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Introduction

•  Decade of protracted conflict with implications for national and regional security.

•  Long and Complex Mediations Initiatives

•  The electoral process has been contentious

•  Current post-election crisis reminds of unresolved issues.

•  With current standoff, what does the future hold for the former bacon of hopes?

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Objective

•  Put the current crisis in perspective

•  Review the peace process critical achievements

•  Discuss the post-electoral conflict

•  Explore options

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Cote d’Ivoire: From Bacon Of Hopes To Bacon Of Instability

•  Post-independence Politics and Governance Deficit •  Deterioration of socio-economic conditions and a youth

budge •  End of Houphouet-Boigny’s Rule and Failed Political

Transition •  Power Struggle and the birth of Ivoirite. •  December 1999 Coup d'état •  Failed National Reconciliation Initiatives •  2002: from an attempted coup to a civil war •  Virtual Partition of Cote d’Ivoire

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Peace process in Cote d’Ivoire: Achievements and Challenges

Cote d’Ivoire has featured in

•  08 Peace Agreements,

•  09 UNSC resolutions and countless meetings.

Pretoria Agreement (2005) and the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (2007) helped define the contours of the Peace through

•  The eligibility to the Presidency of the Republic

•  The structures of the electoral monitoring bodies

•  The role of External Actors in the Electoral Process

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The Post-Election Crisis The Legal Argument

•  Primacy of State Institutions

•  Allegations of Frauds and electoral malpractices

•  Expiry of the legal mandate of the electoral commission

The Legitimacy Argument

•  Transparency and the fairness of the process

•  Additional security and logistical measures to improve first round shortcomings

•  True reflection of the “will of the People”

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Key Provisions of the electoral Act

•  Article 59 of the 2000 Electoral Code of Côte d’Ivoire makes the Constitutional Court the body with legal power to announce the final results of national elections.

•  Ordinance no. 2008-133 on 14 April 2008 amending the 2000 Electoral Code.

•  The Independent Electoral Commission announces consolidated provisional results at the national level […]. Within three days following the vote, and accompanied by supporting documents, the Independent Electoral Commission sends these results to the Constitutional Council, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and the Special Representative of the Facilitator”

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Cont…

•  Art. 64 stipulate that “In the case of serious irregularities that could undermine the credibility of the election, the constitutional council invalidate the process. a new date is set by decree at a cabinet meeting upon the electoral commission’s proposal in 45 days from the date of the invalidation”.

•  Has the Constitutional Council taken this into consideration? And why? How founded are the rigging allegations? Could the CC react otherwise?

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Cont..

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First Round Results

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UN Certification and Regional Response

•  UN Role derives from the OPA •  Informed by its own tally supported by Observation

Missions •  Attempt to protect the electoral process •  Uphold the fragile Governance Architecture •  Exemplary Show of Leadership on Electoral Matters •  “Zero tolerance towards maintaining power trough

illegitimate means”

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Resolving the Crisis: Options Available

Attempts at resolving the post-electoral crisis would need take into consideration two main issues:

•  The first is that Gbagbo will not cede power out of diplomatic pressure. Both his personal convictions and the pressure of the clan surrounding him do not allow for that sort of outcome.

•  Secondly, time plays in his favour and like in previous years he will attempt to break the international community’s unanimity by offering semblances of diplomatic solutions just to cement his grip on power and military force.

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Three Options to Explore

Repeat the Election in contentious regions

•  In line with art.64 of the electoral act •  Difficult option for Ouattara and the AU/ECOWAS •  Compromise between the call for Gbagbo to step

down and his proposal to recount the votes •  Restore the truth of the polls in the North and provide

a sense of inclusion

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Cont..

Government of National Unity •  Results of direct negotiation that could reflect the

current power dynamics. •  Replicate the challenging experience of the past three

years •  Delay in addressing the fundamental causes of the

conflict

Military Intervention •  Although the international community has too early

threatened to use force to enforce its view, probably leading to the mobilization of Gbagbo’s supporters, this remains a serious option to consider

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Conclusions

•  Post-conflict elections need careful management to serve as an exit strategy. It needs to be combined with a range of mechanisms that help mitigate the risk of reversal of fragile gains for Peace.

•  Post-election crisis in Cote d’Ivoire is a test-case for regional leaders commitment to uphold the provisions of regional instruments (2001 Additional protocol on Democracy and Good Governance)

•  The success of the failure of regional actors will have serious implications for the credibility of their approach mainly as the continent expects 17 elections in 2011.

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