CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES JULY 18, 2015

HECTOR TREAS V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESSERENO,J.:Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly within the limits of the law authorizing them to take jurisdiction and to try the case and render judgment thereon.[1]This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 9 July 2010[2]and Resolution dated 4 January 2011.Statement of the Facts and of the CaseThe pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo City covered by TCT No. 109266. It was then mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito Palma recommended the appellant Hector Treas (Hector) to private complainant Elizabeth, who was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the transfer of the title in the latters name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the name of her aunt Margarita, the following expenses would be incurred:P20,000.00-Attorneys fees,P90,000.00-Capital Gains Tax,P24,000.00-Documentary Stamp,P10,000.00-Miscellaneous Expenses.Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for P96,000.00 and 00084369 for P24,000.00. However, when she consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of the money.To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce check No. 0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in the amount of P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as attorneys fees. When the check was deposited with the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed. Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against him.[3]On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), both of Makati City. The Information reads as follows:That on or about the 23rdday of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 which money was given to her by her aunt Margarita Alocilja, with the express obligation on the part of the accused to use the said amount for expenses and fees in connection with the purchase of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-109266, but the said accused, once in possession of the said amount, with the intent to gain and abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the amount of P130,000.00 less attorneys fees and the said accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and Margarita Alocilja in the aforementioned amount of P130,000.00.CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own counsel, entered a plea of Not Guilty. Allegedly due to old age and poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City, petitioner was unable to attend the pre-trial and trial of the case.On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision[5]finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa under section 1, paragraph (b), of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), with the dispositive portion as follows:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding accused Hector Trenas guilty of the crime of Estafa with abuse of confidence as penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and which offense was committed in the manner described in the aforementioned information. As a consequence of this judgment, accused Hector Trenas is sentenced to suffer a penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day ofPrision Mayorto Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months ofReclusion Temporal. Moreover, he is ordered to indemnify private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja the amount of P130,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum, reckoned from the date this case was filed until the amount is fully paid.SO ORDERED.[6]We note at this point that petitioner has been variably called Treas and Trenas in the pleadings and court issuances, but for consistency, we use the name Treas, under which he was accused in the Information.On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[7]which was denied by the RTC in a Resolution dated 2 July 2008.[8]On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC.[9]The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July 2010, the CA rendered a Decision[10]affirming that of the RTC. On 4 August 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 4 January 2011.[11]On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari[12]before this Court. He asked for a period of 15 days within which to file a petition for review, and the Court granted his motion in a Resolution dated 9 February 2011.On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, with the following assignment of errors:1.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED HAS TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION2.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT DEMAND MADE BY A PERSON OTHER THAN THE AGGRIEVED PARTY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA;[13]On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that 150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Instead, the evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner for the money was dated 22 December 1999, without any indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City, also on 22 December 1999. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable presumption that things happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. The only time Makati City was mentioned was with respect to the time when the check provided by petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to allege that any of the acts material to the crime ofestafahad occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to prove lack of jurisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the prosecution evidence.As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of P150,000 actually belongs to Margarita. Assuming there was misappropriation, it was actually she not Elizabeth who was the offended party. Thus, the latters demand does not satisfy the requirement of prior demand by the offended party in the offense ofestafa. Even assuming that the demand could have been properly made by Elizabeth, the demand referred to the amount of P120,000, instead of P150,000. Finally, there is no showing that the demand was actually received by petitioner. The signature on the Registry Return Receipt was not proven to be that of petitioners.On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file the latters Comment on the Petition. On 27 July 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, praying for an additional period of 60 days within which to submit its Comment. This motion was granted in a Resolution dated 12 September 2011. On 23 September 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Special Extension, requesting an additional period of five days. On 29 September 2011, it filed its Comment on the Petition.In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in convicting petitioner as charged. The OSG notes that petitioner does not dispute the factual findings of the trial court with respect to the delivery ofP150,000 to him, and that there was a relationship of trust and confidence between him and Elizabeth. With respect to his claim that the Complaint should have been filed in Iloilo City, his claim was not supported by any piece of evidence, as he did not present any. Further, petitioner is, in effect, asking the Court to weigh the credibility of the prosecution witness, Elizabeth. However, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, unless tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance, which is not the case here.With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense of no valid demand was not raised in the lower court. Nevertheless, the demand letter sent to Elizabeth suffices, as she is also one of the complainants alleged in the Information, as an agent of Margarita. Moreover, no proof was adduced as to the genuineness of petitioners signature in the Registry Return Receipt of the demand letter.The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend petitioner for executive clemency, in view of his advanced age and failing health.The Courts RulingThe Petition is impressed with merit.Review of Factual FindingsWhile the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution of the Petition requires a review of the factual findings of the lower courts and the evidence upon which they are based.As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In many instances, however, this Court has laid down exceptions to this general rule, as follows:(1)When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;(2)When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;(3)When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;(4)When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;(5)When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;(6)When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension of facts;(7)When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;(8)When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;(9)When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; and(10)When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.[14]In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of the place of commission of the offense are conclusions without any citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; they are grounded on conclusions and conjectures.The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense without any finding as to where it was committed:Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution through private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja, the Court is convinced that accused Trenas had committed the offense of Estafa by taking advantage of her trust so that he could misappropriate for his own personal benefit the amount entrusted to him for payment of the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax.As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after accused Trenas had obtained the amount of P150,000.00 from her, he gave her two receipts purportedly issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for the fraudulent purpose of fooling her and making her believe that he had complied with his duty to pay the aforementioned taxes. Eventually, private complainant Luciaja discovered that said receipts were fabricated documents.[15]In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised the argument that it had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The trial court denied the motion, without citing any specific evidence upon which its findings were based, and by relying on conjecture, thus:That the said amount was given to [Treas] in Makati City was incontrovertibly established by the prosecution. Accused Treas, on the other hand, never appeared in Court to present countervailing evidence. It is only now that he is suggesting another possible scenario, not based on the evidence, but on mere what ifs. x x xBesides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions, the same would still not warrant a reversal of the assailed judgment. Even if the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was executed on 22 December 999 in Iloilo City, it cannot preclude the fact that the P150,000.00 was delivered to him by private complainant Luciaja in Makati City the following day. His reasoning the money must have been delivered to him in Iloilo City because it was to be used for paying the taxes with the BIR office in that city does not inspire concurrence. The records show that he did not even pay the taxes because the BIR receipts he gave to private complainant were fake documents. Thus, his argumentation in this regard is too specious to consider favorably.[16]For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial courts jurisdiction in this wise:It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain evidence unless it is offered in evidence. It bears emphasis that Hector did not comment on the formal offer of prosecutions evidence nor present any evidence on his behalf. He failed to substantiate his allegations that he had received the amount of P150,000.00 in Iloilo City. Hence, Hectors allegations cannot be given evidentiary weight.Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to have been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the factual findings and assessment on the credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain binding on appellate tribunal. They are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on review.[17]The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual findings of the lower courts.Jurisdiction of the Trial CourtThe overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. InIsip v. People,[18]this Court explained:The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore,the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it must also prove the identity of the accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court.InFukuzume v. People,[19]this Court dismissed a Complaint forestafa, wherein the prosecution failed to prove that the essential elements of the offense took place within the trial courts jurisdiction. The Court ruled:More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. x x xIn the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC of Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows: x x xThe crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati.However, aside from the sworn statementexecuted by Yu on April 19, 1994,the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu's sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the elements of the offense charged had been committed in Paraaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Paraaque; that with the intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage. Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latter's house in Paraaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his money.x x xFrom the foregoing, it is evident thatthe prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city.Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense ofestafaunder Section 1, paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City.That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the information as follows:That on or about the 23rdday of December, 1999,in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines andwithin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)[20]Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Makati. However, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the offense was committed. It provides in part:4.THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally entrusted to ATTY. HECTOR TREAS the sum of P150,000.00 to be expended as agreed and ATTY. HECTOR TREAS issued to me a receipt, a photo copy of which is hereto attached as Annex B,5.THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREAS, the latter failed to transfer the title of aforesaid property to MRS. MARGARITA ALOCILJA. He also failed to pay the capital gains tax, documentary stamps and BIR-related expenses. What ATTY. HECTOR TREAS accomplished was only the preparation of the Deed of Sale covering aforesaid property. A copy of said Deed of Sale is hereto attached as Annex C,6.THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR TREASissued to me a check for refund of the sum given to him less the attorneys fee of P20,000.00 and the sum of P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR or in the net sum of P120,000.00. x x x7.THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK dela Rosa-Rada Branch at Makati City, the same was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. x x x[21]Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City.Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements ofestafaare as follows: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.[22]There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution[23]that points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of Elizabeth also shows that there was no mention of the place where the offense was allegedly committed:QAfter the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treas to you, what happened next?AWe have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will have to and she will work for the Deed of Sale.QAnd did he quote any amount when you got to the expenses?AYes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSANDQWhat was the amount quoted to you?AONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.QDid he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?AYes, sir.QAnd what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?ATWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorneys fee, NINETY THOUSAND is for the capital gain tax TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND is intended for documentary sum (sic) and TEN THOUSAND PESOS is for other expenses for BIR.QAnd did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?AYes, sir.QDid he issue a receipt?AYes, sir.QIf shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treas for this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND, will you be able to identify it?AYes, sir.QI am showing to you a document, madam witness, already identified during the pre-trial as exhibit B. This appears to be a receipt dated December 22, 1999. Will you please go over this document and inform this court what relation has this to the receipt which you said Atty. Treas issued to you?AThis is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treas.QNow, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was given to Atty. Treas by you, what happened next?AWe made several follow-ups but he failed to do his job.[24]Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the offense ofestafaunder Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the prosecution evidence which even mentions that any of the elements of the offense were committed in Makati. The rule is settled that an objection may be raised based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be consideredmotu proprioby the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.[25]Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.[26]It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue.[27]Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that [s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. This fundamental principle is to ensure that the defendant is not compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place.[28]This principle echoes more strongly in this case, where, due to distance constraints, coupled with his advanced age and failing health, petitioner was unable to present his defense in the charges against him.There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.[29]As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue raised by petitioner.At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional Responsibility strongly militates against the petitioners conduct in handling the funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code provides:Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those others kept by him.When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the client how the money was spent.[30]If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[31]Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as they fall due or upon demand.[32]His failure to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client.[33]It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.[34]InCuizon v. Macalino,[35]this Court ruled that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against petitioner. In any case, should there be a finding that petitioner has failed to account for the funds received by him in trust, the recommendation should include an order to immediately return the amount of 130,000 to his client, with the appropriate rate of interest from the time of demand until full payment.WHEREFORE, the Petition isGRANTED. The Decision dated 9 July 2010and the Resolution dated 4 January 2011issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32177 areSET ASIDEon the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City. Criminal Case No. 01-2409 isDISMISSEDwithout prejudice. This case isREFERREDto the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104879 May 6, 1994ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City; HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 88, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.Alexander A. Padilla for petitioners.The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.REGALADO,J.:Creative legal advocacy has provided this Court with anotherprimae impressioniscase through the present petition wherein the parties have formulated and now pose for resolution the following issue: Whether or not a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection with an offense committed outside its territorial boundary and, thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court's supposed territorial jurisdiction.1The factual background and judicial antecedents of this case are best taken from the findings of respondent Court of Appeals2on which there does not appear to be any dispute, to wit:From the pleadings and supporting documents before the Court, it can be gathered that on March 22, 1990, 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Sector (now Central Sector) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated at No. 25 Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview, Quezon City. On March 23, 1990, respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued Search Warrant No. 95-90. On the same day, at around 2:30 p.m., members of the CAPCOM, armed with subject search warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to, where a labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research (EILER) was then taking place. According to CAPCOM's "Inventory of Property Seized," firearms, explosive materials and subversive documents, among others, were seized and taken during the search. And all the sixty-one (61) persons found within the premises searched were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City but most of them were later released, with the exception of the herein petitioners, EILER Instructors, who were indicated for violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case No. Q-90-11757 before Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco.On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a "Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence" before the Quezon City court; and a "Supplemental Motion to the Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained.On September 21, 1990, the respondent Quezon City Judge issued the challenged order, consolidating subject cases but denying the prayer for the quashal of the search warrant under attack, the validity of which warrant was upheld; opining that the same falls under the category of Writs and Processes, within the contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, and can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court (National Capital Judicial Region);. . .Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order under challenge, having been denied by the assailed Order of October 5, 1990, petitioners have come to this Courtviathe instant petition, raising the sole issue:WHETHER OR NOT A COURT MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF AN APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT IN CONNECTION WITH AN OFFENSE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND TO ISSUE A WARRANT TO CONDUCT A SEARCH ON A PLACE LIKEWISE OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.xxx xxx xxxRespondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment,3in effect affirming that of the trial court, by denying due course to the petition forcertiorariand lifting the temporary restraining order it had issued on November 29, 1990 in connection therewith. This judgment of respondent court is now impugned in and sought to be reversed through the present recourse before us.We are not favorably impressed by the arguments adduced by petitioners in support of their submissions. Their disquisitions postulate interpretative theories contrary to the letter and intent of the rules on search warrants and which could pose legal obstacles, if not dangerous doctrines, in the area of law enforcement. Further, they fail to validly distinguish, hence they do not convincingly delineate the difference, between the matter of (1) the court which has the competence to issue a search warrant under a given set of facts, and (2) the permissible jurisdictional range in the enforcement of such search warrantvis-a-visthe court's territorial jurisdiction. These issues while effectively cognate are essentially discrete since the resolution of one does not necessarily affect or preempt the other. Accordingly, to avoid compounding the seeming confusion, these questions shall be discussedseriatim.IPetitioners invoke the jurisdictional rules in the institution of criminal actions to invalidate the search warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City because it is directed toward the seizure of firearms and ammunition allegedly cached illegally in Quezon City. This theory is sought to be buttressed by the fact that the criminal case against petitioners for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 was subsequently filed in the latter court. The application for the search warrant, it is claimed, was accordingly filed in a court of improper venue and since venue in criminal actions involves the territorial jurisdiction of the court, such warrant is void for having been issued by a court without jurisdiction to do so.The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminalprocess, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to acriminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed inspecific courtsof indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process.4A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court.5A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.6In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search warrants,7such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ,warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law; also the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings,8or all writs,warrants, summonses, andordersof courts of justice or judicial officers.9It is likewise held to include a writ, summons, ororderissued in a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce the judgment,10or a writ,warrant, mandate, or other process issuing from a court of justice.112. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In the latter contingency, as in the case at bar, it would involve some judicial clairvoyance to require observance of the rules as to where a criminal case may eventually be filed where, in the first place, no such action having as yet been instituted, it may ultimately be filed in a territorial jurisdiction other than that wherein the illegal articles sought to be seized are then located. This is aside from the consideration that a criminal action may be filed in different venues under the rules fordelitos continuadosor in those instances where different trial courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the same criminal offense.In fact, to illustrate the gravity of the problem which petitioners' implausible position may create, we need not stray far from the provisions of Section 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court on the venue of criminal actions and which we quote:Sec. 15. Place where action to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.(b) Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft, or any other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such trip, including the place of departure and arrival.(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of international law.(d) Other crimes committed outside of the Philippines but punishable therein under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the proper court in which the charge is first filed. (14a)It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities or the prosecutorial agencies to unerringly determine where they should apply for a search warrant in view of the uncertainties and possibilities as to the ultimate venue of a case under the foregoing rules. It would be doubly so if compliance with that requirement would be under pain of nullification of said warrant should they file their application therefor in and obtain the same from what may later turn out to be a court not within the ambit of the aforequoted Section 15.Our Rules of Court, whether of the 1940, 1964 or the present vintage, and, for that matter, the Judiciary Act of 194812or the recent Judiciary Reorganization Act,13have never required the jurisdictional strictures that the petitioners' thesis would seek to be inferentially drawn from the silence of the reglementary provisions. On the contrary, we are of the view that said statutory omission was both deliberate and significant. It cannot but mean that the formulators of the Rules of Court, and even Congress itself, did not consider it proper or correct, on considerations of national policy and the pragmatics of experience, to clamp a legal manacle on those who would ferret out the evidence of a crime. For us to now impose such conditions or restrictions, under the guise of judicial interpretation, may instead be reasonably construed as trenching on judicial legislation. It would be tantamount to a judicial act of engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted but which someone believes ought to have been embraced therein.14Concededly, the problem of venue would be relatively easier to resolve if a criminal case has already been filed in a particular court and a search warrant is needed to secure evidence to be presented therein. Obviously, the court trying the criminal case may properly issue the warrant, upon proper application and due compliance with the requisites therefor, since such application would only be an incident in that case and which it can resolve in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction. If the contraband articles are within its territorial jurisdiction, there would appear to be no further complications. The jurisdictional problem would resurrect, however, where such articles are outside its territorial jurisdiction, which aspect will be addressed hereafter.3. Coming back to the first issue now under consideration, petitioners, after discoursing on the respective territorial jurisdictions of the thirteen Regional Trial Courts which correspond to the thirteen judicial regions,15invite our attention to the fact that this Court, pursuant to its authority granted bylaw,16has defined the territorial jurisdiction of each branch of a Regional Trial Court17over which the particular branch concerned shall exercise itsauthority.18From this, it is theorized that "only the branch of a Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the place to be searched could grant an application for and issue a warrant to search that place." Support for such position is sought to be drawn from issuances of this Court, that is, Circular No. 13 issued on October 1, 1985, as amended by Circular No. 19 on August 4, 1987.We reject that proposition. Firstly, it is evident that both circulars were not intended to be of general application to all instances involving search warrants and in all courts as would be the case if they had been adopted as part of the Rules of Court. These circulars were issued by the Court to meet a particular exigency, that is, as emergency guidelines on applications for search warrants filedonlyin the courts of Metropolitan Manila and other courts with multiple salas andonlywith respect to violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, crimes against public order under the Revised Penal Code, illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunitions, and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In other words, the aforesaid theory on the court's jurisdiction to issue search warrants would not apply tosingle-salacourtsandothercrimes. Accordingly, the rule sought by petitioners to be adopted by the Court would actually result in a bifurcated procedure which would be vulnerable to legal and constitutional objections.For that matter, neither can we subscribe to petitioners' contention that Administrative Order No. 3 of this Court, supposedly "defining the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts," was the source of thesubject matter jurisdictionof, as distinguished from theexercise of jurisdictionby, the courts. As earlier observed, this administrative order was issued pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the pertinent portion of which states:Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which abranchof the Regional Trial Court shallexercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of thebranchconcerned for purposes of determining the venue of allwrits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, . . . . (Emphasis ours.)Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, not by a procedural law and, much less, by an administrative order or circular. The jurisdiction conferred by said Act on regional trial courts and their judges is basicallyregional in scope. Thus, Section 17 thereof provides that "(e)very Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed to aregionwhich shall be his permanent station," and he "may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch or city or municipality within the sameregionas public interest may require, and such assignment shall not be deemed an assignment to another station . . ." which, otherwise, would necessitate a new appointment for the judge.In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, in like manner, Circulars Nos. 13 and 19, did notper seconfer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial court or its branches, such that non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely defines the limits of theadministrativeareawithin which a branch of the court may exercise its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The circulars only allocated to the three executive judges theadministrative areasfor which they may respectively issue search warrants under the special circumstance contemplated therein, but likewise pursuant to thejurisdictionvested in them by Batas Pambansa Blg, 129.Secondly, and more importantly, we definitely cannot accept the conclusion that the grant of power to the courts mentioned therein, to entertain and issue search warrants where the place to be searched is within their territorial jurisdiction, was intended to exclude other courts from exercising the same power. It will readily be noted that Circular No. 19 was basically intended to provide prompt action on applications for search warrants. Its predecessor, Administrative Circular No. 13, had a number of requirements, principally a raffle of the applications for search warrants, if they had been filed with the executive judge, among the judges within his administrative area. Circular No. 19 eliminated, by amendment, that required raffle and ordered instead that such applications should immediately be "taken cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located," or by their substitutes enumerated therein.Evidently, that particular provision of Circular No. 19 was never intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction on said executive judges. In view of the fact, however, that they were themselves directed to personally act on the applications, instead of farming out the same among the other judges as was the previous practice, it was but necessary and practical to require them to so act only on applications involving search of places located within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The phrase above quoted was, therefore, in the nature of an allocation in the assignment of applications among them, in recognition of human capabilities and limitations, and not a mandate for the exclusion of all other courts. In truth, Administrative Circular No. 13 even specifically envisaged and anticipated the non-exclusionary nature of that provision, thus:4. If, in the implementation of the search warrant properties are seized thereunder and the corresponding case is filed in court, said case shall be distributed conformably with Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974, of this Court, and thereupon tried and decided by the judge to whom it has been assigned, and not necessarily by the judge who issued the search warrant. (Emphasis supplied.)It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only thecourtwhich has jurisdiction over the criminal case can issue the search warrant, as would be the consequence of petitioners' position that only thebranchof the court with jurisdiction over theplace to be searchedcan issue a warrant to search the same. It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch thereof, hasprimaryjurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where no such criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and for the offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall haveprimaryjurisdiction.This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to be searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor, where the obtention of that search warrant is necessitated and justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place. Conversely, neither should a search warrant duly issued by a court which has jurisdiction over a pending criminal case, or one issued by an executive judge or his lawful substitute under the situations provided for by Circular No. 19, be denied enforcement or nullified just because it was implemented outside the court's territorial jurisdiction.This brings us, accordingly, to the second issue on the permissible jurisdictional range of enforcement of search warrants.IIAs stated inlimine, the affiliated issue raised in this case is whether a branch of a regional trial court has the authority to issue a warrant for the search of a place outside its territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners insistently answer the query in the negative. We hold otherwise.1. We repeat what we have earlier stressed:No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest. Parenthetically, in certain states within the American jurisdiction, there were limitations of the time wherein a warrant of arrest could be enforced. In our jurisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to the issuing judge,19said warrant does not becomefunctus officiobut is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled. On the other hand, the lifetime of a search warrant has been expressly set in our Rules at ten days20but there is no provision as to the extent of the territory wherein it may be enforced, provided it is implemented on and within the premises specifically described therein which may or may not be within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court.We make the foregoing comparative advertence to emphasize the fact that when the law or rules would provide conditions, qualifications or restrictions, they so state. Absent specific mention thereof, and the same not being inferable by necessary implication from the statutory provisions which are presumed to be complete and expressive of the intendment of the framers, a contrary interpretation on whatever pretext should not be countenanced.A bit of legal history on this contestation will be helpful. The jurisdictional rule heretofore was that writs and processes of the so-called inferior courts could be enforced outside the province only with the approval of the former court of first instance.21Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the enforcement of such writs and processes no longer needs the approval of the regional trial court.22On the other hand, while, formerly, writs and processes of the then courts of first instance were enforceable throughout the Philippines,23under the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines, certainspecifiedwrits issued by a regional trial court are now enforceable only within its judicial region. In the interest of clarity and contrast, it is necessary that said provision be set out in full:3. Writs and processes. (a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region.(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court. (Emphasis ours.)We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear to be further belabored or enmeshed in unwarranted polemics. The rule enumerates the writs and processes which, even if issued by a regional trial court, are enforceable only within its judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that all other writs and processes, regardless of which court issued the same, shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. As earlier demonstrated, a search warrant is but a judicial process, not a criminal action. No legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability. On the contrary, the above-quoted provision of the interim Rulesexpresslyauthorizes its enforcement anywhere in the country, since it is not among the processes specified in paragraph (a) and there is no distinction or exception made regarding the processes contemplated inparagraph (b).2. This is but a necessary and inevitable consequence of the nature and purpose of a search warrant. The Court cannot be blind to the fact that it is extremely difficult, as it undeniably is, to detect or elicit information regarding the existence and location of illegally possessed or prohibited articles. The Court is accordingly convinced that it should not make the requisites for the apprehension of the culprits and the confiscation of such illicit items, once detected, more onerous if not impossible by imposing further niceties of procedure or substantive rules of jurisdiction through decisional dicta. For that matter, we are unaware of any instance wherein a search warrant was struck down on objections based on territorial jurisdiction. In the landmark case ofStonehill, et al. vs. Diokno,et al.,24the searches in the corporate offices in Manila and the residences in Makati of therein petitioners were conducted pursuant to search warrants issued by the Quezon City and Pasig branches of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and by the Municipal Courts of Manila and Quezon City,25but the same were never challenged on jurisdictional grounds although they were subsequently nullified for being general warrants.3. A clarion call supposedly of libertarian import is further sounded by petitioners, dubiously invoking the constitutional proscription against illegal searches and seizures. We do not believe that the enforcement of a search warrant issued by a court outside the territorial jurisdiction wherein the place to be searched is located would create a constitutional question. Nor are we swayed by the professed apprehension that the law enforcement authorities may resort to what could be a permutation of forum shopping, by filing an application for the warrant with a "friendly" court. It need merely be recalled that a search warrant is only a process, not an action. Furthermore, the constitutional mandate is translated into specifically enumerated safeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure for the issuance of a search warrant,26and all these have to be observed regardless of whatever court in whichever region is importuned for or actually issues a search warrant. Said requirements, together with the ten-day lifetime of the warrant27would discourage resort to a court in another judicial region, not only because of the distance but also the contingencies of travel and the danger involved, unless there are really compelling reasons for the authorities to do so. Besides, it does seem odd that such constitutional protests have not been made against warrants of arrest which are enforceable indefinitely and anywhere although they involve, not only property and privacy, but persons and liberty.On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that the authorities have to contend now and then with local and national criminal syndicates of considerable power and influence, political or financial in nature, and so pervasive as to render foolhardy any attempt to obtain a search warrant in the very locale under their sphere of control. Nor should we overlook the fact that to do so will necessitate the transportation of applicant's witnesses to and their examination in said places, with the attendant risk, danger and expense. Also, a further well-founded precaution, obviously born of experience and verifiable data, is articulated by the courta quo, as quoted by respondent court:This court is of the further belief that the possible leakage of information which is of utmost importance in the issuance of a search warrant is secured (against) where the issuing magistrate within the region does not hold court sessions in the city or municipality, within the region, where the place to be searched is located.28The foregoing situations may also have obtained and were taken into account in the foreign judicial pronouncement that, in theabsence of statutory restrictions, a justice of the peace in one district of the county may issue a search warrant to be served in another district of the county and made returnable before the justice of still another district or another court having jurisdiction to deal with the matters involved.29In the present state of our law on the matter, we find no such statutory restrictions both with respect to the court which can issue the search warrant and the enforcement thereof anywhere in the Philippines.IIIConcern is expressed over possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in theexerciseof jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case. This arrangement is not unknown or without precedent in our jurisdiction. In fact, as hereinbefore noted, this very situation was anticipated in Circular No. 13 of this Court under the limited scenario contemplated therein.Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the following policy guidelines:1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation therefor.5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the case shall have been resolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case.WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23533 is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-25795 October 29, 1966ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ, AURORA MEJIA VILLASOR, ROY P. VILLASOR,petitioners,vs.THE CITY JUDGE, CESAR L. PARAS, TRINIDAD T. LAZATIN, and TERRA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,respondents.San Juan, Africa and Benedicto and Antonio C. Amor and Associates for petitioners.Quasha, Asperilla, Blanco, Zafra and Tayag for respondents.DIZON,J.:In the month of February 1964, petitioners Roy P. Villasor, as administrator of the intestate estate of the spouses Manuel M. Mejia and Gloria Lazatin (Special Proceedings No. 48181 of the Court of First Instance of Manila), together with his co-petitioners Angelina Mejia Lopez and Aurora Mejia Villasor and other heirs of said spouses, entered into a contract with respondent Trinidad T. Lazatin for the development and subdivision of three parcels of land belonging to said intestate estate. Subsequently Lazatin transferred his rights under the contract to the Terra Development Corporation. Months later, petitioners and other co-heirs filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-8344) for the rescission of said contract for alleged gross and willful violation of its terms. Thereafter, Lazatin and the Terra Development Corporation, in turn, filed with the Fiscal's Office of the City of Angeles a complaint against petitioners for an alleged violation of the provisions of Article 172 in relation to those of Article 171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code. After conducting a preliminary examination in connection therewith, the City Fiscal of Angeles filed with the Court of said City an information charging petitioners with the crime of falsification of a private document upon the allegation that they made it appear in the contract mentioned heretofore that Aurora M. Villasor was the "guardian" of the minor George L. Mejia and that Angelina M. Lopez was similarly the "guardian" of the minor Alexander L. Mejia, when in truth and in fact they knew that they were not the guardians of said minors on the date of the execution of the document (Criminal Case No. C-2268).Upon petition of the parties thus charged, the City Fiscal of Angeles reinvestigated the case on March 7, 1965 to give them an opportunity to present exculpatory evidence, and after the conclusion of the reinvestigation the parties charged moved for the dismissal of the case mainly on the ground that the City Court of Angeles had no jurisdiction over the offense because the private document that contained the alleged false statement of fact was signed by them outside the territorial limits of said city. As the resolution of this motion to dismiss was delayed and in the meantime the City Court had set Criminal Case No. C-2268 for arraignment, the defendants secured from said court several postponements of the arraignment.Finally, in view of the City Fiscal's continued failure to act on the motion to dismiss the case, petitioners filed on November 26, 1965 with the City Court a motion to quash upon the ground that said court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The complainants in the case with the conformity of the City Fiscal filed an opposition thereto, and on February 3, 1966 the respondent judge denied said motion to quash and reset the arraignment of all the defendants on March 5 of the same year. In view thereof, petitioners filed the present action forcertiorariand prohibition.Upon the foregoing facts the only question to be resolved is whether or not the City Court of Angeles City has jurisdiction to try and decide Criminal Case No. C-2268 for alleged falsification of a private document by the parties named in the information.It is clear that petitioners are not charged with havingused a falsified document, in violation of the last paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. The charge against them is that of having falsified a private document by knowingly and willfully stating therein that Aurora M. Villasor and Angelina M. Lopez were the "guardians" of their minor brothers George and Alexander, respectively, when in fact they knew that, at the time they made such written statement, it was Carolina M. de Castro who was the judicial guardian of said minors.It is settled law in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense was committed not only determines the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction (U.S. vs. Pagdayuman 5 Phil. 265). Thus, under the provisions of Section 86 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal courts have original jurisdiction only over criminal offenses committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction.In the present case, it is the claim of petitioners a claim supported by the record that Angelina M. Lopez and Aurora M. Villasor signed the private document wherein they are alleged to have made a false statement of fact, the first within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati, and the second within the territorial jurisdiction of Quezon City, both within the province of Rizal.We now come to consider the question of when and where is the offense of falsification of a private document deemed consummated or committed. Upon this point, We have ruled clearly and definitely in U.S. vs. Infante, 36 Phil. 146, that the crime of falsification of a private document defined and penalized by Article 304 of the Penal Code (now paragraph 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code) is consummated when such document is actually falsified with the intent to prejudice a third person, whether such falsified document is or is not thereafter put to the illegal use for which it was intended.Again in U.S. vs. Barretto, 36 Phil. p. 207, We said:. . . The contention of counsel would seem to be that the information was defective, in that it fails to set forth expressly the place where improper and illegal use was made of the falsified document, an allegation which counsel for appellant insists was absolutely essential for the proper determination of the court clothed with jurisdiction over the alleged offense. But under the definition of the crime of falsification of a private document as set forth in Article 304 of the Penal Code, the offense is consummated at the time when and at the place where the document is falsified to the prejudice of or with the intent to prejudice a third person, and this whether the falsified document is or is not put to the improper or illegal use for which it was intended. It is evident, therefore, that the place where the crime is committed is the place where the document is actually falsified, and that the improper or illegal use of the document thereafter is in no wise a material or essential element of the crime of falsification of a private document; . . . .Applying the above ruling to the facts before Us, it would appear that if the private document subject of the information was falsified by the persons therein charged, the act of falsification the signing of the document and the coetaneous intent to cause damage was committed and consummated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Angeles, and that whether the falsified private document was thereafter put or not put to the illegal use for which it was intended, or was signed by the other contracting party within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Angeles is in no wise a material or essential element of the crime of falsification of the private document, nor could it in any way change the fact that the act of falsification charged was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City. Thus, that the City Court of Angeles has, no jurisdiction over the offense charged is beyond question.Respondents, however, contend that the motion to quash filed by the defendants necessarily assumes the truth of the allegation of the information to the effect that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City and that they may not be allowed to disprove this at this early stage of the proceedings. This is not exactly the law on the matter at present. It was the law applicable to ademurrer now obsolete to an information. The motion to quash now provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court is manifestly broader in scope than the demurrer, as it is not limited to defects apparent upon the face of the complaint or information but extends to issues arising out of extraneous facts, as shown by the circumstance that, among the grounds for a motion to quash, Section 2 of said Rule provides for former jeopardy or acquittal, extinction of criminal action or liability, insanity of the accused etc., which necessarily involve questions of fact in the determination of which a preliminary trial is required.In the present case, the portion of the record of the reinvestigation which was submitted to the respondent judge for consideration in connection with the resolution of the motion to quash filed by the defendants shows beyond question that the offense charged was committed far beyond the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City.On the propriety of the writs prayed for, it may be said that, as a general rule, a court of equity will not issue a writ of certiorari to annul an order of a lower court denying a motion to quash, nor issue a writ of prohibition to prevent said court from proceeding with the case after such denial, it being the rule that upon such denial the defendant should enter his plea of not guilty and go to trial and, if convicted, raise on appeal the same legal questions covered by his motion to quash. In this as well as in other jurisdictions however, this is no longer the hard and fast rule.The writs ofcertiorariand prohibition, as extra-ordinary legal remedies, are, in the ultimate analysis, intended to annul void proceedings; to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. Thus, inYu Kong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, We took cognizance of a petition forcertiorariand prohibition although the accused in the case could have appealed in due time from the order complained of, our action in the premises being based on the public welfare and the advancement of public policy. InDimayuga vs. Fajardo, 43 Phil. 304, We also admitted a petition to restrain the prosecution of certain chiropractors although, if convicted, they could have appealed. We gave due course to their petition for the orderly administration of justice and to avoid possible oppression by the strong arm of the law. And inArevalo vs. Nepomuceno, 63 Phil. 627, the petition for certiorari challenging the trial court's action admitting an amended information was sustained despite the availability of appeal at the proper time.More recently, We said the following inYap vs. the Hon. D. Lutero, etc.,G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1959:Manifestly, the denial, by respondent herein, of the motion to quash the information in case No. 16443, may not be characterized as "arbitrary" or "despotic", or to be regarded as amounting to "lack of jurisdiction". The proper procedure, in the event of denial of a motion to quash, is for the accused, upon arraignment, to plead not guilty and reiterate his defense of former jeopardy, and, in case of conviction, to appeal therefrom, upon the ground that he has been twice put in jeopardy of punishment, either for the same offense, or for the same act, as the case may be. However, were we to require adherence to this pretense, the case at bar would have to be dismissed and petitioner required to go through the inconvenience, not to say the mental agony and torture, of submitting himself to trial on the merits in case No. 16443, apart from the expenses incidental thereto, despite the fact that his trial and conviction therein would violate one of his constitutional rights, and that, on appeal to this Court, we would, therefore, have to set aside the judgment of conviction of the lower court. This would, obviously, be most unfair and unjust. Under the circumstances obtaining in the present case, the flaw in the procedure followed by petitioner herein may be overlooked, in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice.Indeed, the lack of jurisdiction of the City Court of Angeles over the criminal offense charged being patent, it would be highly unfair to compel the parties charged to undergo trial in said court and suffer all the embarrassment and mental anguish that go with it.WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the offense charged in the information filed in Criminal Case No. C-2268 of the City Court of Angeles City is not within the jurisdiction of said court and that, therefore, said court is hereby restrained and prohibited from further proceedings therein. Costs against the private respondents.

ERLINDA ILUSORIO V. BILDNER

CARPIO MORALES, J.:Respondents Ma. Erlinda Bildner and Lily Raqueo were charged by Erlinda K. Ilusorio (petitioner) before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City with perjury arising from their filing, on behalf of Lakeridge Development Corp. (LDC), of a petition in the Makati City Regional Trial Court (RTC) for issuance of new owners duplicate copy of Certificate of Condominium Title (CCT) No. 21578 covering a condominium unit in Makati. The Information reads:On or about November 4, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and falsely subscribe and swear to a Petition for Issuance of a New Owners Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578 before Rafael Arsenio S. Dizon, a notary public in and for Pasig City, duly appointed, qualified and acting as such, and in which Petition said accused subscribed and swore to, among other things, facts known to them to be untrue, that is: That the Petitioners claim that the title was lost, which fact was material matter and required by law to be stated in said Petition, when in truth and in fact as the said accused very well knew at the time they swore to and signed the said petition for Issuance of a New Owners Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578, that said statement appearing in paragraph 4 of said Petition:4. Pending registration of the mortgage document with the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, the petitioners had their respective offices, renovated and by reason thereof, documents were moved from their usual places and thereafter, sometime in the early part of the second quarter of this year, when petitioners were ready to have the mortgage documents registered, the said owners duplicate copy of CCT No. 21578 could no longer be located at the places where they may and should likely be found despite earnest and diligent efforts of all the petitioners to locate the same;was false and untrue because the said title was in the possession of the complainant, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, and the above false statement was made in order to obtain a New Owners Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578, to the damage and prejudice of complainant Erlinda K. Ilusorio.Contrary to law.[1] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Three similarly worded Informations for perjury were also filed against respondents Sylvia Ilusorio, Ma. Cristina Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor also before the Pasig City MeTC arising from their filing of three petitions, also on behalf of LDC, before the Tagaytay City RTC for issuance of new owners duplicate copy of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 17010,[2] 17011[3] and 17012[4] covering properties located in Tagaytay City.As the purported corporate officers of LDC, respondents filed the above-mentioned petitions for issuance of new owners duplicate copies of titles over properties located in Makati City and Tagaytay City after the owners copies thereof could no longer be found despite earnest and diligent efforts to locate the same.Petitioner, alleging that she, as bona fide chairman and president of LDC,[5] has in her possession those titles, filed her opposition to respondents petitions.[6] Respondents forthwith amended their respective petitions,[7] the amendments reading, according to petitioner, as follows:4. On November 4, 1999, in the belief that the aforesaid owners duplicate copy of CCT No. 21578 had been lost and can no longer be recovered, the petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a petition for the cancellation and issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of CCT No. 21578 in lieu of the lost copy;5. However, after the jurisdictional facts and evidence had been presented before the said court, the above-named respondents, through their counsel, filed their opposition to the petition on the ground that the said owners duplicate copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578 allegedly is not lost and is actually in their possession and, thereafter, in a subsequent hearing held on February 10, 2000, said respondents, through counsel, presented before this Honorable Court the duplicate copy of said CCT No. 21578;6. The owners duplicate copy of CCT No. 21578, pursuant to law, should be in the actual possession of the registered owner thereof and it is indubitable that LAKERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION is the registered owner entitled to the possession and control of the evidence of ownership of all corporate properties;7. The respondents have no authority nor legal basis to take and continue to have possession of said CCT No. 21578, not one of them being a corporate officer of LAKERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, the registered owner of said property;x x x x9. The respondents, in the absence of any authority or right to take possession of CCT No. 21578, should be ordered by this Honorable Court to surrender the owners duplicate copy thereof, which they continue to hold without legal and/or justifiable reasons, not only for the purpose of causing the registration of the mortgage thereof in favor of the mortgagee/petitioner, Ma. Erlinda I. Bildner, but also for the reason that it is the corporation, as owner of the property, who [sic] is entitled to possession and control and therefore, said CCT must, pursuant to law, be kept at the corporations principal place of business.x x x x. (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)Using as bases the contents of the original petitions filed in the Makati and Tagaytay RTCs,[8] petitioner filed charges of falsification of public documents and perjury against respondents before the Pasig City Prosecutors Office.[9]By Resolution of April 6, 2000, Investigating Prosecutor Edgardo Bautista, with the imprimatur of the City Prosecutor, dismissed the falsification charges but found probable cause to indict respondents for perjury.[10] Four informations for perjury were accordingly filed before the MeTC Pasig, one against respondents Ma. Erlinda I. Bildner and Lily F. Raquero; another against respondents Sylvia K. Ilusorio, Maria Cristina A. Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor; still another against respondents Sylvia K. Ilusorio, Maria Cristina A. Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor; and the last against respondents Sylvia K. Ilusorio, Maria Cristina Ilusorio and Aurora Montemayor, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 121496, 121497, 121498 and 121499, respectively.After the consolidation of the Informations, respondents moved for their quashal on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction due to improper venue, lack of bases of the charges as the original petitions had already been withdrawn, and privileged character of the pleadings.[11]Branch 72 of the Pasig City MeTC, by Order[12] of June 13, 2001, ruled that venue was properly laid, viz:To determine the correct venue (territorial jurisdiction)[,] the vital point is the allegations [sic] in the complaint or information of the situs of the offense charged. If the complaint or information alleges that the crime was committed in the place where the court has jurisdiction, then that court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. (Colmenares vs. Villar, 33 SCRA 186). In other words, what is important is the allegation in the complaint that the crime was committed in the place which is within the courts jurisdiction (Mediante vs. Ortiz, 19 SCRA 832).In the instant cases, the information [sic] allege that the offenses were committed in Pasig City. Hence, pursuant to the aforecited doctrinal rulings, this court has the venue or territorial jurisdiction over these cases. (Underscoring supplied)Nonetheless, finding that respondents petitions are privileged, the MeTC, citing Flordelis v. Judge Himalalaon[13] and People v. Aquino, et al.,[14] granted the Motions to Quash, viz:However, the Court finds the third ground[-privileged character of the pleadings] meritorious. In the case of Flordelis vs. Himalaloan, (84 SCRA 477) which is also a prosecution for Perjury, the Supreme Court held:x x x xMoreover, it is likewise clear that any statement contained in an appropriate pleading filed in court that is relevant to the issues in the case to which it relates is absolutely priveleged [sic] and it is the law that the same may not be made the subject of a criminal prosecution. (People vs. Aquino, 18 SCRA 555.)Similarly, the alleged perjurious statements in the instant cases are contained in a Petition filed before the Regional Trial Courts of Makati and Tagaytay Cities which are relevant to the case the same being for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of a certificate of title alleged to be lost.x x x x.As the facts charged herein do not constitute an offense and/or the information contains averments which, if true, would nonetheless constitute a legal excuse or jurisdiction [sic], quashal of the Information[s] is thus in order.x x x x. (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)Reconsideration of the quashal of the Informations having been denied,[15] petitioner appealed to the Pasig City RTC Branch 263 of which, by Decision[16] of January 25, 2006, affirmed the ruling of the MeTC. After the denial of her motion for reconsideration,[17] petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for review on certiorari,[18] contending that:THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RELYING ON THE CASES OF FLORDELI[S] VS. HIMALALOAN (84 SCRA 477) AND PEOPLE VS. AQUINO (18 SCRA 555) [IN HOLDING] THAT STATEMENTS MADE IN PLEADINGS, EVEN IF PERJURIOUS OR FALSE, ARE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED AND NOT SUBJECT TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTION. (Underscoring supplied)Petitioner is of the view that People v. Aquino[19] cited by the RTC does not apply in the present controversy as that case involved a libel case and there is no authority which states that the rules on absolute privileged statements in pleadings apply to both crimes of perjury and libel.[20]Neither, petitioner posits, does the also cited case of Flordelis v. Himalaloan[21] apply wherein the Court sustained the quashal of the therein information for perjury as the answer to the complaint containing the alleged false allegations did not have to be under oath.In their Comment, respondents initially burrow into the petitions alleged procedural crack by underscoring the apparent disregard by petitioner of the established policy of judicial hierarchy of courts, pointing out that the petition should have been first filed with the Court of Appeals.[22]On the merits, respondents reiterate, in the main, the congruent rulings of the MeTC and RTC that allegations made by the parties or their counsel in a pleading are privileged in nature. Moreover, they contend that since they had amended the original petitions, there were no more bases for the charges of perjury.[23]A word first on the procedural question raised by respondents. The present petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, not a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS), Section 2(c) provides that in all cases where only questions of law are raised, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review in accordance with Rule 45.[24] Indubitably, the issue tendered in this case is a question of law, hence, there is no violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts.On the merits, the Court denies the petition on the ground that, contrary to the lower courts ruling, venue of the Informations was improperly laid in Pasig.The allegations in each of the Informations indicate Pasig as the situs of the offense charged where respondents petitions were notarized. Albeit the Informations referred to the subscribed and sworn petitions of respondents as bases of the charges, there is no mention therein that those petitions were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City. The Complaint-Affidavits,[25] which initiated the criminal actions, reflect such jurisdictional details. Consider this allegation:6. On November 4, 1999, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and LILY F. RAQUENO allegedly representing LAKERIDGE filed a verified Petition for Issuance of a New Owners Duplicate Copy of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21578 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City x x x x, (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)as well as this:06. On November 10, 1999, AURORA I. MONTEMAYOR, SYLVIA ILUSORIO, and MA. CRISTINA A. ILUSORIO allegedly representing LAKERIDGE filed three (3) verified Petitions for Issuance of a New Owners Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 17010, 17011 and 17012 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City x x x x. (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)The allegation in each of the four similarly-worded Informations that perjury was committed in Pasig is neither controlling nor sufficient to show that the Pasig MeTC has jurisdiction over them. The purported perjurious petition quoted in each of the Informations in fact indicates that, with respect to the CCT of the Registry of Deeds of Makati the TCTs of the Registry of Deeds of Tagaytay, venue of the criminal action arising therefrom is in Makati and Tagaytay, respectively.Perjury is committed as follows:Article 183, Revised Penal Code. False Testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmations. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires x x x x[26] (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)There are thus four elements to be taken into account in determining whether there is a prima facie case of perjury, viz:(a) that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) that the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) that in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and (d) that the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.[27] (Citation omitted)It is the deliberate making of untruthful statements upon any material matter, however, before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires,[28] which is imperative in perjury[29]Venue, in criminal cases, being jurisdictional,[30] the action for perjury must be instituted and tried in the municipality or territory where the deliberate making of an untruthful statement upon any matter was made, in this case, in Makati and Tagaytay.[31]It was in Makati and Tagaytay where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement finds relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new owners duplicate copies of the CCT and TCTs may issue.Whether the perjurious statements contained in the four petitions were subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being the intentional giving of false statement. So United States v. Caet [32] teaches, viz:It is imm