STATE PROSECUTOR RINGCAR B. PINOTE, Petitioner, VS. JUDGE ROBERTO L. AYCO, Respondent. A.M. No. RTJ-05-1944, December 13, 2005 D E C I S I O N CARPIO MORALES, J.: On August 13 and 20, 2004, Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Branch 26, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of South Cotabato allowed the defense in Criminal Case No. 1771 TB, People v. Vice Mayor Salvador Ramos, et al., for violation of Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, even in the absence of State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote who was prosecuting the case. State Prosecutor Pinote was on August 13 and 20, 2004 undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon City, hence, his absence during the proceedings on the said dates. On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case on August 27, October 1, 15 and 29, 2004, State Prosecutor Pinote refused to cross-examine the two defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, he maintaining that the proceedings conducted on August 13 and 20, 2004 in his absence were void. State Prosecutor Pinote subsequently filed a Manifestation on November 12, 2004 before the trial court, he restating why he was not present on August 13 and 20, 2004, and reiterating his position that Judge Aycos act of allowing the defense to present evidence in his absence was erroneous and highly irregular. He thus prayed that he should not be coerced to cross-examine those two defense witnesses and that their testimonies be stricken off the record. By Order issued also on November 12, 2004, Judge Ayco, glossing over the Manifestation, considered the prosecution to have waived its right to cross-examine the two defense witnesses. Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by State Prosecutor Pinote (complainant) against Judge Ayco (respondent), for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct. By Comment dated March 18, 2005, respondent proffers that complainant filed the complaint to save his face and cover up for his incompetence and lackadaisical handling of the prosecution of the criminal case as in fact complainant was, on the request of the Provincial Governor of South Cotabato, relieved as prosecutor in the case by the Secretary of Justice. And respondent informs that even after complainant was already relieved as the prosecutor in the case, he filed a motion for his inhibition without setting it for hearing. On the above-said Manifestation filed by complainant before the trial court on November 12, 2004, respondent brands the same as misleading and highly questionable, complainants having undergone medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center on August 13 and 20, 2004 having been relayed to the trial court only on said date. On his Order considering the prosecution to have waived presenting evidence, respondent justifies the same on complainants failure to formally offer the evidence for the prosecution despite several extensions of time granted for the purpose. Finally, respondent proffers that no substantial prejudice was suffered by the prosecution for complainant was permitted to cross examine the two defense witnesses but he refused to do so. By way of counter-complaint, respondent charges complainant with Contempt of Court and Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Unbecoming of a Member of the Bar and as an Officer of the Court.
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STATE PROSECUTOR RINGCAR B. PINOTE, Petitioner, VS. JUDGE ROBERTO L. AYCO, Respondent. A.M. No. RTJ-05-1944, December 13, 2005 D E C I S I O N CARPIO MORALES, J.: On August 13 and 20, 2004, Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Branch 26, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of South Cotabato allowed the defense in Criminal Case No. 1771 TB, People v. Vice Mayor Salvador Ramos, et al., for violation of Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, even in the absence of State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote who was prosecuting the case. State Prosecutor Pinote was on August 13 and 20, 2004 undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon City, hence, his absence during the proceedings on the said dates. On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case on August 27, October 1, 15 and 29, 2004, State Prosecutor Pinote refused to cross-examine the two defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, he maintaining that the proceedings conducted on August 13 and 20, 2004 in his absence were void. State Prosecutor Pinote subsequently filed a Manifestation on November 12, 2004 before the trial court, he restating why he was not present on August 13 and 20, 2004, and reiterating his position that Judge Aycos act of allowing the defense to present evidence in his absence was erroneous and highly irregular. He thus prayed that he should not be coerced to cross-examine those two defense witnesses and that their testimonies be stricken off the record. By Order issued also on November 12, 2004, Judge Ayco, glossing over the Manifestation, considered the prosecution to have waived
its right to cross-examine the two defense witnesses. Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by State Prosecutor Pinote (complainant) against Judge Ayco (respondent), for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct. By Comment dated March 18, 2005, respondent proffers that complainant filed the complaint to save his face and cover up for his incompetence and lackadaisical handling of the prosecution of the criminal case as in fact complainant was, on the request of the Provincial Governor of South Cotabato, relieved as prosecutor in the case by the Secretary of Justice. And respondent informs that even after complainant was already relieved as the prosecutor in the case, he filed a motion for his inhibition without setting it for hearing. On the above-said Manifestation filed by complainant before the trial court on November 12, 2004, respondent brands the same as misleading and highly questionable, complainants having undergone medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center on August 13 and 20, 2004 having been relayed to the trial court only on said date. On his Order considering the prosecution to have waived presenting evidence, respondent justifies the same on complainants failure to formally offer the evidence for the prosecution despite several extensions of time granted for the purpose. Finally, respondent proffers that no substantial prejudice was suffered by the prosecution for complainant was permitted to cross examine the two defense witnesses but he refused to do so. By way of counter-complaint, respondent charges complainant with Contempt of Court and Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Unbecoming of a Member of the Bar and as an Officer of the Court.
On evaluation of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), citing Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure, finds respondent to have breached said rule and accordingly recommends that he be reprimanded therefor, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. - All criminal
actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the Court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the end of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction of the public prosecutor.
If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case there are no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until the termination of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn. Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness.[1] It is on this account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people.[2] Respondents act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of complainant public prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the purpose is thus a clear transgression of the Rules which could not be rectified by subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to cross-examine the witnesses. Respondents intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case, no matter how noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to due process, so is the State. Respondents lament about complainants failure to inform the court of his inability to attend the August 13 and 20, 2004 hearings or to file a motion for postponement thereof or to subsequently file a motion for reconsideration of his Orders allowing the defense to present its
two witnesses on said dates may be mitigating. It does not absolve respondent of his utter disregard of the Rules. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Roberto L. Ayco is hereby ordered to pay a fine FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Respecting the counter-complaint against complainant State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote, respondent is advised that the same should be lodged before the Secretary of Justice. SO ORDERED. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice WE CONCUR: ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Associate Justice Chairman ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice
G.R. No. 114302 September 29, 1995 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. CAMILO O. MONTESA, JR., as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Malolos, Bulacan, APOLONIO CRUZ and BERNARDA CRUZ, respondents. DAVIDE, JR., J.: The core issue raised in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Court is whether the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Case No. 1469-M-93 immediately after the arraignment of the accused-private respondents on the basis of the resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case despite the disapproval of such resolution by the Provincial Prosecutor. This petition was filed by the private prosecutor with the conformity of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan, Liberato L. Reyes. Concededly, it is defective in form. But, in view of the gravity of the error allegedly committed by the respondent Judge, we required a comment from the office of the Solicitor General, the law office of the Government authorized by law to represent the Government in this Court and in the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings and to act and represent the Republic or the People of the Philippines before any court, tribunal, body, or commission in any matter, action, or proceeding which, in the opinion of the Solicitor General, affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require. 1 We had done so in previous cases. 2 In its Comment 3 filed on 24 October 1994, the Office of the Solicitor General adopted the petition as its own and incorporated a supplement thereto. The private respondent's comment was filed only on 23 June 1995. The factual and procedural antecedents which gave rise to this case are uncomplicated. On 6 July 1993, an information was filed with the Regional Trail Court (RTC) of Bulacan charging private respondents Apolonio Cruz and
Bernarda Cruz with the crime of falsification of public document, committed as follows: [O]n or about the 10th day of January, 1991, in the municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the . . . accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare or cause to be prepared a document denominated as "Kasulatan ng Kaloobpala" making it appear therein that the same was executed and signed by the spouses Cenon Constantino and Sotera de la Cruz and that said persons personally appeared before Notary Public Santiago L. Lindayag and acknowledged the same to be their own free act and deed, when in truth and in fact, as said accused well knew, said document was neither executed and signed by the aforementioned Cenon Constantino and Sotera de la Cruz, nor did they ever appear before the abovenamed notary public for the purpose of acknowledging the same as said spouses were already dead at the time of the alleged execution of said document, to the damage and prejudice of public interest. 4 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1469-M-93 in Branch 19 of the said court which is presided by the respondent Judge. Arraignment was set on 19 October 1993. 5 On 8 October 1993, the private respondents filed with the trial court a petition for reinvestigation 6 premised on the ground that "after the information was filed, material and relevant evidence was discovered which, if presented in a reinvestigation, will certainly alter the earlier finding of probable cause by the office of the Provincial Prosecutor thereby avoiding a prolonged litigation which is disadvantageous to all concerned." On 12 October 1993, the respondent Judge issued an order 7 granting the petition for reinvestigation, remanding the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for purposes of reinvestigation, and cancelling the scheduled arraignment on 19 October 1993. At the reinvestigation conducted by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Edsel M. Rutor, the accused presented what it considered new
material and relevant evidence which consists merely of an affidavit of Feliza Constantino who declared that she was the one responsible for the preparation of the questioned public document. In his resolution of 14 December 1993, 8 Rutor recommended the dismissal of the case because: [T]he issue is now moot with the admission by Feliza Constantino in an affidavit submitted only on November 1993, wherein she made clear that she is the one responsible for the preparation of the document subject matter of this case, . . . the accused spouses have no participation in the preparation of the same. Provincial Prosecutor Liberato Reyes disapproved the recommendation and the made of the following handwritten note below the signature of Rutor on the last page of the latter's resolution: Feliza Constantino did not admit having done the falsification. As vendor she merely warrants the good title that transferred to the vendee & she assumes responsibility therefor. Hence, the Court & not this office is in a better position to resolve the issue of whether the accused are the perpetrators of the falsification. We should present our evidence that makes out a prima facie case & let the Court decide, not this office pre-empting the prerogative of the Court. 9 (emphasis supplied) Nonetheless, in obvious disregard of the adverse stand of the Provincial Prosecutor, Rutor submitted his resolution to the trial court. On 22 December 1993, the respondent Judge ordered the arraignment of the private respondents. They pleaded not guilty. Forthwith, the trial court issued an order 10 dismissing criminal Case No. 1469-M-93 on the basis of the Rutor resolution The order reads: Before the Court is the Resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor for the dismissal of the case, however, the Provincial Prosecutor deemed it wise to endorse to the Court the propriety of resolving the case at bar. Both accused after having been arraigned and informed of the nature and cause of the accusation entered a plea of NOT GUILTY.
The facts of the case, in brief, showed that both accused Apolonio Cruz and Bernarda Cruz were charged with the offense of "Falsification of Public Document" as provided for under Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code in conjunction with Art. 171 thereof. Sotera dela Cruz at the time of her death was the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Barrio Pritil, Guiguinto, Bulacan and covered by TCT No. T-281264. Following her death on February 1, 1989, one of the heirs of the deceased, Feliza Constantino, sold her share to accused spouses for P200,000.00 pursuant to extrajudicial settlement with sale (Kasulatan ng Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman). In lieu of presenting the said document to the Register of Deeds for purposes of transfer of said property to the vendees (accused spouses Apolonio and Bernarda Cruz), however, a document denominated as "Kasulatan ng Kaloobpala" dated January 10, 1991 to which both accused affixed their signatures as well as the vendee's parents Sotera dela Cruz and Constantino Cruz despite their death long before the execution of said document, was the one presented to the Register of Deeds. Pursuant therewith, TCT No. T-281264 in the name of Sotera dela Cruz was cancelled and in lieu thereof, a new certificate of title TCT No. T-10178 was issued in favor of the accused. Conformably with the foregoing circumstances, accused spouses are charged with the offense of Falsification of Public Document. Feliza Constantino, one of the two legitimate children of deceased Sotera dela Cruz, expressly admitted having sold her share of 1,034 square meters to accused spouses for a valuable consideration pursuant to "Kasulatan ng Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman na may Bilihan", however, a certain person instead whom she did not identify, caused the execution of a document of "Kasulatan ng Kaloobpala" and used the same to effect the transfer of the property to accused spouses. It is indubitably established that the property subject of the alleged falsification of public document was actually sold to accused spouses for a valuable consideration by one of the heirs of deceased Sotera dela Cruz pursuant to "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman"; that accused the spouses are not directly involved in the preparation of
said "Kasulatan ng Kaloob pala"; and that the person other than the accused was instrumental in the preparation of said document and who facilitated the transfer of said property to accused spouses. The express admission by the sister of the complainant that she sold her share to accused spouses for a valuable consideration and that the latter have no hand in the alleged falsification of public document are material and of the great probative value and the same should be given persuasive effect and credence in judicious assessment of the case at bar. The said admission for all legal intents and purposes exonerates both accused of the offense charged. Accordingly, there is grave doubt to hold the accused criminally liable for the offense charged in the Information. The doubt as to the liability of the accused is evident by the varied and contradictory findings of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutors. In the absence, therefore, of a clear and convincing proof to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, as prayed for the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor for the dismissal of the case and finding the motion tenable, the same be given due course. On 5 January 1994, the private prosecutor, Atty. Edwin P. Cerezo, who received a copy of the dismissal order on 28 December 1993, filed a motion for its reconsideration. 11 He alleged therein that the Rutor resolution was not approved by the Provincial Prosecutor who, on the contrary, directed Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor to proceed with the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution; and that the unapproved resolution did not invalidate of modify the information already filed, neither did it serve as basis for the court's order summarily dismissing the case. He further alleged that since the court had arraigned the accused, it should have, pursuant to the Rules, scheduled the case for pre-trial and trial. At the hearing of the motion for reconsideration on 11 January 1994, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor vehemently opposed it on the ground that the private prosecutor has no personality to intervene in the proceedings and that the motion was a mere scrap of paper for lack of his "(Rutor's) conformity. The respondent Judge forthwith denied the motion. 12
On 12 January 1994, the Provincial Prosecutor and the private prosecutor jointly filed another motion to reconsider 13 the dismissal order of 22 December 1993. They alleged therein that: 2. This Honorable Court based its Order of dismissal on the Resolution of the Asst. Public Prosecutor Edsel M. Rutor dated December 14, 1993, recommending for its dismissal; 3. Said Resolution of Asst. Pros. Edsel M. Rutor was not approved by the undersigned Provincial Prosecutor as he is convinced that a prima facie case existed against the accused, instead, he directed Asst. Pros. Edsel M. Rutor to proceed with the presentation of the prosecution evidence in court; 4. The determination of the existence of a prima facie case by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for the purposes of filing information in the court must be respected by this Honorable Court, and it is beyond its jurisdiction to interfere with the said findings, more so when an information had already been filed in court, as in the present case; 5. For another, accused were already arraigned on the crime charged in the Information dated June 18, 1993, yet this Honorable Court summarily dismissed the case solely based on the unapproved Resolution of Pros. Rutor not on the evidence as no evidence has yet been presented by the parties; 6. Under the Rules, after arraignment of the accused had been made, Pre-trial and Trial will follow; They then prayed that on the order of dismissal be set aside and the case be set for pre-trial and trial. In his order of 1 February 1994, 14 the respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time as a copy of the order of dismissal was received by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor on 22 December 1993, and he declared that the motion for reconsideration earlier filed by the private prosecutor "is of no moment as [it] does not have the imprimatur of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and perforce does not affect the running of the prescriptive period." Hence, this petition which was filed on 25 March 1994 by the private
complainant, through the private prosecutor, with the approval of Provincial Prosecutor Liberato L. Reyes. The petition is impressed with merit. The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition thereof, such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. While the prosecutor retains the discretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the court. The court is the best and the sole judge on what to do with the case. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor before or after the arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records upon reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the court. The action of the court must not, however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law. 15 In the instant case, the respondent Judge granted the motion for reinvestigation and directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to conduct the reinvestigation. The former was, therefore, deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to consider the so-called new relevant and material evidence and determine whether the information it had filed should stand. Having done so, it behooved the respondent Judge to wait for a final resolution of the incident. In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, 16 this Court ruled: Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused's motion for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken thereon to the Department of Justice. The resolution of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor recommending the dismissal of the case never became final, for it
was not approved by the Provincial Prosecutor. On the contrary, the latter disapproved it. As a consequence, the final resolution with respect to the reinvestigation is that of the Provincial Prosecutor, for under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, no complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal or chief state prosecutor. Also, under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 5180, 17 as amended by P.D. No. 77 and P.D. No. 911: [N]o assistant fiscal or state prosecutor may file an information or dismiss a case except with the prior authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or Chief State Prosecutor. . . . The Provincial Prosecutor's opinion that the prosecution should present its "evidence that makes out a prima facie case" clearly indicate that he was convinced that there is at the very least a reasonable ground to believe that the crime of falsification was committed and the private respondents are probably guilty thereof. The findings and conclusion of the Provincial Prosecutor, being the final disposition on the reinvestigation, should have been the sole and only valid basis for the respondent Judge's final action with respect to the reinvestigation in the light of the foregoing provisions of the Rules of Court and R.A. No. 5180, as amended, and the ruling in Marcelo. The respondent Judge must have miscomprehended or misunderstood the notation of the Provincial Prosecutor that "the court & not this office is in a better position to resolve the issue of whether the accused are the perpetrators of the falsification" as a carte blanche to act on the resolution and recommendation of Rutor. He closed his eyes to the Provincial Prosecutor's stand the prosecution should present its evidence "that makes out a prima facie case and let the court decide," which simply means that the case should not be dismissed on the basis of Rutor's recommendation. The Rutor resolution was rendered valueless because of the Provincial Prosecutor's approval thereof. In submitting it nonetheless to the court and moving for the dismissal of the case, Rutor showed outright disregard of the aforementioned provisions and ruling. So did the respondent Judge when he dismissed the case on the basis of that resolution. Their disregard of the said provisions and ruling is
condemnable, for it carries with it a whimsical and capricious bent that taints the exercise of discretion with grave abuse, thereby rendering the whole act infirmed and void. Since the Provincial Prosecutor, to which the respondent Judge had deferred the matter of reinvestigation, had finally resolved to stand on the information and to present evidence to prove the quilt of the private respondents for the crime charged, the respondent Judge did not have the option to dismiss the case on the basis of the disapproved resolution of Rutor. His only option was to proceed with the arraignment of the accused and, thereafter, conduct a pre-trial and trial on the merits should they enter a plea of not guilty. It must be observed that, although the respondent Judge was convinced of Rutor's recommendation to dismiss the case on the ground of want of probable cause because of the "admission" of Feliza Constantino that the accused spouses had no participation in the preparation of the questioned document, he still ordered the arraignment of the private respondents. He seemed to have something in mind for the protection of the interest of the private respondents. Presumably, he thought that the arraignment which was immediately followed by the dismissal of the case would forever foreclose, on the ground of double jeopardy, any reopening of the case. For having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction thereby depriving the State of due process of law or a fair opportunity to present its evidence and prove its case, the challenged order of the respondent Judge dismissing Criminal Case No. 1469-M-93 is a null and void. 18 We thus set it aside and order the reinstatement of the information. A few words are in order before we write finis to this case. This Court wonders why Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Edsel M. Rutor disregarded the disapproval by his superior, Provincial Prosecutor Liberato Reyes, of his resolution recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 1469-M-93. Additionally, he vigorously objected to the private prosecutor's motion to reconsider the dismissal. Something is wrong somewhere. The attention of the
Department of Justice must be called. As stated in the beginning, the instant petition is defective in that it was initiated for the People by the private prosecutor. The "conformity" given by the Provincial Prosecutor did not make it any less defective. This is an opportune time to remind litigants that in cases of this nature, the Office of the Solicitor General must be consulted and its assistance solicited. Prosecutors must not simply give conformity to privately initiated petitions; they should also report the matter to the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders of the respondent Judge of 22 December 1993 dismissing Criminal Case No. 1469-M-93 and of 1 February 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration jointly filed by the Provincial Prosecutor and the private prosecutor are hereby SET ASIDE for being null and void, and the trial court is hereby directed to continue with the proceedings therein with purposeful dispatch. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Secretary of the Department of Justice for him to take such appropriate action as may be necessary against Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Edsel M. Rutor. SO ORDERED. Padilla, Bellosillo and Kapunan JJ., concur. Hermosisima, Jr., J. is on leave.
ROBERTO BRILLANTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. D E C I S I O N TINGA, J.: Good name in man and woman, dear my Lord, Is the immediate jewel of their souls: Who steals my purse steals trash; tis Something, nothing; But he that filches from me my good name Robs me of that which not enriches him, And makes me poor indeed.
- Shakespeare: Othello, III, iii, 155.
Every man has a right to build, keep and be favored with a good name. This right is protected by law with the recognition of slander and libel as actionable wrongs, whether as criminal offenses or tortious conduct. In these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari,[1] petitioner Roberto Brillante (Brillante), also known as Bobby Brillante, questions his convictions for libel for writing and causing to be published in 1988 an open letter addressed to then President of the Republic of the Philippines Corazon C. Aquino discussing the alleged participation of Atty. Jejomar Binay (Binay), then the OIC Mayor[2] and a candidate for the position of Mayor in the Municipality (now City) of Makati, and Dr. Nemesio Prudente (Prudente), then President of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, in an assassination plot against Augusto Syjuco (Syjuco), another candidate for Mayor of Makati at that time. On January 7, 1988, Brillante, then a candidate for the position of Councilor in Makati, held a press conference at the Makati Sports Club which was attended by some 50 journalists. In the course of the press conference, Brillante accused Binay of plotting the assassination of Syjuco. He further accused Binay of terrorism, intimidation and
harassment of the Makati electorate. Brillante also circulated among the journalists copies of an open letter to President Aquino which discussed in detail his charges against Binay.[3] Several journalists who attended the press conference wrote news articles about the same. Angel Gonong, a writer for the Peoples Journal, wrote a news article entitled Binay Accused of Plotting Slays of Rivals. It was cleared for publication by Max Buan, Jr. (Buan), and Luis Camino (Camino), Editor-in-Chief and News Editor, respectively, of the Peoples Journal. Gloria Hernandez (Hernandez) wrote a similar article entitled Binay Slay Plan on Syjuco which was cleared for publication by Augusto Villanueva (Villanueva) and Virgilio Manuel (Manuel), Editor-in-Chief and News Editor, respectively, of the News Today.[4] The open letter was subsequently published under the title Plea to Cory--Save Makati in newspapers such as the Peoples Journal, Balita, Malaya and Philippine Daily Inquirer.[5] The pertinent portions of the open letter read: 4. We have received reports that Atty. Binay and his group are plotting the assassination of Mr. Augusto Bobby Syjuco, now frontrunner in the Makati mayoralty race. These reports are: 1. On December 14, 1987, Atty. Binay and Dr. Nemesio Prudente, president of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), met at Puerto Azul in Cavite with, among others, a Commander Luming, a Major Rafael Nieva, and a commander Francis Baloloy. Subject of the meeting was Winning the Election at all Costs. x x x x x x x x x 3. On December 17, 1987, Dr. Prudente, Atty. Binay and others including some unidentified government officials discussed operation Dirty Fingers after the ASEAN Summit Meeting. The operation involves terrorism, the use of public school teachers, the threat to kill or hurt political ward and precinct leaders not supporting or opposed to Atty. Binay, and to use these as samples to show rivals that his group is capable of doing so, the planting of his squads in places close to potential targets, the mobilization of marshals who will bring
firearms and to ferry hitmen to target points. The marshals will also be used as pointers and to shelter the hitmen after accomplishing or performing their missions. xxx xxx xxx 4. On December 8, 1987, a certain Emilio Anecito, tagged as a hitman in the group of Dr. Prudente, has been specifically assigned to assassinate Mr. Syjuco, Aniceto has been described as Iranian mestizo looking, about five (5) feet in height, fair complexioned curly haired, sporting a mustache, and fairly built bodily. He is said to be a silent person and supposedly has a perfect score in hit missions assigned to him. xxx xxx xxx 5. On December 10, 1987, it was reported that Major Rafael Nieva had been assigned to work with Mr. Aniceto, Nievas background report is that he: xxx xxx xxx c. Was hired by Dr. Prudente as security officer and personal bodyguard. d. Is a notorious killer used by the PUP forces and only his employer can control or stop him.[6] As a result of the publication of the open letter, Binay filed with the Makati fiscals office four complaints for libel against Brillante, as the author of the letter; Gonong, Buan and Camino for writing and publishing the news article on Brillantes accusations against him in the Peoples Journal;[7] Hernandez, Villanueva and Manuel for writing and publishing a similar news article in the News Today;[8] and for publishing the open letter, Buan and Camino of the Peoples Journal;[9] and Arcadio A. Sison (Sison) as President of A. Sison and Associates, an advertising agency.[10] Francisco Baloloy (Baloloy), who was identified in the open letter as among the persons who attended the meeting organized by Binay and Prudente to plan the assassination of Syjuco, likewise filed a criminal complaint for libel against Brillante, Domingo Quimlat (Quimlat), Publisher and Editor-in-Chief of Balita, and Sison as President of A. Sison and Associates.[11]
Subsequently, five Informations for libel against Brillante were filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. Similarly, on January 15, 1988, Prudente filed four complaints for libel against Brillante and the editors and publishers of the newspapers where the open letter was published. On January 16, 1989, four Informations for libel were filed against Brillante and several co-accused with the RTC of Manila. Brillantes co-accused in these cases were: (i) Buan, Editor-in-Chief of the Peoples Journal;[12] (ii) Amado P. Macasaet (Macasaet), Publisher, and Noel Albano (Albano), Editor, of the Malaya;[13] (iii) Sison, Public Relations Officer and Federico D. Pascual (Pascual), Publisher and Executive Editor of the Philippine Daily Inquirer;[14] and (iv) Sison, Public Relations Officer and Quimlat, Publisher and Editor-in-Chief of Balita.[15] Buan was not included in the trial of the cases in the RTC-Manila because he eluded arrest and was not arraigned. The charges against Pascual and Quimlat were dropped upon motion of the Assistant Prosecutor. The charges against Macasaet and Albano were also eventually dismissed upon motion of the prosecution. Only Brillante and Sison remained as accused.[16] Both pleaded not guilty to the charges against them. On January 25, 1993, the RTC-Manila acquitted Sison but found Brillante guilty of libel on four counts. The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision in the consolidated cases reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered pronouncing accused Bobby Brillante, also known as Roberto Brillante, guilty beyond reasonable doubt on four (4) counts, as author or writer, of LIBEL defined under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized under Article 355 of the same code, and sentencing him in each count to the indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor, as minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P2,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of ONE (1) DAY for every P8.00 that he is unable to pay, but which subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed EIGHT (8) months. Accused Bobby Brillante is ordered to pay the private offended party,
Dr. Nemesio Prudente, the total sum of P1,000,000.00 in these four (4) cases for moral damages which the latter suffered. Accused Arcadio Sison is acquitted in the two cases against him, his guilt of the charges against him not having been established beyond reasonable [doubt]. Two-third (2/3) of the costs is assessed against accused Bobby Brillante while the remaining one-third (1/3) is charged de oficio.[17] Subsequently, Brillante appealed the Decision of the RTC-Manila to the Court of Appeals.[18] Brillante contended that when the Informations in Criminal Cases No. 89-69614 to 17 were filed by the prosecutor on January 16, 1989, the offense had already prescribed because more than one year had elapsed since the publication of the open letter on January 10, 11 and 12, 1988. He also averred that the open letter which he wrote and caused to be published was not defamatory and was without malice. Brillante also claimed that the publication is considered privileged communication. Finally, he argued that he is entitled to equal protection of the laws and should be acquitted of the offenses charged like his co-accused.[19] On September 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. No. 14475 affirming the decision of the RTC-Manila. The appellate court held that the offense of libel had not yet prescribed because the one-year prescription period should be reckoned from the time that the private complainant Prudente filed his complaint with the fiscals office on January 15, 1988 and not when the Informations were filed by the prosecutor on January 16, 1989. The Court of Appeals added that under Section 1, Rule 110, which took effect during the pendency of the cases against Brillante, the institution of the complaint before the fiscals office or the courts for preliminary investigation interrupts the prescriptive period of the offense charged. It held that being a procedural rule, Section 1, Rule 110, applies to the cases against Brillante.[20] The Court of Appeals further held that the RTC-Manila did not err in finding that Brillante had committed libel against Prudente. It explained that the open letter, when read in its entirety, gives the impression that Prudente is part of a purported criminal conspiracy to
kill Syjuco. According to the appellate court, the open letter is a malicious defamation which produced in the minds of the readers Brillantes intent and purpose to injure the reputation of Prudente, thereby exposing him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule.[21] The Court of Appeals rejected Brillantes argument that the open letter may be considered privileged communication because the evidence does not show that Brillante wrote and published it out of a legal, moral or social duty.[22] The appellate court also debunked Brillantes allegation that he was denied the equal protection of the laws because while the charges against his co-accused were dropped, those against him were not. According to the appellate court, he and his co-accused are not similarly situated because he was convicted of libel upon a finding that there existed evidence beyond reasonable doubt to sustain his conviction. In contrast, the charges against his co-accused were dismissed and their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.[23] Brillantes contention that his conviction for libel on four counts gave rise to double jeopardy because under our jurisdiction protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses was also overruled by the appellate court. It held that each and every publication of the same libel constitutes a separate distinct offense and the charge for one instance of publication shall not bar a charge for subsequent and separate publications.[24] Brillante filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, but the motion was denied in a Resolution dated January 19, 1995.[25] In the meantime, Brillante was likewise convicted for libel on five counts by the RTC-Makati in Criminal Cases Nos. 88-1410, 88-1411, 88-1412, 88-3060 and 89-721. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated March 22, 1993 of the RTC-Makati reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. In Criminal Cases Nos. 88-1410, 88-1411, 88-1412, 88-3060 and 89-721, finding accused Bobby Brillante, also known as Roberto Brillante,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of libel charged in each of these five (5) cases, and sentencing him in each of the cases to suffer imprisonment of FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor, as minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay fine, likewise in each of these (5) cases, of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency pursuant to Article 39, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. 2. As to moral damages, said accused is also ordered to pay complainant, Jejomar C. Binay, the sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, in all the four (4) charges (Crim. Cases Nos. 88-410, 88-1411, 88-1412 and 89-721), considering the latters professional and political standing in society, he being a lawyer and former Governor of the Metro Manila Commission as well as director of various government agencies. 3. As to moral damages, said accused is also ordered to pay complainant, Francisco Baloloy, the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, in Criminal Case No. 88-3060. 4. In Criminal Cases Nos. 88-1410 and 88-1412, ACQUITTING accused Max Buan, Jr., Angel Gonong and Louie Camino, of the two charges against them on the ground that their guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. 5. In Criminal Case No. 88-1411 (except for accused Brillante) ordering the same ARCHIVED on the ground that the other accused herein, Gloria Hernandez, Augusto Villanueva and Virgilio Manuel, have not been brought to the jurisdiction of this Court; let alias warrant issue for their arrest. 6. In Criminal Cases Nos. 88-3060 and 89-721, likewise ordering the same ARCHIVED ONLY WITH RESPECT TO accused Arcadio Sison, who has not been brought to the jurisdiction of this Court; let alias warrant issue for his arrest. 7. In all these cases, ordering accused Bobby Brillante, also known as Roberto Brillante, to pay the proportionate costs. SO ORDERED.[26] Brillante appealed the Decision of the RTC-Makati to the Court of
Appeals,[27] raising essentially the same arguments in his appeal in CA-G.R. CR No. 14475. On February 28, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 15174 affirming the decision of the RTC-Makati. It held that the filing of the complaint before the fiscals office interrupts the period of prescription because Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code did not make any distinction whether the complaint is filed in court for preliminary investigation or for trial on the merits, because the filing of the complaint for preliminary investigation is the initial step of criminal proceedings. It added that it would be unfair to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays which are not within his control.[28] The appellate court also ruled that the open letter cannot be considered privileged communication because it contains libelous matter and was circulated to the public. Citing U.S. v. Galeza,[29] it held that while it is the right and duty of a citizen to file a complaint regarding a misconduct on the part of a public official, such complaint must be addressed solely to the officials having jurisdiction to inquire into the charges.[30] Lastly, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts observation that unlike Brillante, his co-accused editors and publishers could not be held liable for libel because the news reports regarding the January 7, 1988 press conference which were published in their respective newspapers sufficiently informed the readers that the reference to Binays involvement in the assassination plot were allegations made by Brillante during the press conference and that said allegations were reported for the sole purpose of informing the public of the news regarding the candidates adverted to in the report.[31] Brillante filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, but the motion was denied in a Resolution dated August 17, 1995.[32] Thereafter, Brillante filed the present Petitions for Review on March 13, 1995 in G.R. No. 118757 and on October 10, 1995 in G.R. No. 121571. In G.R. No. 118757, he raises the following arguments: I
THE OFFENSE OF LIBEL CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION (sic) HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED WHEN THE SAID INFORMATION (sic) WAS FILED. II HE IS NOT GUILTY OF LIBEL HE IS CHARGED WITH, BECAUSE THE LETTER HE CAUSED TO BE PUBLISHED WAS WRITTEN AND PUBLISHED WITHOUT ANY MALICE [N]OR MALICIOUS INTENT TO MALIGN THE PERSON, HONOR AND REPUTATION OF THE COMPLAINANT [PRUDENTE/BINAY] BUT SOLELY FOR THE JUSTIFIED AND HONEST PURPOSE OF BRINGING TO THE ATTENTION OF ALL AUTHORITIES CONCERNED THE REPORTS THEREIN MENTIONED FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION. WHERE THERE IS NO MALICE, THERE IS NO LIBEL. III IN TRUTH, PUBLICLY KNOWN PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES OF COMPLAINANT, DR. NEMESIO PRUDENTE, ALREADY IN OPERATION LONG BEFORE JANUARY 12, 1988, INDICATE THAT HE WAS NOT INCAPABLE OF NOURISHING VIOLENT INTENTIONS AGAINST THE POLITICAL OPPONENTS OF MAYOR BINAY. IV MOREOVER, CONSIDERING THAT THE MATTER REFERRED TO IN THE LETTER INDUBITABLY RELATES TO THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN THEN GOING ON AS WELL AS THE PARTICIPATION OF PETITIONER AND COMPLAINANT THEREIN, WHATEVER IS CONTAINED IN SAID LETTER CAN AT MOST BE NO MORE THAN A POLITICAL LIBEL, WHICH IS NOT PUNISHABLE. WE EARNESTLY URGE THAT THIS PROPOSITION BE ENUNCIATED AS A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE IN THE LAW ON LIBEL. V IN THE REMOTE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY PERCEIVE ANY CRIMINAL LIBEL IN THIS CASE, THE PENALTY IMPOSED UPON PETITIONER IS CRUEL AND EXCESSIVE, PARTICULARLY, AS TO THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED TO COMPLAINANT.[33] In G.R. No. 121571, he makes the following assignments of error: I THE OFFENSE HAD PRESCRIBED
II THE PUBLICATION WAS A PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION III THE PUBLICATION WAS MADE WITHOUT MALICE IV IT MAY, AT MOST, ALSO BE CONSIDERED A POLITICAL LIBEL WHICH IS NOT PUNISHABLE V THE DECISION VIOLATES PETITIONERS RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS VI THE PENALTY IS CRUEL AND EXCESSIVE[34] With respect to the issue of prescription, Brillante anchors his claim on the Courts ruling in People v. Tayco[35] that the prescriptive period of a crime is interrupted only upon the filing of the complaint in court and not the filing thereof with the fiscals office. According to Brillante, the ruling in People v. Olarte[36] did not modify the doctrine in Tayco because in Olarte, the Court referred to a complaint filed in court, not in the fiscals office. The ruling in Francisco v. Court of Appeals[37] that a complaint filed with the fiscals office also interrupts the prescriptive period of a criminal offense allegedly cannot overturn the ruling in Olarte because the latter was decided by the Court En Banc while Francisco was decided by a mere division of the Court.[38] It is further asserted by Brillante that the rule in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure that the filing of the criminal complaint with the fiscals office interrupts the prescriptive period, cannot be applied retroactively to the cases against him because it impairs his vested right to have the cases against him dismissed on the ground of prescription.[39] In addition, he claims that Section 6(b), Rule 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that [t]he pendency of a petition for suspension of the criminal action still undergoing preliminary investigation in the fiscals office shall interrupt the prescriptive period for filing the corresponding complaint of information supports his position that prior to the amendment of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in 1985, the prevailing rule was that only
the filing of the complaint or information in court tolls the prescriptive period for a criminal offense.[40] Brillante denies that he is liable for libel for causing to be published his open letter implicating Binay, Prudente and their associates in a planned assassination of Syjuco as well as election-related terrorism, and in uttering remarks against Binay and his associates during the January 7, 1988 press conference. According to Brillante, his statements and utterances were privileged communication because he made them public out of a legal, moral and social duty to safeguard the sanctity of the elections to be held on January 18, 1988, and to avoid the unnecessary loss of life.[41] Since his statements were privileged communication, malice cannot be presumed from them.[42] Brillante adds that at the time he made the statements, he honestly believed that they were true. Citing an American case, Bays v. Hunt,[43] he contends that where there is an honest belief in the truth of the charges made, and the publication is in good faith, one is not responsible even for publishing an untruth.[44] It is further asserted by Brillante that since Binay, the subject of the allegedly defamatory statements is a public figure, his (Brillantes) comments affecting Binays reputation is constitutionally protected speech.[45] Brillante also urges the Court to reverse his convictions, reasoning that at most, what he may have committed is political libel which should exempt him form criminal liability, considering that election campaigns can become very heated and candidates from rival camps often make charges and countercharges which are offensive to the name, honor and prestige of their opponents. He contends that statements made by a candidate against his rivals, although derogatory, are for the purpose of convincing the electorate to prevent suspicious characters from holding public office. In essence, he posits the view that political libel should be deemed constitutionally protected speech.[46] Brillante likewise argues that the multiple publication rule, i.e., that each publication constitutes one offense of libel, should not have been applied to him, considering the factual background of the open
letter and the statements uttered by him during the press conference.[47] Anent the issue of equal protection, Brillante contends that he should have been acquitted like his co-accused Angel Gonong who wrote the news article in the Peoples Journal regarding the January 7, 1988 press conference and Buan and Camino who were the editors of that publication.[48] The Solicitor General filed a Comment on each of the petitions. The Solicitor General insists that the one-year prescriptive period for libel should be reckoned from the date of filing of the complaints with the office of the prosecutor as clarified by the Court in Olarte and Francisco and as stated in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988, which applies to the complaints filed against Brillante as of October 1988.[49] On the issue of libel, the Solicitor General insists that Brillantes statements in the open letter clearly impute upon Prudente and Binay a criminal conspiracy to assassinate Syjuco.[50] The Solicitor General also maintains that contrary to Brillantes claims, the open letter cannot be considered privileged communication because it was published without justifiable motives and it was circulated for the information of the general public instead of addressing the letter solely to the authorities who had the power to curb the dangers alleged by Brillante in the letter.[51] The Solicitor General disagrees with Brillantes contention that his statements are constitutionally protected because they are criticisms of official conduct and deal with public figures. According to the Solicitor General, the record shows that Brillante did not have enough basis to pass off his accusations as true considering that he admitted to relying on unnamed intelligence sources.[52] It is also argued by the Solicitor General that Brillantes statements cannot be exempt from criminal liability on the ground that such statements were political libel. Brillantes claim, the Solicitor General asserts, has no basis in law or jurisprudence.[53] With respect to the issue of equal protection, the Solicitor General avers that Brillante cannot be acquitted like his co-accused publishers,
editors and writers because their alleged participation in the commission of the libel are different from Brillante who is the author of the libelous statements. The writers of the news reports were only narrating what took place during the January 7, 1988 press conference, and wrote the news articles to inform the public of Brillantes statements. In the case of the editors and publishers who published the open letter, they indicated in their respective publications that the open letter was a paid advertisement. The publication of the news reports in the newspapers was also done to inform the public of what transpired during the January 7, 1988 press conference.[54] The Solicitor General further argues that the penalty imposed upon Brillante is not excessive but is in accordance with law, which considers one publication of a libelous statement as a distinct offense from another publication of the same statement.[55] Thus, the Solicitor General prays that Brillantes petitions be denied.[56] Brillante thereafter filed a Reply to each of the Solicitor Generals Comments. The replies reiterate Brillantes arguments in his petitions.[57] The Court is tasked to resolve the following issues: (1) whether the offense of libel had already prescribed when the Informations were filed with the RTC-Manila and RTC-Makati; (2) whether Brillante is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of libel; (3) whether Brillante was denied the equal protection of the laws; and (4) whether the penalty imposed upon him is excessive. Save for the issue on the amount of moral damages, there is no merit in the petitions. With respect to the issue of prescription, the fourth paragraph of Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year. In determining when the one-year prescriptive period should be reckoned, reference must be made to Article 91 of the same code which sets forth the rule on the computation of prescriptive periods of offenses: Computation of prescription of offenses.The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered
by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. The aforequoted provision expressly states that prescriptive period shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. The meaning of the phrase shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information in Article 91 has been settled in the landmark case of People v. Olarte,[58] where the Court settled divergent views as to the effect of filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court for purposes of preliminary investigation on the prescriptive period of the offense. The Court therein held that the filing of the complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation interrupts the period of prescription of criminal responsibility. It explained thus: the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint. And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted prescription shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, thereby indicating that the court in which the complaint or information is filed must have the power to convict or acquit the accused. Precisely, the trial on the merits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But it is in the court conducting a preliminary investigation where the proceedings may terminate without conviction or acquittal, if the court should discharge the accused because no prima facie case had been shown.[59] Thereafter, the Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals[60] clarified that the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a crime: As is a well-known fact, like the proceedings in the court conducting a preliminary investigation, a proceeding in the Fiscal's Office may terminate without conviction or acquittal. As Justice Claudio Teehankee has observed: To the writer's mind, these reasons logically call with equal force, for the express overruling also of the doctrine in People vs. Tayco, 73 Phil. 509, (1941) that the filing of a complaint or denuncia by the offended party with the City Fiscal's Office which is required by law to conduct the preliminary investigation does not interrupt the period of prescription. In chartered cities, criminal prosecution is generally initiated by the filing of the complaint or denuncia with the city fiscal for preliminary investigation. In the case of provincial fiscals, besides being empowered like municipal judges to conduct preliminary investigations, they may even reverse actions of municipal judges with respect to charges triable by Courts of First instance . . ..[61] There is no conflict in the pronouncements of the Court in Olarte and Francisco as Brillante erroneously suggests. Olarte laid down the doctrine that a complaint filed for purposes of preliminary investigation tolls the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense. The criminal complaint for libel in that case was filed, for the purpose of preliminary investigation, with the Justice of the Peace Court in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. Hence, in setting the doctrine, the Court referred to the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court.[62] The question of whether the doctrine laid down in Olarte also applies to criminal complaints filed with the prosecutors office was settled in
Francisco. Specifically, the Court in Francisco amplified the Olarte doctrine when it categorically ruled that the filing of a complaint with the fiscals office suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense. Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in ruling that the offense of libel had not yet prescribed when the informations against Brillante and his co-accused were filed in the RTC-Manila and RTC-Makati. Neither did the appellate court err in sustaining Brillantes conviction for libel. Libel is defined under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.[63] There could be no dispute as to the existence of the first three elements of libel in the cases at bar. An allegation made by a person against another is considered defamatory if it ascribes to the latter the commission of a crime; the possession of a vice or defect, whether real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead.[64] Brillantes statements during the January 7, 1988 press conference and in the open letter explicitly referred to reprehensible acts allegedly committed by Binay, Prudente and their associates, such as the use of goons to threaten Binays opponents in the election and the plotting of Syjucos assassination. The element of publication was likewise established. There is publication if the defamatory material is communicated to a third person, i.e., a person other than the person to whom the defamatory
statement refers.[65] In the cases at bar, it was proven that Brillante uttered defamatory statements during the press conference attended by some fifty journalists and caused the open letter to be published in several newspapers, namely, News Today, Peoples Journal, Balita, Malaya and Philippine Daily Inquirer. Further, Brillante himself admitted that he named Binay, Prudente and their associates as the persons who participated in the planning of the election-related terrorism and the assassination of Syjuco not only in his open letter but also during the press conference. Thus, the determination of Brillantes culpability for libel hinges on the question of whether his statements were made with malice. Malice is a term used to indicate the fact that the offender is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed; it implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.[66] It is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.[67] Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code states, as a general rule, that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if true, if no good intention and justifiable motive is shown.[68] As an exception to the rule, the presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation qualifies as privileged communication.[69] Privileged communication may either be absolutely privileged or conditionally privileged. The Court in Orfanel v. People of the Philippines[70] differentiated absolutely privileged communication from conditionally privileged communication in this manner: A communication is said to be absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if its author acted in bad faith. This class includes statements made by members of Congress in the discharge of their functions as such, official communications made by public officers in the performance of their duties, and allegations or statements made by the parties or their counsel in their pleadings or motions or during the hearing of judicial proceedings, as well as the answers given by
witnesses in reply to questions propounded to them, in the course of said proceedings, provided that said allegations or statements are relevant to the issues, and the answers are responsive or pertinent to the questions propounded to said witnesses. Upon the other hand, conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are those which, although containing defamatory imputations, would not be actionable unless made with malice or bad faith.[71] (Emphasis supplied.) Conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are those mentioned in, Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: 1. A private communication made by a person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.[72] Brillante claims that he wrote the open letter and uttered the statement complained of during the January 7, 1988 press conference out of a social duty to disclose to all concerned the dangers to which he and his fellow candidate Syjuco were exposed in view of the concerted actions of Binay and Prudente.[73] In effect, he argues that his defamatory statements and utterances fall under Article 354, No. 1 and are in the nature of privileged communication; hence, malice cannot be presumed but must be established beyond reasonable doubt. The Court is not convinced. In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualifiedly privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to
furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.[74] With respect to the first requisite, the Court in U.S. v. Caete[75] clarified that the interest sought to be protected by the person making the communication need not be his own, but may refer to an interest shared by the other members of society. It may therefore be argued that Brillantes statements, which according to him were made in order to protect himself and Syjuco as Binays rivals in the 1988 elections, as well as to protect the electorate from possible acts of terrorism by Binay, Prudente and their associates and from casting their votes for undeserving candidates, satisfy the first requisite. However, as the Solicitor General noted, Brillantes statements were based merely on unconfirmed intelligence reports. His belief in such intelligence reports hardly justifies the publication of such serious imputations against his political rivals. As a journalist and as a candidate for public office, Brillante should have known that it is necessary to further verify the truth or at least the reliability of the intelligence reports before making them public. His hasty publication thereof negates the existence of good faith and justifiable motives. The pronouncement of the Court in U.S. v. Galeza[76] is enlightening: Every communication is privileged which is made in good faith with a view to obtain redress for some injury received or to prevent or punish some public abuse. The privilege should not be abused. If such communication be made maliciously and without probable cause, the pretense under which it is made, instead of furnishing a defense, will aggravate the case of the defendant. And a party will be taken to have acted maliciously if he eagerly seizes on some slight and frivolous matter, and without any inquiry into the merits, without even satisfying himself that the account of the matter that has reached him is correct, hastily concludes that a great public scandal has been brought to light which calls for the immediate intervention of the people. (Citations omitted.)[77] It is, however, the absence of the second element of a privileged communication that unequivocally negates the characterization of
Brillantes statements as privileged communication. The law requires that for a defamatory imputation made out of a legal, moral or social duty to be privileged, such statement must be communicated only to the person or persons who have some interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of the statement. In the cases at bar, although the open letter was primarily addressed to then President Aquino, the communication thereof was not limited to her alone. It was also published in several newspapers of general circulation and was thus made known to the general public. Even if the interest sought to be protected belongs not just to Brillante but to the public in general, certainly, the general public does not have the power to remedy the alleged dangers sought to be prevented by Brillante in publishing the open letter or in uttering similar statements during the January 7, 1988 press conference. Brillante employed the shotgun approach to disseminate the information which essentially destroyed the reputations of the complainants. His lack of selectivity is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged communication. In Daez v. Court of Appeals,[78] Daez was charged with libel for publishing a letter which accused the Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan of corruption. The letter addressed to the Mayor was sent not only to him but also to the Municipal Court, Municipal Council and Chief of Police of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Daez contended therein that he was not guilty of libel because he was not motivated by malice or ill-will in publishing the letter, but rather, he did it out of good intentions and a social duty to bring about reforms in the administration of the municipal government of Meycauayan, Bulacan. The Court affirmed his conviction for libel and held: The goodness of the intention is not always sufficient by itself to justify the publication of an injurious fact; thus the goodness of the end is not a sufficient motive to warrant the employment of illicit means to obtain it. The existence of justifiable motives is a question which has to be decided by taking into consideration not only the intention of the author of the publication but all the other
circumstances of each particular case. A communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable. However, a written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated among the public.As a rule, it is the right and duty of a citizen to make a complaint of any misconduct on the part of public officials, which comes to his notice, to those charged with supervision over them. Such a communication is qualifiedly privileged and the author is not guilty of libel. The rule on privilege, however, imposes an additional requirement. Such complaints should be addressed solely to some official having jurisdiction to inquire into the charges, or power to redress the grievance or has some duty to perform or interest in connection therewith. In the instant case, none of the persons to whom the letter was sent, was vested with the power of supervision over the mayor or the authority to investigate the charges made against the latter. (Citations omitted.)[79] Thus, the Court agrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the statements made by Brillante during the press conference and in the open letter do not qualify as privileged communication. Indeed, the purpose of affording protection to privileged communication is to permit all interested persons or citizens with grievances to freely communicate, with immunity, to the persons who could furnish the protection asked for. However, to shield such privilege from abuse, the law itself requires at all times that such petitions or communications shall be made in good faith or with justifiable motives. If it is established that the communication was made maliciously or to persons who could not furnish the protection sought, then the author thereof cannot seek protection under the law.[80] As was explained by the Court in Caete: The plainest principles of natural right and sound public policy require that the utmost possible freedom should be accorded every citizen to complain to the supervising, removing and appointing authorities of
the misconduct of the public officials with whom he comes into contact, and like considerations make it equally proper that members of a religious organization should enjoy equal freedom in bringing to the attention of the church authorities the misbehavior of their spiritual leaders or of fellow-members. Manifestly, the right must be exercised in good faith, and may not with impunity be made the occasion for the venting of private spite. It is subject to the limitation and restriction that such complaints must be made to a functionary having authority to redress the evils complained of; that they must be made in good faith and that they must not be actuated by malice.[81] The Court in Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui[82] clarified that the fact that a communication is privileged does not mean that it is not actionable; the privileged character of the communication simply does away with the presumption of malice, and the plaintiff has to prove the fact of malice in such case. However, since the open letter and the statements uttered by Brillante during the January 7, 1988 press conference are defamatory and do not qualify as conditionally privileged communication, malice is presumed and need not be proven separately from the existence of the defamatory statement.[83] Considering that all the elements of libel are present in the cases against Brillante, the Court finds that no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in affirming his convictions by the RTC-Manila and RTC-Makati. Neither does the Court find any basis in law to uphold Brillantes proposition that his statements made during the January 7, 1988 press conference and those in his open letter constitute political libel and should thus be exempt from liability. Unfounded and malicious statements made by one against another in the course of an election campaign, or by reason of differences in political views are not per se constitutionally protected speech. Our laws on defamation[84] provide for sanctions against unjustified and malicious injury to a persons reputation and honor. Although wider latitude is given to defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant to their performance of official duties,[85] or against public figures in
relation to matters of public interest involving them,[86] such defamatory utterances do not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officers performance of his duties, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability. With respect to the third issue, the Court agrees with the appellate court that Brillantes right to equal protection of the laws was not violated when he was convicted of libel while his co-accused were acquitted. The equal protection clause is not absolute; rather, it permits of reasonable classification. If the classification is characterized by real and substantial differences, one class may be treated differently from another.[87] It is sufficient that the law operates equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons are treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.[88] As mentioned earlier, the cases against some of some of Brillantes co-accused were dismissed during the pendency of the cases before the trial courts.[89] Still, some of his co-accused remained at large,[90] leaving the trial courts with no option but to archive the case as against them. Brillantes other co-accused were acquitted since, unlike Brillante, their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.[91] The foregoing clearly shows that Brillante was in a situation different from his co-accused. The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt his liability for libel, as the author of the open letter and the source of the defamatory statements uttered against Binay, et al. during the January 7, 1988 press conference. As such, his conviction for libel was not violative of the equal protection clause. The Court likewise finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in affirming the penalties imposed upon him by the trial courts of Manila and Makati. The penalty for libel by means of writing or similar means is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which
may be brought by the offended party.[92] It is likewise settled that a single defamatory statement, if published several times, gives rise to as many offenses as there are publications. This is the multiple publication rule which is followed in our jurisdiction, as explained in Soriano v. Intermediate Appellate Court:[93] We follow the "multiple publication" rule in the Philippines. Thus, in the cases of Montinola D. Montalvo (34 Phil. 662, [1916]) and United States v. Sotto (36 Phil. 389 [1917]), this Court ruled that each and every publication of the same libel constitutes a distinct offense. Stated more succinctly for purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction under Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, every time the same written matter is communicated such communication is considered a distinct and separate publication of the libel. We explained this as follows: "The common law as to causes of action for tort arising out of a single publication was to the effect that each communication of a written or printed matter was a distinct and separate publication of a libel contained therein, giving rise to a separate cause of action. This rule ('multiple publication' rule) is still followed in several American jurisdictions, and seems to be favored by the American Law Institute. Other jurisdictions have adopted the 'single publication' rule which originated in New York, under which any single integrated publication, such as one edition of a newspaper, book, or magazine, or one broadcast, is treated as a unit, giving rise to only one cause of action, regardless of the number of times it is exposed to different people. . .(50 Am. Jur. 2d 659 cited in Time, Inc. v. Reyes)" (39 SCRA 301, 313 [1971]).[94] There is therefore no legal basis for Brillantes claim that the penalties imposed upon him are excessive. The Court however agrees with Brillante that the awards of moral damages in the two cases to private complainants Binay, Prudente and Baloloy are excessive considering the circumstances surrounding the making and the publication of the defamatory statements. Accordingly, the award of moral damages in favor of private complainant Prudente is reduced to a total of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) in Criminal Cases No. 89-69614, 89-69615, 89-69616 and 89-69617; and the award of moral damages to private complainant Binay is reduced to Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) in Criminal Cases No. 88-1410, 88-1411, 88-1412 and 89-721. The award of moral damages to private complainant Baloloy in Criminal Case No. 88-3060 is likewise reduced to Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions are GRANTED in part.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14475 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages to private complainant Dr. Nemesio Prudente in Criminal Cases No. 89-69614, 89-69615, 89-69616 is reduced to Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 15174 is likewise AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages to private complainants Atty. Jejomar Binay and Francisco Baloloy is reduced to Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) in Criminal Cases No. 88-1410, 88-1411, 88-1412 and 89-721, and Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) in Criminal Case No. 88-3060, respectively. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur. Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.
G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992 LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner,
vs. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of municipal ordinances.
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of
1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal. The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. 1 The referral-
complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2 The corresponding information
was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. 3
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal to
the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the respondent judge. 4
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge against her is governed by the following
provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure: Sec. 1. Scope — This rule shall govern the procedure in the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx B. Criminal Cases:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations; 2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances; 4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offenses charged does not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine
of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability
Sec. 9. How commenced. — The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by
information filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in
Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when the
offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.
She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:
Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . .
Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of law not included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied) Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed on
the ground of prescription. For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was
suspended upon the filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, providing as follows: Sec. 1. How Instituted — For offenses not subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the complaint with the appropriate officer for the
purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation therein; b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint
directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the
complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal. In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.) Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure. The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following dictum in Francisco v. Court of Appeals: 5
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has re-examined the question
and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the
decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of
the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons
buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for
preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information
is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the
offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.
All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months before the promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988. That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent. As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110. Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos. These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." 6 Both parties
agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the
case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary
investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not
on any date before that. This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended
"when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial
proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of
fact, it does. At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the
Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5)
of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 7
Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision would have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a municipal
ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the
prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that
possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be
corrected. Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed
to the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in
accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of
the information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already
prescribed. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order
dated October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the
G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998 ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. DAVIDE, JR., J.: On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doña Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00. Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint 1 against petitioner with the Fiscal's Office. On 13 January 1988, an information 2 was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (docketed as Criminal Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury." The information read: The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury as follows: That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused, Isabelita Velasco Reodica, being then the driver and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw bearing plate no. NJU-306, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same in a reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid damage to property and injuries to person, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said vehicle to bump/collide with a Toyota Corolla bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven and owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby causing damage amounting to P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of its owner, in
the aforementioned amount of P8,542.00. That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto Bonsol suffered bodily injuries which required medical attendance for a period of less that nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same period of time. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued. On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decision 3 convicting petitioner of the "quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries," and sentencing her: [t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the complainant, Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippine Currency, without subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. 4 The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise: As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant suffered slight physical injuries (Exhs. D, H and I). In view of the resulting physical injuries, the penalty to be imposed is not fine, but imprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental of Criminal Law Review, Eight Edition 1988, p. 711). Slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence is now punished with penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period (People v. Aguiles, L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited in Gregorio's book, p. 718). 5 As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and medical expenses (P5,000.00). Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR No. 14660. After her motions for extension of time to file her brief were granted, she filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex Abundanti Cautela, Period for Filing Appellant's Brief. However, respondent Court of Appeals denied this motion and directed petitioner to file her brief. 6 After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court,
respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision 7 on 31 January 1996 affirming the appealed decision. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration 8 raising new issues, thus: NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE PENALTY AND MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE SINCE IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO BE ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH ARE LIGHT OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION AND EVEN ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT IMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. 9
xxx xxx xxx REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF
PRESCRIPTION OR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 10 In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, as well as her supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court premised
on the following grounds: RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 1996 AND MORE SO ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE
CONTRARY TO LAW AND GROSSLY ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY IMPOSED A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON THE BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A SECONDARY SOURCE.
A. IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR, 11 THE SAME CASE WHERE THE COURT A QUO BASED ITS FINDING OF A PENALTY WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS STATED IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS THAT THE PENALTY FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE IS ARRESTO MENOR AND NOT ARRESTO MAYOR. IT IS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE RESPONDENT COURT TO PUNISH PETITIONER
MORE THAN SHE SHOULD OR COULD BE PUNISHED BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL ERROR COPIED FROM A SECONDARY SOURCE.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES IMPOSING A SINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN ITS
ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996. C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE
DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACK OF JURISDICTION. Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below
misquoted not only the title, but likewise the ruling of the case cited as authority regarding the penalty for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was not People v. Aguiles, but People v. Aguilar; while the ruling was that the penalty
for such quasi offense was arresto menor — not arresto mayor. As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts
below should have pronounced that there were two separate light felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless imprudence with slight physical
injuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with damage to property, instead of considering them a complex crime. Two light felonies, she
insists, "do not . . . rate a single penalty of arresto mayor or imprisonment of six months," citing Lontok v. Gorgonio, 12 thus:
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000.00 and
slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for
the lesiones menos graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365).
The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is different from the instant case because in that case the negligent act resulted in the offenses of lesiones menos graves and damage to property which were both less grave felonies and which, therefore,
constituted a complex crime. In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense
of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate information.
She then suggests that "at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable in their maximum period and computed or added
together, only sum up to 60 days imprisonment and not six months as imposed by the lower courts."
On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, being punishable only
by arresto menor, is a light offense; as such, it prescribes in two months. Here, since the information was filed only on 13 January
1988, or almost three months from the date the vehicular collision occurred, the offense had already prescribed, again citing Lontok,
thus: In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense
of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate information. And since, as a light offense, it prescribes in two months, Lontok's criminal liability therefor was
already extinguished (Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], Rule 117, Rules of Court). The trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontok's motion to quash that part of the information charging him with that
light offense. Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, since Regional Trial Courts do not deal with arresto
menor cases. She submits that damage to property and slight physical injuries are light felonies and thus covered by the rules on summary procedure; therefore, only the filing with the proper Metropolitan
Trial Court could have tolled the statute of limitations, this time invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes. 13
In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with petitioner that the penalty should
have been arresto menor in its maximum period, instead of arresto mayor, pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Buerano v. Court of Appeals, 14 which frowns upon splitting of
crimes and prosecution, it was proper for the trial court to "complex" reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries and damage to
property because what the law seeks to penalize is the single act of reckless imprudence, not the results thereof; hence, there was no
need for two separate informations. To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the
Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction to impose arresto menor for slight physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court properly took
cognizance of this case because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty for the damage to property, which was a fine equal to
thrice the value of P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG cites Cuyos v. Garcia. 15
The OSG then debunks petitioner's defense of prescription of the crime, arguing that the prescriptive period here was tolled by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident, pursuant to People v. Cuaresma 16 and Chico v. Isidro. 17
In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude and appreciation to the OSG in joining cause with her as to the first assigned error. However, she considers the OSG's reliance on
Buerano v. Court of Appeals 18 as misplaced, for nothing there validates the "complexing" of the crime of reckless imprudence with physical injuries and damage to property; besides, in that case, two
separate informations were filed — one for slight and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and the other for damage to property through reckless imprudence. She then insists that in this case, following Arcaya v. Teleron 19 and Lontok v. Gorgonio, 20 two
informations should have been filed. She likewise submits that Cuyos v. Garcia 21 would only apply here on the assumption that it was
proper to "complex" damage to property through reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Chico v. Isidro 22 is likewise "inapposite," for it deals with attempted homicide, which is not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma 23 should not be given retroactive effect; otherwise, it would either unfairly prejudice her or
render nugatory the en banc ruling in Zaldivia 24 favorable to her. The pleadings thus raise the following issues:
I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.
II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries are light felonies. III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code applies to the quasi offenses in question.
IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on appeal.
V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offenses in question.
VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed. I. The Proper Penalty We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arresto mayor imposed by the trial court and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals is incorrect. However, we cannot subscribe to their submission that the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period is the proper penalty. Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed. When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.
A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony. In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64. The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable: 1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply. According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may be either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed under the first paragraph of Article 365. This being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor. 25 As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the third paragraph of Article 365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless imprudence in this case did not result in damage to property only. What applies is the first paragraph of Article 365, which provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an act committed through reckless imprudence which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the crime would have been malicious mischief
under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, and the penalty would then be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months which is higher than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty under Article 329 were equal to or lower than that provided for in the first paragraph, then the sixth paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i.e., the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a maximum of 4 months, at the discretion of the court, since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that in the imposition of the penalties therein provided "the courts shall exercise their sound discretion without regard to the rules prescribed in article 64."
II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question. Felonies committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the wrongful act is
performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or
lack of skill. 26 As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries is punishable by public censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of law
carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public censure is classified under Article 25 of the Code
as a light penalty, and is considered under the graduated scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty lower than
arresto menor, it follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is a light felony.
On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier discussed, penalized with arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods. Since arresto mayor is a correctional penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense
in question is a less grave felony — not a light felony as claimed by petitioner.
III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes. Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one
felony, should Article 48 of the Revised Code on complex crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is
necessary a means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. However,
in Lontok v. Gorgonio, 27 this Court declared that where one of the resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony,
there is no complex crime, thus: Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no
complex crime. The resulting offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light
felonies of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a single act of imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one information. They are separate offenses subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001;
See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513). Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious
physical injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate
complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menor graves and damage to property [Arcaya vs.
Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365]. Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the light felony
of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries. IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.
Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries
should have been charged in a separate information because it is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in one information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property; and
(2) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by her failure to raise it in a motion to quash
before she pleaded to the information. 28 Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are
charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them. 29
V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over theQuasi Offenses in Question. The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to
operate as to actions pending before its enactment. 30 At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in
force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980." Section 32(2) 31 thereof
provided that except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive original jurisdiction over "all offenses punishable with imprisonment of got
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both fine and imprisonment, regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value or amount thereof." The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of the imprisonment and the amount of fine prescribed
by law for the offense charged. The question thus arises as to which court has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure, such as
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, 32 this Court found that a lacuna existed in the law as to which court had jurisdiction over offenses penalized
with destierro, the duration of which was from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, which was co-extensive with prision correccional. We then
interpreted the law in this wise: Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor
under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts, and since by Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has placed destierro below arresto mayor as a lower penalty than the latter, in the
absence of any express provision of law to the contrary it is logical and reasonable to infer from said provisions that its intention was to place offenses penalized with destierro also under the jurisdiction of
justice of the peace and municipal courts and not under that of courts of first instance.
Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within the jurisdictional ambit of the
MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under the
graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries
was cognizable by said courts. As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the
amount of P8,542.00, the same was also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods — the duration of
which was from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months. Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of Makati. VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.
Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, prescribes in five years. To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is necessary to determine whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident in
question tolled the running of the prescriptive period. Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint of information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped by any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis supplied) Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive
period "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information," does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed for preliminary examination or investigation only or for an action on the
merits. 33 Thus, in Francisco v. Court of Appeals 34 and People v. Cuaresma, 35 this Court held that the filing of the complaint even with
the fiscal's office suspends the running of the statute of limitations. We cannot apply Section 9 36 of the Rule on Summary Procedure,
which provides that in cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the
instant case, "the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of
a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be
commenced only by information." However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the
filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts. It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of
substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is
not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. 37 Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter
prevails. Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was involved therein was a violation of a municipal ordinance;
thus, the applicable law was not Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run." Under Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is suspended only
when judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty party. Accordingly, this Court held that the prescriptive period was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, as such did not constitute a judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive period there was only the
filing of the information in the proper court. In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the
Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi
offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the vehicular mishap and
remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner's defense of prescription of the offenses
charged in the information in this case. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenge decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was affirmed therein, had
no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919. Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., concur
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010 JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner, vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents. D E C I S I O N CARPIO, J.:
The Case The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the accused’s previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same
incident grounding the second prosecution. The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary
release in both cases. On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the
matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought
from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion,
the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion
to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion remained unresolved. Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce
sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of
standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding
appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of
conviction.7 Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition
in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the
same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such
crime are material only to determine his penalty. Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s
decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s
attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case
No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to file a comment to the petition as the
public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC
ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether
petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803 Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the
second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions. The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124.10 The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing. Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment,
petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition. Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366 The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense"13 protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."15 We find for petitioner. Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only to Determine the Penalty The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads: Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed. When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos. A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony. In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four. The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable: 1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply. 2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give. Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes: The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that
"reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied) This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in damage, either to person or property.19 Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible
with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes. Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has long been abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based. Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same Quasi-Offense The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case
against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained:34 Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied) Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon. There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based. Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan:38 Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that – Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions. x x x x . . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis supplied) Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona. It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Court’s attention: Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied) Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts
erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42 On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding: — [T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and
after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: . The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence. In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident.’ After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court ῾for failure of the Government to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be P249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor — The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance.
One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x x x x x The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court.43 Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus: The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the
lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied) Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime. In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences. Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when
proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models – that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365? Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period. Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts
penalized as grave or less grave offenses. The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows: [T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows: When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos. The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied) By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365. Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under
Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1 A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code: The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x: [T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court. [W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by
the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied) Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use. Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.55 Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated
2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy. Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. SO ORDERED.
