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7/28/2019 Criminal Procedure Constitutional Rights of the Accused
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Criminal Procedure
Constitutional Rights of the
Accused
Harriz F. Dela Cruz
09-18-001
Paralegal - 41
Judge Tita B. Alisuag
Professor
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Article III
Bill of Rights of the Constitution
Section 1. Right to due process
Section 1. Right to equal protection of the laws
Section 3. Right to inadmissibility of evidences obtained under Setion 2
Section 11. Right to a free access to the courts
Section 11. Right to an adequate legal assistance
Section 12(1). Right to be informed to remain silent
Section12(1). Right to counsel
Section12(1). Right to be informed of such rights
Section 12(2). Right against torture
Section 12(2). Right against secret detention
Section 12(3). Right to inadmissibility of evidence against him obtained from
any confession
Section 13. Right to bail
Section 14(1). Right to due process for a criminal offense
Section 14(2). Right to be presumed innocent until presumed guilty
Section 14(2). Right to be heard by himself and to be heard his counsel
Section 14(2). Right to be informed of the cause and nature of the
accusations against him
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Section 14(2). Right to a speedy, impartial, and public trial
Section 14(2). Right to confront the witnesses
Section 14(2). Right to present evidence
Section 16. Right to a speedy disposition of his case
Section 17. Right against self-incrimination
Section 19(1). Right against excessive fines
Section 19(1). Right against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
Section 21. Right against double jeopardy
Section 22. Right against ex-post facto laws
Under the doctrine of supremacy of the constitution, the constitution is
the supreme law of the land, it is above all laws, and all laws must conform
to it, otherwise it is inoperative, creates no right, no obligation, in short, no
void.
Right is something that is due to a person by just claim, legal
guarantee, or moral principle.1 It gives protection the accused and serves as
a barrier.
The Constitutional Rights of the Accused are those rights of the
accused which were provided by the Constitution, specifically provided under
Article III Bill of Rights of 1987 Philippine Constitution. These rights are ofparamount consideration, and are designed to protect the accused from any
possible abusive acts of the government. It is intended against the State and
in favor of the accused.
____________
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1 Blacks Law Dictionary, page 4120, (8th edition 2004)
Since the Constitution is the highest law of the land, as it provides the
rights of the accused, it fully guarantees them other than any statutes. It
constrains the government to be negligent in promulgating judgments to
avoid injustice and mistrial, and more importantly to prevent mistakes of
judgment convicting innocent people, so that administration of justice will be
more efficient.
Constitutional Rights of the accused
Article III, Bill of Rights, of the 1987 Constitution provides for the
following rights:
1. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
(Sec. 16)
2. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law. (Sec. 14[1])
3. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law.
The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
4. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature ad
cause of the accusation against him, to have speedy, impartial, and
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public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable. (Sec. 14 [2])
5. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. (Sec.
17)
Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel. (Sec. 12[1])
No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him.
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited. (Sec. 12[2])
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(Sec. 12[3])
6. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. (Sec. 19[1])
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7. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act. (Sec. 21)
8. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate
legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of
poverty. (Sec. 11)
Rights of the accused which may be waived and rights which may
not be waived.
A right which may be waived is the right of the accused to
confrontation and cross-examination. A right which may not be waived is the
right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
The reason or principle underlying the difference between rights which
may be waived and rights which may not be waived is that those rights
which may be waived are personal, while those rights which may not be
waived involve public interest which may be affected. (2 Moran, Rules of
Court, 1952 Edition, 748)
Procedural right. It is a right that derives from legal or administrative
procedure; a right that helps in the protection or enforcement of a
substantive right. Cf. substantive right. Blacks Law Dictionary 8th Edition,
2004
Substantial right. It is an essential right that potentially affects the
outcome of a lawsuit and is capable of legal enforcement and protection, as
distinguished from a mere technical or procedural right. Blacks Law
Dictionary 8th Edition, 2004
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Substantive right. It is a right that can be protected or enforced
by law; a right of substance rather than form. Cf. procedural right. Blacks
Law Dictionary 8th Edition, 2004
1987 Constitution is the story of governmental power and
constitutional limits on it found in the Bill of Rights.
The totality of governmental power is contained in three great powers:
police power, power of eminent domain, and the power of taxation. These
belong to the very existence of government and without them no
government can exist. Therefore, inherent powers of the government which
the constitution does not grant to the government, but only define and
delimit them and allocate their exercise among various government
agencies. The story of constitutional jurisprudence is the story of great
minds striving to strike a balance between governmental power and personal
freedom.
Chief Justice Shaw stated that police power is the power vested in the
legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statues, and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge
to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of
the same.
The police power has been used to justify public health, justify public
safety, public morals. The almost awesome character of police power shown
by the vastness of its reach comes out in greater relief when seen together
with the presumption of constitutionality which its exercise enjoys. The
judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is no clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.
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This vast power is, however, must be exercised within the limits set by
the constitution. In the words of the leading case of U.S. v. Toribio, the
legislative determination of what is a proper exercise of its police power is
not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts. The
exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or
property of any person is subject to the judicial inquiry. And exercising such
power must be measured with due process clause and the equal
protection clause.
Finally, it should be noted that the restrictions found in the Bill of
Rights, as constitutional law, are directed against the state. They do not
govern the relations between private persons.
The word person includes not only the citizens but also aliens,
private corporations without regard to any differences of race, color, or
nationality.
Article III, Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws.
Bill of Rights: Protection against abuse of power.
Justice Malcolm elaborated:
The right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes that right
to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or
servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical
restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of
man to enjoy the faculties to which he has endowed by his Creator, subject
only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare.
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Malcolm likewise borrowed from Apolinario Mabini calling liberty
freedom to do right and never wrong. . . ever guided by reason and the
upright and honorable conscience of the individual.
Protected property has been deemed to include vested rights, or a perfected
homestead, or a final judgment. It includes the right to work and the right to
earn a living. Ones employment, profession, trade, or calling is protected
property.
The constitutional protection of the right to life is not just a protection
of the right to be alive or to the security of ones limb against physical harm.
The right to life is also the right to a good life.
The poor are the oppressed precisely because they are poor. In their
regard therefore, property is as important as life and their liberty. Shylock
was right: You take my life, when you do take the means whereby I live.
Under the present provision, understood in the light of established
jurisprudence on the position of property in the hierarchy of constitutional
values, property stands a good chance of serving and enhancing the life and
liberty of all.
Due process as procedural fairness
The legislature must provide due process in the enforcement of law.
Thus, due process was understood to relate chiefly to the mode of procedure
which government agencies must follow; it was understood as a guarantee
of procedural fairness. Its essence was expressed by Daniel Webster as a
law which hears before it condemns.
Due process, however, is not always judicial process. This has always
been recognized. Due process does not always include actor, reus, judex,
regular allegations, opportunity to answer and a trial according to some
settled course of judicial proceedings.
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Substantial evidence means such reasonable evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
What is required is not actual hearing but a real opportunity to be
heard. Thus, one who refuses to appear at a hearing is not thereby denied
due process if a decision is reached without waiting for him.
Substantive due process
If all that the due process clause requires is proper procedure, then
life, liberty, and property can be destroyed, provided, proper forms are
observed. Hence, the clause must be understood to guarantee not just forms
of procedure but also the very substance of life, liberty and property. The
due process clause must be interpreted both as a procedural and as a
substantive guarantee. It must be a guarantee against the exercise of
arbitrary power even when the power is exercised according to proper forms
and procedure.
Shall the judiciary permit a government of men instead of a
government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands? the courts will
assist in retaining it as a government of laws, and not of men, and that no
official, however high, is above the law, and that the courts are the forum
which function is to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official
transgressors.
Equal protection
The equal protection clause is a specific constitutional guarantee of the
Equality of the Person. The equality it guarantees is legal equality or, as it
usually put, the equality of all persons before the law. Under it, each
individual is dealt with as an equal person in the law, which does not treat
the person differently because of who he is or what he is or what he
possesses. The goddess of Justice is portrayed with a blindfold, not because
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she must be hindered in seeing where the right lies, but that she may not
discriminate against suitors before her, dispensing instead an even handed
justice to all.
Equality in the criminal process
One clear consequence of economic inequality is inequality in the field
of criminal justice. In a criminal prosecution the accused finds himself face to
face with the State and all its resources of wealth and power. Even the rich
can feel intimidated by the resources that are at the disposal of the State.
How much more helpless will a poor man feel when he finds himself ranged
against the power of the State? It is for this reason that the law takes a
special interest in the poor when brought before the bar of justice to answer
for a crime.
Article III, Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial
bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty.
This constitutional provision is the basis for the provision of Rule 3,
Section 22, of the New Rules of Court allowing litigation in forma pauperis.
Those protected include low-paid employees, domestic servants and
laborers. They need not be persons so poor that they must be supported at
public expense. It suffices that plaintiff is indigent and the difference
between paupers and indigent persons is that the latter are persons who
have no property or sources of income sufficient for their support aside from
their own labor though self-supporting when able to work and in
employment.
Article III, Section. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
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counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations
of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of
victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
The provision is of American provenance coming as it does principally
from two American Supreme Court decisions: Escobedo v. Illinois and
Miranda v. Arizona. Escobedo spoke of the rights of person in custodial
investigations and specified custodial investigation as the time when the
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into
police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends
itself to eliciting incriminating statements. Miranda for its part enumerated
the rights that were available: (1) the person in custody must be informed at
the outset in clear and unequivocal terms that he has a right to remain
silent. (2) After being so informed, he must be told that anything he says
can and will be used against him in court. (3) He must be clearly informed
that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with
him during the interrogation. He does not have to ask for a lawyer. The
investigators should tell him that he has the right to counsel at that point.
(4) He should be warned that not only has he the right to consult with a
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lawyer but also that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent
him. (5) Even if the person consents to answer questions without the
assistance of counsel, the moment he asks for a lawyer at any point in the
investigation, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. (6)
If the foregoing protections and warnings are not demonstrated during the
trial to have been observed by the prosecution, no evidence obtained as a
result of the interrogation can be used against him . People v. Duero said:
Inasmuch as the prosecution in this case failed to prove that before Duerro
made his alleged oral confession he was informed of his rights to remain
silent and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he knowingly
and intelligently waived those rights, his confession is inadmissible in
evidence.
Meanwhile, however, the process of clarifying the rights that are made
available continue. Discussion of this provision will answer three questions:
(1) When do the rights begin to be available? (2) What rights are made
available? (3) When do the rights cease to be available?
The rights under this section are available to any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense. Investigation in this section
was defined by the 1971 Constitutional Convention as investigation
conducted by the police authorities which will include investigations
conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police
agencies in our government. This includes conversation with a barangay
captain that is part of an ongoing custodial investigation, Section 12(1)
applies.
Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated are not available before
government investigators become involved. Thus admissions made in an
administrative investigation conducted by officials of the Philippine Airlines
do not come under Section 12. It does not apply when the confession or
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admission is made to a private individual. Neither does it apply to a person
undergoing audit because an audit examiner is not a law enforcement
officer. Nor does it apply to a verbal admission made to a radio announcer
who was not part of the investigation. Even an admission made to a mayor
who is approached not as a mayor but as confidante is not covered. Similarly
an interview recorded on video and in the presence of newsmen is not
covered. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as
a medium for admitting ones guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon
in several cases, the Court has warned that it is prudent that trial courts are
reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar
confessions. The Court recognized the possibility of connivance with the
police.
Not for that matter does Section 12(1) apply to a situation where a
person presents himself to the police and in the process makes his
admissions. As the court said in People v. Taylaran:
The applicability of the foregoing provision does not seem to
contemplate cases like the present where no written confession is sought to
be presented in evidence as a result of the formal custodial investigation.
What was testified to was only what appellant told the police why he is (sic)
surrendering to them. It is but natural for one who surrenders to the police
to give reason or explanation for his act of surrendering. It can hardly be
said that under such circumstance, the surrenderee is already under
investigation, within the meaning of the constitutional provision. As the
Solicitor General correctly observes on the circumstances of this case: If
however, he voluntarily admits the killing and it was precisely because he
surrendered to admit the killing (sic), the constitutional safeguards (sic) to
be informed of the rights to silence and to counsel may not be invoked.
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It is now established that constitutional procedures on custodial
investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through
questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the
accused orally admits having committed the crime.
The accepted constitutional rule, moreover, following Escobedo and
Miranda, is that the rule covers only situations when the person is already in
custody, for which reason Escobedo ad referred to them as rights under
custodial investigation. Significantly, however, the Court, in Galman v.
Pamaran, departed from this rule. The Court sustained the contention of
General Ver that the provision covered even persons not yet in custody but
already under investigation. The Court said:
The fact that the framers of our (1973) Constitution did not choose to
use the term custodial by having it inserted between the words under
and investigation, as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase any
person goes to prove that they did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of the
Miranda doctrine.
The Text of the 1987 Constitution has preserved the phrase person
under investigation without the word custodial. Moreover, the discussions
on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission manifest an intent, in the
light of experiences during martial law, to expand he coverage of the right to
situations when a person under investigation is not yet in custody. The
discussion was triggered by the question of Commissioner Aquino whether
the guarantee covered both custodial investigation and tactical
investigation. Responding to the question of Commissioner Aquino,
Commissioner Colayco explained that, indeed, the intention was to extend
the guarantee beyond mere strict custodial investigation of the Escobedo
variety to the time immediately after the commission of any offense,
whether the policeman or the person making the investigation had any
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suspect under custody. Or, as Commissioner Aquino summed it up, the
right should extend to the period of custodial interrogation, temporary
detention and preliminary technical custody. Thus, if one puts the Galman
case together with the 1986 deliberations, the conclusion that comes out is
that the rights are available if a person is already in custody as a suspect, or
if the person is the suspect, even if he is not yet deprived in any significant
way of his liberty.
Jurisprudence under the 1987 Constitution, however, has consistently
held, following Escobedo, the stricter view, that the rights begin to be
available only when the person is already in custody. As Justice Regalado
emphasized in People v. Marra:
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and
begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody,
and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.
In an obiter dictum and writing for a division in People v. Maqueda,
Justice Davide, who, like Justice Regalado, was a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission adverted to the view in the Constitutional
Commission that the rights are available even to one who is not yet in
custody.
There are, moreover, other investigatory situations where Section
12(1) does not apply. Subjection to paraffin test is one because it is not
communicative action or testimonial compulsion. Similarly, one placed in a
police line-up does not enjoy Section 12(1) rights, unless there is a move on
the part of the investigators to elicit admissions or confessions. But a person
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already under custodial investigation who is placed in a police line-up is
entitled to Section 12 rights.
Finally, however, it is important for the defense to remember that
rights under Section 12 can be lost by neglect. Where the defense fails to
raise objections to the admissibility of evidence immediately, as required by
Rule 132, Section 36, the accused is deemed to have waived his right to
object to admissibility. This is an indication that the fate of a person
sometimes depends on the quality of counsel he or she can afford.
Right of a person under investigation.
Three rights are made available by Section 12(1): (1) the right to
remain silent; (2) the right to counsel; (3) the right to be informed of such
rights.
Under the right against self-incrimination in Section 17, only an
accused has the absolute right to remain silent. A person who is not an
accused may assume the stance of silence only when asked an incrimination
question. Under Section 12, however, a person under investigation has the
right to refuse to answer any question. His silence, moreover, may not be
used against him.
The 1987 Constitution now specifies that the counsel made available to
the person under investigation must be competent and independent and
preferably of the accuseds own choice. Under the present provision, where
a former judge showed up and said to the detainee: I am here because I
have been summoned to assist you and I am going to assist you, the offer
of assistance was found inadequate to meet the constitutional requirement.
But if the accused never raises an objection to counsel given to him, he is
deemed to have been properly counseled.
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Moreover, the Court has eloquently said that even in times of
emergency, and especially in times of emergency, the right to counsel must
be respected. This was in the case of Diokno v. Enrile where, after
repeatedly being refused permission to see Diokno, counsel filed a
mandamus petition. Diokno was released on September, 1974, but the
Supreme Court decision affirming his right to counsel was made only on
December 19, 1981.
The right to be informed of his rights which are guaranteed here is
more than what is shown in television shows where the police routinely
reads out the rights from a note card. As People v. Rojas put it:
When the Constitution requires a person under investigation to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed
to contemplate the transmission of a meaningful information rather than just
the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle. As a rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer
just to repeat the person under investigation the provisions of the
Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which
the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms.
In other words, the right of a person under investigation to be
informed implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police
investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that
results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of
the right, as it cannot then truly be said that the person has been informed
of his rights.
The criminal process includes the investigation prior to the filing of
charges, the preliminary examination and investigation after charges are
filed, and the period of trial. The Miranda rights or the Section 12(1) rights
were conceived for the first of these three phases, that is, when the inquiry
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is under the control of police officers. It is in this situation that the
psychological if not physical atmosphere of custodial investigations, in the
absence of proper safeguards, is inherently coercive. Outside of this
situation, Section 12(1) no longer applies. But Sections 14 and 17 come into
play instead.
This was already adverted to during the deliberations of the 1971
Constitutional Convention when, upon inquiry by Delegate Sambolawan,
Delegate R. Ortiz, who was sponsoring the provision, said that
investigation here did not include judicial and quasi-judicial investigation
such as those conducted by the fiscal of by the judge. Justice Narvasa was
referring to the same matter when he said that Section 12(1) does not apply
to persons under preliminary investigation or already charged in court for a
crime and therefore already under the protection of the court:
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary
investigation is not under custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the
police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time for
the filing of the criminal case in court (or in the public prosecutors office).
Hence, with respect to the defendant in a criminal case already pending in
court (or the prosecutor office) there is no occasion to speak of his right
while under custodial interrogation laid down by the second and
subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution [now
Section 12(1)], for the obvious reason that he is no longer under custodial
interrogation.
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary
investigation before the public prosecutor), in common with all persons,
possesses the right against self-incrimination set out in the first sentence of
Section 20, Article IV of he 1973 Constitution [now Section 17, Article III],
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i.e., the right to refuse to answer a specific incriminatory question at the
time it is put to him.
Conceivably, however, even after the charges are filed, the police
might still attempt to extract confessions or admissions from the accused
outside of judicial supervision. In such situation, Section 12(1) would still
apply. But outside of such situation, the applicable provisions are Section 14
and Section 17. It is for this reason that an extrajudicial confessions sworn
to before a judge enjoys the mark of voluntariness.
The 1987 Constitution now says: These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel. The implication of this rule
is that, in localities where there are no lawyers, the state must bring the
individual to a place where there is one or bring counsel to the place where
the person is held. And needless to say, the waiver must be in language
which clearly manifests the desire to wave the right.
The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, also treated
separately as Section 17, has developed and has been interpreted so as to
cover a wide range of forms of self-accusation. To prohibit coerced
confessions, the 1987 Constitution added: secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. Secret
detention places has special reference to safe-houses and, like solitary
and incommunicado detention, were phenomena during the authoritarian
regime of Mr. Marcos.
Under the 1987 Bill of Rights, where self-incrimination is treated in
Section 17 and custodial investigation and forced confessions in Section 12,
the rule is reiterated in Section 12(3) thus: Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
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It covers every form of evidence obtained in violation of Section 12
and Section 17, every form of confession tainted with involuntariness. It is a
manifestation of the care with which the law wishes to insure the
voluntariness of confessions. This care was already evident even under the
1935 Constitution. This care also appears in a number of recent cases where
the Supreme Court has insisted that a plea of guilty should be accepted only
after the trial court has taken pains to assure itself that the accused was well
aware of the consequences and full import of his plea. Or, as one decision
eloquently put it, Even if the confession of an accused is gospel truth, if it
was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence
regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
given. The same would apply to a waiver of the rights to counsel not made
in the presence of counsel.
Moreover, although the word confession was used in the last
sentence of Section 20 of the 1973 Bill of Rights, the protection covered not
only confessions but also admissions. This is now explicit in the 1987
text. The difference between confession and admission is found in Rule 130
of the Rules of Court. Admission is the act, declaration or omission of party
as to a relevant fact (Rule 130, Section 26) whereas confession is the
declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or
of any offense necessarily included therein, (Rule 130, Section 33).
Where the signature of an accused on a receipt for seized property or
marijuana cigarettes where the accused wrote his name is not admissible.
It should also be noted that the exclusionary rule found in Section 12
is not couched in the same language as the exclusionary rule in Section 3.
Section 3 makes evidence illegally obtained inadmissible ofr any purpose in
any proceeding. Section 12 says that confessions made in violation of the
section and Section 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. It
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might be asked whether the text of Section 12 could be open to the
narrowing process which the Miranda rule seems to have undergone in
American jurisprudence. The text of Section 12 is general enough to allow a
strict construction against government. Moreover, considering that
involuntary testimonial evidence is a more serious affront to human dignity
than illegally obtained real evidence, the absolute inadmissibility provided for
in Section 3 should also be read into Section 12, and with greater reason,
since involuntary confessions also affront the right of privacy protected by
Section 2.
The question of retroactivity of the application of this protection
granted by the Constitution was settled in the first important Supreme Court
decision on the new 1973 provision on custodial investigation, Magtoto v.
Manguera. It established the rule that the new provision should only operate
prospectively from the date of effectivity of the new Constitution January 17,
1973. The dissents of Justices Castro, Teehankee, and Fernando arguing for
retroactivity of the rule are persuasive; but the issue is now regarded as
closed and the Court now applies Magtoto where necessary as a matter of
course.
Section 12(4) says: The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions
for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of
victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. Civil sanction in
the form of damages is, strictly speaking, already covered by the Civil Code
provision on actionable violations of constitutional rights. Penal sanctions are
meant to be a deterrent against violations. And the compensation and
rehabilitation provided for are social welfare measures. The way the
provision is worded, however, it will need implementing legislation. And
against the argument that the provision has no place in a Constitution, it
was pointed out that these matters are intimately connected with the rights
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guaranteed by the Constitution and should see articulation in the Bill of
Rights itself which guarantees the inviolability of the rights.
Article III, Section 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Right to bail
The right to bail, which is a corollary to the right to be presumed
innocent is, like the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, another means of
immediately obtaining liberty. It also enables the accused to prepare his
defense. Bail is a mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable
certainty, insure the attendance of the accused. If capital offenses or
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua are not made bailable, it is
because frequently nothing short of confinement can insure the attendance
of one who expects to receive such sentence. Where, however, the right to
bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is
excessive. So the Constitution commands.
Because of the importance of the right to bail both for the accused and
for the prosecution, certain duties are imposed upon the judge. Basco v.
Rapatalo reiterates them thus:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or
require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114
of the Rules of Court as amended);
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
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show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (sections 7
and 8, supra);
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary evidence of the prosecution;
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused
upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra).
Otherwise, petition should be denied.
Particularly in cases where the accused is charged with a capital
offense, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be summary
or otherwise in the discretion of the court, is required with the
participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative of
the prosecution for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong. The burden of proof is on the prosecution to
show that the evidence meets the required quantum. The prosecution
must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all
the evidence that it want to introduce before the court. Likewise, the
petitioner has the right to cross-examine the witnesses and present his
own evidence in rebuttal. When, eventually, the court issues an order
either granting or refusing bail, the same should contain a summary of
the evidence for the prosecution, followed by its conclusion as to
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
The quantum of evidence needed in order to deny an accused
the right to bail is described by the text simply as strong evidence.
This has been construed to mean proof evident or presumption
great. Proof evident or evident proof in this connection means
clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded dispassionate
judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed as
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charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be
punished capitally if the law is administered. Presumption great
exists when the circumstances testified to are such that the
interference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear,
and convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the entire
record the presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital
offense, bail should be refused. If the prosecution does not present
evidence, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as would
ascertain the strength of the states evidence or judge the adequacy of
the amount of bail.
The factors which must be considered in determining bail are:
ability to post bail, the nature of the offense, penalty imposed by law,
character and reputation of the accused, health of the accused,
strength of the evidence, probability of appearing for trial, prior
forfeiture of bonds, whether the accused was a fugitive from justice
when arrested, authority to change the characterization of the offense
but there is no power to reduce or change the crime charged in order
to justify the grant of bail to the accused.
It has been held that a court cannot require a strictly cash bond.
It was established that since bail is constitutionally available to all
persons, it must be available to one who is detained even before
formal charges are filed. But of course, the person claiming the right
must be under actual detention or custody of the law. One is under the
custody of the law either when he has been arrested or has
surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If granted bail, the
accused does not necessarily have the right to leave the country. As a
necessary consequence of the bail bond, which is intended to make a
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person available any time he is needed by the court, a court may
prevent a person admitted to bail from leaving the country.
It has also been held that the right to bail may be waived even
implicitly in an irrecoverable manner. Thus, it was held by the court
that an accused waived his right when he agreed to remain in legal
custody during the pendency of the trial of his criminal case. After
conviction by the trial court, when presumption of innocence
terminates, the constitutional right to bail should also terminate.
Article III, Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusations against him, to have a speedy, impartial,
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
Due process in criminal cases
The criminal due process clause of the Bill of Rights presupposes that
the penal law being applied satisfies the substantive requirements of due
process. As to procedural due process, it may be noted that, while the right
to appeal is statutory, once it is granted by law, its suppression is a violation
of due process.
Public trial
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The Court said, To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must
be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not
simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. Petitioners cannot
just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity.
The Court added:
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity
under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right
to fair trial.
Moreover, the effect of publicity on judges cannot be presumed especially
since, unlike jurors, judges are trained professionals.
Another aspect of due process, so frequently emphasized, is the right
to be tried by an impartial judge. All suitors, we must say, are entitled to
nothing short of the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free,
disinterested and impartial tribunal. The principle is applicable to all types
of cases.
The rights under Section 14(2) guaranteed by the constitution are
rights in all criminal prosecutions and prosecution starts only upon
arraignment. The implication, therefore, is that the rights enumerated in
Section 14(2), including the right to impartiality, are protected only during
the trial.
Finally, it may be asked whether a judge who inherits a case from
another judge may decide a case fairly since he did not hear all the
witnesses presented. The practical answer to the question must be in the
affirmative. As the Court has said: The rule is rooted in practical
considerations. Sometimes it is an impossibility for the judge who tried the
case to be the same judicial officer to decide it. The judge who tired the case
may die, resign or retire from the bench, before he could render judgment
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thereon. We find no legal impediment to his successors continuing with the
trial or rendering judgment on the basis of the evidence submitted if the trial
has been terminated. It is sufficient that in such circumstances the judge, in
deciding the case, must base it completely on the cold record before him, in
the same manner as appellate courts when they review the evidence of the
case raised to them on appeal.
Presumption of innocence
This principle has always been a part of criminal procedural law as
guaranteed first by statutory law (General Orders No. 58) and now by the
Constitution.
Right to be heard
The concept of the right to be heard, applied to criminal procedure,
embodies in shorthand form a very fundamental and multifaceted right of
the accused. In a very broad sense, it can be understood to mean the
totality of the rights embodied in an adequate criminal procedural system.
More precisely, however, it can be viewed as expressing both the qualities of
the hearer and the manner of the hearing.
The qualities demanded of the hearer are fairness and impartiality.
Thhus, it is demanded that the judge may not play the ouble role of
prosecutor and judge in one and the same case. He must maintain an
attitude of neutrality in regard to the prosecution and the accused. Influence
on the judge, even if unconscious, which prevents a calm and careful review
of the evidence can nullify his decision.
The more active role of the accused in expressing the right to be herd
includes three specific rights: (1) the right to present evidence and to be
present at the trial, (2) the right to be assisted by counsel, and (3) the right
to compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf.
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The right to present evidence includes the right to testify in ones favor
and the right to be given time to call witnesses. If accused of two offenses,
he is entitled to a trial of each case, and it is error for the court to consider
in one case the evidence adduced against him in another. It also includes
the right to present evidence even after a motion to dismiss, made before
presentation of evidence for the defense, has been denied. The substantial
rights of the accused should not be impaired because of his counsels
anxiousness to have him promptly acquitted.
Right to counsel
The right to be heard can be a meaningless farce if it does not include
the right to counsel. Justice Sutherlands well-known observations in Powell
v. Alabama deserve to be quoted:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes
no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad.
He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he
may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare
his defense, even though he has a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand
of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though
he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not
know how to establish his innocence.
Thus, the familiarity of the ordinary layman with court procedures was
compounded by the fact that he was made to face a government official
whose specific function was to prosecute, and who was incomparably more
familiar than the accused with the problems of procedure, the idiosyncrasies
of juries, and last but not least, the personnel of the Court,: The guarantee
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of the right to counsel serves to minimize that imbalance in the adversary
system. In the words of Justice Black:
It embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the
average defendant does not have the professional skill to protect himself
when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life, or liberty,
wherein the prosecution is presented by an experienced and learned
counsel.
In sum, the basic elements of the right to counsel as it is enforced now
are the following: (1) The court is duty bound to inform the defendant that
he has a right to an attorney before he is arraigned; (2) The court must ask
him if he desires the service of counsel; (3) If he does, and is unable to get
one, the court must assign counsel de oficio; (4) Or, if the accused wishes to
procure private counsel, the court must give him time to obtain one. Where
the appointed counsel could have acted in a double capacity, that is, if his
actual interests were divided between the prosecution and the defense, his
appointment constitutes reversible error; (5) Where duly authorized
members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint resident of the
province and of good repute for probity and ability. As Section 6 of Rule 116
of the Rules of Court puts it, the judge has four pre-arraignment duties: (1)
to inform the accused that he has the right to have his own counsel before
being arraigned; (2) after giving such information, to ask accused whether
he desires the aid of counsel; (3) if he so desires to procure the services of
counsel, the court must grant him reasonable time to do so; and (4) if he so
desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must assign
counsel de oficio to defend him.
It should be noted that under present jurisprudence the counsel de
oficio must be a qualified lawyer. However, there are limits to the courts
duty to furnish counsel de oficio. The duty of the court to appoint a counsel
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de oficio when the accused has no counsel of choice and desires to employ
the services of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment (Rule 116,
Section 6, Revised Rules of Court). This is no longer so where the accused
has proceeded with the arraignment and the trial with a counsel of his choice
but when the time for the presentation of evidence for the defense has
arrived, he appears by himself alone and the absence of his counsel was
inexcusable.
Moreover, unlike the right to counsel under Section 12(1), counsel
need not be one who is the choice of the accused An examination of related
provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that
the preference in the choice of counsel pertains more aptly and specifically
to a person under investigation [Art. III, Section 14(2)], But, an accused
who wishes to withdraw his appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that
he could not afford counsel should be given counsel de oficio instead.
Like other personal rights, the right to counsel may be waived. In one
case, where defendant, on being asked whether he could afford to employ a
lawyer, replied in the affirmative but said that he had been unable to come
to an agreement with any one as to the amount he should pay for the
services and thereupon entered into trial conducting his own defense, he
was deemed to have waived his right. This waiver of right is exemplified in
People v. Sim Ben. The accused in this case was informed by the judge of
his right to counsel and he was asked if he desired one. He answered that he
did not. He was then asked if he agreed to have the information read to him
even without counsel. He agreed. Thereupon, the information was read and
translated for him. He pleaded guilty. He was then asked whether he
realized that because of his plea of guilt the punishment provided by law
would be imposed on him. He answered that he did. He was deemed to have
validly waived his right.
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However, in another case, People v. Holgado, The following
interchange transpired in court: Court: Do you have an attorney or are you
going to plead guilty? Accused: I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty.
Whereupon he was arraigned. The Supreme Court ruled that the accused
was denied the right to counsel. Waiver was not effective. As the Court said
in another case, Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived
by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against
the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with strongly
convincing evidence to the satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused
willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and
deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist
him during the taking of that confession.
Finally, the rights enumerated in Section 14(2) are rights in all
criminal prosecutions and criminal prosecutions according to the 1971
case ofPeople v. Jose covers the period from arraignment to rendition of
judgment. Hence, according to the same case, the right to counsel exists
only during that period. It has been shown, however, that under the
circumstances of Section 12(1) a right to counsel also exists before
arraignment.
Right to be informed
The heart of the constitutional guarantee its purpose and its
requirements was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen:
The object of this written accusations was First. To furnish the
accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him
to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for prosecution against a further prosecution for the same cause;
and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be
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had. In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated,
not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent;
these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of
time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short,
the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and
circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.
Thus, the cardinal requisite is that the accused be informed of facts
that are imputed to him. To satisfy this requisite, the information must
describe the act with sufficient particularity. If personal property is the
subject of the offense, the descriptive terms used must be sufficient in their
common and ordinary acceptation to show with certainty to the common
understanding of intelligent men what the property was and to fully identify
it. If the value of the property is material, it must be stated. If an offense
has a qualifying circumstance, such as relationship in statutory rape, the
relationship must be alleged. The right to assail the sufficiency of the
information or the admission of evidence may be waived by the accused if
he fails to object to its sufficiency during the trial and the deficiency is cured
by competent evidence presented therein.
What is essential therefore is that the accused be informed of the facts
alleged against him; he need not be informed of the characterization of the
crime, which is a conclusion of law. Hence, provided the facts are found in
the body of the information, an incorrect caption is not a fatal defect.
However, of the accused is charged with two informations containing two
sets of facts, while the trial of the two cases may be joint, there should be
two separate verdicts for the two informations. The facts in the two
informations cannot be combined to allow a conviction for a complex crime
consisting of the allegations in the two informations. To do so would violate
his right to be informed of the accusation against him.
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Speedy, impartial, and public trial
As already seen, the right to impartial treatment is already an aspect
of the guarantee of due process. It should be noted, however, that the right
to an impartial trial is not a bar to a judges intervention in cross-
examination. As the Court said: We have had occasion to hold that it is not
only the right but oft-times the duty of a trial judge to examine witnesses
when it appears necessary for the elucidation of the record. Under the
system of legal procedure in vogue in this jurisdiction, where the trial court
is judge of both the law and the facts, it is oft-times expedient or necessary
in the due and faithful administration of justice for the presiding judge . . .
to re-examine a witness in order that his judgment when rendered may rest
upon a full and clear understanding of the facts.
Speedy trial, for its part, is a two-edged sword. It can work against or
to the advantage of the accused. Since the prosecution has the burden of
proof, delay in the trial occasioning disappearance of witnesses and the
dimming of memories can actually lessen the chances of conviction.
Similarly, the accuseds own witnesses can disappear or suffer a similar
dimming of memory.
Speedy trial, as already stated, like fair trial, is necessarily relative. It
is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights
to the defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice. What the
Constitution prohibits are unreasonable delays.
While it is the duty of the prosecution to see to it that criminal cases
are tried without unfounded delays, the accused himself cannot sleep on
said right but must see to it that his case be tried at any early date . . . He
cannot agree to the repeated postponement of the trial of his case and then,
when he finds the government absent or unable to go to trial on any of the
dates of hearing, take advantage of said absence and ask for the dismissal
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of his case. Much less may he be allowed to connive in the hiding of
witnesses in order to delay trial. The constitutional privilege was never
intended as furnishing a technical means for escaping trial.
The right, moreover, may be waived. But waiver is not to be inferred
from mere failure of the accused to urge the trial of the case. Such waiver or
abandonment may be presumed only when the postponement of the trial
has been sought and obtained by the accused himself or by his attorney. The
presumption, in fact, is always against the waiver of constitutionally
protected rights.
In People v. Oplado, it was said that where one of two co-accused can
be tried separately, the absence of the other does not justify delay of the
trial of the accused who is present.
The remedy an accused has for violation of his right to speedy trial is
dismissal of the case and, if he is under detention, release by habeas corpus.
Moreover, dismissal for violation of the right to speedy trial is equivalent to
acquittal and is therefore a bar to subsequent prosecution for the same
offense.
Right of confrontation
Closely connected with and equally essential as the right to be heard is
the right to meet the witnesses face to face, or, as Rule 115, Section 1(f)
of the (New) Rules of Court expresses it, to confront and cross-examine the
witness against him at the trial. The right has a two-fold purpose: (1)
primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the
witness by cross-examination, and (2) secondarily, to allow the judge to
observe the deportment of the witness.
Agreements between prosecution and the defense to the effect that
certain witnesses, if presented, would testify to certain facts can deprive the
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defendant of the right to confrontation (besides preventing review of the
evidence by the appellate court). The practice, however, of admitting such
agreements has not been completely disallowed.
A corollary of the right of confrontation is that testimony not subjected
to cross-examination must be excluded from consideration. However, if
cross-examination actually commenced, but, for lack of material time, was
not completed, and the witness in the meantime died before cross-
examination could be resumed, so much of the testimony as had already
been covered by cross-examination is admissible.
The Court said in Marinas v. Siochi:
From Section 5 of Rule 112 it is clear that, unlike in the preliminary
investigation proper, an accused is not entitled as a matter of right to be
present during the preliminary examination nor to cross-examine the
witnesses presented against him before his arrest, the purpose of said
examination being merely to determine whether or not there is sufficient
reason to issue a warrant of arrest. The provision commanding the
determination of probable cause prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
requires no notice to an accused. A preliminary examination is generally a
proceeding ex parte in which the person charged has no right to participate
or be present.
Compulsory process
Equally important as the right to counsel is the right to compulsory
process for the attendance of witnesses. The accused, however, may not
invoke this right on appeal if he made no effort during the trial to avail
himself of it. Moreover, to establish the right to continuance by reason of the
absence of witnesses the accused must show: (a) that the witnesses is really
material; (b) that he is guilty of no neglect in previously obtaining
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attendance of said witness; (c) that the witness will be available at the time
desired; (d) that no similar evidence could be obtained.
Trial in absentia
The 1987 Constitution, as also the 1973 Constitution, now provides for
allowable trial in absentia. Article III, Section 14(2), has this added
sentence: However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding
the absence of he accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable. The evident purpose of this change is to
prevent unnecessary delays of the trial. The rights of the accused are amply
protected because trial in absentia can be had only if three conditions
concur: (1) accused has been arraigned; (2) notice of the trial was duly
served to him and properly returned; (3) his failure to appear is unjustified.
The Court has ruled that the presence of the accused at arraignment is an
absolute requisite for any trial to proceed, the reason being that it is at
arraignment that the accused is informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him and it is then that the trial court acquires jurisdiction
over the person. It has also been ruled that the new provision allowing trial
in absentia does not lend itself to a latitudinarian construction that would
preclude forfeiture of bail for one who jumps bail. Moreover, there is a
statutory rule which requires the presence of the accused at promulgation of
judgment.
Trial in absentia can also take place when the accused voluntarily
waives his right to be present. There are, however, restrictive conditions for
allowing waiver. The right may be waived provided that after arraignment
he may be compelled to appear for the purpose of identification by the
witnesses of the prosecution, or provided he unqualifiedly admits in open
court after his arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in
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the case on trial. Reason for requiring the presence of the accused despite
his waiver, is, if allowed to be absent in all the stages of the proceeding
without giving the Peoples witnesses the opportunity to identify him in
court, he may in his defense and, therefore, is entitled to acquittal. Thus,
for an accused to be excused from attending trial, it is not enough that he
vaguely agrees to be excused from attending trial, it is not enough that he
vaguely agrees to be identified by witnesses in his absence. He must
unqualifiedly admit that every time a witness mentions a name by which he
is known, the witness is to be understood as referring to him.
Article III, Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.
Speedy disposition of cases
It is a truism that justice delayed can mean justice denied. It should
be noted that the provision guaranties the right generally to a speedy
disposition of their cases. It covers therefore the periods before, during,
and after trial. In this respect it gives broader protection than Section 14(2)
which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. It is also broader than
the protection given by Article VIII, Section 15, which covers merely the
period after the submission of a case. Moreover, the present provision
applies to civil, criminal, and administrative cases. As the Court has put it,
the constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases,
including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.
The concept of speedy disposition of cases, like speedy trial, is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. It is consistent with
reasonable delay.
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Lastly, as in the case of violation of the right to a speedy trial, the
remedy for violation of the right to a speedy disposition of a case is dismissal
obtained through mandamus.
Article III, Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself.
Self-incrimination
The 1987 Constitution separated the provision from the rules on
custodial investigation. But Section 12(3) places violations of the self-
incrimination clause under the exclusionary rule.
The justification for the guarantee was stated by the Court thus: It
was established on the grounds of public policy and humanity: Of policy,
because, if the party were required to testify, it would place the witness
under the strongest temptation to commit perjury; and of humanity,
because it would prevent the extorting of confessions by duress. Another
decision said: The main purpose of the provision . . . is to prohibit
compulsory oral examination of prisoners before the trial, or upon trial, for
the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating
them in the commission of a crime.
Although the guarantee has proscribed an inquisitorial system of
investigation, it does not prohibit every form of preliminary investigation.
Preliminary investigation is often the only means of discovering the persons
who may be reasonably charged with a crime so as to enable the fiscal his
complaint or information.
To violate the right, it is not necessary that a categorical admission of
a specific offense be sought. Chief Justice Marshall explained that usually a
crime or a criminal act may contain two or more elements and that a
question would have a tendency to incriminate, even if it tends to elicit only
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one of said elements. The right thus includes a right to refuse to testify to
a fact which would be a necessary link in a chain of evidence to prove the
commission of a crime by a witness.
It was held early in Philippine jurisprudence that what is prohibited by
the constitutional guarantee is the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his body in
evidence, when it may be material. Thus, substance emitting from the body
of the defendant was received as evidence in a prosecution for acts of
lasciviousness. Subjection to ultra-violet examination is allowed. So is
paraffin test. Morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused was received.
An order by the judge for the witness to put on a pair of pants for size was
allowed. The taking of an accused persons picture does not incriminate him.
And since, according to the Court, the kernel of the privilege was the
prohibition of testimonial compulsion. This harsh rule, so contrary to the
humane purpose of the law, was justified by justice Malcolm by the
statement that No rule is intended to be so rigid as to embarrass the
administration of justice in its endeavour to ascertain the truth. The Court
added: Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case . . .
which on first impression is a shock to ones sensibilities, we must
nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision . . . undeterred by merely
sentimental influences. The only proviso imposed was that torture or force
should be avoided.
The rule on the permissibility of requiring a witness to write in order to
furnish a sample of his handwriting was settled in Beltran v. Samson. It was
held that, since witnesses in a preliminary investigation are protected by the
prohibition, they may not be compelled to take a dictation in order to
compare their handwriting with that found in a supposedly falsified
document. In support of this ruling, the Court said:
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. . . writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or
the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the
application of the intelligence and attention . . .
We say that, for the purpose of the constitutional privilege, there is a
similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document. And one
who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases,
the witness is require to furnish evidence against himself.
And we say that the present case is more serious . . . because here
the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing,
evidence which does not exist.
Beltran, however, was distinguished from Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan
where the accused where asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes of
the letters which constituted the corpus delicti in a mail pilferage case. The
Court said: To be sure, the use of specimen handwriting in Beltran is
different form and the use of petitioners signature in this case. In that case,
the purpose was to show that the specimen handwriting matched the
handwriting in the document alleged to have been falsified and thereby show
that the accused was the author of the crime (falsification) while in this case
the purpose for securing the signature of petitioner on the envelopes was
merely to authenticate the envelops as the one seized from him and his co-
accused.
When a person, however, voluntarily answers an incriminating
question, he is deemed to have waived his right. Moreover, after the
accused pleaded guilty, for the purpose of ascertaining the proper penalty to
be imposed or for any other legal purposes, the court may properly ask such
questions as are necessary to that end. By this plea of guilty, he is deemed
to have waived his right to the extend, at least of not allowing him
subsequently to claim error by reason of such questions or answers thereto.
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Besides, it is the courts which determine whether or not a question is in fact
incriminating. But an invariable answer of I do not remember is equivalent
to refusal to answer and does not constitute waiver.
The privilege against self-incrimination can be rendered meaningless if
the silence of a witness may be used against him. Hence, the rule has been
established that refusal of an accused to be a witness or of a witness to
answer should in no manner be used against them. This rule, however, does
not prohibit an unfavourable interference from failure of one party to
produce evidence that is in his control.
Documents and records
It will be recalled that Philippine jurisprudence prior to Stonehill v.
Diokno had linked the inadmissibility of illegally obtained evidence with the
self-incrimination clause. Jurisprudence on the subject was founded on Boyd
v. United States which had declared that a compulsory production of the
private books and papers of the owner . . . is compelling him to be a witness
against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Both Stonehill
and Article III, Section 3(1), have since divorced the exclusionary rule in the
search and seizure clause from self-incrimination. Nevertheless, the rule
established in Boyd still remains that the self-incrimination clause covers
documentary evidence.
It should also be noted that, unlike the search and seizure clause,
which protects both natural persons and corporations, the privilege against
self-incrimination is a personal one, applying only to natural individuals.
Moreover, a corporate officer may not prevent the production of corporate
papers on the ground that they may incriminate him personally, for in such
situation it would not be a case of the officer incriminating himself but the
corporation incriminating him.
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Article III, Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall
death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading
punishment against any prisoner or detainee, or the use of
substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman
conditions shall be dealt with by law.
Cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment; excessive fines
In Legarda v. Valdez, it was clearly established that the phrase cruel
and unusual embodied an inseparable pair: To be prohibited by this
provision the punishment must not only be unusual but it must also be cruel.
There is no reason why unusual punishments which were not cruel should
have been prohibited. Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or
a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life.
Thus to be cruel and unusual or excessive within the meaning of
the Constitution, the penalty must be flagrantly disproportionate to the
offense no matter under what circumstances the offense may be committed;
but to be clearly excessive under Article 5 of the Penal Code, it need only
be disproportionate to the circumstances of the offense and of the offender.
In the former, the punishment imposed by the Legislature has exceeded the
limits of its discretionary power, and the Court steps in to apply the
constitutional brake; in the Latter, the Legislature has acted within the limits
of its power, but an unforeseen situation occurs which calls for clemency and
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the court can merely recommend clemency because in the constitutional
scheme it has power only to apply the law.
Abolition of death penalty
It was made clear that there was no intention to pass judgment on
capital punishment as cruel and unusual. The matter should be left to
legislative discretion. Thus, when lethal injection was challenged as a cruel
and unusual punishment disallowed by the Constitution, the Court easily
dismissed the contention appealing to well-settled jurisprudence that the
death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
Punishment is so if it involves torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in
the Constitution. Unconstitutional punishment implies something inhuman
and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.
Article III, Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and
an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Double jeopardy
Justice Moran, writing in 1941, could said: Being thus a mere
recognition of the maxim of the common law, and adoptment from the
Constitution of the United States, the principle of double jeopardy followed in
this jurisdiction the same no narrower or wider line of development as in
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.
It will also be seen that the role which the Rules of Court has played in
the development of the doctrine on double jeopardy has made it very
difficult to determine what aspect of the development belongs to
constitutional double jeopardy and what to statutory double jeopardy.
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When jeopardy attaches
Under present law, to raise the defense of double or second jeopardy
three requisites must be shown: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; (3) the
second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. These
three requisites provide a convenient division for the discussion of the
subject.
The Court enumerated the requisites for the attachment of jeopardy:
(a) upon a good indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, and (d) after plea.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the New Rules of Court, says that there must be
a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction. Under such rule, it has been
uniformly held that if the charge is fatally defective in form, jeopardy does
not attach. Thus, too, when the substance of the information does not allege
sufficient facts to constitute an offense, jeopardy does not attach. Under
these and similarly defective informations, the accused can never be
convicted and, hence, he cannot be said to have been in jeopardy of
conviction.
When the courtthat takes cognizance of the case without jurisdiction,
either because the crime charged is outside the ambit of the courts powers
or because the crime was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of t
he court, all proceedings in such court are void and the accused cannot be
convicted. Hence, again, jeopardy does not attach.
Conviction by a court that is without jurisdiction is a nullity and, at
most, has the effect of a preliminary investigation. In a preliminary
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investigation, however, the accused is not placed in jeopardy because it has
no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe the accused guilty thereof.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that in the case of People v. Balisacan,
where the accused pleaded guilty and was allowed to present evidence in
mitigation, his evidence amounted to a withdrawal of his plea of guilty and,
since no new plea was entered, there was no jeopardy which the acquittal
could terminate.
Termination of jeopardy
Once jeopardy has attached, may double jeopardy be raised as a
defense even before the termination of the first jeopardy? Justice Roberto
Concepcion, in Yap v. Lutero, wrote:
Our bill of Rights deals with two kinds of double jeopardy. The first
sentence of clause 20, Section 1, Article III of the [1935] Constitution
ordains that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment