CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE 114

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Compendium of Cases Based on the Syllabus of Atty. Melissa Romana Suarez

Prepared by 2-Manresa 2012-131 of 65

3Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan

3INDING VS SANDIGANBAYAN

3Marilyn Geduspan v. People

4Rule 110, Sec. 1

4SANRIO COMPANY LIMITED v. EDGAR C. LIM,

4Rule 110, Sec. 4

4Leviste v Alameda

5RULE 110, Section 5

5JIMMY T. GO vs. ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO

5Rule 110, Sec. 6

5Eugene Firaza vs. People of the Philippines

6Rule 110, Sec. 8 & 9

6Michael Malto vs. People

6Rule 110, Sec. 11

6People v. Zaldy Ibanez

6Rule 110, Sec. 13

6Hilario Soriano vs. People of the Philippines

8Rule 110, Sec. 14

8Dino v. Olivarez

8Quintin Saludaga vs. Sandiganbayan

9Rule 110, Sec. 15

9Hector Trenas v. People

9Rule 111, Sec. 1

9Heirs of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos vs. Court of Appeals

10Rule 111, Sec. 4

10Asilo vs. People of the Philippines

10Rule 111, Sec. 5, 6 & 7

10Magestrado vs. People and Librojo

11SPS. JOSE VS. SPS. SUAREZ

11Dreamworks v. Janiola

12De Zuzuarregui vs Villarosa

13Rule 112, Sec. 1

13De Chavez vs. OMB

13Ricaforte vs. Jurado

14Rule 112, Sec. 2

14Turingan vs. Garfin

14Marina Schroeder v. Saldevar

15Payakan Tilendo vs. Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan

15SHARON CASTRO vs. HON. MERLIN DELORIA

16Sps. Chua v. Ang

16Rule 112, Sec. 3

16People v. Emiliano Anonas

17Ladlad vs. Velasco

18Rule 112, Sec. 4

18DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ vs. WILFREDO R. CRUZ

19Adasa v Abalos

20Romulo Tolentino v. Judge Paqueo

20Jose Gonzales vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation

20Summerville v. Eugenio

21Rule 112, Sec. 5

21JUDGE ESPAOL vs. JUDGE TOLEDO-MUPAS

22Rule 112, Sec. 6

22Manolo Adriano v. Judge Bercades;

22Rule 113, Sec. 3

22People vs. Nunez

23Rule 113, Sec. 5

23Pp vs. Carlos Dela Cruz

23Rule 126, Sec. 2

23Sps. Marimla vs. People and Judge Viola

23Rule 126, Sec. 4

24Sony Music Entertainment vs. Hon. Espanol

24Andy Quelnan vs. PP

24COCA-COLA vs. GOMEZ

25Rule 126, Sec. 13

25People vs. Mariacos

25Rule 126, Sec. 14

25MANLY SPORTWEAR vs. DADODETTE ENTERPRISES

27Rule 114, Sec. 1

27Government of Hongkong v. Olalia

28Rule 114, Sec. 3

28P/Supt Orbe v. Digandgang

28Ambil vs. SB

28Rule 114, Sec. 4 & 5

29Eduardo San Miguel v. Judge Maceda

29Rufina Chua v. CA and Chiok

30People v. SB and Jinggoy Estrada

31OCA v. Judge Lorenzo

32People v. Plaza

33Leviste v. CA

34Dipatuan v. Judge Mangotara

34Rule 114, Sec. 7

34Laarni Valerio v. CA

35Atty. Gacal v. Judge Infante

36Rule 114, Sec. 15

36Rasmia Tabao v. Judge Barataman

36Rule 114, Sec. 16

36Judge Simbulan v. Judge Bartolome

37Rule 114, Sec. 17

37Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint

38Purita Lim v. Judge Dumlao

39Rule 114, Sec. 17 and 19

39Virginia Savella v. Judge Ines

39Rule 114, Sec. 8, 15, 18

39Torrevillas v. Judge Navidad

40Rule 114, Sec. 21

40Mendoza v. Alarma

41WILFREDO TALAG v. JUDGE REYES

42Rule 114, Sec. 22 and 24

42Bongcac v. SB

42People v. Cawaling

43Rule 114, Sec. 26

43Borlongan v. Pena

55Rule 116, Sec. 1[g]

55People v. Alfredo Pangilinan

56Olbes v. Judge Buemio

56Rule 116, Sec. 3

56People v. Rogelio Gumimba

57Rule 116, Sec. 9

57Hubert Webb v. Judge de Leon

58Rule 116, Sec. 11

58Spouses Trinidad v. Ang

58Rule 117, Sec. 3

58MELBAROSE SASOT v. PEOPLE

59Romulo Tolentino v. Judge Paqueo

60Rule 117, Sec. 4, 5

60Rafael Gonzalez v. Judge Salvador

63Rule 117, Sec. 7

63People v. Nazareno

63Tan v. People

64Rule 117, Sec. 8

64People v. Panfilo Lacson

65Rule 117, Sec. 9

65People v. Lamberto Rafon

Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan

INDING VS SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:

City Councilor Ricardo Inding was charged before the SB for violations of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Accordingly, he faked buy-bust operations against alleged drug pushers and users to enable him to collect from the coffers of the local government as reimbursement for the actual expenses incurred, thereby causing undue injury to the government.

Inding filed a motion for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. He contended that the SB has jurisdiction to try cases only to those officers who have a Salary Grade 27 or higher; and not to him who as a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod is having only a SG 25. Hence, the crime must be tried in the RTC.

Issue: WON the SB has jurisdiction over petitioner Inding?

Held:

Positive. RA 7975 as amended by RA 8249; expanded the jurisdiction of the SB. Sec. 4 (a); Par. 1 (b) of the said act specifically includes ; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers and other department heads, fall within the jurisdiction of the SB; without classification and regardless of their salary grades.

In addition, when the legislature approved the acts mentioned, it was fully aware that not all positions specifically mentioned in Section 4 were classified as SG 27; and yet were specifically included therein.

Therefore, petitioner fell under the jurisdiction of the SB by express provision of a law.

Marilyn Geduspan v. People

G.R. No. 158187 February 11, 2005

Facts: On July 11, 2002, an information, for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, was filed against petitioner Marilyn C. Geduspan and Dr. Evangeline C. Farahmand, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) Regional Manager/Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc., respectively. Both accused filed a joint motion to quash dated July 29, 2002 contending that the respondent Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over them considering that the principal accused Geduspan was a Regional Director/Manager of Philhealth, Region VI, a position classified under salary grade 26.

Geduspan cites paragraph (1) and (5), Section 4 of RA 8249 which defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:

Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758); specifically including;

xxx xxx xxx

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

Issue: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a regional director/manager of government-owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act? YES.

Held: Petitioner held the position of Department Director A of Philhealth at the time of the commission of the offense and that position was among those enumerated in paragraph 1(g), Section 4a of RA 8249 over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction:

Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense;

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:(a) xxx xxx xxx

(b) xxx xxx xxx

(c) xxx xxx xxx

(d) xxx xxx xxx

(e) xxx xxx xxx

(f) xxx xxx xxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned and controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations." (Underscoring supplied).

It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is merely classified as salary grade 26. While the first part of the abovequoted provision covers only officials of the executive branch with the salary grade 27 and higher, the second part thereof "specifically includes" other executive officials whose positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.

Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner together with Farahmand, a private individual charged together with her. The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Rule 110, Sec. 1

SANRIO COMPANY LIMITED v. EDGAR C. LIM,

Facts:

Sanrio filed a complaint against Edgar Lim for violation of the Intellectual Property Code.

Lim asserted that he did not violate the provisions of the IPC since he was only a retailer and that he obtained his merchandise from authorized manufacturers of Sanrio products.

After the case was elevated to the CA, the appellate court dismissed it on the ground of prescription since no complaint was filed in court within 2 years after the commission of the alleged violation.

Sanrio now contends that the pendency of a preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period.

Issue:

W/N the pendency of a preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period.

Held:

Yes.

Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the prescriptive period for violation of special laws starts on the day such an offense was committed and is interrupted by the institution of proceedings against the accused.

In the case at bar, Sanrio filed his complaint with the Task Force on Anti-Intellectual Property Piracy (TAPP) on April 4, 2002 or 1 year, 10 mos., and 4 days after the NBI searched Lims premises and seized the Sanrio merchandise therefrom. Although no information was immediately filed in court, Lims alleged violation had not yet prescribed.Rule 110, Sec. 4

Leviste v Alameda

This case involves Former Governor of Batangas Antonio Leviste who shot dead his employee in 2007. The pertinent facts to our subject are as follows:

Leviste was, by Information, charged with homicide for the death of De las Alas. This was filed in the court presided by Judge Alameda.

The heirs of de las Alas filed a motion for reinvestigation. This was granted and the Information was amended. The felony of homicide was replaced with murder.

Leviste contended that the heirs did not have the right to cause the reinvestigation when the criminal information had already been filed with the lower court.

Under the rules, ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED IN COURT, the ACCUSED is given another opportunity to ask for a preliminary investigation. In the case at bar, the heirs of de las Alas or the private complainant is the party which asked for reinvestigation and was subsequently granted.

The Rules of Court and the New Rules on Inquest are silent, however, on whether de las Alas or A private complainant could invoke a similar right to ask for a reinvestigation.

Issue: Whether or not the information was validly amended

Ruling: YES. The heirs of de las Alas can move for reinvestigation provided that it shall be done with the conformity of the public prosecutor.

(In case the conformity of the public prosecutor will be asked.)

***There shall be another preliminary investigation. In the case at bar, what was conducted was a reinvestigation. The court ruled that There is no substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder.

RULE 110, Section 5

JIMMY T. GO vs. ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO

Facts: Petitioner Go and respondent Looyuko were business associates. Looyuko is the registered owner of a sole proprietorship of the businesses which are collectively known as the Noahs Ark Group of Companies. Go was the business manager or chief operating officer of the group of companies.

Sometime in 1997, the business associates had a falling out that spawned numerous civil lawsuits. Among these actions are Civil Case No. 67921 and Criminal Case No. 98-1643 from which arose several incidents which eventually became subject of these consolidated petitions.

On May 21, 1998, petitioner filedPeople of the Philippines v. Alberto T. Looyuko, an Affidavit Complaint18before the Makati City RTC, Branch 56, charging Looyuko with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-1643. Go alleged that respondent misappropriated and converted in his name petitioners 41,376 China Banking Corporation (CBC) shares of stock. Petitioner averred that he entrusted the stock certificates to respondent for the latter to sell.

Petitioner Go filed another petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62296. It sought to reverse the orders of the trial court declaring petitioner to have waived his right to formally offer his documentary evidence and allowing respondent to file a demurrer to evidence.

The CA explained that the petition was initiated solely by petitioner and was dismissible for it did not implead nor have the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General. And, on the merits, the appellate court ruled that the voluntary inhibition prayed by petitioner had no legal and factual basis. The appellate court found that three (3) alleged grounds of partiality raised by petitioner were not badges of partiality.Issue: W/ N there is violation of Sec. 5, Rule 110 on the part of petitioner Go.

Held: Petitioner Go filed the two petitions before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58639 and CA-G.R. SP No. 62296 involving incidents arising from the proceedings in Crim. Case No. 98-1643. It can be observed from the two petitions that they do not reflect the conformity of the trial prosecutor assigned to said criminal case. This is in breach of Sec. 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that requires that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted "under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." Although in rare occasions, the offended party as a "person aggrieved" was allowed to file a petition under Rule 65 before the CA without the intervention of the Solicitor General,55the instant petitions before the CA, as a general rule, should be filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State and not solely by the offended party.56For non-compliance with the rules, the twin petitions could have been rejected outright. However, in view of the death of respondent Looyuko, these procedural matters are now mooted and rendered insignificant.

Rule 110, Sec. 6

Eugene Firaza vs. People of the Philippines

Facts:

Eugene Firaza was appointed as a confidential agent of the NBI in Caraga Regional Office. He was issued with a firearm and a mission order to gather and report to the NBU such information as may be relevant to the investigations undertaken by it.

Firaza also served as a manager for RF Communications in connection on which he dealt with Christopher Rivas (Provincial Auditor of Surigao del Sur), for the establishment of Public Calling Office in the Municipality of Lianga, Surigao del Sur.

On August 11, 2000, while in Firaza and Rivas had their meeting at the latters restaurant, a heated argument commenced between them which opted Rivas to point his gun at Rivas. Firazo was accosted by P/Insp. Mullanida and PO2 Ronquillo by which they discovered that Firazas permit to carry firearm outside residence had expired more a month earlier or on July 5, 2000.

A criminal complaint was filed against Firaza for Unauthorized Carrying of License Firearm Outside Residence. He was then convicted that offense.

Firaza now argued that the complaint charged against him should be Illegal Possession of Firearms and not Carrying Firearms Outside of Residence as the phrase in the complaint reads with expired license or permit to carry outside residence being merely descriptive of the alleged unlicensed nature of the firearm.

Issue:

WON the complaint was sufficient.

Held:

Yes. The allegations in a complaint on information determine what the offense is charge. The allege acts or omissions complained of constituting the offense need not be in the terms of the statute determining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as the qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce its judgment.

Firaza cannot seriously claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated. For the transcript of Stenographic notes of the proceedings before the trial court shows that he, through his counsel, was duly informed of the nature of the cause against him.

The mission order issued to Firaza authorized him to carry firearms in connection with confidential cases assigned to him. Admittedly, Firaza was at Rivas restaurant in connection with a private business transaction. Additionally, the mission order did not authorize him to carry his duly issued firearm outside of his residence.

Rule 110, Sec. 8 & 9

Michael Malto vs. People

FACTS:

Information was filed against Michael for violation of RA 7610, Section 5(a), par. 3, Article III (Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution). However, it did not allege anything pertaining to or connected with prostitution. What it charged was that he had carnal knowledge or committed sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct with AAA, which is Section 5(b) of RA 7610.

Despite such, the RTC in its dispositive portion convicted Michael for violation of Section 5(a) of RA 7610 which was affirmed by CA.

ISSUE:Is the information fatally defective?

HELD:

The Real Nature of the Offense is Determined by Facts Alleged in the Information, Not By the DesignationThe designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. However, the failure to designate the offense by statute,or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act,or an erroneous specification of the law violateddoes not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged.What controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the information.In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the information.

The facts stated in the amended information against Michael correctly made out a charge for violation of Section 5(b), Article III, RA 7610. Thus, even if the trial and appellate courts followed the wrong designation of the offense, petitioner could be convicted of the offense on the basis of the facts recited in the information and duly proven during trial.

Rule 110, Sec. 11

People v. Zaldy Ibanez

Facts:

Zaldy Ibanes w as charged with three counts of rape of his own daughter. Lower courts convicted him of the Rape.

Zaldy filed an appeal raising as issue that the lower courts erred in not considering the informations as insufficient to support a judgment of conviction for failure of the prosecution to state the precise dates of the commission of the alleged rapes, it being an essential element of the crime.

He avers that the formations are not explicit and certain as to the dates of the rapes. He argues that such uncertainties run afoul to his Constitutional Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Issue: Whether the dates of the alleged offense are essential ingredient of the crime of rape and thus must be indispensable in the information filed by the prosecution.

Held: NO.

An information is as valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. In the prosecution of rape, the material fact to be considered is the occurrence of rape not the time of its commission.

The gravamen of the offense is the carnal knowlwdge of a woman. The precise time of the crime has no essential bearing on its commission. Therefore it is not essential to be alleged in the information.

Rule 110, Sec. 13

Hilario Soriano vs. People of the Philippines

Facts:

A letter was transmitted to the Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuno by the Office of Special Investigation of the BSP. The letter was attached with five affidavits that would serve as the bases for filing criminal charges for Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents, in relation to PD No. 1689, and for violation of Section 83 of RA 337 as amended by PD 1795 against Hilario Soriano. It alleged that spouses Enrico and Amalia Castro appeared to have an outstanding loan of 8Million Pesos with the Rural Bank of San Miguel, but they had never applied for nor received such loan and that it was Soriano, the president of RBSM who ordered, facilitated, and received such loan without the authorization of RBSM Board of Directors. The letter of the OSI, which was not subscribed under oath, ended with a request that a preliminary investigation be conducted and the corresponding criminal charges be filed against Soriano.

Acting on the letter-request and its annexes, State Prosecutor Albert R. Fonacier proceeded with the preliminary investigation. He issued a subpoena with the witnesses affidavits and supporting documents attached, and required petitioner to file his counter-affidavit. In due course, the investigating officer issued a Resolution finding probable cause and correspondingly filed two separate informations against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan.

Soriano moved to quash the information. One of the grounds for such motion was that the court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. he argued that the letter transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ constituted the complaint and hence was defective for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, such as the statement of address of petitioner and oath and subscription.Moreover, Soriano argued that the officers of OSI, who were the signatories to the "letter-complaint,"were not authorized by the BSP Governor, much less by the Monetary Board, to file the complaint. According to Soriano, this alleged fatal oversight violated Section 18, pars. (c) and (d) of the New Central Bank Act (RA 7653).

The RTC denied Sorianos Motion to Quash for lack of Merit. He also filed a petition for Certiorari before the CA, however, this was denied.

Issue:

WON the complaint complied with the mandatory requirements provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA NO. 7653.

Held:

On March 5, 2007, the Court notedpetitioner's Manifestation and Motion for Partial Withdrawal of the Petition36dated February 7, 2007. In the said motion, petitioner informed the Court of the promulgation of a Decision entitledSoriano v. Hon. Casanova,which also involved petitioner and similar BSP letters to the DOJ. According to petitioner, the said Decision allegedly ruled squarely on the nature of the BSP letters and the validity of the sworn affidavits attached thereto.

We held in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova, after a close scrutiny of the letters transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ, that these were not intended to be the complaint, as envisioned under the Rules. They did not contain averments of personal knowledge of the events and transactions constitutive of any offense. The letters merely transmitted for preliminary investigation the affidavits of people who had personal knowledge of the acts of petitioner. We ruled that these affidavits, not the letters transmitting them, initiated the preliminary investigation. Since these affidavits were subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them before a notary public, then there was substantial compliance with Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

We further held that since the offenses for which Soriano was charged were public crimes, authority holds that it can be initiated by "any competent person" with personal knowledge of the acts committed by the offender.

Furthermore the case of Santos-concio vs. DOJ it held that: The Court is not unaware of the practice of incorporating all allegations in one document denominated as "complaint-affidavit." It does not pronounce strict adherence to only one approach, however, for there are cases where the extent of ones personal knowledge may not cover the entire gamut of details material to the alleged offense. The private offended party or relative of the deceased may not even have witnessed the fatality, in which case the peace officer or law enforcer has to rely chiefly on affidavits of witnesses. The Rules do not in fact preclude the attachment of a referral or transmittal letter similar to that of the NBI-NCR. Thus, inSoriano v. Casanova, the Court held:

A close scrutiny of the letters transmitted by the BSP and PDIC to the DOJ shows that these werenotintended to bethe complaint envisioned under the Rules. It may be clearly inferred from the tenor of the letters that the officers merely intended to transmit the affidavits of the bank employees to the DOJ. Nowhere in the transmittal letters is there any averment on the part of the BSP and PDIC officers of personal knowledge of the events and transactions constitutive of the criminal violations alleged to have been made by the accused. In fact, the letters clearly stated that what the OSI of the BSP and the LIS of the PDIC did was to respectfully transmit to the DOJ for preliminary investigation the affidavits and personal knowledge of the acts of the petitioner. These affidavits were subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them before a notary public. Since theaffidavits, not the letters transmitting them, were intended toinitiatethe preliminary investigation, we hold that Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court was substantially complied with.

Citing the ruling of this Court inEbarle v. Sucaldito, the Court of Appeals correctly held thatacomplaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the offended party. The rule has been that,unless the offense subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecutedde oficio,the same may be filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, byany competent person. The crime of estafa is a public crime which can be initiated by "any competent person." The witnesses who executed the affidavits based on their personal knowledge of the acts committed by the petitioner fall within the purview of "any competent person" who may institute the complaint for a public crime. x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied)

A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis of an affidavit of anycompetent person, without the referral document, like the NBI-NCR Report, having been sworn to by the law enforcer as the nominal complainant. To require otherwise is a needless exercise. The cited case ofOporto, Jr. v. Judge Monseratedoes not appear to dent this proposition. After all, what is required is toreduce the evidence into affidavits, for while reports and even raw information may justify the initiation of an investigation, the preliminary investigation stage can be held only after sufficient evidence has been gathered and evaluated which may warrant the eventual prosecution of the case in court.

Following the foregoing rulings in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova and Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice, we hold that the BSP letter, taken together with the affidavits attached thereto, comply with the requirements provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA 7653.

Rule 110, Sec. 14Dino v. Olivarez

Facts: Bienvenido Dino and Renato Comparado charged Pablito Olivarez of vote buying. Two informations were filed against Olivarez for violation of Section 261, paragraphs a, b and k of Art. 22 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Before arraignment, Olivarez moved to quash the two criminal informations on the ground that more than one offense was charged therein. The assistant prosecutor opposed such motion and likewise moved for the amendment of the information, this time only charging Olivarez with violation of paragraph a, in relation to paragraph b of Section 261, Article 22 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Olivarez opposed the motion for the amendment of the information alleging that there was no resolution to explain the changes therein, particularly the deletion of paragraph k. He likewise posits that the city prosecutor was no longer empowered to amend the informations since COMELEC had already directed it to transmit all the records of the case.

When Olivarez failed to show up for his arraignment the judge denied his petition to quash the informations and likewise admitted the amended complaint.

Subsequently, the COMELEC, upon Olivarez motion, revoked the deputation of the prosecutor to investigate and prosecute election offense cases.

Issue/s: WON the City the Amended Informations should be admitted.

Ruling: The Supreme Court finds that the prosecutors, in filing the Amended Informations, did not exceed the authority delegated by the COMELEC. The resolution which effectively revoked the deputation of the Office of the City Prosecutor was issued on April 4, 2005, after the Amended informations were filed on October 28, 2004.

Furthermore, the letter of the director of the Law Department of COMELEC did not revoke the continuing authority granted to the City Prosecutor. It merely directed the latter to forward the records of the case to COMELEC. The filing of the amended informations was not made in defiance to the order of the Director, rather, it was an act necessitated by the developments of the case.

Moreover, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. x x x. (Emphasis provided.)

Since the Rules of Court provided for a remedy that would avert the dismissal of the informations on the ground that more than one offense was charged, the public prosecutor filed the Amended Informations. The instructions of the COMELEC were clearly intended to allow sufficient time to reconsider the merit of the joint resolution, not to have the public prosecutor abandon the prosecution of the case and negligently allow its dismissal by not filing the Amended Informations, thus leaving the COMELEC in a quandary should it later dismiss the appeal before it. by filing the Amended Informations, the public prosecutor had avoided such undesirable situation, which would have forced the COMELEC to re-file the case, waste government resources, and delay the administration of justice.Quintin Saludaga vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts:

An Information was filed charging both of Mayor Saludaga and SPO2 Geni of violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, by causing undue injury to the government. A Motion to Quash filed by Saludaga was granted for failure of the prosecution to allege and prove the amount of actual damages caused to the government. A new Information was filed charging Saludaga and Genio for violation of Sec. 3(e), by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the prejudice of the government. Saludaga contends that the change from undue injury to the government to giving unwarranted benefit would constitute as a substitution or a substantial amendment.

Issue:

Whether or not the changes made in the new Information filed is a substitution or a substantial amendment.

Ruling:

There is no substitution because only the mode of the commission of the crime was changed. The nature of the offense charged is still the same. Causing undue injury and giving unwarranted benefit are modes of violating Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. The SC also ruled that there was no substantial amendment when there was a shift from giving undue injury to giving unwarranted benefit. The Information is founded on the same transaction as the first Information.

Rule 110, Sec. 15

Hector Trenas v. People

Facts:

A complaint for estafa was file agains Trenas with the RTC of Makati City.

Trenas contends that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Trenas asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that the money that was given to and received by him took place in Makati; the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by him was signed and notarized in Iloilo City; the only time Makati was mentioned was with respect to the time when the check provided by him was dishonored by Equitable PCI Bank in Makati.; and that the prosecution failed to allege that any of the acts material to the crime of estafa occurred in Makati.

Issue:

W/N the RTC of Makati failed to acquire jurisdiction over his case.

Held:

Yes.

It is a fundamental principle that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court in a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so show, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the prosecution evidence and during trial which even mentions that any of the elements of the offense were committed in Makati. There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.

Rule 111, Sec. 1

Heirs of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

While everyone was asleep, the household of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos were attacked by a number of assailants killing Sarah herself and her uncle Erasmo Palma while her another uncle Victor Palma and friend Beningno Oquendo survived the attack.

Based on the theory of the police, the cause for such attack is attributed to the land transaction that gone sour between Sarahs live-in partner, David So and Johnny Co.

Four months after the incident, the police arrested Cresnencio Aman and Romeo Martin and both executed confession allegedly admitting their part in the attack.

They also admitted the participation of Artemio Bergonia, Danilo Sy, and Co who allegedly to be the mastermind. However, these three remained at large. The RTC acquitted Aman and Martin.

Ten years after, Co surrendered to the NBI. He was then charged with two counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty.

Co filed a petition for admission to bail. After hearing, the RTC granted the bail on the ground that the evidence presented against Co was not strong.

The heirs of Sarah moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied such, hence the heirs of Sarah filed a special civil action of certiorari with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals dismissed it for the reason that it was filed without involving the Office of the Solicitor General, which is in violation of the jurisprudence and the Law (Sec. 35 Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code)

Issue:

WON the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the Special Civil Action of certiorari, which questioned the RTCs grant of bail to Co, for having been filed in the name of the offended parties and without Office of the Solicitor General.

Held:

Yes. The civil action, in which the offended party is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant,is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action

The law allows the merger of the criminal and the civil actions to avoid multiplicity of suits.Thus, when the state succeeds in prosecuting the offense, the offended party benefits from such result and is able to collect the damages awarded to him.

But, when the trial court acquits the accusedor dismisses the caseon the ground of lack of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the civil action is not automatically extinguished since liability under such an action can be determined based on mere preponderance of evidence.The offended party may peel off from the terminated criminal action and appeal from the implied dismissal of his claim for civil liability.

The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense, is to determine the penal liability of the accused for having outraged the state with his crime and, if he be found guilty, to punish him for it.In this sense, the parties to the action are the People of thePhilippinesand the accused.The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state.Also in this wise, only the state, through its appellate counsel, the OSG,has the sole right and authority to institute proceedings before the CA or the Supreme Court.

Here, the question of granting bail to the accused is but an aspect of the criminal action, preventing him from eluding punishment in the event of conviction.The grant of bail or its denial has no impact on the civil liability of the accused that depends on conviction by final judgment.Here, respondent Co has already been arraigned.Trial and judgment, with award for civil liability when warranted, could proceed even in his absence.

Rule 111, Sec. 4Asilo vs. People of the Philippines

Facts:

This case involves the acts of the late Mayor Comendador who authorized the demolition of the stores of Spouses Bombasi without a judicial order. The said demolition was supervised by Asilo and Angeles. The acts of the three mentioned Asilo, Mayor Comendador and Angeles prompted the Spouses Bombasi to file a civil action for damages before the RTC and a separate criminal complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3e of R.A. 3019. Upon arraignment the three accused all pleaded not guilty. (Note: After the arraignment the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution ordering the consolidation of the civil with the criminal case. () However during the pendency of the case, Mayor Comendador died. Notwithstanding the Manifestation of Mayor Comendadors counsel informing the court of the Mayors death, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding Comendador and Asilo guilty for violating Section 3e of R.A. 3019 and also held them civilly liable to Spouses Bombasi (No liability si Angeles as he died ahead of Mayor Comendador, the difference is when nag file ng motion to drop ang counsel ni Angeles, there was no objection on the part of the public prosecutor). The counsel for the late Mayor filed a Motion for reconsideration alleging that the death of Mayor Comendador extinguished both his criminal and civil liability. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion as to the extinction of the criminal liability but upheld Mayor Comendadors civil liability.

Issue: WON the death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case also extinguished his civil liability. No.

Ruling: The death of Mayor Comendador did not extinguish his civil liability because his civil liability is not predicated upon the violation of R.A. 3019 but upon his violation as provided under Art. 32(6) of the Civil Code. The Mayor, by authorizing the demolition of the stores of Spouses Bombasi without a judicial order is tantamount to depriving the Spouses Bombasi of their property without due process. Hence, his civil liability stands (Rule 111, Sec. 5, 6 & 7

Magestrado vs. People and Librojo

FACTSElena Librojo filed 2 cases against Magestrado:

1. Criminal action for perjury in the MeTC

2. Civil action for collection of sum of money in the RTC

On the other hand, Magestrado filed a civil action against Librojo for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of title and Damages in the RTC.

Magestrado filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial question. He alleged thatthe civil cases pending before the RTC of Quezon City must be resolved first before the criminal case may proceed since the issues in the said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action.

ISSUEWON there exists a prejudicial question.

HELDNo. there is no prejudicial question.

Sections 6 and 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

The determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the civil cases are so related with the issues raised in the criminal case such that the resolution of the issues in the civil cases would also determine the judgment in the criminal case.

The civil cases are principally for the determination of whether a loan was obtained by and whether Magestrado executed a real estate mortgage involving a property. On the other hand, Criminal Case involves the determination of whether petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to support his request for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT.

The civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the land or his execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit of loss.

SPS. JOSE VS. SPS. SUAREZ

[G.R. No. 176795, June 30, 2008]

FACTS: Spouses Suarez had availed of Carolina Joses offer to lend money at daily interest of 1% to 2% which the latter increased to 5% and Spouses Suarez were forced to accept due to their financial distress. They sought to nullify the 5% interest per day fixing claiming that the same were contrary to morals and done under vitiated consent. Thereafter, the Spouses Jose herein filed cases of violation of BP22 against Sps. Suarez where the latter filed motions to suspend the criminal proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question. Herein Sps. Suarez claimed that if the 5%interest rates are nullified and loans are computed at 1% per month, it would mean that the checks which are objects of BP22 cases are not only fully paid but in fact over paid.

Accordingly, the trial court as well as the appellate court concluded that if the checks subject of the criminal cases were later on declared null and void, then said checks could not be made the bases of criminal prosecutions under B.P. Blg. 22. In other words, the outcome of the determination of the validity of the said checks is determinative of guilt or innocence of Purita in the criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not a prejudicial questions exists such that the outcome of the validity of the interest is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondents in the criminal case. NO

HELD: Prejudicial questions have two elements: a) The civil actions involve an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;

b) The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not determinative of the guilt of the respondents in the criminal case. The cause or reason for issuance of a check is immaterial in determining criminal culpability under BP22. The law punishes the issuance of the bouncing check and not the purpose it was issued for.

The validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not determinative of the guilt of respondents in the criminal cases. The Court has consistently declared that the cause or reason for the issuance of a check is inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under B.P. Blg. 22. In several instances, we have held that what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance; and that the mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum provided the other elements of the offense are properly proved.

Thus, whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void for being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the B.P. Blg. 22 cases because what will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the primordial question posed before the court hearing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been breached, that is, if a bouncing check has been issued.

Dreamworks v. Janiola

Facts: On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola. On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 20065 for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 20076 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.

Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to Accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question7 on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.

Issue:W/N there is a prejudicial question in this case.

SC: The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action

Ruling:It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner.

Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.lawphil.net

Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case before us.

NB:Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.

De Zuzuarregui vs Villarosa

This is regarding Bella Torress estate. When she died, a compromise agreement was entered into by Rosemary Torres (Bellas daughter) and Krizia Torres-de Zuzuarregui(Bellas granddaughter and Rosemarys niece) regarding the letters of administration of Bellas estate. In said compromise agreement, they both alleged that they are the only leaving heirs of Bella, and that they have reached an amicable settlement regarding Bellas estate. The same was approved by the RTC.

However, subsequently after the RTC decision, three others claimed to be living heirs of Bella (Peter, Catherine, and Fannie). These three filed a petition to annul the said compromise agreement as they are also legal and living heirs of Bella.

While the case in the CA is still pending, Fannie filed a criminal complaint against Rosemary and Krizia for perjury and falsification in the MeTC. She alleges that these two committed these crimes when they falsified a sworn statement claiming to be the only living heirs of Bella in the compromise agreement, when in truth and fact, three others are also living heirs.

Rosemary and Krizia motioned to suspend proceedings in the MeTC. They invoke prejudicial question.

Issue: Whether or not there is prejudicial question in the case at bar.

Ruling: Yes, there is aprejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal case against Rosemary and Krizia.

Requisites of Prejudicial question:

1.) The facts and issues raised in the previously instituted civil action are intimately related with the issues in the criminal case;

2.) The resolution of the issues in the civil case would necessarily determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in the criminal case.

It is evident, in the case at bar, that the result of the civil case will determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in the criminal case for perjury and falsification. If it is finally adjudged in the civil case that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie are not biological children of the late Bella and consequently not entitled to a share in the estate, then there is no more basis to proceed with the criminal cases against Rosemary and Krizia, who could not have committed perjury and falsification in her pleadings filed before the RTC, for the truth of her statements regarding Peter, Catherine, and Fannie having been judicially settled

Rule 112, Sec. 1

De Chavez vs. OMB

Facts: On 7 November 2001, private respondent Nora L. Magnaye (Magnaye), Professor IV of the Batangas State University (BSU), filed with the public respondent an administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct, Oppression, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interests of the Service, Falsification of Official Documents, Dishonesty, Gross Neglect of Duty and Violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise known as "CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES" against petitioners.

Subsequently, on 13 November 2001, based on the above imputed acts plus an additional one,7 private respondent also filed with the public respondent another Complaint imputing criminal liability to the BSU officials above-named for Violation of Section 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the "ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT," Violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713, Falsification of Official Documents and Estafa.

After the conduct of a clarificatory hearing14 and upon submission of both parties of their respective position papers, the public respondent, through Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Joy N. Casihan-Dumlao with Director Joaquin F. Salazar and Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C. Fernandez concurring, issued its Joint Resolution dated 14 February 2005 in OMB-1-01-1036-K and OMB-1-01-1083-K recommending the indictment of petitioners De Chavez, Lontok, Sr., and Mendoza for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019. It, however, proposed the dismissal of the complaints against petitioners Ligaya and Lontok, Jr., and other officials of BSU namely, Lualhati, Zaraspe, and Montalbo for lack of probable cause.

Upon review by Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, he issued a Supplemental Resolution dated 12 July 2005 "partially approving" with modifications the Joint Resolution dated 14 February 2005. Among other findings, he found petitioners de Chavez, Lontok, Sr., Lontok, Jr., and Mendoza liable for violation of Section 3(e) and (h) of Republic Act No. 3019 and for violation of Article 315(2)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. He also found petitioners de Chavez, Lontok, Sr., Lontok, Jr., and Ligaya guilty of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct, and, thus, imposed on them the penalty of Dismissal from the Service with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service.

Issue: WON the OMB committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in "convincting" De Chavez et. al.

Held: NO.

Petitioners make mountain on the use of the words "liable for violation x x x" employed by the Ombudsman. A review of the specific powers of the Ombudsman under the Constitution, the laws and jurisprudential pronouncements is in order. Both the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6770) empower the public respondent to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official or employee, office or agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.22 By virtue of this power,23 it may conduct a preliminary investigation for the mere purpose of determining whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no objective except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the respondent is guilty thereof.25 In the conduct of preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of respondent. A prosecutor merely determines the existence of probable cause, and to file the corresponding information if he finds it to be so.FOOTNOTE: simply put, the OMB merely found probable cause against De Chavez, et.al. finding them to be LIABLE for committing the said offensesand be subjected to the appropriate penalties. No Conviction was EVER MADE by the OMB.

Ricaforte vs. Jurado

Facts: Leon Jurado filed a complaint before the prosecutor's office charging Alicia Ricaforte of violation of BP 22 and estafa. Ricaforte alleged that Aguilar who had lost her Metrobank checkbook borrowed her checks to pay off Aguilars obligations with Leon Jurado under the condition that Aguilar will replace these checks with her own once Metrobank issued her a new checkbook. Ricaforte likewise claime that when Aguilar issued the replacement checks, the former asked Jurado to return her checks but Jurado refused and that's when Ricaforte asked her bank to issue a stop payment order and that's why the checks where dishonored.

The Asst. City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for estafa and BP 22 for insufficiency of evidence.Jurado's motion for reconsideration was denied and so he appealed before the Secretary of Justice. The Justice Secretary modified the decision of the prosecutor's office and ordered the filing of an information for violation of BP 22 against Ricaforte.

The motion for reconsideration was denied and the CA upheld the decision of the Justice Secretary. It ruled that trial on the merits must ensue since it is on said occasion that petitioner is granted opportunity for a full and exhaustive presentation of her evidence and not during the preliminary investigation phase where the investigating officer acts upon probable cause and reasonable belief; that in the preliminary investigation phase, it is not yet clear whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed the offense charged and sought to be punished, although petitioner is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt; that the crux of the matter rests upon the reasons for the drawing of the postdated checks by petitioner;i.e., whether they were drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value" as required underB.P. Blg.22 which will only be determined during trial.Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON trial on the merits must ensue ensue for violation of BP 22.

Ruling: Yes. The gravamen of the offense punished byB.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment.

In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a conviction.A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspect.It does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties evidence.It is enough that in the absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness, credence is given to the finding and determination of probable cause by the Secretary of Justice in a preliminary investigation.

Herein case is still in the preliminary investigation stage which is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information.It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty.It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.

Rule 112, Sec. 2

Turingan vs. Garfin

G.R. No. 153284

Facts:An Information was filed against Apolinar charging him for violation of relating sections in R.A. 8282 (Social Security Act) for non-remittance of social security and employees compensation. The Information was signed by state prosecutor Tolentino accompanied by a certification also signed by Tolentino. Apolinar contends that the state prosecutor Tolentino lacked authority to sign the Information. Respondent Judge Garfin (Branch 19 RTC, Naga) dismissed the criminal case for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not the state prosecutor had the authority to file the Information without a written authority or approval of the provincial state prosecutor.

Ruling:

Toletino lacked authority to file the Information because there was neither a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating him as special prosecutor for SSS cases nor the written approval of the Information by the city prosecutor. An information field by an officer without authority to do so is a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured. Judge Garfin correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Note:

The special State Prosecutor is only authorized to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecution of SSS cases and not to sign the information.

Marina Schroeder v. Saldevar

Facts:

Mario A. Saldevar and Erwin C. Macalino are the Legal Division Chief and Attorney II, respectively, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in Quezon City.

Sometime in 1998, respondents were arrested by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment operation conducted upon petitioners complaint.

After inquest, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, an information for direct bribery against respondents. The case was remanded to the DOJ for preliminary investigation.

The DOJ issued a Resolution finding probable cause to indict respondents for direct bribery. Aggrieved, respondents filed in the DOJ a petition for review of the said Resolution. The DOJ, however, endorsed the petition to the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman treated the petition for review as a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid DOJ Resolution. It denied the petition for review for lack of merit.

Respondents filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus. The appellate court found no probable cause against respondent Saldevar, but upheld the finding of probable cause against respondent Macalino.

Issue: WON the CA can substitute the findings of the Ombudsman with regard to finding probable cause.

Ruling: No. The determination of probable cause is an executive function lodged with the prosecutorial arm of the government (Ombudsman), not with the judiciary.

In our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court. Courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the person charged is valid on its face, and no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor. As a rule, courts cannot interfere with the Ombudsmans discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigations. In the determination of probable cause, the Ombudsmans discretion prevails over judicial discretion.

Payakan Tilendo vs. Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan

Facts:

In 1993, Tilendo was appointed as President of the Cotabato City State Polytechnic College (CCSPC).

In December 1998, the Concerned Faculty Members of the CCSPC filed before the Ombudsman a letter-complaint against Tilendo for violation of RA 3019.

The complaint accused Tilendo of diverting and misusing funds allocated for the construction of CCSPC Agriculture Building.

The Deputy-Ombudsman Mindanao also endorsed the anonymous complaint to the NBI, Region XII for the conduct of a fact-finding investigation.

On 26 April 2002, the Deputy-Ombudsman Mindanao received the NBI report charging Tilendo with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and Articles 217, 218, and 219 of the RPC.

Tilendo now contends that the cases against him dragged for more than 3 yrs. in preliminary investigation phase without his fault. The inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation violates his right to speedy disposition of cases.

Issue:

W/N there was delay in the preliminary investigation phase.

Held:

No.

There was no unreasonable delay to speak of because the preliminary investigation stage officially began when the NBI filed before the Ombudsman a complaint against Tilendo.

Contrary to Tilendos view, the preliminary investigation did not automatically commence upon the filing of the anonymous letters in the Ombudsman.

In Raro v. Sandiganbayan, by referring the complaint to the NBI, the Ombudsman did not thereby delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the case to the NBI. What was delegated was only the fact-finding function, preparatory to the preliminary investigation still to be conducted by the Ombudsman.

Further, the NBI is not among those authorized under Section 3, Rule II of AO 7 to conduct preliminary investigations for complaints cognizable by the Ombudsman, to wit:

1) Ombudsman Investigators;

2) Special Prosecuting Officers;

3) Deputized Prosecutors;

4) Investigating Officials authorized by law to conduct preliminary investigations; or

5) Lawyers in the government service, so designated by the Ombudsman.

SHARON CASTRO vs. HON. MERLIN DELORIA

FACTS:

On May 31, 2000, Castro was charged by the Ombudsman before the RTC Guimaras with Malversaton of Public Funds. She pleaded NOT GUILTY. On August 31, 2001, Castro filed a motion to quash on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and file the Information. She argued that the Information failed to allege her salary grade, a material fact upon which depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy vs. SB (August 9, 1999), she was a public employee with salary grade of 27, the case filed against her was cognizable by the RTC and may be investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor and not by the OMB whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable by the SB.

RTC denied motion to quash stating that the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did not depend on the salary grade of petitioner, but on the penalty imposable upon the latter for the offense charged. Moreover, the Uy case which was cited was set aside on March 20,2001 expressly recognizing the prosecutorial and investigatory authority of the OMB in cases cognizable by the RTC.

ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman has the authority to file and prosecute the case

HELD: YES. The Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the SB but also those cognizable by the regular courts. The power to investigate and prosecute granted b law is PLEANRY and UNQUALIFIED. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction. Section 15 (1) of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the SB. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases. This grant does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11of RA 6770. The latter is merely a component of the former. And may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman and also limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the SB.

Sps. Chua v. Ang

Facts: Spouses Leonardo and Milagro Chua and Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI) executed a Contract to Sell a condominium unit

FEPI failed to construct and deliver the contracted condominium

The Chuas filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor accusing the officers and directors of FEPI of violating P.D. 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree)

Assistant City Prosecutor Pastrana and Pasig City Prosecutor Ang issued and approved a resolution dismissing the complaint for being premature

*the resolution said that it is the HLURB that has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business and practices

APPEAL

The Chuas argue that jurisdiction to entertain criminal complaints is lodged with the city prosecutor and that the jurisdiction of the HLURB under P.D. 957 is limited to the enforcement of contractual rights, not the investigation of criminal complaints

The officers and directors of FEPI counter that the petition should be dismissed outright because the petitioners failed to avail of other remedies provided by law

Issue: Whether or not Pastrana and Ang abdicated their authority to conduct a preliminary investigation when they dismissed the criminal complaint for being premature. *abdicate fail to fulfill or undertake J

Held: YES! They committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaints.

Nothing in P.D. 957 vests the HLURB with jurisdiction to impose Section 39 criminal penalties

Unless the contrary appears under other provisions of law (in this case, no provision applies), the determination of the criminal liability lies within the realm of Criminal Procedure as embodied in Section 2 Rule 112

The Chuas have expressly chosen to pursue the criminal prosecution but the prosecutor dismissed their complaint. The dismissal for prematurity was apparently on the view that an administrative finding of violation must first be obtained before recourse can be made to criminal prosecution. But where the law is silent on this matter(like in this case), administrative cases are independent from criminal actions subject only to the rules on forum shopping.

*(SC) The prosecutors should have made a determination of probable cause in the complaint instead of simply dismissing it for prematurity. Their failure to do so and the dismissal they ordered effectively constituted an evasion of a positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.

Petition granted complaint returned to Office of the City Prosecutor for determination of probable cause.

Rule 112, Sec. 3

People v. Emiliano Anonas

Facts: SPO4 Anonas was charged with illegal possession of shabu and also illegal possession of firearms. The accused moved for reinvestigation on the grounds that he was arrested without a warrant and no preliminary investigation was conducted. The motion for reinvestigation was granted. However, the prosecutor assigned to reinvestigate the complaint was appointed as RTC judge and did not inform the prosecutor who took his place about the pending reinvestigation. Meanwhile, respondent has remained in detention.

4years after the motion for reinvestigation was granted, SPO4 Anonas moved for the dismissal of the informations against him contending that the delay in the reinvestigation violated his right to due process. The trial court heard the motion to dismiss. It turned out that the prosecutor who took over the case, was not aware of the pending reinvestigation. The trial court then directed him to terminate the reinvestigation within thirty (30) days.The prosecutor manifested before the trial court that the reinvestigation had been terminated and that evidence exist to sustain the allegations in the Informations against respondent.

On August 9, 2001, the trial court issued an Order denying respondents motion to dismiss the Informations. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. When the case was elevated before the CA, the CA ruled in favor of SPO4 Anonas. The appellate court found that accused's right to due process and speedy trial have been violated because of the delay in the reinvestigation. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the delay in the reinvestigation for almost 5 years constituted a violation of the right to due process of accused SPO4 Anonas.

Ruling: Yes. Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy his right to a speedy trial. Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "All persons shall have the right to speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." This is reinforced by Section 3(f), Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which requires that "the investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days from the conclusion of the investigation." To ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Republic Act No. 8493 (The Speedy Trial Act of 1998) was enacted on February 4, 1998. To implement its provisions, the Court issued SC Circular No. 38-98 dated September 15, 1998 setting a time limit for arraignment and pre-trial for thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

The inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation of an accused violates his constitutional right to due process.

The preliminary investigation of the respondent for the offenses charged took more than four years. He was apprehended for the offenses charged on November 19, 1996. Having been arrested without a warrant of arrest and not having been afforded a formal investigation, he prayed for reinvestigation of the cases. The trial court, in an Order dated January 28, 1997 ordered a reinvestigation which was terminated only on February 16, 2001. In fact, even the Solicitor General admitted "it took some time for the City Prosecutor to terminate and resolve the reinvestigation.

There can be no question that respondent was prejudiced by the delay, having to be confined for more than four oppressive years for failure of the investigating prosecutors to comply with the law on preliminary investigation. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals, respondents right to due process had been violated.

Ladlad vs. Velasco

Facts:This is a consolidation of 2 petitions wherein the accused are members of the House of representatives representing various party-list groups. They are all charged with rebellion. By virtue of a PD 1017, declaring a state of emergency, issued by then President GMA, Crispin Beltran was arrested without a warrant. Beltran was subject to 2 inquests for initiating sedition based on a speech he gave during a rally which commemorated the 20th anniversary of the EDSA revolution. The 2nd inquest was based on the letters of Yolanda Tanigue (Tanigue) and of Rodolfo Mendoza (Mendoza). Tanigue who were officers of the CIDG. Based also on these letters, Vicente Ladlad et.al and Liza Maza et. Al were sent subpoenas by the DOJ requiring them to appear before said department and to get coppies of the complaint and its attachments. During the PI, the DOJ panel of prosecutors presented a masked man, who later was known as Jaime Fuentes, who claimed to be an eye witness against Ladlad and Maza. Fuentes subscribed to his affidavit before prosecutor VCelasco who then gave copies of the affidavit to members of the media present during the proceedings. The prosecutors gave Ladlad and Maza 10 days to file their counter-affidavits. However, the prosecution gave to Ladlad and Maza a copy of the documents supporting the CIDGs letters only after 4 days since the PI started. Ladlad and Maza moved for the inhibition of the prosecutors for lack of impartiality and independence considering the manner in which they conducted the PIthat said PI was attended with irregularities.

Issue:Whether or not the PI of Ladlad and Maza was conducted in accordance with Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Ruling:No. The manner in which the PI was conducted violated the rule mandated by Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Instead of following this procedure scrupulously, as what this Court had mandated in an earlier ruling, "so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage,"38 respondent prosecutors nonchalantly disregarded it. Respondent prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3(a) of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint (which, with its attachment, must be of such number as there are respondents) be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public. Respondent prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as complaints39 and accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some of them were notarized by a notary public without any showing that a prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112.

Further, Section 3(b) of Rule 112 mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the complaint, must determine if there are grounds to continue with the investigation. If there is none, he shall dismiss the case, otherwise he shall "issue a subpoena to the respondents." Here, after receiving the CIDG letters, respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ office on 13 March 2006 "to secure copies of the complaints and its attachments." During the investigation, respondent prosecutors allowed the CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who subscribed to an affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco. Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to members of the media who covered the proceedings. Respondent prosecutors then required petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits in 10 days. It was only four days later, on 17 March 2006, that petitioners received the complete copy of the attachments to the CIDG letters.1a\^/phi1.net

These uncontroverted facts belie respondent prosecutors statement in the Order of 22 March 2006 that the preliminary investigation "was done in accordance with the Revised Rules o[f] Criminal Procedure."40 Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the complainants antics during the investigation, and distributing copies of a witness affidavit to members of the media knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the charges against them, respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation but also lent credence to petitioners claim that the entire proceeding was a sham.

Rule 112, Sec. 4

DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ vs. WILFREDO R. CRUZG.R. No. 154128, February 8, 2007

Wilfredo Cruz, (R), is a nephew by affinity of Dr. Amanda Cruz (P). On June 5, 1996, respondent filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Quezon City a complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against petitioner, docketed as I.S. No. 96-10640. Respondent alleged that petitioner issued to him an undated check in the sum of P100,000.00. On December 29, 1995, he placed this date on the check and deposited the same, but it was dishonored by the drawee bank due to "account closed." On January 5, 1996, he sent the notice of dishonor to petitioner. Without his knowledge, petitioner, on January 16, 1996, deposited P100,000.00 in his savings account.

In her Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss, petitioner declared that in 1986, she issued to respondent BPI Check No. 349866 as a guarantee for the loan of spouses Arturo and Malou Ventura obtained from him. Later, they informed her that they had paid the loan. However, she forgot to ask for the return of the check. In 1987, she closed her account and opened a new one with the drawee bank. For ten (10) years, she forgot having issued the check. She claimed that respondent filed the complaint against her because her husband, Atty. Francisco Galman Cruz, instituted criminal and civil complaints against Carlos Cruz. Jr., respondents brother, involving a parcel of land.

On January 16, 1996, or only after eleven (11) days from January 5, 1996 when she learned that her check was dishonored, she deposited P100,000.00 in the account of respondent at the Westmont Bank, Sta. Mesa Branch.

On August 7, 1996, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City recommended the dismissal of respondents complaint and was then approved by the City Prosecutor.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but in its Resolution dated June 28, 2002, the Court of Appeals denied the same. Hence, this recourse.

Issue: WON the dismissal of the respondents complaint in the office of the prosecutor is proper.

Yes.

First, there is no dispute that when respondent filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City his complaint against petitioner, a preliminary investigation was conducted. Section 1, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, defines preliminary investigation as "an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial."

Under Section 4 of the same Rule, the investigating prosecutor is vested with the duty of (a) preparing a resolution holding the respondent for trial and filing the corresponding information, or (b) dismissing the case should he find that no probable cause exists against respondent.

The investigating Assistant City Prosecutor found no probable cause to charge petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Hence, she recommended the dismissal of the case. The City Prosecutor, the Chief State Prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice sustained the recommendation. They all found that when respondent filed his complaint with the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor, he knew that petitioner had paid the amount of the check. In fact, in his pleading, he admitted such payment. Thus, the prosecutors were one in concluding that petitioner did not commit the offense charged.

The preliminary investigation seeks to free a respondent from the inconvenience, expense, ignominy, and stress of a formal trial after the reasonable probability of his guilt or innocence has been passed upon by a competent officer designated by law for that purpose. As mentioned, the prosecutors and also the Secretary of Justice found no probable cause to warrant the filing against petitioner of an information for violation of B.P. 22. There is no indication that their finding of lack of probable cause was reached without any basis in fact and in law.

Adasa v Abalos

Facts:

Abalos filed two complaints-affidavits against Adasa for Estafa. She filed this on January 18, 2001 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan CIty

On April 25, 2001, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City issued a resolution finding probable cause against Adasa and ordered the filing of two separate informations Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Document by a Private Individual

Two separate criminal cases were filed, 8781 and 8782. This petition pertains only to 8782.

Upon Adasas motion, a reinvestigation was conducted.

The Office of the City Prosecutor affirmed the finding of probable cause against Adala

Adasa was arraigned on October 1, 2001 she entered an unconditional plea of not guilty

Adasa then filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ on October 15, 2001

DOJ reversed and set aside the resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor and directed the said office to withdraw the information for Estafa against Adasa

Abalos then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution of DOJ argued that DOJ should have dismissed Adasas petition outright. Stated in Section 7 of DOJ Circular 70 is that when an accused has already been arraigned and the aggrieved party files a petition for review before the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not take cognizance of the petition or even give due course thereto, but instead deny it outright. In Section 12, arraignment is one of the grounds for dismissing the petition outright.

DOJ denied this Motion for Reconsideration, said that under Section 12, in relation to Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70, the Secretary of Justice is not precluded from entertaining any appeal taken to him even where the accused has already been arraigned in court. This is due to the permissive language may utilized in section 12 whereby the Secretary has the discretion to entertain an appealed resolution notwithstanding the fact that the accused has been arraigned

The trial court issued an order granting Adasas Motion to Withdraw Information and dismissed Criminal Complaint 8782.

Abalos filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals

CA granted Abalos petition and reversed the resolutions of the DOJ

CA relied heavily on Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 if an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned. Should be read in relation to Section 12.

CA ruled that since Abalos had been already arraigned before filing her petition for review, DOJ should have dismissed such petition

CA added when petitioner pleaded to the charge, she was deemed to have waived her right to reinvestigation and right to question any irregularity that surrounds it

Issue: Whether