Corrupt collaboration

Ori Weisel+ Shaul Shalvi§

+University of Nottingham §Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

ICSD Hong Kong June 2015

Funding: Max Planck SocietyThe European Research Council (ERC-AdG 295707 COOPERATION)The European Union’s Seventh Framework Program (FP7/2007-2013; REA 333745)

It’s not cheating, it’s collaboration.(eCheat.com)

Cooperation is good; can it also be bad?

›A cooperative species; deeply ingrained moral sentiment to cooperateBowles and Gintis 2011

›Establishing sustainable cooperative relationships can set successful individuals and groups apart from less successful ones

›Little is known about negative aspects of cooperationVan Lange and Joireman 2008

›In intergroup conflict there are negative externalities to the outgroupBornstein and Ben-Yossef 1994

›Can (moral) cooperative tendencies—or a cooperative corporate culture—encourage the violation of (other) moral rules?

Lying

›To benefit self: People lie, but maintain self-concept› Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008; Shalvi, Dana, and Handgraff 2011; Fischbacher and Föllmi-

Heusi 2013; Gächter and Schulz 2015

›To benefit others: People lie more, still maintain self-concept› Wiltermuth 2011; Gino, Ayal, and Ariely 2013; Conrads, Irlenbusch, Rilke and Walkowitz

2013; Cohen, Gunia, Kim-Jun and Murnighan 2009; Gneezy 2005; Gino and Pierce 2010; Atanasov and Dana 2011

›group-serving dishonesty is modulated by oxytocin› Shalvi and DeDreu 2014

›Self-concept maintenance

Corrupt collaboration

›Corrupt collaboration: The attainment of profits by joint immoral acts

›Our interest is in cases in which the collaborative effort of individuals necessarily and directly entails the violation of moral rules (lying).

Ori Weisel University of Nottingham

Procedure and design

Procedure

1. Player A privately rolls a die and reports the outcome

2. Player B learns about A’s report

3. Player B privately rolls a die and reports the outcome

4. Player A learns about B’s report

Payment

If the reported outcomes are equal each player receives the reported amount in Euros.

If the reported outcomes are not equal both players receive nothing.

Example 2 – No Double

Player A reported

Player B reported

Payment: A gets €0, B gets €0

Example 1 - Double

Player A reported

Player B reported

Payment: A gets €5, B gets €5

Treatment:Aligned Outcomes

Ori Weisel University of Nottingham

Results – Aligned Outcomes

Hypothetical honesty baseline Actual behaviour (20 dyads, 20 trials)

16.67% doubles 82% doubles

Ori Weisel University of Nottingham

Brazen (i.e., bold and shameless) behaviour

A always ‘sets the stage’,B always ‘gets the job done’

A is honest,B always ‘gets the job done’

A mostly ‘sets the stage’,B always ‘gets the job done’

50% totally brazen B’s

Ori Weisel University of Nottingham

Varying incentives

›Remove B’s interest in the value of the double› Treatment B-High – B earns 6 for any double› Treatment B-Low – B earns 1 for any double

›Remove B’s interest in reporting a double› Treatment B-Fixed – B earns 1 regardless of the report

›Remove A’s interest in the value of the double› Treatment A-High – A earns 6 for any double› Treatment A-Low – A earns 1 for any double

›Remove A’s interest in reporting a double› Treatment A-Fixed – A earns 1 regardless of the report

B treatments

A treatments

Ori Weisel University of Nottingham

Varying incentives

›B’s are sensitive to the incentives of A players

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Ori Weisel University of Nottingham

Singnaling

›B’s are sensitive to the incentives of A players

›They are also sensitive to the behaviour of A players

› B’s are more likely to be brazen when A is brazen as well

› Aligned Outcomes: 100% brazen B’s when A is brazen33% when A is not brazen

› All other treatments: 36% brazen B’s when A is brazen13% when A is not brazen

Ori Weisel University of Nottingham

Results – comparison of all treatments (n=316)

A lot of lying in Aligned Outcomes

A lot of lying in general

Changing B’s incentive has the same effect as changing A’s incentives

Collaboration leads to more lying than working alone

More totally brazen B-players in Aligned Outcomes than in any other treatment

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Ori Weisel University of Nottingham

Robustness experiment

›Comparisons of Aligned Outcomes and B-fixed in a different location and with different parameters

›Three pairs of treatment:

› Replication: like original, payment in £ instead of €

› Multiplication: all payoffs are doubled

› Addition: £2 added to all payoffs

Ori Weisel University of Nottingham

Results – robustness experiment (n=236)

Replication and Multiplication – like Original data

Less lying in Addition

Less brazen B’s in Addition

Ori Weisel University of Nottingham

Conclusions

›A dark side of cooperation – corrupt collaboration

›Collaboration reduces concern for self-concept maintenance

›Corrupt collaboration is

› More likely when incentives are aligned

› More likely than individual corruption

›In some cases collaboration should be monitored, rather than encouraged

Ori Weisel University of Nottingham

Thank you