Contentious Politics in New Democracies: Hungary, Poland...

Contentious Politics in New Democracies Hungary Poland Slovakia and the Former

East Germany Since 1989

Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik Harvard University Rutgers University Center for European Studies Department of Political Science Cambridge MA 02138 New Brunswick NJ 08903

Program on Central and Eastern Europe Working Paper Series 141

Abstract

The paper reconstructs and explains the patterns of collective protest in four Central European countries Hungary former East Germany Poland and Slovakia dUring the early phases of democratic consolidation (19891994) Analytical perspective is provided by protest event analysis The empirical evidence comes from content analysis of several major papers in each country The patterns found in the data are comshypared with the predictions derived from four theoretical traditions (a) relative deprivation (b) instrumenshytal institutionalism CC) historical-cultural institutionalism and (d) resource mobilization theory Two main conclusions are reached First the levels of objective or subjective deprivation are unrelated to the magnitude and various feature of protest which are best explained by a combination of institutional and resource mobilization theories Second democratic consolidation is not necessarily threatened by a high magnitude of protest If protests demands are moderate and its methods routinized it contributes to the poshylitical vitality of new democracies

I The location of our project in the literature on democratic consolidations 1

The research proj ect presented in this paper expands our understanding of democratic consolidation The empirical evidence

comes primarily from the systematic data collection on collective

protest during the first years of democratic transition in four

countries Poland Hungary Slovakia and the former East Germany Our analysis focuses on the neglected dimension of the

postcommunist transformations contentious action by non-elite

collective actors in four Central European countries Our aim is to

counter the existing pro-elite bias in the literature determine the impact of protest activities on democratization and to

reconstruct the emerging patterns of the state-society

relationships in the newly democratizing societies

Conceptualizing and explaining the rapid unexpected collapse

of state-socialist regimes in East Central Europe in 1989 and the

ensuing efforts at democratization and restructuring of the economy

is a challenge for students of comparative politics The

simultaneity of the breakdown despite varied political and

economic conditions in each country reinforced a notion that these

regimes were basically identical one-party states kept in power by

the Soviet military presence Additionally some experts assumed

that in the wake of communisms collapse the new regimes developed

similar structures and faced similar challenges and pressures and

therefore should be treated as a single political type

1The project was funded by the Program for the Study of Germany and Europe administered by the Center for European Studies at Harvard University the National Council for Soviet and East European Research and the American Council of Learned Societies It was directed by Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik We would like to thank Sidney Tarrow for his generous help and encouragement For their indispensable assistance and advice our special gratitude goes to Martha Kubik Ela Ekiert Anna Grzymala-Busse Jason Wittenberg Mark Beissinger Nancy Bermeo Valerie Bunce Ellen Comisso Bela Greskovits Janos Kornai Michael D Kennedy Christiane Lemke Darina Malova Alexander Motyl Maryjane Osa Dieter Rucht Mate Szabo Anna Seleny and Mayer N Zald

1

This view is incorrect both with respect to the communist past

and the present developments East Central European state socialist

regimes underwent complex processes of transformation during their

four decades in power Domestic political developments differed from country to country Specifically patterns of political conflict institutional breakdowns and strategies of regime

reequilibration left long-lasting legacies As a result of political crises fundamental changes and adjustments were introduced into the political and economic institutions and practices of these regimes altering relations between

institutional orders of the party-state between the state and

society and producing institutional and policy dissimilarities 2

Thus each state socialist regime left behind distinct legacies which should be carefully examined if we are to explain the present

rapidly diverging trajectories of political social and economic

changes taking place in the region 3

Similarly despite the clustering of regime breakdowns in

1989 there were important differences in the way particular countries exited state socialism and entered the transition

process Pacted transitions that took place in Poland and Hungary and displacement of the communist regime through popular upsurge

that occurred in Czechoslovakia and the GDR produced different transitional institutions and patterns of political conflicts

These distinctive modes of power transfer shaped subsequent political developments and the capacity of various political actors in each country4

2Por the detailed elaboration of this argument see Grzegorz Ekiert The State Against Society Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central Europe Princeton University Press 1996

3Por an exemplary effort to correlate developments under state socialism and their constraining impact on the current transformation process see Janos Kornai Paying the Bill for Goulash-Communism Discussion Paper Series No 1749 Harvard Institute for Economic Research Cambridge 1996

4See for example Grzegorz Ekiert Transitions from StateshySocialism in East Central Europe States and Social Structures Newsletter (1990) 12 1-7 Bartlomiej Kaminski Systemic

2

Several years after the collapse of the communist rule

distinctive regions or groups of countries with contrasting

policies and accomplishments have emerged within the former Soviet

bloc The new postcommunist regimes have been confronted with

specific challenges engendered by different domestic conditions and

have pursued different strategies of political and economic

reforms Stark is correct when he argues that we should II regard

East Central Europe as undergoing a plurality of transitions in a

dual sense across the region we are seeing a multiplicity of

distinctive strategies within any given country we find not one

transition but many occurring in different domains - political

economic and social - and the temporality of these processes are often asynchronous and their articulation seldom harmonious liS

Despite initial concerns expressed by many students of East

European politics and the tragic experiences of the former

Yugoslavia all East Central European states have working

democracies and a solid record of political liberties and human

rights protection 6 These newly democratized regimes do not face

any immediate threats of reversal to authoritarian rule Slovakia

is the only country which prompted serious concerns about political

rights and liberties At the same time the progress of political

and economic transformations has been uneven and their chances of

full democratic consolidation are still unclear Consequently

the study of various aspects and limits of democratic consolidation in postcommunist states has emerged as one of the most intriguing

and challenging areas of comparative politics

Underpinnings of the Transition in Poland The Shadow of the Roundtable Agreement Studies in Comparative communism (1991) 24 2 173-90 David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt Postsocialist Pathways Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe forthcoming in Cambridge University Press especially chapter 1

SDavid Stark Path Dependence and Privatization Strategies in East Central EuropelI East European Politics and Societies 6 1 (1992)18

6In the recent edition of the Freedom House survey Freedom in the World 1994-1995 all Central European countries were declared to be free and scored high both on political rights and civil liberties measures

3

This paper seeks to explore the question of democratic consolidation from a specific analytical and empirical angle We will present selected results of our research project on collective protest in post-1989 East Central Europe Systematic data collection from Hungary Poland Slovakia and the former East Germany reveals striking contrasts in the magnitude and forms of

protests Different groups and different organizations were challenging the policies of the new democratic regimes and different forms of contentious action became prominent in the repertoires of contention emerging in these countries These differences in popular responses to political and economic transformations challenge many initial expectations concerning the nature of postcommunist politics and generate new questions

First all countries have been undergoing a difficult economicI

adjustment and structural changes that engendered major dislocations and exacted considerable social costs Therefore we need to ask whether and how the economic policies of the new regimes were actively contested Did some countries experience more protests than others Does such variation in protest magnitude depend on the adopted type of transformation strategy political and social legacies of the communist rule the level of social cost and hardship produced by the reforms new institutional architecture of the post-1989 polity or the organizational resources and capabilities of various collective actors

Second a regime transition is a highly volatile political process which leaves wide open opportunities for political participation and contentious collective action especially in countries where state institutions undergo a significant transformation and repressive political practices are abandoned Thus one would expect a high level of political mobilization and protest activities in such transitory polities A preliminary overview of protest politics indicates that the number of protest events in the four countries under study is not higher and in two cases is distinctively lower than in consolidated West European

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democracies 7 We want to know why Third modes of breakdown of communist regimes had no

noticeable impact on the magnitude of protest countries which

experienced pacted transitions (Poland and Hungary) vary between themselves as much as countries where popular upsurge forced the

removal of the communist elites from power (Slovakia and the former

GDR) We would like to know which factors account for different magnitudes and specific repertoires of protest

Fourth while a high level of protest could have been expected

in Poland its magnitude in the former GDR is surprising Poland is

the only country in our sample which had a strong and recent

tradition of political conflicts and protests s Since 1989 however the former East Germany has been similarly contentious

despite the absence of any considerable pre-1989 protest

traditions What can explain high levels of protest in East

Germany Comparative studies of collective protest offer four theories

for understanding and explaining the incidence of contentious

collective action its forms and magnitude Variation in protest characteristics can be explained by emphasizing (1) discontents and grievances that can be translated into protest through psychological mechanisms of relative deprivation (2) changes in

the structure of political opportunities and actors calculated

responses to them (3) the prior existence of traditions repertoires of collective action and mobilizing collective action

frames and (4) the availability of resources (material

organizational and cultural) as main determinants of protest

activities We will consider all these factors in analyzing contentious politics in post-1989 East Central Europe It should be noted however that these analytical perspectives are not mutually exclusive since each of them emphasizes a dimension of collective

7See Hanspeter Kriesi at aI New Social Movements in Western Europe Minneapolis University of Minnesota Press 1995

8See Grzegorz Ekiert Rebellious Poles Political Crises and Popular Protest under State Socialism 1945-1989 East European Politics and Societies (1997) 11 2 pp 1-42

5

protest which may be dominant in one set of cases but not another 9

In addition it should be noted that many concepts applied here

were developed in the study of stable democratic polities and their

application to countries undergoing rapid political and economic

transformations may lead to analytical distortions

Our analysis is founded on an assumption that democratic

consolidation is a highly contingent and complex process taking

place in several spheres of the socio-political organization of

society 10 Developments within each sphere and the relationship

between them produce often confusing outcomes and increase

uncertainty Moreover as democratic regimes take different paths

towards consolidation so too do the degrees of contentious

political participation and stability of their institutional

arrangements vary

The prevailing modes of studying democratic consolidation tend

to emphasize structural preconditions of consolidation or eliteshy

level politics Recently the majority of researchers abandoned

structural approaches and adopted the elite centered perspective

0 Donnell Schmitter and their collaborators argued that elite

pacts are a crucial element in the successful transition from

authoritarian rule 11 Similarly Diamond and Linz claimed that lithe

skills values strategies and choices of political leaders figure

prominently in our explanation of the enormously varied experiences

9For recent overviews of literature on social movements and collective protest see Doug McAdam John McCarthy and Mayer Zald Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements Cambridge University Press 1996 Anthony Oberschall Social Movements New Brunswick Transaction Books 1993 Sidney Tarrow Power in Movement Cambridge University Press 1994

10For the elaboration of this point see our Collective Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland 1989-1993 Pew Papers on Central Eastern European Reform and Regionalism No3 Center of International Studies Princeton University 1997

llGuillermo ODonnell and Philippe Schmitter Transitions from Authoritarian Rule Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press 1986 pp 37-9

6

14

wi th democracy in Latin America n12 Higley and Gunther contended

that in independent states with long records of political

instability and authoritarian rule distinctive elite

transformations carried out by the elites themselves constitute

the main and possibly the only route to democratic consolidation 13

This almost exclusive focus on elites creates a theoretical

weakness in the existing studies of regime change and

consolidation Moreover a methodological emphasis on rational

choice explanations and on modeling political processes as games

further reinforced the already dominant elite-centered focus of

research on democratic transition Additionally the greater

availability of nelite data favors the elite-centered perspective

Party programs public speeches and interviews of leaders reports

on electoral campaigns election results journalistic commentaries

etc are all easily accessible in the public domain Such sources

of data enable one to reconstruct the political positions of elite

actors the bargaining processes taking place among them and to

trace their compromises coalitions and policy choices By

contrast data on the political activities of non-elite actors are

not readily available public opinion polls have been routinely

used as the sole source of empirical knowledge on the politics of

the populace at large

We also find that the existing literature has accorded more

prominence to certain dimensions of consolidation and neglected

others the formation of party systems is usually viewed as the

most important element in the stabilization and consolidation of

12Larry Diamond and Juan Linz Introduction Politics Society and Democracy in Latin America in Democracy in Developing Countries Latin America edited by Larry Diamond Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset Boulder Lynne Rienner 1989 p 14

13John Higley and Richard Gunther Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1992 p xi

14See Herbert Kitschelt Comparative Historical Research and Rational Choice Theory the Case of Transition to Democracy Theory and Society (1993) 22 pp 413-427

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democracy such view is well expressed by Haggard and Kaufman who

emphasize that lithe capacity to organize stable political rule shy

whether authoritarian or democratic - in the modern context of

broad social mobilization and complex economic system ultimately

rests on organized systems of accountability and these in turn

rest on political parties 15 In addition to this emphasis on the

capacity and activities of political parties -- quite prominent in

the studies of South European democratizations - - the works on

Eastern Europe tend to focus on the complex interactions between

economic and political reforms 16 This problem has come to be known

as the dilemma of simultaneity or transitional incompatibility thesis 17

The preoccupation with (a) elites (b) party systems (c) the

relationship between political and economic changes is responsible

for a considerable gap in democratization literature We know very

little about the activities of non-elite actors and how these

lSStephan Haggard and Robert R Kaufman The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions Princeton Princeton University Press 1995 p 370 Geoffrey Pridham ed Securing Democracy Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe London Routledge 1990 Juan J Linz IIChange and Continuity in the Nature of Contemporary Democracies II in Reexamining Democracy pp 182-207 Herbert Kitschelt The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe II Politics and Society (1992) 20 I pp 7-50

16See for example Adam Przeworski Democracy and the Market Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1991 Grzegorz Ekiert Prospects and Dilemmas of the Transition to a Market Economy in East Central Europe II in Research on Democracy and Society (1993) I pp 51-82 Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira Jose Maria Maravall and Adam Przeworski Economic Reforms in New Democracies Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1993

17See Claus Offe IICapitalism by Democratic Design Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe Social Research (1991) 58 4 pp 865-92 Piotr Sztompka IIDilemmas of the Great Transition A Tentative Catalogue Program on Central and Eastern Europe Working Paper Series No 19 Center for European Studies Harvard University 1992 Leslie Armijo Thomas Biersteker and Abraham Lowenthal liThe Problems of Simultaneous Transitions Journal of Democracy (1994) 5 4 pp 161-75

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activities shape the processes of democratization Some students of

democratic transitions have begun however studying the importance

of the resurrection of civil society and its political role both

during the decomposition of authoritarian rule and in its

aftermath 18 It is often noted for example that the greatest

challenge to the policies of the newly democratized states may come

from various organizations of civil society (labor unions interest

groups etc) 19 Yet the development of such organizations and their

political role is not systematically documented and analyzed We

also agree with Neidhardt and Rucht who conclude that social

movement research should concentrate more on the interactions of

movements with other agents 20

18For the most recent examples of this growing interest in the role of civil society in democratization see Sidney Tarrow Mass Mobilization and Regime Change Pacts Reform and Popular Power in Italy (1918-1922) and Spain (1975-1978) in Richard Gunter Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jurgen Puhle eds Politics of Democratic Consolidation Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press 1995 pp 204-230 Victor Perez-Diaz The Return of Civil Society Harvard University Press 1993 Nancy Bermeo Myths of Moderation The Parameters of Civility During Democratization unpublished manuscript Princeton University Philippe Schmitter Some Propositions about Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy unpublished manuscript Stanford University Stephen Fish Democracy form Scratch Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution Princeton Princeton University Press 1995 Philip D Oxhorn Organizing Civil Society The Popular Sectors and the Struggle for Democracy in

Chile University Park The pennsylvania State University Press 1995

19Charles Tilly in his studies of collective action in France and Britain convincingly demonstrates that over the last two centuries organizations of civil society were the typical vehicles of protest See Charles Tilly Louise Tilly and Richard Tilly The Rebellious Century 1830-1930 Cambridge Harvard University Press 1975 Charles Tilly The Contentious French Cambridge Harvard University Press 1986 Charles Tilly Repertoires of Contention in America and Britain 1750-1830 in The Dynamic of Social Movements edited by M Zald and JD McCarthy Cambridge Winthrop 1979 This regularity is confirmed by all systematic studies of protest in contemporary societies

20See FriedheIm Neidhardt and Dieter Rucht The Analysis of Social Movements The State of the Art and Some Perspectives for

9

The study of citizens participation in democratic

consolidations has often been reduced to an examination of

political attitudes conducted on representative samples of the

population The third wave ll of democratizations allows often for

the first time in the history of a given society for the

administration of unconstrained public opinion polls

Understandably many scholars capitalized on this opportunity and

studied public attitudes and their changes during the transition 21process Such studies contribute to our knowledge of public

reactions to regime change and are very useful as long as the

results of public opinion polls are not accepted as a substitute

for data on actual political behavior As Tarrow emphasizes

unless we trace the forms of activity people use how these

reflect their demands and their interaction with opponents and

elites we cannot understand either the magnitude or the dynamics

of change in politics and society 1122

Our research project was based on the assumption that event

analysis and in particular the systematic collection of data on

collective action from newspapers can shed new light on the

political behavior of non-elite actors during democratization

Following the pioneering work of Charles Tilly and his associates

event analysis has become an accepted and often an indispensable

Further Research in Research on Social Movements The State of the Art in Western Europe and the USA Dieter Rucht ed Frankfurt am Main and Boulder Campus Verlag and Westview Press 1991 p 459

21See for example impressive series of Studies in Public Policy produced by the Center for the Study of Public Policy University of Strathclyde and coordinated by Richard Rose Peter McDonough Samuel H Barnes and A Lopez Pina The Growth of Democratic Legitimacy in Spain American Political Science Review (1986) 80 3 pp 735-60 Krzysztof Zagorski Hope Factor Inequality and Legitimacy of Systemic Transformations The Case of Poland II Communist and Post-Communist Studies (1994) 27 4 pp 357-376

22Sidney Tarrow Democracy and Disorder Protest and Politics in Italy 1965-1975 Oxford Clarendon Press 1989 pp 7-8 See also his Mass Mobilization and Regime Change II in The Politics of Democratic Consolidation pp 204-230

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research method in the study of collective action protest and

social movements Despite its imperfections and limitations

acknowledged by those who use it the event analysis is uniquely

capable of providing researchers with the most extensive and

systematic sets of data on protest activities and their different

components and dimensions It allows to study both the qualitative

and quantitative aspects of protest actions over time and in large

geographical areas It may be used in various projects ranging

from a single case study to multi-state comparative works It can

be applied to answer a variety of questions concerning collective

action its forms and outcomes its organizers and participants

responses of the state and broader political issues Data sets constructed on the basis of specifically selected press sources

provide information on protest events for extended periods of

time 23

II Incidence and Magnitude of Collective Protest in Post-1989 East

Central Europe

In our research project we sought to construct a detailed data

base of all forms and incidents of collective protest in Hungary

Poland Slovakia and the former East Germany We adopted a broad

definition of protest event to cover all types of non-institutional

and unconventional political actions and used identical coding

23For the review of methodological issues and various applications of the protest event analysis see Roberto Franzosi The Press as a Source of Socio-historical Data Issues in the Methodology of Data Collection from Newspapers in Historical Methods 1987 20 pp5-16 Charles Tilly Popular Contention in Great Britain 1758-1834 Cambridge Harvard University Press 1995 pp 55-105 Dieter Rucht and Thomas Ohlemacher Protest Event Data Collection Uses and Perspectives in Studying Collective Action edited by Mario Diani and Ron Eyerman London SAGE 1992 pp 76-106 Susan Olzak Analysis of Events in the Study of Collective Action Annual Review of Sociology 1989 15 pp119-41 Dieter Rucht Ruud Koopmans and FriedheIm Neidhardt eds Protest Event Analysis Methodological Perspectives and Empirical Results forthcoming

II

protocols in the four countries we study 24 Our research teams

collected information only on IIpublic ll protest events that is

actions which were reported in at least one newspaper included in

our sample They systematically scanned two daily newspapers and

four weeklies in each country for the entire period under study and

recorded all available information concerning reported protest

actions The number of protest events recorded in each country is

presented in the following table

Table 1 Protest events in Hungary Poland Slovakia

and the former East Germany 1989-1993

The table reveals striking differences in the number of protest

events which occurred in these countries Poland and the former GDR

had a high number of protest events during the analyzed period with

relatively small differences between years Hungary and Slovakia

had much lower incidence of protests This situation calls for a

close examination given the fact that all countries have been

undergoing a turbulent political transformation and implemented

comprehensive economic adjustment programs involving a substantial

level of disruption and social cost In Slovakia the low number of

protest activities and the predominance of non-disruptive methods

such as protest letters is especially surprising One may expect

that a country breaking from a long lasting federation and building

an independent statehood would experience a high level of popular

mobilization

The numbers presented in the Table 1 are not weighted by the

size of the population It might be assumed that the larger a

24We define the protest event as collective action of at least three people who set out to articulate specific demands Our database includes also extreme I politically motivated acts such as self-immolation hunger strikes I or acts of terror carried out by individuals In order to qualify as a protest event I such action can not be the routine or legally prescribed behavior of a social or political organization Strikes rallies or demonstrations I are considered to be protest events for the purpose of our analysis because of their radical and disruptive nature For various definitions of events used in event analysis see Susan Olzak IIAnalysis of Events II pp 124-27

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countrys population the more protest events it will experience

This of course may not always be the case but one will never know

unless some measure of protest magnitude is constructed and

weighted by the size of the countrys population Given our

definition of protest event the set of protest events our coders

recorded included both small brief street gatherings and severalshy

month-long strike campaigns Hence in order to grasp the magnitude

of protest in a given unit of time we had to construct a synthetic

index of magnitude Inspired by Tillys idea to gauge

simultaneously several dimensions of protest we attempted to

construct such an index by multiplying three variables of our data 25protocol (a) duration (b) number of participants and (c) scope

Unfortunately number of participants proved to be the variable

with the highest frequency of missing values 26 Two attempts to

estimate missing values relying on different assumptions produced

very different results thus the validity of our composite index of

magnitude proved to be dubious We settled for a simpler index

based on the duration variable alone for which we have an almost

perfect record 27 This index was composed in the following way The

duration of each protest event was expressed as the number of 24

hour periods it was composed of For example a seven day strike

was ascribed a value of 7 protest-days Next we summarized the

values of this new variable for all protest events in a given

25Charles Tilly From Mobilization to Revolution New York McGraw-Hill 1978 pp 162-4

26There are more than fifty percent of missing values in our Polish Slovak and Hungarian databases for several calendar years

27Validity refers to IImeasuring what we think we are measuring (Gary King Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba Designing Social Inquiry Princeton Princeton University Press 1994 p 25) The validity of a synthetic construct or category can be improved by (a) increasing the number of independent measures it is based on and (b) finding such measures which strongly correlate with each other (see Robert Philip Weber Basic Content Analysis Newbury Park Sage 1990 pp 18-21) Since our index of magnitude is based on only one measure (duration) its validity is weak But we traded validity for high reliability_

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calendar year That gave us an approximation of the protest

magnitude for each year in all four countries Additionally we

calculated means of protest magnitude for each country for the

entire period under study This number was then divided by the

number of adults (15-64) in order to arrive at the weighted index of maqnitude for each country The results of these calculations

are reported in Table 2 and illustrated in Graphs 1 through 4

Table 2 General measures of protest activities in the

four countries

Graphs 1-4 Magnitudes of Protest

As Graphs 1 through 4 clearly demonstrate each country had its own

specific dynamic of protest during the period studied 28 In Poland

the magnitude of protest decreased in 1990 but then increased every year after This increasing magnitude of protest in Poland is

the most unexpected finding of our study 29 We assumed that the

regime transition transfer of political power and the

introduction of dramatic economic reforms would produce a higher

level of popular mobilization and contentious politics at the

beginning of the analyzed period In Hungary the magnitude of

protest was highest in 1989 declined in the following two years

and increased again in the end of the analyzed period In Slovakia protest was intensifying until 1992 and declined afterwards In the

former East Germany the magnitude of protest peaked in 1992 and

declined in 1993

The order of weighted indexes of magnitude produces a somewhat surprising ranking of the four countries Poland turns out to be

280ne index of magnitude based partially on the numbers of participants variable (whose missing values were estimated) produced almost identical approximations of protest dynamics between 1989 and 1993

29This phenomenon is analyzed in Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik The Rebellious Civil Society Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland unpublished manuscript under review

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most contentious state during the early phase of democratic

consolidation which -- given Polands traditions of contentious

politics -- is not a surprise But Slovakias second place ranking is This country did not have as much protest as its other states

but on the per capita basis its population proved to be quite contentious The biggest surprise is Hungary coming in last We

expected that Hungarians who by all accounts are more dissatisfied with the post-1989 changes than are Poles or East Germans would be more contentious In the fourth section we offer several

explanations for both the differential patterns of protest dynamic

and each countrys standing in our protest ranking

III Selected Characteristics of Protest Politics

The countries analyzed in this paper differ not only in terms

of incidence and magnitude of protest There were interesting variations among other protest characteristics as well The general

repertoire of contention was similar in all countries and closely

mirrored standard strategies used by protesting groups in

contemporary politics Protest actions in Poland Hungary and Slovakia were decidedly non-violent In Poland disruptive strategies such as street demonstrations and strikes were most

common but in Hungary and Slovakia nearly 70 percent of the

strategies used by protesting groups were of a non-disruptive character In contrast to these three countries the number of

violent protests in the former GDR was significantly higher and

disruptive strategies dominated the repertoire of collective

action

Table 3 General Protest Strategies in East Central Europe

Our database did not record any important shifts in protest strategies used by challenging groups Dominant types of strategies

were consistent throughout the entire period under study Nor did

we register any significant innovations in protest activities which

were latter diffused from one category of protestors to another or among various groups and organizations Thus the repertoires of

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contention in each country were not significantly diverse and

relatively stable over time This stability of repertoires may

indicate that East Central European countries did not experience a

cycle of protest which according to Tarrow is characterized among

other things by expanding repertoires of contention 30

Although the general strategies of protest (violent

disruptive and non-violent) did not vary significantly from

country to country specific forms of protest dominated protest

repertoire of the challenging groups in each country In all four

countries disruptive strategies including demonstrations marches

and street blockades were frequently used by protesting groups and

were most common in the former East Germany In Poland strikes (the

number of strikes was three times higher than in any other country)

and strike alerts were used regularly If we combine strikes and

strike alerts this form of protest comprises 364 percent that is

the majority among protest strategies in the Polish repertoire

The number of strikes was similar and significantly smaller in

other three countries In Hungary and Slovakia protest letters and

statements were the most frequent strategy used to express

grievances and convey demands The most frequently used strategies recorded in our database are presented in Table 4

Table 4 Specific protest strategies in East Central Europe

Not all social groups and categories were active in

contentious politics those who seem to have been hardest hit by

the market reforms were often absent from the protest scene In

this respect it is interesting to note that relatively few protest actions were organized by marginalized social groups (homeless

unemployed) or minorities It was the mainstream social and

professional groups who were most often involved in protest

actions In Hungary Poland and Slovakia public sector employees (excluding workers in state-owned enterprises) comprised the most

30Sidney Tarrow Cycles of Collective Action Between Moments of Madness and the Repertoire of Contention II in Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action edited by Mark Traugott Durham Duke University Press 1995 pp 89-115

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protest prone social category In Poland workers and farmers were

more prominent in protest activities than in the other three

countries Youth was more frequently involved in protest actions in

the former GDR and Poland than in the other two countries This finding however has to be carefully interpreted we were unable

to determine the category of participants in the majority of

demonstrations because we have a substantial amount of missing data regarding the social and professional profile of protestors This amount is lower for Poland because it is easier to identify

participants in a strike which were the dominant strategy in that

country The data on socio-vocational categories of protest

participants are presented in Table 5

Table 5 Socio-vocational category of participants

Our data regarding protest organizers are more reliable We falsified our initial hypothesis that during the early stages of

regime transition the incidence of spontaneous protests is going to

be high Protest events in all countries were usually organized by

existing well established organizations Each countrys protest politics was dominated by a different set of organizations but the

range of organizations sponsoring protest actions was similar to

those sponsoring protest activities in other European countries

They included labor movements political parties interests groups and social movements The only contrast with West European experiences was the much smaller role of social movements in sponsoring protest activities and the relatively larger role of

traditional organizations such as political parties trade unions

or professional groups31 In Poland trade unions were most active

in organizing protest activities In Hungary and Slovakia political parties were the most frequent organizers of protests In the

former East Germany social movements were dominant political

31Kriesi Koopmans Duyvendak and Giugni in their analysis of four West European countries determined that new social movements organized 361 of protests in France 732 in Germany 654 in Netherlands and 610 in Switzerland (see New Social Movements in Western Europe p 20)

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parties followed The data on protest organizers are presented in

Table 6

Table 6 Organizations sponsoring or leading protest actions

Initially we expected that the demands put forward by the

protesting groups would be primarily concerned with political

issues We accepted the notion common in the literature on East

European transitions that in the wake of state socialisms collapse

people are confused about their real economic interests Yet our

data show that politically contentious regime transitions and the

establishment of democracy after decades of authoritarian rule did

not create a highly politicized environment characterized by the

predominance of symbolic politics The demands pressed by

protesting groups were predominantly concrete reflected everyday

economic concerns and when they were political their tenor was

mainly reformist Anti-systemic proclamations were rare Thus in

the language of contention one can find evidence of a broad support

for democracy and market economy

The way demands in all four countries cluster reflects the

concerns of the dominant organizers In Poland where trade unions

played the most active role in organizing protest economic demands

were predominant while in Hungary and Slovakia political parties

organized more protests than other groups and political demands

were most common In the former East Germany political demands only

slightly outnumbered economic demands The data on types of demands

are presented in Table 7

Table 7 Types of demands

Despite the variation in protest strategies demands and protest

sponsoring organizations protest actions were uniformly directed

at the state and demands were addressed to state authorities There

was an evident similarity in the targets of protest actions in all

countries (Targets are understood to be the authorities to which

the demands were addressed and who were expected to respond to

them) The governments followed by parliaments and other national

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level state agencies were by far the most frequent targets of protest actions Only in the former East Germany do we see a

significant number of demands addressed to local and regional authorities due to the federal structure of the state A

surprisingly low number of demands were addressed to the management

of enterprises and domestic or foreign owners It seems that

regardless of the issue at stake protesting groups look to the state and central authorities for solutions The following table presents the distribution of targets of protest in all countries

Table 8 Targets of protest

In sum even a cursory look at various features of protest actions presented in this section reveals considerable contrasts and unexpected similarities among the four post-communist countries Such variations in magnitude scope and forms of protest actions as well as in types of protest organizers and groups prone to participate in collective action raise a number of interesting questions In order to account for such differences we

will briefly examine several possible explanatory leads derived from the arsenal of available theories of social protest Being constrained by the format of this paper we will offer only four explanatory sketches suggested by the following set of theories

1 relative deprivation which links variation in protest activities to the changing perceptions and assessments of peoples (particularly economic) situation 2 instrumental institutionalism founded on the concept of political opportunity structure which focuses on institutional constraints and opportunities available to protestors including those which are linked to the transformation processes taking place in the region 3 historical-cultural institutionalism which emphasizes interactions between institutionalization and cultural

learning and turns our attention toward historically shaped traditions ll of contentious action 4 resource mobilization theory which emphasizes resources available to challenging groups

19

An examination of the IIfitll between these theories and our data

should allow us to determine which factors are primarily

responsible for peoples protest behavior This in turn should

shed new light on the politics of postcommunist consolidation

IV Explaining the patterns of protest politics in East Central

Europe

Conventional wisdom among observers of East Central European

transformations holds that building new democratic state institutions could be accomplished with relative ease Also the

introduction of competitive elections and the formation of partyshysystems was seen as a more or less uncomplicated task The reshy

creation of civil society however was predicted to be a lengthy

and difficult process spanning a generation or two 32 We argue that

these claims should be revised During the first five years of consolidation the rebirth andor expansion of civil society

occurred with unexpected speed and intensity in every country The state however was not so much reformed as weakened The

development of political society was often slow tedious and unpredictable Moreover these processes have differed from country

to country The former East Germany experienced the swift

establishment of a new political and legal framework as a result of

the unification and the new state administration has been stronger and more efficient than in any other post-communist regime

However it can be argued that it is still weaker than in the Western part of Germany Similarly the party system crystallized

and stabilized much faster with the West German parties extending their organizational reach to the five new Lander In the other

three countries the states and party systems have been in flux

with Hungary having the most success in developing a relatively

stable and clearly articulated party system 33

32See Ralf Dahrendorf Reflection on the Revolution in Europe New York Random House 1990

33See Herbert Kitschelt liThe Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe II and IIFormation of Party Cleavages in Postshy

20

The four countries included in the project represent distinct

types of post-communist transformations and have experienced

contrasting political and economic developments since 1989 The

major differences among them stern from (1) the type and sequence of

economic policies and (2) the nature and extent of the state

transformation These differences can be summarized in the

following table

Table 9 Economic transformations and the state continuity

in Hungary Poland Slovakia and the former East Germany

continuity discontinuity

rapid Poland former GDR

gradual Hungary Slovakia

The first dimension represents the extent of changes experienced by

the bureaucratic structures of the post-communist state In all

countries a classical party- state was rapidly dismantled The

dominant role of the communist party was eliminated supreme state

institutions re-designed constitutions amended parliaments and

governments were given supreme authority and re-established under

democratic control The office of president albeit with different

prerogatives was created in all countries Other existing state agencies were reformed to a different degree and new were

incorporated in the state institutional design

In Poland and Hungary there has been a notable continuity in

the institutional organization and personnel of the state both in

the civilian and military sectors Almost all state institutions

inherited from the old regime survived and secured their place in

the new institutional framework of the state This continuity is a

result of two factors first in the final years of the communist

rule these countries introduced a number of institutional reforms

compatible with the requirements of a market economy and democracYi

communist Democracies Theoretical Propositions Party Politics (1995) 1 4 pp 447-472

21

second both countries exited state socialism on the basis of

intra-elite negotiations and pacts which assured a significant degree of continuity of state institutions In contrast to these

two countries the former GDR and Slovakia experienced a more profound change in the state organization In October 1990 the German Democratic Republic was unified with West Germany and the

five new Lander were incorporated into the federal framework of the West German Republic At the same time all institutions of the former East German state were thoroughly dismantled and their

employees screened and purged Slovakia became an independent state on January 1 1993 following failed efforts to renegotiate the Czechoslovak federation Many institutions of the Slovak Republic existing under the federal arrangement of the Czechoslovak state

simply became Slovak national institutions however new segments

of the state administration had to be organized almost from scratch Moreover the rapid and contentious departure from state socialism in these countries contributed to institutional discontinuity with the old regime

Newly emerged democratic states inherited different economic legacies and pursued contrasting economic policies The former East Germany and Poland experienced rapid and radical economic transformations The Balcerowicz Plan introduced in January 1990 in

response to dramatic deterioration of the Polish economy and the threat of hyperinflation imposed harsh macro-economic stabilization measures This adjustment program instantly re-shaped Polands economic system arrested an escalating economic crisis and imposed new market-friendly rules It opened the way for comprehensive structural economic reforms combined with privatization and welfare reforms 34 In the former East Germany the economic transformation was designed to unify economic

institutions fiscal and monetary policies and economic conditions between two parts of the country The change affected the entire

34See Jeffrey Sachs Polands Jump to the Market Economy Cambridge MIT Press 1993j Ben Slay The Polish Economy Crisis Reform and Transformation Princeton Princeton University Press 1994 and Kazimierz Poznanski Polands Protracted Transition Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1996

22

institutional structure of the economy Stabilization policies were

combined with structural reforms comprehensive privatization and

a thorough transformation of welfare institutions The dismantling

of all legacies of state socialism was faster and more radical than

in any other post-communist country It included the massive and

swift privatization of all economic assets previously controlled by

the communist state This ~mmense institutional change was

cushioned by an unprecedented transfer of capital bureaucratic know-how and assistance from the West to the East In contrast to

Poland and East Germany Hungary and Slovakia have chosen a more

gradual pace for economic transformations both in terms of macroshy

economic and privatization policies

This analysis does not reveal any clear patterns There is no

correlation between the nature of power transfer and the type of

economic reforms on the one hand and the protest magnitude on the

other However if one puts aside Slovakia and former East Germany

two countries where a significant amount of protest resulted from

the dramatic redefinition of the polity and focuses on Poland and

Hungary one may conclude that the factor which seems to explain

the varied magnitude of collective protest is the type and sequencing of economic reforms introduced by the post-communist

regimes rapid reforms result in more protests than do gradual

reforms It is customary to build such an argument on the logic of

some deprivation theory II according to which rapid reforms

produced higher social cost and are perceived with more hostility

among the popUlation This in turn leads to the heightened

incidence of protest As we will demonstrate in the next section

neither link in this reasoning is confirmed by our empirical data

41 Protest as an expression of deprivation or grievances

The relationship between rapid economic or political reforms

and the populaces (dis) satisfaction or deprivation is usually

theorized with the help of some simplified version of the relative

deprivation theory It is impossible to summarize the classical

variant of this theory proposed for example by Ted Gurr in his

classic Why Men Rebel i it is a non-parsimonious and intricate

23

theoretical system founded on the concept of relative

deprivation 35 However the main thrust of the argument - at least

in its most popular and influential version -- is simple and

easily falsifiable In general various relative deprivation

approaches assume that

an increase in extent or intensity of grievances or

deprivation and the development of ideology occur prior to the

emergence of social movement phenomena Each of these

perspectives holds that discontent produced by some

combination of structural conditions is a necessary if not

sufficient condition to an account of the rise of specific

social movement (or protest - GE amp JK) phenomenon36

In this rendition of the theory proposed by McCarthy and Zald the

concept of deprivation replaces IIrelative deprivation which

considerably changes the nature of the argument Yet we will follow

this common practice mostly because we do not know of any

comparative study of relative deprivation in the four East Central

European states while we found several comparative studies dealing

with various aspects (indicators) of political and economic

deprivation or intensity of grievances

We will test a simple hypothesis the higher the level of

discontent with the post-1989 economic and political changes or the

higher the intensity of grievances or the sense of deprivation the

higher the magnitude of protest In order to test this hypothesis

we will rank the four countries according to the results of several

comparative studies which measured various aspect of peoples

35Relative deprivation is Ita perceived discrepancy between mens value expectations and their value capabilities Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled Values capabilities are goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining given the social means available to them Ted Gurr Why Men Rebel Princeton Princeton University Press 1970 p 13

36John D McCarthy and Mayer N Zald Resource Mobilization and Social Movements A Partial Theory in Social Movements in an Organizational Society New Brunswick Transaction 1978 p 17

24

discontent and compare the results of such rankings with the

ranking based on the magnitude of protest

The studies we have chosen for this exercise were conducted in

at least three countries we are interested in during the 1989-1993

period The surveys asked the same set of question in all

countries producing thereby comparable results These studies

include

a New Democracies Barometer IV A la-Nation Survey37

b Masons study on attitudes towards the market and the state

in postcommunist Europe 38

c Kornais calculations of the decline of real wages in East

Central Europe 39

d calculations of Gini coefficients40

e calculations of the ratios of top ten percent to bottom ten

percent of wage earners (decile ratios) 41

f Ferges study on the satisfaction with the post-1989

37Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer Change and Stability in the New Democracies Barometer A Trend Analysis Center for the Study of Public Policy Glasgow University of Strathclyde 1996

38David Mason Attitudes Towards the Market and the State in Postcommunist Europe paper presented at the 1992 Annual Meeting of APSA Chicago Ill p14

39Janos Kornai Paying Bill for Goulash-Communism The figure for 1990 refers only to the category of workers and employees excluding workers in agricultural cooperatives since 1991 the data include these

4degWorld Development Report From Plan to Market New York Oxford University Press 1996 p 69 and Michael Wyzan Increased Inequality Poverty Accompany Economic Transition Transition 4 October 1996 pp 24-27

41Jan Rutkowski Becoming Less Equal Wage Effects of Economic Transition in Poland Pew Papers on Central Eastern European Reform and Regionalism Center for International Studies Princeton University 1996 and Zsusa Ferge liThe Evaluation of Freedom Security and Regime Change paper prepared for the Euroconference on Social Policy organized by ICCR-Vienna Lisbon November 8-11 1995

25

reforms 42

Table 10 Selected Rankings of Central European States43

Table 10 presents the results of our analyses The hypothesis is

not confirmed Hungarians are clearly most dissatisfied with the

post-1989 changes and yet the magnitude of protest in this country

is lower than elsewhere The contrast with Poland is particularly

striking even if we assume that Poles and Hungarians are equally

dissatisfied the IIdeprivation hypothesis ll fails for Poland has a

higher magnitude of protest Another anomaly from the point of

view of the regularity suggested by our hypothesis emerges from a

comparison of Hungary with former East Germany The situation in

the latter country is dramatically different from other

postcommunist states given the financial transfers between the

Western and Eastern areas of the country and the efforts of the

German government to equalize their standards of living As a

result of this massive assistance the economy of the five new

German Lander has grown between 7 and 10 percent a year since 1992

and as Kopstein points out purely in terms of living standards East Germans are the clear winners of communisms collapse 44 And

yet East Germans engage in protest activities with a higher

42Zsusa Ferge ibid

43For columns (2) and (3) the numbers were obtained by subtracting the percentage of the respondents who approved of the regime in Winter 199394 (New Democracies Barometer III) from the percentage of those who approved the regime in Fall 1991 (NDB-I) It should be also emphasized that Poles disapproved of the communist regime and the socialist economic system much more decisively than either the Slovaks or the Hungarians For the mean ranking (Column 9) we used Ferges P90P10 index (7) it is more IIhostile to our hypothesis than Rutkowskis index (7) Column (11) is based on Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew M Warner Achieving Rapid Growth in the Transition Economies of Central Europe Development Discussion Papers Harvard Institute for International Development No 544 (July 1996)

44Jeffrey Kopstein nWeak Foundations Under East German Reconstruction Transition 26 January 1996 p64

26

frequency and more zeal than Hungarians who are far less satisfied

with the result of communisms collapse

Graph 5-8 Approval of current political and economic systems45

A comparison of the pattern of changes during the studied

period produces mixed results As Graphs 5 to 8 illustrate the

Slovak and Hungarian data conform to the predictions of the IIdeprivation theory II the fluctuations of protest magnitude in

these countries are correlated with the fluctuations in peoples

approval of economic and political systems However the theory

fails dismally when it is applied to Poland As the peoples approval of the political and economic systems increases

systematically so does the magnitude of protest

Given the data reported in Table la it is possible to falsify

our deprivation hypothesis in many different ways For example given the data in column (5) (Kornais estimates of the real wages decline) this hypothesis would predict that Poland and Slovakia

should have the same magnitude of strikes which would be higher

than in Hungary whose wage earners experienced a much smaller

decline in their incomes Also Polish and Slovak protestors should put forth economic demands (higher wages) with greater frequency

than their Hungarian counterparts The first expectation is not

confirmed by the data presented in tables 2 and 4 Poles organized far more strikes than either Hungarians or Slovaks The second

expectation fails in the light of data presented in table 7 Poles

concentrated their demands on economic issues far more often than

did the Hungarians -- as expected -- but also more often than the Slovaks

One could of course argue that Poles - on the one hand and Hungarians and Slovaks - on the other expressed their economic

deprivation through different idioms and organizational strategies But this is precisely the kind of argument that the lldeprivation

approach 11 is ill-equipped to field Changes in magnitude

45Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer op cit pp 23-27 and 45 49

27

strategies mobilizational efficacy success etc of protest do not reflect the fluctuations in peoples sense of deprivation

(dissatisfaction) Neither do they follow the changes in the so

called objective economic indicators as clearly evidenced by the comparison of data reported in columns (1) (10) and (11) of Table 10 According to Sachs and Warners analysis Poland Hungary and

Slovakia have almost identical scores on the composite Reform Index moreover their scores are the highest in the whole

postcommunist world Yet the patterns of protest activities in

these three countries were widely divergent Finally it should be

emphasized that the country where the accumulative decline of GDP

during the 1989-93 period was the smallest and which was first in overcoming the transitory recession that is Poland

experienced the highest and intensifying magnitude of protest

Our deprivation hypothesis II suggested by a popular interpretation of relative deprivation theory is not confirmed In order to explain fluctuating magnitudes and patterns of protest in

the four countries we must turn elsewhere

42 Institutional explanations

To comprehend the variations in collective actors responses

to economic and political reforms we have to examine East Central

European transformations as combinations of complex developments taking place in several distinct institutional domains We pose a

hypothesis that the many differences in the magnitude and

characteristics of protest actions in the four countries under

study are related both to the institutional legacies of state socialism and the post-1989 processes of the reconstitution and institutionalization of democratic politics But before we attempt

to explain the more subtle differences among the dimensions of

contentious politics we will comment on the overall differences in the magnitude of protest among these countries

If opportunities for collective action afforded by the state

are one of the most critical variable in explaining the incidence

28

and magnitude of collective protest46 transitory polities where all

stable characteristics of the political opportunity structure are

in flux should have been an arena of constant collective struggles

Since they are not and the magnitude of protest varies from state

to state the concept of political opportunity structure has to be

carefully reconsidered for application to cases of regime change 47

We argue that there is a need to distinguish between the

structure of political opportunity (characteristic for stable

polities) and unstructured opportunity (a feature of transitory

II open polities) 48 A change in some partial opportunity structures

or a partial alteration of some dimensions of the opportunity

structure in stable countries will be immediately treated as an

incentive to act by all those collective actors who have been

prepared to press their claims against the state Such a change

will signal to the groups or organizations with resources

established agendas and long-held claims that now is the time to

act When these groups or organization are successful in pressing

their demands other may follow expanding the range of issues and

institutional arenas of contentious politics 49 Thus one could argue

46See for example I Hanspeter Kriesi liThe Political Opportunity Structure of New Social Movements Its Impact on Their Mobilization in J Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans eds The Politics of Social Protest Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements Minneapolis University of Minnesota Press 1995

47There is an argument to be made that the structure of political opportunity is multidimensional There are different opportunity structures for actors differently situated within a given socia-political system (Kriesi op cit) Thus the change in one dimension of the opportunity structure may affect some but not all real or potential collective actors We do not develop this thought here

48l1The most salient changes in opportunity structure are four the opening up of access to participation shifts in ruling alignments the availability of influential allies and cleavages within and among elites Sidney Tarrow Power in Movement p 86

49See debates on cycles of protest and especially Doug McAdam Initiator and Spin-off Movements Diffusion

29

that in stable and gradually changing polities alterations of the

political opportunity structures provide incentives for contentious

action By contrast in countries undergoing rapid political and

economic transition the four elements of the political opportunity

structure specified by Tarrow are wide open and unconstrained Such

a situation may have either demobilizing effects or simply

encourage mobilization without limits For organized collective

actors issues which were important in the past may not be relevant

any more new issue-arenas may become unclear or not yet

established their attention is drawn toward general issues which

are not easily translated into paradigms of collective action they had learned earlier Moreover agendas for contentious politics in

more stable polities are built on the assumption that it is

relatively clear who is the friend and who is the adversary and who

bears responsibility for specific issues and problems The distinction between them and IIUS serves as a guide-post for the

struggle But in transitory polities this underlying cultural

matrix of enemies and culprits becomes unclear and muddled former

oppositional activists take over the state apparatus and it is no longer clear who is us and who is IIthem

such conditions which we will call unstructured opportunity

offer protestors considerable freedom of action there are few

established organizational boundaries that should be abolished

there are no predefined agendas whose expansion may be demanded ruling alignments change often there are potentially many

available allies and cleavages within and among elites are fluid

and poorly structured The state manages to protect order within

the public domain but it offers little resistance to non-violent protest actions and it seems to ignore protestors Additionally

state functionaries do not know how to deal with protestors formal

and informal procedures through which protestors could become a

Processes in Protest Cycles in Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action pp 217-39

30

part of the policy-making processes are poorly developed 50 It is

therefore difficult to analyze changing features of protest as

responses to changing opportunities opportunities simply do not

change much In East Central Europe where such an unchanging and poorly

structured opportunity emerged after 1989 the magnitude of protest

is by and large lower than in more established democracies We

suspect that this is a result of (a) the demobilizing effect the

lIexcessive openness of the opportunity structure and (b) weaker

than in Western Europe institutional support structure for protest

activities including the accessibility of organizational

material and symbolic resources

At the same time the protest magnitude in all countries

fluctuated although the openness of the system (political

opportunity structure) did not Also protest strategies and

demands varied from country to country although their political systems seem to have been equally opened Since neither deprivation

theory nor the features of the opportunity structure explain such

variance I we need to turn to other theories We observe that

despite of the considerable opening in the political opportunity

structure collective action is channelled through various old

and new institutional constraints The opening is extensive and

unstructured ie protestors demands and strategies cannot be

carefully crafted as responses to partial openings here or there in

the established institutional network of the polity Such a network

is simply not yet established But singular institutional points of

reference do exist some of them should be found among the

institutionalized legacies of past struggles and among the elements

of the emerging new political opportunity structure which can offer

concrete incentives for collective actions

This new unstructured political opportunity can be examined

wi th the use of the available institutional modes of analysis 51 For

SOFor an analysis of the significance of such mechanisms see Hanspeter Kriesi op cit pp 173-179

51A very useful typology of institutionalisms has been proposed by Peter Hall and Rosemary C R Taylor 1994

31

example we realized that the relatively high magnitude of protest in Poland can be explained through a comparative study of distinct

though mutually reinforcing institutional mechanisms suggested by

the two institutional theories listed in Section 3 cul turalshy

historical and instrumental as well as by the resource

mobilization theory In the East European field the well-known

dilemma of more cases than variables makes a rigorous test which

would allow us to pinpoint the best n explanation impossible but

we can determine whether the patterns existing in our data conform

to the expectations suggested by major institutional arguments

In the field of protest studies there are two major arguments

concerning the link between protest magnitude and characteristics

and other institutional features of the political system

1 Protesting can be construed as a rational calculated

response to the lack of access to policy making through other

channels (e g the lack of a tri-partite commission thus the lack of corporatist inclusion) The smaller the access to

other channels the higher the probability of protest

2 Protesting can best seen as a useful strategy in intershy

organizational competition involving several competitors (trade unions) When there are several unions (or union

federations) I they tend to engage in protests in order to

demonstrate their champions-of-the-working-people

credentials and to outbid each other in wooing potential supporters 52 The higher the number of labor unions the higher

the probability of protest

Following the logic of the first explanation we expect that there

Political Science and the Four Institutionalisms APSA convention paper

52This explanation draws on the logic of historical institutionalism as defined by Hall and Taylor Historical institutionalists while searching for explanations of group conflict began paying greater attention to the way in which institutions structure political interactions and began to argue that other [than state] social and political institutions could also contribute to political outcomes by structuring conflict among individuals or groups over scarce resources II

Peter Hall and Rosemary C R Taylor op cit p 3

32

will be less strikes and labor-related demonstrations in states

which institutionalized the interaction between labor unions

employers and the relevant state agencies As Wallace and Jenkins

noted the institutionalization of neocorporatist bargaining

diminishes the likelihood of protest Countries with a strong

social democratic party (Hungary) and a centralized labor sector

(Hungary former East Germany Slovakia) are expected to have less

industrial conflicts and strikes than a more pluralistic country wi th several unions that do not have II direct access to theII

political process (Poland) 53

These expected regularities are indeed confirmed by our data

One of the most prominent features of Hungarian Slovak and East

German transitory politics was the early institution of top level

corporatist arrangements For example in Hungary it was the

Council for Interest Reconciliation in Slovakia - the Council of

Economic and Social Agreement 54 And as expected Poland had by far

the highest incidence and magnitude of strikes

The second institutional explanation emphasizing inter-union

competition is also confirmed by our data The Polish trade union

sector was much more diversified and de-centralized than its

53Michael Wallace and J Craig Jenkins The New Class Postindustrialism and Neocorporatism Three Images of Social Protest in Western Democracies in The Politics of Social Protest p 134

54We base our knowledge of the Hungarian tri-partite organization on Greskovits Hungerstrikers the unions the government and the parties A case-study of Hungarian transformation conflict the social pact and democratic development1I Occasional papers in European Studies 6 University of Essex 1995 Janos Kornais lecture and our conversations with both Kornai described it as a second government 11 dominated by the former communist union officials which bears the bulk of responsibility for Hungarys extremely high level of social spending (lecture Princeton University 030494) For Slovakia see Darina Malova The relationship between the state political parties and civil society in postcommunist Czecho-Slovakia paper presented at the Center for European Studies Harvard University May 1993 pp 24 27 Malova observes that it might be assumed that the admission of corporate groups to the process of public policy would reduce the future social and political conflicts p 25

33

Hungarian Slovak and German counterparts As expected Poland had

the higher magnitude of strikes which often had as one of their

goals outcompeting rival trade unions 55

43 Historical-cultural institutional explanation

Strong evidence exists that traditions and previous

experiences of protest is a good indicator of future protest actions Collective action is predicated here on learning

experience as well as the availability of resources inherited from

previous struggles The comparison of our countries clearly shows

that the high magnitude of protest in Poland can be linked to the

existing tradition of protest Poland was the only country in the

former Soviet bloc which experienced five major political crisis

culminating in the self-limiting revolution of 1980-81 During

the Solidarity period millions of Poles participated in collective protests and learned necessary skills of contentious politics This

argument is additionally supported by the fact that the most common

forms of protest (ie strikes) had been developed earlier by the

Solidarity movement as its core strategy of contention Hungary by contrast has a well-established tradition of

street demonstrations and struggles (1956 in particular) which

played a significant role during the power transfer period (1988shy

1990) The unions and other protest organizers in former East

Germany should be influenced by the dominant action repertoire brought over by West German unions and other SMOs which organize

most of the protest actions there As Koopmans and Kriesi report

demonstrative strategy dominated the German action repertoire 56

Moreover the 1989 oppositional movement in former East Germany

relied heavily on street demonstrations as their main protest

strategy Finally SlovakiaS protest traditions are almost non-

55The labor continued to be dominated by postcommunist federations mostly MSZOSZ - The National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions See Greskovits ibid p 10

56Ruud Koopmans and Hanspeter Kriesi Institutional Structures and Prevailing Strategies in New Social Movements in Western Europe p 50

34

existent though it should be noted that the main form of protest

developed by the Czechoslovak dissidents was letter writing Given

these historical traditions Poland should have the highest

magnitude of protest among the four countries The Polish ratio of

street demonstrations to strikes should be considerably lower than

in Hungary or Germany and Slovakia should experience little strikes

or demonstrations

The empirical data used to verify this hypothesis are

summarized in Table 2 The hypotheses are strongly confirmed

Poland has the highest magnitude of protest Hungarian protestors

chose street demonstrations four times more often than strikes

German protestors demonstrated six times more often than they went

on strike Poland had the highest magnitude of strikes and Poles

were almost equally prone to strike and to demonstrate This is an

expected result given the relatively long established tradition of

political conflicts disguised as industrial conflicts in Poland In

Slovakia the most frequently used protest strategy was letter

writing (see Table 4)

44 Resource mobilization theory

While various institutional arguments allow us to account for

the differences between Polish Slovak Hungarian and German

magnitudes of protest their dynamics varying repertoires of

contention and various ratios of strikes to demonstrations in

these countries one would be hard pressed to argue that the five

Lander of the former East Germany -- with their volatile protest

politics -- inherited a long-term elaborate domestic tradition of protest particularly street demonstrations 57

In order to explain the origins of specific features of

protest politics in former East Germany we turned to the resource

mobilization approach which suggests that at least in some

57However a very recent tradition of demonstrations developed in some locations See for example Suzanne Lohmann IIDynamics of Informational Cascades The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig East Germany 1989-91 World Politics October 1994 47(1) pp42-101

35

situations the magnitude of protest depends on the availability of

material organizational and cultural resources at the disposal of

real or potential challenging groups Countries where protest

organizers have access to richer resources will have a higher level

of contention Such resources may be developed internally by

collective actors within a given society (this will be the case of

Polish Solidarity) or may be transferred through trans-national and

trans regional channels from the resource-rich to resource-poor

countries and regions (this is the case of the former GDR) The

transfer and diffusion of resources will depend on the availability

of collective actors who are willing to pursue collective action

and on the compatibility (in cultural and organizational terms) of

countries or regions While trans-national links and diffusion are

relatively common only on rare occasions do such transfers involve

the wholesale shift of organizational structures activists and

resources as occurred after the re-unification of Germany One

could argue therefore that the high magnitude of collective protest

in the former East Germany reflects the external transfer of

resources for collective action

v Conclusions

In the first section of this paper we established a need to

study the bottom-up mechanisms of democratic consolidation We proposed that this largely neglected area can be fruitfully studied

through event analysis of protest behavior The second and third

sections offer selected results from our four-country study of the

post-communist protest politics In the fourth part we offer

explanations of the observed phenomena derived from the four

established research traditions This exercise leads us to the

following general conclusions

1 Varieties in the magnitude repertoires and strategies of

protest politics cannot be fully explained by reference to people s

perceptions and assessments of their situation as the

deprivation approach suggests the states with more discontent do

not necessarily have more protest activities than the states with

less discontent Therefore analyses of the post-1989 reforms in

36

East Central Europe which explain political changes (eg

electoral successes of the post-communist parties) by simply

relating them to peoples growing discontent may all be erroneous

2 Moreover our comparative analysis of East European protest politics reveals that these politics are not simply determined by a configuration of lIobjectivetl economic (or political) factors

3 No single theory of collective action explains all of the

observed variance in protest characteristics we discovered The best fit between theory and empirical results is achieved when

propositions derived several theories are combined Our argument is

that collective protest in democratizing societies is best

explained from an institutional perspective that combines the concept of resources in a broad sense that is including

traditions symbols and discourses alongside material and

organizational elements with the concept of institutional

opportunities which are produced by emerging organizational patterns within the state as well as political and civil societies The resource II segment of such a syncretic explanation allows us to

account for the relatively high magnitude and specific features of

protest in the former East Germany while the institutional ll part helps to illuminate the highest magnitude of protest in Poland and

the differences in protest repertoires between Poland Slovakia and Hungary_

4 It has been theorized that Poland which instituted the most radical economic reforms (shock therapy) would also experience

the highest magnitude of protest This expectation is indeed

confirmed by our analyses Yet the reasons for this phenomenon and the specific features of protest in Poland cannot be explained by invoking a general sense of deprivation felt by the populace as is usually though often implicitly practiced As we demonstrated

protests magnitude in Poland kept increasing as peoples approval

of the postcommunist economic and political order was also growing Our comparative analysis of four cases confirmed a thesis commonly

accepted by the students of protest politics that protest

activities are driven by much subtler mechanisms sketched in our third conclusion

5 What transpired in Central Europe during the early

37

postcommunist years -- most clearly in Poland -- was a different

kind of institutionalization or consolidation of democracy than the

one Bresser Pereira Maravall and Przeworski seem to have had in

mind They concluded that for the successful consolidation of

democracy all groups must channel their demands through the

democratic institutions and abjure other tactics 58 But we found

that increasingly institutionalized protest became a democratic

institution which functioned as part-and-parcel of the

democratizing polity 59 We did not detect any signs that democratic

consolidation was threatened by such an increased magnitude of

contentious collective action For most observers the progress of

democratic consolidation in Hungary Poland and the former East

Germany passed the point of no return an authoritarian reversal in

these states is highly unlikely Yet Poland experienced a high

magnitude of protest actions Interestingly Slovakia the country

with the least disruptive (most benign) repertoire of protest and

a low level of strike activity is commonly perceived as the least

consolidated democracy of the four

We conclude that protest need not be a threat to budding

democracy It is worth recalling Ecksteins and Gurrs observation

that the risk of chronic low-level conflict is one of the prices

democrats should expect to pay for freedom from regimentation by

the state - - or by authorities in other social units whether

industrial establishments trade unions schools universities or families 60 Our research indicates that under certain institutional

conditions protest becomes an indispensable component of

democratic consolidation

58Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira Jose Maria Maravall and Adam Przeworski Economic Reforms in New Democracies p 4

59This argument is developed in Jan Kubik Institutionalization of Protest During Democratic Consolidation in Central Europe in David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow eds The Social Movement Society Comparative Perspectives Boulder Co Rowland and Littlefield 1997 forthcoming

6degHarry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr Patterns of Authoritv A Structural Basis For Political Inquiry New York John Wiley and Sons 1975 p 452

38

Table 1 Post-1989 protest events in East Central Europe (1989-1993)

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254

Table 2 General measures of protest activities in the four countries 1989-1993

Poland Slovakia Hungary GDR

Population (15-64) in millions

25 4 7 11

Protest events 1476 295 699 1254

Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349

Protestyear 295 74 140 251

Protest daysyear 2976 441 515 1070

Protest daysyearl million population

1194 1103 73 97

middot Strikes 432 24 61 107

Demonstrations 544 87 244 607

Ratio demostrike 126 I 363 40 57

Strikesyearl million population

35 15 174 195

Demonstrations yearmillion population

435 545 697 1104


Protest Strategies Poland Hungary Slovakia GDR

violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487

non-disruptive 1051 455

838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183

Table 4 Specific Protest Strategies in East Central Europe


Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59

Occupation of public 119 8 4 76 buildings 51 6 8 35

Demonstrationmarch 544 296 94 792 blockade 235 237 207 366

Strike alertthreat to 408 141 48 64 undertake protest action 177 113 105 30

Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132

Open lettersstatements 316 406 182 180 137 325 400 83

Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295

N =number of strategies 2311 1248 455 2165


Category of Participants Poland Hungary Slovakia GDR

workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184

farmers peasants 141 94

28 56

15 44

24 26

service sector 121 81

17 34

18 53

31 34

public state sector 350 233

161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269

N = total recorded categories 1500 496 338 922


Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions

Peasantfarmer organizations

interest groups

socialpolitical movements

other

N = number of organizations

167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426


Demand type Poland Hungary Slovakia GDR

economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704

Table 8 Targets of protest actions

Ultimate targets of protest actions

Poland Hungary Slovakia GDR

president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145

governmenumUristries central agencies

989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348

local government 177 92

111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21

domestic and foreign owners

15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185

N = number of targets 1929 984 474 1878

Table 10 Selected rankings of the Central European states

(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP

approval of political regime

1993 - 91

(3) CSPP

approval of economic system 1993-91

(4) Mason Index of Political

Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)

(6) Inequality 1993 Gini Coefficient

(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge

Evaluation of change

in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative

decline of GDP 1989shy

1993

(11) Sachs-Warner Refonn Index

Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)

Slovakia 2 2 15 4 2 3 3 4 2 3 I 123 (+2) (-10) (Czechoshy (733) (195) (24) (289) (51 worse) (26) (-274)

slovakia)

GDR 3 -shy -shy 3 -shy -shy -shy 3 (305)

4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)

GRAPH 1 Protest days in Poland 4500

4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

GRAPH 3 Protest days in Hungary 4500

4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993

GRAPH 2 Protest days in Slovakia 4500

4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993

GRAPH 4 Protest days in East Gerrnany 4500 bull

4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993

GRAPH 5 Approval of political and GRAPH 6 Approval of political and economic regime in Hungary economic regime in Slovakia

80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993

[ bull political IIeconomic

GRAPH 8 Approval of political and economic regime in East Germany

80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992

bull political II economic

1991 1992 1993

[ political IIeconomi9 J

GRAPH 7 Approval of political and economic regime in Poland

1991 1992 1993

[ politi~I-1iI econilllJcJ

1993

The Minda de Gunzburg Center poundor Europem Studies

The Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies is an interdisciplinary program organized within the Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences and designed to promote the study of Europe The Cenles governing committees represent the major social science departments at Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of TechnolOgy

Since its establishment in 1969 the Center has tried to orient students towards questions that have been neglected both about past developments in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European societies and about the present The Centers approach is comparative and interdisciplinary with a strong emphasis on the historical and cultural sources which shape a countrys political and economic polices and social structures Major interests of Center members include elements common to industrial societies the role of the state in the political economy of each country political behavior sodal movements parties and elections trade unions intellectuals labor markets and the crisis of industrialization science policy and the interconnections between a countrys culture and politics

For a complete list of Center publications (Working Paper Series Program for the Study of Germany and Europe Working Paper Series Program on Central and Eastem Europe Worlcing Paper Series and French Politics and Society a quarterly journal) please contact the Publications Department 27 Kirkland St Cambridge MA 02138 Additional copies can be purchased for $500 each A monthly calendar of events at the Center is also available at no cost

I The location of our project in the literature on democratic consolidations 1

The research proj ect presented in this paper expands our understanding of democratic consolidation The empirical evidence

comes primarily from the systematic data collection on collective

protest during the first years of democratic transition in four

countries Poland Hungary Slovakia and the former East Germany Our analysis focuses on the neglected dimension of the

postcommunist transformations contentious action by non-elite

collective actors in four Central European countries Our aim is to

counter the existing pro-elite bias in the literature determine the impact of protest activities on democratization and to

reconstruct the emerging patterns of the state-society

relationships in the newly democratizing societies

Conceptualizing and explaining the rapid unexpected collapse

of state-socialist regimes in East Central Europe in 1989 and the

ensuing efforts at democratization and restructuring of the economy

is a challenge for students of comparative politics The

simultaneity of the breakdown despite varied political and

economic conditions in each country reinforced a notion that these

regimes were basically identical one-party states kept in power by

the Soviet military presence Additionally some experts assumed

that in the wake of communisms collapse the new regimes developed

similar structures and faced similar challenges and pressures and

therefore should be treated as a single political type

1The project was funded by the Program for the Study of Germany and Europe administered by the Center for European Studies at Harvard University the National Council for Soviet and East European Research and the American Council of Learned Societies It was directed by Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik We would like to thank Sidney Tarrow for his generous help and encouragement For their indispensable assistance and advice our special gratitude goes to Martha Kubik Ela Ekiert Anna Grzymala-Busse Jason Wittenberg Mark Beissinger Nancy Bermeo Valerie Bunce Ellen Comisso Bela Greskovits Janos Kornai Michael D Kennedy Christiane Lemke Darina Malova Alexander Motyl Maryjane Osa Dieter Rucht Mate Szabo Anna Seleny and Mayer N Zald

1



















2




























3






4






















5














arrangements vary













6

14






























7



















8

















9

























10














time 23


Central Europe







II
























mobilization




12


























13








four countries













declined in 1993




14


















action






15






























16























17


Table 6
































18











19






Europe



















20







following table
























21












22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993























2




























3






4






















5














arrangements vary













6

14






























7



















8

















9

























10














time 23


Central Europe







II
























mobilization




12


























13








four countries













declined in 1993




14


















action






15






























16























17


Table 6
































18











19






Europe



















20







following table
























21












22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993
































3






4






















5














arrangements vary













6

14






























7



















8

















9

























10














time 23


Central Europe







II
























mobilization




12


























13








four countries













declined in 1993




14


















action






15






























16























17


Table 6
































18











19






Europe



















20







following table
























21












22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993










4






















5














arrangements vary













6

14






























7



















8

















9

























10














time 23


Central Europe







II
























mobilization




12


























13








four countries













declined in 1993




14


















action






15






























16























17


Table 6
































18











19






Europe



















20







following table
























21












22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993


























5














arrangements vary













6

14






























7



















8

















9

























10














time 23


Central Europe







II
























mobilization




12


























13








four countries













declined in 1993




14


















action






15






























16























17


Table 6
































18











19






Europe



















20







following table
























21












22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993


















arrangements vary













6

14






























7



















8

















9

























10














time 23


Central Europe







II
























mobilization




12


























13








four countries













declined in 1993




14


















action






15






























16























17


Table 6
































18











19






Europe



















20







following table
























21












22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993





14






























7



















8

















9

























10














time 23


Central Europe







II
























mobilization




12


























13








four countries













declined in 1993




14


















action






15






























16























17


Table 6
































18











19






Europe



















20







following table
























21












22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993























8

















9

























10














time 23


Central Europe







II
























mobilization




12


























13








four countries













declined in 1993




14


















action






15






























16























17


Table 6
































18











19






Europe



















20







following table
























21












22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993





















9

























10














time 23


Central Europe







II
























mobilization




12


























13








four countries













declined in 1993




14


















action






15






























16























17


Table 6
































18











19






Europe



















20







following table
























21












22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993





























10














time 23


Central Europe







II
























mobilization




12


























13








four countries













declined in 1993




14


















action






15






























16























17


Table 6
































18











19






Europe



















20







following table
























21












22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993


















time 23


Central Europe







II
























mobilization




12


























13








four countries













declined in 1993




14


















action






15






























16























17


Table 6
































18











19






Europe



















20







following table
























21












22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993




























mobilization




12


























13








four countries













declined in 1993




14


















action






15






























16























17


Table 6
































18











19






Europe



















20







following table
























21












22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993






























13








four countries













declined in 1993




14


















action






15






























16























17


Table 6
































18











19






Europe



















20







following table
























21












22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993












four countries













declined in 1993




14


















action






15






























16























17


Table 6
































18











19






Europe



















20







following table
























21












22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993






















action






15






























16























17


Table 6
































18











19






Europe



















20







following table
























21












22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993


































16























17


Table 6
































18











19






Europe



















20







following table
























21












22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993



























17


Table 6
































18











19






Europe



















20







following table
























21












22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993






Table 6
































18











19






Europe



















20







following table
























21












22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993















19






Europe



















20







following table
























21












22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993










Europe



















20







following table
























21












22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993











following table
























21












22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993
















22


































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993






































23





























24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993

































24







include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993











include





Central Europe 39










25

reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993





reforms 42



















42Zsusa Ferge ibid



26

























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993





























27























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993



























28
























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993




























29




























30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993
































30

































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993





































31



























32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993































32






















33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993


























33




























34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993
































34







or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993











or demonstrations
























35




















v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993
























v Conclusions















36
























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993




























37






























38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993


































38


1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993






1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total

Poland 314 306 292 314 250 1476

Slovakia - 50 82 116 47 295

Hungary 122 126 191 112 148 699

East Germany 222 188 291 268 283 1254




25 4 7 11


Protest days 14881 2206 2574 5349




1194 1103 73 97





35 15 174 195


435 545 697 1104



violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993







violent 115 50

21 17

9 20

286 132

disruptive 1145 495

382 308

142 312

1054 487


838 675

304 668

826 381

N = all strategies 2311 1241 455 2183



Strike 432 64 25 128 187 51 55 59




Violent 115 21 9 286 50 17 20 132


Other 377 312 93 639 163 250 204 295




workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993







workers 516 344

71 143

74 220

170 184


28 56

15 44

24 26


17 34

18 53

31 34


161 325

111 328

194 210

youth 154 103

63 127

20 59

255 277

other 218 145

156 315

100 296

248 269



Organizations

none

political parties

labor unions


interest groups


other


167 116

89 62

709 491

80 55

91 63

228 158

80 55

1444

125 17450 122 117 105

263 99 335 258 232 201

275160 70 157 164 165

6 93 6 57

56117 56 115 34132

69137 553 134 162 332

79 262213 157209 185

1021 1664426



economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993







economic 1100 572

301 295

119 260

458 269

political 586 305

444 435

176 385

524 308

other 236 123

276 270

162 355

722 424

N = total demands 1922 1021 457 1704




president 92 48

25 25

20 42

4 2

parliament 247 128

155 158

125 264

272 145


989 513

449 456

239 504

654 348


111 113

11 23

493 263

management 322 167

38 39

23 49

39 21


15 8

25 25

0 0

69 37

other 87 45

181 184

56 118

347 185



(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993






(I) Protest

magnitude

(2) CSPP


1993 - 91

(3) CSPP



Alienation

(5) Komai

real wages (1993 as

of 1989)


(7) Rutkowski

P90PI0

(7) Ferge

P90P1O

(8) Ferge


in households

(9) Mean (2)-(8)

(10) Commulative


1993


Poland 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 123 (+ 17) (+ 19) (723) (30) (292) (657) (39 worse) (2) (-122)


slovakia)


4 (19 worse)

4 (33)

-shy -shy

Hungary 4 1 15 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 123 (-6) (-10) (85) (23) (36) (331) (51 worse) (16) (-168)


4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993






4000

3500 bull

3000 i

2500

2000 i

1500 ~ 1000 I I500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 I bull - 1shy1989 1990 - 1991 1992 1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

bull II bull500

0 1989 1990 1991 1992 -1993


4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

o bull I_I I 1989 -1990 1991 1992 1993


80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993






80 80 r -

70 70

60 ~ 60

50 50

40 40

30 30

20 20

1010

oo 1991 1992 1993



80 ----~80

7070

6060 5050 4040 3030

2020 10

0------------------- shy10

o 1991 1992


1991 1992 1993



1991 1992 1993


1993









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Contentious Politics in New Democracies: Hungary, Poland...

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