II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES JULY 18, 2015

U.S. Supreme CourtWeeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)Weeks v. United StatesNo. 461Argued December 2, 3, 1913Decided February 24,1914232 U.S. 383ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATESFOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURISyllabusUnder the Fourth Amendment, Federal courts and officers are under such limitations and restraints in the exercise of their power and authority as to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law.The protection of the Fourth Amendment reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not; and the duty of giving it force and effect is obligatory on all entrusted with the enforcement of Federal laws.The tendency of those executing Federal criminal laws to obtain convictions by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions in violation of Federal rights is not to be sanctioned by the courts which are charged with the support of constitutional rights.The Federal courts cannot, as against a seasonable application for their return, in a criminal prosecution, retain for the purposes of evidence against the accused his letters and correspondence seized in his house during his absence and without his authority by a United States marshal holding no warrant for his arrest or for the search of his premises.While the efforts of courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment are praiseworthy, they are not to be aided by sacrificing the great fundamental rights secured by the Constitution.While an incidental seizure of incriminating papers, made in the execution of a legal warrant, and their use as evidence, may be justified, and a collateral issue will not be raised to ascertain the source of competent evidence,Adams v. New York,192 U. S. 585, that rule does not justify the retention of letters seized in violation of the protection given by the Fourth Amendment where an application in the cause for their return has been made by the accused before trial.The court has power to deal with papers and documents in the possession of the District Attorney and other officers of the court and to direct their return to the accused if wrongfully seized.Where letters and papers of the accused were taken from his premises by an official of the United States, acting under color of office butPage 232 U. S. 384without any search warrant and in violation of the constitutional rights of accused under the Fourth Amendment, and a seasonable application for return of the letters and papers has been refused and they are used in evidence over his objection, prejudicial error is committed, and the judgment should be reversed.The Fourth Amendment is not directed to individual misconduct of state officers. Its limitations reach the Federal Government and its agencies.Boyd v. United States,116 U. S. 616.The facts, which involve the validity under the Fourth Amendment of a verdict and sentence and the extent to which the private papers of the accused taken without search warrant can be used as evidence against him, are stated in the opinion.Page 232 U. S. 386MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court:An indictment was returned against the plaintiff in error, defendant below, and herein so designated, in the district court of the United States for the western district of Missouri, containing nine counts. The seventh count, upon which a conviction was had, charged the use of the mails for the purpose of transporting certain coupons or tickets representing chances or shares in a lottery or gift enterprise, in violation of 213 of the Criminal Code. Sentence of fine and imprisonment was imposed. This writ of error is to review that judgment.The defendant was arrested by a police officer, so far as the record shows, without warrant, at the Union Station in Kansas City, Missouri, where he was employed by an express company. Other police officers had gone to the house of the defendant, and being told by a neighbor where the key was kept, found it and entered the house. They searched the defendant's room and took possession of various papers and articles found there, which were afterwards turned over to the United States marshal. Later in the same day, police officers returned with the marshal, who thought he might find additional evidence and, being admitted by someone in the house, probably a boarder, in response to a rap, the marshal searched the defendant's room and carried away certain letters and envelops found in the drawer of a chiffonier. Neither the marshal nor the police officer had a search warrant.Page 232 U. S. 387The defendant filed in the cause before the time for trial the following petition:"Petition to Return Private Papers, Books, and Other Property.""Now comes defendant and states that he is a citizen and resident of Kansas City, Missouri, and that he resides, owns, and occupies a home at 1834 Penn street in said city:""That, on the 21st day of December, 1911, while plaintiff was absent at his daily vocation, certain officers of the government, whose names are to plaintiff unknown, unlawfully and without warrant or authority so to do, broke open the door to plaintiff's said home and seized all of his books, letters, money, papers, notes, evidences of indebtedness, stock, certificates, insurance policies, deeds, abstracts, and other muniments of title, bonds, candies, clothes, and other property in said home, and this in violation of 11 and 23 to the Constitution of Missouri, and of the 4th and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States;""That the district attorney, marshal, and clerk of the United States court for the western district of Missouri took the above-described property so seized into their possession, and have failed and refused to return to defendant portion of same, to-wit:""One (1) leather grip, value about $7; one (1) tin box valued at $3; one (1) Pettis county, Missouri, bond, value $500; three (3) mining stock certificates which defendant is unable to more particularly describe, valued at $12,000; and certain stock certificates in addition thereto, issued by the San Domingo Mining, Loan, & Investment Company; about $75 in currency; one (1) newspaper published about 1790, an heirloom; and certain other property which plaintiff is now unable to describe.""That said property is being unlawfully and improperlyPage 232 U. S. 388held by said district attorney, marshal, and clerk, in violation of defendant's rights under the Constitution of the United States and the state of Missouri.""That said district attorney purposes to use said books, letters, papers, certificates of stock, etc., at the trial of the above-entitled cause, and that, by reason thereof and of the facts above set forth, defendant's rights under the amendments aforesaid to the Constitutions of Missouri and the United States have been and will be violated unless the court order the return prayed for;""Wherefore, defendant prays that said district attorney, marshal, and clerk be notified, and that the court direct and order said district attorney, marshal, and clerk, to return said property to said defendant."Upon consideration of the petition, the court entered in the cause an order directing the return of such property as was not pertinent to the charge against the defendant, but denied the petition as to pertinent matter, reserving the right to pass upon the pertinency at a later time. In obedience to the order, the district attorney returned part of the property taken and retained the remainder, concluding a list of the latter with the statement that"all of which last above described property is to be used in evidence in the trial of the above-entitled cause, and pertains to the alleged sale of lottery tickets of the company above named."After the jury had been sworn and before any evidence had been given, the defendant again urged his petition for the return of his property, which was denied by the court. Upon the introduction of such papers during the trial, the defendant objected on the ground that the papers had been obtained without a search warrant, and by breaking open his home, in violation of the 4th and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, which objection was overruled by the court. Among the papers retained and put in evidence were a number ofPage 232 U. S. 389lottery tickets and statements with reference to the lottery, taken at the first visit of the police to the defendant's room, and a number of letters written to the defendant in respect to the lottery, taken by the marshal upon his search of defendant's room.The defendant assigns error, among other things, in the court's refusal to grant his petition for the return of his property, and in permitting the papers to be used at the trial.It is thus apparent that the question presented involves the determination of the duty of the court with reference to the motion made by the defendant for the return of certain letters, as well as other papers, taken from his room by the United States marshal, who, without authority of process, if any such could have been legally issued, visited the room of the defendant for the declared purpose of obtaining additional testimony to support the charge against the accused, and, having gained admission to the house, took from the drawer of a chiffonier there found certain letters written to the defendant, tending to show his guilt. These letters were placed in the control of the district attorney, and were subsequently produced by him and offered in evidence against the accused at the trial. The defendant contends that such appropriation of his private correspondence was in violation of rights secured to him by the 4th and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We shall deal with the 4th Amendment, which provides:"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."The history of this Amendment is given with particularity in the opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking forPage 232 U. S. 390the court inBoyd v. United States,116 U. S. 616. As was there shown, it took its origin in the determination of the framers of the Amendments to the Federal Constitution to provide for that instrument a Bill of Rights, securing to the American people, among other things, those safeguards which had grown up in England to protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, such as were permitted under the general warrants issued under authority of the government, by which there had been invasions of the home and privacy of the citizens, and the seizure of their private papers in support of charges, real or imaginary, make against them. Such practices had also received sanction under warrants and seizures under the so-called writs of assistance, issued in the American colonies.See2 Watson, Const. 1414et seq.Resistance to these practices had established the principle which was enacted into the fundamental law in the Fourth Amendment, that a man's house was his castle, and not to be invaded by any general authority to search and seize his goods and papers. Judge Cooley, in his Constitutional Limitations, pp. 425, 426, in treating of this feature of our Constitution said:"The maxim that 'every man's house is his castle' is made a part of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and has always been looked upon as of high value to the citizen.""Accordingly," says Lieber in his work on Civil Liberty and Self-Government, 62, in speaking of the English law in this respect,"no man's house can be forcibly opened, or he or his goods be carried away after it has thus been forced, except in cases of felony; and then the sheriff must be furnished with a warrant, and take great care lest he commit a trespass. This principle is jealously insisted upon."InEx parte Jackson,96 U. S. 727,96 U. S. 733, this court recognized the principle of protection as applicable to letters and sealed packages in the mail, and held that, consistentlyPage 232 U. S. 391with this guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures, such matter could only be opened and examined upon warrants issued on oath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be seized, "as is required when papers are subjected to search in one's own household."In theBoydcase,supra,after citing Lord Camden's judgment inEntick v. Carrington,19 Howell's State Trials 1029, Mr. Justice Bradley said (630):"The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the essence of the offense, but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense -- it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment."InBram v. United States,168 U. S. 532, this court, in speaking by the present Chief Justice ofBoyd's Case,dealing with the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, said (544):"It was in that case demonstrated that both of these Amendments contemplated perpetuating, in their full efficacy, by means of a constitutional provision, principles of humanity and civil liberty which had been secured in the mother country only after years of struggle, so as to implant them in our institutions in the fullness of their integrity, free from the possibilities of future legislative change."The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courtsPage 232 U. S. 392of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all intrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws. The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution, and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.What, then, is the present case? Before answering that inquiry specifically, it may be well, by a process of exclusion, to state what it is not. It is not an assertion of the right on the part of the government always recognized under English and American law to search the person of the accused when legally arrested, to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime. This right has been uniformly maintained in many cases. 1 Bishop.Criminal Procedure 211; Wharton, Crim. Plead. & Practice 8th ed. 60;Dillon v. O'Brien,16 Cox C.C. 245. Nor is it the case of testimony offered at a trial where the court is asked to stop and consider the illegal means by which proofs, otherwise competent, were obtained -- of which we shall have occasion to treat later in this opinion. Nor is it the case of burglar's tools or other proofs of guilt found upon his arrest within the control of the accused.Page 232 U. S. 393The case in the aspect in which we are dealing with it involves the right of the court in a criminal prosecution to retain for the purposes of evidence the letters and correspondence of the accused, seized in his house in his absence and without his authority, by a United States marshal holding no warrant for his arrest and none for the search of his premises. The accused, without awaiting his trial, made timely application to the court for an order for the return of these letters, as well or other property. This application was denied, the letters retained and put in evidence, after a further application at the beginning of the trial, both applications asserting the rights of the accused under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established be years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land. The United States marshal could only have invaded the house of the accused when armed with a warrant issued as required by the Constitution, upon sworn information, and describing with reasonable particularity the thing for which the search was to be made. Instead, he acted without sanction of law, doubtless prompted by the desire to bring further proof to the aid of the government, and, under color of his office, undertook to make a seizure of private papers in direct violation of the constitutional prohibition against such action. Under such circumstances, without sworn information and particular description, not even an order of court wouldPage 232 U. S. 394have justified such procedure; much less was it within the authority of the United States marshal to thus invade the house and privacy of the accused. InAdams v. New York,192 U. S. 585, this court said that the Fourth Amendment was intended to secure the citizen in person and property against unlawful invasion of the sanctity of his home by officers of the law, acting under legislative or judicial sanction. This protection is equally extended to the action of the government and officers of the law acting under it. (Boyd Case, supra) To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action.The court before which the application was made in this case recognized the illegal character of the seizure, and ordered the return of property not in its judgment competent to be offered at the trial, but refused the application of the accused to turn over the letters, which were afterwards put in evidence on behalf of the government. While there is no opinion in the case, the court in this proceeding doubtless relied upon what is now contended by the government to be the correct rule of law under such circumstances -- that the letters having come into the control of the court, it would not inquire into the manner in which they were obtained, but, if competent, would keep them and permit their use in evidence. Such proposition, the government asserts, is conclusively established by certain decisions of this court, the first of which isAdams v. New York, supra.In that case, the plaintiff in error had been convicted in the Supreme Court of the State of New York for having in his possession certain gambling paraphernalia used in the game known as policy, in violation of the Penal Code of New York. At the trial, certain papers, which had been seized by police officers executing a search warrant for the discovery andPage 232 U. S. 395seizure of policy slips, and which had been found in addition to the policy slips, were offered in evidence over his objection. The conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals of New York (176 N.Y. 351), and the case was brought here for alleged violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Pretermitting the question whether these Amendments applied to the action of the states, this court proceeded to examine the alleged violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and put its decision upon the ground that the papers found in the execution of the search warrant, which warrant had a legal purpose in the attempt to find gambling paraphernalia, was competent evidence against the accused, and their offer in testimony did not violate his constitutional privilege against unlawful search or seizure, for is was held that such incriminatory documents thus discovered were not the subject of an unreasonable search and seizure, and, in effect, that the same were incidentally seized in the lawful execution of a warrant, and not in the wrongful invasion of the home of a citizen and the unwarranted seizure of his papers and property. It was further held, approving in that respect the doctrine laid down in 1 Greenleaf, 254a, that it was no valid objection to the use of the papers that they had been thus seized, and that the courts in the course of a trial would not make an issue to determine that question, and many state cases were cited supporting that doctrine.The same point had been ruled inPeople v. Adams,176 N.Y. 351, from which decision the case was brought to this court, where it was held that if the papers seized in addition to the policy slips were competent evidence in the case, as the court held they were, they were admissible in evidence at the trial, the court saying (p. 358):"The underlying principle obviously is that the court, when engaged in trying a criminal cause, will not take notice ofPage 232 U. S. 396the manner in which witnesses have possessed themselves of papers or other articles of personal property which are material and properly offered in evidence."This doctrine thus laid down by the New York Court of Appeals and approved by this Court, that a court will not, in trying a criminal cause, permit a collateral issue to be raised as to the source of competent testimony, has the sanction of so many state cases that it would be impracticable to cite or refer to them in detail. Many of them are collected in the note toState v. Turner,136 Am. St. Rep. 129, 135et seq.After citing numerous cases, the editor says:"The underlying principle of all these decisions obviously is that the court, when engaged in the trial of a criminal action, will not take notice of the manner in which a witness has possessed himself of papers or other chattels, subjects of evidence which are material and properly offered in evidence.People v. Adams, supra.Such an investigation is not involved necessarily in the litigation in chief, and to pursue it would be to halt in the orderly progress of a cause, and consider incidentally a question which has happened to cross the path of such litigation, and which is wholly independent thereof."It is therefore evident that theAdams Caseaffords no authority for the action of the court in this case, when applied to in due season for the return of papers seized in violation of the Constitutional Amendment. The decision in that case rests upon incidental seizure made in the execution of a legal warrant, and in the application of the doctrine that a collateral issue will not be raised to ascertain the source from which testimony, competent in a criminal case, comes.

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK,petitioners,vs.HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN CONCEPCION,C.J.:Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates,3a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court because,inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action forcertiorari, prohibition,mandamusand injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged,6(1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein havenocause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contestedonlyby the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure ispurely personaland cannot be availed of by third parties.10Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongsexclusivelyto the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.11Indeed, it has been held:. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to thecorporationdid not relate to nor did it affect thepersonaldefendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of thecorporationand not the rights of theother defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raisedonlyby onewhose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of defendantswhose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights ofanother.Remus vs. United States(C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure doesnotextend to the personal defendants but embracesonlythecorporationwhose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court,12thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.1wph1.tPetitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution13provides:The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue butupon probablecause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shallparticularlydescribe the things to be seized.None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, nospecificoffense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed wereabstract. As a consequence, it wasimpossiblefor the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performedparticularacts, or committedspecificomissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws orTo uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court14by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court15that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable causein connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining toall business transactionsof petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions werelegalorillegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized beparticularlydescribed as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination ofgeneralwarrants.Relying uponMoncado vs. People's Court(80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered,"16upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained,17such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this isthe only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunctionagainst unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows thatit cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is ofno value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court.20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, inMapp vs. Ohio(supra.):. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State.Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too,without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short,the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized thatthe purpose of the exclusionary rule to"is to deter to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin,we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause,we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it isnot possiblefor the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity offishingevidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility21of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States.22We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced,notin their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.It is so ordered.Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.CASTRO, J.,concurring and dissenting:From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import of the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:1.Allthe search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants were consequently illegal;3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated inMoncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is declared, abandoned;4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners areexpresslydeclared null and void the searches and seizures therein made areexpresslydeclared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is made permanent; and5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief Justicerefrainsfromexpresslydeclaring as null and void the such warrants served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case but as well for future cases and future generations.Allthe search warrants, without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume ingratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almostverbatimfrom the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession actual or constructive of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives "standing."An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same "office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.Ownership of matters seized gives"standing."Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of their location at the time of seizure.Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant);Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant was president),United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not belonging to the defendant);Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf.Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the defendant).In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile:Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man relies upon when heplaces himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room inJeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private papers inGouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance inSilverman. Countless other cases which have come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See alsoU.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).Control of premises searched gives "standing."Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the books, papers and affects seized therefrom.InJones vs. United States,supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards. See alsoChapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. InAlioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the corporate records were seized successfully moved for their return. InUnited States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:Thelawful possessionby Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the corporation'swas entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence so obtained should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But inMacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated inUnited States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, inJones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where the search occurs."Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court'sJonesdecision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of corporate property.Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961),supra. The court conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds:First he had a sufficient interest in the property seized, andsecond he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation' premises and had seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking toJones, the court observed:Jonesclearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and records merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession of the books and records or a substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .Henzelwas soon followed byVillano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962). InVillano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy. BothHenzelandVillanoconsidered also the fact that the search and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant.Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682;Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoenaduces tecumdirected to the custodian of his files. The Government contended that the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were physically in the possession of the custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the contention, holding thatSchwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to produce and deliver them.Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person gives"standing."The latest United States decision squarely in point isUnited States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management." The papers turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate books and records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even though Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing" to move for the return ofallthe papers and properties seized. The court, relying onJones vs. U.S.,supra;U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631:Henzel vs. U.S., supra;andSchwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out thatIt is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having been used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See alsoJeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).The ruling in theBirrellcase was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not appeal from this decision. The factual situation inBirrellis strikingly similar to the case of the present petitioners; as inBirrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not petitioners' family residences; as inBirrell,the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed inBirrellbecause of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the premises raided is much closer than inBirrell.Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners allpersonalandprivatepapers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. Theuncontradictedsworn statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other places werepersonalandprivatepapers and effects belonging to the petitioners.If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a)personalorprivatepapers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing the void search warrants and (b) purelycorporatepapers belonging to corporations. Under such categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and things arepersonal/privateof the petitioners orpurely corporate paperswill have to be left to the lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or return of the said documents.And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear legal standing to move for the suppression ofpurely corporatepapers as "President and/or General Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, vs.NOEL TUDTUDyPAYPA and DINDO BOLONGyNARET,accused-appellants.D E C I S I O NTINGA,J.:.It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available evidence should be used.It also is desirable that the government should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained.If it pays its officers for having got evidence by crime, I do not see why it may not as well pay them for getting it in the same way, and I can attach no importance to protestations of disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays and announces that it will pay for the fruits.We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.So wrote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes inOlmstead v. U.S.[1]On this occasion, this Court is made to choose between letting suspected criminals escape or letting the government play an ignoble part.Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a civilian asset named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud.[2]Solier related that his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area.[3]Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their superior, SPO1 Villalonghan,[4]all members of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station, conducted surveillance in Soliers neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City.[5]For five days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs.[6]According to his neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana.[7]On August 1, 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana.[8]Solier described Tudtud as big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat.[9]At around 4:00 in the afternoon that same day, a team composed of PO1 Desierto, PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to await Tudtuds arrival.[10]All wore civilian clothes.[11]About 8:00 later that evening, two men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton[12]marked King Flakes.[13]Standing some five feet away from the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtuds description.[14]The same man also toted a plastic bag.[15]PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police officers.[16]PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that night.[17]The man who resembled Tudtuds description denied that he was carrying any drugs.[18]PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of the box.[19]Tudtud obliged, saying, it was alright.[20]Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion looked on.[21]The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag[22]and another in newspapers.[23]PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages.[24]They contained what seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves.[25]The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights and brought them to the police station.[26]The two did not resist.[27]The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination.[28]Forensic tests conducted by Police Chief Inspector Noemi Austero, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region XI, on specimens taken from the confiscated items confirmed the police officers suspicion.The plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained another 890 grams.[29]Police Chief Inspector Austero reduced her findings in her report, Physical Sciences Report No. D-220-99 dated 2 August 1999.[30]Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged[31]before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs.[32]Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty.[33]The defense, however, reserved their right to question the validity of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence against them.[34]Trial ensued thereafter.The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely, arresting officers PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta, their civilian informant Bobong Solier, forensic chemist Police Chief Inspector Noemi Austero, and SPO3 Nicolas Algabre, exhibit custodian of the PNP Crime Laboratory.Said witnesses testified to the foregoing narration of facts.The accused, denying the charges against them, cried frame-up.Noel Tudtud recalled that on August 1, 1999 he had gone to Kabacan, North Cotabato to sell pairs of Levis pants, which was his sideline.[35]At about 5:00 in the afternoon, he returned to Davao City by bus.[36]Upon reaching Toril, Tudtud, along with less than ten passengers, got down the bus.[37]Suddenly, a man who identified himself as a police officer approached him, pointing a .38 caliber revolver.[38]The man told him not to run.[39]Tudtud raised his arms and asked, Sir, what is this about?[40]The man answered that he would like to inspect the plastic bag Tudtud was carrying, and instructed Tudtud to open the bag, which revealed several pairs of Levis pants.[41]The man then directed Tudtud to open a carton box some two meters away.[42]According to Tudtud, the box was already there when he disembarked the bus.[43]Tudtud told the man the box was not his, but proceeded to open it out of fear after the man again pointed his revolver at him.[44]Tudtud discovered pieces of dried fish, underneath which was something wrapped in cellophane.[45]What is that? the man asked.[46]Tudtud replied that he did not know.[47]Without even unwrapping the cellophane, the man said it was marijuana and abruptly handcuffed Tudtud.[48]Simultaneously, another man was pointing a firearm at Dindo Bolong at the other side of the street, some eight meters from Tudtud.[49]Bolong recounted that he was on his way to a relative in Daliao after attending a cousins wedding in Hagonoy, Davao del Sur when he was accosted.[50]After alighting the bus, Bolong crossed the street.[51]Someone then approached him and pointed a gun at him.[52]The man ordered him not to move and handcuffed him.[53]Bolong asked why he was being arrested but the man just told him to go with them.[54]The suspects were then taken to the police station where, they would later claim, they met each other for the first time.[55]Assailing the credibility of informant Bobong Solier, the defense offered the testimonies of Felicia Julaton,[56]Branch 3 Clerk of Court, Claudio Bohevia,[57]Branch 7 Clerk of Court, and Mercedita Abunda,[58]Branch 9 Utility Clerk, all of the Davao City Municipal Trial Circuit Court.They testified and presented court documents showing that one Bobo or Bobong Ramirez was charged in their respective branches with various crimes, specifically, light threats, less serious physical injuries and robbery.The defense asserted that the Bobo or Bobong Ramirez accused in these cases is the same person as the informant Bobong Solier.[59]Swayed by the prosecutions evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment convicting both accused as charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetuaand to pay a fine ofP500,000.00.[60]On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the admission in evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim were seized in violation of their right against unreasonable searches and seizures.The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, which states:SEC. 2.The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the places to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomesunreasonable within the meaning of the above-quoted constitutional provision, and any evidence secured thereby, will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.[61]Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides:(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.The proscription in Section 2, Article III, however, covers only unreasonable searches and seizures.The following instances are not deemed unreasonable even in the absence of a warrant:1.Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence);2.Search of evidence in plain view.The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in thepursuitof their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;3.Search of a moving vehicle.Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;4.Consented warrantless search;5.Customs search;6.Stop and Frisk; and7.Exigent and emergency circumstances.[62]The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants belongings under the first exception, as a search incident to a lawful arrest.It cited as authorities this Courts rulings inPeople v. Claudio,[63]People v. Tangliben,[64]People v. Montilla,[65]andPeople v. Valdez.[66]The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in arguing for the affirmance of the appealed decision, invokes the cases ofPeople v. Maspil, Jr.,[67]People v. Malmstedt,[68]andPeople v. Bagista.[69]A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court.Prior to its revision in 2000, Section 12,[70]Rule 126 of said Rules read as follows:SEC. 12.Search incident to lawful arrest.A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules, in turn, allows warrantless arrests:SEC. 5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;.It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest.Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed.[71]Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.[72]The question, therefore, is whether the police in this case had probable cause to arrest appellants.Probable cause has been defined as:an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts,i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the peace officers making the arrest.[73]The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113.The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.In the leading case ofPeople v. Burgos,[74]this Court held that the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must havepersonal knowledgeof that fact.The offensemust also be committed in his presence or within his view.[75]InBurgos, the authorities obtained information that the accused had forcibly recruited one Cesar Masamlok as member of the New Peoples Army, threatening the latter with a firearm.Upon finding the accused, the arresting team searched his house and discovered a gun as well as purportedly subversive documents.This Court, in declaring then Section 6 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court inapplicable, ruled that:There is no such personal knowledge in this case.Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok.The location of the firearm was given by the appellants wife.At the time of the appellants arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document.Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive.He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one.The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed.Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule.We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by law.To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.[76]Consequently, the items seized were held inadmissible, having been obtained in violation of the accuseds constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.InPeople v. Aminnudin,[77]this Court likewise held the warrantless arrest and subsequent search of appellant therein illegal, given the following circumstances:the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so.What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that he called for his arrest.To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel.It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension.It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest.The identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.[78]Thus, notwithstanding tips from confidential informants and regardless of the fact that the search yielded contraband, the mere act of looking from side to side while holding ones abdomen,[79]or of standing on a corner with ones eyes moving very fast, looking at every person who came near,[80]does not justify a warrantless arrest under said Section 5 (a).Neither does putting something in ones pocket,[81]handing over ones baggage,[82]riding a motorcycle,[83]nor does holding a bag on board atrisikad[84]sanction State intrusion.The same rule applies to crossing the streetper se.[85]Personal knowledge was also required in the case ofPeople v. Doria.[86]Recently, inPeople v. Binad Sy Chua,[87]this Court declared invalid the arrest of the accused, who was walking towards a hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box.For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.Reliable information alone is insufficient.In the following cases, the search was held to be incidental to a lawful arrest because of suspicious circumstances:People v. Tangliben[88](accused was acting suspiciously),People v. Malmstedt[89](a bulge on the accuseds waist), andPeople v. de Guzman[90](likewise a bulge on the waist of the accused, who was wearing tight-fitting clothes).There is, however, another set of jurisprudence that deems reliable information sufficient to justify a search incident to a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113, thus deviating fromBurgos.To this class of cases belongPeople v. Maspil, Jr.,[91]People v. Bagista,[92]People v. Balingan,[93]People v. Lising,[94]People v. Montilla,[95]People v. Valdez,[96]andPeople v. Gonzales.[97]In these cases, the arresting authorities were acting on information regarding an offense but there were no overt acts or suspicious circumstances that would indicate that the accused has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit the same. Significantly, these cases, except the last two, come under some other exception to the rule against warrantless searches.Thus,Maspil, Jr.involved a checkpoint search,Balinganwas a search of a moving vehicle,Bagistawas both, andLisingandMontillawere consented searches.Nevertheless, the great majority of cases conforms to the rule inBurgos, which, in turn, more faithfully adheres to the letter of Section 5(a), Rule 113.Note the phrase in his presence therein, connoting personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer.The right of the accused to be secure against any unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his liberty being a most basic and fundamental one, the statute or rule that allows exception to the requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly construed.Its application cannot be extended beyond the cases specifically provided by law.[98]The cases invoked by the RTC and the OSG are, therefore, gravely misplaced.InClaudio,[99]the accused, who was seated aboard a bus in front of the arresting officer, put her bag behind the latter, thus arousing the latters suspicion.InTanglibenandMalmstedt, the accused had also acted suspiciously.As noted earlier,Maspil, Jr.,BagistaandMontillawere justified by other exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches.Montilla, moreover, was not without its critics.There, majority of the Court held:Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a carton box should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal. But precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers and concealed from view.Thus, the officers could reasonably assume, and not merely on a hollow suspicion since the informant was by their side and had so informed them, that the drugs were in appellants luggage.It would obviously have been irresponsible, if now downright absurd under the circumstances, to require the constable to adopt a wait and see attitude at the risk of eventually losing the quarry.Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to the search were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law.The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs.With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caughtin flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified.[100]While concurring with the majority, Mr. Justice Vitug reserved his vote on the discussion on the warrantless search being incidental to a lawful arrest.Mr. Justice Panganiban, joined by Messrs. Justices Melo and Puno, filed a Separate Opinion.Although likewise concurring in the majoritys ruling that appellant consented to the inspection of his baggage, Justice Panganiban disagreed with the conclusion that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest.He argued that jurisprudence required personal knowledge on the part of the officers making thein flagrante delictoarrest.InMontilla, the appellant did not exhibit any overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse in their minds suspicion that he was embarking on some felonious enterprise.Law and jurisprudence in fact require stricter grounds for valid arrests and searches without warrant than for the issuance of warrants therefore. In the former, the arresting person must have actually witnessed the crime being committed or attempted by the person sought to be arrested; or he must have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested perpetrated the crime that had just occurred. In the latter case, the judge simply determines per