Alvarez v CFI (G.R. No. 45358. January 29, 1937)64 Phil. 33

FACTS:

The chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender, charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person. Judge issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the petitioners house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law. On June 4, 1936, around 7 PM, the agents raided the subject place and seized different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc

Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of the judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned to him because the SW issued was illegal.

On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for further investigation. When the judge sustained the latters motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void.

ISSUE:

WON search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has been based upon the affidavit of agent Mariano G. Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a basis for the issuance of the warrant but that he had knowledge thereof through mere information secured from a person whom he considered reliable.RULING:

That the search and seizure made are illegal for the following reasons: (a) Because the warrant was based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal knowledge of the facts necessary to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause, and (b) because the warrant was issued for the sole purpose of seizing evidence which would later be used in the criminal proceedings that might be instituted against the petitioner, for violation of the Anti- Usury Law

Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58 require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce

The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused.

The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness.ASIAN SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitionervHON. JOSE HERRERA, respondentFacts:Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge Jose Herrera of the City Court of Manila, and to command respondents to return immediately the documents, papers, receipts and records alleged to have been illegally seized thereunder by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) led by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta, Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in connection with an undocketed criminal case for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian Surety and Insurance Co., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office at Room 200 Republic Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila.Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division of the NBI entered the premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and served the search warrant upon Atty. Alidio of the insurance company, in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman of the board of directors of the insurance firm. After the search they seized and carried away two (2) carloads of documents, papers and receipts.Issue:Whether or not the search warrant is void.Ruling:In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses of : (1) estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit command of Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search warrant of October 27, 1965, is nullified and set aside, and the respondents are hereby ordered to return immediately all documents, papers and other objects seized or taken thereunder. Without costs.STONEHILL v DIOKNO

FACTS

Several judges issued on different dates a total of 42 search warrants against the petitioners and/or the corporations of which they were officers, to take books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, receipts as means used or intended to commit offense in violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Code, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.

Police proceeded the search and seizure both in the petitioners residences and offices of the corporations. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.

On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.

HELD

Petitioners have no cause of action to question legality of search warrant ordering the search of the corporation because corporations have separate and distinct personality from the petitioners, and this is regardless of the shares of stock each of them has in said corporations.

Legality of the seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired and objection thereto is purely personal and cannot be availed by third parties.

Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things to be seized. The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.

Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the circumstances.

Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different from that of the corporation.

DISSENT:

Aggrieved Person Doctrine

A person has legal standing where he is in a position to be directly aggrieved/benefitted from the adjudication of a case. Petitioners owned the matters seized and they control the premises searched.

PEOPLE VS MAGO GR No. L-27360

FACTS:

On November 4, 1966, Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, together with his group intercepted two trucks at the Agripina Circle, Ermita, Manila, and the two trucks were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. The interception was based to the information that misdeclared and undervalued personal effects would be released from the customs zone of Port of Manila.Alagao and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs conducted surveillance of the two trucks allegedly carrying the goods.

Subsequently, the owner of the cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa (owner of the truck Mago has hired to carry the goods) filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the trucks were seized without a search warrant. Forthwith, the order had been issued by Judge Hilarion to prevent the bales from opening. However, when the restraining order was received, some bales were already opened.

Furthermore, upon hearing, the lower court with respondent Hilarion issued an order releasing the goods to Remedios Mago upon filing her bond. The decision of Judge Hilarion prompted the petitioners to file a petition for prohibition and certiorari citing that the court and Judge Hilarion has no jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE:

WON the inception and seizure of goods without warrant is in contravention with Magos constitutional rights.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, stating that there is no violation of constitutional rights despite the absence of search warrant.

The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the case at bar. The code allows entering, passing through, or searching any land, enclosure, warehouse, store, or building, not being a dwelling house and also to inspect, search, and examine any vessel or aircraft and any truck, package, or envelope of any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast, or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases with exception to the dwelling house.

The Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession and control, even if no warrant of seizure and detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Case Title: DR. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, petitioner, vs. THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC Manila, Branch 33 and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. 82870 December 14, 1989

Topic:Search and Seizure

Facts:

On October 31, 1987 Saturday, Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33, presided over by respondent Judge Abelardo Dayrit, an application for the issuance of a search warrant, docketed therein as SEARCH WARRANT NO. 87-14, for VIOLATION OF PD NO. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Nemesis E. Prudente, Defendant."

Prudente was the president of Polytechnic University of the Philippines, of which premises he hides the firearms and ammunitions without license to possess, likewise to be used in committing an offense. Major Dimagmaliw presented Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, OIC of the Intelligence Section of (ISAD)as witness, which Judge Dayrit asked some questions in connection to the issuance of search warrant.

In the search warrant, several firearms and ammunitions were mentioned to in possession of the petitioner, however during the search, only 3 live fragmentation hand grenades were confiscated.

Petitioner's Contention:

The petitioner attack the validity of the search warrant issued against him by the respondents, in three propositions:

1. That the judge executed the search warrant with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, since probable cause was not established based on personal knowledge of the applicant and his witness.

2. That the area to be searched is general in its terms, since it was not specified what room in the second floor of the university be subject of the searched.

3. That the applicant forgot to comply with Supreme Court Circulars pertaining to search warrant issued after regular office hours, which a reason must be provided for the urgency of issuing the search warrant.

4. That the search warrant did not provide the specific crime committed by the petitioner in relation to his violation to P.D 1866.

Respondents Contention:

That it is based on reliable information and confirmed through a surveillance in the aforementioned university.

Issue:WON the search warrant issued against Prudente is valid.

Court Decisions:

Lower Court: Ruled against the petitioner

Appellate Court: Ruled against the petitioner

Supreme Court:

a. Majority Decision :

No, the search warrant is declared invalid. Nevertheless, the SC ruled that based on the second third and fourth assailed errors of the lower courts by the petitioner, it did not render the search warrant invalid.

The designation of the places to be searched sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction that a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, even if there were several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.

Also, the SC held that it would suffice to state that the circular merely provides for a guideline, departure from which would not necessarily affect the validity of an otherwise valid search warrant.

Moreover, the SC opined that it has long been a practice in the investigative and prosecution arm of the government, to designate the crime of illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives as 'illegal possession of firearms, etc.' The Constitution as well as the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not recognize the issuance of one search warrant for illegal possession of firearms, one warrant for illegal possession of ammunitions, and another for illegal possession of explosives. Neither is the filing of three different informations for each of the above offenses sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The usual practice adopted by the courts is to file a single information for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. This practice is considered to be in accordance with Section 13, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that: 'A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.

With regard to the first assailed error, the respondent Judge did not take the deposition of the applicant as required by the Rules of Court. As held in Roan v. Gonzales, mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record."

Furthermore, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows that it was too brief and short. Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching questions and answers." On the contrary, the questions asked were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. As held in Quintero vs. NBI," the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant."

Manifestly, in the case at bar, the evidence failed to show the existence of probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. SC also notes post facto that the search in question yielded, no armalites, handguns, pistols, assorted weapons or ammunitions as stated in the application for search warrant, the supporting deposition, and the search warrant the supporting hand grenades were itself Only three (3) live fragmentation found in the searched premises of the PUP, according to the affidavit of an alleged member of the searching party.

b. Dissenting Opinion:Doctrines/Definition of Terms:

Probable Cause Personal knowledge

The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and the affiant be held liable for damage caused. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant for search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely reported by a person whom one considers to be reliable.

CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, et al vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, et al.

FACTS:Prior to August 6, 1984, AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case No. MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She was then still at large.On August 6 @ 11:30AM, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. According to the petitioners, at 12:00 NN, the elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City. Therespondents alleged that the search was conducted "late on the same day"; that is late on august 6th.

On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined to be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doa Andrea cases.

In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following circumstances were stated: the Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mila Aguilar-Roque, Accused, Search Warrant No. 80- 84 for rebellion" (the SEARCH WARRANT CASE). Judge Panos Court was Branch 88; It does not appear from the records that an application in writing was submitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno to Judge Pao; according to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus, were examined under oath by Judge Pao but only the deposition of S/A Lapus has been submitted to the Court. The latter deposed that to his personal knowledge, there were kept in the premises to be searched records, documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA and the National Democratic Front, including support money from foreign and local sources intended to be used for rebellion.

In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th the petitioners alleged that: TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was arrested by the searching party presumably without a warrant of arrest; the searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, and additionally a portable typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all; according to the Return, submitted in the search warrant on August 10th, the search was made in the presence of Dra. MarcianaGalang, owner of the premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. No mention was made that TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428 articles and documents attached to the Return was signed by the two Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.

The three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, were charged before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (the CITY FISCAL, for short) upon complaint filed by the CSG against petitioners for "Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion."

ISSUE:

WON THE SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT WAS VALID?

WON THE SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT IS INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST?

RULING:

NO, the search is invalid.

Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities to be seized as follows:

Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the Phihppines/New Peoples Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise available to the public, and support money from foreign or local sources.

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for being too general.

The applicant's witnesses are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof.

2. NO, the search is not a valid search incidental to lawful arrest.

Section 12.Search without warrant of person arrested.A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.

The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without a search warrant, of a person who had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was made can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application of general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be searched. 12 "What must be considered is the balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals.

Valmonte v. De Villa

G.R. No. 83988 (173 SCRA 211)

September 29, 1989

TOPIC: SEARCH and SEIZURE: The Checkpoint Case

FACTS:

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region.As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For Peoples Rights (ULAP) sought thedeclaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people.

Petitioners contention:

Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.

Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn ,Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspite of warning shots fired in the air.

Checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.

ISSUEDo the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures?

HELDNO,military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures.

The Court DISMISSED the petition.

Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se illegal.No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt, in the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individuals right against a warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

Dissenting Opinion

The declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of probable cause and much less the required warrant. The improbable excuse is that they are aimed at 'establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every individual may be stopped and searched at random and at any time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he resists.

While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren advance, is a right personal to the aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely, have come to Court because they had been, or had felt, aggrieved. .In that event, the burden is the State's, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the search. The petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated the "details of the incident" .

PEOPLE VS MAQUEDAAppeal from the decision of RTC Benguet convicting Maqueda of robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries

J. Davide, Jr.

FACTS:

Britisher Horace William Barker and Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza, reside in Tuba, Benguet. On 27 April 1991, Horace was brutally slain and Teresita badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery in their house.

Rene Salvamante, the victims former houseboy, was pinpointed. Richard Malig was initially included in the information robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries filed in the RTC of Benguet.

Only Malig was arrested. Before his arraignment, the prosecution filed a motion to amend the information to implead as co-accused Hector Maqueda alias Putol. On the hearing of the motion the next day, the Prosecutor asked that Malig be dropped from the information because the evidence against him wasnt sufficient. The motion was granted.

Warrants for the arrest of Salvamante and Maqueda were issued. Maqueda was arrested and he filed an application for bail about a month later. He categorically stated that he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness, as he is the least guilty among the accused. Salvamante continued to elude arrest.

Maqueda was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries.

Prosecutions version:

At 6 AM on 27 August 1991, Norie Dacara, a househelp who shared a room with Julieta Villanueva (her cousin and fellow househelp), got up and went to the toilet. There, she was surprised to see Rene Salvamante (whom she knew because she and Julieta replaced Salvamante and his sister).

Salvamante suddenly strangled her and she saw a fair-complexioned, tall man she identified as Maqueda at his side. She fled towards the garage but Salvamante pulled her back into the house.

Julieta got up and saw a man brandishing a lead pipe outside her door. She pointed to Maqueda as the man she saw. She immediately closed the door and she held on to it as the man was trying to force his way in.

The shouts awakened Teresita. In the dining room, she saw Salvamante and a man she identified as Maqueda. They rushed to her and beat her with lead pipes until she lost consciousness. Salvamenta made Julieta and Norie open the door of the garage and then they hid in their room.

Mike Tabayan and Mark Pacio were in a waiting shed beside the Asin road a kilometer away from the Barkers home and two men asked them if the road they were following would lead to Naguilian, La Union. Mike replied that it did not. They identified the shorter man as Salvamante and Maqueda as the taller man with an amputated left hand and a right hand with a missing thumb and index finger.

September 1, 1991: A police team from the Tuba Police Station came to the hospital bed of Mrs. Barker and asked her to identify the persons who assaulted her. She pointed out one who turned out to be Richard Malig. When informed of the investigation, Dr. Hernandez told them it was improper for them to conduct an investigation since Mrs. Barker had not yet fully recovered consciousness and her eyesight had not yet improved.

After efforts to locate Maqueda had failed, on March 1992, they received information that Maqueda had been arrested in Guinyangan. The Guinyangan police turned him over to Maj. Anagaran who brought him to the Benguet Provincial Jail.

Before Maj. Anagaran arrived, Maqueda was taken to the headquarters of the 235th PNP Mobile Force Company and SP03 Amando Molleno got his statement. He informed Maqueda of his rights and Maqueda signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay narrating his participation in the crime.

While under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail in which he stated that he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the case. Prosecutor Zarate had a talk with Maqueda and asked him if he was in the company of Salvamante on the day in question in entering the Barkers home. When he got an affirmative answer, Zarate told him he would oppose the motion to bail since Maqueda is the only one on trial.

Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of the Prosecutor Zarate and obtained permission to talk to Maqueda. Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that Salvamante brought him to Baguio to find a job as a peanut vendor but instead brought him to the Barkers house and told him of his plan. He initially objected but later on agreed to it.

Maqueda put up the defense of denial and alibi. He says:

He claims to have been at the polvoron factory of Minda Castrense. That day, he claims to have been teaching new employees how to make polvoron seasoning. On December 20, 1991, he went home to Gapas, Guinyangan for vacation and ran into Salvamenta, his childhood playmate. They just waved to each other. He again saw Salvamante after Christmas day and Salvamante invited him to go to Calauag. Since he wanted to visit his brother, he agreed. There, Salvamante asked him to accompany him in selling a cassette recorder from Baguio. After that, he never saw Salvamante again.

He was arrested by CAFGU members on March 2. He was told that if he points to Salvamante, he would be freed and would become a state witness, He told them he could attest to Salvamantes sale of the recorder.

Prosecution responded by presenting Fredesminda Castrence, the owner of the factory Maqueda worked in, who testified that she started her business in 30 August 1991, making it impossible for her to have hired Maqueda on 5 July 1991.

The trial court disregarded the testimonies of Mrs. Barker and the maids on Maquedas identification, they decreed a conviction based on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti plus circumstantial evidence.

HELD:

The appeal is dismissed. The decision of RTC Benguet to convict Maqueda is affirmed.

RATIONALE:

It was wrong for the trial court to hold that the the rights to counsel and against self-incrimination are limited to custodial investigation and do not apply to a person against whom a criminal complaint or information has already been filed.

The trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial confession --the Sinumpaang Salaysay--and an extrajudicial admision--the verbal admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa. A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay shows that it is an extrajudicial admission.

The distinction is made clear in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 26: Admission of a party -- The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.

Sec 33. Confession -- The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilty of the offense charged , or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.

In a confession, there is acknowledgement of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgement of his guilty or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged.

A confession is an acknowledgement in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilty of the crime charged while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilty. An admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgement of some fact or circumstance which, in itself is sufficient to authorize a conviction.

TC: At the time the Sinumpaang Salaysay was made, Maqueda was already facing charges in court and no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had a right to refuse to be a witness. And still, he confessed. Thus, the admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay should be tested not under the Constitution (Section 12, Article III) but on the voluntariness of its execution. Voluntariness is presumed so Maqueda has the burden of proving otherwise.

SC: DISAGREE. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed are not confined to that period prior to filing of a criminal complaint or information but available at that stage when a person is under investigation for the commission of an offense. Thus, procedural safeguards still need to be used.

The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term custodial by inserting it between the words under and investigation proves that our Constitution did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine. The second paragraph of Section 20 broadened the application of Miranda by making it applicable to the investigation for the commission of an offense of a person and in custody.

If we follow the TCs theory, police enforcement authorities would have a heyday extracting confessions or admissions from accused persons after they had been arrested but before they are arraigned because at such stage, the accused are supposedly not entitled to the rights to remain silent and to counsel.

Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the accused is thereby arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest, he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the arresting officer must make a return of the warrant to the issuing judge, and since the court has already accepted jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper for any public officer or law enforcement agency to investigate him in connection with the commission of the offense for which he is charged. If, nevertheless, he is subjected to such investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and the jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with.

The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken after his arrest was in violation of his Article III rights. He was not even told of any of his constitutional rights under the said section and the statement was taken in the absence of counsel.

The extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, however, stand on a different footing and are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights. He made them voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation but in connection with his plea to be used as a state witness. As to Salvosa, he is a private person. The Bill of Rights concerns limitations on the government.

Even if we disregard his extrajudicial admissions, his guilty was established by circumstantial evidence.People vs Santiago Evaristo and Noli Carillo

Warrantless Search and Seizure

FACTS:

Sgt. Romeroso, Sgt. Daniel MaligayaEdgardo Villarta of the Philippine Constabulary together with 2 members of the Integrated National Police, were on routine patrol in Mendez, Cavite. At or about 5:50 in the afternoon, successive bursts of gunfire were heard in the vicinity. Proceeding to the the approximate source of the same, they came upon one BarequielRosillo who was firing a gun into the air.

Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of appellant Evaristo prompting the lawmen to pursue him. Upon approaching the immediate perimeter of the house, the patrol chanced upon the slightly inebriated appellants, Evaristo and Carillo. Inquiring as to the whereabouts of Rosillo, the police patrol members were told that he had already escaped through a window of the house. Sgt. Vallarta immediately observed a noticeable bulge around the waist of Carillo who, upon being frisked, admitted the same to be a .38 revolver. After ascertaining that Carillo was neither a member of the military nor had a valid license to possess the said firearm, the gun was confiscated and Carillo invited for questioning.

As the patrol was still in pursuit of Rosillo, Sgt. Romeroso sought Evaristo's permission to scour through the house, which was granted. In the sala, he found, not Rosillo, but a number of firearms and paraphernalia supposedly used in the repair and manufacture of firearms, all of which, thereafter, became the basis for the present indictment against Evaristo.

For their part, the appellants dispute the above narration of the events in question, alleging that they were forcibly taken into custody by the police officers and even subjected to physical and mental indignities. They denied ownership or knowledge of any of the firearms presented in evidence, contending that these were purposely planted in their possession by the prosecution witnesses and other police authorities.

Trial Court Convict Evaristo and Carillo

ISSUE: WON the search and seizure was legal?

RULE: the court sited sec 2 of the bill of rights as well as 2nd paragraph of sec. 3

It is to be noted that what the constitutional provisions prohibit areunreasonablesearches and seizures. For a search to be reasonable under the law, there must, as a rule, be a search warrant validly issued by an appropriate judicial officer. Yet, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid search warrant is not an absolute and inflexible rule, for jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions to the search warrant requirement. Amongthese exceptions isthe seizure of evidence in plain view, adopted by this jurisdiction from the pronouncements of the United States SupremeCourt in Harris vs.U.S.andCoolidge vs.New Hampshire.Thus, it is recognized that objects inadvertently falling in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.

The records in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa was granted permission by the appellant Evaristo to enter his house. The officer's purpose was to apprehend Rosillo whom he saw had sought refuge therein. Therefore, it is clear that the search for firearms was not Romerosa's purpose in entering the house, thereby rendering his discovery of the subject firearms as inadvertent and even accidental.

CARILLO

With respect to the firearms seized from the appellant Carillo, the Court sustains the validly of the firearm's seizure and admissibility in evidence, based on the rule on authorized warrantless arrests. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure

For purposes of the present case, the second circumstance by which a warrantless arrest may be undertaken is applicable. For, as disclosed by the records, the peace officers, while on patrol, heard bursts of gunfire and this proceeded to investigate the matter. This incident may well be within the "offense" envisioned by par. 5 (b) of Rule 113, Rules of Court. As the Court held inPeople of the Philippines v.Sucro,7"an offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or HEARS THE DISTURBANCES CREATED THEREBY AND PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE SCENE THEREOF

The next inquiry is addressed to the existence of personal knowledge on the part of the peace officer of facts pointing to the person to be arrested as the perpetrator of the offense. Again, reference to the records resolves said query. Giving chase to Rosillo, the peace officers came upon the two (2) appellants who were then asked concerning Rosillo's whereabouts. At that point, Sgt. Vallarta discerned the bulge on the waist of Carillo. This visual observation along with the earlier report of gunfire, as well as the peace officer's professional instincts, are more than sufficient to pass the test of the Rules. Consequently, under the facts, the firearm taken from Carillo can be said to have been seized incidental to a lawful and valid arrest.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALVARO SAYCON y BUQUIRAN, accused-appellant

G.R. No. 110995

September 5, 1994

SUBJECT: The State vs. Suspected Shabu Courier

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE: The Philippine Coastguard and Narcotics Command (NARCOM) were alerted to the arrival of a suspected shabu courier in a ship docking that morning. The suspected courier was invited for questioning and asked to reveal the contents of his bag. Prohibited drugs were found and he was arrested.

FACTS:

Alvaro Saycon (D) was charged with violating Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425 as amended, the Dangerous Drugs Act when he was found transporting four (4) grams of metamphetamine hydrochloride ("shabu") and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.

On or about July 8, 1992, at 6:00am, a Coastguard personnel received information from a NARCOM agent Ruben Laddaran that a suspected "shabu" courier by the name of Alvaro Saycon was on board the MV Doa Virginia, which was arriving at that moment in Dumaguete City. Upon receipt of the information, the Coastguard chief officer ordered a combined team of NARCOM agents and Philippine Coastguard personnel to intercept the suspect.

The vessel docked at 6:00am that same morning at Dumaguete City. Saycon alighted from the boat carrying a black bag and went through the checkpoint manned by the Philippine Coastguard where he was identified by a police officer of the NARCOM. Saycon was then invited to the Coastguard Headquarters at the Pier area and he willingly went with them. At the headquarters, Saycon was asked to open his bag and he willingly obliged. In it were personal belongings and a maong wallet. Inside that maong wallet, there was a cigarette pack (Marlboro) containing the suspected "shabu". When asked whether the cigarette pack containing the suspected "shabu" was his, Saycon merely bowed his head. Then, Saycon , his bag and the suspected "shabu" were brought to the NARCOM office for booking. When Alvaro Saycon was arrested, the NARCOM agents did not have a warrant of arrest.

Contention of respondent:

Saycon contends that the search of his bag was illegal because it had been made without a search warrant and that, therefore, the "shabu" discovered during the illegal search was inadmissible in evidence against him.

ISSUE:

Is the warrantless search valid? Is the warrantless arrest valid?

RULING:

Yes. The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute. "There are certain exceptions recognized in our law," the Court noted in People vs. Barros. The exception which appears most pertinent in respect of the case at bar is that relating to the search of moving vehicles. In People vs. Barros, the Court said:

Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. (People vs. Bagista, supra; People vs. Lo Ho Wing, supra) In Valmonte vs. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211 (1989), the Court stated:

"Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case."

When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.

Close examination of the record of the case at bar shows that there did exist reasonable or probable cause to believe that appellant Alvaro Saycon would be carrying or transporting prohibited drugs upon arriving in Dumaguete City on the MV Doa Virginia on 8 July 1992.

This probable cause in fact consisted of two (2) parts.

Firstly, Senior Police Officer Winifredo Noble had testified in court that the NARCOM Agents had, approximately three (3) weeks before 8 July 1992, conducted a test-buy which confirmed that appellant Saycon was indeed engaged in transporting and selling "shabu.". The police authorities did not, on that occasion, arrest Alvaro Saycon, but what should be noted is that the identity of Saycon as a drug courier or drug distributor was established in the minds of the police authorities.

Secondly, the arresting officers testified that they had received confidential information that very early morning of 8 July 1992, Alvaro Saycon would probably be on board the MV Doa Virginia which was scheduled to arrive in Dumaguete City at 6:00 a.m. on 8 July 1992, probably carrying "shabu" with him.

The Court considers that a valid warrantless search had been conducted. It follows that the warrantless arrest of Saycon which ensued forthwith, was also valid and lawful.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 10325, is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATIONS, however, that appellant shall suffer imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision correctional as maximum, and that the fine of P20,000.00 shall be DELETED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Rule of Law:

General rule: The search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the above constitutional provisions.

Exception: Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles without need of a warrant.

Title:People of the Philippines v Normando del Rosario (G.R. No. 109633 July 20, 1994)

Topic:Unreasonable Search & Seizure

Facts:

Del Rosario was charged and convicted for IllegalPossession of Firearm and Ammunitions and Illegal Sale of Regulated Drugs (Branch 17 RTC, Cavite City) for having in his possession during a raid in his residence a homemade(paltik)caliber .22 revolver with three (3) live ammunition and for knowingly selling to a poseur buyer an aluminum foil containingMethamphetamine Hydrochloride also known as "Shabu", aregulated drug, prior to the said raid.

RAID DETAILS:

Search Warrant - applied for by SPO3 RaymundoUntiveros

issued by Judge Arturo de Guia on Sept. 4, 1991 AM

specific place to be searched: appellant's house located at 828 R. Basa St., San Roque, Cavite City

items to be seized: "undetermined quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalias"

Sequence of Events:

9pm: - raiding team organized (raiding team not organized immediately after issuance of search warrant)

final briefing

Station Commander gave to PO1 Luna a marked money consisting of a P100 bill bearing serial no. PQ 329406 and entered in the police logbook;

PO1 Luna (as poseur-buyer) bought shabu from the appellant-accused using the marked money (but Luna didnt testify during the trial; Supreme Court information about the alleged sale is, therefore, considered HEARSAY) Luna returned to the station and informed the raiding team he already bought shabu from the appellant-accused;

Raiding team executed the search warrant and found the appellant-accused lying down in his living room;

Raiding team fetched two persons to serve as witnesses after the raiding team have already bargained themselves into the house of the appellant-accused

Found Items during the Search:

black canister containing shabu,

an aluminumfoil,

a paltik .22 caliber atop the TV set,

three usedammunitions in a cup and three wallets ,

onecontaining the marked money

Barangay Capt. Maigue, Normadel Rosario and appellant

Issue:W/N the search was conducted legally and in accordance to police protocol;

W/N the searched items are admissible as evidence.

Ruling: Conviction reversed. Appellant-accused acquitted.

The failure of the prosecution to present the alleged buyer of themarijuana was a fatal flaw in the case against the accused.

The record is devoid of any reason why the police officers did notmake any attempt to arrest accused-appellant at the time he allegedly sold theshabu to Veneracion Luna who was accompanied by another police officer.That was the opportune moment to arrest accused-appellant. The versionfoisted by the prosecution upon this Court is contrary to human experience inthe ordinary course of human conduct. The usual procedure in a buy-bustoperation is for the police officers to arrest the pusher of drugs at the verymoment he hands over the dangerous drug to the poseur-buyer. That is thevery reason why such a police operation is called a "buy-bust" operation.Thepolice poseur-buyer "buys" dangerous drugs from the pusher and "busts"(arrests) him the moment the pusher hands over the drug to the police officer.

In consequence, the manner the police officers conducted the subsequent and much-delayed search is highly irregular.

At any rate, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of possession of the shabu contained in a canister and allegedly seized at his house, for the charge against him was for selling shabu with the information alleging that the "accused, without legal authority did . . . sell to a poseur buyer an aluminum foil containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride . . ." Sale is totally different from possession. Article 1458 of the Civil Code defines sale as a contract whereby "one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determine thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent", while "possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right" as defined by Article 523 of the Civil Code. Accused-appellant cannot be convicted of a crime which is not charged in the information for to do so would deny him the due process of law

The search warrant implemented by the raiding party authorized only the search and seizure of ". . . the described quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalia" (Exh. O, p. 50, original record). Thus, the raiding party was authorized to seize only shabu and paraphernalia for the use thereof and no other. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a finishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The Constitution itself (Section 2, Article III) and the Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 126) specifically mandate that the search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no authority for the police officers to seize the firearm which was not mentioned, much less described with particularity, in the search warrant.Neither may it be maintained that the gun was seized in the course of an arrest, for as earlier observed, accusedappellant's arrest was far from regular and legal. Said firearm, having been illegally seized, the same is not admissible in evidence (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 [1967]).

Title:ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ,petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALSTopic:Arrest and Seizures Re: Proper Jurisdiction

Facts:

On March 22, 1990, 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Sector (now Central Sector) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated at No. 25 Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview, Quezon City. On March 23, 1990, respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued Search Warrant No. 95-90. On the same day, at around 2:30 p.m., members of the CAPCOM, armed with subject search warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to, where a labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research (EILER) was then taking place. According to CAPCOM's "Inventory of Property Seized," firearms, explosive materials and subversive documents, among others, were seized and taken during the search. And all the sixty-one (61) persons found within the premises searched were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City but most of them were later released, with the exception of the herein petitioners, EILER Instructors, who were indicated for violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case No. Q-90-11757 before Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco.On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a "Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence" before the Quezon City court; and a "Supplemental Motion to the Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained.On September 21, 1990, the respondent Quezon City Judge issued the challenged order, consolidating subject cases but denying the prayer for the quashal of the search warrant under attack, the validity of which warrant was upheld; opining that the same falls under the category of Writs and Processes, within the contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, and can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court (National Capital Judicial Region);. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order under challenge has been denied by the assailed Order of October 5, 1990.

Issue:

Whether or not a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection with an offense allegedly committed outside its territorial jurisdiction and to issue a warrant to conduct a search on a place likewise outside its territorial jurisdiction.

Ruling:

Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Reason:

The basic flaw of the petitioners reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminalprocess, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to acriminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed inspecific courtsof indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action. For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process.

Our Rules of Court, whether of the 1940, 1964 or the present vintage, and, for that matter, the Judiciary Act of 194812or the recent Judiciary Reorganization Act,have never required the jurisdictional strictures that the petitioners' thesis would seek to be inferentially drawn from the silence of the reglementary provisions.

Writs and processes-----(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region.

(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court.

The rule enumerates the writs and processes which, even if issued by a regional trial court, are enforceable only within its judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that all other writs and processes, regardless of which court issued the same, shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. As earlier demonstrated, a search warrant is but a judicial process, not a criminal action. No legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability. On the contrary, the above-quoted provision of the interim Rulesexpresslyauthorizes its enforcement anywhere in the country, since it is not among the processes specified in paragraph (a) and there is no distinction or exception made regarding the processes contemplated inparagraph (b).

Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the following policy guidelines:1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.

2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.

3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.

4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation therefor.

5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the case shall have been resolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case.