Country Report Fiji - V-DemFiji is a former British colony. The country gained independence in 1970...

I N S T I T U T E

COUNTRY BRIEFFIJI

Marina PovitkinaValeriya Mechkova

Country BriefSERIES 2016:08

THE VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE

June 2016

Please address comments and/or queries for information to:

V-Dem Institute

Department of Political Science

University of Gothenburg

Sprängkullsgatan 19, PO Box 711

SE 40530 Gothenburg

Sweden

E-mail: [email protected]

V-Dem Country Briefs are available in electronic format at www.v-dem.net.

Copyright © 2016 University of Gothenburg, V-Dem Institute. All rights reserved.

V-Dem Data Brief Fiji

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About V-Dem Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is a new approach to conceptualizing andmeasuringdemocracy. V-Dem’smultidimensional and disaggregated approach acknowledges thecomplexityof the conceptofdemocracy. TheV-Demprojectdistinguishesamong fivehigh-level principles of democracy: electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, andegalitarian, which are disaggregated into lower-level components and specificindicators.

KeyfeaturesofV-Dem:

• Provides reliable data on five high-level principles and 22 lower-levelcomponentsofdemocracysuchasregularelections,judicialindependence,directdemocracy,andgenderequality,consistingofmorethan400distinctandpreciseindicators;

• Covers all countries and dependent territories from 1900 to the present andprovidesanestimateofmeasurementreliabilityforeachrating;

• Makesallratingspublic,freeofcharge,throughauser-friendlyinterface.With four Principal Investigators, two Project Coordinators, fifteen Project Managers,morethanthirtyRegionalManagers,almost200CountryCoordinators,severalAssistantResearchers,andapproximately2,600CountryExperts,theV-Demprojectisoneofthelargest-ever social science data collection projectswith a database of over 15milliondata points. The database makes highly detailed analysis of virtually all aspects ofdemocracy in a country, while also allowing for summary comparisons betweencountries based on aggregated indices for different dimensions of democracy. UsersfromanywhereareabletousetheV-Demonlineanalysistoolswhichcanbefoundattheproject’swebsite.Governments,developmentagencies,andNGOscanbenefit fromthenuanced comparative and historical data when informing critical decisions such asselectingcountryprogrampriorities,informingprogramdesignsandmonitoringimpactoftheirprograms.

Methodology:

Unlikeextantdatacollectionprojects,whichtypicallyuseasmallgroupofexpertswhorate all countries or ask a single expert to code one country, the V-Dem project hasrecruitedover2,600 localandcross-nationalexperts toprovide judgmentsonvariousindicators about democracy. The V-Dem dataset is created by combining factualinformation from existing data sources about constitutional regulations and de juresituationwithexpert codingfor questions that require evaluation.Experts’ratingsareaggregated through an advanced statistical model that takes into account thepossibilities that expertsmaymakemistakes and have different scales inmindwhencoding.Inaddition,bridge-coders-expertswhocodemultiplecountries-arerecruitedtocalibratethescalesofestimatescross-nationally1.

1ForfurtherdetailsandinformationabouttheV-Demmethodology,seehttp://v-dem.net.


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Fiji

Introduction This V-Demdata brief illustrates the democratic development of Fiji from 1900 to 2014. Thepurpose is to provide a concise overview of the V-Dem data collected for Fiji. The historicaldevelopment of the five V-Dem principles of democracy - electoral, liberal, egalitarian,deliberative and participatory – is analyzed, accompanied by an overview of the female rightsindex.Inaddition,thebriefdelvesfurtherintothedifferentcomponentsanddetailedindicatorsofthemainprinciplesofdemocracy2.Weanticipatethatthisbriefwillbeausefulresourceforpolicy-makers,practitionersandcitizen-leddemocracyassessments.

Fiji is a formerBritish colony.The country gained independence in1970when a constitutionestablishingparliamentarydemocracywith theBritishmonarchasheadof statewasadopted.General elections have been taking place throughout the time period explored althoughwithlimitedsuffrageupto1963.

Sinceindependence,periodsofmoredemocraticdevelopmentshavealternatedwithinstability,including coups and constitutional crises. The democratic process was first interrupted bymilitary coups in May and September 1987 when the Parliament was dissolved. Fiji wasdeclaredaRepublicandanewconstitutionwasadoptedin1990. Politicalinstabilityoccurredagain in early 2000when armedmen occupied Parliament and the PrimeMinister and otherdeputies were held hostage. This led to the military taking over control of the country andinstallinganinterimadministration.Afourthcoupafterindependencewasledbythemilitaryin2006andresultedinaneight-yearperiodoftransitionupto2014whenelectionswereheld.

Principles of Democracy TheradarchartinFigure1,givesanoverviewofthefiveV-DemindicesofdemocracyforFijiatfourdifferentpointsintime:1905,1950,1995and2014.Allindicesinthefigurerangefrom0to1,where a score of 0 suggests that a country did not evince the characteristics of democracyrelevant to thisparticular indexat thispoint in time,while1corresponds to thebestpossiblesituationforthisindex,accordingtotheV-Demmeasures.

In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, the electoral component of democracy is fundamental andunderstoodasanessentialelementoftheotherprinciplesofrepresentativedemocracy–liberal,participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian; without it, we cannot call a regime “democratic”.However, we recognize that countries can have “democratic qualities”, without beingdemocracies. As a result, the aggregation formulae for all high-level principles of democracyincludethemeasureofelectoraldemocracy.Thus, forexample, “ParticipatoryDemocracy” isacompositescoreoftheelectoralandintheparticipatorycomponents.

2AllindicatorsandindicescanbefoundinGlossaryofTermsinAppendixI.Foranoverviewofthestructureofthe

indices,pleaseseeAppendixII.


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Figure 1. Principles of Democracy Indices

Ascanbeseen in the figure, the levelofdemocraticdevelopment incolonialFiji issparseandreflectedintheratingsfor1905and1950whichvaryfrom.05forthelowestscoringprinciple-participatory democracy, to .19 for the highest – electoral democracy. 25 years afterindependence,substantialdemocraticgainshavebeenmadeintheareasofelectoral,egalitariananddeliberativedemocracy.Thismeansthattherehasbeensomeadvancementintermsofthefollowing aspects of democracy: rulers being held responsible by citizens through electoralcompetition and political and civil society organizations’ ability to operate freely in anenvironmentof freedomof expression (electoral democracy); achieving equality among socialgroups in termsof representation, agenda-settingpower,protectionby the law, and influenceover policymaking (egalitarian democracy); and finally, having wide deliberation whenimportant policy changes are being considered (deliberative democracy). However, electoraldemocracyistheonlyprincipleforwhichFijicrossestheupperhalfofthescale.Moremodest democratic improvement during this period takes place in terms of both liberaland participatory democracy principles, which are also the poorest performing principles in2014.Theliberalandparticipatoryprinciplesfocusontheprotectionofindividualandminorityrights,ruleoflawandbalanceofpower;andachievingdirectruleandcitizenparticipationinthepoliticalprocess.

InFijithedemocraticlevelsareapproximatelyonthesamelevelsin2014astheywerein1995with the exception for thedeliberative componentwhich shows slightly lower scores in2014thanitdidin1995.In2014,amongallprinciples,Fijiscoredthehighestinelectoraldemocracyandthelowestintermsoftheparticipatoryprincipleofdemocracy.

InFigure2below,welookfurtherintotheaforementionedindicesandgraphthecomponentsthatgointothefivehigherlevelprincipleindicesofdemocracy:theelectoral,liberal,egalitarian,participatoryanddeliberativeaspects.ThedevelopmentofthesecomponentsinFijiovermorethanonehundredyearsisdisplayedtogetherwiththefemalerightsindex3. 3 The scale of each index and indicator is specifiedwithin parentheses in the legend of each graph. In all indicators and indicesgraphed, a lower score corresponds to a lessdemocratic level,while ahigher score suggests amoredemocratic level. Please seeAppendixIformoreinformationoneachoftheindicatorsandindices.

00,20,40,60,81

ElectoralDemocracy

LiberalDemocracy

ParticipatoryDemocracy

DeliberativeDemocracy

EgalitarianDemocracy

1905

1950

1995

2014


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From thebeginningof the time seriesup to independence,Fiji receivesmoreor less constantscoresonalldemocracycomponentswithfourmeasuresaroundthemiddleofthescaleandtwoclosetothebottom.ThiscouldbeinterpretedassuggestingthatcolonialruleprovidedFijiwithsome democratic qualities, especially in terms of the liberal aspects, but also including a fairshare of gender equality, deliberative qualities and egalitarian aspects. Electoral qualities andparticipatoryaspectswereparticularlysuppressed.

Thefluctuatingscoresinthepost-independenceperiodreflectthevolatilepoliticalhistoryofthecountryasdescribed in the introduction.Followingthe first17yearsofsomewhatdemocraticprogress, coups in 1987, 2000 and 2006, as well as the constitutional crisis in 2009, causedsignificantdropsinseveraloftheindices.Thisisespeciallytruefortheelectoralandtheliberalindices. Because they constricted liberal aspects, the power-holders post-independence havedifferedfromthecolonialgovernors.

Thetwoareasthatweretheleastaffectedbymilitaryinterventionswerefemalerightsandtheegalitarianaspectsofdemocracy.Bothoftheseareasincreasedaround1965andcameclosetothesamescoreof.7in2014.

Thedeliberativecomponentisthefirstonetodevelopmoresubstantiallyhistorically,reachingascore of around .8 in 1970. However, on this measure Fiji currently scores around .6 afterexperiencinganumberofhitsthatcoincidewiththepoliticaldisruptionswhichhaveoccurredinthecountry,althoughanincreasecanbenotedinthelastyearsofthetimeseries.Similarly, intermsofelectoralandliberalcomponents,Fijiendsupwithascoreof.6,abitabovethemiddleofthe index scale indicating an improvement in terms of the democratic qualities across thesethreeareas.

In the following section we further explore each of the six components of democracy bygraphing the indicators and indices which constitute them in order to identify more specificaspectswithinthesevariousdemocraticdevelopments.

The Electoral Component The V-Dem electoral democracy component index measures the core value of achievingresponsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism ofcompetitive and periodic elections that are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic


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irregularities;whetherpoliticalandcivilsocietyorganizationscanoperatefreely;andwhetherthe chief executiveof a country is selected (directlyor indirectly) throughelections.Figure3displaysthefoursub-indicesthatconstitutetheelectoralcomponentindex.

ThefreedomofassociationindexinFigure3receivesconsistentscoresabove.6,althoughdropsarenoted,especiallyafter2006.ThisreflectsthatFijianpartieshavebeenallowedtoformandparticipate in elections and that, to some extent, civil society organizations have been able tooperatefreelysincethebeginningofthe20thcentury.Therelativelyhighscoresfortheseissue-areas could indicate that these are not the main areas that colonial and subsequent non-democraticrulershaverestricted.

Whenitcomestocleanelections,and,thus,totheextenttowhichregistrationfraud,systematicirregularities and vote buying are absent, colonial rulers have kept elections undermoderateauthoritariancontrolasthescoresaround.5suggest.However,thedropstotheverybottomofthe scale after independence reflect the three interruptions on the electoral regime in Fiji.Recently, thesituationhas improvedas isreflected in the .6rating forcleanlinessofelections,althoughthequalityofelectionscouldstillbeimproved.

Asportrayedbythesuffrageindicator,theelectionsinFijiuptothe1960swerehighlyexclusive.In 1963 indigenous Fijianswere granted the right to vote,women’s suffragewas introduced,incomeandpropertyrightswereabolished.However,literacyqualificationsremained.The elected executive index measures whether the chief executive is elected through popularelections. The scores during the colonial rule reflect the fact that the executive is not heldresponsivethroughelectoralcompetitionforthisperiod.Thevolatilehistoryofthecountryandthe occurring coups are also reflected in this indicator by drops of the data to 0. In 2014,however,afternewelectionswereheld,thisindicatorreacheditshighestscoreof1.

It shouldalsobenoted thatFiji adoptedanewconstitution in2013,which is reflected in thesteepincreasesforthethreeofthefourindicators.


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The Liberal Component The liberal dimension of democracy embodies the intrinsic value of protecting individual andminorityrightsfromapotential“tyrannyofthestateandthemajority.”Thisisachievedthroughconstitutionallyprotectedcivillibertiesandstrongruleoflaw,andeffectivechecksandbalancesbythejudiciaryandthelegislaturethatlimittheuseofexecutivepower.

Figure 4 shows similar developments for the indices equality before the law and individualliberty and legislative constraints on the executive over time, while the index for judicialconstraintsontheexecutivedemonstratesadownwardtrend,particularlywiththecoupin1987.

Thelevelsofequalitybeforethelawandindividualliberty,withascoreforFijiofjustunder.7in2014, demonstrate that, to some degree, laws are transparent and rigorously enforced, thepublicadministrationisimpartialandthatcitizenscangenerallyenjoyaccesstojustice,secureproperty rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights,and/orfreedomofreligion.

The legislative constraints on the executive index,measures the extent towhich the legislatureand government agencies are capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversightover theexecutive.The increase from .4 to .6 camewith independence in1970, and the samelevelissustainedfortheperiodsduringwhichthelegislatureexists.Themissingdataduringtheelectoral interruptions reflects the fact that, during those periods, legislature is either closeddownoraborted,whichiswhynolegislativeoversightcouldbeexercised.

Theextenttowhichtheexecutiverespectstheconstitutionandcomplieswithrulings,aswellasthe extent to which the judiciary is able to act independently are measured in the index ofjudicial constraintson theexecutive. In this index,Fiji endsupona levelof .4 in2014, leavingsignificantroomforimprovementinthisaspectofliberaldemocracy.

The Participatory Component The participatory dimension of democracy embodies the values of direct rule and activeparticipationbycitizensinallpoliticalprocesses;itemphasizesnon-electoralformsofpolitical


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participationthroughsuchchannelsascivilsocietyorganizationsandthroughthemechanismsofdirectdemocracy.

Figure 5 displays the four sub-indices that go into the participatory democracy component,whichhadthelowestvaluesofallthedimensionsinFigure2.Thepresentgraphsuggeststhatthe situation in Fiji, with regards to participatory aspects, is best in terms of civil societyparticipation. This variablemeasures, among other things,whether policymakers consult civilsociety organizations. The score of slightly above .5 suggests that while there is room forimprovement in thisaspectofparticipatorydemocracy, thesituationhasmoved inanupwardtrendsinceindependence.

ItisworthnotingthatforFiji,directpopularvote,whichreferstoaprocessbywhichcitizenscanregister their opinion on a certain issue through referendums or plebiscites, and regionalgovernment, which measures whether regional governments exist and are able to operatewithout interference from unelected bodies, are both close to the bottom on the V-Demmeasures.The lowscores for theregionalgovernment index suggest that thecountrydoesnothave elected regional governments. Hence, the ideal of elected and autonomous regionalgovernments,withtheability toactwithout interference fromunelectedregionalbodies is farfromachieved.TheabsenceofalineforlocalgovernmentisunfortunatelyduetomissingdataonthisindexforFijiduringtheperiod.

The Deliberative Component The deliberative component of democracy captures the core value that political decisions areguidedbythepursuitof thepublicgoodandshouldbe informedbyrespectfulandreasonabledialogueatalllevelsratherthanbyemotionalappeals,solidaryattachments,parochialinterests,orcoercion.


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Note, that the indicators displayed in Figures 6, 7 and 8 have different scales, which arespecifiedinparenthesesinthelegendofeachfigure.

Figure 6 shows that the five variables constituting this component follow a common trendmarkedprimarilybyan increasewith independence in1970and thecoups interruptingmoredemocraticruleinthefollowingperiod.

Theindicatorforreasonedjustification(greenline),rangingfrom0to3,measureswhetherthepolitical elites provide public justifications for their positionswhen important policy changesare considered. In 2014, Fiji has achieved a level where qualified justification takes place,meaning that elites tend tooffer at least a simple reason justifyingwhy theproposedpoliciescontributetoordetractfromanoutcome.Thesamelevel,around2,issustainedthroughoutthewholeperiodgraphed,withsignificantdropsoccurringinconjunctionwiththemilitarycoups.

Similarvalues in themiddleof therangearemeasuredby the commongood indicator(purpleline),which captures the extent towhich political elites justify their positions in terms of thecommon good. According to the V-Dem data as of 2014, justifications made by elites to thecitizens, policy choices are based on a mixture of references to constituency/party/ groupinterestsandonappealstothecommongood.

The respect counterarguments indicator (orange line) examines the extent to which politicalelitesacknowledgeandrespectcounterarguments.ThescoreforFijiisjustabove2in2014,onthescalerangingto5.Thissuggeststhatelitestendtoacknowledgecounterargumentsbutthenexplicitly degrade them by making a negative statement about them or the individuals andgroups that propose them. Hence, this aspect of political deliberation needs to receive moreattention inorder to achieve ahigher level of respect for counterargumentswithin thepublicdebate.

The indicatorsengagedsociety (blue line)andrangeofconsultation (red line)bothrecordedadropfrom2005,buthaveexperiencedslightincreasesagaininrecentyears.Theengagedsocietyindicatorcaptureshowwidespreadandindependentpublicdeliberationsare.Thescorein2014suggeststhat,tosomeextent,publicdeliberationdoestakeplaceandcanevenbeencouragedattimes,butitisneverthelessquiteinfrequent.Inaddition,astheredlineshows,theconsultationonimportantpolicychangescouldbeexpandedtoincludeawiderrangeofactorslikeleadersofoppositionparties,independentrepresentativesofdifferentsocietygroups,asthescoresaround2reveal.


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The engaged society (blue line) captures the breadth of public deliberations when importantpolicychangesarebeingconsidered,whichplaysanessentialroleinadeliberativedemocracy.In 2014 the indicator is moving towards a 3 on the scale, a rating which would suggest animproved situation in which public deliberations about major policy decisions are activelyencouragedandsomeautonomousnon-elitegroupsparticipate,but this is confined toasmallportionofspecializedgroups.

The Egalitarian Component The egalitarian idea is thatmaterial and immaterial inequalities inhibit the actual exercise offormalrightsandliberties;henceamoreequaldistributionofresources,education,andhealthacrosssocioeconomicgroupsshouldenhancepoliticalequality.

InFigure7 several of the variables display flat lines across the century on themedium levelvaluesaround2and3,whileothersexperiencemoredramaticchanges.

Thepowerdistributedbysocioeconomicpositionindicator(redline)hasnotchangedmuchovertime, except for an increase after independence. According to the data, wealthy people havemorepoliticalpowerthanothers.Peopleofaverageand lowincome,however,appeartohavesignificantinfluence,aswell.

Asshowninthegraph,powerdistributedbysocialgroup(blackline)hasimproveddramaticallyduringthepasttwoyearsafteradecreasearound2005,inwhichthescoredroppedtothesamelevel as during colonial rule in the beginning of the 20th century. Between 2006 and 2013political power was monopolized by several social groups comprising a minority of thepopulation.Followingtheincreasedscorein2013,however,allsocialgroupsnowpossesssomepoliticalpower,althoughsomegroupshavemorepowerthanothers.

Thevariablemeasuringpoliticalpowerdistributedbygender(greenline)reflectsimprovementswithindependencein1970andthenagainin1990.However,Fijiendsupbetween2-3in2014,indicating that men still have more political power than women. This is thus an area thatrequiresattentioninFiji.

Theindicatorsocialgroupequalityforcivilliberties(orangeline)showshowcivillibertiesacrosssocial groups have been at a constant level of 2 throughout the century, suggesting that


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members of some social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general

population.Thisstillleavesroomforsubstantialimprovementinthisaspectofdemocracy.

The level of health equality (purple line, almost hidden) in Fiji has been on the same levelthroughoutthecenturywithascoreofaround2.5.Educationalequality(darkblueline),ontheother hand, was at a significantly lower level in the beginning of the century, but has, after

gradual improvement in the 1960s and 70s, reached the same level as health equality. These

levels tell us that both health and education are becoming relatively equal. However, due to

poor-quality healthcare and education, ten to 25%of Fijians’ ability to exercise their political

rightsasadultcitizenshasbeenunderminedinmorerecentyears.

Particularistic or public goods (yellow line) refer to how spending is targeted in the nationalbudget.Particularisticspendingtargetsacertaingrouporsector,whilepublic-goodsspendingis

meanttobenefitall.Thegraphreflectsaconstantscorejustabove2throughouttheperiod.This

impliesthatthespendingisevenlydividedbetweenthetwotypesofgoods.

Theindicatormeans-testedvs.universalistic(lightblueline)captureshowwelfareprogramsaretargeted,namelywhethertheytargetunderprivilegedconstituentsonly(throughcash-transfer

programs, forexample)orwhethertheycanpotentiallybenefit theentirepopulation(e.g. free

education, national health care schemes, and retirement programs). In the V-Dem conceptual

scheme, welfare programs that benefit everyone and do not stigmatize certain unprivileged

groups,suchaspoorpeople,aremoredemocraticfromanegalitarianperspectivethanmeans-

testedprogramswhichtargetsolelytheseparticulargroups.Whenlookingatthedata,onecan

seethatalargechangetookplacewithindependencein1970.Thecolonialwelfarestatepolicies

are means-tested, whereas after independence, most of these policies became universalistic,

althoughaportionisstillmeans-tested.

Female Rights Equality betweenwomen andmen is indivisible from democracy at all levels, and is broadly

recognizedasapre-conditionfortrulyrepresentativeandresponsivegovernments.TheV-Dem

femalerightsindexfocusesontheabilityofwomentoparticipateinopendiscussionofpoliticalissues, to take part in civil society organizations, to have an equal share in the overall

distributionofpower,thefreedomofmovement,therighttoprivateproperty,accesstojustice,

andfreedomfromforcedlabor.Figure8displaysthesevenindicatorsthatconstitutethisindexforFiji.


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Asportrayed inFigure8, Fiji scores relativelyhighonmanyof the indicators, someofwhichhavenot changedmuchover time.ThevariableCSOwomen’s participation (red line) suggeststhatwomenarerarelypreventedfromparticipatingincivilsocietyorganizations.Withascoreof3,thefreedomofdiscussionforwomenindicator(purpleline)tellsusthatwomen’sabilitytotake part in political debates in the public and private sphere of Fiji, has been accepted to acertaindegreethroughoutthecentury,withoutanydramaticchanges.

The variable property rights for women (yellow line), with an almost constant level of 3throughouttheperiodofanalysis,indicatesthatmorethanhalfofthewomeninFijienjoymostpropertyrights,however,asmallershareofwomenstillhavemuchmorerestrictedrightsinthissense.

The distribution of power between women and men is depicted by the variable powerdistributedbygender(lightblueline).Itstartsoffatquitelowlevelsofcloseto1,indicatingthat,untilindependencein1970,menhadadominantholdonpoliticalpowerandwomenhadonlymarginalinfluence.Sincethebeginningofthe90s,however,thesituationhasimprovedsothatmenhaveonlyslightlymorepoliticalpowerthanwomen.

The freedomof domesticmovement forwomen (black line)wason a relativelyhigh level evenduringcolonialrule.Sinceindependencethevariablehasbeenatthetopofthescale,whichtellsus that, to a great extent, virtually allwomen are able tomove freely across the country andestablishresidency.

The freedom of forced labor indicator (orange line) reflects a colonial and independent Fijiansocietywhereforcedlaborhasbeenvirtuallynon-existent.

The score justbelow3on theaccess to justice indicator (green line), tells a storyof relativelysecureandeffectiveaccesstojusticeforwomenwhichisusuallyobserved.Hence,womenofFijican,toagreatextent,bringcasesbeforethecourtswithoutriskingtheirpersonalsafety.Theyusually have access to fair trials, and they have the effective ability to seek redress if publicauthoritiesviolatetheirrights.ThisisanotherpositiveaspectintermsofdemocraticqualitiesinFiji.


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Concluding Remarks Based on data from key V-Dem indices and indicators, this brief provides an overview of thedemocraticdevelopmentofFijifrom1900to2014.

Fiji’sindependencefromBritainandadoptionofthenewconstitutionin1970generallybroughtabout democratic enhancementwhich is reflectedwith higher scores on a number of graphs.Majorpoliticaleventsafterindependence,suchasthethreecoupsandtherecentconstitutionalcrisisin2009,ontheotherhand,havebarredfurtherdevelopmentofdemocracy.

Generally, the female rights index and the egalitarian component index are the areas ofdemocracy which are least affected by political turmoil frommore recent years. As a result,theseindicesandsomeoftheindicatorsconstitutingthemscorehigherthantheothermeasures.Thus, for example, women’s right to freely move in the country, participate in civil societyorganizationsandtheirfreedomfromforcedlaborhavebeenlargelyprotectedinrecentyears.Another interesting positive development worth noting is that there has been an increase inpowerdistributedbysocialgroup inrecentyears,afterbigdeficits in thisareaduringpreviousperiods.

Theparticipatorycomponentisthepoorestperformingcomponentwhichsuggeststhatcitizens’politicalparticipationanddirectruleinFijiisanareathatrequiresmorefocusedattention.Thegraphshavealsorevealedthatthedeliberativeprocesscouldbefurtherexpandedtoincludeawiderrangeofrepresentativesofthesocietyofferingdiverseopinions.Inaddition,securingfreeandfairelectionsandaneffectivebalanceofpowersbyprovidingoversightofthejudiciaryandlegislatureontheexecutivecouldbefurtherenhanced.


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Appendix I. List of variables. Thisisalistofalltheindicesandindicatorsincludedinthecountrybrief.

Itcontainsthequestionandthequestionalternativesaswellasinformationofaggregation,

scale,datareleaseandcitation.ThesecanalsobefoundintheV-Demcodebook.

VariablesincludedinFigure1.

Electoraldemocracyindex(D)(v2x_polyarchy)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheidealofelectoraldemocracyinitsfullestsenseachieved?Clarifications: Theelectoralprincipleofdemocracyseekstoembodythecorevalueofmaking

rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate’s

approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society

organizationscanoperatefreely;electionsarecleanandnotmarredbyfraudorsystematic

irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In

between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of

presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual

scheme,electoraldemocracyisunderstoodasanessentialelementofanyotherconceptionof

(representative)democracy–liberal,participatory,deliberative,egalitarian,orsomeother.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the sum of the

indices measuring freedom of association (thick) (v2x_frassoc_thick), suffrage (v2x_suffr),

clean elections (v2xel_frefair), elected executive (de jure) (v2x_accex) and freedom of

expression (v2x_freexp_thick); and, on the other, the five-way interaction between those

indices. This is halfway between a straight average and strictmultiplication,meaning the

averageof the two. It is thusacompromisebetweenthe twomostwellknownaggregation

formulas in the literature, both allowing "compensation" in one sub-component for lack of

polyarchy in the others, but also punishing countries not strong in one sub-component

accordingtothe"weakestlink"argument.TheaggregationisdoneatthelevelofDahlssub-

components (with the one exception of the non-electoral component). The index is

aggregatedusingthisformula:

v2x_polyarchy=

.1*v2x_suffr + .1*v2xel_frefair + .1*v2x_accex+ .1*v2x_frassoc_thick+ .1*v2x_freexp_thick+

.5*v2x_suffr*v2xel_frefair*v2x_accex*v2x_frassoc_thick*v2x_freexp_thick.

Scale:IntervalSources:v2x_freexp_thickv2x_EDcomp_thickDatarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Liberaldemocracyindex(D)(v2x_libdem)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheidealofliberaldemocracyachieved?Clarifications: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting

individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the

majority.Theliberalmodeltakesa“negative”viewofpoliticalpowerinsofarasitjudgesthe

qualityofdemocracybythelimitsplacedongovernment.Thisisachievedbyconstitutionally

protectedcivilliberties,strongruleoflaw,anindependentjudiciary,andeffectivechecksand

balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this a measure of

liberaldemocracy,theindexalsotakesthelevelofelectoraldemocracyintoaccount.Aggregation:Theindexisaggregatedusingthisformula:

v2x_libdem=

.25*v2x_polyarchy^1.6+.25*v2x_liberal+.5*v2x_polyarchy^1.6*v2x_liberal


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Scale:IntervalSources:v2x_liberalv2x_polyarchyDatarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Participatorydemocracyindex(D)(v2x_partipdem)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheidealofparticipatorydemocracyachieved?Clarifications: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by

citizens in all political processes, electoral andnon-electoral. It ismotivated by uneasiness

about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives.

Thus,directrulebycitizensispreferred,whereverpracticable.Thismodelofdemocracythustakes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct

democracy,andsubnationalelectedbodies.Tomakeitameasureofparticipatorydemocracy,theindexalsotakesthelevelofelectoraldemocracyintoaccount.

Aggregation:Theindexisaggregatedusingthisformula:v2x_partipdem=

.25*v2x_polyarchy^1.6+.25*v2x_partip+.5*v2x_polyarchy^1.6*v2x_partip

Scale:IntervalSources:v2x_polyarchyv2x_partipDatarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Deliberativedemocracyindex(D)(v2x_delibdem)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheidealofdeliberativedemocracyachieved?Clarification:Thedeliberativeprincipleofdemocracyfocusesontheprocessbywhichdecisions

arereachedinapolity.Adeliberativeprocessisoneinwhichpublicreasoningfocusedonthecommongoodmotivatespoliticaldecisions—ascontrastedwithemotionalappeals,solidary

attachments,parochialinterests,orcoercion.Accordingtothisprinciple,democracyrequires

morethananaggregationofexistingpreferences.Thereshouldalsoberespectfuldialogueatall levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent

participantswhoareopentopersuasion.Tomake itameasureofnotonlythedeliberative

principle but also of democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into

account.Aggregation:Theindexisaggregatedusingthisformula:

v2x_delibdem=

.25*v2x_polyarchy^1.6+.25*v2x_delib+.5*v2x_polyarchy^1.6*v2x_delib

Scale:IntervalSources:v2xdl_delibv2x_polyarchyDatarelease:4,5.Datarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)

Egalitariandemocracyindex(D)(v2x_egaldem)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheidealofegalitariandemocracyachieved?Clarifications: The egalitarian principle of democracy addresses the distribution of political

power across social groups, i.e., groups defined by class, sex, religion, and ethnicity. This

perspective on democracy emphasizes that a formal guarantee of political rights and civil

libertiesarenotalwayssufficientforpoliticalequality.Ideally,allsocialgroupsshouldhave

approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under


15

the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does

not exist, the state ought to seek to redistribute socio-economic resources, education, and

healthsoastoenhancepoliticalequality.Tomakeitameasureofegalitariandemocracy,theindexalsotakesthelevelofelectoraldemocracyintoaccount.

Aggregation:Theindexisaggregatedusingthisformula:v2x_egaldem=

.25*v2x_polyarchy^1.6+.25*v2x_egal+.5*v2x_polyarchy^1.6*v2x_egal

Scale:IntervalSources:v2x_egalv2x_polyarchyDatarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).


Electoralcomponentindex(D)(v2x_EDcomp_thick)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheelectoralprincipleofdemocracyachieved?Clarification: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and

accountabilitybetweenleadersandcitizensthroughthemechanismofcompetitiveelections.

This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society

organizationscanoperatefreely;electionsarecleanandnotmarredbyfraudorsystematic

irregularities;andthechiefexecutiveofacountryisselected(directlyorindirectly)through

elections.

Aggregation:Theelectoralcomponentindexisoperationalizedasachaindefinedbyitsweakestlinkof freedomof association, suffrage, clean elections, andelected executive.The index is

thusaggregatedusingthisformula:

v2x_EDcomp_thick=

v2x_frassoc_thick*v2x_suffr*v2xel_frefair*v2x_accex.

Scale:IntervalSources:v2x_frassoc_thickv2x_suffrv2xel_frefairv2x_accexDatarelease:3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Participatorycomponentindex(D)(v2x_partip)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheparticipatoryprincipleachieved?Clarification: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by

citizens in all political processes, electoral andnon-electoral. It ismotivated by uneasiness

about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives.

Thus,directrulebycitizensispreferred,whereverpracticable.Thismodelofdemocracythus

takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct

democracy,andsubnationalelectedbodies.

Aggregation:Thisindexisformedbyaveragingthefollowingindices:civilsocietyparticipation(v2x_iccpart), direct popular vote (v2xdd_dd), elected local government power

(v2xel_locelec),andelectedregionalgovernmentpower(v2xel_regelec).

Scale:IntervalSources:v2x_iccpartv2xdd_ddv2xel_locelecv2xel_regelecDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).


16

Egalitariancomponentindex(D)(v2x_egal)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheegalitarianprincipleachieved?Clarifications: The egalitarian principle of democracy addresses the distribution of political

power across social groups, i.e., groups defined by class, sex, religion, and ethnicity. This

perspective on democracy emphasizes that a formal guarantee of political rights and civil

libertiesarenotalwayssufficientforpoliticalequality.Ideally,allsocialgroupsshouldhave

approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under

the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does

not exist, the state ought to seek to redistribute socio-economic resources, education, and

healthsoastoenhancepoliticalequality.

Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysismodel including indicators of power distribution according to socioeconomic position

(v2pepwrses), power distribution according to social group (v2pepwrsoc), social group

equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp), equal access to education (v2peedueq),

equalaccess tohealth (v2pehealth),powerdistributionaccording togender (v2pepwrgen),

shareofbudget allocated topublic/commongoods (v2dlencmps), and the shareofwelfare

programsthatprovideuniversalratherthanmeans-testedbenefits(v2dlunivl).

Scale:IntervalSources: v2pepwrses v2pepwrsoc v2clsocgrp v2peedueq v2pehealth v2pepwrgen

v2dlencmpsv2dlunivl

Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Liberalcomponentindex(D)(v2x_liberal)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentistheliberalprincipleofdemocracyachieved?Clarification: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting

individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the

majority.Theliberalmodeltakesa“negative”viewofpoliticalpowerinsofarasitjudgesthe

qualityofdemocracybythelimitsplacedongovernment.Thisisachievedbyconstitutionally

protectedcivilliberties,strongruleoflaw,anindependentjudiciary,andeffectivechecksand

balancesthat,together,limittheexerciseofexecutivepower.

Aggregation: This index is formedbyaveraging the following indices: equalitybefore the lawand individual liberties (v2xcl_rol), judicial constraints on the executive (v2x_jucon), and

legislativeconstraintsontheexecutive(v2xlg_legcon).

Scale:IntervalSources:v2xcl_rolv2x_juconv2xlg_legconDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Deliberativecomponentindex(D)(v2xdl_delib)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentisthedeliberativeprincipleofdemocracyachieved?Clarification:Thedeliberativeprincipleofdemocracyfocusesontheprocessbywhichdecisions

arereachedinapolity.Adeliberativeprocessisoneinwhichpublicreasoningfocusedonthe

commongoodmotivatespoliticaldecisions—ascontrastedwithemotionalappeals,solidary

attachments,parochialinterests,orcoercion.Accordingtothisprinciple,democracyrequires

morethananaggregationofexistingpreferences.Thereshouldalsoberespectfuldialogueat

all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent

participantswhoareopentopersuasion.


17

Tomeasurethesefeaturesofapolitywetrytodeterminetheextenttowhichpoliticalelitesgivepublicjustificationsfortheirpositionsonmattersofpublicpolicy,justifytheirpositionsintermsofthepublicgood,acknowledgeandrespectcounter-arguments;andhowwidetherangeofconsultationisatelitelevels.

Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysismodelincludingthefollowingindicators:reasonedjustification(v2dlreason),commongoodjustification (v2dlcommon), respect for counterarguments (v2dlcountr), range ofconsultation(v2dlconslt),andengagedsociety(v2dlengage).

Scale:IntervalSources:v2dlreasonv2dlcommonv2dlcountrv2dlconsltv2dlengageDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Femalerightsindex(D)(v2x_gender)

Projectmanager:JohnGerringQuestion:Towhatextentarewomen’spoliticalrightsprotected?Clarifications:Politicalrightsindexfocusesontheabilityofwomentoparticipateindiscussions

ofpoliticalissues,participationincivilsocietyorganizations,freedomofmovement,therighttoprivateproperty,accesstojustice,freedomfromforcedlabor,representationintheranksofjournalists,andanequalshareintheoveralldistributionofpower.

Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysismodel of the indicators for CSO women’s participation (v2csgender), female journalists(v2mefemjrn), freedom of domestic movement for women (v2cldmovew), freedom ofdiscussion for women (v2cldiscw), freedom from forced labor for women (v2clslavef),propertyrightsforwomen(v2clprptyw),accesstojusticeforwomen(v2clacjstw),andpowerdistributedbygender(v2pepwrgen).

Scale:IntervalSources: v2csgender v2mefemjrn v2cldmovew v2cldiscw v2clslavef v2clprptyw v2clacjstw

v2pepwrgenDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).VariablesincludedinFigure3.

Freedomofassociation(thick)index(D)(v2x_frassoc_thick)

Projectmanager:AllenHicken,MichaelBernhard,JanTeorellQuestion: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to

participateinelections,andtowhatextentarecivilsocietyorganizationsabletoformandtooperatefreely?

Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysismodeloftheindicatorsforpartyban(v2psparban),barrierstoparties(v2psbars),oppositionparties autonomy (v2psoppaut), elections multiparty (v2elmulpar), CSO entry and exit(v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss). Since the multiparty elections indicator isonly observed in election years, its values have first been repeatedwithin election regimeperiods(asdefinedbyv2x_elecreg).

Scale:IntervalSources:v2psparbanv2psbarsv2psoppautv2elmulparv2cseeorgsv2csreprssDatarelease:4,5 (release1,2,and3usedadifferentaggregation formula for the thinner index

v2x_frassoc)Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).


18

Cleanelectionsindex(D)(v2xel_frefair)

Projectmanagers:StaffanLindberg,JanTeorellQuestion:Towhatextentareelectionsfreeandfair?Clarifications:Freeandfairconnotesanabsenceofregistrationfraud,systematicirregularities,

governmentintimidationoftheopposition,votebuying,andelectionviolence.Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysis

model of the indicators for EMB autonomy (v2elembaut), EMB capacity (v2elembcap),electionvoterregistry(v2elrgstry),electionvotebuying(v2elvotbuy),electionothervotingirregularities (v2elirreg), election government intimidation (v2elintim), election otherelectoralviolence(v2elpeace),andelectionfreeandfair(v2elfrfair).Sincethebulkoftheseindicators are only observed in election years, the index scores have then been repeatedwithinelectionregimeperiods(asdefinedbyv2x_elecreg)

Scale:IntervalSources:v2elembautv2elembcapv2elrgstryv2elvotbuyv2elirregv2elintimv2elpeacev2elfrfairDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Shareofpopulationwithsuffrage(D)(v2x_suffr)

Projectmanager:Svend-ErikSkaaningQuestion: What share of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in

nationalelections?Clarification: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age,

residence,havingbeenconvictedforcrime,orbeinglegally incompetent. Itcovers legal(dejure) restrictions, not restrictions thatmay be operative in practice (de facto). The scoresreflect de jure provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population as ofJanuary 1 in a particular year. The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined bycitizensinthecaseofindependentcountriesorthepeoplelivingintheterritorialentityinthecaseofcolonies.Universalsuffrageiscodedas100%.Universalmalesuffrageonlyiscodedas50%. Years before electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0%. The scores do notreflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions,electoral laws, or the like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scoreswereadjusted accordingly if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other thangender apply (such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity,religion, and/or ‘economic independence’), estimates have been calculated by combininginformationontherestrictionswithdifferentkindsofstatisticalinformation(onpopulationsize,agedistribution,wealthdistribution,literacyrates,sizeofethnicgroups,etc.),secondarycountry-specificsources,and–inthecaseofverypoorinformation–theconditionsinsimilarcountriesorcolonies.

Aggregation:v2elsuffrage/100Responses:PercentScale:IntervalSource:v2elsuffrageDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Electedexecutiveindex(dejure)(D)(v2x_accex)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion: Is the chief executive appointed through popular elections (either directly or

indirectly)?


19

Clarifications: This index attempts to measure whether the chief executive is elected, either

directly elected through popular elections or indirectly through a popularly elected

legislaturethatthenappointsthechiefexecutive.

Note that a popular election is minimally defined and also includes sham elections with

limited suffrage and no competition. Similarly, “appointment” by legislature only implies

selectionand/orapproval,notthepowertodismiss.

This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not be

interpretedasanimportantelementofdemocracyinitsownright.

Aggregation: There are six different chains of appointment/selection to take into account in

constructingthisindex,allofwhicharescaledtovaryfrom0to1.First,whethertheheadof

state is directly elected (a=1) or not (a=0). Second, the extent to which the legislature is

popularly elected (b), measured as the proportion of legislators elected (if legislature is

unicameral), or the weighted average of the proportion elected for each house, with the

weightdefinedbywhichhouse isdominant(if legislature isbicameral).Third,whether the

headofstateisappointedbythelegislature,ortheapprovalofthelegislatureisnecessaryfor

the appointment of the head of state (c1=1, otherwise 0). Fourth, whether the head of

governmentisappointedbythelegislature,ortheapprovalofthelegislatureisnecessaryfor

theappointmentof theheadofgovernment(c2=1,otherwise0).Fifth,whether theheadof

governmentisappointedbytheheadofstate(d=1)ornot(d=0).Sixth,whethertheheadof

governmentisdirectlyelected(e=1)ornot(e=0).Definehoswastheweightfortheheadof

state.Iftheheadofstateisalsoheadofgovernment(v2exhoshog==1),hosw=1.Iftheheadof

statehasmorepower than theheadofgovernmentover theappointmentanddismissalof

cabinet ministers, then hosw=1; if the reverse is true, hosw=0. If they share equal power,

hosw=.5.Definetheweightfortheheadofgovernmentashogw=1-hosw.Theformulais:

v2x_accex=

hosw*[max(a1,b*c1)]+hogw*[max(a1*d,b*c1*d,a2,b*c2)]

Scale:Interval

Sources: v2lgello v2lgelecup v2lgdomchm v2exaphos v2expathhs v2exaphogp v2expathhg

v2exdfcbhsv2exdjcbhgv2exdfdmhsv2exdfdshgv2exhoshog

Datarelease:4,5(release1,2,and3usedadifferent,preliminaryaggregationformula)

Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).


Equalitybeforethelawandindividuallibertyindex(D)(v2xcl_rol)

Projectmanager:JanTeorell

Question: To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public

administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure

propertyrights, freedomfromforcedlabor, freedomofmovement,physical integrityrights,

andfreedomofreligion?

Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysis

model of the indicators for rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct),

transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw), access to justice for

men/women (v2clacjstm, v2clacjstw), property rights for men/women (v2clprptym,

v2clprptyw),freedomfromtorture(v2cltort),freedomfrompoliticalkillings(v2clkill),from

forced labor for men/women (v2clslavem v2clslavef), freedom of religion (v2clrelig),

freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmove), and freedom of domestic movement for

men/women(v2cldmovem,v2cldmovew).

Scale:Interval

Sources: v2clrspct v2cltrnslw v2clacjstm v2clacjstw v2clprptym v2clprptyw v2cltort v2clkill

v2clslavemv2clslavefv2clreligv2clfmovev2cldmovemv2cldmovew

Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.


20

Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Legislativeconstraintsontheexecutiveindex(D)(v2xlg_legcon)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion: Towhatextentisthelegislatureandgovernmentagencies(e.g.,comptrollergeneral,

general prosecutor, or ombudsman) capable of questioning, investigating, and exercisingoversightovertheexecutive?

Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysismodelof the indicators for legislaturequestionsofficials inpractice(v2lgqstexp),executiveoversight (v2lgotovst), legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvstp), and legislatureoppositionparties(v2lgoppart).

Scale:IntervalSources:v2lgqstexpv2lgotovstv2lginvstpv2lgoppartDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Judicialconstraintsontheexecutiveindex(D)(v2x_jucon)

Projectmanager:JanTeorellQuestion: Towhat extent does the executive respect the constitution and complywith court

rulings,andtowhatextentisthejudiciaryabletoactinanindependentfashion?Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysis

model of the indicators for executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), compliance withjudiciary (v2jucomp), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), high court independence(v2juhcind),andlowercourtindependence(v2juncind).

Scale:IntervalSources:v2exresconv2jucompv2juhccompv2juhcindv2juncindDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).VariablesincludedinFigure5.

Civilsocietyparticipationindex(D)(v2x_cspart)

Projectmanager:MichaelBernhardQuestion:AremajorCSOsroutinelyconsultedbypolicymaker;howlargeistheinvolvementof

people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidatenominationwithinpartyorganizationhighlydecentralizedormadethroughpartyprimaries?

Clarifications:Thesphereofcivilsocietyliesinthepublicspacebetweentheprivatesphereandthestate.Here,citizensorganizeingroupstopursuetheircollectiveinterestsandideals.Wecall these groups civil society organizations (CSOs). CSOs include, but are by no meanslimitedto, interestgroups, laborunions,spiritualorganizations(iftheyareengagedincivicorpoliticalactivities),socialmovements,professionalassociations,charities,andothernon-governmentalorganizations.Thecorecivilsocietyindex(CCSI)isdesignedtoprovideameasureofarobustcivilsociety,understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely andactivelypursuetheirpoliticalandcivicgoals,howeverconceived.

Aggregation:TheindexisformedbytakingthepointestimatesfromaBayesianfactoranalysismodel of the indicators for candidate selection –national/local (v2pscnslnl), CSOconsultation (v2cscnsult), CSO participatory environment (v2csprtcpt), and CSO women’sparticipation(v2csgender).

Scale:Interval


21

Sources:v2pscnslnlv2cscnsultv2csprtcptv2csgenderDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Localgovernment(D)(v2xel_locelec)

Projectmanagers:KellyMcMann,JanTeorellQuestion: Are there elected local governments, and –if so – towhat extent can they operate

withoutinterferencefromunelectedbodiesatthelocallevel?Clarification: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local

governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected localgovernmentsbutwherethosegovernmentsaresubordinatetounelectedofficialsatthelocallevel (perhaps appointed by a higher-level body). A high score would be accorded to acountryinwhichlocalgovernmentsareelectedandabletooperatewithoutrestrictionsfromunelected actors at the local level (with the exception of judicial bodies). (Naturally, localgovernmentsremainsubordinatetotheregionalandnationalgovernments.)

Aggregation: First, local government elected (v2ellocelc) is recoded so that 0=none elected,1=onlyexecutiveelected,2=onlyassemblyelected,and3=bothelected.Thisnewconstructisthen scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr)scaledtovaryfrom0-1.

Scale:IntervalSources:v2ellocelcv2ellocpwrDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).

Directpopularvoteindex(D)(v2xdd_dd)

Projectmanager:DavidAltmanQuestion:Towhatextentisthedirectpopularvoteutilized?Clarification:Directpopularvotingrefersheretoaninstitutionalizedprocessbywhichcitizens

ofaregionorcountryregistertheirchoiceoropiniononspecificissuesthroughaballot.Itisintended to embrace initiatives, referendums, and plebiscites, as those terms are usuallyunderstood.Itcapturessomeaspectsofthemoregeneralconceptofdirectdemocracy.The termdoesnot encompass recall elections,deliberativeassemblies,or settings inwhichthevoteisnotsecretorthepurviewisrestricted.Likewise,itdoesnotapplytoelectionsforrepresentatives.

Aggregation: This indexmeasureshoweasy it is to initiateandapproveadirectpopularvoteandhowconsequential thatvote is (ifapproved)?Easeof initiation ismeasuredby(a) theexistence of a direct democracy process (v2ddlegci), (b) the number of signatures needed(v2ddsigcip), (c) time-limits to circulate the signatures (v2ddgrgpci), and (d) the level ofgovernment (national and/or subnational). Ease of approval is measured by quorumspertaining to (a) participation (v2ddgrgpci), (b) approval (v2ddbindci), (c) supermajority(v2ddspmjci),and(d)districtmajority(v2dddistci).Consequencesaremeasuredby(a)thelegalstatusofthedecisionmadebycitizens(bindingormerelyconsultative)(v2ddlegci),and(b) the frequency with which direct popular votes have been approved in the past(v2ddciniyr).

Scale:IntervalSources: v2ddlegci v2ddsigcip v2ddgrtlci v2ddgrgpci v2ddlevci v2ddbindci v2ddthreci

v2ddspmjciv2dddistciv2ddlegciv2ddciniyrDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).


22

Regionalgovernment(D)(v2xel_regelec)

Projectmanagers:KellyMcMann,JanTeorellQuestion:Arethereelectedregionalgovernments,and–ifso–towhatextentcantheyoperate

withoutinterferencefromunelectedbodiesattheregionallevel?Clarification: The lowest scorewould be reserved for a country that has no elected regional

governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected regionalgovernments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at theregionallevel(perhapsappointedbyahigher-levelbody).Ahighscorewouldbeaccordedtoacountryinwhichregionalgovernmentsareelectedandabletooperatewithoutrestrictionsfromunelectedactorsattheregionallevel(withtheexceptionofjudicialbodies).(Naturally,regionalgovernmentsremainsubordinatetothenationalgovernment.)

Aggregation: First,regionalgovernmentelected(v2elsrgel) isrecodedsothat0=noneelected,1=onlyexecutiveelected,2=onlyassemblyelected,and3=bothelected.Thisnewconstructisthen scaled tovary from0-1andmultipliedby regionaloffices relativepower (v2elrgpwr)scaledtovaryfrom0-1.

Scale:IntervalSources:v2elsrgelv2elrgpwrDatarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).VariablesincludedinFigure6.

Reasonedjustification(C)(v2dlreason,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion: Whenimportantpolicychangesarebeingconsidered, i.e.beforeadecisionhasbeen

made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for theirpositions?

Clarification:Becausediscoursevariesgreatlyfrompersontoperson,baseyouransweronthestylethatismosttypicalofprominentnationalpoliticalleaders.

Responses:0:Nojustification.Elitesalmostalwaysonlydictatethatsomethingshouldorshouldnot

be done, but no reasoning about justification is given. For example, “We must cutspending.”

1:Inferiorjustification.Elitestendtogivereasonswhysomeoneshouldorshouldnotbefordoingornotdoingsomething,butthereasonstendtobeillogicalorfalse,althoughtheymay appeal tomany voters. For example, “Wemust cut spending. The state isinefficient.” [The inference is incompletebecauseaddressing inefficiencieswouldnotnecessarilyreducespendinganditmightundermineessentialservices.]

2: Qualified justification. Elites tend to offer a single simple reason justifying why theproposedpolicies contribute toordetract fromanoutcome. For example, “Wemustcutspendingbecausetaxpayerscannotaffordtopayforcurrentprograms.”

3:Sophisticatedjustification.Elitestendtooffermorethanoneormorecomplex,nuancedand complete justification. For example, “We must cut spending because taxpayerscannot afford to pay for current government programs. Raising taxes would hurteconomicgrowth,anddeficitspendingwouldleadtoinflation.”

Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem

Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).


23

Respectcounterarguments(C)(v2dlcountr,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion:Whenimportantpolicychangesarebeingconsidered,towhatextentdopoliticalelites

acknowledgeandrespectcounterarguments?Clarification:Becausediscoursevariesgreatlyfrompersontoperson,baseyouransweronthe

stylethatismosttypicalofprominentnationalpoliticalleaders.Responses:

0:Counterargumentsarenotallowedorifarticulated,punished.1: Counterarguments are allowed at least from some parties, but almost always are

ignored.2: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by

makinganegativestatementabout themor the individualsandgroups thatproposethem.

3: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative orpositivestatementsaboutthem.

4:Elitesalmostalwaysacknowledgecounterargumentsandexplicitlyvaluethem,eveniftheyultimatelyrejectthemforthemostpart.

5: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, andfrequentlyalsoevenacceptthemandchangetheirposition.



Engagedsociety(C)(v2dlengage,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion:Whenimportantpolicychangesarebeingconsidered,howwideandhowindependent

arepublicdeliberations?Clarification:Thisquestionreferstodeliberationasmanifestedindiscussion,debate,andother

publicforumssuchaspopularmedia.Responses:

0:Publicdeliberationisnever,oralmostneverallowed.1: Some limitedpublicdeliberationsareallowedbut thepublicbelow theelite levels is

almostalwayseitherunawareofmajorpolicydebatesorunabletotakepartinthem.2: Publicdeliberation isnot repressedbutnevertheless infrequent andnon-elite actors

aretypicallycontrolledand/orconstrainedbytheelites.3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups

participate,butitisconfinedtoasmallsliceofspecializedgroupsthattendstobethesameacrossissue-areas.

4: Publicdeliberationisactivelyencouragedandarelativelybroadsegmentofnon-elitegroupsoftenparticipateandvarywithdifferentissue-areas.

5: Large numbers of non-elite groups aswell as ordinary people tend to discussmajorpoliciesamong themselves, in themedia, inassociationsorneighborhoods,or in thestreets.Grass-rootsdeliberationiscommonandunconstrained.




24

Commongood(C)(v2dlcommon,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion:Whenimportantpolicychangesarebeingconsidered,towhatextentdopoliticalelites

justifytheirpositionsintermsofthecommongood?Clarification:Becausediscoursevariesgreatlyfrompersontoperson,baseyouransweronthe

stylethatismosttypicalofprominentnationalpoliticalleaders.Responses:

0:Littleornojustificationintermsofthecommongoodisusuallyoffered.1: Specificbusiness,geographic,group,party,orconstituency interestsare for themost

partofferedasjustifications.2:Justificationsareforthemostpartamixofspecificinterestsandthecommongoodand

itisimpossibletosaywhichjustificationismorecommonthantheother.3: Justifications are based on a mixture of references to constituency/party/group

interestsandonappealstothecommongood.4: Justificationsare for themostpartalmostalwaysbasedonexplicit statementsof the

common good for society, understood either as the greatest good for the greatestnumberorashelpingtheleastadvantagedinasociety.



Rangeofconsultation(C)(v2dlconslt,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of

consultationatelitelevels?Clarification:Becausepracticesvarygreatlyfrompolicytopolicy,baseyouransweronthestyle

thatismosttypicalofpolicymaking.Responses:

0: No consultation. The leader or a very small group (e.g. military council) makesauthoritativedecisionsontheirown.

1: Very little and narrow. Consultation with only a narrow circle of loyal party/rulingelites.

2: Consultation includes the formerplusa largergroup that is loyal to thegovernment,suchastherulingparty’sorparties’localexecutivesand/orwomen,youthandotherbranches.

3:Consultationincludestheformerplusleadersofotherparties.4: Consultation includes the former plus a select range of society/labor/business

representatives.5: Consultationengageselites fromessentiallyallpartsof thepoliticalspectrumandall

politicallyrelevantsectorsofsocietyandbusiness.Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem

Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).Datarelease:1,2,3,4,5.Citation:V-Demcodebook(seesuggestedcitationatthetopofthisdocument).VariablesincludedinFigure7.


25

Powerdistributedbysocioeconomicposition(C)(v2pepwrses,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanager:JohnGerring Question:Ispoliticalpowerdistributedaccordingtosocioeconomicposition?Clarification: Allsocietiesarecharacterizedbysomedegreeofeconomic(wealthand income)

inequality.Insomesocieties,incomeandwealtharedistributedinagrosslyunequalfashion.Inothers, thedifferencebetweenrichandpoor isnotsogreat.Here,weareconcernednotwith the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality.Specifically,we are concernedwith the extent towhichwealth and income translates intopoliticalpower.

Responses:0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer

peoplehavealmostnoinfluence.1: Wealthypeople enjoy adominantholdonpolitical power. Peopleof average income

havelittlesay.Poorerpeoplehaveessentiallynoinfluence.2:Wealthypeoplehaveaverystrongholdonpoliticalpower.Peopleofaverageorpoorer

incomehavesomedegreeofinfluencebutonlyonissuesthatmatterlessforwealthypeople.

3: Wealthypeoplehavemorepoliticalpowerthanothers.Butpeopleofaverageincomehave almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree ofpoliticalpower.

4: Wealthy people have nomore political power than those whose economic status isaverageorpoor.Politicalpower ismoreor less equallydistributedacrosseconomicgroups.



Socialgroupequalityinrespectforcivilliberties(C)(v2clsocgrp,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanager:Svend-ErikSkaaningQuestion: Doallsocialgroups,asdistinguishedbylanguage,ethnicity,religion,race,region,or

caste,enjoythesamelevelofcivilliberties,oraresomegroupsgenerallyinamorefavorableposition?

Clarification: Here, civil liberties areunderstood to includeaccess to justice, privatepropertyrights,freedomofmovement,andfreedomfromforcedlabor.

Responses:0: Members of some social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than the general

population.1:Membersofsomesocialgroupsenjoysubstantiallyfewercivillibertiesthanthegeneral

population.2:Membersofsomesocialgroupsenjoymoderatelyfewercivillibertiesthanthegeneral

population.3: Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general

population.4:Membersofallsalientsocialgroupsenjoythesamelevelofcivilliberties.




26

Healthequality(C)(v2pehealth,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion: Towhatextentishighqualitybasichealthcareguaranteedtoall,sufficienttoenable

themtoexercisetheirbasicpoliticalrightsasadultcitizens?

Clarification: Poor-qualityhealthcarecanmakecitizensunabletoexercisetheirbasicrightsasadult citizens by failing to adequately treat preventable and treatable illnesses that render

themunabletowork,participateinsocialorpoliticalorganizations,orvote(wherevotingis

allowed).

Responses:0:Extreme.Becauseofpoor-qualityhealthcare,atleast75percent(%)ofcitizens’ability

toexercisetheirpoliticalrightsasadultcitizensisundermined.

1:Unequal.Becauseofpoor-qualityhealthcare,atleast25percent(%)ofcitizens’ability

toexercisetheirpoliticalrightsasadultcitizensisundermined.

2:Somewhatequal.Becauseofpoor-qualityhealthcare,tento25percent(%)ofcitizens’

abilitytoexercisetheirpoliticalrightsasadultcitizensisundermined.

3:Relativelyequal.Basichealthcareisoverallequalinqualitybutbecauseofpoor-quality

healthcare,fivetotenpercent(%)ofcitizens’abilitytoexercisetheirpoliticalrightsas

adultcitizensisundermined.

4: Equal.Basichealth care is equal inquality and less than fivepercent (%)of citizens

cannotexercisetheirbasicpoliticalrightsasadultcitizens.



Particularisticorpublicgoods(C)(v2dlencmps)

Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion: Consideringtheprofileofsocialandinfrastructuralspendinginthenationalbudget,

how“particularistic”or“publicgoods”aremostexpenditures?

Clarification: Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted on a specific corporation, sector,socialgroup,region,party,orsetofconstituents.Suchspendingmaybereferredtoas“pork,”

“clientelistic,”or“privategoods.”

Public-goodsspendingisintendedtobenefitallcommunitieswithinasociety,thoughitmay

bemeans-testedsoastotargetpoor,needy,orotherwiseunderprivilegedconstituents.The

keypointisthatallwhosatisfythemeans-testareallowedtoreceivethebenefit.

Youranswershouldconsidertheentirebudgetofsocialandinfrastructuralspending.Weare

interestedintherelativevalueofparticularisticandpublic-goodsspending,notthenumber

ofbillsorprogramsthatfallintoeithercategory.

Responses:0:Almostallofthesocialandinfrastructureexpendituresareparticularistic.

1:Mostsocialandinfrastructureexpendituresareparticularistic,butasignificantportion

(e.g.¼or1/3)ispublic-goods.

2: Socialand infrastructureexpendituresareevenlydividedbetweenparticularisticand

public-goodsprograms.

3: Mostsocialandinfrastructureexpendituresarepublic-goodsbutasignificantportion

(e.g.,¼or1/3)isparticularistic.

4:Almostallsocialandinfrastructureexpendituresarepublic-goodsincharacter.Onlya

smallportionisparticularistic.


Methodology,postedatV-Dem.net).


27


Powerdistributedbysocialgroup(C)(v2pepwrsoc,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanager:JohnGerringQuestion:Ispoliticalpowerdistributedaccordingtosocialgroups?Clarification:Asocialgroupisdifferentiatedwithinacountrybycaste,ethnicity,language,race,

region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded insexualorientationorsocioeconomicstatus.)Socialgroupidentityiscontextuallydefinedandis likely tovaryacrosscountriesandthroughtime.Socialgroup identitiesarealso likely tocross-cut, so that a givenperson couldbedefined inmultipleways, i.e., aspartofmultiplegroups.Nonetheless,atanygivenpointintimetherearesocialgroupswithinasocietythatareunderstood-bythoseresidingwithinthatsociety–tobedifferent,inwaysthatmaybepoliticallyrelevant.

Responses:0: Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the

population.Thismonopolyisinstitutionalized,i.e.,notsubjecttofrequentchange.1: Politicalpower ismonopolizedbyseveral socialgroupscomprisingaminorityof the

population.Thismonopolyisinstitutionalized,i.e.,notsubjecttofrequentchange.2: Politicalpower ismonopolizedby several social groupscomprisingamajorityof the

population.Thismonopolyisinstitutionalized,i.e.,notsubjecttofrequentchange.3: Eitherallsocialgroupspossesssomepoliticalpower,withsomegroupshavingmore

power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one groupcontrollingmuchofthepoliticalpowerforaperiodoftime,followedbyanother–butallsignificantgroupshaveaturnattheseatofpower.

4:Allsocialgroupshaveroughlyequalpoliticalpowerortherearenostrongethnic,caste,linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of. Social groupcharacteristicsarenotrelevanttopolitics.



Educationalequality(C)(v2peedueq,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion: Towhatextent ishighqualitybasiceducationguaranteedtoall, sufficient toenable

themtoexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens?Clarification: Basic education refers to ages typically between 6 and 16 years of age but this

variesslightlyamongcountries.Responses:

0:Extreme.Provisionofhighqualitybasiceducationisextremelyunequalandatleast75percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines theirabilitytoexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens.

1:Unequal.Provisionofhighqualitybasiceducationisextremelyunequalandatleast25percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines theirabilitytoexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens.

2:Somewhatequal.Basiceducationisrelativelyequalinqualitybuttento25percent(%)ofchildrenreceivesuchlow-qualityeducationthatunderminestheirabilitytoexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens.


28

3:Relativelyequal.Basiceducationisoverallequalinqualitybutfivetotenpercent(%)ofchildrenreceivesuchlow-qualityeducationthatprobablyunderminestheirabilitytoexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens.

4: Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of childrenreceivesuchlow-qualityeducationthatprobablyunderminestheirabilitytoexercisetheirbasicrightsasadultcitizens.



Powerdistributedbygender(C)(v2pepwrgen,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanager:JohnGerringQuestion:Ispoliticalpowerdistributedaccordingtogender?Responses:

0:Menhaveanear-monopolyonpoliticalpower.1:Menhaveadominantholdonpoliticalpower.Womenhaveonlymarginalinfluence.2:Menhavemuchmorepoliticalpowerbutwomenhavesomeareasofinfluence.3:Menhavesomewhatmorepoliticalpowerthanwomen.4:Menandwomenhaveroughlyequalpoliticalpower.



Means-testedv.universalisticpolicy(C)(v2dlunivl,*_dos,*_ord,*_meanl)

Projectmanagers:MichaelCoppedge,JohnGerring,StaffanLindbergQuestion:Howmanywelfareprogramsaremeans-testedandhowmanybenefitall(orvirtually

all)membersofthepolity?Clarification: A means-tested program targets poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged

constituents.Cash-transferprogramsarenormallymeans-tested.A universal (non-means tested) program potentially benefits everyone. This includes freeeducation, national health care schemes, and retirement programs. Granted, some maybenefitmore than others from these programs (e.g., when peoplewith higher salaries gethigherunemploymentbenefits).Thekeypointisthatpracticallyeveryoneisabeneficiary,orpotentialbeneficiary.Thepurposeofthisquestionisnottogaugethesizeofthewelfarestatebutratheritsquality.So,youranswershouldbebasedonwhateverprogramsexist.

Responses:0:Thereareno,orextremelylimited,welfarestatepolicies(education,health,retirement,

unemployment,povertyprograms).1:Almostallofthewelfarestatepoliciesaremeans-tested.2: Mostwelfare state policiesmeans-tested, but a significant portion (e.g.¼ or 1/3) is

universalisticandpotentiallybenefitseveryoneinthepopulation.3: The welfare state policies are roughly evenly divided between means-tested and

universalistic.4: Mostwelfarestatepoliciesareuniversalistic,butasignificantportion(e.g.,¼or1/3)

aremeans-tested.5: Almost all welfare state policies are universal in character. Only a small portion is

means-tested.


29




CSOwomen’sparticipation(C)(v2csgender,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanager:MichaelBernhardQuestion:Arewomenpreventedfromparticipatingincivilsocietyorganizations(CSOs)?Clarification:Pleasepayattentiontoboth(A)whetherwomenarepreventedfromparticipating

incivilsocietyorganizations(CSOs)becauseoftheirgenderand(B)whetherCSOspursuing

women’sinterestsarepreventedfromtakingpartinassociationallife.

Responses:0:Almostalways.

1:Frequently.

2:Abouthalfthetime.

3:Rarely.

4:Almostnever.



Freedomofdiscussionforwomen(C)(v2cldiscw,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:PamelaPaxton,Svend-ErikSkaaningQuestion: Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public

spaces?

Clarification: This indicatorspecifiestheextenttowhichwomenareabletoengage inprivatediscussions,particularlyonpoliticalissues,inprivatehomesandpublicspaces(restaurants,

publictransportation,sportsevents,worketc.)withoutfearofharassmentbyothermembers

of thepolity or thepublic authorities.Weare interested in restrictionsby the government

and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other

membersofthepolity,sometimesininformalways.

Thisquestiondoesnotaskyoutoassesstherelativefreedomofmenandwomen.Thus,itispossibletoassignthelowestpossiblescoretoacountryevenifmenandwomenenjoyequal

–andextremelylow–rightstofreedomofdiscussion.

Responses:0:Notrespected.Hardlyanyfreedomofexpressionexistsforwomen.Womenaresubject

to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political

opinion.

1:Weaklyrespected.Expressionsofpoliticalopinionsbywomenarefrequentlyexposed

tointerventionandharassment.

2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionally

exposedtointerventionandharassment.

3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the

private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft

sanctions.Butasarulethereisnointerventionorharassmentifwomenmakepolitical

statements.


30

4: Fullyrespected.Freedomofspeechbywomen in theirhomesand inpublicspaces isnotrestricted.



Propertyrightsforwomen(C)(v2clprptyw,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:PamelaPaxton,Svend-ErikSkaaningQuestion:Dowomenenjoytherighttoprivateproperty?Clarification: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private

property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which maylegally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious orsocialnorms.Thisquestionconcerns the right toprivateproperty,notactualownershipofproperty.This question does not ask you to assess the relative rights ofmen andwomen. Thus, it ispossibletoassignthelowestpossiblescoretoacountryevenifmenandwomenenjoyequal–andveryminimal–propertyrights.

Responses:0:Virtuallynowomenenjoyprivatepropertyrightsofanykind.1:Somewomenenjoysomeprivatepropertyrights,butmosthavenone.2:Manywomenenjoymanyprivatepropertyrights,butasmallerproportionenjoysfew

ornone.3: More than half ofwomen enjoymost private property rights, yet a smaller share of

womenhavemuchmorerestrictedrights.4:Mostwomenenjoymostprivatepropertyrightsbutasmallminoritydoesnot.5:Virtuallyallwomenenjoyall,oralmostall,propertyrights.



Powerdistributedbygender(C)(v2pepwrgen,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanager:JohnGerringQuestion:Ispoliticalpowerdistributedaccordingtogender?Responses:

0:Menhaveanear-monopolyonpoliticalpower.1:Menhaveadominantholdonpoliticalpower.Womenhaveonlymarginalinfluence.2:Menhavemuchmorepoliticalpowerbutwomenhavesomeareasofinfluence.3:Menhavesomewhatmorepoliticalpowerthanwomen.4:Menandwomenhaveroughlyequalpoliticalpower.




31

Freedomofdomesticmovementforwomen(C)(v2cldmovew,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:PamelaPaxton,Svend-ErikSkaaningQuestion:Dowomenenjoyfreedomofmovementwithinthecountry?Clarification: Thisindicatorspecifiestheextenttowhichallwomenareabletomovefreely,in

daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and toestablishpermanentresidencywheretheywish.Notethatrestrictionsinmovementmightbeimposedby thestateand/orby informalnormsandpractices.Suchrestrictionssometimesfallonruralresidents,onspecificsocialgroups,orondissidents.Thisquestiondoesnotaskyoutoassesstherelativefreedomofmenandwomen.Thus,itispossibletoassignthelowestpossiblescoretoacountryevenifmenandwomenenjoyequal–andextremelylow–freedomofmovement.Do not consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political)criminals.Donotconsiderrestrictionsinmovementthatresultfromcrimeorunrest.

Responses:0:Virtuallynowomenenjoyfullfreedomofmovement(e.g.,NorthKoreaorAfghanistan

undertheTaliban).1: Somewomenenjoyfull freedomofmovement,butmostdonot(e.g.,ApartheidSouth

Africa).2: Most women enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not.

Alternativelyallwomenenjoypartialfreedomofmovement.3:Mostwomenenjoyfullfreedomofmovementbutasmallminoritydoesnot.4:Virtuallyallwomenenjoyfullfreedomofmovement.



Freedomfromforcedlaborforwomen(C)(v2clslavef,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:PamelaPaxton,Svend-ErikSkaaningQuestion:Areadultwomenfreefromservitudeandotherkindsofforcedlabor?Clarification:Involuntaryservitudeoccurswhenanadultisunabletoquitajobs/hedesiresto

leave–notbyreasonofeconomicnecessitybutratherbyreasonofemployer’scoercion.Thisincludes labor campsbutnotworkor servicewhich formspartofnormal civicobligationssuchasconscriptionoremploymentincommandeconomies.Thisquestiondoesnotaskyoutoassesstherelativefreedomofmenandwomenfromforcedlabor.Thus,acountryinwhichbothmenandwomensufferthesameconditionsofservitudemightbecodeda(0)forwomen,eventhoughthereisequalityacrossthesexes.

Responses:0: Femaleservitudeorotherkindsof forcedlabor iswidespreadandaccepted(perhaps

evenorganized)bythestate.1: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially

opposedbythepublicauthorities,thestateisunwillingorunabletoeffectivelycontainthepractice.

2:Femaleservitudeorotherkindsofforcedlaborexistsbutisnotwidespreadandusuallyactively opposedbypublic authorities, or only tolerated in someparticular areas oramongparticularsocialgroups.

3: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in thecriminalunderground.Itisactivelyandsincerelyopposedbythepublicauthorities.

4:Femaleservitudeorotherkindsofforcedlaborisvirtuallynon-existent.Scale:Ordinal,convertedtointervalbythemeasurementmodel.


32

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-DemMethodology,postedatV-Dem.net).


Accesstojusticeforwomen(C)(v2clacjstw,*_dos,*_ord,*_mean)

Projectmanagers:PamelaPaxton,Svend-ErikSkaaningQuestion:Dowomenenjoyequal,secure,andeffectiveaccesstojustice?Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the

courtswithoutrisktotheirpersonalsafety,trialsarefair,andwomenhaveeffectiveabilityto

seekredressifpublicauthoritiesviolatetheirrights,includingtherightstocounsel,defense,

andappeal.

Thisquestiondoesnotaskyoutoassesstherelativeaccesstojusticemenandwomen.Thus,it ispossibletoassignthelowestpossiblescoretoacountryevenifmenandwomenenjoy

equal–andextremelylimited–accesstojustice.

Responses:0:Secureandeffectiveaccesstojusticeforwomenisnon-existent.

1: Secureandeffective access to justice forwomen isusuallynot establishedorwidely

respected.

2: Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minor

problems characterizemost cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of

thecountry.

3:Secureandeffectiveaccesstojusticeforwomenisusuallyobserved.

4:Secureandeffectiveaccesstojusticeforwomenisalmostalwaysobserved.




33

Appendix II. Overview of the structure of the indices.

StructureofAggregation–IndicesandIndicators DemocracyIndicesNames

Mid-LevelDemocracyandGovernanceIndicesNames

Lower-LevelDemocracyandGovernanceIndicesNames

NamesIndicators v2_tagIndicesandIndicators

ElectoralDemocracyIndex

v2x_polyarchy

Freedomofexpressionindex

v2x_freexp

Governmentcensorshipeffort-Media

v2mecenefm

Harassmentofjournalists v2meharjrn Mediaself-censorship v2meslfcen Freedomofdiscussion

formenv2cldiscm

Freedomofdiscussionforwomen

v2cldiscw

Freedomofacademicandculturalexpression

v2clacfree

Alternativesourceinformationindex

v2xme_altinf

Mediabias v2mebias Print/broadcastmedia

criticalv2mecrit

Print/broadcastmediaperspectives

v2merange

ElectoralComponentIndex

v2x_EDcomp_thick

Freedomofassociationindex(thick)

v2x_frassoc_thick

PartyBan v2psparban Barrierstoparties v2psbars Oppositionparties

autonomyv2psoppaut

Electionsmultiparty v2elmulpar CSOentryandexit v2cseeorgs CSOrepression v2csreprss Shareof

populationwithsuffrage

v2x_suffr

Percentofpopulationwithsuffrage

v2elsuffrage

Cleanelectionsindex

v2xel_frefair

EMBautonomy v2elembaut EMBcapacity v2elembcap


34

Electionvoterregistry v2elrgstry Electionvotebuying v2elvotbuy Electionothervoting

irregularitiesv2elirreg

Electiongovernmentintimidation

v2elintim

Electionotherelectoralviolence

v2elpeace

Electionfreeandfair v2elfrfair Electedexecutive

index(dejure) v2x_accex

Lowerchamberelected v2lgello Upperchamberelected v2lgelecup Legislaturedominant

chamberv2lgdomchm

HOSselectionbylegislatureinpractice

v2exaphos

HOSappointmentinpractice

v2expathhs

HOGselectionbylegislatureinpractice

v2exaphogp

HOGappointmentinpractice

v2expathhg

HOSappointscabinetinpractice

v2exdfcbhs

HOGappointscabinetinpractice

v2exdjcbhg

HOSdismissesministersinpractice

v2exdfdmhs

HOGdismissesministersinpractice

v2exdfdshg

HOSappointscabinetinpractice

v2exdfcbhs

LiberalDemocracyIndex

v2x_libdem


v2x_polyarchy

LiberalComponentIndex

v2x_liberal

Equalitybeforethelawandindividuallibertyindex

v2xcl_rol

Rigorousandimpartialpublicadministration

v2clrspct

Transparentlawswithpredictableenforcement

v2cltrnslw

Accesstojusticeformen v2clacjstm Accesstojusticefor

womenv2clacjstw

Propertyrightsformen v2clprptym Propertyrightsfor v2clprptyw


35

women Freedomfromtorture v2cltort Freedomfrompolitical

killingsv2clkill

Freedomfromforcedlaborformen

v2clslavem

Freedomfromforcedlaborforwomen

v2clslavef

Freedomofreligion v2clrelig Freedomofforeign

movementv2clfmove

Freedomofdomesticmovementformen

v2cldmovem

Freedomofdomesticmovementforwomen

v2cldmovew

Judicialconstraintsontheexecutiveindex

v2x_jucon

Executiverespectsconstitution

v2exrescon

Compliancewithjudiciary

v2jucomp

Compliancewithhighcourt

v2juhccomp

Highcourtindependence v2juhcind Lowercourtindependence v2juncind Legislative

constraintsontheexecutiveindex

v2xlg_legcon

Legislaturequestionsofficialsinpractice

v2lgqstexp

Executiveoversight v2lgotovst Legislatureinvestigates

inpracticev2lginvstp

Legislatureoppositionparties

v2lgoppart

DeliberativeDemocracyIndex

v2x_delibdem


v2x_polyarchy

DeliberativeComponentIndex

v2xdl_delib

Reasonedjustification v2dlreason Commongood v2dlcommon Respect

counterargumentsv2dlcountr

Rangeofconsultation v2dlconslt Engagedsociety v2dlengage


36

EgalitariandemocracyIndex

v2x_egaldem


v2x_polyarchy

EgalitarianComponentIndex

v2x_egal

Powerdistributedbysocioeconomicposition

v2pepwrses

Powerdistributedbysocialgroup

v2pepwrsoc

Socialgroupequalityinrespectforcivilliberties

v2clsocgrp

Educationalequality v2peedueq Healthequality v2pehealth Powerdistributedby

genderv2pepwrgen

Encompassing-ness v2dlencmps Means-testedvs.

universalisticv2dlunivl

ParticipatoryDemocracyIndex

v2x_partipdem


v2x_polyarchy

ParticipatoryComponentIndex

v2x_partip

Civilsocietyparticipationindex

v2x_cspart

Candidateselection--National/local

v2pscnslnl

CSOconsultation v2cscnsult CSOparticipatory

environmentv2csprtcpt

CSOwomensparticipation

v2csgender

DirectPopularVoteIndex

v2xdd_dd

Initiativespermitted v2ddlegci Initiativessignatures% v2ddsigcip Initiativessignature-

gatheringtimelimitv2ddgrtlci

Initiativessignature-gatheringperiod

v2ddgrgpci

Initiativeslevel v2ddlevci Initiativesparticipation

thresholdv2ddbindci

Initiativesapprovalthreshold

v2ddthreci

Initiativesadministrativethreshold

v2dddistci

Initiativessupermajority v2ddspmjci


37

Occurrenceofcitizen-initiativethisyear

v2ddciniyr

Localgovernmentindex

v2xel_locelec

Localgovernmentelected v2ellocelc Localofficesrelative

powerv2ellocpwr

Localgovernmentexists v2ellocgov Regional

governmentindex

v2xel_regelec

Regionalgovernmentelected

v2elsrgel

Regionalofficesrelativepower

v2elrgpwr

Regionalgovernmentexists

v2elreggov

CoreCivilSociety

Index v2xcs_ccsi

CSOentryandexit v2cseeorgs CSOrepression v2csreprss CSOparticipatory

environmentv2csprtcpt

Party

Institutionalizationindex

v2xps_party

Partyorganizations v2psorgs PartyBranches v2psprbrch Partylinkages v2psprlnks Distinctpartyplatforms v2psplats Legislativeparty

cohesionv2pscohesv

Femalerightsindex v2x_gender

CSOwomensparticipation

v2csgender

Percent(%)FemaleJournalists

v2mefemjrn

Freedomofdomesticmovementforwomen

v2cldmovew

Freedomofdiscussionforwomen

v2cldiscw

Freedomfromforcedlaborforwomen

v2clslavef

Propertyrightsforwomen

v2clprptyw

Accesstojusticeforwomen

v2clacjstw

Powerdistributedbygender

v2pepwrgen


38

ElectoralRegime

Index v2x_elecreg

Legislativeorconstituentassemblyelection

v2xel_elecparl

v2eltype v2eltype_0 v2eltype v2eltype_1 v2eltype v2eltype_4 v2eltype v2eltype_5 Legislature

closeddownoraborted

v2xlg_leginter

Legislaturebicameral v2lgbicam Presidential

election v2xel_elecpres

v2eltype v2eltype_6 v2eltype v2eltype_7 Chiefexecutive

nolongerelected v2x_hosinter

HOS=HOG? v2exhoshog HOGappointmentin

practicev2expathhg

HOSappointmentinpractice

v2expathhs

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