No. 3660 Annual Series. DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR REPORTS. COREA. REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1905 ON TIIE 'l'RADE 0 ]? COitEA. REl<'ERENOE 'l'O PREVIOUS REPORT, Annual Series No. 2687. Presented to botli Houses of Parliament by Command of Ilis JJ1ajcsty, JUNE, 190G. LONDON: PRINTED FOR HIS MAJESTY'S STATIO:YERY OFFICE, BY IIARRISON AND SONS, ST. MARTIN'S LANE, l'RJ:NTERS IN ORDINAJJ.Y TO HIS MAJJ!S'rY. And to be purchased either dirccbly or through any Bookseller, from WYMAN AND SONS, LTD., FETTER LANE, J<J.C.; and [Ud. :2682-185.] 32, Ann,GDON STR!>ET, \V.t,STMINSTER, s.w.; or OLIVER AND BOYD, EDINDURG!I; or E, PONSONBY, 110, GRAFTON STREET, DuDLIN, 190G. Price Twopence ll alfpenny.
Transcript
No. 3660 Annual Series.
DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR REPORTS.
COREA.
REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1905
ON TIIE
'l'RADE 0 ]? COitEA.
REl<'ERENOE 'l'O PREVIOUS REPORT, Annual Series No. 2687.
Presented to botli Houses of Parliament by Command of Ilis JJ1ajcsty,
JUNE, 190G.
LONDON: PRINTED FOR HIS MAJESTY'S STATIO:YERY OFFICE,
BY IIARRISON AND SONS, ST. MARTIN'S LANE, l'RJ:NTERS IN ORDINAJJ.Y TO HIS MAJJ!S'rY.
And to be purchased either dirccbly or through any Bookseller, from WYMAN AND SONS, LTD., FETTER LANE, J<J.C.; and
[Ud. :2682-185.]
32, Ann,GDON STR!>ET, \V.t,STMINSTER, s.w.; or OLIVER AND BOYD, EDINDURG!I; or
Jl,:fc'l'(:.ncc to 2mivions Bcport, A nnnal Series No. 2687.
Repol't on the Tracle ~f 001·f'a jo1' the Year 1905
By Mn. ACTING V1cE-CoNsUL HARRINGTO:N.
(Recei1·cd at Foreign Office, June 1, 1906.)
The figures for the foreign trade of Corea for the year 1905 show Total foreign a considerable increase on those of 1904, the record year hitherto. trade.
The total net imports and exports amounted to 3,967,355l. against 3,444,l 78l., an increase of 523,177, or 15· 2 per cent. ; the average net foreign trade during the period of five years 1901-05 was 2,966,878l., and the increase during 1905 consequently amounted to 1 ,000,477l., or 33· 7 per cent. The following table shows the dis-tribution of the imports and exports during the last two years :-
l!J0-1-1!)05
Year.
Incrnasc or dc•ercasc +
Imports.
£ 2,730,38:.l 3,262,541
526,158
Value.
---------
I Exports. Tota,!.
£ £
I 707,705 3,444,178 701,81,t :3,()67,:~55
I- 2,!)8] + 523,177
The figures above given for the exports are net, other exports were gold, 531,528l. (an increase of 20,132l. on the previous year), and the re-exports 103,336l. (an increase of 42,371l.).
The above totals, however, give no idea of the real state of Condition of business, most of the imports being the result of 1904 orders based Lrade.
on the good trade of 1904 and the favourable outlook for the year under consideration. Actually the year 1905 was very unfavourable; during the latter and more important half of the year trade went from bad to worse and the end of December found the prospects for 1906 as gloomy as those for 1905 had been bright. The principal <;auses for thie condition were currency difficulties
(1002) A 2
Currency reform.
4 COREA.
and the bad rice crop; contributory reasons, varying from place to place, were found in the war, diminution of capital expenditure on railways, &c., inadequate openings for Japanese immigrants with small capital, and also the political unrest which tended to intensify the other difficulties.
The currency problem so dominated the whole commercial situation during the latter part of the year that it is necessary to refer to it at some length.
Apart from ingots, &c., of more precious metal, the original Corean currency was similar to that of China-the copper cash. This coin was not favoured by foreign merchants and the Japanese silver yen from Ja pan and the Mexican dol. from China soon made their appearance. The yen obtained the supremacy and was in use till towards 1898, when the introduction of the gold standard in Ja pan resulted in most of the silver yen returning thither for exchange purposes. The lack of a proper currency in Corea, however, led to
.a large quantity of the silver yen (now no longer current in Ja pan), being specially re-introduced, this time " chopped " or stamped with the character for '' silver." The silver yen remained in use till 1900, when, on the occasion of the troubles in China and the consequent rise in silver, it was exported wholesale to that country. The result was that for the third time since the opening of the treaty ports Corea found herself without an adequate currency. Meanwhile in 1894 the Corean Government had introduced the nickel 5-sen piece. Originally it had not been intended to use the nickel only, a few silver coins were actually minted and according to the Coinage Law of 1897 a gold coin was contemplated. Nothing was
· done along these lines, however, and the nickel as minted in large quantities became (with its attendant copper coins) the Corean currency of the country. The nickel has the same face value as the Japanese 5-sen nickel coin (ld.) and is approximately of the same size and quality, being intrinsically worth only about one-fifth of its face value. The Japanese nickel maintains its value on the same principle as the English shilling, by a legally fixed rate of exchange with a standard gold coin, but the Corean nickel having no higher coin behind it, was itself the standard coin and had to stand or fall by its own merits. Being thus elevated to the fictitious dignity of a currency the result was inevitable, the nickel fell in value as against other currencies. This fall commenced immediately though the lowest point was not reached for some time, the lowest rate reached (apart from one or two special instances) was 145 per cent. discount (i.e., Japanese yen could be exchanged for nickel 2 dol. 45 c.) in 1903. It is a matter of some surprise that, in view of the intrinsic value of the coin, it should not have dropped far lower, and the most satisfactory explanation is to be found in the constant support and credit given to it by the Coreans, especially in the interior. Minted in large quantities by the Government (who made a very great profit thereby), and supplemented by wholesale counterfeits the whole seemell capable of being absorbed
...
COREA. 5
by the people. As the Japanese Dai Ichi Bank had introduced their own notes into Corea in 1902, where they were readily accepted by all foreigners and by Coreans acquainted with foreign methods, there were thus two recognised currencies giving rise to large exchange operations every day, the large section of the populace who adhered to the nickel exchanging always such Japanese money as came to them, the converse being the case with foreign merchants and others whose business necessitated handling nickels. The nickel being thus always quoted above its intrinsic value was naturally sensitive; always tending to sink towards its natural level, it would rise when a demand set in and its fluctuations at times resembled those of an uncertain stock. During 1903 it varied, in Seoul, between 79 per cent. discount and 130 per cent. on the outbreak of the war in February, 1904, the large sums, in Japanese money, earned by the Coreans for supplies and labour for the army, combined with increased distrust on their part of Japanese paper money owing to the initial uncertainties of the war, caused an exceptional demand for nickels, whose exchange rose in Seoul from 130 per cent. discount in January to 50 per cent. in February, while in Chinnampo, furt,her north, the rate varied from 130 to 10 per cent. during the same interval. In fact, those influences, such as the abundance or shortness of money, which in other countries vary the rates of interest, in Corea affected the value of the principal Corean coin, and this nickel coinage was, in some of its phases, more like a commodity than a currency, having a special value on account of its utility as a" medium of exchange." It was these fluctuations, far more than the mere depreciation which made the coin in question so disliked by merchants and so urgently necessitated a scheme of reform. In addition to the Government minted coins, there were very large quantities of counterfeits, some . made in Corea, the majority imported from Japan; there were several qualities of these imitations, but the majority were of good metal, the profit even then being very great. Reliable estimates of the quantity of such counterfeits are lacking, but as it is generally supposed to be about half the total amount in circulation, it is at least certain that the figure is very large. In Chemulpo the total amount of counterfeits which had been seized by the customs down to October, 1905, was nearly 165,000 dol. nickel, and as most of the counterfeits were imported in the north and in junks along the coast where the customs had no adequate preventive service the imports at Chemulpo represent but a small fraction of the whole, while in the port iteslf the ingenuity of the smugglers who imported nickels in the sides of iron safes, in wood hollowed out, in matting and in cases of oil suggests that the amount taken by no means represents the whole import. Eventually in November, 1892, an Imperial Japanese ordinance was issued dealing both with the manufacture of the nickels in Japan and their import by Japanese into Corea and, being rigorously enforced, nickel smuggling practically disappeared. Meanwhile the notes of the Bank of Japan made their appearance
(1002)
6 COREA.
in considerable quantities for use principally in the ports, and in 1902 the Dai Ichi Bank of Tokio was empowered to issue notes (based on a gold currency) for circulation in Corea only, and so far as foreign merchants were concerned they became the currency in general use. Over 71,000l. worth were in circulation by the end of 1902 and this amount had increased to over 344,000l. by the end of 1904. At first it seemed likely that these notes would spread everywhere, Coreans near the ports, especially Fusan, seeming well disposed. In the north and centre, however, the nickel held its own amongst the people generally. It is a matter for regret that these notes were not accepted everywhere as this would have obviated most of the currency di:fficultes. Apart, however, from political influences and prejudices, two factors affected the question. One was the suspicion caused by forged notes ; these seem to have been very few indeed, but to a Corean who could pass on counterfeit nickel without loss and to whom even a 5-yen {10s. 2d.) note was a considerable sum, a forged note was a serious matter and the total loss engendered distrust in a large circle. The other factor was the question of specie. The Corean has all the love of the Chinese for actual coin without his facility of appreciation of a strange paper cmrency. The notes of the Dai Ichi Bank are redeemable at all their branches in Corea in Japanese currency. It is not known how far these various branches would be willing or able to pay gold if that were specially desired, but in practice it is always Bank of Japan notes which are paid out in exchange, and as the total imports of gold into Corea from 1901 to 1904, inclusive, amounted only to
. 102,954 yen (10,510l.), it was evidently not contemplated to do so in practice. The Bank of Japan notes are, of course, redeemable only in Tokio and, consequently, apart from the small amount of subsidiary coins, there was no Japanese specie in circulation and this fact handicapped the paper currency in the struggle for popular favour. It is a question how far the excessive issue of the nickel, the numerous counterfeits introduced or the use of inferior metal, contributed to the depreciation of the nickel below its face value. No doubt the exchange could have been forced up by limiting the output below the amount in demand for purposes of circulation, just as the demand for subsidiary coins has sent the new nickel coin above par in one or two places in the interior notwithstanding its fixed rate of exchange with Dai Ichi banknotes. The maintenance of a high exchange in this way would, however, have been unnatural and, apart from the inconveniences of insufficient currency, the nickel would have been all the more susceptible to the influences for fluctuation, and the only conclusion possible is that the nickel should never have been issued at all except as a token coin for subsidiary purposes.
It may be mentioned that the southern provinces of Corea remained faithful to the copper cash and also took far more readily to the Japanese paper currency. The cash varied during. 1901-04 between 174 and 234 per cent. discount (i.e., 1 yen was equivalent
COREA. 7
to 570 to 770 cash), the average being about 32 per cent. discount (in Fusan).
This, then, was the situation for reform. The Corean mint was closed in September, 1904, and an Imperial ordinance in January, 1905, provided for a scheme of reformation to go into operation in June, 1905. It was reported that a separate central bank would be established under the control of the Dai Ichi bank for undertaking the refonn scheme, but eventually this was managed by the latter bank, which also negotiated a loan of 3,000,000 yen (306,250l.) in January, 1905, to the Corean Government to meet the expenses of the currency reform. In actual practice this reform involved the establishment of the Dai Ichi Bank as the Government Central Treasury and the recognition of its notes as legal tender. Exchange operations were commenced in Seoul on July 1, other offices being subsequently opened at Chemulpo, Pyeng Yang, Chinnampo and Kunsan. The nickel was at the time at 14 per cent. discount and as the rate of exchange, for the highest class coins, was only 100 per cent. (i.e., 100 yen being exchangeable for 2 nickel dol.), this favourable fact greatly stimulated operations at the outset, with the result that by October 15, 10,722,162 nickel dol. (550,000l.) had been withdrawn from circulation, including 1,411,184 nickel dol. paid into the Treasury. Two circumstances in connection with the exchange operations were from the outset causes of difficulty. The first was the rule for the rating of the coins to be exchanged. These were divided into three classes, the first to be exchanged at the proper rate of two to one (these were the coins of good quality minted by the Government); the second class included coins of good but slightly inferior quality, not Government minted, which were to be exchanged at the rate of three to one (i.e., 5 nickel dol. were to receive 1 yen), while the third class included completely bad coins which were to be defaced and returned to the applicants for exchange. Inasmuch as so large a proportion of the coin in circulation was supposed to come under the second class considerable apprehension was created as to the effect on the large number of bona-fide holders of such money. So far, however, only about 1 per cent. of the coins examined have been adjudged to be in the second class, and as there is some reason to think that the percentage of such coins exchanged is some 12 or 15 per cent. of the whole, the rule seems to have been interpreted with considerable liberality. The difficulty arising from the second circumstance is, however, far more serious ; this consists in the fact that so little. specie has been given in exchange for the nickel coins withdrawn from circulation. Up to the end of 1905 less than 400,000 yen (41,000l.) new silver and nickel subsidiary coins had been issued and, making allowance for the small amount of silver coins previously circulating and for the remaining nickel and cash coins, this seems a rather small amount. No reason has so far been given of this small issue, whether it is connected with the rise in silver in China towards the end of 1905
8 COl:EA.
or results from other causes, but there seems no doubt that it is the principal factor in the commercial depression in Corea. The lack of small coins, the prejudice against the Dai Ichi banknotes and the political situation had a detrimental influence on Coreans in a really stable financial condition, and when these found themselves in difficulty there was not much chance of those in real straits escaping.
One of the manifestations of the stringency was found in the failure of the promissory note system. These notes, similar to those in use in China, suffered by the somewhat unbusinesslike methods of the Coreans ; they were bearer notes and in times of crisis they were especially liable to be dishonoured. To restore the credit of the system promissory note regulations were made providing for endorsement, the exclusion of nickel and cash currencies and the formation of note associations, the members of which alone could issue notes under the new regulations.
Another means for assisting the circulation of money was the establishment of warehouse companies whose principal function is the storing of merchandise against the issue of negotiable warehouse certificates; in addition, they advance money on the securitrof goods, crops and fields. A capital of 150,000 yen (15,300l.) has been allotted to each of these purposes, that for the warehouse companies being provided by the Imperial House.
Other causes The rice crop in 1905 was considerably below the average ; the of bad trade. heavy summer rains caused much damage almost everywhere, and
the purchasing powers of the Coreans were consequently much diminished.
The war also had a certain influence on trade especially as the Baltic Fleet approached Far Eastern waters. This influence was more particularly felt near Fusan.
The gradual diminution of expenditure on railways as the main lines neared completi'on lessened the amount of money spent, which in the previous year had contributed considerably to the prosperity of a large section of the population.
Another important source of embarrassment was the absence of adequate openings for Japanese immigrants with small capital; the bad trade and keen competition told heavily on many and, in Chemulpo at least, had it not been for the fact that there was still a considerable amount of capital expenditure in works and housebuilding which eased the situation there would have been much distress. Curiously enough, it was not the persons with the smallest capital who suffered most; the lack of opportunities led these to seek personal work, while those rather better off (with, say, 200l. to 500l.) were often led to open shops or commence trades, and these had by rio means an easy time.
The general result. of all these influences was that business became thoroughly stagnant. Many of the imports could only be warehoused, as delivery could not be taken. Heavy losses in the aggregate were currently reported and the outlook at the end of the year was far from bright.
COREA. 9
The import :figures for 1905 were by far the largest on record. Imports. The favourable conditions of 1904 had induced large orders for the following year, but as stated above a considerable quantity of the imports remained in warehouses at the end of the year.
The greatest increase was in the import of cotton goods, of these couon goods. some l,167,847l. worth entered the country as against 813,644l. · during the previous year, an increase of 354,203l., or 43·5 per cent. Increases took place in nearly all the items, in particular, British shirtings (grey and white), sheetings and drills and Japanese sheetings, miscellaneous piece-goods and yarn showed a great advance.
Though the total import of woollen goods is small, it seems to be Woollen increasing steadily, 1905 showing an increase of 62· 6 per cent. over goods.
the previous year. Metal goods also show a large increase both in the aggregate Metal goods.
amount and in most of the items, the total import has risen from 93,275l. to 142,164l., an increase of 48,889l., or 52·4 per cent. Some of the principal increases have been in materials for building purposes, such as galvanised iron sheets and other ironwork, while steel and miscellaneous goods, such as hardware, brassware, cutlery, &c., also made great forward strides. It would seem very probable that the increases will be maintained in future as these are all goods necessary for any development of the country.
The general expansion of imports was also maintained in the l\Iisceliuneous articles included under the heading of" sundries," though in several goods.
items there was a considerable falling-off. Candles, coal, cotton wadding, flour, grass-cloth, machinery, porcelain, sugar and tobacco all show large increases, while railway plant and rice are responsible for the greatest decrease.
There was a further decrease during 1905 of 2,981l., or 4 per Exports. cent., on the figures of the previous year for the export trade. The exports of Corea have always been subject to great fluctuations due mainly to the factor of the quality of the rice crop.
Though in the early summer the prospects of the rice crop were Rice. good, the heavy rains and, in some places, consequent inundations later on did much damage. The result was a poor crop and the exports were less even than those of the previous year, when they were small owing to the demand at home from the Japanese military authorities and the good prices obtained. Other influences which checked the exports were the difficulties connected with transport and coolie hire in the interior resulting from the currency situation and the import duty on rice in Ja pan.
There was an increase in the export of cattle and other live- C,ttle, &c. stock, though the figures are still much below the average. Doubt-less exports will gradually increase with Vladivostock open again, but the effects of the cattle disease of 1904 are still felt. Exports
· of hides decreased very much as a result of the cessation of the epidemic.
There was a considerable increase in the re-export figures-the Re-exports.
Ooustiug trnclc.
Brifoh trade.
10 C:OllEA.
amount for 1905 being 103,336l. against 60,965l. in 1904. The principal articles re-exported were coal, clothing, tobacco, liquors of various descriptions, galvanised iron sheets and some cotton goods, the greater part of these were re-exported from Chemulpo and Chinnampo, the principal destination being Manchuria.
There was also a very large increase in the value of goods despatched coastwise, the figures for 1905 being about 968,560l. against 918,750l. in 1904. A decrease would ordinarily have been expected with the greater security of the sea communication, but this factor was more than counterbalanced by the effect of the Japanese-Corean agreement of August 13, 1905, regarding coasting trade, which gives privileges under conditions of licences and customs control to Japanese to trade along the coast and which has naturally affected the open ports in this matter also.
The remarks made in last year's trade report as to the value of British trade may be repeated with added emphasis. Although the customs returns give only the figures for the direct trade of the various countries, which arc very small in the case of " British trade," conservative estimates compiled from other sources justify the statement that at least 800,000l., or some 25 per cent., of the imports into Corea in 1905 were of British origin. An instance of the great difference between the two methods of calculation is found in the customs reports for Wonsan for 1903 and 1904 where, in addition to the ordinary tables, special returns were drawn up showing the countries of origin. These showed the percentages of imports of Ftitish origin to be 29·56 per cent. in 1903 and 36·86 per cent. in 1904; the figures on which these calculations are based include foreign goods coming coastwise from other Corean ports, and it is consequently difficult to compare them with the ordinary tables which show British goods to be only 0· 12 per cent. of the foreign goods arriving direct at W onsan from abroad, but as the percentage of imports from the United Kingdom for the whole of Corea is given as only 2· 86 per cent: for 1904 it would seem that the estimate of 25 per cent. as the real proportion of British imports for 1904 and 1905 is probably under the mark. For many years after the opening of Corea to foreign trade imports of British origin were given as over 50 per cent. of the whole, and of the total foreign imports of Corea since 1884 (some 22,000,000Z.) a reasonable estimate. of the British share would be 40 per cent. of the whole (nearly 9,000,000Z.}, and these figures will give an idea of the possible importance of the Corean market in future.
The figures of the British cotton goods import are those ascertainable with the greatest accuracy. Out of a total import of l,167,847l. the British share is estimated at 521,748l., or 44·7 per cent. against a total of 384,549l. (47·2 per cent. of the whole) in 1904. This British trade is evidently in a healthy condition, though in view of the severity of Japanese competition it is impossible to indulge in prophecies for the future. Owing to the fact that the. quality of the rice harvest is so great a factor in the purchasing
COREA. 11
power of Coreans, advance orders have generally some element of risk and this causes the disadvantages of time and distance to press with special heaviness on British imports, the only suggestion that can be made is to point out the convenience accruing where it is possible to supply the Corean market from stocks held in China. Mention may be made of a Corean Government edict forbidding the wearing of the white clothes hitherto worn by Coreans; the edict has been amended and is in general only very partially obeyed but probably in any case coloured cotton goods will grow in favour. Regarding the competition from Japan which supplies nearly the whole of the remainder of the cotton imports attention may be drawn to the gradual approximation to British quality (accompanied, however, also with some rise in price), improved packing and care in modifying lengths to suit Corea ; in the case of sheetings these are being supplied slightly longer and narro,ver. It may also not be out of place to mention again the importance of durability as the Corean method of washing which involves hammering the garments washed throws considerable strain on the cloth used.
Exact figures for British imports of railway material are not obtainable, but it is certain they fell off considerably. It may be mentioned that the railways (as also the posts and telegraphs) are under Japanese control, and that consequently the sources of supply of many of the articles are decided by authorities in Japan.
In the case of woollen goods a considerable quantity is of British origin, the better quality blankets, some of the broad cloth, Italian cloth and lastings coming from the United Kingdom; in the case of the broad cloth there is an increasing demand especially by Japanese in Corea. Though the total imports are small they are growing and the trade might be of considerable importance if woollens displaced the Corean wadded garments to any extent in the future.
Other British imports include candles, some lighthouse material, spirits, caustic soda and sugar, besides metal goods. In candles there is considerable Belgian and also Japanese competition, while Japanese sugar is rapidly increasing to the detriment of the HongKong product.
In the absence of more exact information as to countries of origin there is some difficulty in indicating with exactness the openings for British trade, but mention may be made of wire nails, obtainable in Corea at 12s. 3d. per picul (133 lbs.) c.i.£.; window glass, lls. per case (100 square feet) c.i.£.; and perhaps quinine, needles, enamel ware and iron goods.
In dealing with Coreans it may be well to bear in mind the fact that when in funds they will generally desire good quality in articles whose use is governed by national custom or etiquette; thus in the case of clothing, about which they have very definite opinions, there is always a tendency to buy the best. On the other hand, when dealing with articles of recent introduction regarding which there exist no preconceived notions, the cheapest is often bought
P!'icee.
Currency.
Treo.sure, imp()rts o.nd exports.
Railway3,
12 COREA.
· because there is no cheaper; thus in the item of matches price is · generally the all-important consideration as this line of goods is not governed by the Coreans' sense of the fitness of things. The Coreans also have few prejudices against novelties and take readily to articles whose utility is evident. A notable instance is the use of the sewing machine, which is extending in a remarkable manner; if it were possible to place on the market a cheap machine of strong but simple construction British manufacturers might find this country well worthy of attention.
An examination of the table of exports (Annex No. 3) will show that the high prices of commodities of last year were maintained in nearly all the items. The principal causes were the large number of Japanese immigrants (who with the garrisons have naturally increased the demand), the good wages generally paid in cases of expenditure of capital and the influence of the war, while mention may be made of the tendency of the Corean farmers to hold out, often too long, in bad years for the good prices of previous seasons ; these influences counterbalanced, in the matter of prices, the depressing influences of the bad trade at the end of the year. In the ports especially prices ruled high ; the large immigrations raised rents considerably, and the high cost of imported provisions and articles for the use of the various foreign residents was not decreased by the security of the sea routes.
The reform of the nickel currency has already been dealt with above, and it is only necessary to give supplementary details regarding the Dai Ichi banknotes which have practically become the currency o.£ Corea. At the end of 1904 there were Dai Ichi Ginko notes in circulation to the value of 344,20GZ., and at the end of 1905 the amount had grown to 829,454l., an increase of 485,248Z. ; there were in addition over 40,000Z. worth of new silver and nickel coins issued, making a total issue of some 526,000Z.
The quantity of notes of the Bank of Ja pan in Corea is not known accurately, but it must be considerable. These notes are, of cour2e, kept by the Dai Ichi Bank for exchange against their own notes, while there is also a quantity in circulation.
The old Corean cash currency continues to circulate in the south, though the amount in use is not known. During 1905 the exchange value of these coins rose ; the lowest point reached in 1904 was 48 per cent. discount on the Japanese yen, while in 1905 the lowest figure reached was 25·6 per cent. discount and in November the coin stood at only 2·4 per cent. discount (these rates were those prevailing at Fusan).
The total import of treasure during 1905 was 655,332l., CC>mposed of paper money, 445,009l.; silver, 117,53ll.; and 92,792l. worth of nickel and copper coins and blanks. The export of treasure was 834,909Z.; this sum was made up of gold, 531,528l.; paper money, 259,964l. ; silver, 31,550l. ; and cash and copper coin, ll,867l.
Though there was a slackening of energy as the main lines drew near completion and the military necessity of the railway corn-
COREA, 13
munication through Corea became less urgent, very considerable extensions of the mileage open were made. Altogether some 620 , miles of railway are working in Corea, with other lines constructing or contemplated.
The Seoul-Fusan line was completed during the year, an ~eoul-Fus11n opening celebration being held in May. Returns for the first half hne.
year of 1905 show that the line was making a small profit on receipts of 18s. 8d. per mile per day. During the same period some 332,532 passengers used the line (including 45.000 through passengers to Seoul and 34,000 to Fusan), the average mileage per passenger being 56 miles ; 33,040 tons of freight were sent along the line during the same time. Later returns show that 686,863 passengers and 79,345 tons were carried during the whole year. An important addition to the system is the steamer service from Fnsan to Shimonoseki by two special boats (of 1,600 tons) running either daily or on alternate days; it is now possible to travel from Seoul to Kobe in under two days, though in practice the mail service still takes three days.
The short line of some 25 miles from the port of Masampo to Sanroshin on the Seoul-Fusan line was also opened during the year.
The year 1905 was not so satisfactory for the Seoul-Chemulpo Sroulline as the previous year, mainly on account of the falling-0ff of (:hmulpo the freight service consequent on the smaller quantity of military hue.
stores nnd railway material sent northward. During the first six months of 1905 341,700 passengers and 63,330 tons of goods travelled on the line, but the receipts fell off 13 per cent. Although this line is under the same control as the Seoul-Fusan line, it is in some matters managed separately, and it was a noteworthy fact that during the summer of 1905 considerable excitement was caused in Chemulpo, especially amongst Japanese merchants, at what was considered an alteration in railway rates placing Chemulpo at a disadvantage as compared with Fusan. A recrudescence of the difficulty occurred early in 1906, and it is understood that the difference is due to a commission or allowance for coolie hire in loading and unloading.
Considerable progress was made with the Seoul-Wiju line, and Seo11l-Wiju hy the end of the year trains were running practically the whole line. distance, the line still is under complete military control. On account of military necessity temporary expedients had in places to be employed and there will probably be a partial reconstruction, thus the rails are, many of them, old 60-lb. rails, and these will probably be replaced ; again, the maximum gradient was at first 1 in 30, though this is to be reduced to 1 in 100. The principal difficulties encountered were connected with bridges ; at Pyeng Yang there is a bridge 2,100 feet long, and at Anju there are two channels necessitating bridges each 1,500 feet long. It is stated that only eight tunnels have been found necessary, four between Seoul and Pyeng Yang and four between the latter town and Wiju. The total length of the line is 300 miles
Lines constructing.
Jnpancse rn,ilwa, nnlion°alisntio11.
Foreign t,radc at the rnrious ports.
Chernulpo.
F'1L~nn.
]4 COREA.
A railway between Seoul and the port of Wonsan on the east coast is under construction, but the date of completion is uncertain. A line from the port of Kunsan to the Seoul-Fusan line is proposed and also one to the north of W onsan ; thes.:i proposals will doubtless be ultimately carried out.
The proposals for the nationalisation of railways in Japan include the whole of the Kei-Fu (Seoul-Fusan) line, and if the scheme is carried out doubtless all the railways in Corea will pass under the control of the Government of Ja pan.
Chemulpo and Fusan are by far the most important ports in the peninsula ; 76· l per cent. of the foreign imports in 1905 and 62·7 per cent. of the exports passed through these ports. Wonsan and Chinnampo follow in order, and the four ports do the bulk of the direct foreign trade of Corea, no less than 97 · 5 per cent. of the imports and 87 · 3 per cent. of the exports appearing in their returns.
At Chemulpo, the premier port of Corea, the imports rose but a very small amount, the figures for 1905 being l,651,586l. against l,650,l 72l. in the previous year, while the exports fell from 255,0IOl. in 1904 to 235,186l.
The import of cotton goods increased considerably, but the baa. trade of the year left large stocks in warehouses at the close of December. The British share of these goods advanced from about 286,000l. to 352,200l. Galvanised iron sheets doubled in value, some 13,600l. worth entering. Grass-cloth (which competes with lawns and muslins) almost trebled in value the figures being 92,900l. Flour, sugar and machinery all showed considerable increases, while the most important decrease was in railway material, the import of which naturally fell as the lines neared completion. In exports the most important decreases were in beans and rice due to the bad crop and in cow-hides due to the cessation of the cattle disease.
An electric light and power company was formed in Chemulpo towards the end of 1904 and is expected to commence operations early in 1906. The capital is mostly German and Japanese.
The town is growing considerably, spreading into the country districts, the Japanese population at the end of 1904 numbered nearly 10,000, but at the end of 1905 the number was estimated at 16,000, or about half of the total population of the town, Coreans included.
The trade of Fusan took a great forward step both in imports and exports during 1905. The former increased from 654,387l. in 1904 to 831,814l., and the latter :from 165,310Z. to 206,675l. (the exports in 1904 were, however, rather low). In spite of the increased figures trade was not eor.sidered good The approach of the Baltic Fleet had an unsettli !lg effect, and for a time almost paralysed business, while the OC..:)urrence of plague at Osaka and Kobe had also a detrimental effect. In some respects, however, the port made great progress. Railway communication with the interior and ,,-ith Seoul greatly increased passenger traffic and more effectively opened up the interior to trade. There was a notable increase in
CORRA. 15
Japanese engaging in the retail trades. The Japanese population of Fusan rose to 15,000 or more at the end of 1905, while the number of Japanese resident in the interior from Fusan, including Taiku on the railway, was stated to be over 3,500. The fishing industry also increased, the Japanese taking out an increasing number of licences; a stimulus was given to the industry by the possibility of sending fish inland by rail even as far as Seoul.
The increased imports were generally spread over most of the articles imported, cotton goods especially showing considerable advance, some 237,500l. worth arriving at the port. Railway plant showed, as might be expected, the greatest falling-off. In the exports the increase was also general, beans and peas, cattle and provisions showing the largest advance.
The imports of Chinnampo increased in 1905 from 236,517l. to Obinnompo.
297,844l., while the exports showing a recovery from the previous year's decline rising from 107,695l. to ll0,108l.
Present appearances would point to considerable prospects for Chinnampo in future ; the importance it has acquired as the port of the second city in Corea, Pyeng Yang, will probably be indirectly increased by the construction of the Seoul-Wiju line which crosses the Tatung River at Pyeng Yang, while the efforts which are being made to maintain communication with the port even during winter will, if attended with any degree of success, help the development of Chinnampo considerably. The town itself is expanding a good deal, and the Japanese population has grown during 1905 from about 2,000 to 3,800. The convenience of the large River Tatung seems likely to lead to much activity along its lower reaches ; some 20 miles further up the river than Chinnampo, and on the opposite side, the town of Kyeminpo, already settled by a good many Japanese, would appear to be a place of growing importance and a possible port of the future.
In the case of imports Wonsan not only recovered the ground ,vonsiin.
lost in 1904, but made a considerable advance on all previous figures, the value rising from 108,0291. in 1904 to 400,9451. in 1905. In the matter of exports, however, the general depression extended here also, the figures for Ul05 being only 63,073l. against 65,9021. the previous year. In the case of the imports cotton goods alone (194,427l.) represented an increase of about 140,000l. on 1904, and the 8,914l. worth of metal goods was more than four times th,~ previous year's import; cotton wadding, grain and pulse, rice and tobacco all show large increases during the year.
Wonsan possesses a very fine harbour (second only in Corea to that of Masampo) and, when railway communication is opened both with Seoul and also the rich country to the north, the port will have good reason to anticipate a prosperous future.
The trade of Kunsan fell off still more during 1905 ; the imports Kunson.
only reached 36,834l. against 60,648l. in 1904, and the exports 36,827l. against 42,5167. in the previous year.
The position of Mokpo improved considerably in the matter- of ":\fokpo.
Ma,ampo.
Songchin,
Position of the various ports,
Shipping
16 COREA.
imports, 32,360l. entering against 20,433l. m the previous year ; exports, however, declined still further in 1905, receding from 67, 731l. in 1904 to 48,696l. in 1905.
Masampo recovered a little from the very low figures of 1904, during which year imports to the value of 4, 992l. and exports 3,631l. only were recorded; during 1905 these figures grew to 10,807l. for the imports and 3,804l. for the exports.
Songchin suffered from the war more than any other port. The imports, which were only l,205l. in 1904, sank further to 351l. in 1905. Exports, which in 1904 had been nil, amounted in 1905 to 445l.
In giving the above figures it is proper to mention that they refer only to the direct foreign trade; there is always a considerable amount of trade in foreign goods along the coast, so that imports originally entered at one port may eventually find their way to another port; in this way the position of Masampo and, to a still greater degree, Songchin is better than shown by the above returns and their commercial activity more marked. Apart from the above eight ports, Wiju and Yongampo, there are over 40 unopened ports which appear in the customs returns as more or less regularly engaged in the coasting trade, from which will be gathered the importance of the recent coasting trade agreement (mentioned above) which may result in a very extensive opening up of the whole country.
Speaking generally, it may be said that the position and prospects of the four leading ports, Chemulpo, Fusan, Chinnampo and W onsan, point distinctly to considerable expansion in future. About the remaining four ports the prospects are not so clear, but it may, at all events, be said of them (with the exception perhaps of Masampo) that they seem excellently situated for trade in the interior as soon as railway and road communication is improved ; even in the case of Masampo (which might suffer by its proximity to Fusan), if the price of land be taken as an indication, the future is regarded with confidence locally.
There was a marked increase in the shipping entered at the ports of Corea during the year 1905 ; 5,243 steamers of 1,883,051 tons entered against 3,796 steamers of 1,294,581 tons in 1904, an increase of 1,447 vessels and 588,470 tons; sailing vessels (including junks) numbered 4,705 of 117,573 tons against 3,463 vessels of 97,892 tons n 1904, an increase of 1,242 vessels and 19,681 tons. A reference
to Annex 1 will show that increases occurred at all ports except Kunsan, the greatest advances being at Fusan and Chemulpo.
As might be expected, there has been a great increase in Japanese shipping owing to the ships withdrawn on account of war services being replaced, though the 1905 figures are slightly under those for 1903. The German entries at Chemulpo mostly represent the steady and useful connection which was maintained with Shanghai and Tsingtau; the United States figures nearly all refer to steamers under agreement with the Nippon Yusen Kaisha and forming part of their regular servic~ between Japan and Corea. The most note-
con EA. l7
worthy incident in connection with shipping was, of course, the approach of the Baltic Fleet. Apart from the general anxiety occasioned by the uncertainties of the position, it may be mentioned that even so far north-west as Chemulpo Japanese shipping was affected by the situation, and just before the battle of the sea of Ja pan orders were issued prohibiting Japanese ships from proceeding southwards.
British shipping, it will be seen, decreased considerably, mainly Bi:iLis_h on account of the decreased import of railway material ; 29 steamers slnpprng,
of 61,977 ton entered against 53 vessels of 108,694 tons in 1904 ; sailing ships also fell off from 7 ships of 2,524 tons to I ship of 25 tons.
In dealing with the problem of British shipping in Corea attention may be drawn to the heavy incidence of the tonnage dues. These dues are 25 sen (6d.) per registered ton, and a single payment is good for the same ship for four months at all Corean ports. This is the principle of the shipping dues of both China and Ja pan and falls equally on shipping of all nationalities, though it is naturally a great advantage to all ships trading regularly at the various ports along the coast. It is naturally easier for the shipping companies of Far Eastern nations to maintain regular services, and generally speaking European and American companies do not seem to consider it advantageous to run regular steamers, except in the one case of the Hamburg-Amerika line, which keeps up regular communication between Shanghai and Corea. German steamers are consequently not so handicapped by the system of dues as they might be, and the same may be said of American shipping, as most of the entries. under the American flag are due to steamers running under charter with the Nippon Yusen Kaisha. In the case of British shipping, however, there is no regular line running to Corean ports ; the steamers that do come have often to visit only one port, with the result that quite a disproportionate share of the dues is paid by British ships as will be seen by the following table giving the figures for 1905 :-
Percentages of-
Tonnage Number of Entered. Dues Paid.
Tonna,ge. Dues.
British •• 62,002 1,161 3·1 18·2 Corean .• .. 198,712 259 9.9 4·1 Austro-Hunga.rian 4,984 64 0·2 1 Chinese .• 28,409 245 1·4 3.9 French •• 400 .. German 110,454 390 5.5 6· l Japanese 1,369,322 3,679 68·5 57·6 Norwegian 109,474 · 473 5.5 7.4 Russian 1,143 10 O· l O· l United States . , 115,724 103 5·8 1·6
Total - 2,000,624 6,384 100 100
H
Freigbts nnd insurance.
Cm toms revenue.
Customs ndministration.
Lighthouses.
Agriculture.
COREA.
During the five years 1901 to 1905, inclusive, the British tonnage entered at Corean ports was under 3 per cent. of the whole and the tonnage dues paid over 14 per cent. of the total amount. It can easily be understood, therefore, that there is little tendency to send over individual ships to visit only one or two ports unless there is adequate profit in sight, and there seems no chance that British shipping will improve unless the circumstances should justify the running of a regular line.
During 1905 the ordinary rates of freight were generally maintained; to Japan these were 6·40 yen (13s. ld.) to 8 yen (lGs. 4d.) per ton of 40 cubic feet, according to the class of merchandise, and about 5 yen (10s. 2d.) to 14 yen (ll. 8s. 7d.) per ton weight for varying commodities. Rates generally went up some 20 per cent. on the approach of the Baltic Fleet to Far Eastern waters. At the beginning of 1906 freights have a downward tendency due doubtless to the bad trade at the end of the previous year and the quantity of Japanese shipping released from Government service after the war.
Before the battle of the Sea of Japan marine insurance rates for Corean waters rose considerably, being from three to six times the ordinary rates, according to the locality.
The revenue of the Corean customs during-1905 was 234,103l. against 188,379l. in 1904, an increase of 45,724l. ·
In November, 1905, the British Chief Commissioner of Customs was succeeded by a Japanese Chief Commissioner, who also exercises the functions of :financial adviser to the Corean Government.
According to information published by the customs in November, 1905, there are 10 lighthouses in operation on the Corean coast. Of these five (showing six lights) mark the approach to Chemulpo, they include one light of the fourth order and five of the sixth order. Fusan is provided with three lights (unclassed); Port Hamilton
· with a third order light and Pinnacle Rock, on the west coast, with a first order light. Besides the above, one lighthouse is constructing outside Chemulpo, and preparations are being pushed forward for 13 other lights at various points ; there are also eight other sites indicated for possible future lights.
Considerable attention is being directed towards agriculture in Corea both for the purpose of improving methods and in the matter of Japanese settlers turning farmers. In particular great interest is being taken in the cultivation of cotton. Cotto!).. has .been cultivated in Corea for a long time (see No. 317, Miscellaneous Series, 1894), and is now grown in the provinces of Cholla, Chung Cheng, Kyeng Sang, Kyeng Ki, Whang Hai and Pyeng An. Should the cultivation be extended, the export of cotton will prove of advantage to the factories in Ja pan and may even lead to their ·establishment in Corea. The disintegrated granite and friable earth of the cotton districts seem suitable to the cultivation of cotton, of which four varieties are known-green stalk, red stalk, large Cqi:ean and small ~orean ; the green stalk is the most distinct variety, being smaH
COI:EA. 19
in fibre, and some six or seven days earlier than the others. The fibre is longer tha,n the Japanese or Chinese and equal to Indian, while the lustre, though equal to Indian and Chinese, is inferior to Japanese. It is probable that American upland cotton would make more progress in Corea than in Ja pan, where the rainfall seems excessive. In that case, and in view of the expense of importing American cotton into Japan, the cultivation of cotton in Corea may be of great advantage to the Japanese cotton industry. l\fokpo is the centre of most of the initial Japanese work in this direction. ·
So far as statistical results go there is little to say about mines, l\Jir.cs.
but actually there has been considerable activity shown in various ways. The long pending Italian mining concession was granted in March, 1905, while mining regulations (for gold) are under consideration. Copper and coal are produced in considerable quantities and the latter especially may be an important factor in the develop-ment of the country owing to the continual tendency of imported coal to rise in price. So far, however, there is little outward interest shown in other minerals in .the country.
It is a little difficult to arrive at exact figures of the Japanese Jnpnncse population of Corea for the reason that there is always a certain population.
percentage who neglect to register and are unnoticed in the con-gestion of the ports and in the country districts, but it would seem to be little, if anything, under 80,000, and has been estimated by Japanese sources as high as 100,000. The customs estimate gives only 60,000 at the end of 1905 ; the arrivals of Japanese during 1905 exceeded the departures by over 32,000 and this would indicate only 28,000 in Corea at the end of 1904, and even if allowance is made for movements over the land frontiers, the figures seem inadequate. The excess of Japanese arrivals over departures during the five years 1901 to 1905 was over 78,000 according to the customs returns.
The well-known Yong Am Po on the Yalu was declared an open i\Iiscol-port in April, 1905, but no arrangements have been made. Iancou•.
A new system of Corean weights and measures came into operation in November, 1905.
The following Annexes are attached to this report :-No. 1, Annexes.
shipping at all the open ports; No. 2, imports; No. 3, exports; No. 4, customs revenue; No. 5, gold exports.
(1002) B 2
Annex 1-RETURN of all Shipping Entered at the Open Ports of Corea during the Year 1905.
Flug.
-
British •• .. .. Corea,n .• .. .. Austro-H ungarinn .. Chinese .• .. .. l?rencl1 .• .. .. German .. .. Japanese .. .. Norwegian .. .. Russian .. .. Swedish .. .. United States .. ..
