1. GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs.  Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO [G.R. No. 148571.  September 24, 2002]

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: United States Government sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. He was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in connection with the following charges: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States (2) tax evasion; (3) wire fraud; (4) false statements; and (5) illegal campaign contributions. Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) which prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The same was assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court however dismissed the Petition.   Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this reversed its earlier Decision.  It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.  This Resolution has become final and executory.

Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ filed the appropriate Petition for Extradition and prayed for the issuance of an order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.

Respondent Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,” which prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing and manifested to allow him to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. After hearing, the Court ordered to issues a warrant of arrest and fixed bail for his temporary liberty. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty. Hence, this Petition.

Issue: Whether Jimenez entitled to bail.

Ruling: No. Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:

“Art. III, Sec. 13.  All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.  The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.  Excessive bail shall not be required.”

As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws.  It

does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

It is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited. Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication and delay.  Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person.  It is not part of the function of the assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. ]The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.]

Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances[71] including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.

2. JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010

CORONA, J.:

Facts: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal on the grounds of his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. The Court of Appeals denied his application for bail and found that petitioner failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger and the physical condition of petitioner does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to be attended by his personal physician. The Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioner’s conviction and that there was no reason  substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioner’s guilt. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

         Issue: Whether in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Ruling: Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion. Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied.

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.

In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating ]circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate court’s denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.  On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists.  If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.  Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.

 On the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls within the second scenario, the appellate court’s stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach.  

3. PANFILO D. BONGCAC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SPECIAL PROSECUTOR FORTUNATO LIM, andTORIBIO BON, G.R. Nos. 156687-88, May 21, 2009

CARPIO, J.:

Facts: Petitioner Panfilo Bongcac (Bongcac) was designated by the Mayor of Tagbilaran City Consultant and Coordinator on market matters. Respondents Engr. Fortunato Lim (Lim) and Toribio Bon (Bon) applied for stalls or tiendas in the Cogon Public Market in Tagbilaran City and were referred to by Bongcac. Bongcac informed Lim and Bon the government cannot afford to construct a new market and if the two were interested, they should give Bongcac money for the construction. Lim and Bon thereafter gave Bongcac a check amounting to 62, 000 and 40, 000 respectively. Thereafter, Lim and Bon learned from a newspaper that Bongcac was “sacked” as market body consultant and was terminated as secretary to the Mayor. They looked for him and demanded that he either make an accounting of the money he received or deliver the stalls or tiendas already constructed. Bongcac failed to do so. Thus, he was charged with Estafa by respondents before Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan found Bongcac as guilty of Estafa. Bongcac filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by Sandiganbayan. He then filed a certiorari before SC seeking reversal but was likewise denied through resolution. No motion for reconsideration was filed and the resolution became final and executory. Sandiganbayan issued notice to Bongcac directing him to be present for the execution of judgement. An extraordinary relief was sought by him in SC. Meanwhile, he filed a motion to suspend the execution in the Sandiganbayan but was denied and the cash bond posted by petitioner for his temporary liberty was ordered cancelled. Hence, this case. Petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order praying that the Resolution issued by the Sandiganbayan be set aside and that the warrant of arrest and the order cancelling the bail bond pending resolution of the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief be recalled. Respondent on the other hand in their comment asserts Petitioner’s bail bond was deemed automatically cancelled upon execution of the judgment of conviction.

Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in cancelling Bongcac’s cash bail bond.

Ruling: No. the cancellation of the bailbond was due to the execution of the final judgment of conviction. Section 22 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides:       SEC. 22. Cancellation of bail. - Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.

           The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.

             In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail.

          From this provision, it is clear that the cancellation of bail is automatic upon execution of the judgment of conviction. The Sandiganbayan did not err in cancelling petitioner’s cash bailbond after the judgment of conviction became final and executory and its execution  became  ministerial.

4. JOSELITO V. NARCISO V. FLOR MARIE STA. ROMANA-CRUZ, G.R. No. 134504, March 17, 2000

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: An information for parricide was filed against Joselito Narciso for the death of his wife Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso. After his review asked and motion for reconsideration was both denied, he asked for reinvestigation of his warrant of arrest. Prosecutor found no reason to disturb and the case was remand for arraignment and trial. Thereafter, he filed an ‘Urgent Ex-Parte’ to allow him to Post Bail’. The Public Prosecutor registered no objection and said motion was granted on the same day. It was opposed by respondents herein, then they moved for the postponement of the hearings because no witness was available, Not obtaining any resolution on her ‘Motion To Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail’ private complainant (respondent herein) filed this petition before the CA. CA granted the petition. Hence this case. Petitioner averred that CA erred when it reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which granted the petitioner his constitutional right to bail, considering the absence of strong evidence or proof of his guilt, and more especially when the public prosecutors, who have direct control of the proceedings and after assessment of the evidence, have themselves recommended the grant of bail.

Issue: Whether the bail granted was valid and CA should not have reversed RTC.

Ruling: No. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required." Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended,

also provides: "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such finding, since no hearing had been conducted on the application for bail -- summary or otherwise. The appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion by the accused and the Order granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. We agree with the CA.Stressing in Basco v. Rapatalo that the judge had the duty to determine whether the evidence of guilt was strong, the Court held: x x x x x x x x x "Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. 

Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the required hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital offense. The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of familiarity with the case. "Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor."

Basco v. Rapatalo summarized several case that emphasized the mandatory character of a hearing in a petition for bail in a capital case. It enunciated the following duties of the trial judge in such petition: 

"(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended;"(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra);"(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);"(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied."

The Court added: "The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof."

Additionally, the court’s grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The summary thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail.

Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was laced with grave abuse of discretion and the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing him

5. JOCELYN V. GRAGEDA vs.. JUDGE NIETO T. TRESVALLES A.M. MTJ No. 04-1526.  February 02, 2004

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts: An administrative case was filed by wife of Gil Grageda against Judge Nieto Tresvalles for gross ignorance of the law and abuse of authority relative to the criminal case of murder where her husband was the victim. A complaint was filed for preliminary investigation with Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. in the sala of Judge Nieto. On the same day he issued an order stating that accused was probably guilty of the charged and grants the warrant of arrest, and stated the amount of bail bond. Six days after the order, Accused surrendered and filed a motion to strike out the testimony of Jocelyn and to grant him of bail. The following day, Judge Nieto granted the release of Accused after he posted bail bond of P30, 000. The record was thereafter transferred to Provincial Prosecutor which contained the denial of motion to strike out of testimony of Jocelyn. However, upon preliminary investigation conducted by the Prosecutor, he found that accused was guilty of murder, with aggravating circumstance and no bail was recommended. Thereafter, an administrative case was filed by Jocelyn Grageda against Judge Nieto Tresvalles. According to the complainant, the respondent judge granted bail to the accused without the requisite bail hearing, despite the fact that there was an eyewitness to the murder who made a positive identification of the accused. In his Comment, the respondent admitted that no bail hearing was conducted, but reasoned that the evidence of the guilt of the accused was not strong.  According to the respondent, the matter of granting bail is an exercise of judgment, and that the accused should not be denied his constitutional right to bail.

Issue: Whether bail hearing is required to be conducted by the judge and which he shall be held guilty.

Ruling: Yes. We agree that the respondent judge is administratively liable for granting bail to an accused charged with murder without conducting the requisite bail hearing.

The importance of a hearing in applications for bail should once more be emphasized.  Section 8, Rule 114 provides as follows: Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. -  At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is in custody

for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusionperpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong.  The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, or otherwise, unable to testify.

The importance of the Rule lies on the fact that on the result of the bail hearing depends the right of an accused to provisional liberty vis-à-vis the duty of the State to protect the people against dangerous elements.  The resolution of the issue affects important norms in our society: liberty on one hand, and order on the other.  To minimize, if not eliminate, error and arbitrariness in a judge’s decision, the Rules require the judge to hear the parties and then make an intelligent assessment of their evidence.

The respondent’s argument that a hearing is “only necessary if there is an application for admission to bail” is erroneous.  As found by the Executive Judge: …[T]he fact that the accused has not even filed yet any application for bail at the time bail was fixed on December 5, 2000 aggravates matters.  To state the obvious, there was no occasion for the respondent Judge to exercise any discretion on the matter of bail at that point in time as the accused was not asking to be released on temporary liberty.  The respondent Judge should have followed the straight and trodden path, well-traveled by members of the bench, that bail should not be allowed in cases of murder.  It might also be worth mentioning, in passing, that the right to bail may be waived considering its personal nature.  It arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the law. The fact that the respondent Judge already granted bail when the accused has not been arrested yet compounds the aggravation.

Admission to bail presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal principles.  The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong.  In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally, and within the confines of due process, that is, after the evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. In this case, the respondent judge motu proprio granted bail to the accused.  The prosecution was not even afforded an opportunity to present its evidence, in accordance with the Rules.

6. GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION vs. OLALIA, GR No 153675, April 1, 2007

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Facts: Juan Antonio Muñoz was charged before the Hongkong Court with 3 counts of the offense of accepting an advantage as agent in violation of Section 9 (1)(a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hongkong. He was also charged with seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law

of Hongkong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. The DOJ received a request from the Hongkong Department of Justice for the provisional arrest of Muñoz. The NBI later on arrested him on the basis of a warrant issued by the RTC, Manila. The order was declared void by the CA, but its validity was sustained by the SC. In the meantime, Hongkong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC a petition for his extradition. He applied for bail which was initially denied but which was reconsidered later, granting the petition for bail. There was a motion to vacate the order but it was denied, hence, a special civil action for certiorari was filed alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

In his comment on the petition, Muñoz maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

Issue: Whether the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extend to a prospective extradite in an extradition proceeding.

Ruling: Yes, in view of recent developments, in international law. The following trends in international law cannot be ignored, such as: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20thcentury, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of the Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other. The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.

7. RUIZ vs. BELDIA A. M. No. RTJ-02-1731, February 16, 2005

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts: Shirley Ruiz is the private complainant in a case for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law pending before the DOJ. Santos, who was arrested during entrapment operations relative to the carnapping of Ruiz’s vehicle, was one of the respondents therein.

After her arrest on May 24, 2000, Santos was detained in Camp Crame, Quezon City, pending the filing of formal charges in court.  Santos obtained an Order of Release signed by respondent Judge Beldia who apparently granted bail to Santos and approved the corresponding bail bond without serving notice to the prosecutor.

Ruiz filed the instant administrative complaint contending that respondent Judge Beldia had no authority to grant bail to Santos since the Investigating Prosecutor has yet to conclude the preliminary investigation.  She claimed that for as long as the information has not yet been filed in court, a court has no power to grant bail to a detained person since it has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

In his Comment dated August 14, 2000, respondent Judge Beldia maintained that Section 1 (c), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court allows any person in custody, even if not formally charged in court, to apply for bail.

OCA recommended that respondent Judge Beldia be held liable for gross ignorance of the law and fined in the amount of P5,000.00.  It opined that although a person in custody and who is not formally charged in court could apply for bail pursuant to Section 17 (c), Rule 114, the grant thereof by Judge Beldia was nonetheless irregular.  It noted that no formal petition or application for bail was filed by Santos, and even if one was filed, the Marikina courts could not have properly taken cognizance of the same since Santos was detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City.  There was also no showing that the regular judge of Branch 272, RTC-Marikina City, was unavailable to act on the application for bail.

Issue: Whether the grant of bail by the respondent judge is valid.

Ruling: No. Santos was entitled to bail as a matter of right since the offense with which she was charged does not carry the penalty of life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua or death. Notwithstanding, it was incumbent upon respondent Judge Beldia to grant bail to Santos in accordance with established rules and procedure.  Respondent Judge Beldia failed in this respect and must thus be held administratively liable.

Section 17, par. (c) of Rule 114 distinctly states:

SEC. 17.  Bail, where filed. – …

(c)     Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held. (Emphasis supplied)The Certificate of Detention issued by the PNP-TMG-SOD shows that Santos was detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City.  Thus, as correctly pointed out by the OCA, the application for bail should have been filed before the proper Quezon City court and not in Marikina City.

8. ATTY. FRANKLIN GACAL vs. JUDGE JAIME INFANTE, A. M. No. RTJ-04-1845, October 5, 2011

BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts: Atty. Franklin Gacal, is the private prosecutor in a criminal case for murder. Judge Jaime I. Infante, Presiding Judge of Branch 38 of the RTC to whose branch the criminal case was raffled for arraignment and trial. Respondent judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, and evident partiality, for his failure to set a hearing before granting bail to the accused and for releasing him immediately after allowing bail.

Issue: Whether the grant of bail by the respondent judge is valid.

Ruling: No. Judge Infante apparently acted as if the requirement for the bail hearing was a merely minor rule to be dispensed with. Although, in theory, the only function of bail is to ensure the appearance of the accused at the time set for the arraignment and trial; and, in practice, bail serves the further purpose of preventing the release of an accused who may be dangerous to society or whom the judge may not want to release, a hearing upon notice is mandatory before the grant of bail, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion. With more reason is this true in criminal prosecutions of a capital offense, or of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states that: “No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of criminal action.”

9. OKABE vs. DE LEON GUTIERRES, G.R. No. 150185,  May 27, 2004

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts: Petitioner was charged with Estafa for failure to deliver the money agreed upon with Cecilia Maruyama through door- to- door delivery. The 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution finding probable cause for estafa against the petitioner. The trial court issued a warrant of arrest and recommenced a bond of Php 40, 000. The petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said amount, duly approved by Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, Judge of RTC of Quezon City, who forthwith recalled the said warrant.  The approved personal bail bond of the petitioner was transmitted to the RTC of Pasig City.  Upon her request, the

petitioner was furnished with a certified copy of the Information, the resolution and the criminal complaint which formed part of the records of the said case.  The petitioner left the Philippines for Japan without the trial court’s permission, and returned to the Philippines.  She left the Philippines anew and returned. The trial court issued an order setting the date for arraignment. The private prosecutor files an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of the hold departure order which was granted by the court. The petitioner found that there are documents lacking as to determine probable cause. The petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order to allow her to regularly travel to Japan because she has minor children. She refused to enter her plea with leave of court. When it was elevated to the CA, her petition was partially granted. The CA ruled that by posting bail and praying for reliefs from the trial court, the petitioner waived her right to assail the respondent judge’s finding of the existence of probable cause.  

Issue: Whether bail is a waiver of contending the decision of the trial judge.

Ruling: No. We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the appellate court erred in not applying Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure:

SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. – An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea.  The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case.

It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to modify previous rulings of this Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon.  The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in People v. Red. The new rule is curative in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in procedural rules.  Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable.  Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in application. Besides, procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively, even without express provisions to that effect, to cases pending at the time of their effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined at the time of their effectivity. Before the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already in effect.  It behooved the appellate court to have applied the same in resolving the petitioner’s petition for certiorari and her motion for partial reconsideration.

Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the respondent judge.  There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to

relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. In this case, the records show that a warrant was issued by the respondent judge in Pasay City for the arrest of the petitioner, a resident of Guiguinto, Bulacan. When the petitioner learned of the issuance of the said warrant, she posted a personal bail bond to avert her arrest and secure her provisional liberty.  Thus, the posting of a personal bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert her incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of her right to assail her arrest.  

10. TEODORO C. BORLONGAN JR. ET. AL, vs. MAGDALENO PENA, GR.no. 143591, May 5, 2010

PEREZ, J.: Facts:           Respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña (Atty. Peña) instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees against Urban Bank and herein petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City.  Peña anchored his claim for compensation on the Contract of Agency allegedly entered into with the petitioners, wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank’s property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City.  Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. They presented documents to disprove the same. Atty.  Peña filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City.  He claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI. Worse, petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they were falsified. The City Prosecutor found probable cause for the indictment of petitioners for four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants for the arrest of the petitioners. Petitioners insisted that they were denied due process because of the non-observance of the proper procedure on preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court.  Specifically, they claimed that they were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. The court, likewise, upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules of Court. Besides, the court added, petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant since they already posted bail.  

Issue:  Whether the question raised by petitioners were already moot.

Ruling:  No. The issues raised by the petitioners have not been mooted by the fact that they had posted bail and were already arraigned.

 It appears from the records that upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners immediately posted bail as they wanted to avoid embarrassment, being then the officers of Urban Bank.  On the scheduled date for the arraignment, despite the petitioners’ refusal to enter a plea, the court a quo entered a plea of “Not Guilty” for them. The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest, that has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure.  The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of the arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto.  Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation on the same day that they posted bail.  Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained a stipulation that they were not waiving their right to question the validity of their arrest. On the date of their arraignment, petitioners refused to enter their plea due to the fact that the issue on the legality of their arrest is still pending with the Court.  Thus, when the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for them, there was no valid waiver of their right to preclude them from raising the same with the Court of Appeals or this Court.  The posting of bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert their incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their arrest.  Therefore, the defendants herein cannot be said to have waived the right granted to them by section 13, General Order No. 58, as amended by Act No. 3042.

11. QUI vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 196161, September 26, 2012

VELASCO, J.:

Facts: Petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of Section 10(a), ‚rνll Article VI of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act when he committedacts of cruelty and child abuse upon the person of one Christian John Ignacio, a minor 8 years of age by then and there angrily shouting invectives while pointing her fingers at said minor and threatening to knock down his head which acts are prejudicial to the child’s psychological and emotional development. Petitioner filed her Notice of Appeal. With the perfection of her appeal and the consequent elevation of the case records to the CA, petitioner posthaste filed before the appellate court an Urgent Petition/Application for Bail Pending Appeal which respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed. The OSG urged for the denial of the bail application on the ground of petitioners propensity to evade the law and that she is a flight-risk, as she in fact failed to attend several hearings before the RTC resulting in the issuance of three warrants for her arrest. The CA issued the first assailed Resolution denying petitioners application for bail pending appeal on the basis of Sec. 5(d) of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in not granting the bail for petitioner.

Ruling: No. Bail pending appeal is governed by Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides: Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman. If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as here. Indeed, pursuant to the "tough on bail pending appeal" policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court. ½ll

The CA denied petitioners application for bail pending appeal on the ground that she is a flight risk, a bail-negating factor under Sec. 5(d) of Rule 114 quoted above. The CA properly exercised its discretion in denying petitioners application for bail pending appeal. The CAs determination as to petitioner being a high risk for flight is not without factual mooring.

12. FAR EASTERN SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC., vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,  710 SCRA 358

REYES, J.B.L., J.

Facts: Petitioner posted surety bond in favor of the Commissioner of Immigration for the temporary stay in the Philippines of Co Too, a Chinese alien. The pertinent conditions of the bond are as follows:

a) That the undersigned undertakes that Co Too shall not leave Manila or change his address;b) That the undersigned undertakes to make Co Too all times available to and to present him within 24 hours after receipt of notice to produce before the Immigration Authorities for investigation of his right to further stay in the Philippines;c) That in case Co Too after such inquiry is found to have violated any limitation or condition under which he was admitted as non-immigrant ,and is subject to deportation, the undersigned undertakes to produce him for deportation within 24 hours after receipt of demand to do so;d) That the undersigned agrees to answer for all expenses for the arrest and apprehension of Co Too should the latter fail to appear before the Immigration Authorities at the time, date and place set for the investigation or on such other time, date and place set for the continuation of the investigation of his or should the undersigned after the lapse of time granted him to do so, fail to produce said Co Too for deportation:

x       x       xi.) That the undersigned agrees that this bond with all its terms and conditions shall cover and apply to any and all extension of the temporary stay of said Co Too;j.) That breach of any of the conditions above-mentioned shall entitle the Commissioner of Immigration to declare this bond or part thereof forfeited . ."

The Commissioner wrote a letter to the petitioner requiring Co Too to appear for an investigation of his right to further stay in the Philippines in excess of one year. The Commissioner sent another letter to petitioner requesting said surety company to pay the sum of P3,000 within five days from receipt of said letter. Two extensions of time were granted to the petitioner to produce Co Too: the first extension of fifteen (15) days was given on March 8, 1950 and the second on March 15, 1950, which expired on April 14, 1950. After the last mention date, petitioner failed to comply with the demand to present Co Too for investigation. The Commissioner of Immigration then wrote a letter to the Solicitor General requesting the latter to file a complaint for the recovery of P3,000 from the petitioner.

In the meantime, Co Too was apprehended by the immigration authorities without the help of the petitioner. A deportation proceeding was conducted against him, after which he was ordered deported. However, due to lack of transportation facilities and of a definite place to deport him, he continued his stay here by giving a cash bond of P3,000 and a surety bond in the amount of P7,000, this time posted by the Paramount Surety Company, while Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Company’s bond No. 8569 was declared forfeited. After the forfeiture, the Commissioner of Immigration sent a letter to the petitioner with a list of its cancelled bonds, including therein the name of Co Too. Later on, respondent Commissioner of Immigration sent another letter to the petitioner, explaining that the inclusion of Co Too’s name in the list of cancelled bonds was due to mistake or inadvertence.

Issue: Whether the forfeiture of the bond is lawful.

Ruling: Yes. "By the failure of the alien to appear before the Commissioner of Immigration and to report to him once a week as stipulated in the surety bond, the terms thereof were breached not only by the principal but also by the surety, which justified the forfeiture of the bond."

As regards the inadvertent cancellation of the bond in question, we believe it was really cancelled through mistake.

Such failure on the part of the petitioner to produce Co Too constitutes a breach of one of the principal conditions, especially paragraph (b) of the bond, entitling the Government to forfeit the same to the full amount, without proving actual damage suffered by it.

13. CONQUILLA vs. BERNARDO, 642 SCRA 288

CARPIO, J.:

Facts: Complainant alleged that a criminal complaint for direct assault was filed against her before the MTC of Bocaue, Bulacan. The complaint was signed by Police Chief Inspector Rizalino Andaya of the Bocaue Police Station. Respondent judge conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable cause to hold the complainant for trial for the crime of direct assault. Respondent judge then issued a warrant of arrest with the bail fixed at P12,000. Upon motion of complainant, respondent judge issued an order reducing the bail for complainant’s provisional liberty to P6,000. On the same date, complainant posted cash bail of P6,000 for her provisional liberty.

Complainant then filed an administrative complaint, alleging that first level court judges no longer have the authority to conduct preliminary investigations. Thus, complainant avers that respondent judge committed an illegal act constituting gross ignorance of the law and procedure when he conducted the preliminary investigation and issued the warrant of arrest. Respondent judge further states that he did not usurp the power of the

prosecutor when he reduced the bail considering that under Section 20 of Rule 114, the court may increase or decrease the bail upon good cause.

Issue: Whether the issuance of bail by the judge is valid.

Ruling: No. MTC judges are no longer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation. It was therefore incumbent upon respondent judge to forward the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for preliminary investigation, instead of conducting the preliminary investigation himself.

On respondent judge’s issuance of the warrant of arrest and reduction of the amount of bail, we find such acts void for want of jurisdiction. While Rule 114 of the Rules of Court allows a judge to grant bail in bailable offenses and to increase or decrease bail, it assumes that the judge has jurisdiction over the case. In this case, respondent judge conducted the preliminary investigation without authority and issued the warrant of arrest. Thus, these acts are void for want of jurisdiction. The reduction of bail is also void because in the first place, respondent judge had no jurisdiction over the case itself.

14. PANTILO III vs. CANOY, 642 SCRA 301

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Facts: The complainant, Pantilo, the brother of the homicide victim, recounts in his letter-complaint. Later, at around in the evening, Pantilo was informed by Perocho that Melgazo had been released from detention. Further, the logbook showed that Melgazo was temporarily released upon the order of Judge Canoy after he posted bail in the amount of thirty thousand pesos (PhP 30,000), as evidenced by O.R. No. 0291794 dated September 3, 2008. Pantilo proceeded to the Office of the Clerk of Court to request a copy of the Information, only to find out that none had yet been filed by the Surigao City Prosecutor’s Office. Puzzled, he inquired from the City Prosecutor’s Office the details surrounding the release of Melgazo. He learned that no Information had yet been filed in Court that would serve as the basis for the approval of the bail. Likewise, he also learned from the City Police Station that no written Order of Release had been issued but only a verbal order directing the police officers to release Melgazo from his detention cell. One of the police officers even said that Judge Canoy assured him that a written Order of Release would be available the following day or on September 4, 2008 after the Information is filed in Court.

Issue: Whether the release of the accused thru bail is a valid one.

Ruling: It is settled that an accused in a criminal case has the constitutional right to bail, more so in this case, when the charge against Melgazo. Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide, is a non-capital offense. However, the letter-complaint focuses on the manner of Melgazo’s release from detention. Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure allows that any person in custody who is not yet charged in court “may apply for bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he

is held.” In the case at bar, Melgazo did not file any application or petition for the grant of bail with the Surigao City RTC, Branch 29. Despite the absence of any written application, respondent judge verbally granted bail to Melgazo. This is a clear deviation from the procedure laid down in Sec. 17 of Rule 114.

15. GACAL vs. INFANTE, A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1845, October 5, 2011

BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts: On March 18, 2003, Judge Gregorio R. Balanag, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kiamba-Maitum, Sarangani issued a warrant for the arrest of Faustino Ancheta in connection with a murder case. Judge Balanag did not recommend bail. Ancheta, who had meanwhile gone into hiding, was not arrested. Upon review, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, acting through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfredo Barcelona, Jr., affirmed the findings and recommendation of Judge Balanag on the offense to be charged, and accordingly filed in the RTC an information for murder on April 21, 2003 (Criminal Case No. 1136-03), but with a recommendation for bail in the amount of P400,000.00. Criminal Case No. 1136-03 was raffled to Judge Infante’s Branch.

On April 23, 2003, Judge Infante issued twin orders, one granting bail to Ancheta, and another releasing Ancheta from custody.

On April 25, 2003, Atty. Gacal, upon learning of the twin orders issued by Judge Infante, filed a so-called Very Urgent Motion For Reconsideration And/Or To Cancel Bailbond With Prayer To Enforce Warrant Of Arrest Or Issue Warrant Of Arrest Anew Or In The Alternative Very Urgent Motion For This Court To Motu Prop[r]io Correct An Apparent And Patent Error (very urgent motion).

On May 21, 2003, Judge Infante denied Atty. Gacal’s very urgent motion on the ground that the motion was pro forma for not bearing the conformity of the public prosecutor, and on the further ground that the private prosecutor had not been authorized to act as such pursuant to Section 5, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court. Judge Infante directed that the consideration of the bail issue be held in abeyance until after the public prosecutor had submitted a comment, because he wanted to know the position of the public prosecutor on Atty. Gacal’s very urgent motion having been filed without the approval of the public prosecutor.

Atty. Gacal insisted that the issue of bail urgently required a resolution that involved a judicial determination and was, for that reason, a judicial function; that Judge Infante failed to resolve the issue of bail, although he should have acted upon it with dispatch, because it was unusual that several persons charged with murder were being detained while Ancheta was let free on bail even without his filing a petition for bail; that such event also put the integrity of Judge Infante’s court in peril; and that although his motion for reconsideration included the alternative relief for Judge Infante to motu proprio correct his apparent error, his refusal to resolve the matter in due time constituted gross ignorance of law.

Finally, Atty. Gacal stated that Judge Infante and the public prosecutor were both guilty of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for giving undue advantage to Ancheta by allowing him bail without his filing a petition for bail and without a hearing being first conducted. Judge Infante denied the allegations of Atty Gacal, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether the judge in granting bail to the accused dispense with the hearing of Application for Bail?

Ruling: No. The offense of Murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death (Art. 248, RPC). By reason of the penalty prescribed by law, Murder is considered a capital offense and, grant of bail is a matter of discretion which can be exercised only by respondent judge after the evidence is submitted in a hearing. Hearing of the application for bail is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution’s evidence is weak or strong (People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489). It becomes, therefore, a ministerial duty of a judge to conduct hearing the moment an application for bail is filed if the accused is charged with capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. If doubt can be entertained, it follows that the evidence of guilt is weak and bail shall be recommended. On the other hand, if the evidence is clear and strong, no bail shall be granted.

Verily, respondent judge erred when he issued an order granting the application for bail filed by the accused (Annex "C") based merely on the order issued by the Fiscal (Annex "A") recommending bail of P400,000.00 for the provisional liberty of the accused without even bothering to read the affidavits of the witnesses for the prosecution. Respondent judge cannot abdicate his right and authority to determine whether the evidence against the accused who is charged with capital offense is strong or not.

In case no application for bail is filed, bail hearing was not dispensable.

Judge Infante’s contention is unwarranted.

Even where there is no petition for bail in a case like Criminal Case No. 1138-03, a hearing should still be held. This hearing is separate and distinct from the initial hearing to determine the existence of probable cause, in which the trial judge ascertains whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the crime. The Prosecution must be given a chance to show the strength of its evidence; otherwise, a violation of due process occurs.

Public prosecutor’s failure to opposeapplication for bail or to adduce evidencedid not dispense with hearing

That the Prosecution did not oppose the grant of bail to Ancheta, as in fact it recommended bail, and that the Prosecution did not want to adduce evidence were irrelevant, and did not dispense with the bail hearing. The gravity of the charge in Criminal Case No. 1138-03 made it still mandatory for Judge Infante to conduct a bail hearing in which he could have made on his own searching and clarificatory questions from which to infer the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt. He should not have readily and easily gone along with the public prosecutor’s opinion that the evidence of guilt, being circumstantial, was not strong enough to deny bail; else, he might be regarded as having abdicated from a responsibility that was his alone as the trial judge.

Judge Infante’s granting of bail without a hearing wascensurable for gross ignorance of the law and the rulesIn that light, the failure of Judge Infante to conduct a hearing prior to the grant of bail in capital offenses was inexcusable and reflected gross ignorance of the law and the rules as well as a cavalier disregard of its requirement. He well knew that the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong was a matter of judicial discretion and that the discretion lay not in the determination of whether or not a hearing should be held, but in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the Prosecution’s evidence of guilt against the accused. His fault was made worse by his granting bail despite the absence of a petition for bail from the accused. Consequently, any order he issued in the absence of the requisite evidence was not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.

16. RE: ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST HON. MARILOU RUNES-TAMANG, PRESIDING JUDGE, MeTC PATEROS, METRO MANILA AND PRESIDING JUDGE, MeTC SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, A.M. MTJ-04-155, April 7, 2010(Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1594-MTJ)

Facts: An anonymous "Concerned Filipino Citizen" sent to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter dated October 22, 2003 requesting the investigation of Judge Marilou D. Runes-Tamang, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Pateros and Acting Presiding Judge of the MeTC in San Juan, Metro Manila. The letter-sender complained that Judge Tamang, through the connivance of the arresting officer and court employees of MeTC at San Juan, had been indiscriminately approving fake bonds for a fee of P1,000.00 "per count ng kaso." The letter prompted the Court to treat it as an administrative complaint. On November 4, 2003, Chief Justice Davide, Jr. referred the letter to then Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock (DCA Lock) for appropriate action.

In the initial investigation of the OCAd, they found out that the RTC, Branch 153, in Pasig City furnished to the OCA a copy of its order dated October 22, 2003 revoking the "unethical Orders of Release" issued by Judge Tamang in various criminal cases assigned to that branch. The order stated that Judge Tamang had approved the bail bonds issued by a blacklisted company without any showing of the unavailability of all the RTC Judges in Pasig, considering that the accused persons posting the bail bonds

were charged in criminal cases pending before the RTC in Pasig and were detained in the Pasig City Jail. Acting on OCAd’s recommendation, the Court En Banc made a resolution requiring Judge Tumang to file an Answer/Comment.

In her Answer, Judge Tamang maintained her innocence and Sometime in August of 2003, an RTC Judge of Pasig City called her attention to an irregular order of release she had signed as the Acting Judge of the MeTC in San Juan, Metro Manila, involving a criminal case pending in Pasig City. Allegedly, the order of release was signed without the necessary supporting documents. The discovery of the irregular order of release prompted Judge Tamang to conduct an investigation in the MeTC of San Juan. After her initial investigation, she issued Office Memorandum No. 001-03 dated September 17, 2003, addressed to Ellen Sorio, the Branch Clerk of Court of the MeTC in San Juan, directing her to shed light on the anomaly. Office Memorandum No. 001-03 included a directive that no bails bonds would be approved until after the controversy was resolved.

In her response to Office Memorandum No. 001-03, Sorio explained that as standard office procedure, she checked all orders and documents, including bail bonds, before Judge Tamang signed them. Sorio added that to her recollection, all the bail bonds passing through her for presentation to Judge Tamang had been in order, although on many occasions, Ronnie Medrano, the MeTC’s Process Server, retained possession of some of the documents accompanying the orders of release. Sorio’s explanation prompted Judge Tamang to issue Office Memorandum No. 002-03 dated September 21, 2003, requiring Medrano to submit his comment vis-à-vis Sorio's allegations. Through his Tugon/Salaysay dated September 26, 2003, Medrano "admitted" his guilt, and begged Judge Tamang for forgiveness. Executive Judge Amelia C. Manalastas of the RTC in Pasig City directed Sorio and Medrano to file their respective comments, and set the hearing of the administrative case. Judge Manalastas conducted hearings on October 8 and 16, 2007. In her compliance dated November 29, 2007, Judge Manalastas stated that she had found no evidence to support a finding against Judge Tamang of bad faith, dishonesty, or deliberate intent to do injustice; but recommended that Judge Tamang be found guilty of gross negligence for violating Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and that her co-respondents be found guilty of grave misconduct.

Issue: Whether Judge Tamang and her co-accused committed grave misconduct on issuing illegal bail bonds.

Ruling: Yes, but Judge Tamang and Sorio must have lesser punishment compared to Medrano who admitted his misconduct.

Liability of Judge Tamang

Judge Tamang approved bail bonds issued by Covenant although they manifestly lacked the required clearance from the Supreme Court indicating that Covenant was qualified to transact business with the courts. As earlier stated, Covenant was a

blacklisted company at the time of issuance of the bail bonds. She was thereby guilty of a neglect of duty, for, according to Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of Confiscated Cash, Surety and Property Bonds at RTC, Tarlac City, Brs. 63, 64 & 65, the judge is still bound to review the supporting documents before approving the bail bonds, even if it is the Clerk of Court who has the duty to ascertain that the bail bonds are in order, and that all requisites for approval have been complied with.

Judge Tamang’s excuse of simply relying on the representation of the court personnel who unfortunately took advantage of her leniency and kindness betrayed a deficiency in that requisite degree of circumspection demanded of all those who don the judicial robe. She cannot now thereby exculpate herself, or take refuge behind that excuse, for, in fact, such reliance was actually her admission of being neglectful and of lacking the diligent care in paying attention to the judicial matters brought to her for signature. A carelessness of that kind and degree ran contrary to the competence expected of her as a dispenser of justice and as a visible representation of the law.

Liability of Ellen Sorio

Sorio’s insistence notwithstanding, there were still spurious bail bonds that had reached the hands of Judge Tamang, and that the latter ultimately signed. Thus, although Sorio denied any knowledge of or participation in such anomalous bail bonds, we find her liable. Sorio should have rejected the bail bonds of Covenant due to the latter’s blacklisting and its lack of clearance from the Supreme Court to issue such bail bonds. She cannot now simply feign ignorance and escape liability upon the implausible pretext that some bail bonds did not pass through her. Likewise, Sorio did not explain the non-transmittal of some approved bail bonds and their supporting documents to the courts, before which the criminal cases of the accused concerned had been filed and pending.

Liability of Ronnie Medrano

We cannot be as compassionate towards Medrano, who categorically admitted his offense, giving the simple explanation of having thereby accommodated ill-intentioned people. His anomalies for a consideration appeared to be not isolated, but repeated many times. He thereby converted his employment in the court into an income-generating activity. We find him guilty of grave misconduct, because he fell short of his accountability to the people as a public employee.

17. LEVISTE vs. ALAMEDA, G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Facts: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.           The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised “with grave caution and only for strong reasons.”  Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.           Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

Issue: Whether the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling: No. Petitioner’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules.

Petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. We disagree.

Pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary.

Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of the same thinking: Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion. Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied. ( 

In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail.  

On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal.

 Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail. A finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach. 

 However, judicial discretion has been defined as “choice.” Choice occurs where, between “two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options),” there is “more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker.” On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the appellate court’s discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioner’s theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that “upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.”

The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows:

Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody, shall before final conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.

Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies concerning theeffectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:

 2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;

Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16, 1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:

SECTION 5.   Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.

Denial of bail pending appeal is “a matter of wise discretion.”Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)  After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

18. PEOPLE VS CAWALING, G.R. No. 157147, April 17, 2009

NACHURA J:

Facts: The legal poser arose because, after the prosecution presented an eyewitness to the crime pointing to Cawaling as the perpetrator thereof, the defense offered the testimony of a person, initially charged with Cawaling in the same Information and who previously pled not guilty to the crime, confessing that it was he, and not Cawaling, who murdered the victim.

Even the two courts below us parleyed and rendered conflicting decisions. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) partially upheld the defense’s version of the events, rejected the prosecution’s eyewitness account of the murder and convicted Cawaling only as an accomplice to the offense of homicide. In stark contrast, the CA found the eyewitness’ testimony credible and convicted Cawaling of murder. He flee right away but

bondsperson Margerita Cruz posted bail to secure the former’s person. Cruz filed a manifestation to withdraw the bond.

Issue: Whether can withdraw the bail posted in favor of the accused appellant Cawaling.

Ruling: No. SEC. 22. Cancellation of bail.— Upon application of the bondsmen with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.

In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail.With the conviction of Cawaling for murder, and the Court’s consequent failure to execute the judgment of conviction because of Cawaling’s flight, the motion must be denied. The posted property bond cannot be cancelled, much less withdrawn and replaced with a cash bond by movant Cruz, unless Cawaling is surrendered to the Court, or adequate proof of his death is presented.

SC are not unmindful that Cruz posted the property bond simply to accommodate Cawaling, a relative, obtain provisional liberty. However, under Section 1 of Rule 114, Cruz, as a bondsman, guarantees the appearance of the accused before any court as required under specified conditions.

It is beyond cavil that, with the property bond posted by Cruz, Cawaling was allowed temporary liberty, which made it possible, quite easily, to flee and evade punishment. As it stands now, Cawaling, a convicted felon, is beyond reach of the law, and the property bond cannot be released.

19. BELLEZA VS MACASA, A.C. No. 7815, July 23, 2009

Facts: Complainant thru referral wanted to avail of respondent’s legal services in connection with the case of her son, Francis John Belleza, who was arrested by policemen of Bacolod City earlier that day for alleged violation of Republic Act (RA) 9165. Respondent agreed to handle the case for P30,000. The following day, complainant made a partial payment of P15,000 to respondent thru their mutual friend Chua. On November 17, 2004, she gave him an additionalP10,000. She paid the P5,000 balance on November 18, 2004. Both payments were also made thru Chua. On all three occasions, respondent did not issue any receipt. On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from complainant for the purpose of posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainant’s) son. Again, respondent did not issue any receipt. When complainant went to the court the next day, she found out that respondent did not remit the amount to the court. 

Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several occasions but respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of complainant’s son and complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public Attorney’s Office for her son’s defense.

Issue: Whether compalinant was denied of right to counsel due to the negligence of Atty. Macasa.

Ruling: The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Constitution. However, this right can only be meaningful if the accused is accorded ample legal assistance by his lawyer: ... The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence.             The right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental right. Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is through counsel that the accused secures his other rights. In other words, the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.

In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainant’s son and receiving his attorney’s fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and efficient legal assistance. For all intents and purposes, respondent abandoned the cause of his client. Indeed, on account of respondent’s continued inaction, complainant was compelled to seek the services of the Public Attorney’s Office. Respondent’s lackadaisical attitude towards the case of complainant’s son was reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainant’s son, it also deprived him of his constitutional right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the amount entrusted to him for posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of his client, respondent unduly impeded the latter’s constitutional right to bail.

20. CERVANTES VS PANGILINAN, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1709

CARPIO MORALES J:

Facts: Respondent Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant of arrest in a criminal case for Slander against the therein accused-herein complainant who subsequently posted bail fixed at P2,000.  On arraignment complainant pleaded not guilty.  She later filed a Motion to Admit Counter-Affidavit with her Ganting Salaysay.  Respondent Clerk of Court Carmenchita refused to accept the Motion, however, in the absence of Judge Pangilinan, being apprehensive that he might scold her.   Complainant returned during which Carmenchita told her not to see the judge that day as he was still tired from his trip. The following day, Judge Pangilinan advised complainant that he could not accept her belatedly filed Motion because she had already been arraigned, Hence, spawned the filing of the present complaint.

Respondent Carmenchita explained that she refused to receive the Motion because there was no proper proof of service, but she advised complainant to serve a copy thereof on the Chief of Police of Cuyo, the designated prosecutor, at the police station across the street. Judge Pangilinan justified the non-receipt of complainant’s motion for lack of proper proof of service, and complainant, instead of heeding the advice to comply therewith, went to Puerto Princesa City to air her grievance over a local radio station.

Issue: Whether Judge Pangilinan and Baloco committed gross ignorance of the law. Ruling: Yes. Respondent judge manifested a lack of mastery of the provision of the 1991 Rules on Summary Procedure. On 05 December 2001, Judge Pangilinan issued a Warrant of Arrest against Lanie Cervantes, fixing the bond of the accused in the amount of Php2,000.00. The requirement for the accused to post bail is part of the regular procedure, not the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

The proceedings in a criminal case for Slander are governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Instead of first ruling whether the case fell under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, Judge Pangilinan immediately issued a warrant of arrest and fixed complainant’s bail at P2,000.  There being no showing that complainant failed to appear in court when required by Judge Pangilinan, the warrant of arrest he issued had no legal basis.   In Agunday v. Judge Tresvalles the Court noted that the requirement to post bail is no longer necessary under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Further, inMartinez, Sr. v. Judge Paguio, the Court observed that under Republic Act No. 6036, bail is not generally required for violation of municipal or city ordinances, and for criminal offenses when the prescribed penalty is not higher than arresto mayor or fine of P2,000 or both, as in the case for Slander against complainant which is covered by Art. 358 of the Revised Penal Code.

21. GO, SR. VS. RAMOS, G.R. NO. 167569; 167570; 171946 SEPTEMBER 4, 2009

QUISUMBING,J.:

Facts: A complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipinocitizen, Jimmy’s personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s citizenship as “FChinese.” Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He also averred that in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit.

Board of Commissioners found Jimmy’s claim to Philippine citizenship in serious doubt by reason of his father’s questionable election thereof, the Board directed the preparation and filing of the appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy. The corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy, charging him of violating Section 37(a)(9) in relation to Section 45(c) of Com. Act No. 613, otherwise known as The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The Board issued a warrant of deportation which led to the apprehension of Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a petition for habeas corpus, but the same was eventually dismissed by reason of his provisional release on bail. On account of his detention, Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC assailing his apprehension and detention despite the pendency of his appeal and his release on recognizance.

Issue: Whether the there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the regular courts in not entertaining the motions of the accused at bar.

Ruling: No. A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person’s detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.

Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas

corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term “court” in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.

22. PEOPLE VS. PLAZA, G.R. NO. 176 933, OCTOBER 2, 2009

CARPIO – MORALES, J.:

Facts: Luis Bucalon Plaza was charged of the crime of murder under the case filed in Branch 30 RTC Surigao, presided by Judge Buyser. After the prosecution rested its case, respondent, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence. The Demurrer was denied by Judge Buyser.

The defense thereupon presented evidence in the course of which respondent filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, contending that in view of Judge Buyser’s ruling that the prosecution evidence is sufficient to prove only Homicide, he could be released on bail. He thus prayed that the bail bond for his temporary liberty be fixed at P40,000.00 which he claimed was the usual bond for Homicide.

The prosecution contended, in the main, that the case being for Murder, it is non-bailable as the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal to death; that it is the public prosecutor who has exclusive jurisdiction to determine what crime the accused should be charged with; that the accused should have filed a motion/application to bail and not just a motion to fix the amount of the bail bond; that the accused had already waived his right to apply for bail at that stage of the proceeding; and and that under the Rules, the prosecution could still prove the existence of treachery on rebuttal after the defense has rested its case. Senior State Prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo questioned Judge Buyser’s impartiality, prompting the judge to inhibit himself and to order the case transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC for further proceedings.

Branch 29 Presiding Judge Jose Manuel Tan (Judge Tan) heard the Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond. Still, after examination, he agreed to the decision of Judge Buyser. Therefore same was alleged acting in grave abuse discretion by Plazas. Roberto Murcia (Roberto), the victim’s brother, impleading the People as co-petitioner, assailed the trial court’s orders via petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

Roberto faulted Judge Tan for granting bail without an application for bail having been filed by respondent and without conducting the mandatory hearing to determine whether or not the prosecution’s evidence is strong.The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) adopted Roberto’s argument that the grant of bail to respondent without any separate hearing is contrary to prevailing jurisprudence.

Issue: Whether or not Judges are guilty of serious and grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling: No. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that "All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.”

Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, thus provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right.The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused charged with a capital offense thus depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Since Judge Tan concurred with the assessment by Judge Buyser of the prosecution evidence when he denied the Demurrer and the latter’s statement that the evidence was sufficient to convict respondent of Homicide, holding a summary hearing merely to determine whether respondent was entitled to bail would have been unnecessary as the evidence in chief was already presented by the prosecution.

23. BARBERO VS. DUMLAO, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1682, June 19, 2008

Facts: This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law filed by Ester F. Barbero (Barbero) against Judge Cesar M. Dumlao (Judge Dumlao), Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo, Isabela.Barbero filed a criminal case for estafa against a certain Herman A. Medina (Medina). The case was raffled to Judge Anastacio D. Anghad (Judge Anghad), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region II, Branch 36, Santiago City, Isabela. On 19 February 2003,Judge Anghad issued a warrant of arrest commanding the proper officer toarrest Medina.

Medina was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest. However, Judge Dumlao approved Medina’s bail and, on 9 May 2003, issued an order commanding the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and the Philippine

National Police to release Medina. Barbero alleged that Judge Dumlao’s approval of Medina’s bail and his order to release Medina were unlawful.

Issue: Whether or not the Judge is guilty of serious and grave abuse of dicretion.

Ruling: Yes. Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that no person under detention by legal process shall be released except when he is admitted to bail. Section 19 provides that the accused must be discharged upon approval of the bail by the judge with whom it was filed in accordance with Section 17. Section 17 provides that the bail may be filed with the court where the case is pending, unless (1) the judge in that court is absent or unavailable, or (2) the accused is arrested in a province, city, or

municipality other than where the case is pending. If the judge is absent or unavailable, the bail should be filed with another branch of the same court. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, the bail should be filed with any RTC of the place.

It is not disputed that the criminal cases filed by complainant against Herman Medina were pending before the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 35. In fact, the warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Fe Albano Madrid, presiding judge of the said court. The order of release therefore, on account of the posting of the bail, should have been issued by that court, or in the absence or unavailability of Judge Madrid, by another branch of an RTC in Santiago City. In this case, however, there is no proof that Judge Madrid was absent or unavailable at the time of the posting of the bail bond. In fact, complainant Lim avers that on the day [Judge Dumlao] ordered the release of Medina, Judge Madrid and all the judges of the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela were at their respective posts.  

It is elementary that a municipal trial court judge has no authority to grant bail to an accused arrested outside of his territorial jurisdiction. The requirements of Section 17(a), Rule 114 x x x must be complied with before a judge may grant bail. The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where x x x the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. [Judge Dumlao] undeniably erred in approving the bail and issuing the order of release. He is expected to know that certain requirements ought to be complied with before he can approve Medina’s bail and issue an order for his release. The law involved is rudimentary that it leaves little room for error. The acts of approving bail and ordering the release of accused whose cases are pending before other courts constitute gross ignorance of the law. Gross ignorance of the law is a serious offense punishable by (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.

24. TRILLANES IV vs. PIMENTEL SR., G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008

Facts: Antonio Trillanes won a seat in the Senate while being under detention for staging an alleged coup d’etat. Before the commencement of his term, his fellow opposition Senators filed a motion to allow him to attend Senate sessions and perform his duties as senator. It was argued that there is a world of difference between his case and that of Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the motion, and other circumstances which demonstrate the inapplicability of Jalosjos. Trillanes posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to serve his

mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to removing him from office, depriving the people of proper representation, denying the people’s will, repudiating the people’s choice, and overruling the mandate of the people. Moreover, he pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend “social functions.” Are the contentions of Trillanes tenable?

Issues: (1) Whether Trillanes‘ case is different from that of the Jalosjos case; (2) Whether Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work and serve his mandate as senator; (3) Whether there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of detention prisoners who are held without bail.

Ruling. The SC ruled that the distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. No less than the Constitution provides: “All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.” That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged. The high court also denied Trillanes’ assertion that he was not a flight risk since he voluntary surrendered to authorities. The incident at the Manila Peninsula Hotel in Makati showed him to be a flight risk. xxx The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are multifarious. xxx Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."

Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor

engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.

Trillanes’ election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him to serve his mandate

The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.

It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.

all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.

25. WINSTON MENDOZA and FE MICLAT vs. FERNANDO ALARMA and FAUSTA ALARMA, G.R. No. 151970, May 7, 2008

CARPIO, J.:

Facts: Spouses Fernando and Fausta Alarma (respondents) are the owners of an 11.7 hectare parcel of land (land) located in Iba, Zambales. The land was posted as a property bond for the provisional liberty of a certain Joselito Mayo, charged with illegal possession of firearms.

When the accused failed to appear in court as directed on 19 March 1984, the trial court ordered his arrest and the confiscation of his bail bond in favor of the government. It also directed the bondsmen to produce within a period of 30 days the person of the accused and to show cause why judgment should not be entered against the bail bond. However, without a judgment being rendered against the bondsmen, the trial court issued a writ of execution against the land in april 14 1986. The land was eventually sold at public auction and was awarded to petitioners and they immediately took possession of the same.

Sometime thereafter, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of property against petitioners. grounded on the nullity of the entire proceedings relating to the property bond. The court decision dismissed the complaint and declared that the Order dated 14 April 1986 was a judgment on the bond.

On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and nullified the proceedings on the execution, sale, and issuance of the writ of possession. The petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari in which the SC also affirmed the CA.

Meanwhile, petitioners applied for the registration of the land and the RTC zambales granted it. Rspondents filed for annulment in rtc another branch which was denied because of co-equality.

They went to the CA which granted their appeal and annulled the registration.

Issue: whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding a defect in the proceedings and in ordering the annulment.

Ruling: Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states:

SEC. 21. — Forfeiture of bail. When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen must:

(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and

(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.

Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted.

In the present case, it is undisputed that the accused failed to appear in person before the court and that the trial court declared his bail forfeited. The trial court gave the bondsmen, respondents in this case, a 30-day period to produce the accused or a reasonable explanation for their non-production. However, two years had passed from the time the court ordered the forfeiture and still no judgment had been rendered against the bondsmen for the amount of the bail. Instead, an order of execution was issued and the property was put up for sale and awarded to petitioners, the highest bidders.

These turn of events distinctly show that there was a failure of due process of law. The execution was issued, not on a judgment, because there was none, but simply and solely on the declaration of forfeiture.

An order of forfeiture of the bail bond is conditional and interlocutory, there being something more to be done such as the production of the accused within 30 days. This process is also called confiscation of bond. an order of forfeiture is interlocutory and merely requires appellant "to show cause why judgment should not be rendered against it for the amount of the bond." Such order is different from a judgment on the bond which is issued if the accused was not produced within the 30-day period. The judgment on the bond is the one that ultimately determines the liability of the surety, and when it becomes final, execution may issue at once. In this case, no such judgment was ever issued and neither has an amount been fixed for which the bondsmen may be held liable. The law was not strictly observed and this violated respondents’ right to procedural due process.

26. SAN MIGUEL v. MACEDA, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1749, April 4, 2007

Facts: Complainant was arrested for illegal sale, dispensation, distribution and delivery of .50 grams ofmethamphetamine hydrochloride, punishable by prision correccional. He jumped bail. On May 10, 2001, then Judge Alumbres issued a bench warrant and canceled his bail bond in the amount of P60,000.00 and fixed a new bail bond in the amount of P120,000.00. Complainant was arrested on September 8, 2001. On September 12, 2001, the state prosecutor filed a Motion to Cancel Recommended Bail on the ground of reasonable belief and indications pointing to the probability that accused is seriously considering flight from prosecution. The Motion was set for hearing on September 19, 2001. On September 17, 2001, complainant filed an Opposition to the Motion. Complainant comes to this Court alleging that his right to procedural due

process was gravely violated when respondent issued the September 17, 2001 Order without giving him the opportunity to comment on the same. The issuance of the September 17, 2001 Order shows respondent's gross ignorance of the law as the offense charged is neither a capital offense nor punishable by reclusion perpetua. His right to bail is not a mere privilege but a constitutionally guaranteed right that cannot be defeated by any order. Clearly, the intendment of the September 17, 2001 Order was to deny him of his constitutional right to bail.

OCA submitted its evaluation and recommendation and stated that the complainant is correct in saying that the order dated September 17, 2001 of respondent denied him his right to bail. It is thus clear that what the prosecution prayed for was the cancellation of the bail of P120,000.00 set by Judge Alumbres in his Warrant of Arrest dated May 10, 2001. This necessarily meant that the prosecution wanted complainant to remain in jail without bail. Hence, when respondent granted the motion in his order dated September 17, 2001, he in effect denied complainant his right to bail. It can not be denied that since complainant was charged with an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment and since he has not yet been convicted, bail in his case is still a matter of right. (Section 4, Rule 114, Rules of Court) This is true notwithstanding the fact that he previously jumped bail. In such a case, respondent should have increased the amount of bail or set certain conditions to ensure complainant's presence during the trial, but he cannot deny altogether complainant's right to bail. The Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the OCA.1awphi1.néHowever, respondent Judge Maceda continued with the hearing on September 19, 2001. He considered the Opposition to the Motion as a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Order granting the withdrawal by the prosecution of the recommended bail.

Issue: whether or not the increased bail of P120,000.00 fixed by Hon. Alumbres, in the Warrant of Arrest he issued on May 10, 2001 was also withdrawn by the Order dated September 17, 2001 granting the prosecution's withdrawal of its recommended bail.

Ruling:No. On September 19, 2001 Atty. Sebrio xxx manifested that x x x the bail fixed by Judge Alumbres was not affected by the withdrawal of the prosecution's recommended bail. That is correct. Any of the accused, therefore, could have applied for bail thereunder. They could have even moved for the lifting of the warrant dated May 10. But, they did not.

It is clear from the September 17 Order that only the bail recommended by the prosecutor was "considered withdrawn". Such Order does not speak of cancellation of the P120,000.00 bail fixed by the former Presiding Judge x x x. And even granting for the sake of argument that complainant was also charged with the crime of murder on September 14, 2001, or three days before the Order of cancellation was issued, respondent failed to consider that what was being prayed for by the prosecutor was the cancellation of the recommended bail for violation of R.A. No. 6425 and not that of the crime of murder.

Respondent's asseveration that the cancellation of the bail without due hearing was justified considering that complainant was already detained for the non-bailable offense of murder three days before the cancellation was ordered, is misplaced.1a\^/phi1.netAs the Court opined in Andres v. Beltran, it is a misconception that when an accused is charged with the crime of murder, he is not entitled to bail at all or that the crime of murder is non-bailable. The grant of bail to an accused charged with an offense that carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua x x x is discretionary on the part of the trial court. In other words, accused is still entitled to bail but no longer "as a matter of right." Instead, it is discretionary and calls for a judicial determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong in order to grant bail. The prosecution is accorded ample opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. And in Sy Guan v. Amparo, where bail is a matter of right and prior absconding and forfeiture is not excepted from such right, bail must be allowed irrespective of such circumstance. The existence of a high degree of probability that the defendant will abscond confers upon the court no greater discretion than to increase the bond to such an amount as would reasonably tend to assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted, such amount to be subject, of course, to the other provision that excessive bail shall not be required.

Upon review of the TSN of the September 19, 2001 hearing, we find that the prosecutor failed to adduce evidence that there exists a high probability of accused's jumping bail that would warrant the cancellation of the recommended bail bond. Following then the above ratiocination, respondent's only recourse is to fix a higher amount of bail and not cancel the P120,000.00 bail fixed by Judge Alumbres.

27. CHUA v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 140842, April 12, 2007

Facts: Rufina Chua, petitioner, met Wilfred Chiok, respondent, who represented himself as a licensed stockbroker and an expert in the stock market. He encouraged petitioner to invest her money in stocks, requesting her to designate him as her stockbroker. On respondent’s prodding, she agreed. In 1995, respondent encouraged petitioner to purchase shares in bulk as this will increase her earnings. Hence, in June 1995, she entrusted to him the amount of P9,563,900.00 for the purpose of buying shares of stocks in bulk. Petitioner deposited P7,100,000.00 in respondent’s account and personally gave him the remainingP2,463,900.00. Thereupon, he told petitioner to wait for one week. A week elapsed and respondent advised her to wait for another week. Then, there was no more news from respondent. Finally, when petitioner was able to contact him, respondent admitted that he spent the money. At any rate, he issued two checks as payment but when petitioner deposited them in the drawee bank, the checks were dishonored for insufficient funds. Petitioner then came to know that respondent was not a licensed stockbroker but only a telephone clerk at Bernard Securities, Inc. Immediately, she caused the filing of an information for estafa against him.

After the prosecution and the defense had presented their respective evidence, the trial court set the promulgation of judgment on January 26, 1999. However, respondent and

his counsel failed to appear on said date despite notice. The trial court reset the promulgation of judgment on February 1, 1999, with notice to respondent. Again, respondent failed to appear. The trial court then promulgated its Decision convicting respondent of estafa and sentencing him to suffer twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The prosecution filed a motion for cancellation of bail on the ground that respondent might flee or commit another crime. The trial court issued an Omnibus Order cancelling his bail. However, On September 20, 1999, after hearing respondent’s application for injunction, the appellate court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the arrest of respondent, holding that the latter should not be deprived of his liberty pending resolution of his appeal as the offense for which he was convicted is a non-capital offense; and that the probability that he will flee during the pendency of his appeal is merely conjectural. Hence, this petition.Issue: Whether or not the the filing of the motions for Injunctions assailing the Omnibus Order cancelling the bail is proper.

Ruling: No. Firstly, the petition for certiorari with prayer for a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction is not the proper recourse in assailing the trial court’s May 28, 1999 Omnibus Order canceling his bail. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure3 provides:

SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. – Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or ON MOTION OF ANY PARTY, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.

It is clear from the last paragraph of the above provision that private respondent’s appropriate remedy against the trial court’s May 28, 1999 Omnibus Order canceling his bail is by filing with the Court of Appeals a motion to review the said order in the same regular appeal proceedings in CA-G.R. CR No. 23309 he himself initiated. Such motion is an incident in his appeal.

Secondly, the assailed September 20, 1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals granting respondent’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the trial court’s Omnibus Order canceling his bail, is bereft of any factual or legal basis. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the applicant must show that (1) he has a clear existing right to be protected; and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are in violation of such right.

The first requisite is absent. Respondent has no right to be freed on bail pending his appeal from the trial court’s judgment. His conviction carries a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years (to be exact, 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum) which justifies the cancellation of his bail pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 5 (b), (d) and (e) of Rule 114, quoted above. Moreover, he failed to appear despite notice during the promulgation of judgment on January 26, 1999. His inexcusable non-appearance not only violated the condition of his bail that he "shall appear" before the court "whenever required" by the latter or the Rules, but also showed the probability that he might flee or commit another crime while released on bail.

28. SAVELLA VS. INES, AM. NO. MTJ- 07-1673

TINGA,J.:

Facts: Virginia Savella filed a criminal complaint for the falsification of Public Document against Isabel Ibanez in MTCC Vigan, presided by Judge Ante. Upon serving the warrant of arrest, the accused was nowhere to be found. Instead, her saughter produces copy of the order issued by Judge Iluminada Ines directing the provisional release of the accused upon paying the posted bond of P12,000. Complainant claims that the Clerk of Court of MTC-Sinait did not forward the bail bond papers to the court where the case was pending. This failure, according to complainant, is tantamount to serious misconduct. He further alleges that the order of respondent judge was highly irregular for it gave undue favor and illegal accommodation to the accused who is known to be a close friend of respondent judge.

Issue: Whether the judge was guilty of serious misconduct.

Ruling: Yes. Respondent judge failed to properly apply the rule regarding the bail bond application. Section 17, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that “(b)ail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge of the province or city or municipality.” The instant falsification case against accused was filed before the MTCC-Vigan, presided by Judge Ante. There was no showing of the unavailability of Judge Ante at that time. Following the said rule, respondent judge clearly erred in entertaining the bail application despite knowledge of the pendency of the falsification case before the MTCC of Vigan.  Assuming arguendo that respondent judge rightfully granted bail to accused, her failure to transmit the order of release and other supporting papers to the court where the case is pending constitutes another violation of the rules, particularly Section 19 of Rule 114. Respondent judge should have forwarded the records pertaining to the bail bond immediately after she received the same.

29. ESPANOL VS. FORMOSO, G.R. NO. 150949, JUNE 21, 2007

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:

Facts: Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. (Sharcons) bought from Evanswinda Morales a piece of land. Thus, TCT No. T-278479 in Evanswinda’s name was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-511462 was issued in the name of Sharcons. However, when the latter’s workers tried to fence and take possession of the lot, they were prevented by the caretaker of spouses Joseph and Enriqueta Mapua. The caretaker claimed that spouses Mapua are the owners of the land. Sharcons verified the status of the title and found that TCT No. T-107163 was indeed registered in the names of spouses Mapua as early as July 13, 1979.

Sharcons filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite a complaint for quieting of title. In their answer, spouses Mapua alleged, among others, that all the documents relied upon by Sharcons are spurious and falsified.

Judge Dolores L. Español, declared respondents guilty of direct contempt of court and ordered their confinement for ten (10) days in the municipal jail of Dasmariñas, Cavite. They were confined in the municipal jail of Dasmariñas, Cavite. That same day, respondents filed a motion for bail and a motion to lift the order of arrest. But they were denied outright by petitioner.

Respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65652. On July 19, 2001, the Court of Appeals granted the petition.

Issue: Whether Sharcons are guilty of direct contempt.

Ruling: No. Meanwhile, the instant petition challenging the Decision of the Court of Appeals granting the writ of habeas corpus in favor of respondents has become moot. We recall that respondents were released after posting the required bail as ordered by the Court of Appeals. A writ of habeas corpus will not lie on behalf of a person who is not actually restrained of his liberty. And a person discharged on bail is not restrained of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.

30. PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 158754, August 10, 2007

Facts: In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President and members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. One of the Informations was for the crime of plunder and among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila. The amended information referred to, like the original, charged respondent Jinggoy, together with the former President and several others, with plunder, defined and penalized under RA No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of RA No. 7659.

Jinggoy filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion" alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a "series or combination of overt or criminal acts" as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right. He prayed that he be allowed to post bail. On June 28, 2001, [he] filed a "Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada’s Motion To Fix Bail On Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To Him." Sadiganbayan set his alternative prayer to post bail for hearing after arraignment of all accused. From the denial action of the Sandiganbayan immediately adverted to, Jinggoy interposed a petition for certiorari before this Court claiming, among others, that \Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not fixing bail for him. Pending resolution of this petition, docketed as G.R. No. 148965, Jinggoy filed with the Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons." The Ombudsman opposed the motion. For three (3) days in September 2001, the Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion for bail. Jinggoy filed with the Court an Urgent Motion praying for early resolution of his Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations." He reiterated his earlier plea for bail filed with the Sandiganbayan. On the same day, the Court referred the motion to the Sandiganbayan for resolution and directed said court to make a report. According to the graft court, basing its findings on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio, Jinggoy "failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince the court that the medical condition of the accused requires that he be confined at home and for that purpose that he be allowed to post bail." On April 17, 2002, Jinggoy filed before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Application for Bail against which the prosecution filed its comment and opposition. Bail

hearings were then conducted, followed by the submission by the parties of their respective memoranda, respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) granted the omnibus application for bail.

Issue: whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting Jinggoy Estrada’s Motion for Bail?

Ruling: No. To begin with, Section 13 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution mandates:

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. xxx.Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the right to bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great.14 Here, ever since the promulgation of the assailed Resolutions a little more than four (4) years ago, Jinggoy does not, as determined by Sandiganbayan, seem to be a flight risk. The likelihood of escape on the part individual respondent is now almost nil, given his election on May 10, 2004, as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, considering also that he has a reputation to uphold and a respectable name to protect and preserve.

Moreover, Revoking the bail thus granted to respondent Jinggoy, as the petitioner urges, which necessarily implies that the evidence of his guilt is strong, would be tantamount to pre-empting the Sandiganbayan’s ongoing determination of the facts and merits of the main case.Here, the Sandiganbayan is not is not making any judgment as to the final outcome of this case either with respect to movant Jinggoy or with respect to accused Estrada, but is simply called to determine whether, at this stage, the evidence of movant's guilt is strong as to warrant his temporary release on bail.

With the view we take of this case, the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed resolutions, because the grant of bail therein is predicated only on its preliminary appreciation of the evidence adduced in the bail hearing to determine whether or not deprivation of the right to bail is warranted. Needless to stress, a grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts, the same Anti-Graft Court, from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits. As jurisprudence teaches:

xxx Such appreciation [of evidence] is at best preliminary and should not prevent the trial judge from making a final assessment of the evidence before him after full trial. It is not an uncommon occurrence that an accused person granted bail is convicted in due course.

In all, the Court rules that public respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) did not commit grave abuse of discretion when, after conducting numerous bail hearings and evaluating the weight of the prosecution’s evidence, it determined that the evidence

against individual respondent was not strong and, on the basis of that determination, resolved to grant him bail.

31. VALERIO vs. COURT APPEALS, G.R. Nos. 164311-12, October 10, 2007

Facts: On March 18, 2000, Jun Valerio, Chief of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, was shot and killed in front of his house at No. 82 Mapang-akit St., Diliman, Quezon City. Thus, an Information for murder was filed against Antonio E. Cabador, Martin M. Jimenez, Samuel C. Baran, and Geronimo S. Quintana; while an Information for parricide was filed against the victim’s wife, Milagros E. Valerio.

Milagros filed an application for bail claiming that the evidence of guilt against her was not strong. The RTC granted Milagros’ application for bail, but denied the motion to convert Samuel as state witness. On March 5, 2002, Milagros posted a bailbond furnished by Central Surety and Insurance Company, and was ordered released. Herein petitioners, Laarni N. Valerio, sister of the victim, and the People of the Philippines, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC judge for granting Milagros bail. In its assailed Decision, the appellate court found no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC. Hence, this petition where the petitioner and the people alleged, among others, that public respondent court of appeals erred in holding that it found nothing arbitrary or capricious in the lower court’s evaluation of the evidence for purposes solely of private respondent milagros "myla" valerio’s application for bail. Petitioners contend that Milagros is not entitled to bail as the evidence of guilt against her is strong. They bank on the testimony of Modesto Cabador that he heard Milagros impatiently ask Antonio about their plot to kill Jun Valerio

Issue: Whether or not Milagros is entitled to Bail.

Ruling: No. Bail is not a matter of right in cases where the person is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Article 114, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, states, "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action."

In this case, the trial court had disregarded the glaring fact that the killer himself has confessed to the crime and has implicated Milagros as the mastermind. When taken in conjunction with the other evidence on record, these facts show very strongly that Milagros may have participated as principal by inducement in the murder of Jun Valerio. It was thus a grave error or a grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court to grant her application for bail. The appellate court clearly committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s decision granting bail to Milagros Valerio

32. RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 4, DOLORES, EASTERN SAMAR, A.M. No. 06-6-340-RTC, October 17, 2007

Facts: This administrative case arose from a memorandum an audit team of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted. The audit team reported on the judicial audit conducted in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar.Judge Gorgonio T. Alvarez (Judge Alvarez), who was due for compulsory retirement on 9 September 2005, used to preside over the trial court. In view of his compulsory retirement, the audit team conducted a judicial audit of cases.

The audit team also found that Judge Bugtas accepted the bail bonds in Criminal Case Nos. 393 and 358, both of which were pending before Judge Alvarez. In Criminal Case No. 393, the supposed surety filed with Judge Alvarez an affidavit of disclaimer stating that (1) she did not know the accused; (2) the use of her property as bail bond was unauthorized; (3) the signature on the property bond was forged; (4) she did not sign as a surety; (5) her real signature was different from the signature on the property bond. In Criminal Case No. 358, Judge Bugtas accepted the bail bond and, then officer-in-charge Quitorio, now legal researcher, signed the order of release. Judge Bugtas and Quitorio did not forward the bail, order of release, and other supporting papers to Judge Alvarez until after a subpoena duces tecum was issued on 29 January 2002Judge bugtas explained that: (1) he accepted the bail bonds in Criminal Case Nos. 393 and 358 because Judge Alvarez was unavailable; (2) ordered the release of the accused in Criminal Case No. 393 because the property bond and other bail documents were regular on their face and the surety’s signature was genuine. Thus, In its memorandum, the OCA found that acted without authority when he accepted the bail bonds in Criminal Case Nos. 393 and 358; violated the Rules of Court when he failed to forward the bail, order of release, and other supporting papers in Criminal Case No. 358; and went beyond the call of his duties when he approved the spurious property bond in Criminal Case No. 393.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Bugtas erred in approving the bail and issuing the order of release

Ruling: Yes. SEC. 17. Bail, where filed. — (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.

In Cruz v. Judge Yaneza, the Court held that: there are prerequisites to be complied with. First, the application for bail must be filed in the court where the case is pending. In the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, the application for bail must be filed

with another branch of the same court within the province or city. Second, if the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may be filed with any regional trial court of the place.

In the instant case, Judge Bugtas did not present any proof to show that (1) Judge Alvarez was unavailable, or (2) the accused were arrested in Borongan. Since (1) Criminal Case Nos. 393 and 358 were pending before Judge Alvarez, (2) there was no showing that Judge Alvarez was unavailable, and (3) the accused were not arrested in Borongan, Judge Bugtas had no authority to accept the bail bonds in these cases. In Espanol v. Mupas, the Court held that judges who approve applications for bail of accused whose cases are pending in other courts are guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Respondent judge undeniably erred in approving the bail and issuing the order of release. He is expected to know that certain requirements ought to be complied with before he can approve [the accused’s] bail and issue an order for his release. The law involved is rudimentary that it leaves little room for error. In Criminal Case No. 358, Judge Bugtas not only wrongfully accepted the bail but also failed to forward the bail, order of release, and other supporting papers to Judge Alvarez as required in the Rules of Court. Section 19, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 19. Release on bail. — The accused must be discharged upon approval of the bail by the judge with whom it was filed in accordance with section 17 of this Rule.

When bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge who accepted the bail shall forward it, together with the order of release and other supporting papers, to the court where the case is pending, which may, for good reason, require a different one to be filed.

In Naui v. Mauricio, Sr., the Court held that judges should forward the records pertaining to the bail bond immediately after receiving them. In the instant case, Judge Bugtas accepted the bail bond in Criminal Case No. 358 on 9 December 1999. He forwarded the bail, order of release, and other supporting papers only after a subpoena duces tecum was issued on 29 January 2002. If the subpoena duces tecum were not issued, Judge Bugtas would have continued to ignore the provisions of Section 19 indefinitely.Judge Bugtas explained that he did not forward the records pertaining to the bail because the accused failed to cause the annotation of the lien on the property’s certificate of title. This is unacceptable. Section 19 is very clear: "When bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge who accepted the bail shall forward it, together with the order of release and other supporting papers, to the court where the case is pending."

Section 11, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court states that failure of the accused to cause the annotation of the lien on the property’s certificate of title within 10 days after the approval of the property bond shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation of the bond and re-arrest and detention of the accused. Judge Alvarez could have cancelled the property bond and issued the warrant of arrest much sooner had Judge Bugtas followed Section 19. Moreover, since Judge Bugtas opted to accept and retain possession of the

bail bond, albeit erroneously, the least he could have done was to cancel the property bond and issue a warrant of arrest when the accused failed to cause the annotation of the lien within 10 days, yet he did not do so.