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Socorro Ramirez vs Court of Appeals
No. 2
Case Digests: Statutory Construction
Socorro Ramirez vs Court of Appeals
248 SCRA 590
G. R. No. 93833
September 25 1995
Facts:
A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the RTC of Quezon City
alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner
offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality, “contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy.”
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event. The transcript on
which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping
the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the RTC of Pasay
City for violation of RA 4200, entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wiretapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication, and Other Purposes.”
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense particularly a violation of RA 4200.
The trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner.
From the trial court’s Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with
this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the CA.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court’s order
null and void.
Issue:
W/N RA 4200 applies to taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to a conversation.
Held:
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of
a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible
or absurd or would lead to an injustice.
Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized
by all parties to any private communication, to secretly record such communication by means of
a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by
the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording
is underscored by the use of qualifier “any.” Consequently, as respondent CA correctly
concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this provision of RA
4200.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision therefore plainly supports the view held
by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Stat Con Principle: Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
Legal Maxims: Verba Legis (the statute must be interpreted literally if the language of the statute
is plain and free from ambiguity)
VERSION 2
Facts of the case: Soccoro Ramirez was scolded by Ester Garcia inside Garcia’s office. Ramirez
taped the conversation and later filed charges against Garcia for insulting and humiliating her,
using as evidence the transcript of the conversation, based on the tape recording.
Garcia filed criminal charges against Ramirez for violating the anti-wire tapping act, because it
was done without her knowledge and consent. Ramirez claimed that what the law forbids is for
other parties, who are not part of the conversation, to record it using the instruments enumerated
in the law (there was an earlier case that was dismissed because the instrument used was not
mentioned in the law).
The trial court ruled in favor of Ramirez, granting a motion to quash on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, but the Court of Appeals reversed it.
Ratio: First, the court noted that the provision makes it clear that it is illegal for any person to
secretly record a conversation, unless authorized by all parties involved.
“The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought
to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.”
The congressional records also showed that the intent was that permission must be sought from
all parties in the conversation. “This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken
without the authorization of all the parties,” Sen. Tanada said during the deliberations.
“The provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law
makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.”
Decision: Petition denied. Decision of CA affirmed. Costs against Ramirez.
Pedro vs Ramirez (????)
Facts: In the late afternoon, Ramirez, the accused fired his pistol
at Alo Zaragoza four times in various parts of the body.
Zaragoza died two hours later. It was not disputed that the
shooting was preceded by a conversation between Ramirez and
Zaragoza in a restaurant in Tayug. Seated at same table were
Ramirez’s companion, Espero, Mamenta, Carbonel and Castulo.
At another table were two other acquaintances, Robosa and
Arestado, who both could see the group through the doorway.
The conversation was about the setting up of “jueteng”
gambling operation in the town although it was unclear who was
precisely making the proposal. Soon after the conversation,
Zaragoza became agitated and stood up, angrily uttering some
words and pounding the table with his hand. Ramirez also stood
up and walked away from the table, towards the comfort room.
A few minutes later, Zaragoza also walked out of the room.
From this point, two different versions were offered by the
prosecution and the defense.
Prosecution side: After leaving the room, Zaragoza stopped
between two tables in the main eating area to drink beer from
the mug he was holding. While he was standing and drinking,
Ramirez suddenly appeared and fired three shots at Zaragoza.
Alarmed, Robosa grabbed Ramirez to prevent him from firing
more shots, but Ramirez was able to squeeze another shot at
Zaragoza before losing his balance. The pistol slipped from
Ramirez hand, but accused was able to recover it immediately.
Ramirez fired a shot at Robosa but missed. Soon after, Ramirez
fled from the restaurant.
Defense side: According to Ramirez, it was Zaragoza who
suggested the jueteng operation. When he refused, Zaragoza
became agitated and cursed him for not accepting the proposal.
Moreover, he claimed that Zaragoza threatened to kill him when
the latter tried to borrow a gun from his companion. In order to
avoid trouble, he quickly went to the toilet. On his way out,
Carbonel told him that he should go home directly as Zaragoza
was very angry. Accused claimed that he shoved Carbonel and
walked towards the main room. On his way to the main room, he
saw Zaragoza cursing him and saying “I am going to kill you.”
Because of Zaragoza’s previous threat, he quickly drew his
pistol and fired at Zaragoza while fleeing the restaurant.
Accused claimed that he was merely acting on self-defense.
The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty.
Issue: Whether the Regional Trial Court erred in finding the
defendant guilty of murder and in disregarding the evidence of
self-defense
Held: Defendant is guilty. The consideration of self-defense is
out of question. Regional Trial Court’s decision is affirmed.
The Court struck out the possibility of unlawful aggression on
the part of Zaragoza because evidence obtained from both sides,
point to the fact that Zaragoza had no gun or weapon of any
other sort when he emerged from the main room. The evidence
was that Zaragoza was merely holding a glass of beer.
Ramirez’s contention that Zaragoza threatened to kill him was
untenable because there is nothing but defendant’s
uncorroborated testimony to establish this. Even assuming that
Ramirez’s testimony was true, he should have quickly seen that
Zaragoza bore no arms and was launching nothing more perilous
than a verbal onslaught. Clearly, there was no well-grounded
fear of imminent danger to defendant’s life by reason of any real
or perceived unlawful aggression on the part of Zaragoza. Thus,
without the unlawful aggression element, self-defense should be
removed from the equation.
G.R. No. 162540
July 13, 2009
GEMMA T. JACINTO,
Petitionervs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RespondentPERALTA,
J
.:
A petition for review on
certiorari
filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appealsaffirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Facts:
Baby Aquino handed petitioner Gemma Jacinto a Banco De Oro (BDO) Check in the amount of
P10,000.00. The check waspayment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and
petitioner was then the collector of MegaFoam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank
account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the
former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.Later, Rowena Ricablanca, another
employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank,who was looking for
Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO checkdeposited in
his account had been dishonored. Ricablanca then called and relayed the message through accusedAnita
Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but
theycould be reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at
Mega Foam.Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed
Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquinoto replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to
take the cash and divide it equally intofour: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline
Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam'saccountant, reported the matter to the owner of
Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to
confirm that the latter indeed handedpetitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 as payment for her purchases
from Mega Foam. Baby Aquino furthertestified that petitioner Jacinto also called her on the phone to tell
her that the BDO check bounced. Verificationfrom company records showed that petitioner never
remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, BabyAquino said that she had already paid Mega
Foam P10,000.00 cash as replacement for the dishonored check.Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapmentoperation with its agents. Ten
pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were marked and dusted withfluorescent powder by the
NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that shewas going along
with Valencia's plan.Ricablanca, petitioner, her husband, and Valencia then boarded petitioner's jeep and
went on to Baby Aquino'sfactory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the premises of
Baby Aquino, pretending that shewas getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually
brought out from the premises was theP10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco.
Ricablanca divided the money and uponreturning to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and
petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia werearrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole
time.A case was filed against the three accused, Jacinto, Valencia and Capitle. RTC rendered its
Decisionfinding them
GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
QUALIFIED THEFT
and sentenced eachimprisonment of
FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS,
as minimum
, to SIX(6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS,
as maximum
.The three appealed to the CA and the decision of the trial court was
MODIFIED
, in that:(a) thesentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands; (b) the sentence against accused Anita
Valencia isreduced to 4 months
arresto mayor
medium, and (c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted. Hence,the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari
filed by petitioner alone,
Issue:
Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft.
Held:
As may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code,
the personal property subject of thetheft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to
gain
from the thing stolen
. This isfurther bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the
accused isdependent on the value of the thing stolen.In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated
check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparentlywithout value, as it was subsequently
dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime of qualified theftwas actually produced. The
Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
Intod v. Court of Appeals
is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In
Intod (see doctrines laid out inIntod)
, the Court went on to give an example of
an offense that involved factual impossibility,
i.e.
, a man puts hishand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets
nothing since the pocket isempty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given in
Intod.
In this case,petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime
against property.Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check
meant for Mega Foamshowed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the
check bounced, she would havereceived the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore,
it was only due to the extraneouscircumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner
at the time, that prevented the crime frombeing produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned
out to be absolutely worthless, because the checkwas eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had
received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.The fact that petitioner was later entrapped
receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which she thought was thecash replacement for the dishonored check, is of
no moment. The Court held in
Valenzuela v. People
that under thedefinition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code there is only one operative act of
execution by the actorinvolved in theft
─
the taking of personal property of another.”
As of the time that petitioner took possessionof the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to
consummate the crime of theft,had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case
. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino togive cash as replacement for the check was hatched only
after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank.Since the crime of theft is not a continuing
offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not beconsidered as a continuation of the
theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked moneywas merely corroborating
evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to
have the dishonored check replaced with cash by its issuer is adifferent and separate fraudulent scheme.
Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included or covered by theallegations in the Information, the
Court cannot pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would violatethe due process clause of the
Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been another possiblesource of criminal
liability.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
GRANTED
. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, are
MODIFIED
.Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found
GUILTY
of an
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
as defined and penalized in Articles 4,paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively.
Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six(6) months of
arrresto mayor
, and to pay the costs.
Version 2
Jacinto v People
Petitioner had been convicted of
qualified theft and is now seeking
for a reversal of thedecision.
Facts:
Jacinto along with Valencia and Capitle was
charged with qualified theft for having stole
and deposited acheck with an amount of
10,000 php. Such check was issued by Baby
Aquino for payment of her purchasesfrom
Mega Foam, but the check
bounced.Dyhengco found out about the theft
and filed a complaint with the NBI. An
entrapment operation wasconducted, with the
use of marked bills. The entrapment was a
success and the petitioner along with her co-
accused was arrested.
Issue:
Whether this can constitute as an impossible
crime and not as qualified theft
Held:
This constitutes as an impossible crime.The
requistites of an impossible crime are:1. that the
act performed would be an offense against
persons or property
(all acts to consummate thecrime of qualified theft
was consummated – crime against property)
2. that the act was done with evil intent
(mere act of unlawful taking showed intent to
gain)
3. that its accomplishment was inherently
impossible or the means employed was either
inadequate or ineffectual – or the extraneous
circumstance that constituted it as a factual
impossibility
(the fact that thecheck bounced)
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended
acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime.(Impossibility of killing a dead person)
Factual impossibility – when extraneous
circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond
his controlprevent consummation of the intended
crime. (Like the example in the case of Intod: a
man puts hishand on the coat pocket of another
with intent to steal but gets nothing since the pocket
is empty)
From the time the petitioner took possession of
the check meant for Mega Foam, she had
performed all theacts to consummate the
crime of theft, had it not been impossible of
accomplishment in this case.Replacement for
the check was no longer necessary for the
consummation of the crime since the crime
of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioners
act of receiving the cash replacement should
not be considered
as a continuation of the theft. The fact that the
petitioner was caught receiving the marked
money wasmerely corroborating evidence to
strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
CASE DIGEST ON PEOPLE v.
SUMALPONG [284 SCRA 464 (1998)]
November 10, 2010
Nature: Appeal from a decision of RTC Cotabato City (1998)
FACTS: On Jan 12, 1994, 8PM, Arola Dilangalen & Mohammad Managuili escorted home their
friend, Jukaris Buan, to Nayon Shariff Kabunsuan on a service owned by 1 Nong Fred. After
dropping off their friend. The 3 went on their way home. Dilangalen & Managuili asked to be
dropped off at 4J Pizza House along Notre Dame Avenue to eat. After w/c, while waiting for a
tricycle to take them home, they saw 4 men near an electric post 5 meters away from the 4J Pizza
Hse entrance. W/o warning, the 4 men suddenly & simultaneously stabbed them. Arola
Dilangalen died of hemmorhage & antecedent multiple wounds while Managuili, who sustained
stab wounds on his right anterior-axillary line, was still rushed to the ER. He was confined for
2nts. On Jan 14 ’94, Police Officer Tayong brought before him 5 persons including appellant
Gerry Sumalpong for identification purposes. He was positively identified by Managuili as 1 of
the assailants. Dilangalen’s mother testified that they spent PhP70K for the burial of her son &
for other Muslim ceremonies for the dead.
Two of the 4 men remain at large. Only Sumalpong and Fernando were convicted w/ the crimes
of murder and frustrated murder. For their defense, both gave their defense of alibi. Fernando
said he was working then from 7-10pm at his employer’s shop, making balusters (railings),
taking only 10 min breaks for lunch and supper. He denied previously knowing the accused.
However, his employer testified that in making balusters, they had to wait for 4 hrs from the time
they poured mixed cement into the molding till it hardened. During this wait, Fernando would
usually go home to eat and sleep and one would just wake him up when his services were again
needed. Sumalpong, on the other hand, claimed that he was a home reading in the evening of
Jan 12. This was attested to by his father.
The court held that their defenses were of no merit. The residence of Fernando was just a few
minutes ride from the scene of the crime. And it was unusual for Sumalpong, a college student,
to be at home and asleep at such an early time in the evening. Moreover, both were positively
identified by victim Managuili as those who attacked them. The court found the presence of
treachery in the sudden and simultaneous attack against the victims who were unarmed and
unsuspecting. It also believed that there was conspiracy among the accused. But w/o
explanation, it found that evident premeditation aggravated the crime. Thus, it imposed upon
both the penalty of death for the fatal stabbing of Dilangalen and reclusion temporal maximum
for the wounding of Managuili, w/ damages.
Both appeal that in the clear absence of any generic aggravating circumstance attending the
murder, appellants may be sentenced only to reclusion perpetua, not death.
HELD: Evident premeditation and even voluntary surrender were wrongly appreciated by the
trial court. Appellant Fernando claim that he voluntary surrendered to the brgy capt. However,
it was shown that the police had tried to arrest him prior but he implicitly allowed his father to
conceal his presence. When the brgy capt came, he submitted himself only w/ the assurance of
his safety. His surrender then was not of his own knowing and unconditional accord as required
by law. It has been held that if the only reason for the accused’s supposed surrender is to ensure
his safety, his arrest being inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous and not voluntary.
The court re premeditacion conocida did not make any ratiocination or analysis as to how or why
it was appreciated. For evident premeditation to aggravate a crime, there must be proof, as clear
as the evidence of the crime itself, of the ff elements: (1) the time when the offender determined
to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; & (3)
sufficient laps of time between determination & execution, to allow himself to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. The SolGen correctly observed that these requisites were not duly
established by the prosecution.
Absent any clear and convincing evidence of evident premeditation or other aggr/mit
circumstances, the penalty imposable for the murder of Dilangalen is reclusion perpetua (A63(2)
RPC).
The penalty for the attempt on Managuili’s life is prision mayor in its medium period.
However, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable against appellants is
4 yrs & 2 mos of prision correccional medium, as minimum, to 10yrs of prision mayor medium,
as maximum.
Both sentences shall be served successively. Assailed decision modified.
Case Digest on PEOPLE VS. CUPINO G.R.
No. 125688. March 31, 2000.
November 26, 2010
Cupino and Dejoras were charged and convicted for conspiring to commit murder.
Held:
Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself through clear and convincing
evidence, not merely by conjecture. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of
conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity. Hence, conspiracy exists in a situation where at the time the malefactors were
committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted
effort to bring about the death of the victim. In a great majority of cases, complicity was
established by proof of acts done in concert, i.e., acts that yielded the reasonable inference that
the doers thereof were acting with a common intent or design. Therefore, the task in every case is
determining whether the particular acts established by the requisite quantum of proof do
reasonably yield that inference.”
PEOPLE vs. REYNALDO VILLANUEVA Y MARQUEZG.R. NO. 172697September 25, 2007
Facts:
In the morning of January 21, 2000, appellant, Reynaldo Villanueva, then 31 years old, killed hisniece
Angelica Villanueva, aged 8, by boxing her on the head and kicking her several times
onthe different parts of her body. Appellant also mauled his nephews Rexie Villanueva and
EnriqueVillanueva, Jr., aged 5 and 2, respectively.Angelica died of massive brain edema, cerebral
contusion, subdural hemorrhage due to mauling.Rexie sustained injuries, which could have
resulted to massive brain edema and his subsequentdeath, were it not for the medical
intervention. Enrique, Jr. suffered a broken mouth and wasconfined at the Baguio General
Hospital (BGH) for four days. Consequently, appellant was charged with murder for the death of
Angelica, frustrated murder for the serious injuries suffered by Rexie, and attempted murder for the
injuries inflicted on Enrique, Jr.Appellant pleaded insanity. He claimed that he did not know that he killed
his niece Angelicaand that he mauled his nephews Rexie and Enrique, Jr. A doctor testified that appellant
issuffering from a mental disorder classified as schizophrenia, paranoid, episodic with
interepisoderesidual symptoms characterized by intermittent episodes of psychotic signs and
symptoms.The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, frustrated murder,
andattempted murder, which the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification.
Issue:
Whether appellant should be acquitted on the ground of insanity.
Held:
The defense failed to prove that appellant was completely deprived of intelligence in committingthe
dastardly acts. Proof of the existence of some abnormalities in the mental faculties will notexempt the
accused from culpability, if it was shown that he was not completely deprived of f r e e d o m
a n d i n t e l l i ge n c e . A p p e l l a n t ' s r e c o l l e c t i o n o f t h e e ve n t s p r i o r t o t h e c r i me s a n d
h i s emotions afterwards indicate that he was sane before, during, and after the commission
of thecrimes.The CA correctly appreciated appellant's mental disorder as a mitigating circumstance
under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code. There is no dispute that appellant has a history of
mental illness. He was diagnosed to be suffering from Schizophrenia, Paranoid, Episodic
withInterepisode Residual Symptoms which began in 1985 and was characterized by
intermittentepisodes of psychotic signs and symptoms since then until appellant's examination on June
21,2000. Such illness diminished the exercise of appellant's will power without however deprivinghim of
the consciousness of his acts.Judgment affirmed with modifications
Licyayo vs. People- Sufficient Provocation
and Intoxication
G.R. No. 169425, March 4, 2008
FACTS:
Licyayo was charged of Homicide with the RTC when he stabbed Rufino in different parts of the
body. The RTC convicted Licyayo guilty of the crime Homicide there being no attending
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
The petitioner appealed contending that sufficient provocation and intoxication should be taken
as mitigating circumstances attendant in the case. He insisted that there is sufficient provocation
because it was the deceased who punched him first and when the incident ensued he was
intoxicated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not sufficient provocation and intoxication should be considered as mitigating
circumstances attendant in the case.
HELD:
The records do not sufficiently establish who between Rufino and Aron started the brawl which
resulted in the stabbing of Rufino by petitioner. Granting arguendo that there was unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim, it is obvious that immediately he became the underdog,
literally even. He was easily overpowered by the bigger and sober Aron Licyayo. Sufficient
provocation therefore cannot be appreciated in favor of the petitioner.
As testified by the police officers, they said that petitioner indeed was drunk when the scuffle
ensued. However, these testimonies alone do not suffice as proof to appreciate intoxication as a
mitigating circumstance. In the case at bar, there is no plausible evidence showing that the
quantity of liquor taken by petitioner was of such quantity as to affect his mental faculties. On
the contrary, the fact that petitioner could recall the details that transpired during and after his
drinking session with friends is the best proof that he knew what he was doing during the
incident.
Francisco vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 108747
April 6, 1995
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Facts:
Petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, upon humiliating his employees, was accused of multiple grave oral
defamation in five (5) separate Informations instituted by five of his employees, each Information
charging him with gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61, found
petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, guilty of grave oral defamation, in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against
him, and sentenced him to a prison term of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and eight (8)
months of prision correccional "in each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the
information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena
Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for
attorney's fees, plus costs of suit. However, he was acquitted in for persistent failure of the offended
party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify.
Issue:
(a) Whether petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation even after appealing his conviction to the
RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of the penalties imposed.
Held:
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based on the
assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just because of
their demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity and serious
consequences of the offense they might further commit.
The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who have been convicted of grave felonies as
defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of the Revised Penal Code, and not necessarily those who have
been convicted of multiple offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse.
Hence, the basis of the disqualification of the petitioner is principally on the gravity of the offense
committed and the concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not
exceeding six (6) years are not generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of
probation.
The Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in each of the
above entitled cases and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance which is analogous to
passion or obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the said accused in each case to a straight penalty of
eight months imprisonment, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law; and to pay the costs.
The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which necessarily must
be after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the application for probation with the
trial court, is to stretch the law beyond comprehension. The law, simply, does not allow probation after
an appeal has been perfected.
Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive
remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by the MeTC although the imposed penalties
were already probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted only his innocence and did not even raise the
issue of the propriety of the penalties imposed on him, and finally, he filed an application for probation
outside the period for perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the instant
petition for review should be as it is hereby DENIED.