CONTROVERY, COMPROMISE, and RECONCENTRATION in … · Indeed, Hacienda Luisita is an outstanding...

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CONTROVERY,COMPROMISE,andRECONCENTRATIONinAGRARIANREFORMIMPLEMENTATION:TheCaseofHaciendaLuisita,TarlacProvince,Philippines

AFieldStudiesPaperSubmittedto

TheGraduateSchoolofUniversityofthePhilippines

LosBanos

InPartialFulfillmentOftheRequirementsfortheDegreeof

MASTERINPUBLICAFFAIRSANDDEVELOPMENTMajorinAgrarianandRurbanStudies

by

GILI.ESPENIDO

May2016

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APPROVALSHEET

ThisFieldStudyentitledtheCONTROVERSY,COMPROMISE,andRECONCENTRATIONinAgrarianReformImplementation:TheCaseofHaciendaLuisita,TarlacProvince,Philippines

preparedandsubmittedbyGilI.EspenidoaspartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsfortheDegreeofMastersinPublicAffairs

andDevelopmentmajorinAgrarianandRurbanDevelopmentStudies.

AcceptedaspartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsoftheDegreeofMastersinPublicAffairsandDevelopmentmajorinAgrarianandRurbanDevelopmentStudies.

___________________________Prof.RolandoT.Bello

Chair

_________________________ ________________________Dr.MerlyneM.Paunlagui Dr.BingC.BrilloMemberMember

___________Date

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ABSTRACT

Thefarmworkerswereshort-changedthreetimes.

The peso loan for the acquisition ofHacienda Luisita in 1957 (completed in 1958) fromDonAntonioLopezYLopezby theCojuanco’swas financedby theGovernmentService InsuranceSystem(GSIS) on condition that JoseCojuanco (Pnoy’s grandfather)will distribute thewholehaciendatothetenantsaftertenyears,or in1967. TheCentralBankalsofacilitatedadollarloanthroughtheManufactuersTrustCompanyinNewYorkforthepurchaseofthesugarmillona similar condition.1967cameandpassedbut thehaciendawasneverdistributed to thefarmers.

Duringthecampaignforthesnapelectionin1985,thenpresidentialcandidateCorazon“Cory”Aquino, promised tomake land reform as the center-piece of her administration. After sheassumedthepresidency,CoryalsopromisedtosubjectHaciendaLuisitaunderagrarianreform.After theenactmentofRA6657 in1988,anewmodesurfacedwhichhelpedcorporate farmowners evade actual land distribution through the onerous Stock Distribution Option (SDO).This new scheme designated the possession and control of agricultural land to corporationswhile depriving the farmworkers ownership over the land. This scheme was vigorouslyimplementedbytheCoryadministrationinHaciendaLuisita,breakingCory’spromises.

Thefinalandexecutoryresolutionof theSupremeCourtontheHaciendaLuisita, Inc.case in2011 instructed the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to facilitate the transfer of landownershipofagriculturallandsinHaciendaLuisitatoqualifiedfarmworkersallwithinaperiodofoneyear.

TheDAR landdistributionscheme inHaciendaLuisita isa typicalprogramofa state-led landreformwithinahighlystratifiedsocietylikethePhilippines.Itsimplementationismarredwithdubious irregularities that rendered the supposedbeneficiariesdisenfranchisedand swindledthrough:(a) insertingquestionablenamesintothemasterlistofbeneficiaries;(b) procuringadubiousandoverpriced landsurvey;(c)exclusionofhundredsofhectaresofagricultural landfrom distribution; (d) imposition of compulsory signing of promissory notes to ensureamortizationpayments;(e)grantofoverpricedlandlordcompensationtotheHLI/Cojuangco-Aquinos;(f)ineptfacilitationoftheauditofHLIandCHIassets;and(g)passionatejustificationofCojuangco-AquinoclaimsoveragriculturallandsinTarlacCity;(h)inactiononfarmworkers’appeal for revocation of conversion order on 500 hectares (RCBC/LIPCO); and (i) impositionandpromotionofblockfarmingscheme“assupportservice”toservelandlordinterest.

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All these happened while majority of these contested lands were already pawned to themiddlemen since 2002. This has created a tragic situationwherein the lands distributed arenow effectively in the hands of the middlemen. Effectively, the system of arriendo hasinstitutionalized a subtle way of dislodging the farmworker from his awarded land. Privatesecurity forces and state military and police personnel are no longer needed to evictfarmworkers from the land. Since the illegal transaction is consciously entered into by thefarmworker,hisdislocationfromhismeansofproductioniseasilyconsummated.

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TableofContents

PageAbstract ChapterI Introduction 7 StatementoftheProblem 8 ObjectivesoftheStudy

SignificanceoftheStudy

99

ChapterIIMethodologyandDataSourcesLocaleoftheStudyDataSourcesInstrumentsUsedDefinitionofTermsLimitationofthestudy

9910101112

ChapterIII BackgroundoftheStudy(HistoricalContextOfHaciendaLuisita)

13

ChapterIV CARP(TheStockDistributionOption) 16 ChapterV TheJourneyFromSDOtoLandReformDistribution

andthe2013-2014LandDistributionImplementationTheStruggletoNullifytheStockDistributionOptionThe2013-2014LandDistributionImplementationTheFluidityoftheMasterlistTheIrregularityoftheLandSurveyTheContentious500-hectare“convertedland”TADECO’sResurrectedClaimLotAllocationThroughRaffleCertificateofLandOwnershipAward(CLOA)DistributionCojuangco’sMilkingtheGovernmentbyBeingPaidin

Millions

18192525293436384346

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ChapterVI LandReconcentrationState-ledReconcentrationBlockFarmingandthePassageofSugarcaneIndustryDevelopmentActof2015Private-ledReconcentration

494953

TwotypesofArriendaSystem 55 IncreasingTransactionsofOutrightSaleofLotsAwarded 57 CreepingEjectionsofIndividualBeneficiariesfromthe

Land58

ChapterVII ConclusionsandRecommendations 59 References 61 Appendices

64

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I.Introduction

ThehugesizeofHaciendaLuisitatogetherwiththelandedestatesinNegrosaswellasinotherprovincesarelivingtestimoniesofhowrulingfamiliesinthepastwereabletoaccumulatelargetractsofland.Butthroughthedecades,largeandoldprovinceshadbeensubdividedintonewprovinces to become fiefdomsof landlords and/orwarlords, and cities had to accommodategeographicalchangesintheirboundaries.Yet,HaciendaLuisitaisamongofthoseestatesthatwereabletoretainitslargeexpanseofland.Infact,thehaciendaisbiggerthansomecitiesinMetroManilathataredenselypopulated.

Source:2013HLNationalFactFindingMission

These vestiges of feudalism graphically show how skewed land ownership is in our country.Researches using the political economy framework have empirically established the variousfeudalandsemi-feudal relationsandoperationsofsuchestates.FormerChiefJusticeCoronaputs it sharply that “Hacienda Luisita has always been viewed as a litmus test of genuinereformprogram.”Thisisespeciallytruesincetwopresidents(theso-callediconofdemocracy,CoryAquino and the current president,Noynoy (who claims that themasses are his bosses)comefromthefamilythatownedHaciendaLuisita.

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HaciendaLuisitasymbolizesthehaciendasystemthattiesthecountryandtheruralpopulationto underdevelopment and perennial crisis. The Cojuangcos have been relentless in theirmaneuversandschemestoretainitsmonopolyoverthehaciendaandpreventitsdistributiontothefarmworkers.

On the 24th of April, 2012, as the impeachment trial of SC Chief Justice Renato Coronawastaking place in the Senate, the Supreme Court “ruled in finality” through its resolution no.171101, confirming their November 24 ,2011, decision that the land be distributed to thefarmerswithcompensationatNovember21,1989,prices(OFWBlogger,2013).

Agrarianreformispopularlydefinedas“thedistributionofpublicandprivateagriculturallands,regardlessofproduceandtenurialarrangement,tolandlessfarmersandregularfarmworkers,to include support services” (AFA & AsiaDHRRA, 2005). But in a society like the Philippineswhereclassstratification ishighlypronounced,agrarianreform isanattempt tochangeclassrelationswithin the confinementof a systemdominatedby the ruling class. That iswhy it iscalledanagrarianreformprogram.

StatementoftheProblem

On April 23, 2012, a day before the Supreme Court released its landmark decision, formerUniversity of the Philippines School of Labor and Industrial Relations (SOLAIR) Dean Rene E.Ofreneo said that addressing the systemofarriendowasoneof the manyhurdles that thegovernmentcouldfaceinimplementingtheCourt’sdecision(PCIJ,2012).

Thispaperaimstohelpinthediscourseonagrarianreformimplementationbystudyingandanalyzing the position and the roles played by arriendadors in the agrarian reformimplementationinHaciendaLuisita.

ObjectivesoftheStudy

Thispaperaimstodothefollowing:

1. outlinethesagaoflandreform,themazeoftalesandyarns,lawsanddeception,legal,extra-legal,meta-legalandillegalmaneuveringinHaciendaLuisita;

2. uncoverthearriendosystemandhowthegovernmenthassignificantlyfailedtoaddressthissysteminsideHaciendaLuisita;

3. present the processes where the agrarian reform beneficiaries are driven from theirawardedland;and

4. make some recommendations to avert the seemingly inevitable failure of agrarianreforminHaciedaLuisita.

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SignificanceoftheStudy

Thecentralityoflandtoman’slifelikeatypicalfarmworkerinHaciendaLuisistaisahistoricalfact.Landsupportsallformsoflivesandotherfactorsofproduction(Kiita,2010).AnAmericaneconomist and philosopher, emphasized the importance of land and remarked “soman notonlylivesoff land,levyingonitforitsmaterialsandforces,buthealsolivesonland.Hisverylifedependsonland.Landisthehabitationofman,thestore-houseuponwhichhemustdrawfor all his needs, thematerial to which his labourmust be applied for the supply of all hisdesires;foreventheproductsoftheseacannotbetaken,thelightofthesunenjoyed,oranyoftheforcesofnatureutilized,withouttheuseoflandoritsproducts.Onthelandweareborn,fromitwelive,toitwereturnagain-childrenofthesoilastrulyasisthebladeofgrassortheflowerofthefield.Takeawayfrommanallthatbelongsto landandheisbutadisembodiedspirit”(Henry,1871).

Andyet,thelandquestionisnotsimplyaneconomicquestion.AccordingtoNikitaSud,landisa metaphor for power, wealth and status. More importantly, the land question is also apolitical question. In the Philippines, an archipelagic country with a nature-based economy,land and natural resources are highly politicized. Thus, control over land and resources isalways a strategy for maintaining political control; traditional politics are oriented towardmaintainingelitecontroloverthenation’slandandotherresources(USAIDpaper).

Indeed,HaciendaLuisitaisanoutstandingcasetostudytheresultsofagrarianreformafteratwoyearimplementation.AnunclassifiedbutsensitiveUSdiplomaticcablepublishedbyanti-secrecy group Wikileaks has said that the implications of the Hacienda Luisita case to thelandholdingsofotherwealthyfamiliesinthePhilippineswhohaveavoidedlandreformwouldbe far ranging and would have a deep social impact (An uncomplicatedmind.blogspot.com,2012).

II. METHODOLOGYANDDATASOURCES

LocaleoftheStudy

Hacienda Luisita is a 6,453-hectare sugarestate covering11 villages in three townsof Tarlacprovince.Mostoftheoriginalfarmworkersresidein10villages–BarangaysBalete,Cutcut(orSta.Catalina),Lourdes(formerlyTexas),Mapalacsiao(formerlyLuisita),Asturias,andBantoginTarlacCity;BarangayMotricoinLaPaztown;andBarangaysParang(formerlySanSebastian),Mabilog (formerly Pasajes) and Pando in Concepcion town. The original estate includes theCentralAzucareradeTarlac(CAT)sugarmillandagolfcourse.TheeleventhvillageisBarangayCentralinTarlacCitywhichhousestheCATsugarmill,theSt.MartindePorresHospitalandtheOurLadyofLourdesChurch.

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DataSourcesThestudymadeuseofsurveydataalreadygathered/beinggatheredbyotherindividuals,non-government organizations (NGOs) as well as advocates groups for Hacienda Luisitafarmworkers. These will be complemented by data coming from administrative reports andothersecondarydata.InstrumentsUsed

Sincethefocusofthefieldstudyisapotentialsocialproblemwithmultiplelayersofnuiancesandcomplexities,theauthoremploysqualitativemethodstogetatdifferentquestionstoillicitquality answers. It is aimed to surface and understand “data and useful insights about thelivedexperiencesofthefarmworkers,thereasonsfortheirprotests(unspokenorarticulated),thedecisionstheymake,andtheimpacttheiractionsanddecisionswillhaveonthem.

The first instrument used was focused group discussion(FGD). This is a discussion-basedinterviewthat“producesaparticulartypeofqualitativedata,involvingthesimultaneoususeofmultipleresponsestogeneratedata”.

The FGD for this study drew on the “Focused Conversation” techniques developed by theCanadianInstituteforCulturalAffairs(ICA).ICAwasfoundedin1962toimplementcommunitydevelopment and trainingprogramsand conductpolicy research. The FocusedConversationwasdevelopedto facilitategroup interactionswherecollaborativedecisionsandplansareanexpectedoutput.Thepremiseofthetechnique is thatposingtherightquestions iscritical tofostering meaningful and productive interaction and decision-making. Focused Conversation(alsocalledtheORIDMethod)involvesfourlevelsofquestions(Guerrero,2002):

Objectivelevel:questionsaboutfactsandexternalrealitythatpeopletakeinwiththeirsenses,

Reflective level: questions to call forth immediate personal reaction to the data, an internalresponse,sometimesemotionsorfeelings,hiddenimagesandpeople’spastassociationswiththefacts,

Interpretativelevel:questionstodrawoutmeaning,values,significance,andimplicationsforthe individualorgroupbybuildingon thedata fromtheobjective levelplus theassociationsformthereflectivelevel,and

Decisionlevel:questionstoelicitresolution,enabletheindividualorgrouptomakeadecisioninresponsetotheeventoraboutthefuture(StanfieldinPACAP,2008).

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Thesecondinstrumentusedwastheinterviewofkeyinformants.Thekeyinformantinterviewwereconductedwithpeoplewhohavefirsthandknowledgeaboutthe issuesoftheagrarianreformimplementation,knewagreatdealaboutanimportanteventororganizationorplayeda central roles in the agrarian reform implemention in Hacienda Luisita like leaders of theARBO,FARM,andkeyDARprovincialofficials.

LiketheFDGs,the interviewofkey informantsfollowedtheORIDmethod,withthefollowingquestions(Guerrero,2002):

O: What are the accomplishments of the agrarian reform implementation? How did theimplementation proceed? In addressing the arriendo system? In ensuring that the lotallocationisfair?farmworkers’wellbeing?

R:Which of the results do you feel are themost significant, whether the positive and thenegative results?Whyare they significant?What lessonsand insightsdidyou learn fromtheimplementation?Whatarethefarmworkersperceptions,opinions,beliefsandattitudestowardtheprocessesonhowthelanddistributionwasdone?

I: What changes did the implementation bring to your life? How do you think theimplementationhaschangedthelivesofthefarmworkers?

D:Whataretheplansoftheorganization?Howdoyouseethefutureoftheimplementation?

The third instrument is the oral histories of few individual overlapped with intensiveinterviewing.Theoralhistoryhasillicitedrecollectionsofevents,processes,andevenprotestsinthepast.

DefinitionofTerms

Agrarian reform - in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (RA 6657), agrarian

reformisdefinedtomeantheredistributionoflands,regardlessofcropsorfruitsproduced,to

farmers and regular farmworkerswho are landless, irrespective of tenurial arrangement, to

includethe totallyof factorsandsupportservicesdesignedto lift theeconomicstatusof the

beneficiariesandallotherarrangementsalternativetothephysicalredistributionoflands,such

asproductionorprofit sharing, laboradministration,andthedistributionofsharesofstocks,

whichwillallowbeneficiariestoreceiveajust share of the fruits of the lands they work.

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Landedestates-formerhaciendasorlandholdingsorprivateindividualsorcorporationswhich

havebeenacquiredby thegovernmentunderdifferent laws, for redistributionand resale to

deservingtenantsandlandlessfarmers

Stock distribution option - (non-land transfer program of CARP), the farmers become stock

owners,meaning,theyaregivenrightstopurchasecapitalstocks,equitiesorsharesfromthe

corporate landowners and association. Having acquired shares of stocks, dividend and other

financial benefits and representation in the seat of the board of directors; they also acquire

management rights in the corporate farm concerned. (Section 31-Corporate Landowners, RA

6657).Inaproductionandprofitsharingscheme,thereisadistributionofsharesofproduction

andprofit for the farmworkerswho are awaiting the eventual transfer of land ownership to

them.(Section32ofRA6657).

“Arriendo”system-alandreformbeneficiarywhohasnocapitalneededtomakehishacienda

landproductive,leaseouthisfarmtoan“arriendaor”foraspecificamountayearforathree-

yearperiod.

Block farming– an arrangement that allowsa farmmanager to control 30 to60hectaresofindividually –titled farmlots. So-called farmer beneficiarieswould have to place their lots astheir share in ablock. Under this scheme, farmworkerswill havepractically no control overtheirlotsinblockfarmandwilllosetheirrighttotill.

LimitationoftheStudy

SincetheDARisnowintobuildingacaseagainstthosebeneficiarieswhohavemortgagedorsoldtheirlands,nobeneficiarywouldacceptthathehasindeedmortgagedorsoldhislotsincethis isaviolationofthe lawandheknowstheconsequencesofthisact. Gettinganysimpledocumenttotheeffectthatthisfarmerleasedorsoldhislandtothispersonisveryhard.

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III. BackgroundoftheStudy(HistoricalContextofHaciendaLuisita)

In1882,DonAntonioLopezYLopez,themostsuccessfulandinfluentialSpanishbusinessmanof the19thCentury, acquiredmore than12,000hectaresof primeagricultural land in Tarlac,CentralLuzon,onbehalfofhisnewlyformedcompany,theCompaniaGeneraldeTobacosdeFilipinas,knownasthe“Tabacalera”.ThisacquisitionwasachievedbymeansofaRoyalGrantfromtheSpanishCrown,whichhelda selfappointedclaimto the landsof thePhilippinesascolonialoverlords.HenamedthepropertyHaciendaLuisita,afterhiswife,LuisaBruYLassus(Saguing,2013).

TobaccousedtobethemaincropplantedinLuisitabutthedominanceofsugarindustryontheeconomy started by 1850-1860. The intensification of sugar production from sugarcanewasmadepossiblewhencentrifugalsugarmillsreplacedthestream-drivenmillsinpracticallyeveryhacienda in 1902-1929 (KPD paper, 2001). Expectedly, the Spaniards shifted to sugar in the1920s(Dychiu,TheHLStory,Part1,2010).SugarproductionhadbecomemoreprofitablewhentheUSmarketensuredthequotasystemandpreferentialtreatmentofsugarcomingfromthePhilippines.TheSpaniardsbuiltthesugarmillCentralAzucareradeTarlac(CAT)toaccompanytheirsugarcaneplantation(Dychiu,2010).

Intheearly1950ʹs,theSpanishownersoftheTabacalera,decidedtosellHaciendaLuisitaandthe CAT, due to concerns over Hukbalahap (communist) insurgencies in the area (Saguing,2013).

ThewealthyLopezfamilyofIloilomovedtopurchasetheCAT,butthispurchasewasvetoedbyPresident Ramon Magsaysay, reportedly due to concerns that the Lopez clan, who alreadyowned Meralco, Negros Navigation, The Manila Chronicle, ABS-CBN, substantial agriculturalholdingsintheWesternVisayas’andthenearbyPampangaSugarMill(PASUMIL)consortiuminPampanga which they had purchased from the Americans, would become too powerful(Saguing,2013).

Instead,Pres.MagsaysaybrokeredadealwithhispoliticalprodigyBenigno“Ninoy”SAquinoJr,for whom Magsaysay had acted as Ninong (primary sponsor) of his wedding to CorazonCojuangco, to offer the property exclusively to Ninoy’s father-in-law Jose “Don Pepe”Cojuangco Sr. The Cojuangcos at the time were already the largest land owners in CentralLuzon,butwhilewealthyinPesoandbankholdings,hadnosubstantialholdingsinUSdollars(Saguing,2013).

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Whenthe familyof JoseCojuangco,Sr.acquiredHaciendaLuisita in the1950s, theyreceivedsignificant preferential treatment and assistance from the government to facilitate theirtakeoverofHaciendaLuisitaandCATin1957(Dychiu,2010).

ToacquireacontrollinginterestinCAT,JoseCojuangco,Sr.hadtopaytheSpaniardsindollars.HeturnedtotheManufacturer’sTrustCompanyinNewYorkfora10-year,$2.1million loan.Dollars were tightly regulated in those times. To ease the flow of foreign exchange forCojuangco’s loan, the Central Bank of the Philippines deposited part of the country’sinternationalreserveswiththeManufacturer’sTrustCompanyinNewYork(Dychiu,2010).

TheCentralBankdidthisontheconditionthatCojuangcowouldsimultaneouslypurchasethe6,443-hectareHacienda Luisita, “witha view todistributing thishacienda to small farmers inlinewiththeadministration’ssocialjusticeprogram."(CentralBankMonetaryBoardResolutionNo.1240,August27,1957).

To finance the purchase of Hacienda Luisita, Cojuangco turned to the Government ServiceInsuranceSystem (GSIS).His application for aP7million loan said that4,000hectaresof thehaciendawouldbemadeavailabletobonafidesugarplanters,whilethebalance2,453hectareswouldbedistributedtobarrioresidentswhowillpayforthemoninstallment(Dychiu,2010).

The GSIS approved a P5.9 million loan, on the condition that Hacienda Luisita would be“subdivided among the tenantswho shall pay the cost thereof under reasonable terms andconditions".(GSISResolutionNo.1085,May7,1957;GSISResolutionNo.3202,November25,1957).

Later,JoseCojuangco,Sr.requestedthatthephrasebeamendedto“...shallbesoldatcosttotenants,shouldtherebeany"(GSISResolutionNo.356,February5,1958).Thisphrasewouldbecitedlateronasjustificationnottodistributethehacienda’sland.

On April 8, 1958, Jose Cojuangco, Sr.’s company, the Tarlac Development Corporation(TADECO),becamethenewownerofHaciendaLuisitaandCAT.NinoyAquinowasappointedthehacienda’sfirstadministrator.

When1967cameandwent,withnolanddistributiontakingplace,thefarmworkersbegantoorganizethemselvestoupholdtheircause.

OnJune22,1978,DemetriaCojuangco,widowofthelateJoseCojuangco,Sr.,wrotetoErnestoValdez, theDeputyMinisterof theMinistryofAgrarianReform. In this letter,shesaidthat itwas“extremelyunwarrantedtomakeusaccountforthefulfillmentofaconditionthatcannotbe enforced”, furthermore that “there are no tenants in Hacienda Luisita”, adding that “theCentralBankresolutiondoesnotindicatesmallfarmers”andthat“theHaciendaisoutsidethe

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scopeofanylandreformprogramoftheGovernment”andthat“thereisnoagrarianunrestinHaciendaLuisita.”(Saguing,2013).

TheCojuangcos’disputedholdoverHaciendaLuisitahadbeentoleratedbyMarcosevenattheheightofhisdictatorship.ItwasonlyonMay7,1980,whenNinoyAquinoandhisfamilywereleaving for exile in theUS, Marcos government filed a case against JoseCojuangcoandhisheirs before the Manila Regional Court to force the Cojuangco-owned TADECO intosurrenderingHaciendaLuisitatotheMinistryofAgrarianReform,solandcouldbedistributedtothefarmersatcost.Thiswasinaccordancewiththetermsofthegovernmentloansgivenin1957-1958 to the late Jose Cojuangco, Sr.,who died in 1976 (Republic of the Philippines vs.TADECO,CivilCaseNo.131654,ManilaRegionalTrialCourt,BranchXLIII).

TheMarcosgovernmentfiledthiscaseafterwrittenfollow-upssenttotheCojuangcosoveraperiodofelevenyearsdidnot result in landdistribution.TheCojuangcosalways replied thatthe loantermswereunenforceablebecausetherewerenotenantsonthehacienda. (Dychiu,The HL Story, Part 1, 2010) The government’s first follow-up letter was written by ConradoEstrellaof the LandAuthorityonMarch2, 1967.Another letterwaswrittenbyCentralBankGovernor Gregorio Licaros onMay 5, 1977. Another letter was written by Agrarian ReformDeputyMinisterErnestoValdezonMay23,1978(Dychiu,2010).

In their January10,1981responsetothegovernment’scomplaint, theCojuangcosagainsaidthattheCentralBankandGSISresolutionswereunenforceablebecausetherewerenotenantson Hacienda Luisita. They further asserted that therewas no agrarian unrest in Luisita, andexistingMarcos landreformlegislationexemptedsugar lands.Further,theyassertedthatthegovernment’s claim on Luisita had already expired since no litigation was undertaken since1967(Dychiu,2010).

ThegovernmentpursueditscaseagainsttheCojuangcos,andbyDecember2,1985,theManilaRegionalTrialCourtorderedTADECOtosurrenderHaciendaLuisitatotheMinistryofAgrarianReform. The Cojuangcos elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (Court of Appeals G.R.08634).

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IV. ComprehensiveAgrarianReformProgram(StockDistributionOption)

CoryAquinoofficiallyannouncedhercandidacyonDecember3,1985.Landreformwasoneofthepillarsofhercampaign.FarmersweretoldbytheCojuangcofamilymembersmanagingthehaciendaduringthistimethatifCorybecamepresident,HaciendaLuisitawouldonceandforallbe distributed to the farmers through her land reform program. They said this promisewasmade tomotivate them to vote for Cory and join the jeepney-loads of people being sent toManilafromTarlactoattendherrallies(Dychiu,2010).

On January 6, 1986, Aquino delivered the first policy speech of her campaign inMakati andsaid, “We are determined to implement a genuine land reform program . . . to enable[beneficiaries]tobecomeself-reliantandprosperousfarmers."Tendayslater,onJanuary16,1986, Aquino delivered her secondmajor speech inDavao and said, “Land-to-the-tillermustbecomeareality,insteadofanemptyslogan."Inthesamespeech,Aquinoalsosaid,“Youwillprobablyaskme:WillIalsoapplyittomyfamily’sHaciendaLuisita?Myanswerisyes."(Dychiu,2010).

The snap elections took place on February 7, 1986. Marcos was declared winner, but wasoustedbythepeoplepowerrevolution.CoryAquinowassworninasPresidentonFebruary25,1986. Amonthlater,AquinoissuedPresidentialProclamationNo.3declaringarevolutionarygovernmentanddissolvingthe1973Constitution.

On January22, 1987, elevenmonths into theAquinoadministration, theMendiolamassacrehappened.Aquinofast-trackedthepassageofthelandreformlaw.Thenew1987ConstitutiontookeffectonFebruary11,1987,andonJuly22,1987,AquinoissuedPresidentialProclamation131andExecutiveOrderNo.229outliningherlandreformprogram.Sheexpandeditscoveragetoincludesugarandcoconutlands(Dychiu,2010).

Her outline also included a provision for the Stock Distribution Option (SDO), a mode ofcomplyingwiththelandreformlawthatdidnotrequireactualtransferoflandtothetiller.

On May 18, 1988, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case filed in 1980 by the Philippinegovernment—underMarcos—againsttheCojuangcocompanyTADECOtocompelthehandoverof Hacienda Luisita. It was the Philippine government itself—under Aquino—that filed themotiontodismissitsowncaseagainstTADECO,sayingthelandsofHaciendaLuisitaweregoingtobedistributedanywaythroughthenewagrarianreformlaw(Dychiu,2010).

TheDepartment of Agrarian Reform and theGSIS, now headed by Aquino appointees PhilipJuicoandFeliciano“Sonny"Belmonterespectively,posednoobjectiontothemotiontodismiss

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the case. Themotion to dismisswas filed by Solicitor General Frank Chavez, also an Aquinoappointee. The Central Bank, headed byMarcos appointee Jose B. Fernandez, said it wouldhavenoobjectionif,asdeterminedbytheDepartmentofAgrarianReform,thedistributionofHacienda Luisita to small farmers would be achieved under the Comprehensive AgrarianReformProgram[CARP)(Dychiu,2010).

Amonth after the casewas dismissed, on June 10, 1988, Aquino signed the ComprehensiveAgrarianReformLaw. Earlier,CoryAquino gaveherselfpower throughExecutiveOrderNo.229 to preside over the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), the body that wouldapprovestockdistributionprograms,includingtheoneforHaciendaLuisitaundertheFreedomConstitution (provisionalconstitutionafterasuccessfulpeoplepowerrevolution).TheFreedomConstitutiontookeffectonMarch25,1986untilitwasreplacedbythenew1987Constitutionapprovedbythepeoplethroughaplebiscite.

Soon after, Hacienda Luisitawas put under the Stock DistributionOption (SDO) that Aquinoincludedinthelaw.ThroughtheSDO,landlordscouldcomplywiththelandreformlawwithoutgiving land to farmers. Cojuangcos had taken advantage of the powers of the presidency tocircumventlandreformandstayincontrolofHaciendaLuisita(Dychiu,2010).

The legislature back thenwas dominated by landlords, including President Aquino’s brother,TarlacRep.Jose“Peping"Cojuangco,Jr.,thetopdecision-makerinHaciendaLuisita.Cojuangcowas“attheheadofthelandlordjuggernaut"inCongress(Nieva,1993).

The carefully worded proposal on the stock distribution optionmade by TADECO, in effect,assuredof(Brion,2011):

1. Distributionofsharesofstocksoveranumberofyearsamongthequalifiedbeneficiariesatnocosttothem;

2. Allowing the farmworkers to continue to work on the land as such and receive thewagesandotherbenefitsprovidedforbyhiscollectivebargainingagreementwiththecorporatelandowner’

3. Entitling him to receive dividends,whether in cash or in stock, on the shares alreadydistributedtohimandbenefitfromwhateverappreciationinvaluethatthesaidsharesmaygainasthecorporationbecomesprofitable;

4. Qualifying him to become the recipient ofwhatever income-augmenting and benefit-improvingschemesthatthespin-offcorporationmayestablish,suchasthepaymentoftheguaranteedthree(3%)percentofgrosssaleseveryyearandthefreeresidentialorhomelotstobeallottedtofamilybeneficiariesoftheplan;and

5. Keeping the agricultural and intac and unfragmented, tomaintain the viability of thesugar operation involving the farm as a single unit and thus, warrant to be

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acknowledged farmworker-beneficiaries, hand-in-hand with their acquisition of thesharesofthecapitalstockofthecorporationowningtheland,acontinuingandstablesourceofincome.

Thelawallowedanexistingcorporatefarmtoestablisha‘spin-off’corporationforpurposesofstock distribution (Putzel, 1992). The Cojuangco’s established Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI onAugust 1, 1988, just one month after CARP was passed. It was the newest of a string ofCojuangcocompaniessetuptoprofitfromtheformerlyTabacalera-ownedpropertiesinTarlac(Putzel,1992) .These included: theCentralAzucareradeTarlac;TarlacDistilleryCorporation;LuisitaMarketing;CentralAzucareradeTarlacRealityCorporation;LuisitaRealtyCorporation;Luisita Golf and Country Club; the Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), by which satatopalltheothersandhadamanagementcontractwitheachofthesistercompanies(Putzel,1992).

Onlyofthe4,914hectaresoftheoriginal6,431hectarepropertyweretransferredtoHLIfromTADECOatthetimethatthenewcorporationwasestablished.Themostquestionableaspectof thedealwas thedeterminationofHLI’snon-landassets,whichmadeuptwo-thirdsof thecompany’stotalassets(Putzel,1992).

BySeptember1990,DARhadreceivedapplicationsforcorporatestockdistributionfromonly83 corporations (Putzel, 1992). By early 1991, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council wasreadytoapprovejustsixofthese(Putzel,1992).

CorporatelandownersalsosoughttoexempttheirlandsfromCARPcoveragebyapplyingforaten-year deferment granted to those producing high-value export crops. Landowners hopedthatbefore thisperiodexpired, the lawwouldbe changedeither toextendconsiderably theperiodofdeferment,ortoexemptpropertiespermanently(Putzel,1992).Thesecorporations,and others awaiting coverage under other aspects of the law, were required to engage inproductionandprofitsharingwiththeirworkers if theirannualsalesexceededP5millionperyear.Thelawrequiredthattheypaytheiremployeesthreepercent(Putzel,1992).

IV. TheJourneyFromSDOtoLandReformDistribution

TherelevantConstitutionalprovisionbeingcitedfortheSDOisArticleXIII,Section4.“Thestateshall,by law,undertakeanagrarianreformprogramfoundedontherightofthefarmersandregularfarmworkerswhoarelandless,toowndirectlyorcollectivelythelandstheytillor,inthecaseofotherfarmworkers,toreceiveajustshareofthefruitsthereof.”

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TheStruggletoNullifytheStockDistributionOption

TheSDOgravelydamagedthepotentialoflandreformtodeliversocialjusticetoscoresofruralpoor,whosevoteshadironicallybeencourtedbyPresidentAquinoin1986bypromisinglandreform.

In 1989, the Cojuangcos justified Luisita’s SDO by saying it was impractical to divide thehacienda’s 4,915.75 hectares of land among 6,296 farmworkers, as thiswould result in lessthan one hectare each (0.78). A study by the private group Center for Research &Communication(nowUniversityofAsia&thePacific)wascitedtosupportthisclaim(Dychiu,2010).

The claim was contradicted by a study of the National Economic Development Authority(NEDA),which stated that the farmworkers could still earnmorewith0.78hectaresof landeachthanstocks.ButtheNEDAstudywasignoredbythePresidentialAgrarianReformCouncil[PARC](Tadem,1989).

In 2005, after its investigation into the Luisitamassacre, theDepartmentofAgrarianReform(DAR)alsodebunkedtheclaimthateconomiesofscalejustifiedLuisita’sSDO.TheDARsaidtheissueofeconomiesofscalecouldhavebeenaddressedunderSection29ofCARP,whichstatesthat workers’ cooperatives should be created in cases where dividing land was not feasible(Dychiu,2010).

OnMay 9, 1989, Luisita’s farm workers were asked to choose between stocks or land in areferendum.TheSDOwon92.9%ofthevote.Asecondreferendumandinformationcampaignwere held on October 14, 1989, and again the SDO won, this time by a 96.75% vote. Theoutcome of the votewas entirely predictable. The balance of power in the country favoredfamiliesliketheCojuangcos.Theproblemwasnotreallythatthefarmworkersweredeniedtherighttochoose...itwasratherthattheyweredeniedanenvironmentthatwouldallowthemtoidentifywhattheirchoiceswere(Putzel,1992).

Evenbeforethesecondreferendumwasheld,theSDOwasinconsistentwiththeConstitution(Bernas,1989).TheSDOisaloopholebecauseitdoesnotsupporttheConstitution’sdesirethattherightoffarmerstobecomeownersofthelandtheytillshouldbepromotedbygovernment(Bernas,1989).

Ayearafter,anotherlegalinstitutionalsocalledLuisita’sSDOillegalinapaperitsubmittedtothe Senate Committee on Agrarian Reform in June 1990 (UP Center of Law). The paperquestionedthemorality,propriety,andconstitutionalityofaplanthatallowedthelandlordtoretain controlling interest at the expense of farmer beneficiaries.The Department of Justicethen issued a legal opinion affirming the constitutionality of the SDO, saying an act of the

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legislature,approvedbytheexecutive,waspresumedvalidwithinthelimitsoftheConstitutionunlessnullifiedincourt.

HaciendaLuisita, Inc (HLI), thecompany formedby theCojuangcos tooperationalizeLuisita’sSDO,wasincorporatedinAugust1988—ninemonthsbeforethefarmworkerswerefirstaskedtochoosebetweenstocksorlandinMay1989(Putzel,1992).Thefarmworkers’ownershipofHacienda Luisitawas pegged at 33%while 67%was retained by the Cojuangcos. The stocksrepresentingthefarmworkers’sharewerenottransferredtothemin1989,butwerespreadoveraperiodof30years(Putzel,1992)..

Luisita’sSDOagreementspelleda30-yearschedulefortransferringstocktothefarmworkers:

“At the end of each fiscal year, for a period of 30 years, the SECOND PARTY (HLI) shallarrange with the FIRST PARTY (TADECO) the acquisition and distribution to the THIRDPARTY(farmworkers)onthebasisofnumberofdaysworkedandatnocost to themofone-thirtieth (1/30) of 118,391,976.85 shares of the capital stock of the SECONDPARTY(HLI)thatarepresentlyownedandheldbytheFIRSTPARTY(TADECO),untilsuchtimeasthe entire block of 118,391,976.85 shares shall have been completely acquired anddistributedtotheTHIRDPARTY(farmworkers)."

Theimpactofthisprovisionwasfar-reaching.

Thestocksrepresentingthefarmworkers’full33%sharewerenottransferredtothemin1989,butwere spread over “a period of 30 years"with only “one-thirtieth (1/30)" released everyyear. At this rate, itwould take until 2019 for the farm-worker beneficiaries to receive theircomplete set of stocks.While their shares remained undistributed, these were “owned andheld" by the Cojuangco company TADECO.Thus, the common belief that 33% of HaciendaLuisitahasbeenownedbyfarmworkerssinceCARPwas implemented in1989 isnotentirelyaccurate,becausethefulltransferofstocksdidnothappenin1989(Dychiu,2010).

Thefarmworkersalsohadtocontinuouslyrenderlabortoreceiveshares,becausedistributionwasbased“onthenumberofdaysworked".Ifaworkerquitorifmanagementfiredhim,henolongergottheundistributedportionofhisshares.Ifmanagementcutworkdays,distributionofshareswasalsoaffected(Dychiu,2010).

Complicatingthingsfurtherwasaseparateprovisionthatsettheannualpayrollasthebasisfordecidingwhocouldgetsharesattheendofeachyear.Asnamesonthepayrollchangedeveryyearwhenworkersleftorjoinedthecompany,thelistofshareholdersgrewlongerandlonger,diluting the entitlement of the original beneficiaries. In 1989, therewere 6,296 farm-workerbeneficiariesinLuisita.By2005,therewere11,955namesontheHLIstockholderlist.Notallof

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the 11,955 remained employed with HLI, or were part of the original 6,296 beneficiaries(Dychiu,2010).

AftertheNovember2004massacreandsubsequentinvestigationbytheDAR,HLIannouncedon June 9, 2005 that it had given out all undistributed stocks “in one supreme act of goodfaith,"about15yearsaheadofthe30-yearschedule.It isbelievedthiswasdonebecausethe30-year distribution periodwas a loophole. The 30-year distribution period seemedwithoutbasisinthelaw(Riedinger,1995).Section11oftheDARAdministrativeOrderNo.10,Seriesof1988statesthatstocksshouldbetransferredtobeneficiarieswithin60daysafter theSDO isimplemented.HLIhadnotyetbeen issuedaCertificateofCompliancebytheDARsince1989becausethefulltransferofstockshadnothappened.

Like Father Bernas in 1989 and the UP Center of Law in 1990, Riedinger also said the SDO“appears to violate the constitutional mandate that ownership of agricultural lands beredistributedtotheregularfarmworkerscultivatingthem."

UndertheSDO,Luisita’sfarmworkerswereentitledtotwonewperks:theywereallotteda3%share in thegrossproductionoutputof thehacienda,andsomeweregivenhome lots insidetheplantation.Thefarmworkersmakeclear,however,thattheseweremandatedbylawunderSection30andSection32ofCARP,notvoluntaryactsofgenerosityoftheCojuangcos.The3%productionshareneverwentbeyondP1,120perfarmworkerperyear.Thetitlesofthehomelotsalsohaveproblems(Dychiu,2010).

About five years after the SDOwas implemented,management began to claim thatHLIwaslosingmoney. The farmworkers’wageswere frozen and theirwork dayswere cut (Dychiu,2010).

It was also in 1992 that Pedro Cojuangco, Don Pepe’s eldest son and administrator of theHacienda,withtenuresecuredbythestockdistributionoption,attemptedtobringLuisitauptoapointofprofit.He initiallyattemptedavarietyofausteritymeasures,all to littleavail,asasugarproducingentitytheHaciendaandtheCATwouldfailtorecordaprofituntil2009,andthenonlyduetothetemporaryunreliabilityoftheBraziliansugarmarket(Saguing,2013).

ItwasapparentthatdiversificationmaybethekeytothesurvivalofHaciendaLuisitaandonthe1stofSeptember,1995,theSangguniangBayanofTarlac(ProvincialBoardofTarlac),undertheleadershipoftheGovernorofTarlacProvince,Margarita“Tingting”Cojuangco,thewifeofJose“Peping”CojuangcoJr.,passedaresolutionthatreclassified3,290outofHaciendaLuisita’sviable4,915hectares,fromagriculturaltocommercial,industrial,andresidentialland(Saguing,2013).

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TheDepartmentofAgrarianReformapprovedforconversion500hectaresoftheLuisita landonthe14thofAugust1996(Saguing,2013).

As landwasbeing converted, thearea left for farminggrewsmaller and smaller.Moreworkdayswere cut, andwageswere practically frozen.Mechanization also reduced the need formanuallabor.

Then, amaster plan commissioned in 1998by the LuisitaRealtyCorporation, a subsidiaryofJoseCojuangcoandSons,wasunearthed (Dychiu,2010). It showed thecompany’s long-termintention to convert the hacienda into a business and residential hub,with no areas left foragriculture.Thatlanduseplanfrom1998alreadycontainedtheSubic-Clark-TarlacExpresswayorSCTEx,whichwascompleted in2007(Dychiu,2010). In2009,thegovernmentpaidHLIaninflatedamountofP83million for the rightofwayandassumed the costofbuildingaP170millioninterchangetoconnecttheCentralTechnoParkinsidetheCojuangcofamilyhaciendatothe SCTEx (Remulla, 2009). The 94-kilometer SCTEx is presently the longest highway in thecountry.ItconnectstheSubicBayFreeport,theClarkFreeport,andTarlacCity(Dychiu,2010).Theconstructionledtothelossoflargetrackofthehacienda’slandtonon-agriculturaluse.

By2003,thefarmworkers’dailywagewasdowntoP194.50andworkdaysweredowntooneperweek.Theyalso finally sawthe futilityofhaving fourboardseatsagainstmanagement’sseven (the SDO agreement allotted 4 board seats to the farmworkers ahead of the 30-yearwaitingperiodfortheirstocks).Theywerealwaysgoingtobeoutvoted.TheyrealizedthattheSDOhadtogo.

TheunionleadersputtogetherapetitiontorevoketheSDOandstoplandconversioninLuisita.It was signed by 5,339 farm workers and filed at the Department of Agrarian Reform onDecember4,2003.

OnNovember22,2004,thenDARsecretaryReneC.villaissuedSpecialOrderNo.789,seriesof2004,whichcreatedtheSpecialTaskForceonHaciendaLuisita,Inc.StockDistributionOptionPlan(Brion,2011).ThistaskforcewasconvenedprimarilytoreviewtheSDPandevaluateHLIscompliancewithitstermsandconditions.

TheTaskForcewaslaterrenamedTaskForceLuisita.TheDAR’sTaskForceLuisitaconductedaninvestigation and focus group discussions among the farm workers, between the 25th ofNovember2004andthe22ndofFebruary,2005(Saguing,2013).

Basedonthepartiespleadingsandocularinspectionsconducted,theSpecialTaskForceissuedaTerminalReportonSeptember22,2005,which found that theHLIdidnot complywith itsobligationsunder the law implementing the SDP (Brion2011). There is yet noCertificateofComplianceissued.

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Thebasisissimple.Despitethelapseofsixteen(16years),fromthetimetheSDPwasapprovedinNovember1989,byresolutionofthePARC,theobjectiveandpolicyofCARP,i.e.,acquisitionanddistribution(hereinundertheSDP,onlysharesofstocks)isyettobefullyimplemented;theFWBs,insteadofthepromised/envisionedbetterlifeundertheCARP(herein,ascorporateowner),dostillliveinwant,inabjectpoverty,highlightedbytheresultinglossoflivesintheirvain/futileattempttobefinanciallyrestoredatleasttowheretheywerebeforetheCARPwasimplemented(Brion,2011).

InJuly2004,theuniontriedtonegotiateawageincreasetoP225perday.Theyalsoaskedforanincreaseinworkdaysto2-3daysperweek.Managementsaidno,sayingthecompanywaslosing money.Management then issued notices retrenching 327 farm workers effectiveOctober1,2004.Amonthlatercametheworkers’strike,thenthemassacre.

On November 10, 2004, four days after the strike started, the Department of Labor andEmployment(DOLE)declaredanAssumptionofJurisdiction.LaborSecretaryPatriciaSto.TomasannouncedthatquellingthestrikewasamatterofnationalinterestbecauseLuisitawasoneoftheCountry’smajorsugarproducers.TheAssumptionofJurisdictionlegallyclearedthewaytouse government troops to stop the strike. The picketers were ordered to vacatewithin fivedays,orelseberemovedbyforce(Saguing,2013).

OnNovember15,2004,700policemen,17truckloadsofsoldiersinfullbattlegear,twotanksequippedwith heavyweapons, a payloader, four fire truckswithwater cannons and sniperspositioned in at least five strategic places were mobilized to disperse the 4,000 protesters.1,000roundsofammunitionwereused(Dychiu,2010).

Theresistanceputupbythestrikersresultedinthedeathofsevenstrikersandwoundingof36others. 100 policemen and soldiers were injured and 111 civilians were arrested. The slainworkerswerenotresidentsofTarlacnoremployeesofHaciendaLuisita(Dychiu,2010).

TheAquinosbroketieswithArroyoinJuly2005,thesamemonththeDAR’sTaskForceLuisitasubmittedthefindingsandrecommendationsofitsinvestigation.Thisformedthebasisforthegovernment’sdecisiona fewmonths later to revokeLuisita’sStockDistributionOption (SDO)andorderthedistributionofthehacienda’slandtothefarmers.

AspeciallegalteamwasformedbytheDARinAugust2005,toreviewthereportsubmittedbyTask Force Luisita. On September the 22nd, 2005, Task Force Luisita recommended therevocationoftheSDOAforgedinMay1989,sayingtheSDOfailedtofulfilltheobjectivesoftheComprehensiveAgrarianReformLaw(CARL)inregardtopromotingsocialjusticeandimprovingthelivesofthefarmers.Soonthe22ndofDecember,2005,PARCissuedResolutionNo.2005-32-01, ordering the revocation of Luisita’s SDO agreement and the distribution of theHacienda’slandtofarmerbeneficiaries.Inresponsetothatruling,HLIpetitionedtheSupreme

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Court(SC)topreventthePARCfromenforcingtheresolutiononthe1stofFebruary,2006.TheSCgrantedHLI’spetitionandissuedatemporaryrestrainingorder,preventingthePARCfromcancelingtheSDOagreementinJuneofthatyear(Saguing,2013).

Onthe18thofAugust,2010,forthefirsttimesincethedisputewaselevatedtotheSCin2006,oralargumentsontheHaciendaLuisitacasewereheard.TheSC,inalandmarkdecisiononJulythe5th,2011,upheldthePARC’sorderrevokingHLI’s1989stockdistributionplan.TheSCdidnot ruleon the constitutionality of the SDObut revoked the SDOon grounds that it didnotbenefitthefarmer-beneficiaries.

Undertheplanisthestockdistributionoptionagreementthatallowedfarmerstopickbetweensharesof stockand land.TheSCalsoordered theDAR toadminister theconductofanotherreferenduminwhichthe6,296qualifiedfarmworkerbeneficiariescanvotewhethertheywanttoremainHLIstockholdersorreceiveactualland(Saguing,2013).

TheSCsaidthatwhilethestockdistributionplanisnullified,thequalifiedfarmerbeneficiariesmuststillbegiventheoptiontochooseiftheywanttoremainasstockholdersornot.

In summation the SC said, “While the assailed PARC resolutions effectively nullifying theHacienda Luisita SDP are upheld, the revocation must, by application of the operative factprinciple, giveway to the right of the original 6,296 qualified FWBs to choosewhether theywanttoremainasHLIstockholdersornot.TheCourtcannotturnablindeyetothefactthatin1989,93%oftheFWBsagreedtotheSDOA,whichbecamethebasisoftheSDPapprovedbyPARC.”

Onthe20thofJuly,AlyansangmgaManggagwangBukidsaAsyendaLuisita(AMBALA)filedamotion for reconsideration, on the Supreme Court decision ordering the Department ofAgrarian Reform to hold a referendum in Hacienda Luisita and allow the farmers to choosebetween owning shares of stocks or land parcels (OFW Blogger, 2013). In asking the SC toreverse its decision, the AMBALA said, “there is no reason for the Court to declare that theStockDistributionOptionAgreement (SDOA)wasnot revokedand that itwasonly theStockDistributionPlan(SDP)andPresidentialAgrarianReformCouncil(PARC)resolutionapprovingitthatwascanceled.”

On the 24th of November the SC released its decision on the farmers petition forreconsideration. Voting 14-0, the SC granted their petition and unanimously ordered thedistribution of 4,916 hectares of Hacienda Luisita lands to the original 4,296 originalfarmworkerbeneficiaries(FWBs).ItmodifieditsJuly5,2011rulingorderingtheDepartmentofAgrarianReform(DAR)toholdareferendumtolettheLuisitafarmerschoosebetweenowningshares of stocks in Hacienda Luisita Inc. or getting portions of themore than 6,000-hectareestate(Saguing,2013).

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On the 24th of April, 2012, as the impeachment trial of SC Chief Justice Renato Coronawastaking place in the Senate, the SC “ruled in finality” through its resolution no. 171101,confirmingtheirNovember24,2011,decisionthatthelandbedistributedtothefarmerswithcompensationatNovember21,1989,prices(Saguing,2013).

The2013-2014LandDistributionImplementation

Lookingback,theSupremeCourt,on24April2012, issuedafinalandexecutoryresolutioninthe case Hacienda Luisita Incorporated (HLI) versus Presidential Agrarian Reform Committee(PARC),etal, to (1) revoke theStockDistributionOption (SDO); (2) for theDAR todistribute4,335hectaresof landplus those that theDARwould find tobe agricultural in use to 6,296qualifiedFWBs.EachofthequalifiedFWBsshouldreceivenot lessthan6,886squaremeters;(3) for HLI to issue, for free, 18,804 shares of stocks to 4.026 non-qualified FWBs who willremainasstockholdersofHLI;(4)forDARtorespectandforHLItoaccounttheproceedsofthesaleof500hectarestoRizalCommercialBankingCorporation(RCBC)andLuisitaIndustrialParkCorporation(LIPCO)and80hectaresusedforSubicClarkTarlacExpressway(SCTEX);(5)topayHLI justcompensationatthepriceprevailing inNovember1989whenSDOwas implementedand(6)topayHLIthevalueof240squaremetershomelots;DARwasalsodirectedtoengagean independentaccounting firmtoaccount theproceedsof thesaleof the580hectaresandreturn to theFWBs1,333Billionpesosas their share in thesaleof the580hectares (Pahilga,2013).

In the second half of 2012, DAR declared that land reform inHacienda Luisita is an anchorprogramof the department,meaning its flagship program. Some sections took this as P’noywillingnesstoabidebytheSupremeCourtdecisionandtrulysubjectthevasttrackofHaciendaLuisita to distribution. The pressure furthermore in beating the deadline in 2014 for thecompletionofCARPER’slandreformtargets,accordingtoDAR,canonlymakelanddistributioninHaciendaLuisitamoreexpeditious(FARMorganizer).

TheFluidityoftheMasterlist

A qualified Farmworker Beneficiary (FWB) is defined by the SC decision as onewhowas aworkerinthehaciendain1989whentheSDOwasadopted.AnFWBthereforewassupposedtohavebeeneligibletoownlandhadactuallanddistributionbeenimplementedinthesaidyearinsteadoftheSDO.AnonqualifiedFWB,meanwhile,issomeonewhobecameaworkerinthehaciendaonlyaftertheSDOschemehadbeenineffect.HeorshethereforeisnotentitledtolanddistributionbuttosharesofstockofHLI(InterviewwithFARMofficer).

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The 1989 MOA masterlist is the most reliable documented reference to check for originalfarmworker beneficiaries. Immediately, the difficulty of identifying the legal successors ofthosedeadfarmworkerbeneficiaries(PCIJ,2012).Itmustberecalled,however,thatthissamelist had been used by HLI to gain leverage over the opponents of its policies among thefarmworkers. Those who staunchly asserted their right to land in 1989 were automaticallystrickenoffthislist.Later,ina2003petition,AMBALAaccusedtheHLImanagementofbloatingthenumberofworkersunderthepayroll(interviewwithAMBALAofficers).

In2010,theHLImanagementsubmittedtotheSC10,502nameswhichtheformeridentifiedasHaciendaLuisitaFWBs.

The DAR released an initial masterlist of FWBs in October 30, 2012 comprised of 5,365farmworkers, and an accompanying provisional list containing names of 1,221 individualspurportedlylackinginrequisitedocumentstoprovetheirqualificationsasFWBs.(SeeTable1andTable2.)

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Table1.BreakdownofInitialMasterList

BARANGAYPreliminaryListNo.

ofFWBs

ProvisionalList

No.ofPFWBs

ASTURIAS 370 86

BALETE 664 107

BANTOG 375 88

CUTCUT 542 173

LOURDES 534 93

MABILOG 547 124

MAPALACSIAO 701 104

MOTRICO 578 134

PANDO 504 150

PARANG 550 162

GrandTotal 5365 1221

Source:DAR

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Table2.SubmissionofAdditionalDocumentsSummaryofPFWBsintheProvisionalList

BARANGAYPreliminaryListNo.

ofFWBs

ProvisionalList

No.ofPFWBs

ASTURIAS 42 44

BALETE 58 49

BANTOG 37 49

CUTCUT 112 62

LOURDES 51 42

MABILOG 103 25

MAPALACSIAO 63 41

MOTRICO 98 41

PANDO 102 47

PARANG 116 39

Total 782 439

Source:DAR

The DAR announced their elaborate verification process which mobilized hundreds of itspersonnelforroundsofinterviewsandcollectionofdocumentaryevidencefromnearly10,000FWBapplicants.

KilusangMagbubukidsaPilipinas(KMP),anationalpeasantorganizationcriticizedtheDARforsowing confusion,disunity, andchaoswhen itpadded theoriginalnumberof6,296FWBs to8,482.IncreasingthenumberofbeneficiariesbyconsideringCojuangcos’couldonlyreducethesizeoflandforindividualdistributiondowntoapitifulgardenplot,andthusjustifyoncemoretheage-oldCojuangcos’alibioftheimpracticabilityofsubdividinganextremelyvastestatelikeHaciendaLuisita(2013HLFFM).

AMBALA’sfearshoweverwouldberealizedinFebruary2013whentheDARfinallyreleaseditsofficial masterlist of 6,212 beneficiaries. Some of the oldest farmworker families, most

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prominentunionand farmworkers’ leaders andactivists, and kinsof victimsof theHaciendaLuisita massacre and subsequent killings were nowhere to be found in the list. Meanwhile,nearlyathousandquestionablenameswereincluded,somebelongingtotheCojuangcos’mostrabidagents,supervisorsandso-called“yellowarmy.”(InterviewwithMotricoARBOofficers).

TheIrregularityoftheLandSurvey

In July of 2013, the DAR announced that FF Cruz & Co., Inc., the survey firm that theDepartmenthired, foundonly4,099.92hectaresofagricultural land fordistribution fromtheoriginal6,453-hectareproperty.Eachofthe6,212FWBscouldthusexpecttoreceivea6,600-sq.meterfarmlot(.66hectares)ormorethanhalfahectareofland(DAR).

TheDAR-FFCruzsurveybaseditssummaryon5,149hectareswhichsupposedlycoversthreelandtitlesfoundinTarlacCity,LaPazandConcepciontownsthatTADECOcededtoHLIin1989and placed under the SDO scheme. According to public records, the total agricultural landcoveredintheSDOisequalto4,915.75hectares,whichshouldmakeonlyaround234hectaresin these three towns to be non-agricultural.With this formula, the survey has glaringly leftmorethan1,300hectaresofHaciendaLuisitapropertyunaccountedfor(2013HLFFM).

ThesefiguresshowhowtheDARcameupwithonly4,099.92hectare–outof4,335hectaresdecreedbytheSCoroutofthe6,453originallandareaofHaciendaLuisita–fordistributiontofarmworkers.Italsojustifiestheexclusionofnearly300hectaresoflandas“newroads,creeksand irrigation, railroads, a cemetery, firebreaks, buffer zones, lagoons, fishponds, andadditionalerodedareas.”(InterviewedprovincialDARstaff).

Farmworkersinsistthatitisimpossiblefor300hectaresoftheseso-called“commonareas”tosimply “disappear.” In contrast, the visibly vast expanse of the SCTEX over Hacienda Luisitacovers only 80.5 hectares. Below is a comparison of figures from a 1989 report by formerSolicitor-GeneralFrankChavezandtheDAR’slatestsummary:

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Table3.HaciendaLuisitaLandClassificationin1989and2013

HACIENDALUISITAINLANDCLASSIFICATION

(INHECTARES)

1989 2013

AGRICULTURALLAND(UNDERLANDREFORM) 4,915.75 4,099.92

ROADS,CREEKS 265.75 140.29

FARMWORKERS’HOMELOTS 120.92

AGRO-FOREST 158.85

RESIDENTIAL 652.43 56.12

NEWDEDUCTIONSBYDAR

FIREBREAKS,FISHPOND,NEWROADS,ETC. 260.59

CEMETERY/SCTEXACCESSROAD 12.13

CONVERTEDAREA 500

SCTEX 80.51

UNACCOUNTED 339.3 1,303.44

ORIGINALTOTALLANDAREA 6,453.00 6,453.00

Source:ManilaBulletin&DAR

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Table4.2013HaciendaLuisitaSurveybyDARandFFCruz

LANDSUMMARYOFHACIENDALUISITA,INC.UpdatedsummaryasofJuly12,2013

LAPAZ TARLAC CONCEPTION TOTAL

OriginalTitles T-236740 T-236741 T-236742

AreacoveredbyTitlesofHLI 1,434.4829 1,783.7684 1,931.3068 5149.5581

LESS(DEDUCTEDIN1989):

Roads 10.0653 19.5641 6.1821 35.8115

Canals 22.3791 26.1796 15.3719 63.9306

Eroded 4.0702 21.4215 12.5685 38.0602

LegalEasement 2.4815

Residential 6.3668 38.1366 11.6206 56.124

TOTAL(TOBEDEDUCTED) 45.3629 105.3018 45.7431 196.4078

BALANCE 1,389.1200 1,678.4666 1,885.5637 4,953.1503

LESS(PERSUPREMECOURTDIRECIVE):

BCDA(SCTEX) 47.9313 5.9715 26.6087 80.5115

ConvertedAreas 500.000 500.000


BALANCE 1,341.1887 1,172.4951 1,858.9550 4,372.6388

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LESS(NOTCOVERABLE):

Cemetery 2.1603 2.1603

SCTEX 1.5936 7.0827 1.3424 10.0187


BALANCE 1,337.4888 1,165.4124 1,857.6126 4,360.5138

ADD(DEDUCTEDIN1989BUTTOBEACQUIREDASCOMMONAREASOFFWBS)

Roads 10.0653 19.5641 6.1821 35.8115

Canals 22.3791 26.1796 15.3719 63.9306

Eroded 4.0702 21.4215 12.5685 38.0602

LegalEasement 2.4815 2.4815

TOTAL(TOBEADDED) 38.9961 67.1652 34.1225 140.2838

TOTALAREA

(TOBEACQUIRED)

1376.4849 1232.5776 1891.7351 4500.7976

LESS(TOBERETAINEDBYRP[NOTERP[NOTDISTRIBUTED]ASCOMMONAREASOFFWBS)

ConcreteStructure 0.0155 0.0155

Add.Eroded 2.7425 2.7425

Creeks/Irrigation 0.9031 0.9813 4.5736 6.4580

NewRoads 4.3400 2.1417 9.9466 16.4283

Fishpond 14.1317 7.3715 32.5872 54.0904

Lagoon 2.2315 2.2315

Railroad 3.7194 3.7194

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Firebreaks 63.5341 39.0121 71.5298 174.0760

BufferZone 0.3768 0.2836 0.1719 0.8323

Roads 10.0653 19.5641 6.1821 35.8115

Canals 22.3791 26.1796 15.3719 63.9306

Eroded 4.0702 21.4215 12.5685 38.0602

LegalEasement 2.4815 2.4815

TOTAL(TODEDUCTED)CTED)

122.2818 125.6643 152.9316 400.8777

TOTALNET

DISTRIBUTABLEAREA

1254.2031 1106.9133 1738.8035 4099.9199

Source:DAR

Chaveznotedthatthelargeportiondescribedasresidentiallandinthe1989dataisareservethatwillalsobedistributedtofarmworkersiftheallocatedhomelotswereinadequate.

Ahead of Cory Aquino’s land reform program, the Cojuangcos, through the Luisita RealtyCorporation (LRC), converted certain portions of Luisita for commercial, residential andindustrialuse.Basedon1989and2013information,itisstillunclearhowever,ifthesefamousHaciendaLuisitalandmarksbelongtothe“residential”ortothe“unaccounted”section.

Furthermore, the DAR-FF Cruz survey is anomalous not only by its blatant exclusion of vastagriculturallandsthattheCojuangco-Aquinoclanwishestoretain.ConcernedDARemployeeshavepointedout that the FF Cruz survey itselfwas overpricedby asmuch as Php6million.BasedonDARrecords,theacquisitionsurveyforlandsplantedtosugarcaneispeggedatPhp2,516perhectareoratotalofaroundPhp12.9millionforthe5,149hectaresthattheFFCruzfirmsurveyedinHaciendaLuisita.TheFFCruzfirmwaspaidPhp19millioninpublicfundsforthisquestionablesurvey(2013HLnationalFFM).

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Thecontentious500-hectare“convertedland”

Furthermore,theDARhasexcludedthe500hectaresof“convertedarea”fromtheTarlacCitytitle (T-236741) which the department has claimed to be entirely situated in Brgy. Balete,contrarytothe1996orderwhichstatedthatonly341.45hectaresfromthislandtitlehadbeenapprovedforconversion.However,therearealsodiscrepanciesbetweenthetotalnumberofhectaresdeclaredin1996(1,594.2has)and2013(1,783.8has.)forthisTarlaclandtitle,makingdeclarationsbasedonthesepurportedoriginaltitleshighlyquestionableunlessdirectlyopenedtopublicscrutiny(2013HLnationalFFM).

Table5.500-hectareAreaApprovedbyDARforConversionin1996(inhectares)

LANDTITLEAREAPERTITLE

(basedon1996DARorder)

AREAPERTITLE(basedon2013DAR

summary)

AREAAPPROVEDbyDARforconversionin

1996

T-240197 8.7763 NODATA 8.7763

T-258791 149.773 NODATA 149.773

T-236741 1,594.2008 1,783.7684 341.4507

TOTAL 500.0003


HLI’sconversionapplicationinOctober1995statedthat300hectaresweretobeusedforanindustrialestate,100hectaresformedium-costhousing,andanother100forlow-costhousing.According toDAR’s conversionorder, the500-hectareproperty is found in sitios SanMiguel,Luisita and Bantug, Barangay Ungot in Tarlac City, the original villages declared in the 1907TABACALERAownedlandtitles.

The500-hectare“convertedarea”hasbeenaboneofcontentionbetweentheCojuangcosandthefarmwokersinthevillagesofTarlacCity,especiallyinBarangayBaletewhere,accordingtoDAR,theentire500-hectareareaisfound.Aftertheapprovaloftheconversion,HLIceded300hectares to another Cojuangco firm, Centennary Holdings, Inc. (CHI) which in turn sold thepropertytoLuisita IndustrialParkCorporation (LIPCO).A fewdaysafter theHaciendaLuisitaMassacre in 2004, LIPCO sold 184 hectares of the property to Rizal Commercial BankingCorporation(RCBC).

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These“convertedareas”failedtoundergoanykindofdevelopmentandremainagriculturaluptothepresent.ThegateoftheLuisitaIndustrialParkIIComplexleadstoavastexpanseofidleland.However,attheheightoftheHaciendaLuisitastrikeandAMBALA’sbungkalancampaignand other local residents initiatives in 2005 – or 10 years since theHLI applied for land useconversion – farmworkers took it upon themselves to cultivate part of the contested RCBCpropertyforfoodcrops.

AMBALA through its counsel SENTRA has challenged RCBC in court. AMBALA contends thatwithintheboundsoflaw,anareaapprovedforconversionshouldundergodevelopmentwithinfiveyears.Failuretodosoforfeitstheconversionorder.Section65ofRepublicActNo.6657,asamended(CARPER)stipulatesthefollowing:

“Failure to implement the conversion plan within five (5) years from the approval of suchconversionplanoranyviolationof theconditionsof theconversionorderduetothefaultoftheapplicantshallcausethelandtoautomaticallybecoveredbyCARP.”

That these areaswere never covered by any kind of development after nearly two decadesuncovered the scheme that theCojuangcoshadall alongbeenusing spin-off corporations tododgelandreformandtobenefitfinanciallythroughdeceptionandlandgrabbing.TheDARhasbeen issuing several technical andbureaucratic excuses for its ineptitude–in effect, favoringtheCojuangcosandtheRCBC–onthelandconversionissue(2013HLnationalFFM).

By the timeDAR started its landallocation activities in July 2013,RCBChad installed severalwatchtowersmannedbyarmedpersonnel,extensiveconcretefencesandlayersoffortificationaroundthecontestedproperty.

According to some leaders, the 500-hectare “converted area” could not have possibly beenchoppedofffromBrgy.Baletegiventhatthedeclaredareaofthesaidbarangay intheTarlacCitytitleisonlyaround101hectares.

Instead, according to its records, the DAR has excluded from distribution a whopping 526hectares inBrgy.Lourdes,avillageadjacenttoBalete. Itcouldbeassumedthistimethatthe500-hectare“convertedarea”hadbeenslashedofffromLourdes.

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Table6.LandAreaofHaciendaLuisitainTarlac(inHectares)

LANDAREAOFHACIENDALUISITAPROPERTYINTARLACCITY

(INHECTARES)

BARANGAY

(VILLAGE)

TOTALAREA

BASEDON1989

HLILANDTITLE

ALLOCATED

BYDARTOBENEFICIARIESVIA

RAFFLE

EXCLUDED

BYDARFROMDISTRIBUTION

Cutcut 364.9736 345.84 19.1336

Bantog 164.497 155.76 8.737

Balete 101.124 57.42 43.704

Lourdes 732.0936 205.92 526.1786

Asturias 271.5172 254.1 17.4172

Mapalacsiao 149.558 110.22 39.338

TOTAL 1,783.7684 1,129.26 654.5084

*CONSISTENTWITHFFCRUZREPORTOF

2013HLISURVEY

*INCONSISTENTWITHDARSURVEYOF

1,106.91HECTARES

*INCONSISTENTW/DARDEDUCTIONSOF

676.8HAS

Source:DAR

TADECO’sResurrectedClaim

FromJulytoAugust2013,residentsbegantonoticefromDARtarpaulinmapsondisplaythatcertain portions in Barangays Balete, Cutcut and Mapalacsiao have been excluded fromdistribution.DARpersonneltoldresidentsthatcertainareaswereyettobesurveyed.

Aroundthistime,theCojuangcossuddenlyrevivedtheLuisitaclaimoftheirfirmTADECO.Vasttractsofagriculturalland–morethan200hectaresinBaleteand100hectaresinCutcutweredeclared“TADECOprivateproperty”andwerecordonedoff fromfarmers throughaggressiveinstallation of watchtowers, guardhouses and armed personnel. TADECO also sent evictionletters to hundreds of residents and farmers who are supposed to be beneficiaries of landreform in these two villages. The letter signed by TADECO lawyer Eufrocinio dela Merced

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assertedthatfarmworkershaveencroachedonlandsownedbyTADECOandshouldvacatethelotswithin 15 days upon receipt of notice or face legal action. TADECO, as stated in the SCdecisionhasnolongeranylegalclaimstolandscoveredbyHaciendaLuisita:

“Thestockdistributionschemeappeared tobeTADECO’spreferredoption incomplyingwiththeCARPwhenitorganizedHLIasitsspin-offcorporationinordertofacilitatestockacquisitionbytheFWBs.Forthispurpose,TADECOassignedandconveyedtoHLItheagriculturallandsofHaciendaLuisita,setat4,915.75hectares,amongothers.Theseagricultural landsconstitutedas the capital contribution of the FWBs in HLI. In effect, TADECO deprived itself of theownershipovertheselandswhenittransferredthesametoHLI.”


ThetractsoflandaggressivelyclaimedbyTADECOareconsideredprimelots–thoseinBaleteandMapalacsiaoareveryneartheSCTEX,whiletheCutcutareaisalsoadjacenttothenewly-openedTarlac-Pangasinan-LaUnionExpressway(TPLEX)operatedbySanMiguelCorporation,acompany owned by another Cojuangco landlord and business magnate, Eduardo “Danding”Cojuangco,Jr.,cousinofCoryAquino.

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Through several formal correspondences, documenteddialogues, personal follow-ups andanomnibusmotionbeforetheSC,AMBALAhasrepeatedlyrequestedtheDARanditslocalofficestofurnishthemacopyofthenewLuisitasubdivisionplanbasedonthesurveyconductedbyFFCruz. Portions of the whole subdivision plan were viewed by residents during the lotteryactivities, but still the DAR ignored AMBALA’s request to furnish the groupwith completemaps and other documents pertaining to the most recent land survey. Through its July 23omnibusmotion,AMBALAhasurgedtheSCtoappointageodeticengineer,oranindependentsurveytovalidatethesurveyconductedbytheDAR.

By withholding the survey from AMBALA and by consistently and openly defending theTADECO’sclaimstotheseagriculturallandsinitsrecentmediapronouncements,theDARisineffect being complicit to any attempts by any party to go against the SC decision. It is thepositionoffarmworkersleadersthattheDARispracticallyaidingtheCojuangco-Aquinoclaninthe latter’saggressivebid to retainownershipof choiceprime lots,particularly inTarlacCity(2013HLnationalFFM).

The DAR must show the public a complete survey of Hacienda Luisita to ensure that ALLagricultural land in Luisita is coveredby landdistribution.Granting the exclusionof the500-hectare“convertedarea”andanother500plushectaresofHaciendaLuisitalandmarkssuchasthegolfcourseandexistingresidentialandindustrialareas,thereisstilladiscrepancyofnearlyathousandhectaresthattheCojuangco-AquinoclanandtheDARshouldclearlyandtruthfullyaccount for. Still, owing to its agricultural nature and potential, it is but just that the 500-hectare area which the RCBC and LIPCO failed to develop for industrial use must also bedistributedtofarmworkers.

TheSCorderedtheDARtoimmediatelydistributetoFWBsagriculturallandputundertheSDOscheme.ButtheDARisalsomandated,notonlybythisspecificSCrulingbutbyitsverynatureasagovernmentlineagencyinchargeofagrarianreform,todistributealllandthatitmayfindtobeagricultural.

LotAllocationThroughaRaffle

TheDARcarriedoutthedistributionofLotAllocationCertificates(LAC)tolistedFWBsinallofthe10barangaysofHaciendaLuisitathrougharatherunorthodoxmode:raffle.ThispromptedAMBALA,throughitslegalcounselSENTRAtofileanomnibusmotionbeforetheSupremeCourton July23,questioning the“anomalous” landdistributionschemebeing implementedby theDAR.

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In all barangays, residents reported the presence of DAR personnel months before thescheduledlottery.Thesepeoplewerewelcomedbybarangayofficialsandheldhouse-to-houseinformation campaigns regarding the DAR’s land distribution scheme. These employeesexplainedtofarmworkersthattheDARlanddistributionschemeis“good”andwillbe“forthebenefit of all.” But they also qualified that “only those who will sign the Application toPurchaseandFarmers’Undertaking(APFU)willbegivenland.”

DARofficials,evenintheirpressreleaseshavealwaysstressedthattheAPFUisamandatoryrequirement for the generation and registration of the beneficiary’s Certificate of LandOwnershipAward(CLOA),alandreformdocumentortitle.

ButsomefarmworkersrelatedinstancesofdeceptionanddisinformationperpetratedbyDARpersonnelandpersonsbelievedtobeunderthepayrolloftheCojuangcos,monthsbeforetheDAR’slotteryactivities(InterviewwithsomeMotricoAMBALAmembers).

InBarangaysBalete,CutcutandMapalacsiao, farmworkersweremadetobelievethatsigningtheAPFUisaprerequisiteforthebeneficiarytoavailoftheCojuangcos’supposedoffertobuytheirfarmlotsatPhp1millionperhectare.InBarangayCutcut,manyFWBsattendedtheraffleproceedingswith thebelief that theywillbe instantlyawardedthepromisedcashduring theDARlottery.

Inmany villages, financier-agentsof the Luisita EstateManagement (LEM)of theCojuangcosurged farmworkers to sign the APFU to serve as a sort of collateral before cash-strappedfarmworkers can avail of illicit loans and leasehold agreements. Many farmworkers havecomplainedthatthedistantlocationofmanyfarmlotsdiscouragesthemtoevenplanontillingtheland,thustheir“choice”toenterillicitleaseagreementsforeasycash.

AMBALAdecried theDAR’sactions compelling farmworkers to signadocumentwhich statesthat they are willing to buy the land which is essentially theirs, at a price which was notexpressedlystatedinthedocumentandcouldbeeasilymanipulatedtofavortheCojuangcos.SENTRAmaintainsthatthethreatoftheDARtodisqualifytheFWBswhofailorrefusetosigntheAFPUhasnobasisinfactandinlaw.

IfsigningtheAPFUwasimplementedtoprotecttheinterestsofFWBs,theDARhasalsoerredbyissuingauniqueAPFUforHaciendaLuisitaFWBsthatexcludedacertainclausewhichaskstheFWBoftheirpreferredmodeofownership–individualorcollective.ThisclauseisfoundinregularDARAPFUsbutnotintheAPFUsissuedinHaciendaLuisita(2013HLnationalFFM).

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Table7.ResultsofDAR’sLotAllocationThruaRaffleinTarlacCity

BARANGAY

(VILLAGE)

TOTALRESIDENTS

(2010)

LANDAREA

(basedon1989HUITITLE,inhectares)

LANDAREA

ALLOCATEDTO

RESIDENTS

LANDAREAALLOCATEDTONON-RESIDENTS

FWBsALLOCATED

LOTSWITHINVILLAGE

FWBsALLOCATEDLOTSIN

ADJACENTVILLAGES

FWBsALLOCATED

LOTSOUTSIDETARLACCITY

TOTALFWBs

CUTCUT 6,890 364.9736 345.18 .66 523 3 119 645

BANTOG 1,926 164.497 153.78 1.98 233 0 202 435

BALETE 4,819 101.124 57.42 0 87 30 618 735

LOURDES 2,365 732.0986 186.12 19.8 282 127 177 586

ASTURIAS 1,359 271.5172 173.58 80.52 263 0 179 442

MAPALACSIAO

4,980 149.558 107.58 2.64 163 65** 582 810

TOTAL 22,339 1783.7684

1023.66 105.6 1,551 225 1,877 3,653

FARMERSINTARLACCITYTOBEDISLOCATEDBYDAR‘SLOTALLOCATIONTHRURAFFLE:1.877to2.102individuals–30to34%or1/3ofallHaciendaLuisitabeneficiaries

**outsideTarlacCitybutvillageadjacenttoMalapacsiao

Source:DARandNSCB

Beforethelottery,theDARinsteadannouncedthatinterestedFWBsmustshowtheirintenttohavetheirfarmlotsallocatedadjacenttootherFWBs,mostlikelytheirspousesorotherfamilymembers, by filing notarized manifestations before the DAR Provincial Office during a two-month period from April toMay 2013. Please see Table 8 on number of farmworkers whoascribedtheirnamestothemanifesto.

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Table8.SummaryofFWBswithTabi-tabiManifesto

BARANGAY No.ofGroups No.ofFWBs

ASTURIAS 16 98

BALETE 57 342

BANTOG 39 224

CUTCUT 67 344

LOURDES 54 345

MABILOG 103 548

MAPALACSIAO 63 374

MOTRICO 83 451

PANDO 94 524

PARANG 113 554

GrandTotal 689 3,804

Source:DAR

Whenthe lotallocationschemewasdonethrough lottery,theDARreport impliedthat3,804FWBsweretobeallocatedlotsin689groups.

The lottery is a very uncommon way of allocating land. It evades the correct process oftruthfullyconsultingwiththeFWBsandstudyingthelonghistoryofexploitationwithinLuisitaso as to exact social justice. Land allocation must consider the fact that since 2005, aconsiderable number of farmers have already cultivated plots and positioned themselves inareasthatarenaturallyneartheirplacesofabode(2013HLnationalFFM).

The DAR has continued to ignore the fact that almost a thousand hectares, a very sizableportionoftheagriculturallanditistaskedtodistribute,arenowricefieldsandfoodcropareasdevelopedbythefarmworkers.TheDAR’spublicistsevenphotographandfilmthesevastriceplantationsforitsmediacampaignstoprojectprosperityinHaciendaLuisita(InterviewwithanFWBleader).

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In Mapalacsiao, only 163 lots or 107.58 hectares of land were allocated by the DAR fordistribution to 810 beneficiaries. This means that majority, or 647 out of 810 FWBs fromMapalacsiaowill not get farmlotswithin, or near their places of residence. Twenty-one (21)FWBs in Mapalacsiao were allocated lots in Mabilog, 60 in Pando and 65 in Parang all inConcepciontown,whilethemajorityof500FWBswereallocatedlotsinMotrico,LaPaz(2013HLnationalFFM).

IfFWBschosetotendtotheselotsbylivinginfarmhuts,therewouldbeavirtualexodusofthepopulation.Mapalacsiao residents also complained that a beneficiary awarded a farm lot inBarangayMotricoinLaPaztownsoughttosurveythefarmlotallocatedbyDARonlytobetoldby the Barangay Captain that her name and lot number were nowhere in the official DARsurveyofBarangayMotrico(2013HLnationalFFM).

InBarangayCutcut, 119 FWBswere allocated lotsmore than10 kilometers away inMotricovillage in La Paz town. Residents also questioned the exclusion of around 100 hectares ofagricultural land from theDAR survey, notably the farmlotswhich arepart of theAMBALA’sbungkalan(2013HLnationalFFM).

Inother TarlacCity villages, significantnumberof FWBswere allocated lots in LaPaz town,owingtothereduceddistributablelandareawithinthecity.InBarangayBantog,202outof435FWBswereallocatedlotsinMotrico,LaPaz.Thesameistruefor179FWBsinBarangayAsturiasand177FWBsinBarangayLourdes(2013HLnationalFFM).

InBarangayBalete,only87lotsorapaltry57.42hectareswereallocatedfordistribution.Thismeansthatmajority,or618FWBsoutof735BaleteFWBswillnotgetfarmlotswithin,orneartheir places of residence.Of the 735 FWBs in Balete, 30were allocated lots in the adjacentbarangay Lourdes. The rest, howeverwere allocated lots in Concepcion town, approximately10-15 kilometers away fromBalete – 307were allocated lots in BarangayMabilogwhile 311wereallocatedlotsinPando.Tobeabletotendtotheirsupposedfarmlotsinthesebarangays,aBaleteresidentmusttravelabout20kilometersbackandforthandmustspendasmuchasPhp300adayfortransportation(2013HLnationalFFM).

InBarangaysBantogandBalete,residentscomplainedthatbecauseoftheraffle,spousesandfamilymembershavebeensplitupthroughtheallocationoflotsthatwereseveralkilometers,orseveralvillagesapart.

Farmworkerleadersinterviewedimpliedthatthelotterysystemwasnotatallrandomasithadalready been pre-programmed to impose land allocation based on the DAR’s anomaloussurvey. The DAR insists that only a small percentage – about 10% -- of all FWBs are to beawardedlotsthatarefarfromtheiroriginalresidences.TheDARpointsoutBarangayBaleteas

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theonlycommunityaffected,astheentire500-hectare“convertedarea”issupposedlylocatedinthisvillage(2013HLnationalFFM).

However, sixoutof ten Luisitabarangaysare situated inTarlacCitywheredistributable landhas been reduced by a minimum of 677 hectares, based solely on the problematic FF Cruzsurvey.BasedontheDAR’sownfigures,3,653individualsoralmost60%ofthetotalHaciendaLuisita FWBs are from Tarlac City.Walking or riding a bicycle to tend a farmlot evenwithinone’sownvillagehasnowbecomedifficultifthelotislocatedontheothersideoftheSCTEX.YetevenDAR’sowndataattestthat2,102FWBswhoresideinthesixTarlacCityvillageswereallocated farmlotsoutsideof this city. This is 34%ormore than1/3of all FWBs inHaciendaLuisita–andnotamere10%astheDARstubbornlyinsists.Thesefigureshaveyettotakeintoaccountdeservingbeneficiariesundulydiscreditedby theDARmaster list (2013HLnationalFFM).

CertificateofLandOwnershipAward(CLOA)Distribution

Only a month after these lot allocation activities, the DAR announced that it was ready todistributephotocopiesoftheirCLOAstothousandsofFWBs.Afterthelotallocations,majorityof the beneficiaries signed the APFU signifying their intention to enter into the paymentschemewiththeLandBank.Initiallysome300or400plusbeneficiariesbelongingtoAMBALAdidnotsigntheapplicationwiththeargumentthattheywouldnotpayforthelandsincetheyhad already paid for it through their labor power rendered in the past years (this is comingfrom the frameworkofangenuineagrarian reformprogram).ButbyFebruary15,2014only125 did not sign the form from the original 300 or 400 plus (Interviewwith provincial DARofficer).

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Table9.SummaryofCLOAGenerationandRegistrationasofJuly3,2014

BARANGAYRegistered ForRegistration

No.ofFWBs No.ofCLOAs No.ofFWBs No.ofCLOAs

PANDO 603 664

MOTRICO 666 719 3 3

LOURDES 586 652

PARANG 642 719 1 1

MABILOG 635 707 3 4

BANTOG 379 432 50 55

CUTCUT 574 628 9 10

ASTURIAS 400 453 25 29

BALETE 674 729 11 11

MAPALACSIAO 751 852 23 28

Total 5910 6555 125 141

Source:DAR

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Table10.SummaryofCLOATitlesDistributionasofJuly3,2014

BARANGAYNo.ofCLOADISTRIBUTED

No.ofCLOAsUNDISTRIBUTED

FWBs CLOAs FWBs CLOAs

PANDO 603 664 0 0

MOTRICO 665 718 1 1

LOURDES 585 652 1 1

PARANG 641 717 1 2

MABILOG 635 707 0 0

BANTOG 378 431 1 1

CUTCUT 567 618 7 10

ASTURIAS 396 448 4 5

BALETE 648 703 26 26

MAPALACSIAO 737 834 14 18

Total 5855 6491 55 64

Source:DAR

Similar toother landareaswhereCLOAsweredistributed, theoriginalowner’s copiesof theCLOAarewiththeLandBankofthePhilippines(LBP)andwillnotbereleasedtotheFWBuntiltheypaythefullamortizationoveraspanofanother30years.ThevalueoffarmlotsamounttoalmostPhp80,000perhectare.

AccordingtoSec.DelosReyes:“Forthefirstthreeyears,HaciendaLuisitabeneficiarieswillpayonlyP730peryearoraboutP61.00permonth.Forthe4thand5thyear,theywillpaymoreorlessP1,410.00peryearorP118.00permonth.Andfromthe6thtothe30thyear,theywillpaymoreorlessP2,770peryearorP230.00permonth.”

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Cojuangcos’MilkingtheGovernmentbyBeingPaidinMillions

Luisitafarmworkers,accordingtoAMBALA,shouldnotbetreatedlikeanyordinaryclaimantsofgovernment land reform benefits. They have long been in fact the rightful, original Luisitalandowners whom the Cojuangcos, through decades of swindle and terror, have severelydisenfranchised.AMBALAmaintainsthereforethattheCojuangcos,infinallyrelinquishingclaimoverHaciendaLuisita,deservenotasinglepeso.

The Cojuangcos, however, as any landlord whose land is subject to land reform, shall beawardedbythegovernment,throughtheLandBankofthePhilippines(LBP)anamountwhichcurrent agrarian law has chosen to call “just compensation.” As far as Hacienda Luisita isconcerned,suchremuneration,accordingtotheSCrulingshallbepeggedattheestate’s1989value, or about Php 40,000 per hectare.With the landlord prerogative, however, to activelytake part in the valuation process (which includes the right to appeal to the SC) verymuchrecognizedby theCARPER, “just compensation” for theCojuangco-Aquinos is not unlikely toshootuptothemillions?

HLIspokespersonAntonioLigonadmittedthattheCojuangco-Aquinosfoundthe1989valuationvery low.Themost logicalrecoursethenforhisbosses,Ligonoffered,wastomakesurethatinterest rateswould generously be considered. This was corroborated by the DAR secretaryhimself,VirgiliodelosReyes,whenherevealed inAugust2013duringacongressionalbudgethearing,that,afterfactoringin12%interest incurredbytheLuisitapropertysince1989,“justcompensation”fortheCojungco-Aquinomaywellreachalittleoverahundredthousandpesosperhectare,oreasilymorethandoublethevalueinitiallyprescribedbytheSC.

At another budget hearing in September 2013, Committee on Appropriations Vice ChairmanRep.HenryPrydeTevesdisclosedthattheDARinfacthadalreadypaidtheHLIatotalofPhp471,501,417.98, Php 304,033,138.20million ofwhich is the actual cost of the land propertywhile the remainingamount is the cashequivalentofmatured10-year LBPbonds computedusingtheprevailing91-dayT-billratesfrom1989to1999.

Thesame lucrativetransactionbetweenthegovernmentandtheCojuangcos is recorded inaJuly2013reportof theLBP.What isalarmingwiththisLBPreport, is thattheLBPmayhavepaidtheCojuangcosforlandtitlesthatare,oddlyenough,completelydifferentfromtheonesthat,accordingtotheDAR,representthedistributableLuisitaland(2013HLnationalFFM).

According to the report (seeTable11))around510hectaresof thedistributable landbelongnottothethree(3)originaltitlesofLuisitalandinTarlacCity,LaPazandConcepcionbutto18altogether different titles. The said three titles have a total area of only 3,990.88 hectaresaccordingtotheLBPreportfromwhichDAR’shasfurtherdeducted400.88hectaressupposedlyfor new roads, firebreaks, easements and others reduces the distributable land from these

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titlestoonly3,590hectares.Thus,atotalof910.88hectaresofland--510hectares“padded”and400.88undulydeducted– isnowunderquestion.Themysterious910.88hectaresmatchLuisitafarmworkers’observationsandestimatesthatnearlyathousandhectaresare“missing”orhavebeenchoppedofffromlanddistribution(2013HLnationalFFM).

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Table11.LandAcquistion&CompensationbyGovernmentBasedonLandBankReport

LANDTITLE LOCATION AMOUNTPAIDBYLBPCojuangco-Aquino(inPHpesos)

AREAPER

TITLE(inhectares)

AREAACQUIREDBYLBP

TOBEACQUIRED

TOTALAREA

ACQUIREDbasedonpayments

TOTALAREAACQUIRED

basedonDARsurvey

TCT–236740 LAPAZ 74,176,407.37

1,434.48 1,093.56 56.27 1,149.83 1,376.48

TCT–236742 CONCEPTION

122,418,506.00

1,931.31 1,804.98 5.80 1,810.79 1,891.74

TCT–236741 TARLACCITY

68,520,712.04

1,783.77 1,030.26 0 1,030.26 1,232.56

SUBTOTAL 265,115,625.41

5,149.54 3,928.80 62.07 3,990.88 4500.80

PLUSACQUISITIONSBYLBPUNDECLAREDINDARLANDSUMMARY

4OTHERTITLES

LAPAZ (availabledataindicatedonlytotal) 11.93 (total) 0

11OTHERTITLES

TARLACCITY

(availabledataindicatedonlytotal) 0 (total) 0

3OTHERTITLES

CONCEPTION

(availabledataindicatedonlytotal) 0 (total) 0

TOTAL 34,053,361.23

497.99 497.99 11.93 509.92 0.00

299,167,486.54

5,647.54 4,426.79 74.00 4,500.80 4,500.80

Source:DAR

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Relatedtothecompensation issue isthedelay intheauditingprocessofHLIandCentennaryHoldings,Inc(CHI)assetscausedbytheactionsoftheDARitself.TheDARwasalsodirectedbytheSCrulingtoappointareputableaccountingfirmtoauditthebooksofHLIandCHIonthesaleof580.51hectaresofHaciendaLuisita.Opening thebooksof theHLIwill furtherexposehowtheCojuangco-Aquinos swindled farmworkersduring the16-year implementationof theSDOscheme.FiveofthesixpartiestotheSCcasehadalreadychosenanauditingfirm,butDARrefusedtoaccededuetooppositionfromtheHLI. Insteadofupholdingthemajoritydecision,theDARpracticallysubvertedtheauditingprocessbyreferringtheissuebacktotheSC(2013HLnationalFFM).

V. LandReconcentration

State-ledReconcentration

SugarIndustryDevelopmentActof2015)RA10659

SugarblockfarmingisbeingvigorouslyencouragedbyDARinsideHaciendaLuisita(Cervantes,2014). This new type of sugar production is legally buttressed by Sugarcane IndustryDevelopmentActof2015, a recently signed lawbyPres.Noynoy lastApril5,2015.The lawspecificallylaysdowntheconditionsforthemaximizationofthecountry’ssugarcaneresources(Valencia,2015).

The Block Farm started in 2013 under the Convergence Initiative of the Department ofAgriculture, Department of Agrarian Reform, and Sugar Regulatory Administration [SRA](Martin,2015).

TheSugarcaneAct,throughtheBlockFarmProgram,providesassistancetosmallfarmerswithfarm sizes of less than 5 hectares whomake up about 80% of all sugarcane farmers in thecountry.Smallfarmersdonothavethefinancialcapabilitytocultivatetheirfarmstoitsfullestpotential, hence, small farms generally have lower productivity. The Block Farm Programconsolidatessmallfarmstoaminimumof30hectaresinordertobemorecost-effectiveinthedeliveryofservicessuchasfarminputsandequipment.Theindividualownershipofthefarmsare preserved but farm activities are planned together and synchronized to improve theirproductionefficiencythroughtheeconomiesofscale(Martin,2015).

Ablockfarmisconceptualizedtobean“agribusinessunit”inamillingdistrict,(Martin,2015).The Block Farm Program aims at improving the productivity of at least 1,000 hectares ofsugarcanefarmsperyear(or10,000hectaresin10years)withaprojectedannualincreaseinincomeoffarmersatnolessthanP40,000.00/hectare(Martin,2015).

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Based on SRA data, farms of 10Hectares and belowproduce an average of 98.5 bagswhilefarms of 25 to 50 hectares can produce 129.3 bags per hectare, or 31% increase byconsolidation,andanother10%byusingHYVs(Martin,2015).

ThelawalsomandatestheDepartmentofBudgetandManagementtoincludeintheprogramofexpendituresannuallyanamountofP2billion,starting2016,forthesugarcaneindustryandtobeallocatedasfollows(Reyes2015):

• 15%fortheBlockFarmProgram

• 15%forsocializedcredit

• 15%forresearchanddevelopment,andcapabilitybuildingprograms

• 5%forscholarshipgrants

• 50%forinfrastructuresupportprograms

This isnowaclassiccaseofhowtheobjectivesof social justice inanagrarian land reform issubsumed to the dictates of globalizationwherein the country is a signatory to the GeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade(GATT)andtheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO).Blockfarmingis to correct the inadequategovernmentassistance for the sugar industry in the faceof theimplementationof the tariff reductionof sugar importson January1, 2015under theAseanFree Trade Agreement (Doronilla, 2014). The reduction in tariff inevitably exposes theindustry—itsproducersandworkers—tounfaircompetitionfromThailand,theworld’ssecond-largest sugar exporter (behind Brazil) and largest producer and exporter in Asia (Doronilla,2014).

TheDARhasintroduced“diversifiedsugarcaneblockfarming”asitsmajorsupportservicetoFWBs in an elaborate information drive even before its lot allocation activities. Thefarmworkerssimplyunderstandablockfarmasanaggregationofseveralfarmlotsintoa30-60hectaresugarcaneplantationadministeredbyafarmmanager(2013HLnationalFFM).

The farmer-leaders interviewed vehemently opposed this block farming measures. Instead,theywantedtoshiftfromsugarcaneproductiontovegetableandriceproductions.Bothcropsdohaveshorterproductioncycles.

Atthegroundlevel,blockfarmingwillcontributetothestrengtheningofthestatusquo.ItisstilltheCojuangcosinasmuchastheyaretheownersofCAT,whodecideswhatcroptoplant,when to plant andwhen to harvest the sugarcane. Block farming allows a farmmanager tocontrol30to60hectaresofindividually-titledfarmlots.Theso-calledbeneficiarieswouldhaveto place their lots as their share in a block (Cervantes, 2014). Under this scheme, the

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beneficiarieswillhavepracticallynocontrolovertheirlotsintheblockfarmandwilllosetheirrighttotill(Cervantes,2014).Essentially,theblockfarmwillcontributetothesteadysupplyofsugarcanetotherequirementoftargetedproductionofCAT.

Block farming is essentially a pro-landlord program clothedwith a nationalist fervor that noimportedsugarwillfloodthelocalmarket.

While there is a national push for block farming, there is now a gradual shifting of cropproduction.Withinthe4,915hectaresdistributedland,446.9hectaresarealreadydevotedtoriceproductionasof2014,100hectaresdevotedtovegetableproduction(asof2014)andtherestisstilltiedupwithsugarcaneproduction.

Pie-chartonAreaDevotedbyTypeofCrops2014(SourceDAR)

Source:DAR

3,584.35

446.9

48.77 19.9

AreaDevotedbyTypeofCrops

Sugarcane Rice Vegetables IdleLands

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Pie-chartontheBreakdownofRiceProductionAreabyBarangay2014

Source:DAR

All the existing programs of the provincial DAR like the Agrarian Reform CommunityConnectivityandEconomicSupportServices(ARCCESS);TheCommunityServiceFacility(CSF);activities like Experiental Learning on Integrated Vegetable Production, Agrarian ReformBeneficiaries Organizaitons (ARBOs) Organizational cum Leadership Training, AppreciationCourse on Rice Production, Cross Learning cum Appreciation on Integrated SugarcaneProduction and PBD Briefing cum ARBOs Formation in Ten Barangays under the ProgramBeneficiaries Development (PBD) are geared to help out the beneficiaries not only on thecommoditychainbutalsotofarmenterprisedevelopment.

Under theAgricultural ProductionCredit Program (APCP) programan individual CLOAholdercanaccessloanfromtheLandBank.TheloanfacilityisPhp24,400forthosewhoareengagedinriceproduction,Php33,000forvegetableandPhp50,000forsugarcaneproduction.Allthe

21.74

272.4927.96

28.09

18.21

15.7124.34 5.6

32.75

RICEPRODUCTIONAREA=446.90has

CUT-CUT MOTRICO BANTOG ASTURIAS LOURDES

MAPALACSIAO PARANG MABILOG PANDO

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borrowers should pay the loanwithin sixmonths. For Barangay Pando, Concepcion, only 57percenthaveformalaccesswhichhasapass-oninterestrateof15percent(Gueidon,2015)

Theindividualinitiativeofsomebeneficiarieswhoshiftedtoriceproductionareslowlyprovingthat such crop production is better than being tied up with sugarcane production. TheirFarming Operation Record for Rice shows that a 12,200 square meter engaged in riceproductionwasabletoearnagross incomeofPhp110,649.6 forasinglecroppingseason.Athreecroppingseason ispossiblewithoneyear.Witha totalexpensesofPhp32,144.00, thetwo beneficiaries will share a net income of Php 87,505.6. The beneficiaries were able toachievethiswithonlyaminimalsupport fromtheDAR(interviewwithMotrico farmworkers’leaders).

Inasmuchastheywereusedtoworkinasugarcaneproduction,thesebeneficiariesareforcedtohire farm labor for the landpreparation,plantingandharvesting. Theexpenses fordieselsince the sourceofwater isdeepwell varybetween thewetanddry season.During thedryseason,theyneeded420litersofdieseland30litersofdieselduringthewetseason(aliterofdieselcostsPhp28.00).Fortheirirrigationcanal,theyusetheformerlycanalofthehaciendaforexcesswater.

The general sentiment of the farmworkers interviewed is that the DAR support services aremostlycateredtotheagenciesfavoredARBOsandvillageofficialsandnottoallbeneficiaries.That is why the beneficiaries are tapping the National Secretariat for Social Action of theCatholicBishops”ConferenceofthePhilippines(CBCP)andFARMforsupportservicesfortheiragriculturalproduction.

Private-ledReconcentration

TheaftermathoftheNovember15,2004massacrewasequallydevastating.Onefarmer-leaderdescribeditasperiodofparalyzedsugarcaneproduction.InbarangayPando,Conception,largetracks of lands were leased by Taiwanese businessmen for water melon and honey dewproduction(InterviewwithPandoARBOPresident).

Theinitialattemptstogointovegetableandricefarmingimmediatelyafterthe2004strikewasfoiled by the destruction brought about by two consecutive typhoons that hit the area. Itcreated a sense of helplessness among the farmworkers. During this time, 40-50% of thewomen are either working outside the hacienda or were employed as househelpers. Thefarmworkers and their families are simply surviving. Thus,when thebarangayofficials actinguponthe instructionoftheRep.Noel Villanueva, offeredthesystemofarriendaamongthestrugglingfarmworkers,theaffectedfarmworkersgrabbedtheoffer.

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After the barangay election in 2007, the newly elected barangay council of Pando togetherwiththeDARinthemunicipalityofConcepcionandtheMayorofConcepcioncameupwitharesolutiontoassignonefamilyperhectareinordertomakethelandproductive.Theassigningof land was not strictly based on the status of being a farmworker. Since it was simply atemporarylandoccupationtoavertpotentialfoodcrisisamongtheresidents,evenresidentsinthebarangaywereassignedonehectareland.

This land occupation also happened in Barangay Mabilog, also a barangay of Concepcion,Tarlac. By the following year 2008, land was planted with rice as well as sugarcane.Simultaneously, the farmers’ coalitionAMBALAdecided to clean the landandmake it againproductivewithrice,vegetablesandsugarcane.

Thefarmworkers inBarangayParang,Concepcion,Tarlacalsowantedto followsuit.Buttheywerevehementlydiscouragedbyex-barangaycaptainNemisandtheex-presidentof UnitedLuisitaWorkersUnion(ULWU,a leaderclosely identifiedwiththeCojuangcos.) Both leaderswarnedthefarmworkersthatwhattheywereplanningwastantamounttolanddistribution.

Byallaccounts, thisunilateralact fromthefarmworkershavecollectivelydemonstratedtheirenormouscapacitytoeffectchangeinthelandaswellasintheenvironment.

By 2008-2009, the big middlemen (arriendadors) slowly set up their operations via thebarangayofficials.Theirentrywastoengageagaininsugarproductionsincethepricesofsugarthenwasquitehigh.Strappedwithoutcashandlackofglaringsupportfromthegovernment,farmworkersenteredintoinformalcontractswiththearriendadorandrentedouttheirland,inordertosurvive.Thesecontractsarehighlycontroversialsincetheyarenotonlyagreedonaninformalbasis,butalsocompriseunjustconditions,i.e.thewholepropertyisrentedouttothearriendador,thusthefarmworkercannoteventillsomepartsofthelandwithcropsfortheirownneeds,nordo theyhaveaccess to their land,nordo theyobtainaprofit incomeshare.Theyonly receiveaminimal yearly loanofmaximumPhP7,000. Normally, thearriendadorsleaselandforaminimumofthreeyearssotheycanbeassuredofaharvest(Ranada,2014).

Itcomesasnosurprisethatwhenthelanddistributionwasimplementedin2013,majorityoftheplotsdistributedareplantedwithsugarcanebyanarriendador.

Theextentofthesystemofarriendoisalarming.Onthe25thanniversaryoftheCARP(beforethelanddistribution),theSaveAgrarianReformAlliance(SARA)claimedthatoutofthe6,212farmworkersthatweregivenland,95%ofthemhavealreadypawnedtheirlands.

The data from the ground level after the distribution is more telling. For Barangay Pando,Conceptionalone,outof602beneficiaries,only50beneficiarieshavenotrentedouttheirlandtothearriendador.Ofthe441hectaresofdistributedlandinBarangayMortico,LaPaz,60%of

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these lands are already in the virtual ownership of the arriendador (Interviewwith PandoARBOPresident).FarmworkersAgrarianReformMovement(FARM),oneof thepartiestothecontroversial Hacienda Luisita case and pushed for land distribution of the estate, said thatbetween70-80percentofawardedlandsoraround3,000hectareshavealreadybeenretakenfromthefarmworkersthroughthesystemofarriendo.

FromthepointofviewofDAR,themortgagingifnotsellingofthelandcanpartlybeexplainedthatfarmworkersdonothavedeepaffinitywiththeland.Fordecades,theyhavebeenusedtosimply receiving wages for the labor participation in the sugar cane production in differentportionsofthehacienda(sharingwithprovincialDARofficer).

DARisnowintobuildingacaseagainstthosebeneficiarieswhohavemortgagedtheirland.Theproblem is that nobody talks. Of course, the beneficiary will not accept that he has indeedmortgagedhislotsincethisisaviolationofthelawandheknowstheconsequenceofthisact.“Ourchief legalofficercannotalsotakethenecessarysteps.Wecannotfileanycasewithouthardevidenceinourhands.Wecannotgetanysimpledocumenttotheeffectthatthisfarmerleasedhislandtothisperson”(TarlacProvincialReformOfficerIleonaPangilinan).

Section 27 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program with Extension and Reforms(CARPER)stipulatesthat“landacquiredbybeneficiariesunderthisActorotheragrarianreformlawsshallnotbesold,transferredorconveyedexceptthroughhereditarysuccession,ortothegovernment,ortotheLBP,ortootherqualifiedbeneficiariesthroughtheDARforaperiodoften(10)years.”

TwotypesofArriendaSystem

The system of arrienda maintained by small-time arriendador is engaged only in rice andvegetableproductions(averageoftwocroppingseasonsperyear).Oneofourrespondenthascontrolover15hectaresinBarangayPando,Concepcion.

Theintervieweedescribeditasmoreofasupportsystemschemetohelpaneighbor,relative,orclosefriendtocopeupwiththelackofcapitalforproductionofthelatter.Thebeneficiaryisnotdisplacedfromtheland.Ifproventohavetheskills,thebeneficiaryprovidesthelaborfortheeitherriceorvegetableproduction.Ifheisbeinghireddailyforspecifictypeofwork,hegetsP300.00aday.

Ifheworksforthewholecycleofproduction,hegets12%ofthegross.Hecanavailof loansduringemergency.Hewillpaythearriendadorfromhisshareofthegross.

Therearecaseswhenthearriendadorgivesonesackofpalaytothebeneficiary(whodoesnotparticipate in the production) after the harvest. There are also arrangements when the

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arriendador pays the beneficiary 10,000.00 instead of the 7,000.00 per year as rental of theland.

If thebeneficiarywantstotill the landonhisown,hecannegotiatewiththearreindadorforthelandtobereturnedtohimevenifthecontractisstillnotconsummated.

The system of arrienda maintained by big-time arriendador is quite different. All the landsunder this system are used solely for sugar production. James Villanueva, son of Rep. NoelVillanuevaisfrontingforhisfather.Rep.NoelVillanuevaisathree-termmayorofConcepcion,Tarlacandsinceheisrunningunopposed,willbeonhissecondtermasacongressmanforthethirdcongressionaldistrict.HeisalsothepresidentoftheSugarPlantersAssociationofRegion3.With the hold of politicians on the local government units, it is safe to assert that Cong.VillanuevahasenjoyedfavoredpositioninaccessingDARsupportforhissugarcaneproductionsincehewasamayorofConcepcion,Tarlac.

Otherbigarriendadorsareanex-militarymanisretiredAirForceCol.FranciscoCruz,brother-in-law of Rep. Villanueva; Ernesto Cunanan,who is based in Barangay Pando, Concepcion; acertainTurla,acertainTan(whoownsabodegainbrgy.Sta.Cruz,Conception.Therearealsoarriendadors livingoutside thehacienda (BarangayParaiso, SanMiguelandTarlac) thathavefrontmen spread over the ten barangays that comprise the hacienda. Other arriendadorscomefromtheranksoflocalgovernmentofficialsandformermanagersandsupervisorsofHLI(PCIJ,2012).

Theactivitiesonthelandishighlymechanizedduringthelandpreparation.Sinceitinvolvestheuse of machines, only highly skilled individuals are hired. A round of plowing the land, thearriendador pays the hired labor operating themachine the amount of P1,800.00. This landpreparation activity requires three rounds. The operator that plants the sugar with themachine earns P150.00 a day. Manual planting per hectare costs P5,000.00. Harvesting isP185.00perton.

Thearriendadordoesnothirethebeneficiaryinanyactivityorpoint inthesugarproduction.The beneficiaries who havemortgaged their land work as construction workers outside thehacienda.

It is reported thatacontractbetween thearriendadorand thebeneficiary is signedwith thebarangayofficialsaswitnesses.Nobeneficiarywasgivenacopyofthecontract.

Itisthebig-timearriendadorwhoareensuringthesupplyofsugarforthesugarcentralownedbytheCojuangcos.

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The big-time arriendadors are consistently undermining the operations of the small-timearriendadors.The frontmenof thebig-timearriendadorsat thebarangay levelarealwaysonthe look-out who among the beneficiaries are into negotiations with the small-timearriendadors. Once they have identified these individuals, they dangle a higher amountcomparedtotheamountofferedbythesmall-timearriendadors.Ifthesmall-timearriendadorhasalreadypaid7,000.00ayear,theywouldconvincethebeneficiarytoreturnthemoneyandinstead offer 21,000.00 for the next three years to the beneficiary. This is especially true inthosesandwichedlotsorthoselotsplantedwithvegetableorricesurroundedbylotsplantedwithsugarcane.

TheDARhasbeenencouragingtheexpansionandcontinuityofthesystemofarriendoonthefollowing counts (FARM, 2014): (a) the DAR refuses to file any legal action against thearriendadors for the illegal arriendo systemand related violations such as thedestructionoflandmarkers during the arriendador’s land preparation activities. Instead of prosecuting theviolators, the DAR meekly tried to replace the destroyed land markers. Farm workers alsoaccused theDARof double standard. Forwhile actual farmworker-occupantswere forced tovacatethelandstheydevelopedtogivewaytotheDARslotallotment,theagencyrefusedtoactontheillegalarriendosystemthatclearlyviolatedthelaw.LetterssentbyFARMmembersto the DAR Secretary to investigate the situation were also ignored. For this reason, FARMleaders believed that local and national DAR officials are connivingwith the arriendadors toreconsolidate the land for sugarcane production; (b) many farmworker-beneficiaries do nothave their landsyetdespite receiving theirCertificateof LandOwnershipAward (CLOAs) lastyear. This slow distribution and installation processes had given the arriendadors theopportunitytocontinueofferingcash-strappedfarmworkerswitheasybutcheapcashunderthesystemofarriendotofurtherexpandtheircontrolof“reformed”lands;(c)theDARhasnotgiven any form of actual support services for farmworkers to develop their lands, furtherdiscouragingthefarmworkersfromholdingontothelands;and(d)theDARhasinitiatedtheorganizing of farmworker-beneficiaries, many members of whom are under the arriendosystem.FARMmemberssuspect that theseorganizationswillbeusedbytheDAR laterontoenter into sugarcane production agreementwith the arriendadors as financiers in a private-publicpartnershipforsugarcanetolegitimizethearriendosystem.

IncreasingTransactionsofOutrightSaleofLotsAwarded

Theseeminglytemporarytransferoflandthroughmortgagearrangementhasbeenrenderedirreversiblenow.

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Saleofdistributed lots isbecominganewphenomenon.The firstwavehadasellingpriceofPhp150,000andthesecondwavehadasellingpriceofPhp250-280,000.00.ThosedistributedlotsneartheroadcanbeboughtatPho300,000.AcommissionofPhp50,000.00goestothesaleagent.Thisoutrightsalestartedasadirect transactionbetweenrelatives (middlementothefarmerbeneficiary)andlaterexpandedtonon-relativesofthemiddlemen(InterviewwithMotricofarmworkers’leaders).

Theabsurdityofthewholetransactionisthefactthatadeedforsaleisissuedbythebarangayofficialsinvolvedgivenaprovisionoflandreformwhichstipulatessellingofawardedlandisprohibited.

In Barangay Pando, Concepcion, Tarlac, one third of the 602 beneficiaries have already soldtheir land (Interviewwith PandoARBOPresident). Substantial number of CLOA in barangayMotrico,LaPazaresimilarlyalreadybeensold.

Takingcuefromfarmlotsthatarebeingsold,residentiallotsadjacentifnotwithinthebarangayproperarealsobeingsoldtointerestednewresidentsofthebarangay.Each240squaremetercostsfromPhp50,000.00toPhp75,000.00(InterviewwithMotricofarmworkers’leaders).

CreepingEjectionsofIndividualBeneficiariesfromtheLand

AnewphenomenonpeculiaronlyinHaciendaLuisitaisemerging.Thisisanoffshootofalanddistributionstraddledoveraproductionsystemdictatedbythesystemofarriendo.Therearecaseswheretwomortgagedpiecesofdistributedlandsandwichedanunmortgagedpieceofland.Thetwomortagedpiecesofdistributed landare intosugarcaneproductionsincethis iswhatisbeingpromotedbythearriendadorandthesandwichedunmortgagedpieceoflandisintovegetables. When the landsplanted to sugarcanewere sprayedwith2DRchemical, thevegetablesontheunmortgagedlanddied.

Byanypracticalmeasure,thisset-upledtothefinanciallossofthecultivatorofthevegetable.Theawardeeeventuallyenteredalsointothearriendosystem.

InBarangayPando,therearealsocaseswheretheconcretereferencepointstructures(mojons)arealsobeingrammedthroughbytractorsofthearriendadorsduringthelandpreparationforsugarcane production. Aggrieved farmworkers took pictures of displaced concrete structuresandsentittoDARintheirrequestforinvestigation.Sucheffortsproducednoresults.

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VI. SUMMARY,CONCLUSIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS

Themore than fourdecades sagaof the struggleof the farmworkers inHaciendaLuisita is ahistoryofdeceitandgreed.TheCojuangcoshavebeentenaciousintheireffortstosabotageland reform inHacienda Luisita. Similar to other owners of landedestates, their poweroverstateinstitutionssuchastheDAR,thePNP,AFP,thelocalandhighcourtsandotherbranchesofgovernmenthaveaccordedthemthisunprecedentedprivilege.

HaciendaLuisitastandsasacenterpieceof landreformthat failed notoncebuttrice.First,the Cojuangcos acquired the estate through loans from the government in 1957 with thecondition to distribute land to the farmers after ten years. After so many decades, theCojuangcofamilyneverfulfilledthecondition.Second,itfailedduringtheCoryAquinoregimewhen she adopted and implemented the Stock Distribution Option (SDO) in lieu of landdistributionin1989.Thethirdonewasin2013whenthelandreformprogramstraddledontheoperationsof thewell-entrenched lease systemofmiddlemen.Suchoperationat thegroundlevel made the 2013 land reform program a dismal failure since it promoted and furtherinstitutionalizedthephenomenonoflandreconcentrationinsideHaciendaLuisitathatstartedsince2004.

TheDAR landdistributionscheme inHaciendaLuisita isa typicalprogramofa state-led landreformwithinahighlystratifiedsocietylikethePhilippines.Itsimplementationismarredwithdubious irregularities that rendered the supposedbeneficiariesdisenfranchisedand swindledthrough:(a) insertingquestionablenamesintothemasterlistofbeneficiaries;(b) procuringadubiousandoverpriced landsurvey;(c)exclusionofhundredsofhectaresofagricultural landfrom distribution; (d) imposition of compulsory signing of promissory notes to ensureamortizationpayments;(e)grantofoverpricedlandlordcompensationtotheHLI/Cojuangco-Aquinos; (f) inept facilitationof theauditofHLIandCHIassets;and (g) rabid justificationofCojuangco-Aquino claims over agricultural lands in Tarlac City; (h) inaction on farmworkers’appeal for revocation of conversion order on 500 hectares (RCBC/LIPCO); and (i) impositionandpromotionofblockfarmingscheme“assupportservice”toservelandlordinterest.

All these happened while majority of these contested lands were already pawned to themiddlemensince2002.Thishascreatedatragicsituationwhereinthelanddistributedarenoweffectivelyinthehandsofthemiddlemen.Infact,thesystemofarriendohasinstitutionalizedasubtleyeteffectivewayofdislodgingthefarmworkerfromhisawardedland.Privatesecurityforcesandstatemilitaryandpolicepersonnelarenolongerneededtoevictfarmworkersfromthe land. Since the illegal transaction is consciously entered into by the farmworker, hisdislocationfromhismeansofproductioniseasilyconsummated.

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SinceCongressmanNoel Villanueva runs unopposed this comingMay election, hewill surelyclinch his second term as a congressman of the third district of Tarlac. The incoming 17thHouse of Representatives, through the newly convened Ethics and Privileges Committeeshould pursue a query of how the congressman dispenses his duties in his congressionaldistrict as the most dominant arriendador. By all indications, his acts are inimical to theinterestsofsomeofconstituentswhohappentobefarmworkersofHaciendaLuisita.Fourofthe ten barangays of Hacienda Luisita covered by land reform are within his congressionaldistrict.

The incoming 17th House of Representatives, through its newly formed Agrarian ReformCommitteesinceitsconcernsinvolve“allmattersdirectlyandprincipallyrelatingtoagrarianreform, theresettlementofandothersupportservices foragrarianreformbeneficiaries,andthe implementation and amendment of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law” shouldconductapublichearingastothenamesandoperationsofallthemiddlemenoperatinginsidethe Hacienda Luisita. This public hearing will be directed as to graphically come up with apicture on how the middlemen have been subverting the government’s own land reformprogram and comeupwith tangiblemeasures to decisively negate and further frustrate theoperationsofmiddlemeninalandreformarea.

Thedemandforafreelanddistributionshouldbegrantedinasmuchasitisajustandmorallyjustifiable.ThelandreformbeneficiariesinsideHaciendaLuisitapossessallthemoral,historicaland legal rights to the landwhich theCojuangco-Aquino clanhas ruthlessly denied them fordecades.

FormerChiefJusticeCoronaputitsharplythat“HaciendaLuisitahasalwaysbeenviewedasalitmus test of genuine reform program.” The new government should form a third partyindependentbodythatwillmakeareviewandassessmentastohowthelandreformprograminHaciendaLuisitawasimplementedandcomeupwithcorrectivemeasuresastomitigatetheeffectsofatypicaldefectivelandreformprogram.Thequestforsocialjusticedemandsnoless.

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Riendinger,Dr.JeffreyM.,(1995).AgrarianReforminthePhilippines:DemocraticTransitionsandRedistributiveReform.

Page63of83

SaveAgrarianReformAlliance(SARA),(June9,2013).ThreatofLandReconcentrationLoomsinHaciendaLuisita;95%ofLandstobeDistributedPawnedAlready.

Saguing,Belarmino,(July15,2013).AShortHistoryofHaciendaLuisita,OFWBlogger.

Tadem,Eduardo,(October,20,1989).TechnicalworkinggroupofthePresidentialAgrarianReformCouncil(PARC).

UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID),(2010).PhilippineCountryProfile,PropertyRightsandResourceGovernance.

Valencia,Czeriza,(April5,2015).PnoysignsSugarcaneIndustryDevelopmentAct,thePhilippineStar.

Page64of83

LITERATURECITED/APPENDICES

APPENDIXI

SAMPLECOPYOFASIGNEDAPPLICATIONTOPURCHASEANDFARMERSUNDERTAKING(APFU)

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APPENDIXII

SAMPLECOPYOFTHEMEMORANDUMOFAGREEMNTSIGNEDBYTHETARLACDEVELOPMENTCORPORATION(TADECO),HACIENDALUISITA,INC.(HLI),ANDTHEFARMWOKERSWHOQUALIFYAS

BENEFICIARIESOFTHECOMPREHENSIVEAGRARIANREFORMPROGRAM(CARP)

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APPENDIXIII

DEPARTMENTOFAGRICULTURE(DAR)2014BRIEFINGPAPER“HACIENDALUISITAINC.CARPCOVERAGE”

BasisofCoverage

• 1stSCDecision–July5,2011• 2ndSCDecision–November22,2011• April24,2012DecisionofSupremeCourtonHLIversusPARC

Ø DeniedtheMotiontoClarifyandReconsiderResolutionofNovember22,2011datedDecember16,2011filedHLIandtheMotionforReconsideration/ClarificationdatedDecember9,2011filedbyprivaterespondentsNoelMallari,JulioSuniga,SupervisoryGroupofHaciendaLuisita,Inc.andWindsorAndaya

Ø AffirmedtheSC’sJuly5,2011DecisionasmodifiedbyitsNovember22,2011ResolutionwiththefurthermodificationthatthegovernmentpayHLIjustcompensationforhomelotsdistributedtoFWBs

Ø Decisionisfinalandexecutory(nofurtherpleadingtobeentertained)Ø EntryofJudgementifthedecisionmadeupontimeofpromulgation(i.e.April24,

2012)Ø PARCResolutionrevokingtheStockDistributionPlan(SDP)ofHLIwasaffirmedØ Onlythe4,915.75hectaresthatwasthesubjectofthe1989SDPofHLI(outof

thetotal6,443hectareofHaciendaLuisita)iscoveredbytheDecision.NothinginthedecisionshouldpreventtheDARfromcoveringtheremainingbalanceshoulditdeemitcoveredunderCARP

Ø Fromthe4,915.75hectares,theDARmustsegregatethe500-hectareportionthatwasalreadysoldtoLuisitaRealty,Inc.andLuisitaIndustrialParkCorporationandthe80.51-hectareportionthatwasexpropriatedfortheSubic-Clark-TarlacExpressway(SCTEX)

Profile

AreaPerTitle 5,149Has.AreaAcquired 4,500HasTotalNo.ofTitlesTransferredToRP 51AreaTransferredtoFWBs 4,099HasAreaRetainedtoRP 401Has.

(Commonareas,suchasfishponds,accessroads,firebreaks,quarriedsites,etc)

3MunicipalitiesCovered TarlacCity,LaPaz,Conception,

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10TotalNo.ofBarangaysCovered Asturias,Balete,Bantog,Cutcut,Lourdes,MapalacsiaoforTarlacCity;MotricoforLaPaz;andPando,ParangandMabilogforConception

DAROperationalPlantoImplementSCDecision

MajorActivitiesUndertaken

ResearchandGatheringofBasicDocumentse.gtaxdeclarations,titles,ASPs:listofMOAVoter’slist,HLIFWB6296list,HLIStockholders’listandothervitaldocuments

DatabaseBuild-upofHLIFWB6296list,MOAVoter’slistandHLIStockholders’listasbasisfortheidentificationofpotentialfarmworkerbeneficiaries

SocialPreparation

Ø December19,2011–SkillsTrainingforInfo-DriveSpeakers

CFDocumentationCompletion

• ApprovalfsurveyplanbyLMS• Allocationoflots• SubmissiontoLandBankofcompletedclaimfolder

Valuation

• IssuanceofMemorandumofValuationtoDAR• IssuanceofHLI&PostingofNoticeofLandValuation&Acquisition• InitialpaymenttoHLIandissuanceofaCertificateofDeposit

DistributionofLand

• IssuanceofRPtitlebytheRegisterofDeeds• GenerationandregistrationofCLOA• InstallationofFWBs

• ConductofinformationCampaign

• InterviewofFWBapplicant

• EncodingandProcessing

• PostingofMasterlistofFWBs

• Petitionforinclusion/exclusion

• PostingofFinalMasterlistofFWBs

• Preparationofsurveymodule/biddingofsurveyservices

• Research,projectionanddeterminationofnetareafordistribution

• Conductofperimeter/segregationsurvey

• Subdivisionandmonumenting

• Preparationofsurveyreturns

• SubmissiontoLMS-DENRforapproval

• Organizationaldevelopmentandcapacitybuilding

• Socio-economicmappingorprofiling

• Scoping• Projectdevelopment

• Contractingofaccountingfirm

• AuditofHLIandCLIrecordsinconnectionwithsaleof500haandexpropriationof80ha

• SubmissionofcompliancereporttotheSupremeCourt

Page73of83

Ø January16,2012–BriefingforInfoDriveSpeakersonNovember22,2011SCDecision

Ø January20,2012–FinalBriefingof180DARPersonnelInfoDriveSpeakersforMassiveInfoCampaignonNovember22,2011SCDecision

Ø January21,2012–ConductofMassiveInformationCampaignonNovember22,2011SCDecisionin10Barangays

Ø May9&17,2012–OrientationofDARpersonnelfortheMassiveInfoCampaignonFinalSCDecision

Ø May9&17,2012,DistributionofInterviewScheduleStubs

Identification,Profiling,ScreeningandValidationofPotentialFWBs

Ø May22,2012–BriefingontheDetailedInstructionspriortotheConductofInterview

Ø May23toJune10,2012–InterviewofPotentialFarmworkerBeneficiaries

SummaryofInterviewedHLIPotentialFarmworkerBeneficiaries

BARANGAYNAME NO.OFPFWBsASTURIAS 525BALETE 966BANTOG 617CUTCUT 944LOURDES 821MABILOG 822

MAPALACSIAO 1,085MOTRICO 943PANDO 830PARANG 999

GrandTotal 8,552Ø DigitalScanning,Encoding&ProofreadingofISFsatDARCOBackroomOperations

contractedwithUBIXØ SortingandCodingofInterviewSheetFoldersbyBarangayatDARPOØ PostingoftarpsanddistributionofinterviewedPFWBslistingswithscheduleto

barangayleaders&CSOsØ August8-10,2012–2ndRoundInterviewOrientation/BriefingØ August13-24,2012–Conductof2ndRoundInterviewwithadditional89newapplicants

leavingatotalnumberof8,641PFWBsinterviewedØ September2012–Processingof8,641PFWBssubmitteddocumentsanddatavalidation

againstHLI6296andMOAvoters’lists

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ResultsofISFProcessing

BARANGAYNAME PreliminaryListNo.ofFWBs

ProvisionalListNo.ofPFWBs

ASTURIAS 370 86BALETE 664 107BANTOG 375 88CUTCUT 542 173LOURDES 534 93MABILOG 547 124

MAPALACSIAO 701 104MOTRICO 578 134PANDO 504 150PARANG 550 162

GrandTotal 5365 1221

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Ø October31,2012§ SimultaneouspostingofPreliminaryMasterlistandProvisionalListin10

Barangays§ PostingofTarpsanddistributionofKitstoCSOleadersand10Barangay

ChairmenofHLI.KitscontainPreliminaryMasterlist,ProvisionalList,PatalastasandNoticewiththeinstructiononhowtofilethePetitionforInclusion/Exclusion

Ø November5to30,2012–Submissionofadditionaldocument/proofsasbonafideHLI“manggagawangbukid”ofPFWBsintheProvisionalListandfilingofPetitionforInclusion/Exclusion

SubmissionofAdditionalDocumentsSummaryofPFWBsintheProvisionalList

BARANGAYNo.ofFWBswho

SubmittedAdditionalDocuments

No.ofFWBswhodidnotSubmitAdditionalDocuments

ASTURIAS 42 44BALETE 58 49BANTOG 37 49CUTCUT 112 62LOURDES 51 42MABILOG 103 25

MAPALACSIAO 63 41MOTRICO 98 41PANDO 102 47PARANG 116 39

GrandTotal 782 439

SummaryofPFWBswhoFiledPetitionforInclusion

Municipal/BarangayAddress No.ofApplicants

ASTURIAS 4BALETE 43BANTOG 20CENTRAL 2CUTCUT 13DPCH 2

LOURDES 10MABILOG 51

MAPALACSIAO 70MOTRICO 6PANDO 38PARANG 100PURA 1

GrandTotal 360*TherewasnoPetitionforExclusionfiledatDARPO

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Ø December10,2012–SeminarWorkshoponthePreparationofSwornStatementsEvaluationofAdditionalDocumentsandAssessmentofthe…

Ø December17to22,2012–GettingtheSinumpaangSalaysayfromInterviewedApplicants

Ø January4,2013–HLICommitteeandSub-CommitteeMembersMeeting/OrientationØ January21to23,2013–ProcessingofPFWBsFolderswhoSubmittedAdditional

EvidenceintheProvisionallistandwithfiledPetitionofinclusionbyDARNationwideLegalTeam

Ø January28to29,2013–HLIOver-allCommitteeMeetingRegardingtheFinalizationofHLI’sMasterlistofFarmworkerBeneficiaries

Ø February21,2013–PreliminaryOcularInspectionØ February27,2013–PostingofFinalMasterlistwith6,212qualifiedFWBs

LandAcquisition

Ø ClaimFolderDocumentationperTitle

LOCATION(a)

TITLENO.(b)

LOTNO.(c)

AREA/TITLE(d)

AREAAcquired/CARPABLE

(e)

AREANON-CARP

(f)LAPAZ T-236740 1,434.4829 1,093.5564 57.2838 T-240205 88-B 213.3321 T-401428 2-A 0.5152 T-401428 2-C 1.2302 T-240207 124-B 0.3629 SUB-TOTAL 1,308.4816 57.7990 TARLAC T-236741 1783.7684 799.0328 552.7322 T-287947 3 21.0189 T-287948 4 2.3639 T-287949 5 152.8236 T-287950 6 3.2245 T-287951 7 0.9032 T-287952 8 1.2833 T-287953 9 0.2752 T-287954 10 0.5255 T-287955 11 3.5310 T-287956 12 12.0821 T-240195 138-B 2.7402 SUB-TOTAL 999.8042 552.7322 CONCEPTION T-236742 1804.9834 38.2293 T-240201 40.7584 T-240203 5.6684 T-400303 35.8651 SUBTOTAL 1887.2753 38.2293

TOTAL 5,149.5581 4,195.5611 648.7605

Note:Non-Carpableincludeconverted,SCTEXandresidentialareas

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Ø ConductofSurvey• October4,2012–ExecutionofServiceContractforthesurveyofHLIbetween

theDARandFFCruz&Co.,Inc.(Contractor)asthewinningbidder• October5,2012–IssuanceofNoticetoProceed(NTP)bytheDARandreceived

byFFCruzCo.,• November11,2012–ConductofAerialPhotogrammetry• January24,2013–SubmissionofAerialPhotogrammetryoutput• October2013toMay2014–FabricationofMonuments• SegregationSurvey(SCTEX,accessroad,cemetery,residentialareas)

§ DateSubmittedtoLRA–May2,2013§ Dateapproved–June14,2013;13plans

• 3rdwkFebto2ndwkMar2013–PreparationofImaginaryConsolidationandSubdivisionPlans

• ApprovalofConsolidation/SubdivisionPlansMunicipality DateSubmitted

toLRADateofApproval

1. Tarlac June14,2013 July3,20132. LaPaz July4,2013 July8,20133. Conception July10,2013 July15,2013

Ø BLDHLISystemsDevelopment• LotAllocationRaffleSystems

§ AutoKaMappingSystem§ MapInfo/GISSystem§ LotAllocationCertificatePrinting&TaggingSystems§ ApplicationtoPurchase&Farmer’sUndertakingPrinting&Tagging

Systems§ HLISystemReports

• CLOAGenerationSystemØ LotAllocationRaffle

• MarchtoApril2013–SubmissionofTabi-tabiManipesto&additionaldocumentsofrepresentativesof6,212FWBswhoaredeceased,inabroudandinthePhilippines

SummaryofFWBswithTabi-tabiManipesto

Barangay No.ofGroups

No.ofFWBs

Asturias 16 98Balete 57 342Bantog 39 224Cut-CutII 67 344Lourdes 54 345Mabilog 103 548

Mapalacsiao 63 374

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Motrico 83 451Pando 94 524Parang 113 554

GrandTotal 689 3,804• IssuanceofLotAllocationCertificates(LAC)&OathTakingandSigningofApplication

toPurchaseandFarmer’sUndertaking(APFU)

LotAllocationBarangaySchedule

Barangay PetsangPalabunutanCUTCUT July18&19,2013(Huwebes&Biyernes)LOURDES July22&23,2013(Lunes&Martes)BANTOG July25&26,2013(Huwebes&Biyernes)ASTURIAS July29&30,2013(Lunes&Martes)MOTRICO August1&2,2013(Huwebes&Biyernes)PANDO August5&6,2013(Lunes&Martes)MABILOG August8&9,2013(Huwebes&Biyernes)PARANG August12&13,2013(Lunes&Martes)BALETE August15&16,2013(Huwebes&Biyernes)MAPALACSIAO August19,20&21,2013(Lunes,Martes&Miyerkules

LotAllocationSummary

Raffle/Address LotAllocationBarangays Barangay Asturias Balete Bantog Cut-cut Lourdes Mabilog Mapalacsiao Motrico Pando Parang TotalAsturias 263 179 442Balete 87 30 307 311 735Bantog 233 202 435Cut-cut 3 523 120 646Lourdes 122 1 282 4 177 586Mabilog 637 1 638

Mapalacsiao 21 163 500 62 65 811Motrico 669 1 670Pando 603 603Parang 646 646

GrandTotal 385 87 236 524 312 965 167 1847 976 713 6212

• January17to24,2014–FieldFacilitatorspostingoftarpsandservingofletterstoFWBsintheFinalMasterListwhofailedtoclaimtheirLACandsigntheirAPFUwithadeadlineuntilFebruary15,2014

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LBPProcessingandValuationLOCATION

(a)TITLENO.

(b)

DATE W/CODDate(j)

W/RPTITLEDate@ROD

(k)MOV(g)

NVLA(h)

ORDERTODEPOSITE(i)

LAPAZ T-236740 May15,2013 May16,2013 May20,2013 May23,2013 June03,2013 T-240205 April26,2013 May02,2013 May02,2013 May06,2013 May20,2013 T-401428 T-401428 April26,2013 May02,2013 May02,2013 May06,2013 May20,2013 T-240207 April26,2013 May02,2013 May02,2013 May06,2013 May20,2013 TARLAC T-236741 May24,2013 May30,2013 May31,2013 June4,2013 June17,2013 T-287947 April26,2013 May02,2013 May02,2013 May06,2013 May20,2013 T-287948 April26,2013 May02,2013 May02,2013 May06,2013 May20,2013 T-287949 April26,2013 May02,2013 May02,2013 May06,2013 May20,2013 T-287950 April26,2013 May02,2013 May02,2013 May06,2013 May20,2013 T-287951 April26,2013 May02,2013 May02,2013 May06,2013 May20,2013 T-287952 April26,2013 May02,2013 May02,2013 May06,2013 May20,2013 T-287953 April26,2013 May02,2013 May02,2013 May06,2013 May20,2013 T-287954 April26,2013 May02,2013 May02,2013 May06,2013 May20,2013 T-287955 April26,2013 May02,2013 May02,2013 May06,2013 May20,2013 T-287956 April26,2013 May02,2013 May02,2013 May06,2013 May20,2013 T-240195 April26,2013 May02,2013 May02,2013 May06,2013 May20,2013 CONCEPTION T-236742 May15,2013 May16,2013 May20,2013 May23,2013 June3,2013 T-240201 April26,2013 May02,2013 May02,2013 May06,2013 May20,2013 T-240203 April26,2013 May02,2013 May02,2013 May06,2013 May20,2013 T-400303 April26,2013 May02,2013 May02,2013 May06,2013 May20,2013

CLOAGenerationandRegistrationSummaryofCLOAGenerationandRegistration

AsofJuly3,2014

BarangayRegistered ForRegistration

No.ofFWBs No.ofCLOAs No.ofFWBs No.ofCLOAsPANDO 603 664 MOTRICO 666 719 3 3LOURDES 586 652 PARANG 642 719 1 1MABILOG 635 707 3 4BANTOG 379 432 50 55CUTCUT 574 628 9 10ASTURIAS 400 453 25 29BALETE 674 729 11 11MAPALACSIAO 751 852 23 28

TOTAL 5910 6555 125 141CLOADistribution

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Ø September30toOctober8,2013–CLOADistributionscheduleatHLIBarangays

SummaryofCLOATitlesDistributionAsofJuly3,2014

BarangayNo.ofCLOADISTRIBUTED No.ofCLOAsUndistributedFWBs CLOAs FWBs CLOAs

603 664 0 0MOTRICO 665 718 1 1LOURDES 585 651 1 1PARANG 641 717 1 2MABILOG 635 707 0 0BANTOG 378 431 1 1CUTCUT 567 618 7 10ASTURIAS 396 448 4 5BALETE 648 703 26 26MAPALACSIAO 737 834 14 18

TOTAL 5910 6555 55 64*FigureincludesCLOAsdistributedatDARPO

Ø August26,2014–DARSecretaryIssuanceofOrderre:RequestofForty-six(46)FarmworkerBeneficiariesforPermissiontoClaimtheLotAllocationCertificateandtoExecuteApplicationtoPurchaseandFarmer’sUndertaking(with125FWBsdisqualified)

Ø August27,2014–IssuanceofNoticeofOrderre:RequestofForty-six(46)FarmworkerBeneficiariesforPermissiontoClaimtheLotAllocationCertificateandtoExecuteApplicationtoPurchaseandFarmer’sUndertakingbytheAssistantSecretary/OICHEA

Ø September4to12,2014–Sheriff’sserviceofOrdertothe46FWBswhoweregrantedtoclaimtheirLACandsigntheirAPFUandtothe125disqualifiedFWBs

Statuesof171FWBswhofailedtoexecuteAPFU

46FWBsgrantedtosignAPFU(Ordersuccessfullyserved)

43FWBssignedandclaimedtheirAPFUs3stilldidnotclaimtheirAPFU

125FWBsdisqualified33refusedtoreceivethecopyofthe

Orders/registeredmail92successfullyserved–13filedtheirletterrequesttograntthesigningoftheirAPFU

(afterAug.26,2014)

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SettingoutofBoundariesandMonumenting

Ø November28,2013–Postingof“Babala”tarpsonAlteringBoundariesandLandmarkstoallHLIbarangays

Ø December10,2013–Postingof“Paunawa”tarpson“Arrienda”toallHLIbarangays

ARBInstallation

Ø January28,2014–StartedARBInstallationconductedbyadminatBlock2ofbarangayMapalacsiaowhichconsistof46lotsinvolving45ARBs.

Ø May31,2014–Lastdayofinstallation

ProgramBeneficiariesandDevelopment

Ø May23to25,2013–InformationDriveonAgriculturalSupportServicesØ October15,2013–AreaProfilingandReconnaissance

• Profilingorrice,vegetablesandothercropswasundertakentogeneratepertinentdatasuchastotalareadevotedtocropsotherthansugarcane

• Complexissuesonarienda(leasing)system• Rice,Vegetablesandothercropsshallbethetake-offpointoftheagricultural

developmentcomponentofPBD

AreaProfilingResults

3,584.35

446.9

48.77 19.9

AreaDevotedbyTypeofCrops

Sugarcane Rice Vegetables IdleLands

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Ø February23to25,2014–PBDInfoDrivere:ARBOFormationØ MarchtoApril2014–SECRegistrationofthetenHLIARBOs

21.74

272.4927.96

28.09

18.21

15.7124.34 5.6

32.75

RICEPRODUCTIONAREA=446.90has

CUT-CUT MOTRICO BANTOG ASTURIAS LOURDES

MAPALACSIAO PARANG MABILOG PANDO

24.4853

0.74421.0672.3727

7.3553

6.9834

5.8152

VEGETABLEPRODUCTIONAREA=48.77has

CUT-CUT BANTOG LOURDES MAPALACSIAO PARANG MABILOG PANDO

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OE-NADAandARCCESSProgramActivities

Ø April15,2014–MOAsigningwithTarlacStateUniversity(TSU)&TarlacCollegeofAgriculture(TCA)aspartnerProfessionalServiceProviderintheconductofOE-NADA

Ø April24toMay2,2014–ConductofOrganizationalEnterprise–NeedsAssessmentandDesignAssessment(OE-NADA)inallbarangayofHLI

Ø May8,2014–MeetingwithTsUandTCAre:BDScomponentofARCCESSprogramforHLIFWBs

Ø May9,2014–OrientationconductedbyBSWNre:FertilityAssessmentresultDARPOØ May13,2014–SubmissionofInitialDraftsbySUCsfortheOE-NADAresultatDARPOØ May16,17&18,2014–PBDGroundingcumplanningsessionwithBARBD&DARPO

Staff/FFsØ May23,2014–SubmissionofIdentifiedStrategicGoals&Objectives,aswellastheKey

Taskstobedonere:ARBOsOrganizationalDevelopment&Strengthening/EnterpriseDevelopment(DARPOlevel)

Ø May20,2014–TechnicalreviewAndFeedbackingSessionsontheOE-NADAwithDAR,TarlacCollegeofAgricultureandARBOs

Ø May21,2014–TechnicalreviewAndFeedbackingSessionsontheOE-NADAwithDAR,TarlacStateUniversityandARBOs

Ø May30,2014–PresentationofutputbyDARPOtoBARBDØ June3,2014–Endorsementof10HLIARBOsFinalDraftofOE-NADAReports

Interventions

Ø May31,2014toDec.2014–PreparationofProjectProposals(AES/BDSComponents)• ConductofVariouslivelihoodtrainings/seminars(inhouse&communitybased)• ProvisionofAgri-ExtensionServices/BusinessDevelopmentServicestoHLI

ARBOs(uponapprovaloftheproposalsunderARCCESSProgram)Ø May30-June4,2014–FieldFacilitatorsIdentificationofActualCultivatorsinHacienda

LuisitaØ June6,2014–ExploratoryConferenceofDARRe:TermsofReference(TOR)ofAESand

BDSEngagementinHLIØ June9,2014–PBDMeetingRe:OrientationofVegetableProductionandDistributionof

AssortedVegetableSeedsinHLIonJune17,18,19,24,25,2014.

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