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CHAPTER 3

Counterinsurgency Operations

Section I. General

3-1. Different conditions.

a. As described in chapters 1 and 2, the nature of counterguerrillaoperations differs from the conditions most soldiers expect to facein combat. The counterguerrilla commander faces an enemywhose objectives, tactics, and concepts are usually different fromhis own.

b. This chapter examines the role of tactical counterguerrillaoperations in relation to the COIN program. In addition, itdiscusses planning considerations and principles for thesuccessful conduct of counterguerrilla operations, as well asrelated operations that the counterguerrilla force must beacquainted with.

3-2. US role.

The most common role in which US forces will conduct counter-guerrilla operations will be as a foreign internal defense (FID) force.The FID is designed to support the host country’s national objectivesand COIN plan. Two of the primary considerations for the FIDcommander are the final goals of the host country COIN program andhow to coordinate his operations to support hose goals.

Section Il. Considerations

3-3. FID operations.

a. Most US forces conducting counterguerrilla operations will bepart of an FID force. The commander must understand how FIDoperations support the host country COIN plan. In this sense, thegoals of the host country COIN plan become the goals for the FIDforce and the counterguerrilla commander.

b. The primary consideration when planning counterguerrillaoperations is the effect operations will have on the populace.Commanders must attempt to win the active support of thepopulation for the government. At a minimum, counterguerrillaactivities must eliminate incidents which the guerrilla mayexploit in his psychological operations.

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3-4. Support of coin.

a. US forces committed to FID in the host country have a dualmission. First, they must defeat or neutralize the guerrillamilitarily so the host country government can begin or resumefunctioning in previously contested or guerrilla-controlled areas.Second, they must support the overall COIN program byconducting noncombat operations to provide an environmentwhere the host country government can win the trust and supportof its people and ultimately become self-sustaining. Both aspectsof the COIN mission are of equal importance and are usuallyconducted simultaneously.

b. A common mistake made by FID forces when trying to gainpopular support is that they sometimes win popular support onlyfor themselves. The commander must ensure that popularsupport, in the end, is for the host country government. Credit forsuccessful campaigns against the guerrillas, or programs to helpthe people, should go to the host country government and not tothe FID force commander.

3-5. Purpose of tactical operations.

Tactical counterguerrilla operations are conducted to reduce theguerrilla threat or activity in the area, and to provide a favorableenvironment for the host country’s development program. Thesepurposes are complementary. When the guerrilla threat is reduced,internal development can begin, and when internal developmentworks, the causes of dissatisfaction which gave rise to the insurgencyare alleviated. This deprives the guerrilla of both popular support and areason for fighting (which he needs to survive).

3-6. Planning considerations — METT-T.a. Mission.

(1) Foreign internal defense operations fall into six areas:

(a) Intelligence operations.

(b) Psychological operations.(c) Populace and resources control operations.

(d) Military-civic action.

(e) Tactical operations (both strike and consolidation).(f) Adv i sory ass i s tance .

(2) The combat brigade is most often concerned with tacticaloperations, but because of the nature of counterguerrillawarfare, a specific tactical operation or campaign will

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probably involve elements of the five other operations tosome degree. The commander’s guidance for counterguerrillaoperations is more detailed and comprehensive than formore conventional operations and must accommodate alloperational aspects inherent in brigade counterguerrillaoperations.

(3) Before receipt of a specific mission, the commander’sguidance and subsequent planning is based on all probablemissions, to include supporting consolidation operations orconducting strike operations, as well as on the specificcharacteristics of the guerrilla, terrain, and population in thespecific operational area. After receipt of the mission, hisguidance becomes more specific and includes the extent towhich the brigade will become involved in each of the sixareas of FID operations.

b. Enemy. When evaluating the guerrilla capabilities and limitations,the commander considers:

(1) National and regional origins.

(2) Organization, to include effectiveness and unity of command.

(3) Strength, morale, and status of training.

(4) Tactics being employed and tactical proficiency.

(5) Capability to attack, defend, and reinforce.

(6) Resources available:

(a) Food and water.

(b) Arms, ammunition, demolitions, fuels, medicines, andneclear, biological, chemical (NBC) protective equipment(agents, detection devices, and employment assets);external support — personnel, materiel, and morale.

(7) Leaders and their personalities.

(8) Relations with the civilian population.

(9) Status of supplies.

(10) Effectiveness of communications.

(11) Effectiveness of intelligence and counterintelligence, toinclude the extent of infiltration of host country civil andmilitary establishments.

(12) Lines of communications.

(13) Vulnerabilities.

(14) External support.

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c. Terrain and weather. When evaluating the effects of terrainand weather on counterguerrilla operations, the commanderconsiders:

(1) Effects of seasons of the year (to include planting andharvesting periods), phases of the moon, and coastal tides.Particular attention is focused on the effects of the weatheron men, equipment, visibility, and mobility (on both USforces and the guerrilla).

(2) Suitability of terrain (to include landing zones and pickupzones) and road nets for tactical and logistical operations. Aswith weather, particular attention is focused on the effectsthe terrain has on men, equipment, visibility, and mobility(on both US forces and the guerrilla).

d. Troops and resources available.

(1) The commander has a variety of combat, combat support,and combat service support assets at his disposal. Theseassets may be from US forces and civilian agencies, or fromhost country forces and civilian agencies, or from acombination of all these.

(2) Successful counterguerrilla operations depend upon thecommander utilizing his available assets to maximize theirstrengths and minimize their weaknesses. To do this, thecommander realistically appraises the capabilities andlimitations of his assets and then organizes and employsthem on suitable missions. Oftentimes, the commander findshe lacks assets which would greatly facilitate missionaccomplishment. In these instances, he should request whathe needs from his higher headquarters. If his needs cannotbe met, he has the option of improvising a solution or doingwithout.

(3) The peculiar circumstances of counterguerrilla warfarerequire that senior commanders allow subordinate leaders,at all levels, a great deal of flexibility in accomplishing theirmissions.

e. Time.

(1) Time is relative. The conditions leading to the developmentof the insurgency did not appear overnight, and they will notdisappear overnight, either.

(2) US forces involved in FID operations should anticipatestaying in the host country only as long as required tocomplete their mission. Usually, this will only be as long as ittakes the host country forces to assume missions thecounterguerrilla force is accomplishing. No matter how

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(3)

(4)

(5)

3-7.

a.

b.

c.

successful FID forces are militarily, the insurgency is notdefeated until the political, economic, and social problemswhich led to it are corrected or significantly alleviated. Thisusually takes a considerable length of time.

In the area of tactical operations, time available for planningand execution varies. When planning for long-term actions,such as consolidation campaigns, a long lead time isnecessary to permit planning in meticulous detail. However,when planning shorter term actions, such as strike campaignsor offensive operations against fleeting guerrilla targets,planning time is usually short.

Commanders at all levels can use the time available to themmore efficiently by planning for contingency missions. Lackof hard information precludes planning in detail, but routinetasks common to similar missions should be codified instanding operating procedures (SOP) and understood by allconcerned. When the need to execute a contingency missionarises, the basic plan can be reviewed and planningexpedited by making minor adjustment as required.Planning time is often extremely limited. Warning andoperation orders are normally issued orally. In theseinstances, the one-third rule applies: the commander utilizesone third of the available time for his own planning andallows two thirds of the available time for his subordinates todevelop their plans and issue their orders. In many cases,planning time will be so limited that formal planning isprecluded. In these instances, commanders direct theirsubordinates by using fragmentary orders.

Restrictions.

US forces engaged in counterguerrilla operations function underrestrictions not encountered in other types of warfare. Theserestrictions may appear to hamper efforts to find and destroy theguerrilla. For example, the safety of noncombatants and thepreservation of their property is vitally important to winningthem over to the government’s side.

The guerrilla knows this and will attempt to capitalize on it byengaging US forces at locations where US fire would endangercivilians or damage their property. While the temptation to returnfire may be great, a few dead or injured enemy will in no waycompensate for the ill will of the local populace if some innocentcivilians are killed or injured or their homes and propertydestroyed.

Political considerations influence the conduct of counterguerrillaoperations. It is essentially a contest between the host government

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and guerrillas concerning political, social, religious, or economicissues. The government and its representatives must presentthemselves and their program as the better choice.

d. Commanders must be prepared to operate in a broad range ofpolitical atmospheres. The host country’s form of governmentmay be anything from an absolute, and not too benevolent,dictatorship to a democracy struggling to establish itself, oranything in between.

e. No matter what political atmosphere prevails in the host country,the brigade commander must engage the guerrilla with everyasset at the commander’s disposal. He must realize thatdemocratic principles may not be immediately applicable.However, he should act within the limits of his authority toimprove the circumstances of the government he was sent tosupport. Any incidents of deep-rooted corruption, gross inefficiency,or violation of human rights should be documented and reportedto higher headquarters. The commander can also offer otheralternatives to accomplish the same objective. It is the respon-sibility of the US Government to influence the hostgovernment’s attitude toward democratic principles; it isnot the responsibility of the commander.

f . There will be situations where well-defined responsibilities in alocal area may not be readily apparent. It is the duty of the higherheadquarters to determine these responsibilities and make themknown prior to the insertion of US forces, especially in theexecution of strike missions. However, there maybe eventualitiesin which the counterguerrilla force commander may be required tocoordinate with numerous governmental officials to locatesources of authority and decision. If the commander encountersgovernment officials who habitually hinder operations againstthe guerrillas through incompetence, self-interest, or suspectedsympathy for the guerrilla cause, he should document his caseand forward it to the next higher commander for disposition.

3-8. Operating principles.

a. Intelligence. Tactical intelligence is the key to defeating theguerrilla. It provides the commander with information aboutguerrilla locations, activities, strengths, weaknesses, and planswhich enable the commander to seize the initiative. Withoutintelligence sources, the chances of success (particularly inoffensive operations) are limited and the commander must reactto guerrilla initiatives rather than controlling the situation in thearea of operations. Every relevant source of information about thecommander’s area of operation should be exploited and include:

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(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

The brigade intelligence section (and augmentation):

(a) Ground surveillance radar (augmentation fromdivision).

(b) Ground sensors (augmentation from division).(c) Long-range surveillance unit (augmentation from

division).(d) Aviation assets (augmentation from division).

(e) Aerial imagery reconnaissance (from corps).

The maneuver battalion’s intelligence section and recon-naissance platoons.

The maneuver companies’ sightings and reports (combatinformation).

Combat support units’ target acquisition batteries, militarypolice, chemical reconnaissance units (if available), andsightings and reports (combat information).

Combat service support units’ sightings and reports (combatinformation).

Other sources:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

Local populace.

Intelligence agents (from division and corps).

Host government civilian agencies.

Captured enemy documents (from division and corps).

Enemy prisoners (from division and corps).

Intercepted enemy communications (from division andcorps).

Special operation forces.

b. Tactical situation. The organization for, and conduct of,counterguerrilla operations is dependent on the tactical situation.Units are organized and employed to counter the current guerrillathreat. For example, if guerrillas are operating in platoon-sizeunits, then platoon- or company-size units are used against them.These units conduct independent operations such as patrols andambushes, under centralized control (company or battalion). Thisenables them to cover more area simultaneously than a largerunit and still have the firepower to deal with the typical guerrillaunit they might encounter. Employing a large force to counter asignificantly smaller guerrilla force is inefficient because itcompromises the chance of achieving surprise, reduces the area

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that can be covered at any one time, and is more difficult to move(than a smaller force) if it is required elsewhere. However, sendinga small force to counter a significantly larger guerrilla force mayprove disastrous unless the smaller force is supported by fire orcan be rapidly reinforced.

c. Flexibility. Forces engaged in counterguerrilla operations areflexible and capable of adapting to rapidly changing tacticalsituations. The nature of counterguerrilla warfare necessitatesbeing able to make swift transitions from large to small unitoperations; to adjust to extremes of terrain, weather, andvisibility; to move on foot, by vehicle, or by aircraft; and tofunction in offensive or defensive modes. Adapting to changingtactical situations keeps the guerrilla force off balance andprevents it from developing effective tactical operations.

d. Mobility.(1) Counterguerrilla forces most possess mobility equal to or

greater than that of the guerrilla in order to find, fix, fight,and pursue him. Since the guerrilla is primarilly footmobile,counterguerrilla forces equipped with motorized, mechanized,or air transportation assets would appear to have asignificant mobility advantage. However, the guerrillatypically operates from terrain that precludes (or severelylimits) speed on a ground approach. The counterguerrillaforce’s mobility advantage may not be as great as it firstappears to be. When terrain, weather, or the guerrilla forcedisposition precludes closing on guerrilla positions byhigh-speed air or ground transport, then counterguerrillaforces should be moved by the fastest available transportationto the nearest suitable, safe area to launch footmobileoperations. A well-trained, footmobile counterguerrilla force,that can use terrain better than the enemy, can achieve atactical mobility advantage.

(2) Commanders should not overburden soldiers with excessiveloads because the guerrillas will be able to outrun them.Soldiers should carry only the things they need to find andfix the guerrilla. Once this is accomplished, they can beresupplied by ground or air.

e. Minimum use of force.

(1) Only the minimal firepower needed to accomplish a givenmission is employed. If US forces come under guerrilla fire,and if by returning fire noncombatant civilians maybeinjured or their homes and property destroyed, then only theamount of fire necessary to protect US forces is returned.Under these circumstances, the commander attempts tosuppress the guerrillas with minimal return fire (possibly

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using snipers) and moves his forces to advantageouspositions from which he may engage the guerrillas while notendangering civilian life or property. He may use smoke and,if authorized, riot control agents to facilitate maneuver. Ifthe guerrillas cannot be engaged without endangeringcivilian life or property, the commander moves his forces(over covered or concealed routes) to positions that cut offtheir escape routes and encircle them. Then he begins totighten the ring around them.

(2) The unrestricted use of firepower in the vicinity of civiliansor their property will result in turning their anger toward thegovernment and may turn them to the insurgent cause. USsoldiers must understand this and follow strict rules ofengagement. However, the right to self defense is neverdenied.

(3) All available fire may be brought to bear on guerrillas whenit does not endanger civilian life or property. However, theexpenditure of ammunition should be appropriate: mortarsto knock out a machine gun position; small arms to kill asniper. The use of indirect fire, while effective in some cases,is not a substitute for maneuver.

f. Patience. Counterguerrilla forces must anticipate long periodswithout making contact. The guerrilla knows he is outnumberedand outgunned and avoids engagement unless it is on his terms.Counterguerrilla forces should not develop a false sense ofsecurity if it appears the guerrilla has ceased operations in theirarea. It must be assumed that the guerrilla is always observingthe operating patterns of the counterguerrilla force for weakpoints, and waiting for lax security to strike with minimum risk. Aguerrilla attack must be expected at any time.

g. Reserves.

(1) The commander always maintains a reserve to takeadvantage of sudden opportunities, and to counter guerrillainitiatives. The size of the reserve depends on the size of itsparent unit and the tactical situation.

(2) In offensive operations, a company might keep a squad inreserve; battalions, a platoon; and brigade, a company.

(3) In defensive operations, because of the need for 360-degreesecurity, a reserve at company and battalion is complicatedby the fact that the on-line strength of the perimeter isreduced.

(4) The company or battalion commander may have to spreadhis forces thin to protect his perimeter. In these instances,the commander has four options: establish a small, centrally

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(5)

(6)

(7)

located reserve at the expense of on-line strength; establishno reserve but specify units on-line to be prepared to shift aportion of their strength to other sections of the perimeter;establish no reserve but reinforce the most heavily contestedsection of the perimeter by fire; and consider reducing thesize of the perimeter.

Brigades too should maintain a company in reserve indefensive operations. This mission should be rotated amongcompanies, with the company that has spent the most timein the field (or that has seen the heaviest action) beingdesignated as the reserve. The reserve company can rest,rearm, and train during the time it has the reserve mission.

The reserve unit should be highly mobile. Air transport is thepreferred method for moving the reserve because it is fastand not dependent on open ground routes as are motorized ormechanized modes of transport. Whatever its mode oftransportation, the reserve’s vehicles are dedicated to thereserve and immediately available for employment.

Reserve units are prepared for contingency missions. If thereserve is committed, the commander designates a newreserve. In this case, his least committed unit is the firstchoice.

Section III. Strike Campaigns

3-9. Targets.

This section provides guidance on the organization, missions,concepts, and operations of strike campaigns. Strike campaignsconsist of a series of major combat operations targeted againstinsurgent tactical forces and bases in contested or insurgent-controlledzones. Other internal defense activities may support tactical forcesduring strike operations. Strike campaign operations are usually ofrelatively short duration (generally, one day to several weeks). Whilethe guidance outlined here is focused on the infantry brigade, thissection may be extended to apply to any combined arms organizationconducting counterguerrilla operations.

3-10. Organization.

Brigades assigned strike campaign missions either are relieved fromarea responsibility in advance of the mission or, preferably, areconstituted as specialized forces held at the national or regional levels.Brigade strike forces are organized as self-sufficient task forcescapable of operating in areas remote from logistical bases. Brigadesare assigned support bases in secure areas for elements not committedto operations.

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3-11. Missions.

Strike campaigns are conducted against guerrilla forces and bases.They serve to keep guerrilla forces moving and off balance. Strikecampaign areas are usually outside of those undergoing consolidationor those under friendly control. Ground or water means of entry maybeused, but air assault or parachute deliveries can be employed.

3-12. Concepts.

a. Strike campaigns include offensive tactics such as raids,reconnaissance in force, hasty or deliberate attacks, and pursuit(or combinations of these operations).

b. Brigade strike campaign operations are conducted to:

(1) Harass the guerrilla to prevent the buildup of personnel andlogistical resources.

(2) Destroy the guerrilla force and its base complexes.

(3) Demonstrate support for the government and for thepopulace in the local area.

(4) Expand consolidation areas.

3-13. Operations.

a. Brigades committed to strike campaigns are assigned a tacticalarea of responsibility. The brigade commander normally assignsoperational areas to the subordinate battalions which, in turn,may assign areas to companies. Company commanders mayassign specific areas to platoons at times; however,’ platoons arenormally assigned specific missions rather than operationalareas. Each battalion normally establishes a separate operationalsupport base (OSB). Companies normally operate from patrolbases, but at times may operate separate company OSBs. Whenthe areas assigned to units are too large to be reconnoiteredconcurrently by subordinate units, commanders establish anorder of priority for reconnaissance of the areas.

b. Battalion commanders maintain reserve forces (ready forces) toreact quickly to situations requiring an immediate response. Eachrifle company patrols its area of operations continuously andaggressively. The location of the company patrol base and patrolroutes are varied to ensure complete coverage of the area.

c. The rifle company moves to, secures, and occupies the companypatrol base with sufficient supplies to permit limited independentoperations. If it is to operate in the same area for a period of time, itshould consider establishing small ration and ammunitionreserves.

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d. The company area is patrolled to provide complete coverage dayand night with emphasis on night patrols. Generally, platoon-sizepatrols have sufficient firepower to handle the situation if aguerrilla force is encountered. If additional support is needed, thecompany commander may maneuver his other platoons againstthe guerrillas, or he may request assistance from the battalionreserve (ready force). Emphasis is placed on engaging theguerrilla with organic means of fire and movement (if required)and on employing supporting artillery and air support.

e. Orders issued to the company commanders include the areaassigned and resupply instructions. The conduct of operations isbased on decentralized planning and execution. Companycommanders plan and coordinate platoon activities to ensurecompletion of the overall company mission. Platoons on patrolcarry light rations and store unneeded equipment at OSBs.

f. Rifle company mortars may (at times) be located in battalionOSBs while fire support teams (FIST) move with the companies. Ifthe terrain and situation permit, battalion OSBs may be moved asthe companies move their patrol bases. If civilian communitiesare in the area, and if security conditions permit, battalion basesmay be near (but not within) the community. Here, the battalionmay conduct psychological, intelligence, and military-civicaction operation.

g. Brigade commanders use all available means to locate guerrillaforces and bases, and they give priority to destroying the guerrillaforces. An attack on a guerrilla force normally requires superiorcombat power. Reserves (ready forces) attempt to immediatelyengage and destroy moving guerrilla forces before they candisperse. Depending on the situation, either hasty or deliberateattacks are made on guerrilla bases that contain fortifications.After a successful attack on guerrilla forces, troops thoroughlysearch the area for guerrilla personnel, supplies, equipment, anddocuments. Pursuit operations are undertaken to destroy orcapture forces attempting to flee. Artillery, air support, and airassault forces support ground pursuit.

h. The brigade does not normally occupy the area defensively for anextended time following a successful attack. Operations to searchout guerrillas continue. Elements of the brigade may be rotatedthrough the brigade support base for periods of rest and training.

i. Speed and surprise are important in strike operations, especiallywhen attacking a known guerrilla stronghold. The sudden andunexpected delivery of combat forces into a guerrilla-held orcontested area provides significant advantages to the counter-guerrilla commander. If caught by surprise, the guerrilla maybeunable to react in time to save himself. He is confused initially and

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may panic. In the time it takes him to become aware of the tacticalsituation, or to take effective action, the counterguerrilla forcesmay encircle him. Speed and surprise may be achieved by usingair assault tactics to insert the first counterguerrilla forces intothe area of operations. Subsequent forces can be delivered on laterairlifts or by other modes of transportation.

j. Strike forces are most vulnerable just after entering a new area ofoperations. Initially, there is some confusion until patrol basesare established and patrols are sent out. counterguerrilla forcesmust be especially security conscious the first few hours in a newlocation. Upon arrival, they should immediately establish targetreference points, observation posts, and listening posts.

Section IV. Consolidation Campaigns

3-14. Control.

a. This section provides the brigade guidance on the missions,organization, and operations of consolidation compaigns.Consolidation campaigns are the application of all civil andmilitary aspects of internal defense and internal developmentprograms. They are designed to establish, regain, or maintaincontrol of specific areas.

b. The brigade participates in consolidation campaigns by conductingtactical, intelligence, psychological, civil affairs, populace andresources control, and advisory assistance operations.

c. Brigades committed to consolidation campaigns support theoverall host country internal defense and development (IDAD)effort by applying their resources in the following manner:

(1) In the preparation and offensive phases, tactical operationsare stressed. Initial area control is established by clearingguerrilla forces from an area, expanding it, and linking it toother areas as they are cleared.

(2) In the development phase, the primary mission is tacticaloperations to maintain security of the cleared area. Concur-rently, the brigade performs intelligence, psychological,populace and resources control, civil affairs, and advisoryassistance operations. The brigade also conducts military-civicaction in conjunction with civil affairs programs.

(3) During the completion phase, when guerrilla activity withina consolidated area has been largely neutralized and hostcountry agencies have resumed control of the area, thebrigade begins to phase out its participation in localoperations and prepares to conduct operations in anotherarea.

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3-15. Preparatory phase.

Consolidation campaign plans are detailed and provide for long-rangecommitment of both personnel and materiel. Plans are coordinatedwith all agencies involved in the consolidation campaign. In additionto planning, the brigade conducts necessary training and becomesengaged in intelligence and other FID activities.

3-16. Offensive phase.

a. The offensive phase of a consolidation campaign involvesmoving the civil-military task force into the operational area,neutralizing guerrilla forces and sympathizers, and removinginsurgent personnel who may have infiltrated the local govern-ment.

b. Patrolling, area surveillance, ambushes, and other small-unitactions are used extensively. Offensive operations, such asmovements to contact, hasty or deliberate attacks, raids, orpursuits follow the small unit reconnaissance as targets arelocated.

c. Care is taken that once cleared, the friendly, controlled areas arenot allowed to revert to guerrilla domination.

3-17. Development and completion phases.

a. During the development and completion phases of a consolidationcampaign, brigade operations involve holding an area to permitgovernment agencies to conduct their internal defense anddevelopment programs. Operations also involve training localforces to assume the defensive and security missions from theregular armed forces. Aggressive defensive operations providesecurity against guerrilla attack, deny guerrillas access tosupport, and provide a secure base from which to expand theconsolidated areas. Offensive action is continued to destroyguerrilla forces; however, defense must be provided for populationcenters, tactical bases, logistical installations, airbases andairfields, and lines of communication.

b. Defensive actions are conducted to accomplish one or more of thefollowing:

(1) Destroy or capture guerrilla forces.

(2) Reduce guerrilla capability and opportunity for offensiveaction.

(3) Deny guerrilla entry into an area.

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(4) Provide security and thus develop favorable conditions forother IDAD operations.

c. The normal defense in consolidation campaign operationsemploys small-unit tactics, using air assault and other reserveforces (ready forces) to immediately react to intelligence or aninsurgent attack. Artillery and air support is prearranged to thedegree possible, and plans are adjusted as required.

d. Security forces conduct extensive patrolling throughout the area.The bulk of the brigade force may be assigned areas of responsibilityand be heavily engaged in patrolling and supporting efforts oflocal security forces.

e. The composition of the brigade reserve varies with the size of thearea, nature of the enemy threat, and the terrain. Some brigadeunits may be fragmented into small elements and required todefend dispersed installations. In this situation, the reserveelements are assigned contingency missions to provide reactionforces for several installations.

f. Area coverage may require assignment of fire support units to amuch lower level than is normal in conventional operations. Tosupport dispersed security elements, decentralization of firesupport may be required. Direct fire supporting weapons(including artillery in the direct fire role) can be effective at shortranges when using time and super quick fuze. Direct fire supportweapons are important if the guerrilla force moves within theminimum range of indirect fire weapons.

g. All military and critical civilian installations and populationcenters must be protected against sabotage and attack.

h. The larger installations and communities and the surroundingsmaller ones mutually assist each other in their defense. Firesupport from several installations and communities can contributeto mutual defense.

i. The defense of communities is primarily the task of localparamilitary forces and police. The defense of communities isconducted with special emphasis on physical security andpopulace and resources control measures. In planning thedefense, military units may be required to secure lines ofcommunication in the area. They may do so by surveillance,occupation of tactical positions, or use of guards for convoysecurity, patrolling, and security posts. Along lines of communi-cation, fixed security posts protect critical points such asterminals, tunnels, bridges, and road or railway junctions. Thesize of the security post depends on the mission and the type andsize of the hostile forces which may attack it. Security posts inremote areas are larger than those near supporting forces.

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Section V. Offensive Operations

3-18. Three phases.

This section discusses offensive operations which brigades (andsubordinate units) may have to conduct. For purposes of organizationand clarity, operations are discussed under those phases of aninsurgency in which they will most often have to be conducted.Depending on the tactical situation, these operations, or variationsand combinations of them, may be conducted during any of the threephases of insurgent activity: latent and incipient insurgency; guerrillawarfare; and war of movement.

3-19. Phase I — Latent and incipient insurgency.

a. This phase ranges from subversive activity that is only apotential threat, latent or incipient, to situations in whichfrequent subversive incidents and activities occur in an organizedpattern. It involves no major outbreak of violence or uncontrolledinsurgency activity.

b. Possible insurgent activities during Phase I include attacks onpolice forces, other terroristic activities, and some minor militaryoperations carried out to gain additional influence over thepopulation (or provide arms for the movement) and to challengethe government’s ability to maintain law and order. Furthermore,groundwork is laid for extensive external materiel support whichis essential in most cases for the expansion of the insurgency andits eventual success.

3-20. Police-type operations.

a.

b.

c.

To control the movement of insurgents or guerrillas, and theirmateriel, police-type operations are conducted. These operationsare executed by host country police, paramilitary, or militaryforces. For various reasons, this may not be possible, and USforces may have to conduct police-type operations until hostcountry forces are available to relieve them. (Under US law, themilitary cannot advise or train foreign police forces.)

If US forces must conduct this type of operation, military policeunits are suitable for this function. If they are not available,combat forces do the job.

When conducting police operations, host government representativesare with US troops to serve as interpreters and advise on localcustoms and courtesies. When performing these duties, US troopstreat passive civilians and their property with as much courtesyand respect as the situation permits.

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3-21. Searches.

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

The need for a counterguerrilla force to conduct search operationsor to employ search procedures is a continuous requirement. Mostsearch operations support strike operations or consolidationoperations, or they may be conducted as the main effort inpopulace and resources control operations. A search maybeoriented to people, to materiel, to buildings, or to terrain. It usuallyinvolves both civil police and military personnel.

Since misuse of search authority can adversely affect the ultimateoutcome of operations agtainst guerrillas, seizure of contraband,evidence, intelligence material, supplies, or minor items duringsearches must be accomplished lawfully and properly recorded tobe of future legal value. Proper use of authority in searches gainsthe respect and support of the people. Abusive, excessive, orinconsiderate search methods may temporarily suppress theguerrilla force or expose elements of it, but at the same time suchmethods may ultimately increase the civilian population’ssympathy for and/or support of the guerrilla.

Authority for search operations is carefully reviewed. Militarypersonnel must be aware that they perform searches only in areaswithin military jurisdiction (or where otherwise lawful) forpurposes of apprehending suspects or securing evidence thattends to prove an offense has been committed. Usually, there arespecial laws regulating the search powers of the military forces.These laws are given wide dissemination.

Search teams have detailed instruction on controlled items. Listsof prohibited or controlled-distribution items such as chemicals,medicines, machine tools, and other items should be distributed.The military or civil police who administer the populace andresources control program are contacted before the conduct ofsearch operations, or periodically if search operations are acontinuing activity.

Search operations involving US forces maybe ineffective whenlanguage difficulties prevent full communication with theindigenous population. US units given a search mission areprovided with interpreters as required.

The pace at which a search operation is conducted is slow enoughto allow for an effective search but not so slow as to allow theguerrilla force time to react to the threat of the search.

If active resistance develops to the search operation, offensiveoperations are conducted to eliminate the resistance.

Consideration is fiven to returning to a searched area after thecompletion of an initial search to surprise and eliminate

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guerrillas or their infrastructure that may have remainedundetected or may have returned.

3-22. Search of individuals.

The fact that anyone in an area to be searched can be a guerrilla or aguerrilla sympathizer is stressed in all search operations. However,searchers are tactful to avoid making an enemy out of a suspect whomay, in fact, support the host country government. It is during theinitial handling of a person about to be searched that the greatestcaution is required. During the search of an individual, one member ofa search team always covers the other member who makes the actualsearch. (For information on how to conduct searches, see Appendix G.)

3-23. Checkpoints, roadblocks, and vehicle searches.

a. It will be necessary to maintain a continuous check on roadmovement to apprehend suspects and to prevent smuggling ofcontrolled items. This requires the use of checkpoints. Sincecheckpoints cause considerable inconvenience and even fear, it isimportant that the civil population understands that checkpointsare a preventive and not a punitive measure.

b. Checkpoints maybe described as either deliberate or hasty. Thedeliberate checkpoint is positioned in a town or in the opencountry, often on a main road. It acts as a useful deterrent tounlawful movement. The hasty checkpoint is highly mobile and isquickly positioned in a town or in the open country. The actuallocation of the hasty checkpoint is designed to achieve quicksuccess.

c. Concealment of a checkpoint is desirable, but often impossible.The location should make it difficult for a person to turn back orreverse a vehicle without being observed. Culverts, bridges, ordeep cuts may be suitable locations. Positions beyond sharpcurves have the advantage that drivers do not see the checkpointin sufficient time to avoid inspection. Safety disadvantages mayoutweigh the advantages of such positions. A scarcity of goodroads increases the effect of a well-placed checkpoint.

d. A checkpoint requires adequate troops to prevent ambush andsurprise by a guerrilla force. An element of the checkpoint force ispositioned and concealed an appropriate distance (one hundred toseveral hundred meters) from the checkpoint to prevent the escapeof any vehicle or person attempting to turn back upon sighting thecheckpoint. The vehicle, driver, and passengers are searched. Ifthe checkpoint is manned for any length of time, part of the forceis allowed to rest. The rest area is located near the search area sothat the troops can be assembled quickly as a reserve force. (For

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information on how to conduct checkpoints and roadblocks, seeAppendix G.)

3-24. Search of built-up areas - cordon and searchoperations.

a. Techniques. Search techniques in built-up areas are practicedby police and military forces operating in populated areas. Thesetechniques are required for searching either a few isolated huts orbuildings, or for searching well-developed urban sections. Searchoperations in built-up areas require thorough preparation andrehearsal. Special emphasis should be given to the following:

(1) Divide the area to be searched into zones, and assign asearch party to each. A search party consists of a searchelement (to conduct the search), a security element (toencircle the area and prevent entrance and exit, and to secureopen areas), and a reserve element (to assist, as required).

(a) The search element conducts the mission assigned forthe operation. Normally it is organized into specialteams.

(b) The security element surrounds the area while thesearch element moves in. Members of the securityelement orient primarily upon evaders from thepopulated area; however, they can cut off any insurgentstrying to reinforce. Checkpoints and road blocks areestablished. Subsurface routes of escape, such assubways and sewers, must be considered when operatingin cities.

(c) The reserve element is a mobile force within a nearbyarea. Its specific mission is to assist the other twoelements should they meet resistance they cannothandle. In addition, it is capable of replacing orreinforcing either of the other two elements should theneed arise.

(2) Consider any enemy material found, including propagandasigns and leaflets, to be booby-trapped until inspectionproves it is safe.

(3) Thoroughly search underground and underwater areas. Anyfreshly excavated ground can be a hiding place. Use minedetectors to locate metal objects underground and under-water.

(4) Deploy rapidly, especially when a guerrilla force is still in thearea to be searched. The entire area to be searched is

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surrounded simultaneously. If this is not possible, observedfire must cover that portion not covered by soldiers.

b. Principles. A basic principle when searching a built-up area isto conduct it with limited inconvenience to the population. Thepopulace may be inconvenienced to the point where theydiscourage guerrillas and insurgent sympathizers from remainingin the locale, but not to the point that they collaborate with theguerrilla force as a result of the search. The large-scale search of abuilt-up area is normally a combined civil police and militaryoperation. It is planned in detail and rehearsed when possible.Physical reconnaissance of the area just prior to a search isavoided. Information needed about the terrain may be obtainedfrom aerial photographs. In larger towns or cities, the local policemay have detailed maps showing relative size and location ofbuildings. For success, the search plan must be simple and beexecuted swiftly.

c. Command and control. Normally, a search involving abattalion or larger force is best controlled by the militarycommander with the civil police in support. A search involving asmaller force is best controlled by the civil police with the militaryin support. Regardless of the controlling agency, the actual searchis performed by host country police when they are available inadequate numbers and have been trained in search operations.(For detailed information on how to conduct cordon and searchoperations, see Appendix G.)

3-25. Aerial search operations.

a.

b.

c.

d.

Search unite mounted in armed helicopters use the mobility andfirepower of these aircraft to the maximum. (This may seriouslyaffect the morale of the guerrilla force.)

Air assault combat patrols, conducting an aerial search,reconnoiter an assigned area or route in search of guerrilla forces.When a guerrilla force is located, the air assault combat patrolmay engage it from the air or may land and engage it on theground. This technique has little value in areas of densevegetation. Use of air assault combat patrols should be limited tothose operations in which sufficient intelligence exists to justifytheir use and then normally in conjunction with ground oper-ations.

In ground search operations, helicopters drop off troops in an areasuspected of containing guerrilla elements. With the helicoptersovermatching from the air, troops search the area. Troops are thenpicked up and the process is repeated in other areas.

Members of air assault combat patrols should be trained intracking procedures in order to follow guerrillas to their base. If

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the patrol encounters a large guerrilla force, the reserve (readyforces) are committed. Plans must provide for evacuation ofprisoners, casualties, and materiel.

3-26. Civil disturbance and riot control.

a. US forces participating in counterguerrilla operations may betasked to assist host country police and military forces inrestoring order disrupted by civil disturbance or riot. If thisoccurs, US force participation should be limited to containing thedisturbance and protecting US lives and property.

b. The suppression of demonstrators or rioters should be left entirelyto host country forces. Any direct action by US troops againstdemonstrators or rioters will be misrepresented by the insurgentsand their sympathizers as brutal suppression of legitimatedissent and be used by them as a propaganda weapon. (Forfurther information on specific techniques, see FM 19-15.)

3-27. Phase II — Guerrilla warfare.

a. Phase II is reached when the subversive movement, havinggained sufficient local or external support, initiates organizedguerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against thegovernment. Examples of insurgent activities during Phase IIinclude:

(1) Activities initiated in Phase I are continued and expanded.Insurgent control, both political and military, over territoryand populace, is intensified.

(2) Guerrilla warfare is used on a larger scale, and limiteddefense is conducted in some geographic areas.

(3) An insurgent government is established in insurgent-dominated areas as the military situation permits. In areasnot yet controlled, efforts are made to neutralize actual orpotential opposition groups and to increase infiltration intogovernment agencies. Intimidation through terror andthreat of guerrilla action increases and thus becomes moresignificant.

b. Militarily, the major goal is to control additional areas; thegovernment is forced to strain its resources trying to protecteverything at the same time. Insurgent forces attempt to tie downgovernment troops in static defense tasks, interdict and destroylines of communications, and capture or destroy supplies andother government resources.

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3-28. Small-unit operations.

Small-unit operations are used against guerrilla activities in thesecond phase of an insurgency. They are effective since small units cancover more territory than a large unit, they keep the guerrilla offbalance, and their friendly firepower (that can be rapidly massed) mayprovide a favorable ratio in meeting engagements. In Phase II, theguerrilla is usually operating in smaller units, too.

3-29. Raid.

a.

b.

c.

A raid is an operation involving a swift penetration of hostileterritory to secure information, harass the guerrilla force, ordestroy the guerrilla force and its installation. It ends in aplanned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. Asuccessful raid is based on accurate, timely, and detailedinformation. Raids are usually targeted against single, isolatedguerrilla base camps. To assist in attaining surprise, the raidingforce uses inclement weather, limited visibility, or terrainnormally considered impassable.

The raiding force is normally organized into an assault elementand a security element. A larger raiding force may add a supportelement while a small raiding force includes supporting weaponsin the assault element.

The use of airborne and air assault forces for a raid enhancessurprise. If night airborne or air assault raids are conducted, theforce must be accurately inserted and oriented on the ground. Airassault forces supported by armed helicopters offer infinitepossibilities for conducting raids. This type of raid force can movein, strike the objective, and withdraw without extensive preparationor support from other sources. (For further information on thecomposition and organization of raid forces, see FM 7-8, FM 7-10,and FM 7-20.)

3-30. Patrols.

a. Conventional patrolling doctrine normally applies to counter-guerrilla operations, but some techniques must be oriented to meetthe guerrilla’s activities and the operational environment.Patrolling becomes more significant in counterguerrilla operationsbecause of the difficulty in locating and identifying guerrillaforces and determining their intentions. Patrolling is used whenlimited (or no) intelligence on guerrilla activity is available.Personnel should be thoroughly briefed, carry only mission-essentialequipment, and be physically fit. Routes are planned carefullyand coordinated with higher, lower, and adjacent units, to includeair and ground fire support elements and reserve forces.

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b. Patrolling is done to find and destroy the guerrilla, and to denyhim use of an area. Patrols are usually categorized as eithercombat or reconnaissance.

c. Patrols can be employed to:

(1) Saturate areas of suspected guerrilla activity.

(2) Control critical roads and trails.

(3) Maintain contact between villages and units.

(4) Establish population checkpoints.

(5) Provide security for friendly forces.

(6) Interdict guerrilla routes of supply and communication.

(7) Establish ambushes.

(8) Pursue, maintain contact with, and destroy guerrillas.

(9) Provide internal security in rural areas.

(10) Locate guerrilla units and base camps.

d. Saturation patrolling is extremely effective in Phase II situations.In this technique, patrols are conducted by many lightly armed,small, fast-moving units and provide thorough area coverage.Patrols move over planned and coordinated routes which arechanged frequently to avoid establishing patterns. Use ofsaturation patrolling results in the sustained denial of an area toguerrilla forces as they seek to avoid contact with the counter-guerrilla units. In addition to harassment and discovery ofguerrilla tactical forces, this technique provides:

(1) An opportunity to gain an intimate knowledge of the area ofoperations.

(2) A form of reassurance to the local population that thegovernment is concerned about their protection and security.

(3) A means by which information about the guerrilla can beobtained. (For further information on preparation, execution,and operational techniques of patrols, see FM 7-10, FM 7-20,and Appendix D.)

3-31. Ambush

a. An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position upona moving or temporarily halted target. Ambushes give thecounterguerrilla force several advantages:

(1) An ambush does not require ground to be seized or held.

(2) Smaller forces with limited weapons and equipment canharass or destroy larger, better armed forces.

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(3) Guerrillas can be forced to engage in decisive combat atunfavorable times and places.

(4) Guerrillas can be denied freedom of movement and deprivedof weapons and equipment that are difficult to replace.

b. Well-planned and well-executed ambushes maybe the mostsuccessful operational technique employed against guerrillas. Itis an effective technique to interdict movement of guerrilla forceswithin an area. Selection of the site is a key step in developing awell-organized ambush. Also, leaders must be proficient in usingmines, antihandling devices, demolitions, and expedient devicesfor organization of the position. Fire support is prepared forimmediate delivery on call.

3-32. Night ambush.Ambush during darkness is difficult to control, but darkness increasesthe security of the ambush party and the confusion of those beingambushed. A small ambush party generally is more practical;however, the size of the party depends on factors such as the size of theunit to be ambushed and the estimated guerrilla strength in the area.(For further information on preparation, execution, and operationalambush techniques, see FM 7-8, FM 7-10, and Appendix C.)

3-33. Encirclement.

a. Encirclement offers the best chance to fix guerrilla forces inposition and achieve decisive results. The battalion and largerunits will usually plan and conduct encirclements. The companyand smaller units normally do not have the manpower andcommand and control capability to execute encirclements exceptas part of a larger force.

b. Encirclements require accurate intelligence on the location ofguerrilla elements. Since it requires a major portion of thecounterguerrilla force to execute this maneuver, it is usuallytargeted against large guerrilla forces or guerrilla base complexes,a series of smaller base camps clustered within an area.

c. Planning, preparation, and execution are aimed at encircling theguerrilla force rapidly. Maximum security and surprise can begained by occupying the initial encirclement positions duringdarkness.

d. In large operations, air assault and airborne troops add speed andsurprise to the operation. Positions are occupied simultaneouslyin order to block escape. If simultaneous occupation is not

possible, probable escape routes are covered first. Initialoccupation is the most critical period of the operation. When theguerrillas become aware that they are being encircled, they will

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e.

f.

g.

h.

i.

probably probe for gaps or attack weak points and attempt tobreak out.

Encircling units provide strong combat patrols far to their front togive early warning of attempted breakouts. Mobile reserves arepositioned to counter a breakout and to reinforce difficult areassuch as broken terrain or areas with caves, tunnels, orfortification complexes.

Indirect fire support can serve to cloak an encirclement bygaining and holding the guerrillas’ attention. Fires are planned indetail to support the encirclement.

Following completion of the encirclement, the circle is contractedto capture or destroy the guerrilla force. As the circle is contracted,units may be removed from the line and added to the reserve.Against small guerrilla forces, the encircled area may be clearedby contraction and a final sweep. Against larger guerrilla forces,however, at some point, some action other than contraction will berequired.

One technique consists of driving a wedge through the guerrillaforce to divide it and then destroying the guerrillas in eachsubarea.

Another technique, employed after some degree of contraction, isto employ a blocking force on one or more sides of the perimeterwhile the remainder of the encircling force drives the guerrillasagainst the blocking force. Either element may accomplish theactual destruction. This technique is effective when the blockingforce can be located on, or immediately in the rear of, a naturalterrain obstacle. (For further information, see Appendix G.)

3-34. Phase III — War of movement.The situation moves from Phase II to Phase III when insurgencybecomes primarily a war of movement between organized insurgentforces and forces of the established government. During Phase III,insurgent activities conducted in Phases I and II are continued andexpanded. Larger insurgent units are used to fight government forcesand to capture key geographical and political objectives to be used todefeat government forces.

3-35. Large-unit operations.When an insurgency enters Phase III, the guerrilla begins to mass hisforces and challenge government forces openly. He may begin to useconventional warfare tactics to a greater degree. He may even elect tostand and fight in defense of terrain if he feels that it is in his interest toretain it or if he feels that he can deal government forces a seriousmilitary or political defeat by defending. In this phase, conventional

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warfare tactics can be effectively employed to defeat the guerrilla. (Forfurther information on how to employ these tactics, see FM 7-8, FM7-10, FM 7-20, and FM 7-30.)

3-36. Movement to contact.

a. Movement to contact in counterguerrilla tactical operations isbasically the same as in conventional conflicts. Night movement,clandestine movement, and counterambush precautions areemphasized.

b. Care is taken to avoid ambushes in movement to contact. Theinfantry maintains contact by aggressive frontal and flankpatrolling by small security elements, thereby exposing aminimum of troops to ambush. Supporting fires are placedclose-in along, and parallel to, the route of advance.

3-37. Reconnaissance in force.

a. Reconnaissance in force is a limited-objective operation todiscover and test guerrilla positions, locations, and strength, andto gather information. In counterguerrilla operations, theobjective is collection of information about guerrillas and thedestruction of units and facilities. The commander is prepared toexploit meeting engagements and intelligence to achieve tacticalsuccess by conducting a hasty or deliberate attack to destroydiscovered guerrilla units and facilities. The recon force mayconduct the operation as a unit, or selected subordinate units maybe committed on a limited scale.

b. Reconnaissance-in-force operations normally develop informationmore rapidly and in more detail than do other reconnaissancemethods. When firm intelligence is lacking, the principal effort ofthe recon unit may be a widespread and continuous reconnais-sance-in-force operation coupled with mandatory securitymissions. In arriving at a decision to reconnoiter in force, thecommander considers:

(1) His overall mission.

(2) His knowledge of the enemy situation.

(3) The urgency and importance of other information,

(4) The efficiency and speed of other intelligence collectionagencies.

(5) The possibility that the reconnaissance may lead to ageneral engagement under favorable conditions.

(6) The continuing requirements for local and area security.

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(7) The availability of adequate reserves (reaction forces) andthe resources to deliver them quickly to the area to beexploited.

(8) The availability of adequate, all-weather fire support means.

c. The reconnaissance elements in the force should have mobility atleast equal to that of the enemy. Mobile reserves (ready forces)quickly exploit guerrilla weaknesses and influence the action.

3-38. Hasty attack.

a.

b.

c.

d .

Once contact with the enemy is made, the commander deploys hisforce, coordinating movement, fires, air support, and other meansin an attempt to immediately destroy the enemy or fully developthe situation. Generally, if the leading element contacting theenemy cannot defeat him quickly, the commander must decidewhether to conduct a hasty attack or to take time to develop thesituation more carefully and then conduct a deliberate attack.

At times, the intelligence available to the commander indicatesclearly which course he should follow. At other times, however,judgment may dictate that he conduct a hasty attack to avoidbeing held up by inferior forces and being unnecessarily delayed.At the same time, he must be careful to avoid being drawn intoambush.

Conduct of a hasty attack is a difficult and challenging operation.Ideally, there should be no pause in the forward momentum of theforce upon initial contact. Maneuver units swing into actionimmediately, using movement techniques appropriate to theenemy and terrain.

The commander calls for available fire support. He coordinatesand maneuvers resources so as to apply the combat power neededagainst the enemy. The hasty attack tries to fix enemy elements inplace with firepower and either overrun or encircle them. Speed isessential. The reserve force has to be deployed early if maneuverelements are held up. If momentum is lost, the hasty attack fails.

3-39. Deliberate attack.

a . When the force commander knows he has encountered a strongenemy force in well-prepared defensive positions, he mayconclude that a deliberate attack is necessary.

A deliberate attack is characterized by detailed (and widelydistributed) knowledge of enemy positions, by large volumes ofeffectively delivered supporting fires, by extensive deception, byfull exploitation of electronic warfare (EW), and by employing

b.

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measures beyond those possible in a hasty attack. Continuedcontact with the guerrilla force must be maintained to prevent itsescape.

3-40. Exploitation.

a. If an attack succeeds, exploitation and pursuit follow. Exploitationis an operation undertaken to follow up success in the attack.Following the principle of reinforcing success, immediateexploitation using an uncommitted element of the force isadvisable.

b. The exploiting force drives swiftly to disrupt guerrilla commandand control functions, severs escape routes, destroys reserves andequipment, and denies the enemy an opportunity to reorganize hisdefense. The exploitation force is large, reasonably self-sufficient,and well-supported by tactical air, air cavalry, and attackhelicopters. It does not pause to achieve minor tactical successesagainst isolated or fleeing enemy units; it attempts to fix themwhile concentrating on destroying the main guerrilla force. Thecommander provides mobile support, including helicopters foremergency supply of petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) andammunition, and ensures sufficient follow-on forces to attackguerrilla forces bypassed or fixed by the exploiting force.

3-41. Pursuit.

a .

b.

c .

d.

Pursuit is an offensive action against a retreating enemy. It is thefinal phase of the exploitation and occurs when a large guerrillaforce attempts to disengage. Normally, it attempts to cut offescape routes and encircle and destroy the guerrilla force. Itmaintains pressure with an exploiting force.

As the guerrilla unit disintegrates, exploitation may develop intopursuit. Pursuit may develop in any operation in which the enemyhas lost his ability to operate effectively and attempts to flee.Pursuit requires energy and resolution to press on despite fatigue,dwindling supplies, or the approach of darkness. Nighttimepursuit increases the enemy’s confusion and speeds his disinte-gration.

The primary purpose of pursuit is to destroy the guerrilla force.Although terrain objectives may be assigned as control measures,the primary objective is the guerrilla force.

In pursuit, the requirements and command relationships forforces which follow and support are the same as in exploitation.They destroy bypassed enemy strongholds, relieve supportedunits that have halted to contain enemy forces, guard prisoners,

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open and secure lines of communications, and control refugees. Inconducting a pursuit, the commander maintains unremitting,direct pressure against the enemy while trying to envelop him tocut his line of retreat. When conditions permit, the commanderorders double envelopments of the retreating guerrilla force. Hemakes maximum use of fire support, air assault forces, andoffensive electronic warfare.

Section VI. Defensive Operations

3-42. Variations.

a. This section discusses defensive operations which brigades and subordinate units may have to conduct. Depending on the tacticalsituation, these operations, or variations of them, may beconducted during any phase of an insurgency. In some instances,the type of operation under consideration is identical to onealready discussed in Section V. The difference is the purpose.

b. For example, patrolling maybe either offensive or defensive inpurpose. When its purpose is offensive, it is done to locate theenemy and destroy him. When its purpose is defensive, it is done todeny the enemy access to an area, and to keep him fromorganizing for offensive operation. (For similarities of offensiveand defensive operations, see Section V.)

c. This section also provides guidance to commanders concernedwith the defense of various types of temporary or semipermanentbases, such as logistical installations, OSBS, airfields, andairbases, under varying conditions of security that may exist inan area of operations.

d. It is also applicable to the defense of civilian communities.Commanders responsible for bases, facilities, and communitiesshould exercise those principles and techniques discussed whichapply to their particular situation.

3-43. Base defense environment.

a . Defense and security of tactical units and installations areintegral parts of combat missions. (The term “base” is used toinclude all types of facilities to be defended.)

b. Base defense operations are executed under the guidance of anarea commander whose responsibilities include protecting theresources of his area from interruptions caused by enemyactivities. This is a territorial responsibility in which basecommanders provide for the local defense of their immediate baseareas. In addition, base commanders may be asked to provide

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resources for other activities which may be classified as rearbattle.

c. The base defense environment is established in an area generallycontrolled by friendly forces but not sufficiently secure to preventguerrillas from moving in small groups, establishing firingpositions, or mounting small-scale attacks.

d. Conditions which may characterize the environment for basedefense include:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

3-44.

US forces are in a host country.

Other nations in similar roles may be in the same hostcountry.

Unity of command or a combined headquarters may or maynot exist.

Although there is organized armed conflict, there is norecognized state of war.

Many of the guerrillas do not wear distinctive uniforms. Attimes, some may appear dressed in government uniforms.Guerrillas cannot always be distinguished from governmentsupporters or neutrals even when they are conducting overtoperations.

External support may be provided to the guerrillas, bothovertly and covertly. Nations or groups supporting theguerrillas may provide sanctuaries where guerrilla forcesmay establish base areas.

Paramilitary forces may assume increased responsibilities.

No military "frontline" exists where continuous contact canbe maintained.

Guerrillas usually do not hold territory. They may disperseand avoid combat at the appearance of a stronger force.

Missions, functions, and responsibilities.

a. Base defense consists of both normal and emergency localmilitary measures taken to nullify or reduce the effectiveness ofenemy attacks or sabotage. Base defense is conducted to ensurethe continued effectiveness of its facilities and units to fulfill theirmissions.

The commander of an area or a subarea that contains a base isresponsible for its overall defense. The base commander, however,is responsible for its local defense; he must have under hisoperational control all forces, regardless of branch of service, thatare assigned to the base primarily for its defense. Forces assigned

b.

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to the base for other primary purposes will also assist in localdefense during an attack. Each commander of forces located at abase is responsible for:(1) Participating in preparation of base defense plans. Training

his forces for base defense.

(2) Providing appropriate facilities and essential personnel forthe base defense operations center and appropriate personnelfor the base defense force staff.

(3) Providing for internal security of his own command.

3-45. Passive defense.

In addition to their assigned defense missions, all units in the base areaare responsible for maximum implementation of passive defense.Passive defense consists of measures taken to reduce the probability(and to minimize the effects) of damage caused by hostile action,without the expectation of taking the initiative. Responsibility for theconduct of specialized passive defense measures is assigned tofirefighting units, chemical units, medical units, and other appropriateorganizations capable of satisfying passive defense requirements.Additionally, all units assigned to the base initiate passive defensemeasures, such as dispersion, camouflage, blackout, and use ofshelters. These measures assist in preserving the operating integrity ofthe base and ensuring decisive and effective action against enemyattack.

3-46. Command relationships.

Command relationships for base defense operations provide unity ofcommand while preserving simplicity. The urgency of base defenseoperations requires clear-cut authority.

3-47. Fundamentals of base defense.

a . Base defense. It is established to provide all-round security forthe base with available forces and is characterized by detailedplanning and centralized control. Security measures may alsoinclude provisions to protect adjacent civilian communities, iffeasible. Constant and aggressive action by friendly elementsagainst enemy forces constitutes a major element of base defense.Vigilance and sound security measures reduce enemy interferencewith operations at the base and also tend to cause enemy forces todivert their operations from the area.

Use of terrain. Proper evaluation and organization of the areaare essential to hold down the number of additional forcesrequired for base defense. Factors considered are:

b .

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(1) Natural defensive characteristics of the terrain.

Use of artificial obstacles to enhance the natural defensivecharacteristics of the terrain.

(2)

Existing roads and waterways used for military lines ofcommunications and civilian commerce.

(3)

Control of land areas surrounding the base complex to arange beyond that of enemy mortars and rockets, and alsocontrol of water approaches.

(4)

c. Security. Early warning of pending actions ensures the basecommander time to react to any threat. Outposts, patrols, groundsurveillance andcountermortar radar, infantry scout dogs (ifavailable), and air reconnaissance and surveillance provide earlywarning. Civilian informants and actions of indigenous personnelnear the base are excellent indicators of pending enemy actions.Security measures vary with enemy threat, forces available, andother factors; all-round security is essential.

d. Mutual support. Defending forces are positioned to ensuremutual employment of defensive resources, which include fires,observation, and maneuver elements. Mutual support betweendefensive elements requires careful planning, positioning, andcoordination because of the circular aspects of the base area.Surveillance, obstacles, prearranged fires, and maneuver are usedto control gaps. Defense plans provide for use of all availablesupport, including attack helicopters and close air support.

e. All-round defense. In defensive planning, the base commanderhas to be prepared to defend against enemy attack from anydirection. Plans are sufficiently flexible, and reserves arepositioned to permit reaction to any threat. Base defense forces(BDF) are assigned primary and alternate positions and sectors ofresponsibility. All personnel are assigned duty stations orshelters.

f . Defense in depth. Alternate and supplementary positions,combat outposts, and mutually supporting strongpoints in frontof the base forward defense area extend the depth. The commanderplans fires throughout the defensive area up to the maximumrange of available weapons. Portable obstacles may be placedaround critical targets during reduced visibility to disrupt theenemy’s plan and add depth to the defense.

Responsiveness. Attacks against a base may range fromlong-range sniper, mortar, or rocket fire to attacks by suicidedemolition squads or major forces. The enemy has the advantageof deciding when, where, and with what force he will attack. Thedefender positions his forces and plans fires and movement so hecan respond to the widest possible range of enemy actions. The

g.

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defender prepares plans, to include counterattack plans, andrehearses, evaluates, and revises them as necessary.

h . Maximum use of offensive action. Since the objective of thebase defense is to maintain a secure base, the defender usesoffensive action to the maximum to engage enemy forces outsidethe base. On initial occupation of the base site, friendly forces takeoffensive actions to destroy enemy forces in the immediate area.The area commander employs patrols, raids, ambushes, airattacks, and supporting fires to harass and destroy anyremaining enemy force. Once the enemy has been cleared from thearea, the base can be defended by a smaller force. The BDFcommander maintains constant liaison with major tactical unitcommanders in the area to stay abreast of efforts to remove thethreat.

3-48. Defense preparations.

a. Implementation of base defense measures in a new base beginsbefore base units arrive, if possible. Normally, combat unitsprovide the initial defense in a new base area, These combat forcesremain in the base area, conducting aggressive offensive actions,until base units are capable of assuming the mission.

When base units arrive, they immediately start organizing thebase defense. They perform many of the tasks concurrently, butsome tasks require priority. The base commander specifies thesequence for preparation of the defense system. (FM 7-8, FM 7-10,and FM 7-20 provide a recommended sequence for tacticaldefense. For more information on base defense, see Appendix E.)

3-49. Patrols.

b.

a.

b.

c .

Base defense operations to counter small groups of enemy forcesinclude aggressive, frequent patrolling by squad- and platoon-sizeforces to detect and capture or destroy small groups of guerrillas.Infantry scout dogs, if available, maybe used to add security andadditional detection ability to patrol operations.

Patrolling is conducted by small, highly mobile units moving onfoot or by vehicles during daylight and darkness. It may includethe use of aircraft or boats. Populated areas near the base aresearched, and surprise checkpoints are established along knownor suspected routes of guerrilla communications.

Dug-in or concealed night ambush sites are manned outside thebarrier system trace on a random basis. Indigenous personnelshould accompany ambushes near populated areas. Theirknowledge of local populace and terrain assists the ambushmission. Artillery and mortar targets are registered and plotted to

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provide rapid on-call support. Detectors and sensors are emplacedto provide early warning.

d. BDF or other base unit reconnaissance patrols obtain targetacquisition data. They may penetrate known guerrilla-controlledterritory to install sensors that report the enemy’s presence alonginfiltration and supply routes. In addition, such patrols observeknown infiltration and supply routes and report any activityalong these routes. They provide early warning of guerrillaassembly of personnel; movement of weapons, ammunition, orother supplies; and preparation of mortar and rocket firing sites.In addition to the acquisition of specific targets, reconnaissancepatrols may be used to locate suspected areas where other types ofsurveillance or acquisition systems may be employed to obtaininformation. Indigenous personnel are valuable assets toreconnaissance patrols. Their knowledge of the terrain, ability tooperate effectively in the environment, knowledge of thelanguage, and familiarity with local customs are useful.

e. Combat patrols, when used for base defense, are employed indifficult terrain some distance from the base but within range ofsupporting artillery. Combat patrols employ ranger-type tacticsand remain committed for relatively long periods. They may besupplied by air and equipped to communicate with the base andsupporting aircraft. Such patrols may vary in size from squad toplatoon. They have the mission of making planned searches tolocate areas used by guerrillas to hide supplies, regroup, rest,train, or otherwise prepare for offensive actions. Small groups ofguerrillas are engaged and destroyed. Large groups are reportedand kept under surveillance until they are attacked. Augmentationin the form of local paramilitary guides or trackers increases theeffectiveness of combat patrols.(1) Reaction force operations. When a guerrilla unit is

located, the reaction force is deployed rapidly to engage theunit, disrupt its cohesion, and destroy it. If the guerrilla forcecannot be contained and destroyed, contact is maintained;reinforcements are dispatched if needed; and the guerrillasare pursued. When escape routes have been effectivelyblocked, the attack is continued to destroy the enemy force.The required mobility is provided by ground and air vehiclesand by rapid foot movement. Wheeled vehicles for reactionforces are predesignated.(a) Reaction operations are simple, planned, and rehearsed

day and night. Primary and alternate points arepredesignated for the release of reaction forces fromcentralized control to facilitate movement againstmultiple targets. Such points are reconnoitered andphotographed for use in planning and briefing. Withinsecurity limitations, actual release points are used

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during rehearsals to promote complete familiarity withthe area.

(b) Immediate reaction to any type of attack is essentialand is attained through employment of firepower andmovement of forces and their equipment. Immediatereaction to accurate and timely intelligence maypermit destruction of the guerrilla force before anattack. Immediate reaction to standoff mortar or rocketfire may permit destruction of the guerrilla force duringan assault on the base and facilitate blocking routes ofwithdrawal.

(2 ) Host and third country forces. The BDF commandernormally considers the integration of host and third countryforces in the overall base defense effort. Particular emphasisis on integration of host country forces in patrol andpopulace control activities. Both host and third countryforces provide local security for their own units; however, toensure maximum benefit, all such local plans should becoordinated with, and integrated in, the base master defenseplan. The degree of participation in base defense by host andthird country forces depends on the orders and guidance oftheir governments.

3-50. Securing lines of communication (LOC).a . Guerrillas may attempt to sever lines of communications (LOC)

by various methods. Roads, waterways, and railways can bemined, or ambush sites located adjacent to them. Bridges andtunnels can be destroyed by demolitions. It is impossible toabsolutely secure long lines of communication, but measures canbe taken to minimize the effect of guerrilla activity against them.

b . Patrolling by counterguerrilla forces increases the chances ofdetecting guerrillas before they can emplace mines or demolitions,or establish ambushes or roadblocks. During Phases I and 11 of aninsurgent action, military police can do most of the patrolling ofground lines of communication, but the tactical situation maydictate combat forces having to perform this mission.

c . Patrolling is done regularly, but patrols should not establish aroutine which enables the guerrilla to avoid or ambush them.Patrols must pay particular attention to probable ambush sitesand chokepoints where roadblocks or mines and demolitionswould be effective.

d. Aerial patrols are effective for covering large areas in a short time.e. Surface patrols are slower, but they can check routes in greater

detail. Surface patrol members must be trained in the detection ofmines and booby traps. Mine detectors and infantry scout dogs, ifavailable, may aid them in this task.

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f .

g .

h .

i .

j .

The primary function of a patrol is to check the security of theroutes it patrols. Ordinarily, manpower constraints prohibit apatrol from being organized and equipped to counter a largeguerrilla force; however, reinforcement by artillery and attackhelicopters increases a patrol’s capability to deal with guerrillasthey encounter. Patrols are organized with enough combat powerto survive an initial contact. Recent guerrilla activity providesguidance on how patrols are organized. If the guerrilla is found instrength, his destruction is the reaction force mission.

Patrols always attempt to make initial contact with the smallestof their elements, and they must be thoroughly proficient in counter-ambush techniques.

Roadblocks, checkpoints, and guardposts at critical chokepoints(such as bridges and tunnels) are effective in preventing acts ofsabotage. Vehicles and persons are stopped and searched beforebeing allowed to proceed. Vehicles are not allowed to stop on orunder bridges or in tunnels.

Critical chokepoints are watched carefully at night. Personnelguarding them are equipped with night vision equipment, andground surveillance radar and sensors are used to cover theimmediate, surrounding area. Curves on railroads are alsowatched. Mining indirect approaches to sensitive areas may helpto lessen the chances of ground attack. The area is ringed withplanned artillery fires, and bunkers are constructed to protectguard personnel and provide them positions from which to fightuntil reinforced. Underwater approaches to bridges are reinforcedby booby-trapped obstacles.

Engineers are used to help keep lines of communication open.They can locate and clear mines, clear potential ambush sites,and repair damage. They may also prepare defensive systems aroundchokepoints.

3-51. Defending against guerrilla offensive.

a . When insurgent action enters Phase III, the guerrilla may beginto attack using conventional tactics with the intention ofcapturing and holding facilities, installations, bases, communities,and t.errority. He also attemps to permanently sever critical linesof communication. These attacks are similar to attacks conductedby conventional infantry except the initial absence of establishedlines enables the guerrilla to strike from any direction, or frommany directions at once. As host government and US forces reactto these initiatives, enemy and friendly lines may evolve;however, during the initial stages of the guerrilla’s offensivecampaign, friendly bases, facilities, installation, and even citiesmay be surrounded and come under siege.

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The organization of the defense and the construction of physicaldefenses must be at least partially completed prior to theguerrilla’s attack if the defenders are expected to hold until acounteroffense can begin.

c . Once enemy and friendly lines are established, conventionaltactics are employed by both sides. Initially, however, US forcesmay have to conduct limited attacks to reopen lines of communi-cation or to relieve besieged areas.

Section VII. Common Operations

Operations common to offensive and defensive counterguerrillaoperations may be conducted during any of the three phases of aninsurgency. The degree to which these operations are utilized isdependent on the tactical situation.

3-52. Movement security.

a. All movements of troops and supplies are planned and conductedas tactical operations with emphasis on extensive securitymeasures. These security measures may include:

b .

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Secrecy when planning and disseminating orders, strictnoise and light discipline during movement when appropriate,and varying routes and schedules of movement.

Security forces organized and equipped to ensure effectivefront, flank, and rear security during movement and halts.Pre-positioning security elements along the route of movementhelps in performing route reconnaissance and movementsecurity.

Coordination with supporting air units to ensure a thoroughunderstanding of air support used to assist the movement,both in taking preventive measures and in close combatoperations. The need for secrecy may preclude initial aircover, but it will not preclude use of close air support whenrequired. The use of aerial photographs is critical.

Fire support elements which provide close and continuousfire support for the movement.

Maneuver for counterambush actions, to include contingencyplans for immediate action against an ambush and use offormations which allow part of the column to be in position tomaneuver against an ambush force.

Communications with supporting units, adjacent hostcountry forces, and higher headquarters, to include airborneradio relay.

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Varying the location of leaders, communications, andautomatic weapons within the movement formation.

(8) Questioning local civilians along the movement route forintelligence information, to include possible guerrillaambush sites.

(9) Movement by bounds with overmatching fire.

(10) Use of infantry scout dogs, if available, and other ambushdetection means.

(7)

b. Organization of the movement depends upon the type ofmovement, whether by ground, air, or water.

c . Planning for movement is coordinated with military units alongroutes of movement and considers the following:

(1) Communications. Communications are vital to thesuccess of movements. Radio communication is planned andavailable between convoy serials and march units, withartillery forward observers and air controllers, and withunits and population centers in the areas along the route ofmovement. Visual and sound signals, which include coloredsmoke, identification panels, and whistle or horn signals, areprearranged. While limited, these communication means areeffective when prearranged meanings and responses areunderstood and rehearsed.

(2) Artillery and mortar support. Artillery and mortarsupport may be provided by units within range of the route ofmovement or by artillery and mortars which may bepositioned within range of the proposed route. Movementsrequiring artillery and mortar support have observers eitherwith them or in supporting observation aircraft. Strip mapsmarked with planned targets enable personnel (other thanforward observers) to request fires. Coordination with firedirection centers (FDC) capable of providing fire along theroute of movement ensures that forward observers can enterthe FDC net, make routine location reports, and request andadjust fires. Call signs, frequencies, authentications, areasof possible employment, schedules of movement, and targetnumbers are coordinated.

(3) Aircraft. Experience has shown that the presence ofaircraft deters ambushes. Column movement covered bytraveling overwatch or bounding overwatch attack helicopters,in conjunction with a route reconnaissance by scouthelicopters or fixed-wing strike aircraft, maybe requested.Planning includes the type, number, and method of employ-ment of aircraft. Methods of employment include columncover, air alert, and ground alert. Column cover by fighter

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FM 90-8

aircraft is expensive in terms of crew fatigue and equipmentmaintenance; therefore, light observation-type aircraft thatcan direct on-call air support are used for short movementsover frequently used routes in more secure areas. When airsupport is planned, communications information concerningradio frequencies, call signs, and identification procedures isprovided to all who may need to use them. In addition, thesupporting air unit knows the maneuver intentions of theground element in case of ambush.

(4) Route clearing. This operation may be conducted beforecertain critical movements. The use of route-clearingoperations depends upon the availability of troops, theimportance of the movement, and the guerrilla threat withinthe area. Normally the units responsible for the area throughwhich the movement will pass are used in route-clearingoperations. These route-clearing forces normally includeboth mounted and dismounted elements. In addition to athorough reconnaissance of the main route of movement,critical terrain near the route is secured. This maybe done byplacing pickets along critical stretches of the route or byselective placement of tactical units.

(5) Reserves. Reserves (ready forces) are vital to counteringambushes. The guerrilla must be convinced that ambushesproduce a fast, relentless, hard-hitting response by counter-guerrilla supporting forces, to include airstrikes and groundpursuit. Prior to a movement, reserve force commanders andaviators are briefed on the general area of operations;landing areas, known and suspected guerrilla locations, andcommunications are emphasized. If the distance to becovered from a single location prevents quick reaction,reserve ready forces are designated in successive areas. (Forfurther information on movement security, see Appendix G.)

3-53. Motor movement.

a . Special escort attachments may not be available to support allmotor movements; therefore, many convoys must be prepared tosecure themselves for part or all of the distance. When a maneuverunit is designated to provide escort for a vehicle convoy, elementsof the unit provide escort through their respective areas ofresponsibility. Armor or armored cavalry units are ideally suitedto provide convoy escorts. Reconnaissance of the route immediatelyprior to the passage of the convoy is desirable. When a single unitis to provide escort through other units’ areas of responsibility,the single unit coordinates closely with those other units to ensureadequate fire support and available reinforcements duringpassage of the convoy.

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Since there is seldom time to issue orders during an ambush, thesecurity detachment’s actions are planned and, when possible,rehearsed by drills prior to the movement.

c . Convoy command responsibility is clearly fixed throughout thechain of command. The commander and as many of hissubordinates as possible are briefed on the latest informationabout the area through which they are to pass. The commanderformulates his plans and issues his orders to include formation,intervals between echelons and vehicles, rate of travel, anddetailed plans for action if a guerrilla force attacks the convoy. Allpersonnel board their vehicle in such a way that they candismount rapidly into predrilled formations. Arms and ammunitionare readied for immediate action, and vehicle commanders areresponsible for keeping personnel alert (Figure 3-1 ).

d. Convoys may be escorted by reconnaissance aircraft or attackhelicopters and may have tactical air support on call. The use ofreconnaissance Army aircraft to survey routes immediately

b.

forward of a convoy often provides early warning of danger. -

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3-54. Armor and cavalry movement.

a. During movements, unit vehicles and equipment are arranged tofacilitate their employment upon contact with, or interferencefrom, the enemy. Traveling, traveling overwatch, and boundingoverwatch techniques are used in movement. (See FM 71-2 forarmor ground movement security techniques, and FM 17-95 forcavalry movement techniques.)

Air cavalry can be used to provide column cover and to give earlywarning of hostile activity. Security measures are employed tokeep the enemy from learning of the movement or its destinationonce the column has begun moving.

b.

c . Terrain and weather permitting, aground security force (advanceguard, flank security, and/or rear guards) are used to providesecurity. When terrain precludes the use of these ground securityelements, air cavalry may perform these activities as part of thesecurity mission.

3-55. Rail movement.a. Mission. The primary mission of train personnel and combat or

security troops is to get the train to its destination.

b . Concept. As long as the train continues to move, controlremains with the train crew; however, if an ambush or firefightdevelops and the train is unable to disengage by movementforward or backward, the escort commander takes command andundertakes defense of the train with all available personnel. Ifthere is no escort, the senior military member aboard takescommand. Radio communications are used to call for assistance.Security detachments guarding the right of way have their owncommunication system which may be tied into the railwaycommunication system, when required.

c . Organization. Railway installations and rail traffic are securedby establishing defined areas of responsibility. Standingoperating procedures on organization for rail movement arenormally published by the highest level of command. Railsecurity is coordinated with area and tactical commands whichprovide support.

d . Operations. Armored trains may be used for patrolling trackwhere guerrilla activity may be expected. Armored trains operatetactically under orders of the appropriate military commander.Since the operation of an armored train is quite different from thatof other trains, the military transportation service assigns aspecially selected train crew. This crew coordinates the trainmovement with that of other trains and with proper regard for thetactical situation. Railway gondolas may be prepared for defense

3-41

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by piling sandbags on the floor and at the sides and by mountingmachine guns, mortars, and rocket launchers. These cars mustnot be placed next to cars containing gasoline, ammunition, orother flammables. Locomotives should be preceded by two or morecars loaded with sandbags, rocks, or scrap material for protectionagainst mines and obstructions. On a single-track rail divisionsubject to guerrilla attack, the positive-block method of operationsis employed. In this method of operation, a following train is notpermitted to enter a block until the preceding train has cleared it.This permits the train in the block, if attacked, to back up ifnecessary and to receive reinforcements by train from eitherdirection.

3-56. Water movement and riverine operations.Counterguerrilla operations may be conducted in large inundatedareas (lakes, coastal waters, flooded delta areas, and inland waterways)which are inhabited by large population segments and which havelimited, or no, rail and road nets. The ability of the counterguerrillaforce to operate in these areas is a requirement for successful missions.(See FM 31-11 and FM 31-12 for amphibious operations.)

a . Mission and concept. Boats may be used to perform a variety oftactical as well as logistical tasks. Waterway movement of troopsand supplies is planned and conducted in much the same manneras mounted movements on land; however, special characteristicsof water transportation must be considered. The counterguerrillaforce may participate in riverine operations along with hostcountry regular forces (particularly naval forces), paramilitaryforces, US Army waterborne transportation forces, and US navalforces.

b. Organization. When a large waterborne force moves, it adopts amarch formation similar to a ground convoy. Advance and rearguards in boats are organized. Flank security maybe provided bypatrols in boats in adjacent streams or on foot on the banks.Unlike ground convoy procedures, movement is not necessarily infile or column formation. The formation depends upon thepurpose of the movement, the strength of the friendly force, andthe width of the stream. It is based on the same considerations asthose for combat formations on land, to include control, security,flexibility, speed of reaction, observation, and fields of fire.

c . Operations.

(1) Waterways afford little cover and concealment. Power-drivenboats are noisy and attract attention. Boats can be seen andfired on easily in daylight, but this disadvantage can bereduced by night movement and by traveling close to thestream banks where shadow and overhead branches aid

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concealment. Boats must go to or near the shore to unload,thus affecting the reaction time in case of an ambush.Landing operations may be difficult because of unfavorablecharacteristics along the banks. Transported troops shouldbe assigned firing positions on board their vessels fordefense against ambush. The transported units shouldposition the maximum number of crew-served weapons onboard to engage enemy on the near bank or both banks of thewaterway.

(2) Combinations of blocking, attacking, and screening tacticalactions can be devised by the counterguerrilla force utilizingthe mobility of naval forces (river assault groups) and airassault units. Teamwork between ground forces movingalong river banks, and supporting naval craft firepower andfloating artillery, can result in successful operations againstguerrilla forces in water areas.

(3) The amount of time required for planning increases with thesize of the force involved. Planning should be as detailed astime permits, but quick reaction is necessary to capitalize oncurrent intelligence.

Planning includes:(4)

(a) Reducing all planning facets of embarking anddebarking of troops and equipment to SOP.

Integrating and combining plans for US, allied, andhost country military forces and civilian agencies.

(b)

(c) Facilitating command and control means to unifycommand and coordination of fires and other support.

(d) Reducing rehearsals to a minimum, based on habitualemployment; reducing activities to SOP; reducingequipment and logistical requirements.

Obtaining detailed intelligence from the populationand civilian police.

(e)

(f) Obtaining information on currents and tides atH-hour, beach conditions, and conditions of banks orshores for exit routes.

(5) Crew-served weapons transported on water craft must be inposition at all times to engage guerrilla ambush forces.

3-57. Foot and air movement.

a. Foot movement. Dismounted movements by small units areplanned and conducted using the principles for patrolling; for

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larger units, the principles for movement to contact will apply(FM 7-8, FM 7-10, and FM 7-20).

b . Air movement. Air movements are an integral part of counter-guerrilla operations. The principles governing security of suchmovements are contained in FM 7-10, FM 7-20, and FM 90-4.

3-58. Border operations.

a. While operations to control borders are normally a civiliansecurity agency mission, the brigade may be required toparticipate in these operations by reinforcing or assumingresponsibility for border surveillance and control.

b. Brigades conducting or supporting consolidation or strikeoperations may become involved in border control activities. Insome cases, the scope and combat requirements of controlling aborder may make border operations more a tactical than a civiliansecurity force problem, and may require the conduct of successivestrike operations by the brigade in its area of operations.

(1) Purpose. Border control operations require effectivemeasures to secure extensive land border or seacoast areasand to preclude communication and supply operations (toinclude aerial resupply) between an external sponsoringpower and guerrilla forces.

(a) Concept. In Phase I insurgency, operations in borderareas are normally a function of police, customs, andother government organizations. Armed and paramili-tary forces may assist these organizations, particularlyin remote areas. In Phases II and III, denial of externalsupport for the insurgency may require combatoperations in border areas. These operations requireclose coordination and cooperation between the armedforces, paramilitary forces, and all governmentagencies involved. Physically sealing the border maynot be possible since it could require the commitment ofmore government forces and materiel than overallnational resources permit. Since placing forces andbarriers at all possible crossings or entry sites maybeimpossible, priorities should be established. Naturalbarriers must be used wherever possible. Using patrols,sensors, and obstacles in selected areas increases theeffectiveness of natural barriers. Barrier and denialoperations are established after careful considerationof the threat, the environment, and the location of theinfiltrator’s probable targets and methods of oper-ation.

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( b )

( c )

(d)

Organization. National border forces may be com-posed of border police and guards and may includeparamilitary forces and regular armed forces withsupporting or direct responsibility for portions of theinternational border.

Command and control. Border operations areplanned, directed, and supervised from the nationallevel. Authority to conduct these operations may bedelegated to subnational and other area commanders.

Structuring. Border task forces are tailored unitsdesigned to meet requirements in their assigned areas.They should contain sufficient combat support andcombat service support elements to support operationsfor extended periods.

(2) Operations.

(a) Restricted zones or friendly population buffer zonescan be established if needed. Either of these operations,which could require relocating many persons, must becarefully planned. Although armed forces may assist,civil authorities normally are responsible for planningand carrying out a relocation program. Forced relocationis held to a minimum. The 1949 Geneva Conventionsprohibit forced population resettlement unless there isclear military necessity.

(b) While specific portions of an international land borderor shoreline maybe placed under effective surveillanceand control by use of static security posts, reserveforces, ground and aerial observers, electronic listeningposts, and patrols, the continuous surveillance andcontrol of an extensive land border or shoreline isdifficult. Since it may not be possible to place brigadeforces at all the crossing or landing sites, a prioritysystem for the sites requiring military forces isestablished.

(3) Surveillance. Continuous and detailed surveillance isrequired to determine infiltration and exfiltration routes andsupport sites, frequency and volume of traffic, type oftransportation, number and type of personnel, amount andtype of materiel, terrain and traffic conditions, and theprobable location of base areas and sanctuaries. Surveillanceand control of extensive coastal areas normally require theuse of coordinated ground patrols on the shoreline, coordinatedoffshore patrols, aerial surveillance, strategic observationposts along the shoreline, and an effective system of

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licensing and identifying friendly military and civilianwatercraft.

(4) Military operations. Border units establish operationalsupport bases at battalion and company levels to directoperations. Aviation, signal, engineer, and fire supportaugmentation usually is required. These are normally foundin the brigade support base if not augmenting subordinateunits.

(5) Border control methods. Two operational concepts forthe control of extensive land borders are the restricted zoneand the friendly population buffer.

(a) Restricted zone. Under this concept, an area ofpredetermined width along the border is declared arestricted zone. Appropriate proclamations are issuedto the population so that everyone understands thatany individual or group encountered in the zone will beconsidered as an element of the guerrilla force,paramilitary force, or similar organization. So far aspracticable, the restricted zone is cleared of vegetationand other obstacles to observation over the area.Earth-moving equipment may be used for this purpose.Defoliants, if authorized, may also be used for thispurpose, but this should be considered when no othermethod is feasible. Since the clearance of the zonealong the entire border is normally not feasible, apriority of areas for clearance is usually necessary. Therestricted zone is controlled by the use of ground andaerial observers, electronic sensor devices, listeningposts, patrols, mines, and obstacles. It is preferablethat these activities be conducted by host country civilpolice and paramilitary forces to economize on theavailable regular armed forces’ combat power whichcan be better utilized in tactical operations.

(b) Friendly population buffer. The civilian populationin the area of operations is redistributed as necessaryto ensure that all civilians residing near the border aresympathetic to the host country government. This mayentail the screening of all persons settled along theborder, relocation of those persons of doubtful sympathy,and supplementary resettlement of the border areawith friendly elements of the civilian population. Thisconcept provides a potential informant net along theborder, it provides friendly local civilians for employmentin self-defense units to control the border area, and itdenies potential civilian contacts and houses of refugefor use by the guerrillas in border-crossing activities.

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Relocation of civilians is a sensitive legal and politicalissue and should be undertaken with host countryauthority in compliance with host country law. USpersonnel should not be actively involved. US relocationactivities in an international conflict environmentmust comply with applicable provisions of GenevaConventions IV. Relocation operations must be pre-ceded by detailed economic, social, psychological, andpolitical preparation so the socio-economic stability ofthe area is not endangered by the shifts in population.The conduct of these operations without such preparationcan result in such undesirable effects in the area aspolitical instability, extensive unemployment, inequitiesin land distribution, inadequate public utilities,inadequate housing, and intermingling of populationwith conflicting religious beliefs and social mores.

(6) Waterline borders. In addition to use of restricted zonesand friendly population buffers, as discussed above for landborders, the surveillance and control of extensive coastalareas and shorelines normally require the use of:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

Coordinated ground patrols on the shoreline.

Coordinated offshore sea patrols of the shoreline andriver delta areas.

Reinforcing aerial, visual, and photographic surveillanceof the offshore waters and the shoreline.

Observation posts along the shoreline in the vicinity ofriver mouths, ground lines of communication, andaccessible portions of the shoreline.

An effective system of licensing and identifying allfriendly military and civilian watercraft using theoffshore waters.

Effective, centralized control and coordination of allthese activities.

(7) Sanctuaries. Guerrillas may establish base camps andconduct cross-border operations from countries adjacent tothe host country. They will take advantage of an internationalboundary to launch operations or evade pursuit withimpunity. Commanders operating in border areas mustrespect the sanctity of international boundaries, but theycan conduct combat operations against the guerrilla forceonce it crosses back over the border. Ambush patrols are anexcellent means of dealing with guerrillas who attempt touse an international border as a sanctuary.

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3-59. Urban operations.

a. Operations in an urban environment require different emphasisand different techniques than those in rural areas. The presenceof many people and the characteristics of the area influence bothinsurgent and government operations. During Phases I and II,these areas are usually unfavorable for guerrilla operations.Guerrillas will not normally fight in these areas; however, otherinsurgent elements in the urban areas may incite rioting, useterrorist tactics, or seize portions of the city and key facilities.Armed forces may be required to reinforce police in combattingriots and disorders provoked by the insurgents. Tacticaloperations may be necessary if the guerrillas take direct action toseize urban areas or critical installations within them. This mayoccur in smaller urban areas during Phase II, and may occur inlarge urban areas in the later stages of Phase III. (FM 90-10discusses tactical operations in urban areas. FM 19-15 discussescivil disturbances.)

b . The population density requires emphasis on the use of nonlethalweapons and the careful use of weapons of destruction when forceis necessary. The application of “minimum essential force” tominimize loss of life and destruction of property requires detailedplanning, coordination, and control.

c . Covert insurgent activity is extensive in urban areas. Thegovernment must emphasize intelligence and police operations tocounter clandestine organizational, intelligence, logistical, andterrorist activities. IDAD operations in urban areas maybe partof a consolidation campaign.

d . Urban areas are critical and require a continuing IDAD effortwhether or not they are included in a specific campaign. Militaryforces should participate in IDAD planning and operations inurban areas during all phases of insurgency to be prepared toassist other national security and law enforcement agencies ifsituations requiring military forces develop.

(1) Operational environment. The characteristics of anurban area normally include:(a) A large, concentrated population.(b) Government facilities.(c) Industrial complexes.(d) Communications facilities.

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(e) Transportation terminals.

(f) Storage facilities.

(g) Food markets.

FM 90-8

(h) Medical facilities.

(i) Public utilities.

(j) Educational centers.

(k) Ethnic, religious, and economic groups.

(l) Man-made features (multistory buildings and subter-ranean facilities).

(m) Police force, paramilitary force, and other law en-forcement agencies.

(2) Government activity. Urban areas need more governmentfunctions and services than rural areas. This requires moreand possibly larger government organizations for operations.The activities and capabilities of all government agenciesshould be considered in planning and executing IDADoperations.

(3) Subversive activities. A subversive element intent ondestroying the government may strain the capabilities oflocal authorities. The insurgents will attempt to exploit localcivilian organizations by subverting their goals andobjectives. They will try to place them in opposition to thegovernment. Terrorist activities and psychological operationswill take place along with covert insurgent organizational,intelligence, and logistical operations. Police, internalsecurity, and other government organizations will be highpriority targets of the insurgents.

(4) Operations. Operations require careful planning andcoordination, particularly those operations involvingapplication of force. Military forces designated to provideassistance, if needed, make plans and prepare to implementthem. Military forces must be able to communicate withpolice and other agencies involved in the operations. Theymust collect and have readily available detailed informationon area characteristics and critical installations.

(5) Tactical operations.

( a ) Tactical operations may be required inside or near anurban area to defeat an insurgent attack. Any insurgentattempt to seize and hold an urban area will probablyinvolve operations in nearby areas as well. When thepolice and other internal security forces can cope withthe attack inside the urban area, military forces canbest participate by establishing security around theurban area and by denying the insurgent reinforcementor support. When military forces are required toreinforce police or defeat insurgent forces inside the

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FM 90-8

urban area, operations must be closely controlled andcoordinated. Military forces should be withdrawn assoon as police forces can handle the situation.

(b) When an urban area has been seized by insurgentforces, an evaluation must be made from both a tacticaland psychological perspective whether to recapture itusing major military force or using other techniques.The amount of force and the specific techniques to beused to recapture the area are decided based on theprobable psychological impact on the enemy, noncom-batant civilians, and friendly troops; the safety ofcivilians and friendly troops; the destruction ofbuildings; and the military forces available. Theprinciple of “minimum essential force” will help reducecasualties in the noncombatant civilian population.

(c) Riot control munitions can be used against targets sothat military forces can close with and capture theenemy with minimum injury to the noncombatants.Operations may be in the form of assistance to civilianpolice. In any event, military operations must becoordinated with the civilian police. (For informationon combat in fortified and built-up areas, see FM 90-10and FM 90-10-1.)

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