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Creating a Culture of Safety:Challenges in Ophthalmology
James P. Bagian, MD, PEDirector, Center for Health Engineering
University of MichiganFounding Director, VA National Center for Patient
Ensuring Correct Surgical Care
• What was the objective?
• What have we done?
• How have we done?
• What have we learned?
• What remains to be done?
What Was The Objective?
• Patient gets the best care possible• Diagnose and treat as intended
• No inadvertent harm• Incorrect surgery (aka Wrong-sided surgery)• SSI/HAI/DVT
What Have We Done?
• Public & Professional Recognition of Problem• NQF, Joint Commission, AAOS, AAO, etc.
• Guidelines, Regulations, etc.• NQF Serious Reportable Events• Joint Commission National Patient Safety
Goals• State, local, and organizational actions
American Academy of Ophthalmology
• Steps Prior to Day of Surgery• “clinic and surgery areas…specific data be
passed between sites via written documentation rather than verbal”
• Steps On the Day of Surgery• “…proper eye should clearly be notated on
the consent form. “• “person who marks the eye should use written
documentation with verbal verification” • Timeout – All team members, patient, side,
implant, etc. Use “Hard Stop” if required
American Academy of Ophthalmology
• Checklist for the Surgery Chart • Pre-Op Area
• Patient ID, Procedure, Side• Eye marked
• Operating Room• Patient ID – name and birth date• Procedure & Side• Proper Implant – Style and Power• “Prior to draping, circulating nurse ensures that
operative plan is visible (post drape) so that the surgeon can read it while gowned and gloved. “
• “The circulating nurse writes the patient's name, operative eye, IOL style, and IOL power on the white board. “
How Have We Done? - VA
• 2001-2006 Experience (All Specialties)• 108 OR adverse events reported• Ophthalmology and Orthopedics the highest
reports although not most common procedures
• Communication (inadequate timeout) and Patient Mis-Identification played major role
• Wrong side >40%• Wrong Implant >30%• Wrong Site/Patient/Procedure each approx.
10%Neily et al. Incorrect Surgical Procedures …Arch Surg 2009 Nov;144(11):1028-34
What Have We Learned? - VA
• Actions needed well before entering the OR• Timeout period is too late in many cases• Systems-based approaches beyond individual
• Involvement of all disciplines
• Structured communication that drives discussion• Briefings & debriefings, Medical Team
Training essential
Supporting Long Term Memory
• Checklists• Put knowledge in the world vs. in the head • Recognition is better than recall
• Checklist Philosophy• “Read and Verify” checklists• “Read and Do” checklists
Vertical Hierarchy
• “Silence Kills”. Team members uncomfortable “speaking up” when something does not seem right in a patient’s care, leading to patient harm.
• Poor communication between team members leading to a lack of situational awareness and a poor clinical decision resulting in patient harm.
• Did Medical Team Training (MTT) improve either of these baseline healthcare problems in our Organization?
Has MTT improved the Care of the Veteran?
• “Catches” in the Operating Room.
• Surgical morbidity and mortality.
Improved OR Efficiency Following MTT
Following MTT . . .
MTT Status Update June 1, 2009, 110 Facilities.
0
2
4
6
8
10%
Tu
rno
ve
r P
er
Ye
ar
Pre Post
Operating Room
Nursing Turnover
P = 0.02
45 Operating Rooms and 35 Intensive Care Units
Pre = 12 Months Prior to Learning Session
Post = 12 Months Following Learning Session
2525
Outcomes – Morbidity / MortalityObserved / Expected Mortality Ratios
Quarters of MTT
August 19, 2009 MTT Preliminary Report : N = 99 facilities.
P = 0.03
Summary - Gaps• Systems Approach – Surgical issues must be
dealt with in the extended peri-operative period, not solely in the OR • Entire system of care must be examined and engineered
with desired results in mind – avoid unintended consequences
• Patient Identification• Antibiotic Prophylaxis• DVT Prophylaxis
• Implant Use
• Checklist-guided briefings and debriefings• Can’t rely on individuals being careful (vigilant)
• Team Training – start in initial training & sustain• More than SBAR – Leadership Must Be Involved