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    Cardiff University

    France: Corruption as ResentmentAuthor(s): Vincenzo RuggieroReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 23, No. 1, The Corruption of Politics and the Politicsof Corruption (Mar., 1996), pp. 113-131Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Cardiff UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1410470 .

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    JOURNAL FLAWANDSOCIETYVOLUME3,NUMBER ,MARCH 996ISSN:0263-323X,pp. 113-131

    France:Corruption s ResentmentVINCENZO RUGGIERO*

    Corruption will be defined here as occurring when one or more actorsinvolved in, or witnessing corrupt exchange have reasons for resentment andtherefore permit corruption to come to light. This thesis will be elaboratedand critiquedwith respect to recent episodes of political, administrative, andeconomic corruption occurring in France. The adoption of this frameworkof analysis s not a short-cutwhichspares he authorthecustomaryreviewof the literature' n the subjectmatter.Rather,it is an implicitrefutationof some of the views included n that literature,n particular hose whichassociatecorruptionwith variables uchaseconomicunderdevelopmentndsocialbackwardness.1he choiceof the formula corruption s resentment'permits heexplorationof how corruptexchangealso takesplacein highlydeveloped and advanced social contexts.Inapreviousarticle,where heauthorcould notescape hepainfulexerciseof a reviewof the literature,corruptionwas analysedwith a view to un-coveringsome aspectsof victimization ausedby it.2It was arguedthat anumberof actors,endowed with varyingdegreesof resourcesand power,participaten corruptexchange,and that only a deeply-rooted pticalillu-sion enablesus to see theseexchangesas victimless.Withoutanalysingwhycorruptionoccurs, n that article he attemptwasmadeto showwhy,when,and for whomit is harmful.In a similarvein, this articledoes not proposean aetiologicalview:here,the existenceof corruptions treatedas a given,whilequestionsareposedregardinghow it is perceived. n otherwords,anexplanation s attemptedof itspublicmanifestation, ather han of its 'true'prevalence,of its verydefinitionas corruption, ather han of its causes.This avenuehas also been takenby otherauthors: scandal, iketreason,onlyexistswhensomethinggoes wrong'.3This is to saythat abuseof power,governmentalmalpractice,and incompetenceonly emergewhen they are* Reader, Faculty of Social Science, Middlesex University, Queensway,Enfield EN3 4SF, EnglandThis article s based on research onducted n France n 1995. The research onsistedof anumberof interviews nd collectivediscussions arriedout withjudgesandjournalists.Forthe information nd contactsprovidedduring he courseof theresearch, am indebted o theSyndicat de la Magistratureand to Laurent Joffrin of Le Nouvel Observateur.

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    exposed. However, when this avenue has been explored, the emergence ofcorruption and its concealment have mainly been associated with, respec-tively, the efficacy or lack of scrutiny of political and economic power. Thisperspective appears to entail that there would be less corruption if someactors - usually the judiciary, the media, and the public - exerted strictercontrol over others - usually politicians and entrepreneurs.4 n the followingpages, the emphasis will be placed on the interactions between these actorsand, crucially, on the resentment that corrupt behaviour produces in someof them, a resentment which translates into the exposure of that behaviourand its definition as corrupt.A related assumption to this approach is that corrupt activities, albeitunorthodox or even illegal, may be tolerated when they appear to generatebenefits for all those participating in or witnessing them. Resentment, andtherefore corruption, emerge when these activities are no longer perceivedas generating acceptable benefits for everyone; or when the previous roledivision, and the related expectations, are no longer accepted. In some cases,which will be mentioned later, some of the actors involved may find the 'dis-economies' of corrupt exchange too heavy to endure, and begin to perceivethat exchange as tantamount to extortion. In the present article politicians,entrepreneurs, judges, and the media are identified as the main actorscontributing to the definition of certain behaviours as corrupt. It is in thelight of the interactions taking place between these actors, which periodicallyoscillate between mutual acceptance and competition, that corrupt exchangein France is examined. In the first part of this article, some characteristicsof the French political apparatusare sketched which may help locate corruptexchange in the national context. The actors of corrupt exchange and theirinteractions are the focus of the second part of the article, while the emer-gence of resentment among some of them forms the third part. The institu-tional responses to this resentment form the last section, while a briefconclusion tries to clarify the reasons for the exclusion of 'public opinion'from the dynamics described.

    MONTESQUIEU VERSUS ROBESPIERRE?French republicanism,and indeed the 'corruption of the Republic', are oftenexamined against the analytical framework provided by one of the mostcelebrated fathers of political philosophy.5 The emphasis on Montesquieu'sview that the republic is based on virtue leads some commentators to claimthat contemporary France, where many of its political representatives aredeemed far from virtuous, is no longer a republic. However, the resort tothe political philosophy of Montesquieu appears to rest on a one-sided inter-pretation of his thought. In fact, his association of virtue with the republicanform of government can also be interpretedas a proposition aimed at under-mining the legitimacy of republicanism itself. Montesquieu made no secret

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    of his preference for monarchy, a form of government that he associatedwith 'honour', allegedly more tangible and definite a value to pursue thanunrealistic and vague 'virtue'.6Montesquieu's theory of the division of powers within the republic is also

    constantly invoked. However, it is unclear whether the enthusiasm causedby this theory is the result of misunderstanding or of support of even itsmore disputable aspects. In Montesquieu, the legislative, executive, andjudi-ciary powers are not as rigorously separate as republicans would advocate,as the pre-eminence of the executive surfaces throughout his argument. Fordecades, the myth of the separation of powers in Montesquieu has been theobject of critical discussion.7 This discussion has centred on the fact that his'power diagram' entails the existence of a strong executive which is entitledto scrutinize, veto, influence, and in other ways hamper both the legislativeand thejudiciary powers. An interesting aspect for the purpose of this articleregards Montesquieu's view that state dignitaries should not stand trial inordinary tribunals, for 'their dignity must be safeguarded from any contactwith the prejudicesof ordinary judges'.8In other words, the morality of staterepresentativesshould only be judged by those who possess a similar notionof morality, namely their peers, who stand outside the domain of ordinaryjustice.

    Montesquieu's judiciary is as invisible as it is null. The judge is a glanceand a voice, in the sense that he or she only reads and pronounces the wordsof the law, like a talking code. Crimes committed by the aristocracy andother members of the ruling class must be judged by the rulers themselves.Indeed, the power of judges is null, because they are deprived of the politicalimpact that their action would be expected to produce. Hence the criticismattracted by Montesquieu well-known definition of political regimes.It is all right to claim that despotism is a regime where one person governs without rulesor laws [ ... ]; there are regimes in which despotism reigns within the very existing laws.9

    It should be noted that the predominance of the executive over the otherconstitutional powers also features in the Republican Constitution of 1793,allegedly the most revolutionary brain-child of Robespierre:The new Constitution was a trap;it re-createda monstrous executive power, independentof the Assemble, a colossal power inimical to freedom, which restored a new type ofroyalty.'0

    The predominance of the executive power is among the legacies character-izing contemporary France, a background against which corrupt exchangeshould be analysed.

    POLITICIANS AND ENTREPRENEURSThe pendulum-like movement between concentration of power and itsdistribution has remained one of traits of the French Republic:

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    SincetheRevolution,all authoritarianegimeshave triedto putpower n the handsofone person: hedictator, heemperor, he head of state at central evel,theprefectandthemayorsatthe local evel.Conversely, emocraticegimes ave ried, ometimes oingtoo far,to fragmentpower."Duringthe Thirdand FourthRepublics, or instance, he centralpowerofthe executivewas weakened,while the local executiveswerestrengthened.Opportunitiesorcorrupt xchangewerethereforemainly ocatedwithin hedomain of the legislative power, where economic decisionswere made.Lobbyingparliamentmemberswas amongthe activitiesof powerfulentre-preneurs,whowere deemed he victimsof thecorruptingnfluenceof Paris.ThePanama candalexemplifieshistypeof corrupt xchange. t beganwitha project o builda channel hrough heisthmusof CentralAmerica n orderto join the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Difficulties and incompetencerepeatedlynterruptedhe work,while the budgetgrewdisproportionatelyhigher han the expenses nitiallyenvisaged.Thecompanyneededconstantre-financing, ntil a final parliamentary ote was required o authorizealarge loan. More than a hundreddeputieswere accused of havingtakenbribesin exchange or a 'yes' vote over an undertakingwhichthey knewwas boundto fail.12

    Duringthe FourthRepublic,however,the involvementof politicians ncorruptexchangewas also traced n local clientelism.Politiciansowed theirpresencen Parliament o thefinancial upportof localnotables,withwhomthey had ties of mutual interests:once elected, they would exchangethesupportreceived or favouritism n the concession of local contracts.'3Weshallsee how the evolutionof thesenational-localdynamicsplaysa crucialrole in the emergence f corruptexchange n contemporaryFrance.The FifthRepublicnheritedhestrong xecutive dvocated y MontesquieuandRobespierre,withpowerbeingconcentratednthepresidency.However,alongwiththenational,regionalandcity authoritiesalso took on unprece-denteddecision-making owers.This 'monarchicmodel',withthe executivepowerbeing strongboth at the centre and at the periphery, esulted n themultiplicationof corrupt opportunities.A notoriousexampleof nationalexecutive nvolvement n corruptionwas the 'Carrefour u Developpement'affair.The Carrefour asan association, ounded n 1983,officially hargedwith the development f commercial inkswith andproductiveactivities nAfrica.14undedbytheMinistry fCo-operationndtheMinistry fEconomyand Finances, his associationwas foundto havewastedresourcesby bothindulgingin personal expenses, includingthe purchaseof a castle, anddivertingmoneyto financethe electoralcampaignof its members.'5 t is awidely-sharedonviction hatthe'CarrefouruDeveloppement'ffair s onlythe most visibleepisodeamonga chain of similaraffairs akingplacebehindthe friendly links of 'la grandefamille franco-aJricaine'6Opportunitiesorcorrupt xchange o takeplaceatthelocal level ncreasedwith thelegislationpassed n 1982which accordedrelativeautonomy-statusto regionexecutivesand mayors.Since 1982,the decentralization rocess

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    endowed ocal authoritieswith suchcrucialprerogativeshat localpoliticiansareoftenreferredoas 'feudal eigneurs'.17hepowerofmayors, orexample,included ullresponsibilitywithregard o all aspectsof urbandevelopment,town planning, propertyand planning permission,health (with mayorssittingon executiveboards of public hospitals),social welfare,education,andenvironment.Decisionstaken n thesefieldswerenot subject o a prioriscrutinyby nationalbodies,but only to a posterioricontrol on the partofregionalauthorities.Thesewould forward he relevant nformation o theprefects, he representativesf the government t local level,only afterthecommitmentwith local contractorshad been taken.18t should be addedthat most members f theFrenchParliament eld,andto a degree tillhold,local office in theirconstituencies,and that about threequartersof themaremayors:To combinethe role of deputeand mayor givesmuchgreatercontrol over the localpoliticalsub-system,gives one more influencewhen it comes to obtaininggrantsorsubsidies rom centralgovernment, ives one, as a notable,a betterchance of beingelected.19French membersof Parliament, herefore,may devote more time to theirlocal concerns han to theirparliamentary esponsibilities s controllersofthe executive.On the otherhand,they may be part of the executive tself,albeitat the local level, thusactingas both controllersandcontrolled.Local publicexecutivesare said to act and feel as purebusinesspeople,more nterestedntheprofits heygeneratehan intheorthodoxyof practicesand methodsutilized.20 owever,beneath heofficial mageof effectiveness,theymay rewardassociatesand supportersrrespective f businessprofita-bility.Nevertheless,at the originof centralization f poweris the rhetoricof effectiveness,whichfavoursthe accumulation f mandatesand the con-sequentconcentration f resources.Under the impulseof GastonDefferre,both mayorof Marseilleand Ministerof the Interior, he socialistgovern-mentplayeda centralrole in devising he 1982legislationon decentraliza-tion. Inspiredby the apparentdesireto realizeforms of local democracy,and to bringcitizenscloserto decision-makingodies,thislegislation n factfavoured he largeentrepreneurialroupswhichsurrounded nd supportedlocalpoliticians.Virtualmonopolieswereestablished,with someloyalentre-preneursattracting he most remunerative ontracts romlocal authorities.It shouldbe added that in France,over the last fifteenyears,the majorityof publiccontracts,consistingof majorurbanworks,wereissuedby localauthorities,with fundsbeingreleasedby mayors: In Francethreequartersof civilinvestments reundertakenby territorial ommunities,whichact asmaitres d'ouvrage.'21Thiscircumstanceedentrepreneurso focus theiractivityon municipali-ties and regions,wherefunds weremoreeasilyavailable.The 'localchoice'was also promptedby the rule wherebythose winning contractswererequiredo pre-financeheworksor servicesundertaken ndacceptdelayedreimbursement. hisconsiderably educed he numberof firmswhichwere

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    in a positionto bid,andonlygroupsalready trongnationally,namely hoseendowedwith nationalcredentials ndcollateral,had a realisticprospectofwinningcontracts.In theircase,credibility t the national evel turned ntoopportunities t the local one.In thisrespect t maybe of interest o highlight hefollowingcomparativenote. Unlikein the Italiancontext,corruptionn Francedoesnotnecessarilyrely on mediatorswho act as informalcontactpersonsfor politiciansandentrepreneurs.n Italy,these mediatorsare non-elected igureswhose char-acteristicsarehybrid n nature,stridingas they do between he publicandtheprivate.This'caste',whichreproducestselfirrespective f electoralout-comes,presentsus with the followingtypology.Thereare 'entrepreneurialmeddlers',who mediatebetween irmsand a numberof publicadministra-

    tors; politicalbag-carriers',ho mediatebetween nepolitician nd anumberof privateentrepreneurs;nd'self-employed heeler-dealers',ho offertheirservices o all.22 n France, instead,relationshipsbetweenthe politicalandentrepreneurial orldsseemto be moredirect,with mayors,deputies,andministers n a position to relate to entrepreneursn a more independentfashion.Thiswouldsuggest hatcorrupt xchangen France scharacterizedby a lower degreeof dispersion,and that corrupt ncome is concentratedamong limited elites. As its proceedsare less 'socialized',corruptioninFranceappears o entaillower connivancecosts.The dynamicsdescribed o far may lead one to over-emphasizehe roleof local authoritiesn thebuildingof a corrupt ystemand,morespecifically,the role of thepoliticalright,whichcontrolsthe majorityof local adminis-trations. Did the righttake advantageof a piece of legislation,namelyawell-intentioned ecentralizationfpower,designedbythe left?Thisassump-tion is challengedby facts. ThePechiney-Triangleffairshows howcorrup-tion in ministerialcircles can proceed simultaneouslywith locally-basedcorruption.The state-ownedPechiney group acquiredthe United StatescompanyTrianglen 1988,under heencouragementf Ministryof Financeofficials.23mmediately fter the governmenthad secured he go aheadforthe takeover,a businessman loselylinked with the SocialistPartybought32,000Triangleshares,while a close friend of the Presidentpurchasedafurther20,000. The profitswere laundered hroughbusinessesset up inPanamaandreturned o France,allegedly o the SocialistParty.24 heUrbaaffair,whichwill be discussedater, s anothernotoriousexampleof socialistinvolvementin corrupt practices,and, most importantly,of the local/nationalco-ordinationof corruptexchange.It has beensuggested hatcorruptionn France s to be analysedagainsta crucialcharacteristic f thepoliticalapparatus.This is thatpoliticalpartiesare financiallyand sociallyweak. Numerousand undisciplined with thenotableexceptionof the CommunistParty),they have neverachievedthefeaturesof hierarchicallytructuredmachinesset in motion by the effortsof branches, epresentatives,nd members.25acking n humanand financialresources,partiestraditionallyresort to informal donations and opaque

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    contributions given in exchange for 'influence'. The example of Urba isilluminating. In President Mitterrand's ambition, the Socialist Party was toevolve into a modern party of the Left, though it was unable to gain thesupport of active members and generous entrepreneurs.The establishmentof a network of societes d'etudes, which would attract funds officially ear-marked for research and cultural development, was thought to serve thepurpose. These societes d'etudes had to 'ensure an intermediary functionbetween those who controlled the resources (the firms) and their beneficiary(the Socialist Party), thus making obligatory a movement of funds whichhad never been spontaneous.'26Not completely new, this system reachedorganizational perfection with the socialist government, with percentages onthe contracts granted being paid to commissioning politicians and theirparties.27However, the weakness of political parties may only explain the causesof specific episodes in the French context, and should not be regarded as auniversal causation of corrupt activities. For example, in the face of theItalian case, one might endorse a completely opposite aetiology, the countrybeing characterized by extremely powerful political parties. In this respect,the 'Republic of Parties' is a commonly shared definition, one which retainsderogatory as well as aetiological significance when applied to Italy. But toattribute to the weakness or to the power of political parties the causes ofcorruption is to overlook the interactions of political parties themselves withother actors who contribute to the definition of some activities as corrupt.The next section is devoted to such actors, in particular to the judiciaryand the media, and to the way in which they have long been unable toperceive corrupt activities as being corrupt, or have been prevented fromexpressing their resentment over them.

    PRIVILEGE OF JURISDICTIONA number of articles included in the code of penal procedureallow the execu-tive to deprive judges who conduct delicate investigations of their investiga-tive power.28For example, legislation passed in 1974,and in place until 1993,established that public prosecutors could not investigate offences committedby mayors within the sphere of their public mandate, but had to hand suchcases to the Court of Cassation, where an appropriate investigative judgewould be designated.29The designated investigator had to be one of the highjudges sitting in the SupremeCourt (Haut Court de Justice). This prerogativeis inscribed in the proceduralcode, according to which the Court of Cassationcan suspend the validity of decisions taken by lower courts and tribunals,and is required to ensure that legal proceedings adhere to the existinglegislation.30The 1974 legislation also implied that whenever in investigativedocuments the names of public administrators were mentioned, examiningjudges were required to hand the investigation over to the higher ranks of

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    thejudicialhierarchy.31f theyfailed to do so, the Court of Cassation,afterseizingthe investigation, ould annulall the previousproceduralacts andfindings,beforetransferringhe proceedings o the SupremeCourt. How-ever,only casesnot dismissedby the formercourt would be handedto thelatter.The immunity njoyedby cabinetministersdatesbackto 1958,whentheSupremeCourtwas established.This Court,elected anew by each newlyformedparliament,dealt with crimescommittedby governmentmembersin relationto the exerciseof their functions. But beforelegal proceedingcould be initiated,permissionhad to be grantedby parliament hroughaformalresolutionof mise en accusation.Duringthe thirty-fiveyearsof itsexistence, heSupremeCourt(this'archaicnstitution ormedof 12senatorsand 12deputies'32)nly heard wo casesamongthoseselectedby the Courtof Cassationand approved or examinationby parliament.33Thisprocedure uprivilege ameto an end not least becauseof its indirect,catastrophicudicialeffect.Theprivilege fjurisdiction lsoapplied o policeofficersand detectives. n a numberof investigations ver drugtraffickingoffences,some officerswerechargedwith malpracticeor even complicitywith offenders.The transferral f the investigationo a higher udgemeanta delaywhichresulted n allegeddrugtraffickers einggrantedconditionalbail.

    LITTLEAND BIG JUDGESAccordingto Bancaud,those occupyingthe high ranks of the judiciary'have neverchanged': heyhavebeentherebefore,duringand afterVichy,andallegedly heyall haveverycorrectRepublicanviews.34VogelweithandVaudano term the culturecharacterizingenior udgesa 'subservient ne',andsee the intermediarynd low ranksof thejudiciaryas moresusceptibleto changeand moreindependent.The lowestpositions nthejudiciary reoccupiedby thejugesd'instruction,examining udgeswho are chargedwith the gatheringof informationandevidencerelatingto criminaloffences.35 bove them are thejudgesof thepublicprosecutionservice(also termedthe parquet),who are required osupervisethe legalityof the examiningprocedure.The presidentsof theparquets,or public prosecutors,have the prerogative o designatewhichexaminingudge (petitjuge)willbe entrustedwith the investigation f whichcase. They also have the powerto appointone or moreexamining udgesundertheirsupervision s theexperts n financialandadministrative rime.Data produced n 1994indicatethat an elite of eleveninvestigativeudgeswas dealingwith about7,000caseseachyear.36 his is obviouslya limitingfactor!

    Althoughtheir action is dependenton decisions taken by theirpublicprosecutors, t is common for examiningudgesto be accused of wielding120

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    too much power.In effect, once they receivepermission o proceed,theybecomeresponsible or both the investigationand the treatmentof thoseinvestigated.For example,they can remandsuspects n custodyuntil theybelieveall evidencehas been examined.This, however,does not applytoproceedingsn whichpublicpoliticalfiguresareinvolved,as these cases aredealtwith according o the proceduredescribedabove.The careerof an examining udgeoffers imitedpromotionopportunities:

    Normally,he may only progress rom the lower'grade' o a higher grade'and salaryscaleby abandoning is function n 'instruction' ndby orientinghis career owards heparquetas a publicprosecutor) r a siege (as a judge).37This organizationalmake-up ends itself to potentialabuse,as examiningjudgeswho intend to advance n their career are required o act amicablytowardspublicprosecutorsn orderto eventuallyoin theparquet.There salso scope for 'punitive'promotions, whereby'stubborn' ndividualsareremovedfrom theirinvestigative ole and assigneda higherrank in a lessproblematicregionof the country. Finally, somejudges may 'choose' toabandon theircareeraltogetherwhen the feelingthat their handsare tiedbecomestoo unpleasant o bear. The followingis one such case.Jean-PierreThierrywas handling he Urba affairin the capacityofjuged'instruction.He was gatheringevidenceconcerning he illegalfundingofpoliticalparties.In particular,his investigationbeganto suggest hat a partof thefundsusedto finance he 1988electioncampaignof the SocialistPartyhad beenillegallyobtained.Thefundshadbeendiverted roma constructioncompany, ndvia theintermediaryrbanetwork fsocietesd'etude,orwardedto the SocialistParty,whichwasingovernment t the timeof investigation.38Thierrywasaccusedof havingtaken the law into his own handsbecausehehad failed to reportback to the public prosecutorsabout his investigation,and had not received he necessarypermission o continuehis investigationof the case.Thierrywasimmediatelyemoved rom the casebytheprocureurgeneral thehead of thepublicprosecution ervice).Thierrydecided o aban-don his careeras a judgeand became nvolved n politics.The head of theprosecution ervice s directlyappointed anddisciplinedorfired)by theMinistryof Justice, herefore,by theparty n office.In orderto completethe descriptionof the Thierrycase, it should be noted that,when the examining udge was removed from the case, this MinistrywasheadedbyHenriNallet,formerlyhe treasureror Mitterrand's 988electioncampaign.39While the independence f thejuge desiege is rarelyquestioned, t is thejuges d'instructionand the procureursgeneraux who are usually the objectof controversy.Theformerare deemed oo youngandinexperiencedo holda positionwhich entailstoo muchpower.However,we have seen how thispowercan be curtailedand bridled.The latter,as we have also seen,maybe underattack for theirclose relationshipwith the executive,as theirverycareerdependson the will of the Ministryof Justice.This is exemplified y

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    the fact that all criminal proceedings initiated by prosecutors must receiveofficial approval by the Minister. Theoretically, prosecutors can advise theMinister 'that proceedings are being undertaken rather than they haveintention of undertaking them'.40However, in practice, before sensitive pro-ceedings are started, consultation with the Ministry is essential, in particularwhen cases are investigated which could cause distress for government andthe public opinion. When prosecutors are instructed by the Minister inrelation to sensitive affairs 'the problem is not to pursue a case or not (vis-a-vis the law), but to obey or disobey (vis-d-vis the instructions received)'.41The only avenue available to public prosecutors, and for that matter topetitsjuges, to pursue a case entails the media enlarging upon the case beinginvestigated. Once the media divulge information relating to an affair, it ismore difficult for the Ministry to deny permission to proceed.But with this we are entering the role of the fourth actor involved in thedefinition of certain activities as corrupt.

    THE MEDIAThe French media have never been regardedas particularlyeffective in theirwatchdog role. This notoriety applies in particularto television, whose cover-age of news was under direct government control during the de Gaulle andPompidou presidencies.42With Giscardd'Estaing, 'directcontrol was replacedby patronage: associates of the President were put in charge of televisionand radio organisations'.43Before the scandals of the last decade were unearthed, the press also wasnoticeable for its investigative inefficiency in exposing abuses of power. Thevigilance of papers such as Le CanardEnchatne,along with the work of afew independentjournalists, were sufficient to bring abuses to light, but wereincapable of following up inquiries or forcing the judiciary to act, let aloneto sustain generalizedpublic interest. In its turn, television, too timid to dealwith the malpractice and offences of the elites, applied self-censorship as itsrule. In choosing the items for 'evening news', for example, 'delicate' affairsand their critical discussion were relegatedto the midnight programme, whilepre-arrangedinterviews with politicians involved in those affairs were givenprominence in the six-o'-clock programme.44There exists a media network of trustedjournalists who are omnipresent,on television and in the press. According to Halimi, they amount to no morethan a dozen, and their presence and opinion can never be escaped.45Connivance and uniformity of views are the consequence: they meet, exchangeinformation, appreciate each other, and end up agreeing on everything. Aleader in a weekly, an interview in a monthly, radio and television appear-ances, and the inevitable book every year.Controlled, like elsewhere, by financial groups and sustained by theiradvertisement money, newspapers and 'independent' television stations

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    were, and to a degree still are, under strict control. Financial groups do nothide their political sympathies nor do they conceal which newspaper theyfind most congenial, and therefore worthy of support. Newspapers selladvertisement pages to political parties and also to individual politiciansengaged in their electoral campaigns. Moreover, political parties themselvesown papers and magazines, and sometimes set up their own radio stations.See the example of Radio Nostalgie, whose programmes contained only in-direct political propaganda for the Socialist Party, but was proved to act asa counduit to channel illegal funds to the party.46 ronically, the companieswhich were eventually to be exposed for their role in illegal party fundingwere the same which sustainedpapers such as Le Monde,L'Express,Le Point,and L'Expansion.47

    RESENTMENTThe exposure of political scandals and corruption was the result of theresentment of one or more of the actors described so far. Before brieflysketching the institutional reaction to the onslaught of accusations, let ussee how this resentment found its expression.1. CorruptcompaniesThe exchange of public contracts for bribes (whether for personal gain orillegal party funding) may not be a widely accepted practice among enter-prises. This implies that only 'trustworthy' companies can be expected toparticipate in the exchange. For this reason politicians' choice as to the typeof service or work to contract out may not depend on the actual need forthat service or work, but on the potential that available enterprisesoffer forhidden money to move. Resentment may therefore be expressed by firmsoffering services which, though needed, are nevertheless never asked for.The example of service privatization offers an illuminating extension of this.Here it is not only the nature of the service privatized, but also the costsincurred by private providers which may cause resentment. Private firmscontracted with servicemay apply highercosts than theircompetitors, becausethey are, in a sense, assisted enterprises.48The resentmentof competing firmsarises, therefore, from the diseconomy caused by both the type of servicecontracted out and its costs. The former is in fact determined by the loyaltymanifested by firms to politicians, the latter by the cost of this loyalty.Other sources of resentment may come to light when the relationshipsbetween small and large firms are analysed. The system of illegal party fund-ing created a de facto corrupt monopoly which mostly benefited the largegroupsmore closely associatedwith the executive,be this locally-or nationally-based. The organizational structure of these groups was decentralizedenoughfor them to gain contracts in different business arenas and geographical

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    contexts.For example,a large firmcould offer buildingwork to a localauthorityand furnishhospital equipment o another.This strategy s partof whathas been ermed flexible ccumulation', phenomenonwhichbecameapparent n many Westerncountriesthroughoutthe 1980s. The previousfinancialmovementto low-incomecountriespartlychangedits direction,with the predominant endencybecomingthe re-centralization f financesin high-income ountriesandregions.49n France,opportunitieso diversifydomestic nvestmentswerecreatedbypubliccontracts,and receiveda boostby the relatedprocessof decentralization escribedabove.French irmsseem to have stretched he conceptof flexibility o embracethepoliticalarena,with work and servicesbeingoffered o localauthoritiescontrolledboth by the rightand the left. Finally, flexibilityalso informedthe ethicalsphere, n the sensethat rulesandprocedureswould be stretchedto tallywith thoseadoptedby thosegrantingcontracts.This diversificationallowed arge irms o be competitiven both nationalandlocal markets. nthe lattermarkets hey encountered he resentmentof smaller irmswhichwere unableto achievesimilarorganizational omplexity.One of the firstlargescandalsuncovered n the 1980s nvolvedone suchsmallenterprise.The scandalcameto lightbypure judicial ccident',duringthecourseof investigationsntothe death of two workerson a building ite.Followingpressures y theunion,examiningudgesfoundthat workcondi-tions in the companyinvolvedwerepoor and safety regulations gnored.The market orpubliccontracts n theregionwheretheaccident ook placewas characterizedya situationof oligopolysharedby large irmsconnectedwith local politicians.Smaller irmscould only gain contractsby applyingsignificantlyowercosts, thuscuttingon safetyexpenses.The resentment fthe firm underinvestigationwas expressed hroughthe claim that it hadincurredhighcosts for the 'privilege'ofwinningthe contract:

    The accident n the work place had occurredbecausethe firm had had to pay abackhandero politiciansn order o winthetender,a circumstance hichhaddeprivedthe firmof the financialmeansnecessaryor therespectof safetyregulations.5Theinvestigation, ventually, ncovered widenetworkof enterprises dopt-ing the sameprocedure:he Urba affair was born.It isworthnoting hat the Italian cleanhand'operation tartedon a similarnote.The whistlewasblownbya smallentrepreneurperatingn Milanwhowas contracted or cleaningduties in a home for the elderly.He reportedto the policethe incessantrequestsby top administrators f the home fora percentage f his profits.Because hispercentagewas incessantlyncreas-ing,theentrepreneurould no longerguaranteeor thequalityof theservicehe was providing.51Resentmentagainstcompaniesengaged n corruptpracticesmayalso beexpressedby shareholders.Again, this may resultfrom 'accidents' uch asunexpectedly oorfinancial eturns o shareholders r even thesuddenbank-ruptcyof a company. n France, his was the case with a numberof allegedly

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    stablecompanies uddenlygoingintoreceivership. ressureby shareholdersled examining udgesto uncover llegaltransfersof finances,displacementof funds,falseinvoices,and so-called taxicompanies',whose role consistedsolelyof deliveringmoneyto politicalparties.Finally,there is a broaderpossibleexplanationof why corruptexchangeemerges.Theinternationalizationf theeconomyrenders orruptexchangetantamount o unfaircompetition,with firms unable to build up politicalcontactsbeingpenalizedntheiractivity.Corrupt ompanies enerate esent-mentbecausethey enjoythe privilegeof operating n protectedmarkets,acircumstancewhich s at oddswith the freemarketrhetoricrecentlyprevail-inginEurope. nItaly,forexample,only0.1percent of contractsaregrantedto non-Italian irms,52nd the French authoritiesare equallyungenerous

    withnon-national conomicactors.Corruptioneducesuncertainty ygivingdomesticcompaniesa competitive dge.Thesecompaniesmay be resentedby foreign entrepreneurswho take the opening of European marketsseriously.According o some authors,internationalizationeads businessculturestowardsgreater homogeneityand the sharingof 'concerns for businessethics,greater ransparencyf markets,and theestablishment ndpreserva-tion of acceptablenternationaltandards f businessconduct'.53 ccordingto our interpretation,nstead, nternationalizationnd deregulation implylead to moreexposureof corruptpracticesas a resultof increased ompeti-tion and resentment.Firms enjoyingpolitical protection,whose businessuncertaintysconsequentlyeduced, reresentedbyfirms eekingbut unableto achievesimilarforms of protectionism. t is not their belief in the freemarket,but its opposite,whichtriggers esentment.nternational eregula-tion brings along processesof 'informalization',hat is, a proliferationofincome-generatingctivities hat bypass legal regulation hroughone kindoranotherof political,personalorfamilial ntrepreneurialism.54esspower-ful companiesmay not be capableof participatingn this processof infor-malization,hence their resentment.Even in an ideal situation,where allentrepreneursould begivenequalopportunitiesrrespectivef thecountryin which they operate,it remainsto be seen whethercorruptionwouldbecomeredundant,55r whethernew conditions conduciveto corruptionwouldemerge. n such an ideal situationcorrupt xchangemaywellbecomeinternational n scale, with a limitednumberof companiesmonopolizinginternational ontracts.2. Thejudiciary-mediaallianceThe resentment f thejudiciarywenthand in hand with that of the media.The bargainingpower of judgesmainlystems from their ability to makeinvestigation indingspublic.In thistheymayalso be helpedby the defencelawyersof those under nvestigation, s is the case withpoliticiansand theircounselcallingpressconferenceso revealthe 'absurdcharges'broughtby

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    judges. For example,when the first large financialscandalsof the 1980sexploded,TF1 channel auncheda serialprogrammeof invectivesagainstthe 'witch hunt' mountedby thejudiciary.One of these scandals nvolvedthe Alcatel groupwhich,underinvestigationon corruptioncharges,pre-emptedthejudiciary n makingthe contentof the accusationspublic, pre-sumably n the attemptto keepcontrolof the informationrevealed.56hismoveprovedbeneficialo the examining udge,who couldrelyon the sup-port of the media andobtainpermission o carryon with the investigationfrom the procureurgeneral.In other cases publicitywas sought by investigativeudges themselves,but in doing so theycould be accused of non-compliancewith the secrecyprinciplegoverning he investigation rocess.57 hishappenedn relation othe Henri Emmanuelli ase, when the media revealedcorruptionchargesbrought againstthis SocialistPartypoliticianbeforehe had receivedanyofficialnotificationby the examining udge.Thisjudiciary-medialliance gnited he reactionof politiciansand entre-preneurs,who felt theywerebeingtreatedas guiltybefore theirguilt hadbeen proven.Judgeswere likened to some contemporarySaint-Justs,andconvictionswere said to emanate rom thepress.Obscure nvestigators ndjournalistswere accusedof pursuing ame,of actingas stars,in a spectaclewhichsome commentators quatedto a 'judiciary-mediaircus'.58

    INSTITUTIONALRESPONSESAccordingto influentialwriterAlain Minc, France is experiencing mis-guided'democratic nebriation'whichprefiguresa new public individual:one who is obsessedby externalobserversand is thereforebound to losereflexivityand tolerance.59 he new public individuals,namelythe politi-cians, will be required o constantlyfight those who accusethem:a HolyTrinity ormedby judges,publicopinion,and media. Francehas become a'government f judges',the damningphrasewith whichthe accusedmounttheir counterattack gainst nvestigators.In July 1988,in the wake of the presidential lection,along with a newpieceof legislation stablishinghefundingof partiesbythestate,anamnestywas givento all politicianschargedwith malpracticeand corruption.Theamnestycoveredall offencescommitted n relation o electoral ampaigningand politicalpartyfunding.In that year big cases such as the Urba affairhad not yet cometo light.Aftertheyhad,a secondamnestywasgranted n1990for all those who had not benefited rom thepreviousone,butcorruptpoliticianswho had pursuedpersonalgains,ratherthanpartyfunds,wereexcluded.This secondamnestywas presentedas an inevitablemeasurevis-a-vis offencescommitted na phaseofjudicialvoid,when egislation egulat-ing political partyfundingwas non-existentor vague.Therefore,with theamnesty,newlegislationregulatinghe financialaspectsof politicalactivity

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    was introduced. This reduced the amount of funds each campaigning candi-date was allowed to spend, and decreed that private donations to parties begiven a pre-established ceiling, be precisely recorded, and made public. Thispiece of legislation was regarded by critics as a de facto de-criminalizationof formerly illegal practices. Currently, it is argued, if politicians still intendto pursue their personal gains, they may well continue in this practice byresorting to falsification and forgery, as they did before. If funds exceedingthe legally set ceiling can still be channelled to parties by means of forgedinvoices, individual politicians may well 'forge the forged invoices' to pocketmonies destined for their party. On the other hand, with the state fundingsystem, improbable political parties and even 'unipersonal parties' are saidto crop up with the sole purpose of attracting state finances.60The 1990 legislation marked a shift in the legal perception of corruption.Amnesties granted in 1947 and 1953, for example, were not intended forpoliticians, who were deemed passive parties in corrupt exchange. Theirbehaviour was only regarded as one of complicity with corrupt individuals.Moreover, politicians using mediators in their corrupt practices could escapeprosecution because they would be defined as 'accomplices of accomplices',a byzantine category devoid of juridical significance. Finally, 'attempts tocorrupt' could not be prosecuted because 'attempting to become an accom-plice in crime' was an even more byzantine juridical category.61Changesintroduced by the 1990 amnesty abolished these privileges.In 1993the Bouchery report was published, which addressedthree of whatwere believed to be the deep-seated problems of France: unemployment,streetcrime,and corruption.62The report describedcorruption as a gangrenedevouring society, but failed to identify new rules for its prevention. Toomany rules regulating the relationships between politicians and enterprises,it was argued, would hamper competition and benefit companies from otherEuropean countries, unless all countries of the Union agreed to introducesimilar rules.Organizational reform of the judiciary was one of the responses to assuageresentment. In 1993, a number of amendments to the code of procedurewere passed. The privilege dejurisdiction was abolished, although membersof parliamenttook a precaution: 'theprocureurgeneralmaintained the powerto remove a judge from a case when this was in the best interest of theadministration of justice'.63In 1992 a new piece of legislation made conces-sions on two important issues. First, it made the procedure related to thecareer of judges more transparent, with new powers being given to theirnational professional body. This body, elected by judges themselves, wasmade responsible for transferralsand promotions. Second, it issued a seriesof statutory guarantees aimed at reducing the influence of the executive onthe judiciary.Concessions were also made to journalists. Their resentment had inducedMitterrand to create the 'High Authority for Audio-Visual Communica-tions', allegedly independent of government, to superviseradio and television

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    programmes nd makeappointmentso topjobs.64Abolishedby Chirac n1986,and replacedby his CNCL (NationalCommission or Communica-tions and Liberties) he 'High Authority'did not 'free' the press:whenLeMondestartedcovering heAlcatelaffair,the advertisement ontractof thepaperwith that companywas cut down.

    CONCLUSIONIt is difficult o assess he extent o whichtheinstitutional esponses ketchedabove will reduceresentmentand thus expositionof corruptactivities, etalonereducecorruptiontself. The actors involved n identifyingwhat con-stitutescorruptionmaytemporarily e satisfiedbythe concessionsobtained,but maysoon discovernew reasonsfor beingdissatisfied.It shouldbe noted that resentment lone does not explainthe successofthoseexposingcases of corruption; esentment s merely he motivation orexposure.Themultiplication f casesof corruption evealedoverthe recentyears,and thesuccessof the mediaand thejudiciary,areperhapsdue to thefact that all political partieswereaccused,sooner or later.This may havereduced he embarrassmentf individualparties,andconsequentlyemperedtheirwillingnessand capacityto stop the anti-corruption nslaught.It isworthrememberinghat therightcameto power hanks,amongother hings,to theirexposureof corruptepisodes n which the SocialistPartyhad beeninvolved.When the rightitself was chargedwith corruptpractices, t couldnot replicate he responsesgiven by its socialistcounterparts.For example,it could not claim that there was a politicalconspiracyagainstit, nor thatjudges and journalistshad hiddenagendas,becausethese were the sameagenciesthat had indicted theirpredecessors. n a sense, the alternationbetweenpoliticalpartiescreateda climate nwhich tbecameeasier o exposecorruption.65imilarly,afterthe initialreprisalby firmsagainstthepressinthe formof curtailment f advertisementontracts,hingsreturned o normalbecause too manyfirms came underinvestigation.Soon the issue becamethat of how to imposelimitationson the presswhen individualsnot foundguiltyof an offencewerementioned.New legislationunderdiscussion n theFrench parliamentconcerns 'the freedom of communicationwithin therespect or the presumption f innocence'.66Thispaperdoes not includepublicopinionamongthe actorsinvolved ncorruptexchangeand its exposure.It is timeto explainwhy.It is a characteristic f representativeemocracies o createan increasingdistancebetweenelectoraldecisionsandpolicydecisions.Electedpoliticiansare therecipients f powerconferredon themby citizens.67 s withbankinginstitutions,once theyhavereceived his 'deposit'of power,politicianscaninvestit in enterpriseswhichare out of the controlof depositors.Increas-ingly,decisionsaffectingall are made in placesand times knownonly to afew. It is the awareness f this distancebetween he'public'andtheirpolitical

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    representatives hichmakesthe role of the former n exposingcorruptiona secondaryone. This distance s perceivedas the cause of corruption,oreven deemedcorruption tself. To use Geertz'smetaphor:as in the pastcrownsand coronations,now limousinesand conferences markthe centreas centreandgivewhatgoeson there ts auraof beingnotmerely mportantbut in some odd fashion connectedwith the waythe worldis built'.68 ara-doxically,this distancedoes not shelterpoliticiansfrom 'public'scrutiny,because hebehaviour f politicianswillbe assumed o becorrupt venwhenit is not. Theslogan'toutestpourri'wasnot coined to describe he scandalsof the 1980s,but dates backcenturies.Butthisslogan,applied o allregimesand governments,makes it impossible o establishthe limit within whichcorruptioncan be acceptedand beyond which it must be exposed. Forexample,in recentopinion polls conducted in France,respondentswereasked o choosewhether heyhad ratherbegovernedbycorruptbuteffectivepoliticiansorbyhonestandineffective nes.69As politicians re notexpectedto have bothattributes,hebeliefthat it is impossibleo getridof theformerled the'public' o optat leastfor thelatter.In a poll conductedby L'ExpressInternational, orethan70 percentof respondentsbelieved hatcorruptionwas rifeamongmembers f parliament ndentrepreneurs,bout55percentsaidthatcorruptexchangehad not increasedover the yearsbut that some-thinghadhappenedwhichled themedia to writemoreaboutit, and 70 percent felt that a degreeof corruption s inevitable n modernsociety.70Butagain,littleattentionwaspaidby both interviewers ndrespofidentso thelimitbeyondwhichcorruptexchangemust be halted.Thispaperhas tried o understandwhycorruptions exposed,rather hanwhyit occurs.Thefocus has beenon relatively owerfulactorswhose resent-ment againstthose deemedmorepowerfulthan themselveshas led to thedefinitionof some activitiesas corrupt. Publicopinion'has beenexcludedfrom this definitionalprocess:the labellingof otherpeople'sbehaviourascorrupthas not beenanalysedas the resultof a conflict nvolvingpowerlessandpowerfulactors,but of a conflictstagedby powerfulactorsagainstoneanother.

    NOTESAND REFERENCES1 I am referring in particular to R. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (1968);D. Bailey, 'The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation' (1966) 19 WesternPolitical

    Q. 719; S.P. Huntington, Modernizationand Corruption 1968); J.Q. Wilson, 'Corruption:The Shame of the State' in Political Corruption:A Handbook., eds. A. Heidenheimer etal. (1990).2 V. Ruggiero, 'Corruption in Italy: An Attempt to Identify the Victims' (1994) 33 HowardJ. of CriminalJustice, 319.3 J. Frears, 'Not Sex, the Abuse of Power: Political Scandal in France' (1988) 3 Corruptionand Reform 307.4 See, for example, P. Lascoumes, Les affaires ou l'art de l'ombre: les delinquanceseconomiques etfinancieres et leur contr6le (1986).129

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    5 Montesquieu, L'esprit des Lois (10th ed., 1907).6 L. Althusser, Montesquieu, la politique et l'histoire (1964)7 S. Eisenmann, L'esprit des lois et la separation des pouvoirs (1933).8 L. Althusser, op. cit., n. 6.9 id., p. 96.10 J. Michelet, Storia della rivoluzionefrancese (1981) 361.11 Y. Meny, 'France: la fin de l'etique republicaine? in Democratie et corruptionen Europe,eds. D. della Porta and Y. M6ny (1995) 23.12 J.Y. Mollier, Le scandale de Panama (1991). See also M. Cornick, 'From the Sublime tothe Ridiculous: Scandals in France' (1993) 3 Modern and ContemporaryFrance 301.13 B. Jenkins and P. Morris, 'Political Scandal in France' (1993) 2 Modern and ContemporaryFrance, 127. See, also, R. Bornstein, 'The Politics of Scandal' in P. Hall et al., Developmentin French Politics (1990).14 A. Garrigour, 'Strategic Analysis of a Scandal: Carrefour du D6veloppement' (1989) 4

    Corruptionand Reform 159.15 G. Gaetner, L'argent facile. Dictionnaire de la corruptionen France (1992).16 J-F. M6dard, 'France-Afrique:des affaires defamille', in della Porta and Meny, op. cit.,n. 11, p. 29.17 A. Bercoff, La France des seigneurs (1989); 'Corruption: la decentralisation en accusation'

    Politis, 22 December 1994; P-A. Lorenzi, Corruptionet imposture (1995).18 A. Etchegoyen, Le corrupteuret le corrompu(1995).19 Frears, op. cit., n. 3, p. 308.20 Y. Meny, La corruptionde la Republique(1992).21 id., p. 134.22 D. della Porta and A. Vannucci, Corruzionepolitica e amministrazionepubblica (1994).23 M. Maclean, 'Dirty Dealing: Business and Scandal in Contemporary France' (1993) 2Modern and ContemporaryFrance 161.24 'Le dossier noir de la corruption',Le Nouvel Observateur,6-12 October 1994.25 della Porta and Meny, op. cit., n. 11.26 id., p. 20.27 J-L. Uguen, Les elus et l'argent (1994); C. Leyrit, Les Partis politiques et l'argent (1995).28 Y. Lemoine and F. Nguyen, Tristesjustices (1994); D. Conil, Notrejustice (1995).29 A. Vogelweith and M. Vaudano, Mains propres. Mains liees (1995).30 H. Pinsseau, L'organisationjudiciaire de la France (1985); G. Camillieri and C. Lazerges,Atlas de la criminaliteen France (1992).31 A. Vogelweith and P. Jacquin, 'Des juges en liberte tres surveillee'(1994) 140 Justice 3.32 Maclean, op. cit., n. 23, p. 163.33 Volgelweith and Vaudano, op. cit., n. 29.34 A. Bancaud, La haute magistrature udiciaire entrepolitique et sacerdoce (1991).35 H. Trouille, 'The Juge d'Instruction:A Figure under Threat or Supremely Untouchable?'

    (1994) 2 Modern and ContemporaryFrance 11.36 'Cesjuges au coeur des afJaires'Le Monde, 20 October 1994.37 Trouille, op. cit., n. 35, p. 12.38 id.39 id.40 Lorenzi, op. cit., n. 17, p. 242.41 ,(id., p. 244.42 Frears, op. cit., n. 3.43 id., p. 308.44 Vogelweith and Vaudano, op. cit., n. 29.45 S. Halimi, 'Unjournalisme de reverence' Le Monde Diplomatique, February 1995.46 Gaetner, op. cit., n. 15. See, also, 'L'affaire de Radio Nostalgie' Le Monde, 22 November1987.47 Vogelweith and Vaudano, op. cit., n. 29.

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    48 W. Tocci, 'Partiti, finanza e mattone' in L'economia della corruzione, eds. L. Barca andS. Trento 1994)119.49 D. Gordon, TheGlobalEconomy:New Edificeor CrumblingFoundations?'1988)168New Left Rev. 24; G. Arrighi, The Long TwentiethCentury (1994).50 Vogelweith ndVaudano,op. cit., n. 29, p. 22.51 Ruggiero,op. cit., n. 2; F. Cazzola, I costi dellacorruzione'n BarcaandTrento,op. cit.,n. 48, p. 109.52 Barcaand S. Trento, d.53 Maclean,op. cit., n. 23, p. 167.54 E. Feige, 'Definingand EstimatingUnderground nd InformalEconomies' 1990) 18WorldDevelopment89;A. Portes, Paradoxes f the InformalEconomy:The SocialBasisof UnregulatedEntrepreneurship',n Handbookf Economic ociology, ds. N.J. SmelserandR. Swedberg 1994).55 G. Cazzaniga, 'Sulle cause morali della corruzione', in Barca and Trento, op. cit., n. 48,p. 33.56 Lorenzi,op. cit., n. 17.57 'Les senateurssouhaitent renforcerle secret de l'instruction'Le Monde, 7 April 1995.58 D. Soulez Lariviere, Du cirquemediatico-judiciaireet des moyens d'en sortir (1993).59 A. Minc, L'ivressedemocratique(1995).60 'La dotation de l'Etat aux partis pour 1995 va leuretre versee' Le Monde, 24 March 1995.61 Etchegoyen, p. cit., n. 18.62 R. Bouchery, Prevention de la corruptionet transparencede la vie economique (1993). Fora comment to the report, see M. Maclean, 'La moralisation de la vie Economiqueen France:GlobalImperativesndCulturalmpediments'1995)3 Modern ndContemporaryrance71.63 Vogelweith ndVaudano,op. cit., n. 29, p. 59.64 Frears,op. cit., n. 3.65 H. Imerglik, 'Corruzione in Francia: il ruolo della magistratura' (1994) XIII QuestioneGiustizia 646.66 'La presse bouc emissaire', and 'Liberte de communication et respect de la presomptiond'innocence' Le Monde 7 April 1995.67 This parallel is suggested by T. Parsons, On Institutions and Social Evolution (1982).However, romthatparallelParsonsdoes not drawthe same conclusionspresented ere.68 C. Geertz, Local Knowledge.FurtherEssays in Interpretive Anthropology(1983) 124.69 Etchegoyen, p. cit., n. 18.70 'Le tour de France de la corruption'L'Express International,8 December 1994.

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