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Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 14 Stabilization Policy in the Closed and Open Economy
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Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Chapter 14

Stabilization Policy in the Closed and Open Economy

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-2

Introduction to Stabilization Policies

• Stabilization policies aim at minimizing changes to real GDP from exogenous Demand Shocks including:– Changes in business and consumer optimism

– Changes in net exports

– Changes in government spending and/or taxes not related to stabilization policy

• Policy Activism purposefully changes the settings of the instruments of monetary and fiscal policy to offset changes in private sector spending.– An alternate approach recommends Policy Rules that call for a

fixed path of a policy instrument like the money supply or a target variable like inflation or unemployment.

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-3

Policy Rules and Monetary Policy

• In the 1930s, University of Chicago economist Henry Simons posed a stark contrast between a totally discretionary monetary policy and a fixed rule.– A Discretionary Policy treats each macroeconomic episode as a

unique event without a common approach to all events.

– A Rigid Rule for policy sets a key policy instrument at a fixed value.

• In the 1950s, Milton Friedman advocated a Constant Growth Rate Rule (CGRR) that stipulated a fixed percentage growth rate for the money supply. He was part of the Monetarism school of thought.

• A Feedback Rule sets stabilization policy to respond in a systematic way to a macroeconomic event (e.g. the “Taylor” Rule).

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-4

Figure 14-1 A Flowchart Showing the Relationship Between Policy Instruments, Policy Targets, and Economic Welfare

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-5

The Positive Case for Rules

• Milton Freidman’s arguments for monetary policy rules:– A rule insulates the Fed from political pressure

– A rule allows the Fed’s performance to be judged

– A rule reduces uncertainty

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-6

The Negative Case for Rules

• Rules are favorable to discretionary policies because of the “long and variable” lags between changes in monetary policy instruments and the ultimate response of target variables like inflation and unemployment.

• Five Types of Lags– The Data Lag

– The Recognition Lag

– The Legislative Lag

– The Transmission Lag

– The Effectiveness Lag

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-7

Figure 14-2 The Percent Change in Real GDP Following a 1 Percentage Point Change in the Treasury Bill Rate, Three Intervals, 1961–2007

Source: See Appendix C-4.

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-8

Multiplier Uncertainty

• The multiplier formulas from Chapters 3 and 4 showed the size of the change in real GDP that would result from a change in a policy instrument.

• Dynamic Multipliers are the amount by which output is raised during each of several time periods after a given change in the policy instrument.

• Multiplier Uncertainty concerns the lack of firm knowledge regarding the change in output caused by a change in a policy instrument.

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-9

The Fed and the “Great Moderation”

• Why has there been a decline in economic volatility since the mid-1980s?– In other words, what caused the “Great Moderation”?

• Possibility 1: Smaller Demand and Supply Shocks– Government military spending fell and was more stable.

– Financial deregulation made residential construction less volatile.

– Computers and improved management practices reduced the volatility of inventory investment.

– The oil and farm prices shocks of the 1970s were absent in the 1980s.

• Possibility 2: Improved Federal Reserve Performance– The Fed moved rapidly and decisively in response to movements in

the log output ratio.

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-10

Figure 14-3 The Log Output Ratio and the Moving Average of its Absolute Value, 1960–2007 (1 of 2)

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-11

Figure 14-3 The Log Output Ratio and the Moving Average of its Absolute Value, 1960–2007 (2 of 2)

Source: See Appendix C-4.

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-12

Figure 14-3 The Log Output Ratio and the Moving Average of its Absolute Value, 1960–2007

Source: See Appendix C-4.

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-13

Figure 14-4 The Federal Funds Interest Rate and the Log Output Ratio, 1980–2007

Source: See Appendix C-4.

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-14

Time Inconsistency and Policy Credibility

• Time Inconsistency describes the temptations of policy makers to deviate from a policy after it is announced and private decision makers have reacted to it.

• Policy Credibility is the belief by the public that policy makers will actually carry out an announced policy.

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-15

The Taylor Rule

• Stanford University economist John Taylor has proposed a simple rule (called the Taylor Rule) for the Fed to follow in setting the real federal funds rate (rFF):

rFF = rFF* + a(p – p*) + b[log(Y/YN)]

(where * represents the desired or target levels of variables and a, b are parameters > 0)

– If the Fed cares about avoiding accelerating inflation, then “a” is large.

– If the Fed cares about avoiding recession and/or high unemployment, then it chooses a large “b.”

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-16

Figure 14-5 The Actual Federal Funds Rate and Interest Rates Calculated by Two Versions of the Taylor Rule, 1980–2007

Source: See Appendix C-4.

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-17

Table 14-1 Assessing Alternative Policy Rules (1 of 2)

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-18

Table 14-1 Assessing Alternative Policy Rules (2 of 2)

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-19

Table 14-1 Assessing Alternative Policy Rules

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-20

MS and Targeting Exchange Rates

• Under flexible exchange rates, an expansionary monetary policy lowers interest rates, leading to a depreciation that boosts NX and therefore output.

• Under fixed exchange rates, monetary policy must be used to maintain the fixed exchange rate, and therefore, is no longer available for stabilization purposes.

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-21

How the Fed Reinvented Instability in Residential Construction

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-22

The Debate About The Euro

• What are the benefits and costs of a single currency for the EU?

• Benefits– Elimination of costs and risks associated with exchange

rates improved intra-EU commerce– Monetary and fiscal discipline lower inflation

• Costs– No independent control over MS

– Prohibition of fiscal deficits over 3% limits automatic stabilization during recessions

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-23

International Perspective: The Debate About the Euro

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-24

Chapter Equations

Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 14-25

Chapter Equations

* ˆ* (14.1)FF FFr r a p p bY


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