Copy and Save this Template to your Syndicate Folder !!!

Copy and Save this Template to your

Syndicate Folder !!!• For the backbrief save file in:

S:\M-4-92\STUDENT FOLDER\ALLSYN\01. Presentation drop-box

Use the following naming convention: SYN# Phase 3 DEL

3

Phase 3Operational Orientation

MISSION ANALYSIS BRIEFING

Syndicate

Student Template

4

• This template is in line with the processes outlining Phase 3 as presented in

Chapter 4 but does not strictly adhere Appendix 1 to Annex H of the COPD V1.0

dated 17 Dec 10.

• As annotated in Appendix 1, the template is illustrative only – actual briefing

requirements are determined by the Commander.

• This template is intended to assist you with preparation of the mission analysis

briefing, but you are not expected to adhere to it rigidly. Feel free to:

– Add slides where you feel important items of analysis have been omitted

– Delete slides about which you have no significant analysis to brief

– Modify slides to facilitate your own presentation style

• Remember to make adjustments to agenda slides as necessary to support

modifications.

• Be cognizant of the size/length of the brief – presenting more material is not

necessarily conducive to a clearer operational picture

ADMIN INSTRUCTIONS (1 of 2)

5

• Items in GREEN text are administrative notes or instructions

which should be deleted prior to the presentation of the

briefing. Refers to information in the notes page below.

Delete prior to presentation.

• Items in BLACK represent information from the Zoran Sea

scenario that has been input for your benefit and header

information

• BLUE RED has been used for the classification in the

header/footer and to highlight key points within your analysis

• Slides in light blue background require student inputs. You

may reset to white for backbrief.

ADMIN INSTRUCTIONS (2 of 2)

6

Logistic Input into Mission Analysis

Purpose

• To provide the Resource Director/JOPG LOG Rep an overview of the logistics input into the Mission/Operational Analysis of the JOPG.

Agenda

• Key Factors• Critical Logistics

Requirements• Assumptions• Limitations• Center of Gravity Inputs• Risks• Effects/Actions• CCIRs• Initial Force Estimate

• Estimate of Required Logistic Capabilities

• C2• Deployment Timeline• Proposed Planning

Guidance• Conclusion

Factor Deduction ConclusionPredeployment & deployment to SAG, PER & AUR.

Different deployment in respect of time & place.

Between STRATLIFT & SROM to AUR security of extensive LOC need.

Planning through all options in a complex environment.

SPACE

Provision of small SA (s) in PER

FORCE

M&T capabilities +++

TIME

CCIR

Break or block of LOC

RFI

...

CC

Force multiplyers

CR

FP for RSOM ++ (Kama Sea LOC)

CV

LOC in Kama Sea threat by mines

Key Factors and DeductionTime/Space/Force/Information

Factor Deduction ConclusionForward stage will be limited to SAG & Kama Sea.

1 APOD and 2 SPOD in PER

Only 1 APOD in AUR

LLOC plan to carry troops and materiel flow

SPACE

LLOC to cover the onwards movement

FORCE

M&T capabilities +++

TIME

....

CCIR

Break or block of LLOC

RFI

APOD/SPOD capabilities

CC

High readiness and availability of M&T

CR

Freedom of movement in PER, AUR

CV

APOD/SPOD capabilities

LLOC blocked or stalled


Factor Deduction ConclusionSustain pos for 6 months until FOF deployment

Provisions (contracts, employment, etc) for 6 months support for 6 months

Ensure LOC operable for 6 months

SPACE

Excessive storage in SAG

FORCE

M&T ++

TIME

…

CCIR

...

RFI

HNS capabilities/capacities

CC

...

CR

M&T availability

CV

...


12

Factor Deduction ConclusionLOG minimum footprint

Increase HNS

Contract heavy spt

Bi/Multi lateral NSE cooperation

SPACE

LLOC to cover the onwards movement

FORCE

NSPA involvement in the Predeployment

TIME

Phase I early stage

CCIR

…

RFI

HNS capabilities

CC

...

CR

Freedom of movement in PER, AUR

CV

PER, AUR HNS capabilities in Class I

AUR collapse


13

Factor Deduction Conclusion

AUR The implications, issues or considerations, derived from fact(s) that have operational significance.

What is the significance of the factor?

The outcome or result reached that requires action in planning or further analysis.

What can or should be done? Fit each into a category belowFSTimelineActionCCIRRFICCCR CV


14

Critical Logistics Requirements

15

Logistics Planning Assumptions

• List any assumptions that you have made during your analysis of key factors

• Remember that assumptions must be:– Logical– Realistic– Necessary - Planning can not continue unless an

assumption is made– Valid – if assumption turns out to be false, framework

of problem would have to be readdressed.

16

LIMITATIONS

CONSTRAINTS (Must Do) RESTRAINTS (Can’t Do)

Identify Constraints and Restraints from SSA, MRO, SPD and list those with Operational and Logistics impacts

NATO UNCLASSIFIEDNATO UNCLASSIFIED


17

Centre of Gravity Analysis

Assessed Aim and desired Outcome: What is the actor’s main goal and what conditions does he seek to achieve by his actions?

Centre of Gravity: What is the primary element of power upon which an actor depends to accomplish his operational objectives (to be targeted in an opponent and protect in a friend)?

Critical Capabilities: What are the primary means that enables the COG to gain and maintain dominant influence over an opponent or situation?

Critical Vulnerabilities: What are the weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationships, specific resources or influences through which the COG may be influenced or neutralised?

Critical requirements: What are those key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities and influences required to generate and sustain the COG’s critical capabilities, such as specific assets, physical resources, or relationships with other actors?

Conclusions: Which weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationships, specific resources or influences could be exploited to change the capabilities and behaviour of the actor and improve conditions in the operational environment?



18

Alliance Centre of Gravity Analysis

Assessed Aim and desired Outcome: deter VUL, assist AUR in disrupting BLA and in re-establishing internal security, set conditions for NEO, provide FoM for UN HA.

Centre of Gravity:

CJTFCritical Capabilities:1. ability to deter VUL

2. ability to train AUR/PER

3. ability to disrupt BLA (ourselves)

4. ability to create a SASE

5. ability to sustain ourselves

6. ability to coordinate with external partners

Critical Vulnerabilities:- Extensive LOCs- Limited APOD/SPOD capability- Weather cond in winter- Degradation of Humanitarian situation

Critical requirements:- 1-6: C2- 1-5: FOA

- 1-5 : strategic deployment secured (within JOA)- RSOM-I in place

- 5: sustainment

- 6: robust liaison & training capacity

Conclusions:CJTF effectiveness depends on early activation/availability of Strategic assets, sourcing of force package and intelligence data. Furthermore, protection of APOD/SPOD is critical.



UN Centre of Gravity Analysis

Assessed Aim and desired Outcome: Security for UN refugees camps and maintain flow of HA.

Centre of Gravity:

UNMA Humanitarian Mission

Critical Capabilities:1 Act with legitimacy

2 Intervene in critical area

Critical Vulnerabilities:

2 a 1 Force Protection not adequate

2 b 1 LOC not secured

2 c 1 APOD not available

Critical requirements:1 a UN SC Resolutions

2 a Force protection (UNSECFORA)

2 b Freedom of movement

2 c Access to APOD/SPOD

Conclusions: Intervene with force protection, secure LOC and reopen Capella Airport.



AURIGA Centre of Gravity AnalysisAssessed Aim and desired Outcome: preserve its territorial integrity and stability

Centre of Gravity:

Security forces

Critical Capabilities:

1 Mantain control of its territory

2 Cooperate with PER Security Forces

3 Defeat BLA

4 Protect DPREs

5 Control of critical infrastructures


1 a 1 Moral

3 a 1 Lack of Training

3 b 1 Credibility

3 b 2 Cohesion

Critical requirements:

1 a FoM

1 b High mobility/terrain Equipment

3 a COIN TTPs

3 b Effective C2

4 a Logistics

Conclusions: Keep working on AUR specific training, strengthening logistic capacity, establishing FoM, supporting them in fighting BLA and in keeping the territorial integrity.



PERSEUS Centre of Gravity Analysis

Assessed Aim and desired Outcome: Maintain the control of the territory and sustain AUR in containing BLA

Centre of Gravity:

Security Forces


1 Defeat BLA

2 Support Auriga

3 Maintain its territorial integrity

4 Protect energy infrastructures

5 Maintain population support


1 a 1 Air Defence Force weakness

1 a 2 Limited numbers of modern weapons systems

2 b 1 Low military readiness

2 b 2 Lack of Training

5 a 1 Control of HA and of DPREs flow


1 a COIN TTPs

2 a Logistics

2 b Capable Fighting Force

4 a Access to SPOE/SPOD

5 a International ties

Conclusions: Increase Security Forces capabilities IOT defeat BLA and obtain a better control of the territory.



Batari National Movement Centre of Gravity Analysis

Assessed Aim and desired Outcome: to create an ethnically pure BATARI state.

Centre of Gravity:

BLA Fighters


1 Capability to attack refugees camp.

2 Control of etnhic batari area

3 Expel non BATARI people

4 Destabilise AURIGA

5 Acting as insurgency


2 a 1 FOM in Kandar Valley

2 a 2 Differencies in council

3 1 Support/recruitment people

4 a 1 Financial resources (VUL/ Crime Organization)

4 a 2 VUL supply lines

a Cellphone network


1 a Weapons

1 b FOM

2 a Support of tribal council

4 a VUL support/logistic/training/ safe heavens

5 a C2 (1c)

a Communications (all)

Conclusions: Prevent destabilization actions in AUR performed by BLA, cutting VUL support. The operation will focus on limiting FOM mainly in the Kandar valley and decreasing C2 capabilities. Conduct INFO operations IOT exploit council differences and gain population support to limit the effects of hostile propaganda.



Assessed Aim and desired Outcome: Political, economic and military dominance of the Zoran Sea region in order to achieve regional hegemony.

Centre of Gravity:

VUL Intervention Forces

Critical Capabilities:1 Deny/delay NATO’s access to the region2 Deter/ threaten Alliance forces/ Partners3 Directly intervene into AUR/PER4 Support the BLA (use as proxy org.)

Critical Vulnerabilities: 3 a 1 Limited avenues of approach to AUR/PER3 b 1 Logistics and sustainment of long term operations3 b 2 Simultaneous ops (AUR/PER) (3c)3 b 3 LOCs and links (phys/influence) with BLA (4a)3 c 1 Joint C2 structure and not capable for efficient joint

operations a Energy exports (In case of VUL’s intervention embargo

should be applied- UNSCR)

Critical requirements: 1&2 Submarines, mines, SOF, Air force

2 a TBMs, WMD (Counter WMD, TBMs capabilities required)

2 b Aggressive Government (Deterrence required, PsyOps )

3 a Armoured land forces

3 b Operational sustainment (logistics, reinforcement)

3 c Effective C2

4 a Training, bases and equipments for the BLA

4 b Effective supply chain (LLOCs)

a Dependence on energy/drugs exports

Conclusions: Prevent VUL from hampering our deployment to the Kama Sea (particularly with their maritime component) in coordination with SAG. TBMD may be vital should VUL launch a TBM attack. Cutting the support (physical links and influence) to BLA will prevent VUL’s proxy to act effectively. Should VUL armed forces attack, operations should focus on limited logistics capacity and joint C2 to degrade ability to conduct/continue operations. Furthermore, military reactions should include the interdiction of their LOCs to prevent resupplies thereby further reducing their sustainment.

VUL Centre of Gravity Analysis

24

Operational RisksOperational Risk Assessment: Risk Name

Source Consequence for Severity Probability

- Actions of the opponent(s).

- Actions of friendly forces.

- Operational environmental factors.

- Overall mission- Line of

operation- Decisive Points- Desired effect.

Extremely high - could result failure to accomplish mission.

High - could result in failure to accomplish one or more objectives.

Moderate - could result in failure to meet criteria for success or exceed time, space, forces/actors limits

Low - minimal impact on mission accomplishment

Select one &Delete rest for presentation)

- High- Moderate- Low

(Select 1 &Delete

rest)

• Risk Management• Can we neutralise the source?• Can we reduce our vulnerability to the source of the risk? • Can we limit the consequence and/or severity of the occurrence?• Can we reduce the probability of occurrence?

• Conclusion• Unacceptable - risk management cannot reduce risk to an acceptable level!• Conditionally acceptable - risk can be reduced to an acceptable level by taking actions to:• Modify force disposition/posture/composition.• Adjust current operations.• Prepare branch plan or sequel.• Acceptable, no risk management actions required

Logistics Input into Operational Design

• Review the following 4 slides from the JOPG

• Review and evaluate the DC/Effects– Has the JOPG gotten this right? If not…what

are your inputs?

• What are the Key actions logisticians will have to take to support the effects and DCs?tional Design? Keep them broad and focus on the most important actions.

Objectives• MSO 1. Prevention of further escalation and widening of the Zoran Sea conflict; • MSO 2. Uninterrupted international access to the region and its resources;• MSO 3. Support Aurigan efforts to achieve and maintain a safe and secure

environment. • MSO 4. Enable safe delivery of humanitarian aid and access to DPRE camps.• MSO 5. Deter Vulpecula. • MSO 6. Isolate BLA Insurgency

• OO 1. Contribute to the deterrence of Vulpecula• OO 2. Assist Auriga in defeating any external aggression• OO 3. Assist Auriga to re-establish internal security• OO 4. Provide for the freedom of movement for UN humanitarian activities• OO 5. Enable freedom of access to the region and its energy resources

• BPT 1. Set the conditions for NEO• BPT 2. Conduct interdiction operations in support of a potential embargo• BPT 3. Support PER to maintain / re-establish territorial integrity

For Reference Only

Deter&Defeat

ALLIANCECoG

Initial Deployment

Early Deployment Deployment & Shaping SASE Handover

International peace and security in the Zoran Sea region is restored with full implementation of all UNSC resolutions, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Alliance partners is preserved.

VULCoG

OO1

OO2

OO3

OO4

COIN

FoM

UNCoG

AURCoG

PERCoG

MSO1

MSO2

MSO3

MSO6

MSO5

OO5

G-Day D + 30 D + 120

1 2 3 4 75 6

MSO4

8 9 10

14 1513

OE:8

OE:9,10

OE:11,12

OE:13,14

OE:1

OE:5

OE:18

OE:15,16

OE17

OE:19

OE:20

OE:21

OE:2,3,4

OE:6

11

16 17 18BP

12

BPT3

BPT1

BPT2

BLACoG

For Reference Only

Deter & Defeat

VUL deterred

AUR SF trained

Terrorist activity mitigated

AUR SF capable of independent ops

Freedom of Movement

VUL naval forces contained

LLOCs secured

HA delivered without interruption

Critical nodes secured

Decisive Conditions – By LoOCOIN

SLOCs secured

CIA open & operational

GoA stabilized

BLA fractured

BLA isolated

SASE established in AUR

GoA – Bataris dialogue established

Branch plan

VUL offensive operations ceased

AUR territorial integrity re-established

PER territorial integrity re-established

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

16

8

9

10

13

14

12

17

11

15

18

For Reference Only

Effects to be Achieved : For Reference Only

Nr Effect LOO

1

LOO

2

LOO

3

1 VUL SF returned to peace locations X

2 AUR police trained X

3 AUR border control trained X

4 AUR army trained X

5 Terrorist attacks decreased X

6 AUR army conduct ops without assistance X

8 VUL threats on SLOCs neutralized X X

9 BLA attacks on CIA ceased X X

10 Civ/Mil traffic restored X

11 Public support increased X

12 Public services provided X

13 Hardliners & Moderates separated X

14 Tribal council spt to BLA decreased X

15 Tribal council spt to BLA stopped X

16 FoM for BLA denied X

17 BLA attacks in Kandar Valley decreased X

18 Comms between GoA and tribal council established X

19 LOCs attacks reduced X X X

20 Attacks on HA actors decreased X

21 Attacks on pipelines decreased X



Commanders' Critical Information Requirements

CCIR NATO - UN

1. READINESS NATO JF

2. ACHIVEMENT OF FULL OPS CAPABILITY (NRF + FOLLOW ON FORCES )

3. REQUIREMENT OF ACTIVATION OR USAGE OF OPERATIONAL RESERVE

4. LOSS OF CRITICAL ASSETS/CAPABILITIES (tbd)

5. SPOD AND APOD UNDER ATTACK

6. ATTACK ON NATO SECURITY FORCES/FACILITIES

7. KIDNAPPING OF NATO SECURITY FORCES PERSONNEL AND VIPs

8. ATTACK ON UN ASSETS/FACILITIES OR REFUGEE CAMPS

CCIR AURIGA AND PERSEUS

1.GOA COLLAPSE;

2.CIA UNAVAILABLE;

3.ATTACK SPOD IN PERSEUS;

4.ATTACKS ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES;

5.GOA/GOP SECURITY FORCES NOT ABLE TO CONTRAST BLA;

6.HUMANITARIAN CRISIS DETERIORED;

7.AURIGA/PERSEUS ATTACKED.

31

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements



Agenda: Initial Force Estimate

Estimate of Required Capabilities

Preliminary C2 Arrangements



MLOPC INITIAL FORCE ESTIMATE. The following preliminary estimate of force levels is provided as a basis for planning and are available in the IRF or RFP. All others units need to be force generated.

NRF FOLLOW-ON Joint C2 DJSE JF HQ

LAND FORCES

1 Infantry BDE 4-5 BDES 2 Mech Bns 3 Light Bns

2 ENGR BDE 1 CIMIC GP

HELO TRANS HELO ATTACK

MARITIME FORCES NTF NETF(-)

1 MPA Detachment AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE 1 MCM TG 1 MCM TG

1 AGI 3 AOR 5 AOR 1 AFS 3 AFS

AIR FORCES 1 AEW Squadron 2 AAEW Squadron

1 AIR/GRND SURV DET 2 AIR/GRND SURV DET 1 TRX (AAR) SQN 3 TRX/TRO/TRI (AAR) SQN

2 ADX SQN 3 ADX/ADR SQN 1 FBA SQN (-) 3 FBX/FBA SQN

3 FBX/ADX SQN 6 SAM M/H BN 1 TMD BN 2 TMD BN

1 EW Squadron (SEAD) SHARED EARLY WARNING 1 CSAR Detachment 2 CSAR Detachments

1 ESJ SQN 1 ESJ/ETS SQN 1 AAR Squadron 4 AAR Squadron 3 AIRBASE SPT 3 AIR 2 APOD OPS GP BASE SPT

1 Tactical Air Lift Squadron 2 UAV Platoons

1 ESM Detachment

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 4 SPEC OPS TASK GPS 6 SPEC OPS TASK GPS

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS FORCES PSYOPS COY PSYOPS TF

JOINT LOGISTICS SUPPORT GROUP (JLSG) Logistics Base Bn

RSOM Bn SPOD/APOD Operating Coys

Ground Trans Bn Role 3 Hosp

NATIONAL SURVEILLANCE ASSETS / SPACE SUPPORT TEAMS

Initial Force EstimateInitial Force Estimate

For Reference Only



JLSG HQ

JLSG HQ Sp Unit

JLSG HQ FP Coy

Supply Bn HQ

Ammo Storage Supply Coy

Water Purification Unit

POL Supply CoyField Warehousing

CoySupply and Field Service Coy (mx)

Medical Log Coy

Role 3 Medical Facility

MOVCON Teams

RSOM HQ

Staging Area Support Unit

JLSG

JLSG HQ

LOG BASE RSOM

Cargo Truck Coy

Ground Transport. HQ

POL Truck Coy

Water Truck Coy

Heavy EquipmentTransport Coy

Gen Support Eng Coy

POL Facility Const Unit

Cargo Transfer Unit

MOVCON Center

GROUNDTRANSPORTATION SPOD

Sea Port Ops Coy

Initial Force Estimate JLSG

APOD

AirPort Ops Coy

Convoy Support Centers

Force Protection Unit

For Reference Only



Logistics Required Capabilities

Identify and highlight any significant differences between required operational capabilities based on the mission analysis and the force capability requirements provided in the Strategic Planning Directive/Initial Force Estimate.

Provide assessment on the forces required. What gaps in capabilities have you identified between what is available and what actions-effects logisticians will have to create?



Portray your initial concept for the organization of the Joint Force.

Determine TOO/JOA requirements.

Determine required C2 functions and locations.

Determine critical liaison and coordination requirements.

Include NSEs in C2 arrangements

Include Role Specialist Nation & Lead Nation designations

Preliminary C2 Arrangements

37

Deployment Timeline

38

Agenda: Proposed Planning Guidance

• Tentative Missions for Subordinate

Commands

• Requests for SHAPE

39

• Draft mission statement for the JLSG. Be sure to include the following: Who, What, When, Where, & Why…plus the assigned objectives.

See Page 11 of SPD for an example from the COM JFC Naples mission statement.

Tentative Mission for Component (JLSG)

40

• Develop requests, requirements and issues that require action at the strategic level such as:– Requests for additional Crisis Response Measures

(CRMs). – ROE requests. – Requests for Information– Pre-conditions for success.– Force requirements.

Requests for SHAPE

41

CONCLUSION

• Provide any additional conclusions that

are essential for the JFC to fully

comprehend the operational problem to be

solved or the specific operational

conditions that must be achieved.

Date post:	02-Feb-2016
Category:	Documents
Upload:	telma
View:	46 times
Download:	0 times

Copy and Save this Template to your Syndicate Folder !!!

Documents