Coping With Social Deprivation

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Rather than waiting or

the local governmentauthorities that are closest

to them (and with a lot o

money), the local people in

oil-producing communities,

through sel-organizing and

sel-governing activities,

have planned and executed

essential social services.


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Coping Wih Social Deprivaion

hrough Self-Governing Insiuions in

Oil Communiies of NigeriaS R. Aa

In spite of the fact that Nigeria relies on oil for the main

source of its revenue, the communities where crude oil is

extracted lack important social services. The politics of exclu-

sion adopted by the Nigerian state is largely responsible for

this lack, which in turn breeds resentment and aggression

on the part of the people, who respond in various ways,

using various strategies for various reasons. Some people have

adopted a negative approach, using violent and confronta-

tional means, but others have revived their old traditions,

rooted in collective action: through self-organizing and self-

governing capabilities, they have worked to meet the needs

of their communities and have achieved some success in

providing social services. Social disparities among the Nige-

rian state, its oil partners, and the oil communities can be

addressed if a new institutional arrangement, one that could

use existing self-organizing and self-governing institutions as

building blocks for reconstituting order from the bottom up,

is designed and implemented.

Inroducion

The Nigerian state relies on oil as the main source o its revenue, but the

communities where crude oil is extracted generally suer poverty, neglect,

environmental degradation, and the denial o undamental human rights

(Naanen 1995; Obi 2004:450). The aluence exhibited by many oil-company

workers and political oiceholders in Nigeria sharply contrasts with the

social deprivation o most residents o oil communities (Akinola 1992, 1998,

2000, 2003b, 2005; Obi 2004:448). A consequence o such deprivation has

been violent protests and demonstrations by marginalized youths.


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1993; Robinson 1996; Rowell 1994). In response, the people o oil commu-

nities resist this oppression in various ways (Douglas and Ola 1999:334;

Obi 2000b:281). These people can be divided into our groups on the basis

o their perception o the problem and their methods o addressing it. The

rst two groups are elites; the other two are nonelites. The rst group, thepoliticians and bureaucrats, adopts clientelism, constantly adjusting its

strategies to romanticize with and benet rom all governments in power,

whether military or civilian. The other group o elites, though very ew,

condescends to the level o ordinary person in oil communities and con-

tinues to champion the course o reedom rom oppression, exploitation,

injustice, and poverty. In this group were people like Ken Saro Wiwa and the

other eight Ogonis hanged by the military regime o the Late General Sanni

Abacha on 15 November 1995. Similarly, the nonelites organize themselves

into two groups. The rst adopts a crude approach, by using violence in put-ting pressure to bear on the ederal government and oil multinationals; this

group is not interested in any orderly manner and has been responsible or

most pipeline explosions, takings o hostages, vandalization o oil installa-

tions, and so on. In the second group o nonelites are the grassroots people,

who invest their sovereignty horizontally in one another through collective

action and sel-organizing arrangements to address inrastructural problems

at the community level.

Several studies examine the rst three groups, but little is known

about the ourth; hence, my concern is to study this group so as to ascertainits contributions or otherwise to the development o the oil communities.

A sel-governing institution (SGI) can be dened as an institution crated

by the people, without external intererence, in an attempt to solve their

common problems within their locality or community. It is also called a

people-oriented, people-centered, or community-based institution (Akinola

2005; Ayo 2002; McGinnis 1999; Olowu and Wunsch 2004; E. Ostrom 1990,

1999; E. Ostrom, J. Walker, and R. Gardner 1992; V. Ostrom 1994, 1997, 2000;

V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom 2003; Sawyer 2005; Wunsch and Olowu 1995). This

paper examines how such institutions cope with the challenges o socialdeprivation in selected oil communities in Nigeria. It identies actors that

avor collective action among local people and how they organize themselves

to address their lack o social services. To ascertain the role that these insti-

tutions play in coping with the challenges o social deprivation, empirical

data were collected on the provision o social servicesroads, bridges, water

supply, education, health, and so onin the Niger Delta region.

theoreical Framework

Thi d t bli h i th hi h i th d t l


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order in a human societyan approach in which people are seen as sharing

a community o understanding in oering solutions to the problems o daily

lie in a rule-ordered relationship (V. Ostrom et al. 1988:51).

Public-choice scholars emphasize the development o an alternative

institutional paradigm by calling attention to the peoples sel-governing andsel organizing capabilities. Though this paradigm was originally conceived

within the context o American experiences, it has become a potent alterna-

tive eectively employed by Arican scholars (Akinola 2005; Ayittez 1991;

Ayo 2002; Olowu 1999, 2006), who have conrmed the resilience and eec-

tiveness o institutions designed and managed by the people. Sel-governance

demonstrates the sel-organizing capabilities o local communities and the

tendency to relate with one another in a rule-ordered relationship, sharing

ideas, and using their own initiatives and institutional potentials to address

problems o daily existence. Sel-governance empowers citizens, protectsindividual choice, and allows or polycentric institutional arrangement: it

permits citizens to join with one another to take collective action. Through

sel-organizing capacities, it helps promote human development (Wunsch

and Olowu 1995:274).

Theories o collective action suggest that individuals under certain

institutional arrangements and shared norms can organize and sustain

cooperation that advances the common interest o the group in which they

belong (see, or example, E. Ostrom 1990). This line o thought recognizes

that human beings can organize and govern themselves according to appro-priate institutional arrangements and mutual agreements in a community

o understanding. This is the undamental o institutional analysis and

development (IAD) ramework, which emphasizes institutional arrangement

designed by people who cooperate based on rules and constitution o their

choice, and can thereby resolve socioeconomic and political problems that

others (external to their conditions) are incapable o doing or them.

The existence and operation o these institutions does not replace the

role o government: rather, it redenes it. The most important role o govern-

ment in a polycentric order is to help local people resolve their conficts ointerest in ways that remain consistent with societal standards o airness:

government should not be involved in too many things; it should play the

roles o acilitator and supervisor to ensure airness and justice.

IAD considers the role o evolution, culture, learning, and social

norms in the discourse on collective action (E. Ostrom and Walker 2003).

Institutional structures that people have developed avail individuals in the

community to make inputs to development in their locality by contribut-

ing toward projects (labour, nance, and materials) and decision-making,

especially in rural settings. According to Sawyer (2005:3), institutionalanalysis helps us better understand how individuals within communities,

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settings. Understanding institutions is a process o learning what they do,

how and why they work, how to create or modiy them, and eventually how

to convey that knowledge to others.

Examples o local peoples provision o public goods using institutions

designed by the people are well documented throughout Arican continent(Akinola 2000, 2003a, 2004, 2005; Barkan, McNulty, and Ayeni 1991; Insti-

tute o Development Studies 2001; McGaey 1992; Okotoni and Akinola

1996; Olowu, Ayo, and Akande 1991; Olowu and Erero 1997; Smock 1971).

Many Arican societies support a vibrant associational lie (Hyden 2006),

in which community institutions deliver goods and services better than

state-run institutions do.

Similarly, indigenous structures o governance in communities across

Nigeria help people order their lives and solve their problems (Ayo 2002).

The success and achievement o CDAs traverse cultural, linguistic, andnational boundaries. As an institution, a CDA is gender-neutral (Awotona

and Akinola 1996), a universal key to grassroots development, adopted by

decentralized democratic systems o governance in developed societies:

In contrast to the general weakness o ormal local govern-

ments, many inormal governance initiatives have developed

in Arica, and been quite active in perorming what are usu-

ally the unctions o ormal local governments, especially

in delivering social services, providing policing, and engag-ing in economic development / income-enhancing activities.

(Wunsch 2008)

These institutions play important roles in socioeconomic development. The

sel-governing propensities and capabilities o institutional arrangements

evolved directly by the people are indispensable or harnessing community

potentials to achieve sel-reliance and improved governance. The decentral-

ization o governance to the level o local government has not enhanced

sel-governing capabilities o the people at grassroots levels (Wunsch andOlowu 1995); besides, there is a growing awareness o the need to strengthen

community institutions that have acilitated sel-reliant development at

local levels.

Sel-governing institutions in oil communities o Nigeria exist at the

grassroots without oicial connection with state-based institutions. They

operate in parallel with governments, their agencies (oil commissions), and

oil companies. Under ideal circumstances, these people-oriented institu-

tions, governments, and oil companies would operate together as stakehold-

ers in development and as colleagues with equal standing within socioeco-nomic and political arenas; however, they have not done so: governments

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producing communities. For instance, several ederally established commis-

sions and agencies have relied on a centralized system o governance, which

excludes the grassroots rom making decisions. Hitherto, emphasis has been

on physical capital at the expense o social capital and people-oriented insti-

tutions. Since 1999, especially ater the inception Nigerias nascent democ-racy (in that year), the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, the Niger

Delta Development Commission, and oil companies have been ocusing

their attentions on inrastructure: roads, electricity, health acilities, water

supply, and training and vocational programs in the oil communities. They

have spent a lot o money on these projects, but with little local impact;

hence, problems in the region have accumulated and worsened. An impor-

tant actor that accounts or the negligible impact o oicials operations in

the region is corruption, which may be diicult to address until appropriate

institutional arrangements are put in place.Over the years, several initiatives have been established or the oil

region, initiatives such as the Oil Mineral Areas Development Commis-

sion, the Niger Delta Development Board, the River Basin Development

Authority, the Presidential Task Force on Niger Delta Development, the Oil

Mineral Producing Area Development Commission, and the Niger-Delta

Development Commissionnone o which has let an enduring legacy.

Despite these ederally authorized programs and commissions, the residents

o oil-producing communities still have unullled hopes and aspirations.

Oil money is allegedly stolen and plundered by Nigerian leaders at all levelso government, or by their agencies. For instance, the European Union (EU)

representative, Richard Gozney, part o the EU act-nding mission to Rivers

State, stated that:

circumstances surrounding the spending attitudes o govern-

ment at all levels in the country (Nigeria), especially in the

Niger-Delta states, and the recent windall in the global oil

market indicated that the country was rich. (Nigerian Tribune,

26 October 2004, p. 3)

The level o pillage and plundering o public resources is not limited to

oil communities; it is emblematic o the corruption pervading Nigerias

larger society. The picture was captured by the IMF and World Bank when

they described Nigeria as a country where oil wealth has not beneted its

populace (Vanguard, 12 August 2003, p. 1). In the same manner, a report

by Human Rights Watch asserts: Much greater sums o money are fow-

ing rom the Federal Government to the Delta region but ordinary people

living in the Delta see little, i any, benet rom these unds (2003, p. 37).What puzzles analysts and observers is that while some groups are agitat-

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involvement o sel-governing people-oriented institutions. Consequently,

the misuse o public resources, corruption, and low accountability o gov-

ernment oicials in the region continues. The marginalized people o oil-

producing communitieswhose poverty rate (measured as the share o

the population subsisting on less than $1 per day) increased rom close to36 percent in 1970 to just less than 70 percent in 2000have not received

benets rom oil-windall revenues, estimated cumulatively to total US$350

billion (Ogon 2005).

Governments and their agencies have been unable to respond to the

needs and aspirations o the people because o a centralized system o gov-

ernance, but the local people in oil communities have responded to their

common challenges through shared strategies and problem-solving inter-

dependencies. They rely on rules in use1 to regulate their conduct and

interaction toward the provision o social services.Public-choice scholars may well ask what role culture plays in col-

lective action and sel-governing arrangements in oil communities o Nige-

ria: what kinds o incentives can promote cooperation and sel-governing

arrangements? I constitutional choice structures human relationships in

some undamental sense, how can constitutional institutions infuence

cooperation, collective action, and sel-governing arrangements in oil com-

munities o Nigeria? This paper attempts to answer some o these questions

using empirical analysis o how communities are sel-organized to produce

social services that can sustain peoples livelihoods.

Research Mehodology

Oil communities in Nigeria comprise nine states: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa,

Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and River States. Six o these states

orm the area commonly called the Niger Delta; the remaining three (Abia,

Imo, and Ondo) do not belong to the Niger Delta region, but are called oil-

producing states. In the Niger Delta area live members o several minoritytribes, such as the Ijaws (mostly in the riverine area), the Ilaje, the Itsekiri,

the Urhobo, and others. In this paper, or the purpose o uniormity, all nine

states are called oil-producing states, and the communities where oil is

extracted are called oil communities.

In the course o generating data or this paper, seven local government

areas (LGAs) rom three o the oil-producing states were surveyed between

2003 and 2004. Between June and September 2003, data were collected rom

three oil-producing states: Bayelsa, Ondo, and Rivers. Similar data were col-

lected between October and November 2004 rom Gokana, Khana, and TaiLGAs, Rivers State; Brass, Sagbama, and Yenegoa LGAs in Bayelsa State; and

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Community leaders and leaders o community development associa-

tions (CDAs) were interviewed using an interview guide to ascertain the

degree o social-services provision by these associations, particularly on

how decisions are made, priorities determined, projects executed, and so on.

Data were collected on the resource-mobilization strategies o the selectedassociations and the cost the associations expended on community projects,

including roads, bridges, water supply, education, and health. Data on the

amount o money spent on these projects were collected rom all the associa-

tions covered during the survey: or space considerations, the inormation

is merely summarized here; however, to demonstrate certain operational

strategies, detailed analysis on some o these associations is presented.

Financial statistics were collected rom local government oicials to

determine the contributions o local governments to social-service develop-

ment at the grassroots. Similarly, nancial statistics were extracted romoicial documents in the oice o the Accountant General o the Federation

in Abuja (The Federal Capital Territory) to determine the amount o money

transerred rom the central government to the local government councils

in the oil region.

Self-Governing Insiuions in Oil Communiies of Nigeria

Sel-governing institutions (SGIs), otherwise known as community-basedinstitutions, can be classied into two broad categories in the oil communi-

ties: indigenous and endogenous. Indigenous SGIs are a legacy o precolonial

experiences, and endogenous SGIs are a postindependence development, one

that grew or arose rom indigenous contexts to address modern-day challenges.

Western infuence, particularly education and religion, has undoubtedly shaped

them, but they take their inspiration rom indigenous settings, and they have

emerged in response to present-day realities. They are not exogenous in any

respect, but were merely infuenced by Western culture. Detailed histories o

them can be ound elsewhere (Adedeji and Onigu 1997). Though these institu-tions exhibit variation in their origin, they share common experiences in their

community-development operations. Beore the advent o British government,

the people o Niger Delta and the Ibos in Abia and Imo states had operated

an egalitarian system, which had enabled these societies to be sel-governing.

Similarly, oil communities in Ondo State (the Ilaje part o Yorubaland) had a

sel-regulating system o governance beore the colonial invasion.

In the rst group (indigenous institutions) are traditional institutions,

community-development associations (CDAs) or town-development unions

(TDUs), age-grade societies, trade groups (e.g., shermens associations,blacksmiths associations, market-womens associations). The second group

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Two examples o sel-governing community-based institutions dis-

cussed in this paper are CDAs, and TDUs, and age-grade societiesinsti-

tutions that mobilize people and their material resources or community

projects. Many unction as a nonpartisan umbrella or rallying community

members to address common problems. An age-grade association is organizedalong gender and age lines, while a CDA is gender-neutral and age-neutral.

CDAs, TDUs, and age-grade societies at the grassroots level perorm several

unctions, including (a) inrastructural development o the village or com-

munity; (b) settlement o individual and intervillage disputes; (c) promotion

o community relations; (d) maintenance o sociocultural unctions; and (e)

overall local governance o the community, including the ormulation and

execution o policies and laws.

CDAs and TDUs (or village-development committees) are ound in

every community, town, and village. Their oicers are elected by membersthrough an open ballot system during annual meetings. The oices consist

o chairman or president, vice chairman or vice president, secretary, assistant

secretary, treasurer, nancial secretary, public-relations oicer, and auditor.

Oicers hold oice or between two and ve years, depending on each insti-

tutions constitution. Some o these institutions have written constitutions,

but others depend on oral methods. Oral constitutions are very common

and useul, because they are usually crated and amended through a com-

munity assembly that benets rom participation by members endowed with

sharp memories. Each age grade is social, but has political implications, asits unctions make the structures and processes o indigenous government

diuse to involve everybody. Even children are not let out, as they watch

their parents and elders legislate and judge cases in the town hall. Similarly,

kindred or kinship associations occur throughout the region, as do councils

o elders, which are also sociopolitical organizations. Membership in such

organizations is a mark o identity and belonging.

An age-grade organization operates more or less as a mass party with

eatures o essentially compulsory membership and participation in local

community work. Because such associations are made up o hometowncitizens, members living outside the community are expected to partici-

pate in local aairs and development by sending monetary contributions.

All the people participate in the conduct o their own aairs through ree

discussion, and they act as the nal arbiters in processes directed by elders,

who seek the opinion o their executive assistants, the age-group leaders,

and make their own investigations into particular aspects o the towns

government, administration, and welare. Generally, age grades, in healthy

competition, undertake specic projects, such as constructing wooden

bridges, culverts, and new roads, and building village or community hallsand squares. Decisions taken at the community level easily pass down to all

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and public accountability; and the contributions o CDAs vis--vis those o

local governments.

Democratic Conditions in Sel-Governing Institutions in Oil Communities

The organizational structure and management o sel-governing institu-

tions in the region is unique. The conguration o relationships that bind

the people together in these institutions is cultural value, which plays an

important role in the operational perormance o the institutions. In spite

o socioeconomic deprivation, the people o Niger Delta still demonstrate

commitment to the development o their communities. What could have

accounted or this? The reason may not be unconnected with their culture.

Their contact with Western culture notwithstanding, they still rely on pre-

colonial traditions and experiences o social organization and cooperation.An important aspect o this culture is a system o trust and reciprocity, one

that sustains peoples cooperation. People with a good track record easily

secure popular condence in daily interactions. This has tremendously

helped these community institutions build and sustain trusted institutional

arrangements. Consequently, these arrangements serve as incentives or

leadership in these institutions in rallying their members around community

decisions and projects to combat challenges o daily lie where government

eorts have altered.

The intervention o Western infuence on local culture tends to weakenthe culture, especially among the urban-based people o Niger Delta, but the

people have resorted to utilizing certain elements o their culture, such as

naming and burial ceremonies and rotatory unds (nancial assistance) to

strengthen their culture and secure popular loyalty. For instance, a person

who deaults in payment o a community contribution and levy is considered

a ree-rider. Such a person will nd it diicult to get his people to attend his

naming ceremony or a amily burial ceremony, or to secure unding or busi-

ness assistance. To the people o Niger Delta, these ceremonies and events

are vital. To be deserted by ones people in such occasions would signiysocietal stigma and disgrace to the entire amily and relations. As expected,

these cultural values have tended to secure and reinorce compliance and

the cooperation o community members toward community tasks and at the

same time reduce ree-riding. This cultural actor, invariably, has generated

and strengthened patriotic attitudes that the local people in sel-governing

institutions have demonstrated. For example, in the mid-1980s, Oza-Ngogo

community o Ika South LGA o Delta State, having been disappointed by a

councilor who promised to provide a borehole or the community, decided to

raise money and construct a borehole through sel-eorts. The success o thisproject spurred the community into actions in the early 1990s and provided

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leaders, and leaders o community institutions, especially those with good

track records. This, however, does not mean that such elders or leaders are

immune rom sanctions, i and when they err. The case o the our Ogoni

chies lynched or their perceived collaboration with Shell and Nigerias mili-

tary government proves that political consciousness is gaining ascendancyover traditional power that oppresses the people.

Generally in the oil region, communities are organized into com-

pounds, with compound heads responsible to the community leader or

paramount chie. At the same time, the executives o all the sel-governing

institutions, though independent o the community leader or paramount

chie, respect the community leader or paramount chie. Community devel-

opment is usually addressed by the local CDA. The whole community is

headed by the community leader with his council o elders, and the CDAs

operations are directed by its executives. The CDA operates by dividing thecommunity into wards or quarters, rom which representatives meet with

the central executives o the association. Each ward or quarter is composed

o compounds, and each compound in turn comprises households or ami-

lies. At the same time, age-grade societies, womens associations, and so on

are all connected to the traditional and CDA or TDU structures. In this

orm, inormation is passed to the people through interactive links among

institutions and associations.

Resource Mobilization and Public Accountability in Oil Communities

Resource mobilization is not an easy task in any society. The Niger-Delta

people depend on their cultural values to harness resources rom their sons

and daughters, whether at home or abroad. Families constitute the units o

contribution within each ward. At the community level, once a project is

decided upon, the money or it will be allocated on the basis o the number

o the amilies in each quarter or ward. Each quarter-representative will go

back to his quarter and divide the monetary commitments on the basis o

the number o compounds in the quarter. The compound representatives (notcompound heads) will then mobilize the money according to the number o

adults in that compound. Through amily heads, nancial contributions o

amily members outside the community are collected. At times, a progenitor

pays the money on behal o his children (to be collected rom them later),

or he may send or the children. In most cases, people at home pool their

labor during construction o projects to reduce the cost o the projects, at

least, in nancial terms.

A amiliar code o social justice is applied, and there is prudent man-

agement o public matters and nancial accounts when one considers theimpact o mobilized resources (as is shown later in this paper). The moral

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conscated and sold to recover the unds. Nevertheless, the CDAs and TDUs

did not accomplish their goals and objectives without employing sanctions

on deaulting members. Sanctions vary rom community to community:

in some communities in Rivers State, or example, deaulters household

materials are removed and put outside the house. Because o the commonproblems that unite them, it is rare to nd somebody who would not want

to pay except in adverse circumstances, like sickness, loss o property, and

so on. Most people pay their dues.

Another actor that enhances the achievement o these institutions

is lineage consciousness. All people want to protect their athers names by

paying the appropriate amount. Individuals are usually tasked according to

their status to contribute some amount o money: wealthy people are asked

or larger donations. Above all, launching is organized and unds are raised

or specic projects. Unlike governments, these institutions are not in thehabit o securing loans rom banks or other nancial institutions. Although

local governments also contribute money, their percentage contribution is

small in comparison with their regular monthly allocation rom the ederal

government, as shown in the last column o table 1.

Socioeconomic Activities o Sel-Governing Institutions in Oil Communities

Table 1 shows that the selected institutions have initiated and provided

public goods and services worth more than 83 million, an amount thatconstituted 77.4 percent o 107.3 million, the total cost o the projects.

The local governments in the selected communities contributed 24.2 mil-

lion, which accounts or 22.6 percent o the total money spent on the same

projects.

Eight pipe-borne water projects in Nonwa Tai community in Tai Local

Government were initiated and executed by the Gbogbara Development

Association in 1994. In 1999, the number o mono-pump projects at strate-

gic places in the community was increased to 55. Consequently, the social

impact is immeasurable, as deaths caused by pollution o stream water romthe activities o the oil companies is drastically reduced through the eorts

o these sel-governing institutions.

Similarly, the healthcare project in Tai LGA between 1994 and 1995

was initiated by the women, popularly known as Kawas Forum. It was a

three-year plan, at an estimated cost o 5.0 million. Initially, a launching

was conducted, and 531,000 was realized rom within the community and

the local government. The breakdown o the contributions is as ollows:

youths, 15,000; men, 95,000; women, 205,000; elders, 64,000; chies,

52,000; and the local government, 100,000. The total contributions were5,332,435 (see table 2), which exceeded the projected amount o 5.0 million

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Table 1:

The Activities of Self-Governing Institutions (SGIs) in Oil Communities.

S/N Sel-GoverningInstitution

Projects Executed Contributionby SGI

Contributionby LG

Allocationto LG (June

2002)1 SGIs in Gokana

and KhanaLGAs, Rivers

State

Roads, bridge,water supply,health, and

market

35.3 million(73.2%)

12.9 million(26.8%)

29.9million

2 SGIs in TaiLGA, RiversState

Water supply,health, bridge,and market

21.8 million(82.15%)

4.1 million(17.85%)

29.9million

3 SGIs in Yenegoa,

Sagbama andBrass LGAs in

Bayelsa State

Water supply,

bridge, transport,education and

health

18.5 million

(82.2%)

4.0 million

(17.8%)

32.9

million

4 SGIs in IlajeLGA in OndoState

Town hall,water, transport,education and

market

7.5 million(70.0%)

3.2 million(30.0%)

30.1million

Total/Average 83.05(77.4%)

24.21(22.6%)

30.7million

Source: Survey, 20032004 and Oice o the Accountant-General o the Federation, Abuja.

Note: While LGA (local government area) is a geographical coverage o a government at the

local level, LG (local government) is a government at the local level.

The census o 1992 ranked Bunu Tai, a community o 25,000 people

in Tai LGA, as the largest community in Tai LGA. In spite o the population

density and the landmass, the community had no electricity, no pipe-borne

water, and not even a maternity home. Though these social amenities were

important or the people, their priority was the construction o a bridge toconnect the community with its arms and ports. Several eorts had been

made to get the government construct a bridge, but to no avail. When all

hopes appeared to have ailed, several community-development associa-

tions in the LGA resolved to shoulder the responsibility o generating unds

or the construction o the bridge. Table 3 shows the details o the money

contributed by the people through CDAs in the community.

Between 1994 and 1998, the ve CDAs (Gboko, Gbomene, Piatam,

Waaadam and Yugudam) in the community contributed 11,243,874.00,

which accounted or 91.8 percent o the cost o the project, while the per-centage contribution by the local government was considerably low (8.2

t) Th j t d d t Gi i d S Ltd t th t


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the rate o production, enhancing the local standard o living. This type

o accomplishment is rare among oicials, whether government or oil

multinational companies in the Niger Delta.

The activities o community-based institutions in Bayelsa State

(19751986) parallel the activities in Rivers State. The ve associations(Yenegoa CDA in Yenegoa LGA, Kuma Youth Association in Kolo Kuma

LGA, Fisherman Association in South Ijaw LGA, Sagba Elele Association

in Sagbama LGA, and Local Proessional Association in Brass LGA) like

their counterparts in other Niger Delta communities, ocused on the water

supply, a bridge, water transport, education, and health. The summary

shows that the contributions o these institutions in Bayelsa accounted

or 82.2 percent, while that o the LGs was 17.8 percent, conrming that

grassroots people represent the prime mover o socioeconomic develop-

ment at the community level. The same pattern exists across all theselected oil communities in the Niger Delta region, as shown in table 1.

A l i th t ti t ti th iti i

Table 2:

Kawas Annual Contribution toward Maternity Home in Naira

(19941996).

Year Kawas contribution Kawas % Local Govt. LGAs % Total

1994 413,500 77.5% 120,000 22.4% 533,5001995 520,420 61.9% 320,950 38.1% 841,370

1996 2,417,250 61% 1,540,315 38.9% 3,957,565

Total/Average 3,351,170 62.8% 1,981,265 37.2% 5,332,435

Source: Local Government Annual Report, July 1999, Saakpenwa, River State.

Table 3:

The Money Contributed by Bunu Tai CDAs in Tai LGA in Naira.

Years YugudamDev.Assn.*

WaadamDev.Assn.

GbokoDev.Assn.

PiatamDev.Assn.

GbomeneDev.Assn.

LGA Total

1994 175,000 205,000 305,195 165,195 302,145 500,000 1,652,535

1995 165,000 450,415 345,702 485,905 175,185 75,000 1,697,207

1996 495,250 785,450 905,745 658,415 745,452 205,000 3,795,312

1997 1,205,250 415,850 175,820 485,920 321,400 135,000 2,739,240

1998 805,485 320,680 650,415 420,000 78,000 95,000 2,369,580

Total 2,845,985 2,177,395 2,382,877 2,215,435 1,622,182 1,010,000 12,253,874

All Associations = 11,243,874 (91.8%) 8.2% Source: Local government annual report, July 1999, Saakpenwa, River State.

*Dev. Assn. = Development Association.


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and dispensary centers, and the building o bus-stops or sheds at strategic

points o the community.

Age-grade activities in Aduku community in Sagbama LGA o Bayelsa

State provide a vivid operation o sel-organized community in the Niger

Delta. Each age gradeyoung children, youth, women, adult, the agedisorganized under a distinctive leadership or a specic aspect o community

development. Adult men handle tasks such as roads, culverts, and bridges,

which require manual labor; women take care o market maintenance; and

girls between the ages o 8 and 15 years are in charge o environmental sanita-

tion. Hunters take care o security. The type o media used at the community

level is the beating o a drum or a gong (depending on the age grade or task at

hand) to call community members together or a meeting in the market or

town hall. This medium is otherwise used to assemble a designated category

o age grade or a particular assignmentor example, to remind a group ovigilantes the time to report or duty or the general community or commu-

nity project. This system o mass media seems to be crude, but it works. It is

not the sophistication o a particular method that matters, but its eective-

ness, durability, and sustainability. By this, everyone is kept abreast o the

news, instructions, or advice designed or the local people.

Girls in Aduku community perorm the task o environmental sani-

tation on a daily basis. The leader, who normally wakes up her colleagues

as early as six oclock on weekdays and seven oclock on weekends, moves

rom street to street or house to house as the case may be, and gathers othergirls with a gong at the community square, where the assignment will be

distributed. On weekdays, they sweep the streets in the community beore

they go to school; they attend to shrubs and grasses on Saturdays. This pat-

tern suggests that right rom their early years in lie, these girls have imbibed

the culture o sacrice, community attachment, patriotism, and or some

o them, leadership.

The discussions so ar conrm that sel-organizing and sel-governing

institutions have positively aected grassroots development in the oil

region. The sampled local governments that received an average o 30.7million per month rom the ederal government perormed less than expec-

tation in terms o service provision or the people at the grassroots in oil

communities.

Since 2002, Nigerian local government managers have demanded an

upward review o allocations due to them rom the ederal government, and

this demand has yielded dividends, as the money released to the councils has

increased by considerably more than 200 percent. Consequently, the local

governments received an average 71.4 million in 2004 (The News, vol. 23,

no. 11, Sept. 2004, pp. 2236) and 83.8 million per month in 2005 (Tell, no.42, 17 October 2005, pp. 2944). In spite o the increase in revenues that

th l l t h i d h d i ti i il


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The above analyses show that a mass mobilization strategy provides

answers to most local development questions that the state has been dodg-

ing. Rather than waiting or the local government authorities that are

closest to them (and with a lot o money), the local people in oil-producing

communities, through sel-organizing and sel-governing activities, haveplanned and executed essential social services. All these groups see the need

to address their common problems in their localities. It is only at this level

o resources that achievements have been realized. This is the doctrine o

polycentricity, which provides alternative strategies to address problems

o daily existence at the grassroots level in the ace o dismal and appalling

perormance o state institutions.

The lesson we can learn rom these institutions is how they mobilize

and use resources or providing social services. Local governments and other

higher levels o governments have access to greater resources, but they havelet no signicant impact on the peoples lives. The concern is that i these

institutions are so accountable to their members, we should begin to concep-

tualize how they can be used to reconstitute order rom the bottom and to

serve as alternatives to the modern state institutions. To democratize social

relations in the-oil producing communities, two tasks need be accomplished:

(1) building on the existing sel-governing structures, and (2) improvement

on public accountability in the region.

The ederal government and other tiers o government with oil com-

panies should establish appropriate interinstitutional relations with existingsel-governing institutions in the oil region. Sel-governing arrangements,

inward looking and capable o bridging the gaps between Nigerian leaders

and the people o oil communities, should be brought into the decision-

making mainstream. The involvement o sel-governing institutions in

making local decisions would enable local government projects to refect

the peoples yearnings and aspirations.

In the light o the above, it is clear that the social disparities among the

Nigerian state, its oil partners, and the oil communities can be addressed i a

new institutional arrangement, one capable o bringing all the stakeholderstogether or regular discussions and decisions, is designed and implemented.

Such an arrangement should regard the existing sel-organizing and sel-

governing arrangements that have proved eective as building blocks or

reconstituting order rom the bottom up. The sel-governing institutions can

act as checks and balances on the local government oicials. Much might

be made o community-level government, both to enhance voice and to

improve local governance.

When representatives o groups and associations (including warring

actions) can meet with oicials o governments and oil companies, discusstheir common problems, and crat working rules together, a shared commu-

it d t di ill b t bli h d I t ti b t th


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to modiy the governing institutions as their situations change. I Nigeria

wants to address the problem o inrastructural deprivation, corruption, and

poverty in the oil communities, it needs to learn how to make eicient use

o her physical, human, and institutional resources. Experiences o com-

munity-based institutions in oil communities through sel-organizing andsel-governing capabilities in meeting common challenges in the delivery

o common goods and social services need to be taken into consideration in

policy ormulation in the region.

Conclusion

Residents o the oil communities o the Niger Delta have responded to social

deprivation by reviving traditions that embrace collective action. Through

sel-governing arrangements, they have achieved a air level o success in

providing social services, showing that sel-organizing and sel-governing

institutions have positively aected development at the grassroots level

there. Most people o the oil communities are not beneting rom unds allo-

cated to the local governmentsindicating that the problem o corruption

and low public morality among the government oicials remains.

The adoption o sel-governing arrangements in the oil-producing

region, whereby existing sel-governing institutions will orm decision-

making consortiums, monitor nancial and material resources allocated to

their communities by government, and resolve issues through sel-governing

capabilities, may be able to provide lasting solutions to the problems o social

deprivation in the region.

ACknoWleDgement

th frs h llw l ar ackwldd r cllc h daa: nkrba

ea, o Bjw, irwa Raa, Sar Rady, oa ebabr, ad orb

ncas.

noteS

Rs s ar rs r rscrs crad by rdr r racs1.

w r r r r xra acs. Sc rs ar, wr,

cssary wr.t asscas wc daa wr ccd ar Br Y Assca ad Br D-2.

A k W d k Y A B /l t


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Assca nwa ad kawas r ta lgA, Rrs Sa; Yda D

Assca, Waada D Assca, gbk D Assca,

paa D Assca, ad gb D Assca B ta

Cy ta lgA Rrs Sa; g-kr ad o Cy D

Assca ta lgA Rrs Sa; Ya Cy D Assca, Ya lgA, ka Y Assca, k ka lgA, sra Assca-

, S ijaw lgA, Saba e Assca, Sabaa lgA, lca prs-

sa Assca, ad Brass lgA. Baysa Sa; ad bra iaj D

Assca iaj lgA od Sa.

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Coping With Social Deprivation

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