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Roger ClarkeXamax Consultancy, Canberra

Visiting Professor at ANU, UNSW, and the Uni. of Hong Kong

Chair, Australian Privacy Foundation

http://www.anu.edu.au/Roger.Clarke/......../DV/ANPR-Surv {.html,.ppt}

Social Implications of Covert Policing Workshop – 7 April 2009

The Covert Implementation

of Mass Vehicle Surveillance in Australia

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Red Light and Speed Cameras

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speed_cameras_in_Australia

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Cynicism about Red Light and Speed Cameras

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http://www.speedcam.co.uk/http://fightfines.info/ (Vic)

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Covert Implementation of Mass Vehicle Surveillance

AGENDA

• Red-Light / Speed Cameras to ANPR

• Traffic Applications • Blacklist-in-Camera

Architecture• Quality Factors

• LEAs – Operational Applications• LEAs – Intelligence Applications

• Mass Surveillance ANPR• ANPR Deployments in Australia• ANPR Coordination in Australia

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Beyond Red Light / Speed CamerasTo Vehicle Surveillance

• Vehicles can be monitored in various ways, e.g.• Manual Inspection of VINs, registration plates• Passive RFID-tags passing control-points• On-Board Transmitters, with self-reporting

of GPS-based or other coordinates

• Vehicle Registration Data can be monitored:• Cameras were wet chemistry, are now digital• Data Extraction was manual, is now

automated• Auto-Lookup of Blacklists is now feasible

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Automated Number Plate Recognition (ANPR)

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Automated Number Plate Recognition (ANPR)

• A Digital Camera Captures an image of a motor vehicle’s 'number' plate

• SoftwareExtracts the registration data (numbers, letters, perhaps other data such as colour and jurisdiction identifiers)

• List(s) of Numbers Being SoughtEnables evaluation of the significance of the extracted data

• Transmission FacilitiesSends the extracted data and perhaps other data elsewhere

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Traffic Applications√ Traffic Law Enforcement. Detection and prosecution

for:√ running red lights√ driving at a point-in-time speed over the speed limit

√ Traffic Law Enforcement. Detection and interception of:√ Unregistered Vehicles? Driving at an average speed over the speed limit?? Vehicles owned by currently Unlicensed Drivers

√ Public Safety. Deterrence of unsafe practices, e.g.√ running red lights, speeding? driving unregistered vehicles?? driving while unlicensed

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Camera& OCR

Tightly-Coupled

Processing

PoliceCarsAlerts

'Blacklist in Camera' ANPR Architecture

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Camera& OCR

Tightly-Coupled

Processing

Sources ofData-SetsPoliceCarsAlerts

'Blacklist in Camera' ANPR Architecture

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'Blacklist in Camera' ANPR Architecture

Camera& OCR

Tightly-Coupled

Processing

Sources ofData-SetsOperational

PolicingPoliceCarsAlertsAlertsOnlyAlerts

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ANPR Quality• Alliances of purveyors and purchasers suggest that data

extraction is accurate and reliable ... BUT ...

• Very little evidence is publicly available• There appear to be no independent tests• Many factors reduce reliability, including:

• the nature and condition of the registration plates• the condition of the camera lens• the conditions of the light-path and back-lighting

• The extraction is by its nature 'fuzzy', and confidence threshholds have to be set

• Reliable extraction of the registration data may be as low as 70% even under favourable conditions

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ANPR Traffic ApplicationsSome Implications

• Deterrence of Targeted Behaviour• Targeted Fines and Points

Deductions• Substantial Resources Required,

in particular Police Cars Downstream

• False-Negatives Escape• False-Positives Suffer:

• Financial Impacts• Licence-Retention Impacts

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LEAs – Operational Applications

• Detection and Interception of:• Wanted Vehicles, in particular:

• 'Reported Stolen'• 'Get-Away Cars'

• Vehicles associated with Persons of Interest

• Dependent on:• Real-Time Acccess to ...• Real-Time-Maintained Data Sources

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LEA Operational ApplicationsQuality Factors and Implications

• Data-Source Quality Factors are critical, esp. Accuracy, Precision and Currency

• (Rare?) Instances of Large Benefits• (Common?) Instances of Error:

• High Risk to Vehicle Occupantsbecause of the Interceptor's Suspicions

• Substantial Embarrassment, Confusion• Likelihood of Collateral Police Actions

– arbitrary vehicle inspection, search

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LEAs – Intelligence Applications

• Retrospective Analysis of Vehicle Movements:• Detection of Duplicates• False Registration Numbers

• Retrospective Inferences about Owner Location and Movements

• Retrospective Inferences about Co-Location, and Co-Location Frequency, of:

• Vehicles• People

• Real-Time Inferences about Location, Co-Location

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Mass Surveillance ANPR Architecture

Camera& OCR

OperationalPolicing

PoliceCarsAlertsAll

Sightings

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Mass Surveillance ANPR Architecture

Camera& OCR

CentralProcessing& Storage

OperationalPolicing

PoliceCarsAlertsAll

SightingsAll

Sightings

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LEAs – Intelligence ApplicationsQuality Factors

• Unreliable Extraction of Registration Data

• Data Collection Speculativei.e. without Due Cause / Reasonable Grounds for Suspicion

This protection is a foundation of a free society

• Retention Periods unclear and possibly very long

• Use of Probabilistic (Speculative) Data Mining in order to generate suspicions

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ANPR Deployments in Australia

• In most States and Territories, one or more agencies has deployed or at least piloted ANPR

• 300-400 cameras acquired, some currently operational

• One longstanding application exists:• NSW RTA Safe-T-Cam for trucks• 24 fixed-location cameras since 1989• relatively recently migrated to ANPR

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Features ofANPR Deployments in Australia

• Every Single Deployment Lacks:• Explicit Legal Authority• Public Justification• Public Information• Public Consultation• Operational Transparency• Effective Regulatory

Control• Effective Privacy Laws

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Submissions expressing serious concern about privacy:

• APF• OFPC• OVPC• QCCL

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• OVPC: "The whole concept of an individual’s right to anonymity is sacrificed: it is no longer possible to drive on a public road anonymously, even if one is doing nothing wrong"

• OFPC: "ANPR can result in the routine collection of the personal information of large numbers of people. For many of these people, there may be no cause for suspicion and hence no reason to collect information about them. A widespread ANPR system may permit government agencies to track a large number of vehicles (and individuals), revealing where individuals have been, when and potentially with whom. Other than in specific circumstances, this does not seem to be information that government agencies would routinely need to know about members of the community ... The Office would caution against establishing infrastructure that could [be] used in such an expansive and invasive manner"

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Recommendations of the Qld Parliamentary Committee:

• [because there is no current justification,] further research of the road safety benefits of ANPR

• [because the proposal is so privacy-intrusive,] crucial legislative safeguards ... to protect ... privacy

• [because quality is low,] the resolution of technical problems that prevent ANPR devices reading some number plate designs

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Coordinative Activitiesby Crimtrac

• The national LEA information systems operator (e.g. fingerprint, DNA databases)

• Given $2.3m for an 'ANPR Scoping Study' 2007-08

• Privacy Issues Analysis conducted Nov 2007• "We have not yet determined exactly the extent

to which we would capture all data. It may well be that we only capture hot list data" (Transcript of Evidence to Qld Parltry Travelsafe Committee, 14 Mar 2008, p. 17)

• PIA and Consultation (Jun-Nov 2008)

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Crimtrac's PIA Consultation PaperJune 2008

" ... the system will collect and store ... all sightings of all vehicle passengers"

A 'National Automated Vehicle Recognition System' (NAVR)

"data-matching to identify alerts would take place centrally ..."

"sightings would be collected for all vehicles passing a camera site, and would contain an overhead image of the vehicle at sufficient resolution so that the driver or passenger could be identified if appropriate

"[from] 300 fixed and 100 mobile to 4000 fixed and 500 mobile cameras"

"all ANPR data would be held for five years"

an indicative 70 million sightings per day – implying 127 billion photographs and associated metadata over a rolling 5-year cycle

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Crimtrac's Untrustworthiness• The position established in May 2008 is

inconsistent with the statements of mid-Mar 2008

• Committed to Mass Surveillance ANPR

• Expressly Facilitative of Mass Surveillance

• No Consideration of the negative consequences

• PIA Report withheld, despite an understanding it would be published

• Scoping Study Report withheld

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Covert Implementation of Mass Vehicle SurveillanceConclusions

• LEAs are implementing ANPR covertlyi.e. without full public information, without oversight, without express authority

• LEAs are using Mass Surveillance ANPR, not Blackist-in-Camera architecture

• Crimtrac is implementing the facilitative

mechanism for Mass Surveillance ANPR

• After initially adopting some degree of openness, Crimtrac is operating covertly

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Covert Implementation of Mass Vehicle SurveillanceImplications

For LEAs• A further step in the slide into

untrustworthiness• Greatly increased risk of behaviour above the

law• Greatly increased risk of serious public distrust

For Australian society• A profound reduction in civil liberties• A groundbreaker for a surveillance society• A major contributor to social breakdown

and anarchic behaviour

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Covert Implementation of Mass Vehicle Surveillance

Policy Implications

• ANPR is a litmus test of the Rudd Government's capacity to withstand the backroom pressure put on it by the law enforcement community

• The Australian public wants law enforcement agencies to have appropriate technology and appropriate powers ... but not to the extent that freedoms and democracy are undermined

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Counterveillance Principles1. Independent Evaluation of Technology2. A Moratorium on Technology

Deployments3. Open Information Flows4. Justification for Proposed Measures5. Consultation and Participation6. Evaluation7. Design Principles

1. Balance2. Independent Controls3. Nymity and Multiple Identity

8. Rollback

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Roger ClarkeXamax Consultancy, Canberra

Visiting Professor at ANU, UNSW, and the Uni. of Hong Kong

Chair, Australian Privacy Foundation

http://www.anu.edu.au/Roger.Clarke/......../DV/ANPR-Surv {.html,.ppt}

Social Implications of Covert Policing Workshop – 7 April 2009

The Covert Implementation

of Mass Vehicle Surveillance in Australia