individualistic identity
Postmodern or even post-modernistic identity forces to search for the
foundation of identity in subjectivity and individualism or in the group of choice.
In the postmodern world identity is no longer given once for the whole life and is
not given because of birth and given “in advance” but it is the subject of choice,
12
subjective task of an individual. Identity is chosen, constructed, negotiated upon.
Contemporary man does not inherit identity. Traditional markers of identity, such
as race, culture, nation, region, history, religion or even gender are losing
significance and are suppressed. Identity is not a matter of fate but a matter of
choice, individual sense, self-deterministic structure of meaning. Identity is formed
“on your own” today, without the reference to social structures or the systems of
values. If it is formed with reference to a group, the choice of the group is an
individual decision, from the offers of plenty groups. It is not given from the top,
yet it does not struggle to anchor. It is “flowing” and “drifting”. Creating the
foundations of one’s own identity, a contemporary individual avails oneself of
internal determinants, makes more or less rational or emotional decisions. What is
emotionally or illuminatingly moving becomes a forming factor for the identity.
An individual in a culture of individualism is allowed to self-construct their own
identity, to search for it, to change it, to choose it, but also is allowed for
eclecticism and crisis. The crisis of contemporary identity seems to reflect the
crisis in political, economic and cultural spheres. The manifestation of the crisis in
the sphere of identity may be the lack of it, underachievement or its collapse,
atrophy. The diffusion or disintegration of post modernistic identity leads to the
extinction of identity, to inability to obtain it. The dynamism of contemporary
socio-cultural changes induces to accept the thesis concerning the impossibility to
form a coherent and continuous identity.
Individualistic identity (ibid, p. 64) is a type of cultural identity,
characteristic for modern societies which ore democratic civic societies, composed
of various racial, ethnic and religious groups. This type of identity is a unitary
identity, a type of “individual identity” (ibid, p. 64). Individualistic identity is
developed by an individual, not received by a group. It is constructed in the
process of cultural universalization (assimilation, integration, and globalization). It
is not a cultural ethnocentric and homogeneous identity. This type of identity is
characteristic for the individuals of liberal, open orientation who are ready to
develop their own identity, frequently against the expectations of their group. This
identification is based on the sense of citizenship, shared symbols, place of
residence and class position (ibid, p. 64).
The changes of contemporary identity The changes in the field of post modern identity concern two types of
reactions and strategies of identity: the former are based on individualism and
universalism (cosmopolitism), the latter are characterised by the preference to
community and particularism, conservatism and mythologization of the past.
Presently, the process of identity formation is influence by individual, rather than
collective factors. It is dependable on its own personal connections, not communal
belonging. For instance, an individual who migrates may drift for a long time
between the two collective systems (Budakowska, 2005, p. 68).
Individualistic ideology is believed in by quite a significant group of people
in industrialized countries who shape their identities on the basis of the access to
global networks of information and values and the, so called, hyper-class – a group
13
of migrating specialist who are influenced by global and local systems. The
presence of these people in virtual reality influences the identification with people
who spend time in a similar way (Bellah, 2007) and weakens the bonds with the
real local community. Nevertheless, in the countries of poor south, identity is still
formed by traditions and people live beyond the network of services in the
cyberspace (comp. Rifkin, 2003, p. 236). Unidentified cultural position of a
contemporary nomad – an employee of a multinational corporation, makes him
loosen his bonds with his own cultural pattern and obtains a broader context of
identity references by participation in systems: global, which he works in, and
local, which he origins from.
Broadened context of cultural and identification (identity) references results
in the formation of flexible individual identities. They are adjustable to the
situation and the complexity of the external environment. Identity is no longer
treated as constant and unified but is a variable. In post-modernity, the process of
transition beyond group, national, local and regional identities occurs. Presently,
individual, not collective criteria of identity assessment are predominant. Identity
is not assessed on the basis of group membership but from the perspective of
individual actions of a person.
Postmodern changeability of the world, cultural pluralism and the variety of
social contexts make an individual redefine him/herself and answer the question:
“who am I?” and “who do I want to be? (Budakowska, 2005, p. 62). This is how a
reflexive „I” emerges. An individual is bound to continuous reconstruction of its
own being (ibid, p. 53) and to giving sense to it. Moreover, an identity makes
choices concerning its identity on the basis of intercultural contacts. It oscillates
between what it inherited and where it is now. Identity formation does not happen
by means of imitation. Social mobility causes a broach in the model of cultural
duplication (ibid, p. 63).
Qualitative changes in identity process are based on breaching and erasing
the identity borders (e.g. in having black skin or being an Indian on the territory of
contemporary metropolis). An individual may have a few cultural affiliations that
characterise him or her as a member of one or another group (ibid, p. 51) or prove
various group identities of immigrants (ibid, p. 52)
It is a serious problem for a citizen of a global village to reconcile
individual, regional and local identity that is based on tradition, territory,
topographic features of the region, its industrial, social and cultural specificity with
global identity in post modern conditions of time and space compression in the
situation of the migration of symbols and people, modern economy and different
systems of values.
Creating a new form of group (collective) identity faces obstacles or is
simply impossible. Unsuccessful, 74-year long attempt to form a new soviet
identity among the citizens of the former USSR or an attempt to form an extra-
national European identity may be examples. The former seems to be built upon
individualism of particular people and groups, rather than on the basis of universal
values of European culture, such as justice, democracy and freedom. Bauman
(2005, p. 188) claimed that these values, professed by Europeans, define their
14
identity. Pomian (2009) posed a thesis on the universality of European culture and
that it is culture to unite the identity of European societies and countries. In our
opinion, this culture and its universal values did not prove to be durable cement of
the integration of Europe and European identification because it was the ideology
of individualism to have won. It is the culture of individualism that is the winner.
What is more, in some countries (presumably, as a result of the increase in the
significance of individualization processes), traditional construction of national
identities strengthened, what is manifested in emergence of nations in such
countries as Great Britain, Belgium, Spain or Canada. National identity, in spite of
unfavourable processes demonstrates its persistence, although there are frequent
examples of cultural identities that contain identification with two national groups.
The specificity of American (national) identity
The awakening after September 11, 2001 caused an increase of the
importance of national identity for Americans, in comparison to other identities (p.
17). The crisis of identity however, became a worldwide phenomenon covering not
only America (Huntington lists as many as 15 nations that found themselves in the
identity crisis) (p. 25). This indicated common factors determining the
phenomenon, such as modernization, economic development globalization,
urbanization and communication progress. There are dialectic processes of
narrowing and broadening identity, fragmentation and globalization, integration
and separation as well as mixing identities (Asians and Latinos in USA, Arabs and
Turks in Western Europe).
The fact that had a decisive and lasting impact on the shape of the American
culture, institution, history and also on American identity was that America is an
Anglo-protestant society, established in 17th and 18
th century by settlers from the
British Isles. The settler initially defined America in terms of race, ethnicity,
culture and – most importantly – religion (Huntington, p. 45). In 18 c. they had to
define America in terms of ideology, in order to justify their independence form
other citizens of their former homeland. These four factors remained a part of
American identity in 19 c. At the end of the century, ethnic ingredient increased by
Germans, the Irish and Scandinavians. Then, up to the ban on mass immigration in
1924, American society assimilated large mass of immigrants from southern and
eastern Europe. Due to this, by the outbreak of World War II, ethnic affiliation had
no longer been a basic ingredient of American national identity. Ethnic affiliation
also lost its significance as an element of identity after the successes of human
rights movement and the enactment of the bill on immigration in 1965. Since
1970’s it has been culture and credo that define American identity.
Evolution of American identity At the end of 20 c. separate elements of this culture/identity began to
change. White English-speaking protestants neighboured with immigrants from
South American and Asia and the manifestation of group identities: ethnic, racial
and sexual was accompanied by the popularity of the doctrines of multiculturalism
and diversity (raised to the rank of a dogma). The erosion of American national
15
identity in 1980’s and 1990’s of 20 c. is also linked to exalting different sub-
national identities over the national identity and the relation of part of the elites
and interest groups to cosmopolitan and supranational identities. Some elite groups
in America – business, financial, intellectual, professional and even governmental
ones – were deprived of their national identity (comp., p. 21). The phenomena of
patriotism extinction and devaluation of American citizenship are described.
Higher ethnic and religious awareness, the increase of Hispanic influences has
been slowly transforming America into a bilingual and bicultural society and
facilitates double identity retention (Huntington, op. cit., p. 128 and 129). Will it
be successful to defend American unity as a society based on Christianity and
religious dedication, freedom, equality, the riles of law and the rights of an
individual, on protestant values such as individualism and ethics at workplace?
These are the questions that bother not only the author of the book entitled: “Who
are we?” In the perspective of Huntington’s analyses, one might put forward a
thesis that possibly it was the ideology of individualism to be the last cement that
bounded the elements of American society if all other elements American identity
no longer exist. Race and ethnic American does not exist any more. Cultural
America is in the stage of siege (ibidem, p. 24). In the future America may be a
mix of four types of identity: ideological, i.e. the America deprived of cultural
historic foundations and unified by the attachment to American rules, the identity
split into two cultures: Anglo-protestant and Hispanic and two languages,
exclusivist identity - redefined by race and ethnic affiliation, excluding any
coloured people from outside Europe and finally cultural identity – revitalized
which proves its cultural Anglo-protestant and European cultural roots,
involvement and religious values in the confrontation with the hostile world
(ibidem, p. 12 and 30).
September 11, 2001 Anglo-protestant American culture was attacked, what
brought by the perspective of settling the perspective of American identity on
ideological and political attachment to credo exclusively (comp. ibid, p. 46).
Huntington polemicizes with Robert Bellaha’s opinion who repeated
Franklin Roosevelt’s words that all Americans except Indians are immigrants or
immigrants’ descendants (comp. Ibid, p. 46) maintaining that there is a
fundamental difference between immigrants and settlers. The first communities of
settlers came to America in 1607, 1620 and 1630 because “America was a tabula
rasa”, i.e. except for Indians there was no other society. Settlers had a common
(not individual as was the case of later immigrants) attitude to the old and the new
homeland. Actually, the term “immigrant” came into being in the English language
in America in 1790’s to distinguish new-comers from the first settlers.
Fundamental culture and American identity is in its core still colonial and is still
the culture of the first settlers whose basic elements are: “Christian religion,
Protestant values and morality, the ethics of work, the English language, British
traditions of law and justice, the limitations of the government as well as the
heritage of art, literature, philosophy and music (ibidem, p. 48). The settlers added
the, so called, American credo with its rules of freedom, equality, individualism
representative government and private property. By the end of 20th century it was
16
the following values that attracted immigrants: Anglo-protestant culture, political
freedom and economic possibilities.
In 1790 the population of United States was 3.929 million people, including
698 thousand slaves. In terms of ethnicity 60% of white population was English,
80% British (the rest was German and Dutch). 98% of the population was of
Protestant denomination. America was, therefore, a homogenous society in terms
of race, nationality and religion. In the period between 1820 and 2000, about 66
million of immigrants came to America what made the American nation more
heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity and religion. However, demographic influence
of immigrants was just minimally higher than the influence of 17th and 18
th century
settlers and their slaves. At the end of 18 century, America experienced a
demographic boom. The birth rate was as high as 7.7 children per woman in 1790,
what constituted 55 children per 1000 people, in comparison to 35 births per 1000
people in European countries (ibidem, p. 51). At the end of 20th century (in 1990)
America was, in terms of demography, the creature of the first settlers and slaves
in half (49% of population came from settlers and African American population
from 1790) and in half immigrants (51% of the American people descended from
immigrants who came later). In the population of America in the period of 1820
and 2000, average ratio of people who were born outside America was as little as
10%, what proves the thesis that America is not “a nation of immigrants”.
American national identity is defined by the rules, not by attribution, it is a
civic and national not ethnic and cultural identity what results in the perception of
America as a universal nation because its rules are applicable to all human
societies. It is based on the ideology of credo, expressed in the Declaration of
Independence. The definition of American identity was formed with reference to
political conception, not to race, culture, language and ethnic affiliation:
Americans and British were one nation after all. The conflicts with Great Britain
related to trade, taxes, military safety and the scope of the power of parliament
over the colonies made Americans defend traditional English values from the
British government whose aim was to undermine them. Americans demanded
observing traditional English rules, freedoms and the governance mandated by the
subjects. Americans referred to more universal, values of the Enlightenment
concerning freedom, equality and the rights of individuals. These two sources
established the American credo, present in various documents, sermons, writings
and speeches from 1770’s and 1780’s. “The credo legitimizes the use of
“Americanism” as a political ideology or the set of views analogical to socialism
or communism in such a way that had never been referred to “Romanism”,
“Anglicanism” and “Germanism” (ibid, p. 54). Americanism has certain features
of religion, what makes America “a nation of the soul of a church” and implements
ideology not ethnic affiliation, language or religion as basic criteria of national
identity, moreover it considers its enemies in terms of credo. Americans identify
their enemies with tyranny, monarchy, aristocracy and stifling freedom and the
rights of an individual. “In 20th
century, Americans identified themselves as world
advocates of democracy and freedom against German and Japanese militarism and
Nazism as well as Soviet communism (ibid, p. 55). Despite these declarations,
17
Americans massacred and marginalised Indians, subjugated and excluded African
Americans, excluded Asians, discriminated Catholics, expelled loyalists and
hindered immigration of people from outside North West Europe.
American identity is not linked to any particular territory, the symbolic heart
of the nation, holy land of the ancestors or geographic and physical properties of
the land. Up to this day, they exhibit a high degree of mobility, they are in constant
movement and do not identify themselves with any particular place of residence.
Towards the end of the 20th century, 16% of Americans were changing houses.
Only in one year, from march 1999 to march 2000, 43 million Americans changed
their house. The majority of Americans do not treat New York City, Los Angeles
or Washington DC as the embodiment of the American spirit. They also do not
identify themselves with the American territory as a whole. The relationship with
land is expressed in terms of possession and not identity. They do not call the USA
their home country. They think of their land in abstract, not particular, terms. They
do not express local bonds with a particular territory. Americans epitomise their
country neither with a place nor with natural characteristics but with ideas or
political and government institutions.
For 400 years, Protestant culture and its values, which greatly influenced
Catholicism and other religions in America, have been the foundation of the
American identity. In the year 2000, Protestants constituted 60% of the American
population. Protestant values shaped the American attitude towards public and
private morality, economic activities, government's public policies. “America- the
child of the reformation” (ibid, p. 66). Later, the Enlightenment Age, secular,
liberal and bourgeois ethos stemmed from the protestant values. American
Protestantism differed from its European counterpart in its spirit of freedom, its
aversion to subjecting the mind and its religious zeal. The colonists regarded
themselves as the chosen people and defined their mission in the New World in
biblical categories. Various types of Protestantism, in the form of Baptist Church,
Methodism, Fundamentalism, Evangelicalism or Pentecostalism, place great
influence on the direct contact between an individual and God, the Bible's
superiority as the true source of the word of God, deliverance through faith,
transforming experience of re-birth, personal responsibility for spreading the word
of God, living in faith, democratic, with lesser degree of hierarchy, organisation of
the Church, presupposing general participation and the superior position of
emotional element over the intellectual. Modern Evangelicalism is the most
popular religion among Americans.
The fundamental, and very often the sole indicator of the American identity
of the so-called American Credo, i.e. common “social ethos and political faith,
consisting of the concepts of equality, dignity of an individual, the right to
freedom, justice, fair opportunities and search for happiness. The political beliefs
of Americans encompass the sacred right of and individual, the nation as the
source of political authority, government limited by law and the nation, superiority
of the local government over the central government, power of the majority and the
belief in “the less government the better (ibid, p. 69). This unique secular credo is
the offspring of the dissident Protestant culture. Its basis consists of 5 principles:
18
freedom, egalitarianism, individualism, populism and the principle of laissez-faire
(comp. Ibid, p. 70).
Americans brought up in the Protestant culture, more often than Europeans,
Canadians or the Japanese, express the belief that there exist absolute moral norms,
independent from circumstances which ought to direct their individual behaviour
(ibid, p. 71). Protestantism stresses the role of the individual in experiencing God
directly through the Bible without the mediation of the Church and emphasises the
possibility of salvation or re-birth by means of the Holy Grace, also without the
mediation. The Protestant Culture made Americans the most individualistic nation
of the world (ibid), and the fundamental element of the culture- work ethics, made
the religion of work and the gospel of success the American religion. American
society exhibits the belief of moral value of work and work glorification.
Furthermore, employment is the source of self- confidence and independence
whereas idleness is a sin. Americans, more strongly than other nations, identify
with work. Work is the source of satisfaction and they are proud of it. In 1997
Americans worked 350 hours on average more than Europeans (ibid, p. 73). One
ought to be active and useful, make decisions and do one's work. Individual
success depends on talent and character. Americans divide people into those who
are productive and those who are not. As early as the first half of the 19th century,
observers notice work addiction in this type of behaviour. The concept of a self-
made man i.e. a person who owes everything him/ herself is the product of the
American culture.
America – the Christian nation Americans are one of the most religious nations in the world, especially in
comparison with other, highly industrialised democratic societies. Over 80% of the
population describe themselves as Christians. America is predominantly a
Christian nation with a secular government (ibid, p. 82). The Founding Fathers of
the American Constitution forbade the creation of the national church in order to
limit the power of the government and to defend and strengthen religion.
Consequently, this lead to the identification of religion with the society and
ensured the freedom of religion (and not the freedom from religion). With the lack
of the national religion, Americans gained not only the freedom of religion but also
the freedom to create any religious communities and organisations (ibid, p. 84).
This lead to an unusual expansion of various religions, religious movements and
sects and also religious schools, biblical associations and missionary movements,
which embody mostly a form of Protestantism. Americans succeeded in joining the
spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom (while in France these two are in
opposition)- which was observed by Tocqueville. At the threshold of the 21st
century, Americans were not less attached to their Christian identity- maybe they
were attached to it the most in their history (ibid, p. 99). They are a religious
nation. Non-religious and secular, if not antireligious, is only a part of American
intellectual, academic and media elites.
19
American national identity is built on the foundation of civil religion. The
religion consists of 4 elements. The first, American government and lifestyle
presupposes the existence of a Higher Being and is based on the religious basis.
The second, Americans are sure, that they are the chosen nation, and the USA is
“the new Israel” with the God-given mission of doing good in the world. The third
element of the American civil religion is the omnipresence of religious symbols in
ceremonies, rituals and public rhetoric. Finally, national ceremonies possess a
religious function. The holy texts defining the identity of the USA are the
following political documents: Declaration of Independence, Constitution of the
United States of America, Bill of Rights, Getysburg Address, Lincoln's second
inaugural speech, Kennedy's inaugural speech, Martin Luther King's speech (“I
have a dream”) (ibid, p. 101).
American civil religion is of national and extra-religious character (it
encompasses Protestants, Catholics, Jews, other non-Christians and even
agnostics). However, the religion is deeply Christian in its spirit, substance,
principles and stipulations regarding human nature. Behind each aspect of civil
religion stand Biblical archetypes: the Exodus, the Chosen Nation, the Promised
Land, the New Jerusalem, sacrificial death and re-birth- claims Bellah (ibid, p.
102). Although each American banknote and coin bears the words: The United
States of America” and “In God We Trust”, Americans do not swear allegiance to
one God, but to “a nation under one God's care”. American civil religion is
Christianity without Christ and does not mention two words: “Jesus Christ”.
Muslim Identit – an example of cultural identity New Islamic identity as a cultural/ religious identity emerged as a
consequence of negating the cultural exclusion where the exclusion from
modernity obtains religious sense and the method of combating the exclusion
consists of self-sacrifice (compare Castells, op. cit., p. 35). Constructing the
modern Islamic identity occurs as a reaction against unattainable in the 70's and
80's and failed modernisation (be it capitalist or socialist, negative effects of
globalisation and the collapse of post-colonial, nationalist project (ibid, p. 33).
The rapid emergence of Islamic movements seems to be linked with the
interference in the functioning of the traditional societies. Islamic countries'
economies were not able to adapt to new conditions of global competition and the
technological revolution in the 70's and 80's. Young, highly educated city-dwellers
were frustrated with their expectations aroused in the 50's and 60's. In 1980's,
nationalist projects in the most westernised countries of Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia
collapsed. This marked the beginning of social tensions which were seized mostly
by moderate Islamists (Muslim Brotherhood) but also by radicals (Jemaah
Islamiyah). In Indonesia and Malaysia, the crisis of nationalism brought about
Islamism as well.
Fundamentalist Islamic identity spread into the socially excluded areas of
the developed capitalist societies. In this way, the emergence of a new Islamic
identity not only among the disappointed French youth originating from Maghreb,
20
but also among young Turks born in Germany or among the Pakistanis in the UK
occurred. At the same time, the collapse of the Soviet Union enabled the
emergence of Islamic movements in the Caucasus and in the Central Asia. A new
identity is formed not only by the return to tradition, communal world where
lacking means of existence masses and disappointed intellectuals can rebuild the
sense in a global alternative against the excluding global order (ibid, p. 35).
Islamic fundamentalism is not a traditionalist movement. Despite all the
exegetical efforts of rooting the Islamic identity in history and holy texts, Islamists
continue to reconstruct the cultural identity which is hypermodern in reality.
Politicisation of the sacred, the sacralisation of politics and conversion of pseudo-
legal Islamic institutes into “social religious rites” are all the means of the
implementation of authentic ego policy, the policy of identity, thus the means of
formulation and in essence discovering the identity (ibid, p. 31). The Islamic
identity is, therefore, (re)constructed by fundamentalists in the opposition to
capitalism, socialism and nationalism (Arabic or otherwise), which constitute in
their perception the collapsing ideologies of the postcolonial order (ibid).
Religious fundamentalism (Islamic or Christian) according to Castell's
analyses, in the new millennium, proved to be surprisingly strong and influential as
an identity source. Islamic fundamentalism as a reconstructed identity and a
political project is in the centre of the most crucial process, by and large
conditioning the future of the world (ibid, p. 28). In cultural/ religious/ political;
framework the Islamic identity is built on the principle of double deconstruction:
by public actors and by public institutions. The actors must deconstruct themselves
as subjects, be it an individual or as a part of an ethnic group or as citizens of a
nation. In addition, women must subordinate themselves to their male carers for
they are encouraged to fulfil themselves in the family life. Habermas' principle of
subjectivity constitutes a heresy for Islamic fundamentalists. Only ummah provides
an individual with the ability of being oneself, as a part of a brotherhood of the
true, which is a basic equalising mechanism providing mutual support, solidarity
and shared sense. At the same time, the nation state must negate its identity: an
Islamic state based on Sharia receives precedence over the nation state. Islamic
fundamentalism is a cultural construction based on the propagated priority of the
religious identity (ibid, p. 108).
Religious identity of resistance – Al-Kaida
The movement symbolically represented by al-Qaeda is a movement of
other kind- namely, in Castells' opinion- a global movement built around the
definition of an opponent and not around the definition of own identity principles.
The Soviets in Afghanistan, Americans in the Saudi Arabia or Jews in the Palestine
are all opponents. Al-Qaeda is a global terrorist network leading global jihad
against the USA's and its allies' global authority. Castells invokes Kepel from
2003, who having examined several processes concluded that Islamism as a
political power, in fact, failed in the majority of Muslim countries. Kepel argues
that it is due to this fact that radical and terrorist groups emerged, who constitute a
21
desperate attempt at forcing their own utopia by means of violent revolutionary
avant-garde and who echo the history of early communist era (ibid, p. 35).
Al-Qaeda was built on the principle of identity based on territorial
expression of the religious identity which is the identity of resistance and not the
identity of the project. Although it exhibits offensive, global projection due to the
nature of its opponent consisting of secular regimes (the USA and Zionism), it
does not put forward a programme for the society or mankind. Western powers
marginalise Muslims evoking in them deep injustice and humiliation (compare
ibid, p. 111). Al-Qaeda is a multiethnic and multinational global network. It is not
a class, an ethnic group, a national or regional group. Finally, it is not an
expression of rebellion against economic exploitation (ibid, p. 117). Castells writes
further: It is definitely a group based on religious identity, but lacking particular
social anchor, apart from common experience of the first religious war in
Afghanistan (ibid, p. 133). It is rather a commune of practices, and the practice is
jihad, whereas the power if identity is the power of God (ibid).
Conclusion
Research on Muslim radicalism find its causes in the micro-social, mezzo-
social and macro-social levels. On the micro level, individuals are examined by
means of qualitative methods e.g. on the basis of personal documents analysis.
Researchers concluded that, before becoming part of extremist organisations,
people undergo deep identity crisis of life between two cultures, which disappears
after their immersion in the structures of the organisation (“finding oneself”, “one's
own manhood”).
Such state may be explained by the theory of culture clash, presupposing
that the identity crisis must occur as a result of attempt at reconciliation of two
conflicting world-views and systems of values.
A different attempt at explaining the identity crisis was put forward by
Bryan Turner who sees the source of the crisis in atomised Western- European
societies, where the commercialisation and privatisation of the majority of life
spheres does not allow for the assimilation of social roles or for developing one's
own identity on the basis of e.g. work. Identity function can be fulfilled, however,
by religious or “alterreligious” institutions. Owing to great social solidarity, radical
religious organisations attract their members suffering from the identity crisis, the
members usually being the representatives of the well-educated middle class,
especially science graduates.
The third explanation of the identity crisis may be globalisation processes.
The disintegration of identity on the social and personal level can be regarded as
the effect of global universalisation and relativisation. However, these processes
bring about the revitalisation of the Muslim identity, regeneration of identities, but
those limited to particular groups, e.g. religious, racial or ethnic. This is the effect
of particularisation, a phenomenon which is a paradox of globalisation-
universalisation and revitaliation. This is illustrated by the Rushdie scandal. His
book and ideas which revitalised the Muslim religion were supposed to enable
22
participation in the global culture, thus universalisation in return. However, the
book incited religious radicalism among the European Muslims.
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