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Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko,...

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Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff
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Page 1: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Course:Game Theory and Psychology

Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli

TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff

Page 2: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Let’s discuss some puzzles of psychology…

Page 3: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Puzzle 1:

Norm against Chemical Weapons

Page 4: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.
Page 5: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Why were chemical weapons the red line?

Why not 100,000 deaths?

Why not wanton murder of civilians?

Page 6: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

This norm reared its head many times before…

Page 7: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

“These flamethrowers were used to kill Japanese holed into pillboxes, buildings and caves. “-Wiki entry for Battle of Iwo Jima

Page 8: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Why flame throwers?

“A strong military case was made for the use of gas before America’s attack on the island of Iwo Jima; Japanese defenders in caves and tunnels would have been particularly vulnerable. Franklin Roosevelt rejected the idea.”-The Economist, The History of Chemical Weapons

Page 9: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

>26,000 American casualties, Iwo Jima, WWII

Page 10: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

“Because all the civilians had been evacuated, there were no civilian casualties at Iwo Jima”

Page 11: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Video Clip: Japanese Soldier Burnt Alive by Flame Thrower

Page 12: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

More humane than chemical weapon?

Page 13: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Thus,

-Chemical weapons would have saved lives!-No civilian casualties either way!-Not obviously “more humane”

Page 14: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

In general:

1) Where do such inefficient norms come from?2) What types of norms occur?

Page 15: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Puzzle 2:

Apologies

Page 16: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Salala Pakistan, Nov 26 2011:US accidentally killed 24 Pakistani Soldiers

Page 17: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Pakistan closed supply routes, until we apologized

Page 18: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

~$1 billion in extra shipping fees

Page 19: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Until July 3 2012

“We are sorry for the losses suffered by the Pakistani military”

-Hilary Clinton

Page 20: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Immediately after…

“…the ground supply lines into Afghanistan are opening”

Page 21: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Why wouldn’t US just say sorry? -mere words? -worth a billion?

Why would Pakistan care?-wouldn’t US “fake it”?

Page 22: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

More generally:

1) Why do mere words matter? 2) When do mere words matter? 3) What about other symbolic gestures (e.g.

coronations, handshakes, etc)?

Page 23: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Puzzle 3:

Why do we consider transgressions of commission worse than those of omission?

Page 24: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

“I won’t kill you…but I don’t have to save you”

Page 25: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Notice:

-Batman’s intention is the same-The outcome is the same-But Batman (and presumably the viewer) thinks omission less bad

Page 26: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

1) Why is omission viewed differently from commission?

2) Is this distinction something we should legally respect or overcome?

Page 27: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

More generally:

1) Where do our moral intuitions come from?2) Do they make a good basis for law?

Page 28: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Puzzle 4:

Where do “rights“ come from?

Page 29: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Self evident? The creator?

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created

equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable

Rights…”

Page 30: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Might?

Page 31: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

The “state of nature”?

Page 32: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

A “social contract”?

Page 33: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

What does this mean?

Page 34: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

1) Where DO rights ACTUALLY come from?2) What can cause them to change? 3) What kind of rights are we likely to observe?

Page 35: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Puzzle 5:

Why does love “blind us”?

Page 36: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

When we get married, we vow, “for better or for worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness, and in health.”

And sometimes, we commit acts of love that are extremely costly…

Page 37: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

End of Last of the Mohicans

Page 38: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Why does love cause us to ignore the costs of the relationship, sometimes to catastrophic

results?

Why doesn’t it just cause us to consider their interests, while being sensitive to the costs?

Page 39: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

In other classes…

Page 40: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Brooks, Alison Wood, Hengchen Dai, and Maurice E. Schweitzer. "I’m Sorry About the Rain! Superfluous Apologies Demonstrate Empathic Concern and Increase Trust." Social Psychological and Personality Science (2013): 1948550613506122.

Page 41: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Super interesting. But does not answer why apologies have this effect…

Page 42: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Acevedo, Bianca P., et al. "Neural correlates of long-term intense romantic love." Social cognitive and affective neuroscience 7.2 (2012): 145-159.

Page 43: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Important to know neural pathways.

But doesn’t explain why love works this way…

Page 44: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Spranca, Mark, Elisa Minsk, and Jonathan Baron. "Omission and commission in judgment and choice." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 27.1 (1991): 76-105.

Page 45: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Important to document.

And to rule out obvious alternative explanations.

But doesn’t explain why…

Page 46: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

In this class…

We will address these “why’s”

…Using game theory

Page 47: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

What is game theory?

Page 48: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

5, 6 8, 4

3, 2 0, -3

U

D

L RThe simplest “game” can be represented by the following “payoff matrix”

Page 49: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

5,6 8, 4

3, 2 0, -3

U

D

L RPlayer 1 chooses between two actions

Page 50: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

5, 6 8, 4

3, 2 0, -3

U

D

L RPlayer 2 simultaneously chooses between 2 actions

Page 51: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

5, 6 8, 4

3, 2 0, -3

U

D

L R

The payoffs to player 1 are determined by her action as well as the action of player 2

Page 52: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

5, 6 8, 4

3, 2 0, -3

U

D

L R

The payoffs to player 2 are determined by her action as well as the action of player 2

Page 53: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

5, 6 8, 4

3, 2 0, -3

U

D

L RThis game can be “solved” by finding the “Nash equilibria”

Page 54: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

5, 6 8, 4

3, 2 0, -3

U

D

L R(U, L) is a Nash Equilibrium b/c neither can benefit by unilaterally deviating

Page 55: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

“Prediction” of game theory:

If both “expected” (U,L), both would play (U,L)!

(Nash is “self enforcing”)

Page 56: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

5, 6 8, 4

3, 2 0, -3

U

D

L R(U,R) is NOT a Nash Equilibrium b/c 2 can benefit by unilaterally deviating to L

Page 57: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Game theory “predicts”:

If both expected (U,R), player 2 would deviate!

(I.e. if not Nash, cannot be “stable”)

Page 58: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Nash makes sense (arguably) if…

-Uber-rational

-Calculating

Page 59: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Such as Auctions…

Page 60: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Or Oligopolies…

Page 61: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

But why would game theory matter for our puzzles?

Page 62: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Norms/rights/morality/emotions are not chosen; rather…

We believe we have rights!

We feel batman would be worse if he killed

Apologies matter because recipients feel nice when they hear them

Page 63: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

But…

From where do these feelings/beliefs come?

Page 64: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Our thesis (in a few steps):

Page 65: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that “do better” become “more frequent”

Page 66: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that “do better” become “more frequent”

Because of “evolution” (people with certain beliefs or preferences die out?)

Page 67: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that “do better” become “more frequent”

Because of “selective imitation”(people with certain beliefs or preferences are more likely to be imitated?)

Page 68: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that “do better” become “more frequent”

Because of “reinforcement learning”(certain beliefs or preferences are held onto more tenaciously?)

Page 69: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that do better become more frequent

behavior ends up consistent with Nash (o.w. feelings/beliefs would change!)

(even though not conscious of Nash, or of where feelings come from)

Page 70: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that do better become more frequent

behavior ends up consistent with Nash (o.w. feelings/beliefs would change!)

(even though not conscious of Nash, or of where feelings come from)

Page 71: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that do better become more frequent

behavior ends up consistent with Nash (o.w. feelings/beliefs would change!)

(even though not aware of game, or of where feelings/beliefs come from)

Page 72: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

In detail…

Page 73: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

What is the key assumption in evolution, imitation, reinforcement learning?

Page 74: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

T=0 T=1

Evolution

More successful traits reproduce faster

Page 75: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

T=0 T=1

Selective Imitation

More successful traits more likely to be imitated

Page 76: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

T=0 T=1

Reinforcement Learning

More successful behaviors held more tenaciously

Page 77: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

All 3 processes “optimal behaviors”!

Page 78: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

T=0 T=1 T=2 T=3

Page 79: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Also true in a game…

Page 80: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

T=0 T=1

L

L

L L

L

L

L

R

RR

RR

R R

L L

More successful strategies become more frequent

Page 81: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

T=0 T=1 T=2 T=3

L

L

L

L L

L

L

L

R

RR

RR

R R

L

L

L

L L

L

L

L

R

RL

R R

LL

L

L

And eventually take over…

Page 82: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

What if beliefs/feelings are being learned/evolving instead of “strategies”?

Page 83: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Suppose BL is belief that causes action L to be taken

Page 84: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

T=0 T=1

BL

BL

BL

BL BL

BL

BL

BL

BR

BRBR

BRBR

BR BR

BL

Feelings/beliefs that do better become more frequent

Page 85: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

T=0 T=1 T=2 T=3

BL

BL

BL

BL BL

BL

BL

BL

BR

BRBR

BRBR

BR BR

BL

BL

BL

BL BL

BL

BL

BL

BL

BRBL

BR BR

BLBL

BL

BL

Behavior ends up consistent with Nash

(even though not conscious of Nash, or of where feelings come from)

Page 86: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

How do we know?

Page 87: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

We will …-show model “fits” puzzles, and no alternative can… -develop novel predictions and validate with evidence…-show model is powerful outside of psychology …-demonstrate assumptions…-show robust

Page 88: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Who cares?

Page 89: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Novel prescriptions:

e.g.Should our legal system treat omission and commission differently?

(NO!)

Should we attend to our emotions like love or try to overcome them?

(Falling in love pays!)

Page 90: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Novel Predictions:

e.g. Is commission worse than omission for all types of

judgments?

(We predict don’t care for how much you trust but does matter for how much you punish)

Page 91: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Clarifies:

e.g. What are rights?What is a symbolic gesture?

Page 92: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

Skills you’ll gain:

– Basic game theory• How to solve. • Including some famous models like the “prisoners’ dilemma” and “Hawk-Dove”

– Basic evolutionary dynamics• How to simulate• Including famous models like the “replicator dynamic”

– Basic experimental methods• How to evaluate• At the end of the class, you will design experiments to provide more evidence (or not!)

And… an understanding of where preferences and ideologies come from!

Page 93: Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff.

And now, for some logistics…


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