Crimpro Search and Seizures

June 21, 2010. G.R. No. 188611.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BELEN MARIACOS, appellant.

Searches and Seizures; Warrantless Searches and Seizures.—Law and jurisprudence have

laid down the instances when a warrantless search is valid. These are: 1. Warrantless search

incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12 [now Section 13], Rule 126 of the

Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; 2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” the

elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which

the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was

inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the

evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and; (d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of

evidence without further search. 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the

government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its

transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable

cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5.

Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; and 7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

Same; Same; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases; It is well to remember that in the

instances recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary

that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so because of

probable cause; Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by

circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that

the person accused is guilty of the offense charged, and, the grounds of suspicion are

reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the

person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e.,

supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of

guilt of the person to be arrested.—It is well to remember that in the instances we have

recognized as exceptions to the requirement of

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

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328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mariacos

a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have

been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause

must be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. Without

probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against the person

arrested. Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by

circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the

person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and

circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense

has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said

offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched. The

grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting

officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the

offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in

themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable

suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of

the peace officers making the arrest.

Same; Same; Same; Search of Moving Vehicles; A search warrant may readily be

obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure, but it

is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an

aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or

jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.—Over the years, the rules governing search

and seizure have been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the

search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be

obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of

the issuing judge—a requirement which borders on the impossible in instances where moving

vehicle is used to transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. This

exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is

made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a

warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor

vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant

must

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People vs. Mariacos

be sought. Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case

is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2

Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to

procure a warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the

essence in this case. The searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only

had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.

Same; Same; Same; Search Incident to Lawful Arrest; A search substantially

contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to

make the arrest at the outset of the search.—This Court has also, time and again, upheld as

valid a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of

Court provides: SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.—A person lawfully arrested may be

searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in

the commission of an offense without a search warrant. For this rule to apply, it is imperative

that there be a prior valid arrest. Although, generally, a warrant is necessary for a valid arrest,

the Rules of Court provides the exceptions therefor, to wit: x x x Be that as it may, we have

held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the

police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Possession or Transportation of Prohibited

Drugs; When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited

drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the

confiscated marijuana is not necessary.—In her defense, appellant averred that the packages

she was carrying did not belong to her but to a neighbor who had asked her to carry the same

for him. This contention, however, is of no consequence. When an accused is charged with

illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial.

Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.

Same; Same; Same; Crimes Mala Prohibita; Mere possession and/or delivery of a

prohibited drug, without legal authority, is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act; Anti-

narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes—they are rules of convenience

designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of

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People vs. Mariacos

society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita.—Appellant’s alleged lack

of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not

exempting circumstances where the crime charged is malum prohibitum, as in this case. Mere

possession and/or delivery of a prohibited drug, without legal authority, is punishable under

the Dangerous Drugs Act. Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes.

They are rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of

society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. Laws defining crimes mala

prohibitacondemn behavior directed not against particular individuals, but against public

order.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Jurisprudence defines “transport” as “to carry or

convey from one place to another”; There is no definitive moment when an accused

“transports” a prohibited drug—when the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused

to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as to the

perpetration of the criminal act.—Jurisprudence defines “transport” as “to carry or convey from

one place to another.” There is no definitive moment when an accused “transports” a

prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to transport and

the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as to the perpetration of the

criminal act. The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act

of transporting was committed and it is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is

reached.

Same; Same; Same; The accused’s possession of the packages containing illegal drugs

gives rise to the disputable presumption that she is the owner of the packages and their

contents.—Appellant’s possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave rise to the

disputable presumption that she is the owner of the packages and their contents. Appellant

failed to rebut this presumption. Her uncorroborated claim of lack of knowledge that she had

prohibited drug in her possession is insufficient.

Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; Non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No.

9165 is not fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal, or make the items seized

inadmissible—what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary

value of the seized items.—It is admitted that there were no

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People vs. Mariacos

photographs taken of the drugs seized, that appellant was not accompanied by counsel,

and that no representative from the media and the DOJ were present. However, this Court has

already previously held that non-compliance with Section 21 is not fatal and will not render an

accused’s arrest illegal, or make the items seized inadmissible. What is of utmost importance

is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.

Same; Same; Same; Assuming that the police officers failed to abide by Section 21,

failure of the accused to raise this issue before the trial court is deemed to be a waiver of any

objection on the matter.—While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the

justifiable ground for non-compliance with Section 21, this does not necessarily mean that

appellant’s arrest was illegal or that the items seized are inadmissible. The justifiable ground

will remain unknown because appellant did not question the custody and disposition of the

items taken from her during the trial. Even assuming that the police officers failed to abide by

Section 21, appellant should have raised this issue before the trial court. She could have

moved for the quashal of the information at the first instance. But she did not. Hence, she is

deemed to have waived any objection on the matter.

Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Regularity; Actions of the police officers, in relation

to the procedural rules on the chain of custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the

performance of official functions.—The actions of the police officers, in relation to the

procedural rules on the chain of custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the

performance of official functions. Courts accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of

police authorities, as they are presumed to be performing their duties regularly, absent any

convincing proof to the contrary.

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Office of the Solicitor General for appellee. Public Attorney’s Office for appellant.


People vs. Mariacos

NACHURA,J.:

Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718, which affirmed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, San Fernando City, La Union, in Criminal Case No. 7144, finding appellant Belen Mariacos guilty of violating Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

“Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information,

dated November 7, 2005 of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic

Act [No.] 9165, allegedly committed as follows:

“That on or about the 27th day of October, 2005, in the

Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union, Philippines,

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-

named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously transport, deliver 7,030.3, (sic) grams of dried

marijuana fruiting tops without the necessary permit or

authority from the proper government agency or office.

CONTRARY TO LAW.”

When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-appellant pleaded

not guilty. During the pre-trial, the following were stipulated upon:

Accused admits that she is the same person identified in the

information as Belen Mariacos; “1.

2. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy, San Gabriel, La

Union;

That at the time of the arrest of the accused, accused had just

alighted from a passenger jeepney; 3.

_______________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., with

Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this

Court) and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, concurring; Rollo, pp. 2-13.

2 CA Rollo, pp. 13-29.

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People vs. Mariacos

That the marijuana allegedly taken from the possession of the

accused contained in two (2) bags were submitted for

examination to the Crime Lab; 4.

That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005, the alleged drug

submitted for examination gave positive result for the presence

of marijuana; 5.

That the drugs allegedly obtained from the accused contained (

6.sic) and submitted for examination weighed 7,030.3 grams;

The Prosecutor admits the existence of a counter-affidavit

executed by the accused; and 7.

The existence of the affidavits executed by the witnesses of the

accused family ( 8.sic): Lyn Punasen, Mercedes Tila and

Magdalena Carino.”

During the trial, the prosecution established the following evidence:

On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station

of San Gabriel, La Union, conducted a checkpoint near the police

station at the poblacion to intercept a suspected transportation of

marijuana from Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. The

group at the checkpoint was composed of PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc (“PO2

Pallayoc”), the Chief of Police, and other policemen. When the

checkpoint did not yield any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of Police

instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay Balbalayang to

conduct surveillance operation (sic).

At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2

Pallayoc met with a secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network

who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a

passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The

agent mentioned three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic bag. Further,

the agent described a backpack bag with an “O.K.” marking. PO2

Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top

thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he found the black backpack

with an “O.K.” marking and peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc

found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then asked the

other passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner of the bag,

but no one knew.334


People vs. Mariacos

When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted

together with the other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice

who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a

few moments later that the said bag and three (3) other bags,

including a blue plastic bag, were already being carried away by two

(2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a

policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but one of the

women got away.

PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein

accused-appellant Belen Mariacos, and the bags to the police station.

At the police station, the investigators contacted the Mayor of San

Gabriel to witness the opening of the bags. When the Mayor arrived

about fifteen (15) minutes later, the bags were opened and three (3)

bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round bundles of

marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in

a newspaper, were recovered.

Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and forwarded the

confiscated marijuana to the crime laboratory for examination. The

laboratory examination showed that the stuff found in the bags all

tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.

When it was accused-appellant’s turn to present evidence, she

testified that:

On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-

appellant, together with Lani Herbacio, was inside a passenger jeepney

bound for the poblacion. While the jeepney was still at the terminal

waiting for passengers, one Bennie Lao-ang (“Lao-ang”), her neighbor,

requested her to carry a few bags which had been loaded on top of the

jeepney. At first, accused-appellant refused, but she was persuaded

later when she was told that she would only be carrying the bags.

When they reached the poblacion, Lao-ang handed accused-appellant

and her companion, Lani Herbacio, the bags, and then Lao-ang

suddenly ran away. A few moments later, PO2 Pallayoc was upon

them, arresting them. Without explanation, they were brought to the

police station. When they were at the police station, Lani Herbacio

disappeared. It was also at the police station that accused-appellant

discovered the true contents of the bags which she was asked to carry.

She maintained that she was not the

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People vs. Mariacos

owner of the bags and that she did not know what were contained in the bags. At the police station (sic) she executed a Counter-Affidavit.”3

On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Belen Mariacos GUILTY as charged and

sentences here (sic) to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of

P500,000.00.

The 7,030.3 grams of marijuana are ordered confiscated and turned over to the Philippine

Drug Enforcement Agency for destruction in the presence of the Court personnel and media.

SO ORDERED.”4

Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She argued that the trial court erred in considering the evidence of the prosecution despite its inadmissibility.5 She claimed that her right against an unreasonable search was flagrantly violated by Police Officer (PO)2 Pallayoc when the latter searched the bag, assuming it was hers, without a search warrant and with no permission from her. She averred that PO2 Pallayoc’s purpose for apprehending her was to verify if the bag she was carrying was the same one he had illegally searched earlier. Moreover, appellant contended that there was no probable cause for her arrest.6

Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime.7 She alleged that the apprehending police officers violated Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, which prescribes the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles. The said regulation directs_______________

3 Rollo, pp. 2-5.

4 CA Rollo, p. 29.

5 Id., at p. 45.

6 Id., at p. 48.

7 Id., at p. 50.


People vs. Mariacos

the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs and/or paraphernalia, immediately after seizure or confiscation, to have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of appellant or her representative, who shall be required to sign copies of the inventory. The failure to comply with this directive, appellant claimed, casts a serious doubt on the identity of the items allegedly confiscated from her. She, likewise, averred that the prosecution failed to prove that the items allegedly confiscated were indeed prohibited drugs, and to establish the chain of custody over the same.

On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued that the warrantless arrest of appellant and the warrantless seizure of marijuana were valid and legal,8 justified as a search of a moving vehicle. It averred that PO2 Pallayoc had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had committed the crime of delivering dangerous drugs based on reliable information from their agent, which was confirmed when he peeked into the bags and smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana.9 The OSG also argued that appellant was now estopped from questioning the illegality of her arrest since she voluntarily entered a plea of “not guilty” upon arraignment and participated in the trial and presented her evidence.10 The OSG brushed aside appellant’s argument that the bricks of marijuana were not photographed and inventoried in her presence or that of her counsel immediately after confiscation, positing that physical inventory may be

done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team, whichever was practicable.11

_______________

8 Id., at p. 108.

9 Id., at p. 112.

10 Id., at p. 113.

11 Id., at pp. 114-115.

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People vs. Mariacos

In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA dismissed appellant’s appeal and affirmed the RTC decision in toto.12It held that the prosecution had successfully proven that appellant carried away from the jeepney a number of bags which, when inspected by the police, contained dangerous drugs. The CA ruled that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of “carrying and conveying” the bag that contained the illegal drugs, and thus held that appellant’s warrantless arrest was valid. The appellate court ratiocinated:

“It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had earlier ascertained the contents of the bags

when he was aboard the jeep. He saw the bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper. That said

marijuana was on board the jeepney to be delivered to a specified destination was already

unlawful. PO2 Pallayoc needed only to see for himself to whom those bags belonged. So, when

he saw accused-appellant carrying the bags, PO2 Pallayoc was within his lawful duty to make a

warrantless arrest of accused-appellant.

x x x x

Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution is

misplaced. At the time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the contents of the suspicious bags,

there was no identified owner. He asked the other passengers atop the jeepney but no one

knew who owned the bags. Thus, there could be no violation of the right when no one was

entitled thereto at that time.

Secondly, the facts of the case show the urgency of the situation. The local police has been

trying to intercept the transport of the illegal drugs for more than a day, to no avail. Thus,

when PO2 Pallayoc was tipped by the secret agent of the BarangayIntelligence Network, PO2

Pallayoc had no other recourse than to verify as promptly as possible the tip and check the

contents of the bags.

Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a search of a

moving vehicle has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it

possible for the vehicle to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be

sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2 Pallayoc could

_______________

12 Rollo, p. 13.

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People vs. Mariacos

not be expected to secure a search warrant in order to check the contents of the bags which

were loaded on top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search warrant would have been of no

use because the motor vehicle had already left the locality.”13

Appellant is now before this Court, appealing her conviction.

Once again, we are asked to determine the limits of the powers of the State’s agents to conduct searches and seizures. Over the years, this Court had laid down the rules on searches and seizures, providing, more or less, clear parameters in determining which are proper and which are not.

Appellant’s main argument before the CA centered on the inadmissibility of the evidence used against her. She claims that her constitutional right against unreasonable searches was flagrantly violated by the apprehending officer.

Thus, we must determine if the search was lawful. If it was, then there would have been probable cause for the warrantless arrest of appellant.

Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against

unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be

inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause

to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be

searched and the persons or things to be seized.” 2. “Section

Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless search is valid. These are:_______________

13 Id., at pp. 8-9.

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People vs. Mariacos

“1.Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12 [now

Section 13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;

Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” the elements of which are: 2.

a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are

legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (a)

the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be

where they are; (b)

the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and; (c)

“plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. (d)

Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent

mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares

furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant

committed a criminal activity; 3.

Consented warrantless search; 4.

Customs search; 5.

Stop and Frisk; and 6.

Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.” 7.14

Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective decisions on the fact that the search was conducted on a moving vehicle to justify the validity of the search.

Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a war-_______________

14 People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 879-880; 288 SCRA 626, 637-638 (1998). (Citations omitted.)


People vs. Mariacos

rant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause.15

In People v. Bagista,16 the Court said:“The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain

exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been

upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.

With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the

mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the

locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct

warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is

stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be

valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to

believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a

crime, in the vehicle to be searched.

It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.17 Without probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against the person arrested.18

_______________

15 Asuncion v. Court of Appeals, 362 Phil. 118, 126; 302 SCRA 490, 498 (1999), citing Mustang

Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 430 (1996); and People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 (1991).

16 G.R. No. 86218, September 18, 1992, 214 SCRA 63, 68-69. (Citations omitted.)

17 People v. Aruta, supra note 14, at p. 880; p. 638.

18 Except when the prohibited items are in plain view.

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People vs. Mariacos

Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.19

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers,

the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.20

Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge—a requirement which borders on the impossible in instances where moving vehicle is used to transport contraband from one place to another with impunity.21

This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store,_______________

19 People v. Aruta, supra note 14, at p. 880; p. 638, citing People v. Encinada, 345 Phil. 301; 280 SCRA

72 (1997).

20 People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 632; 301 SCRA 668, 709 (1999).

21 People v. Lo Ho Wing, supra note 15, at pp. 128-129, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,

153 (1925); People v. Del Mundo, 418 Phil. 740; 366 SCRA 471 (2001).


People vs. Mariacos

dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is

conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.22

Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.

It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before appellant’s arrest, the police received information that marijuana was to be transported from BarangayBalbalayang, and had set up a checkpoint around the area to intercept the suspects. At dawn of October 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc met the secret agent from the BarangayIntelligence Network, who informed him that a baggage of marijuana was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had probable cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal drugs.

This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

13. “SEC.Search incident to lawful arrest.—A person lawfully arrested may be searched

for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the

commission of an offense without a search warrant.”23

_______________

22 Salvador v. People, 502 Phil. 60, 72; 463 SCRA 489, 501 (2005).

23 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 126.

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People vs. Mariacos

For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although, generally, a warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the exceptions therefor, to wit:

5. “SEC.Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may,

without a warrant, arrest a person:

When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (a)

When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe

based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested

has committed it; and (b)

When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal

establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined

while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one

confinement to another. (c)

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant

shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against

in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.”24

Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.25

Given that the search was valid, appellant’s arrest based on that search is also valid.

Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 states:

_______________

24 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 113.

25 People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007, 516 SCRA 463, citing People v. Tudtud, 458

Phil. 752; 412 SCRA 142 (2003).


People vs. Mariacos

5. “SEC.Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and

Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.—

The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand

pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person,

who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to

another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all

species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker

in any of such transactions.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)

years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred

thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by

law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in

transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in

such transactions.”

In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not belong to her but to a neighbor who had asked her to carry the same for him. This contention, however, is of no consequence.

When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.26

Appellant’s alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charged ismalum prohibitum, as in this case.27 Mere possession and/or delivery_______________

26 People v. Del Mundo, supra note 21, at p. 751; pp. 481-482. (Citations omitted.)

27 Id., citing People v. Sy Bing Yok, 309 SCRA 28, 38 (1999).

345VOL. 621, JUNE 21, 2010 345

People vs. Mariacos

of a prohibited drug, without legal authority, is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.28

Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes. They are rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed not against particular individuals, but against public order.29

Jurisprudence defines “transport” as “to carry or convey from one place to another.”30 There is no definitive moment when an accused “transports” a prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as to the perpetration of the criminal act.31The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed and it is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is reached.32

Moreover, appellant’s possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave rise to the disputable presumption33

_______________

28 People v. Beriarmente, 418 Phil. 229, 239; 365 SCRA 747, 756 (2001).

29 People v. Doria, supra note 20, at p. 618; p. 696. (Citations omitted.)

30 People v. Peñaflorida, G.R. No. 175604, April 10, 2008, 551 SCRA 111, 125.

31 People v. Jones, 343 Phil. 865, 877; 278 SCRA 345, 355 (1997).

32 People v. Correa, G.R. No. 119246, January 30, 1998, 285 SCRA 679, 700.

33 Section 3 (j) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court states:

3. Sec.Disputable presumptions.—The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but

may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

x x x x

That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker

and the doer of the whole (j)


People vs. Mariacos

that she is the owner of the packages and their contents.34Appellant failed to rebut this presumption. Her uncorroborated claim of lack of knowledge that she had prohibited drug in her possession is insufficient.

Appellant’s narration of facts deserves little credence. If it is true that Bennie Lao-ang merely asked her and her companion to carry some baggages, it is but logical to first ask what the packages contained and where these would be taken. Likewise, if, as appellant said, Lao-ang ran away after they disembarked from the jeepney, appellant and her companion should have ran after him to give him the bags he had left with them, and

not to continue on their journey without knowing where they were taking the bags.

Next, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. In particular, she alleged that the apprehending police officers failed to follow the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles.

In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of all dangerous drugs is a sine qua nonfor conviction. The dangerous drug is the very corpus delictiof that crime.35

Thus, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the procedure for custody and disposition of seized dangerous drugs, to wit:

“21. Section Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential

Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.—The PDEA shall take

charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled

precursors and essential chemicals, as

_______________

act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him.

34 See People v. Del Mundo, supra note 21.

35 People v. Kimura, 471 Phil. 895, 909; 428 SCRA 51, 61 (2004), citingPeople v. Mendiola, 235 SCRA 116, 120

(1994).

347

VOL. 621, JUNE 21, 2010 347

People vs. Mariacos

well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or

surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,

immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the

same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were

confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from

the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who

shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. (1)

The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further provides:

“ 21. SECTIONCustody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or

Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled

Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory

Equipment.—The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant

sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as

instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or

surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs

shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph

the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were

confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from

the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who

shall be requi (a)red to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy

thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at

the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the

nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of

warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements

under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the

seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending

348


People vs. Mariacos

officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said

items.”

PO2 Pallayoc testified that after apprehending appellant, he immediately brought her to the police

station. At the station, the police requested the Mayor to witness the opening of the bags seized from appellant. When the Mayor arrived, he opened the bag in front of appellant and the other police officers. The black bag yielded three bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, while the plastic bag yielded two bundles of marijuana and two bricks of marijuana fruiting tops.36 PO2 Pallayoc identified the bricks. He and PO3 Stanley Campit then marked the same. Then the seized items were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.

It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that appellant was not accompanied by counsel, and that no representative from the media and the DOJ were present. However, this Court has already previously held that non-compliance with Section 21 is not fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal, or make the items seized inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.37

Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after appellant’s arrest, she was immediately brought to the police station where she stayed while waiting for the Mayor. It was the Mayor who opened the packages, revealing the illegal drugs, which were thereafter marked and sent to the police crime laboratory the following day. Contrary to appellant’s claim, the prosecution’s evidence establishes the chain of custody from the time of appellant’s arrest until the prohibited drugs were tested at the police crime laboratory.

_______________

36 CA Rollo, p. 16.

37 People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 178876, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 421, 436-437, citing People v. Del

Monte, 552 SCRA 627 (2008).

349VOL. 621, JUNE 21, 2010 349

People vs. Mariacos

While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the justifiable ground for non-compliance with Section 21, this does not necessarily mean that appellant’s arrest was illegal or that the items seized are inadmissible. The justifiable ground will remain unknown because appellant did not question the custody and disposition of the items taken from her during the trial.38 Even assuming that the police officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant should have raised this issue before the trial court. She could have moved for the quashal of the information at the first instance. But she did not. Hence, she is deemed to have waived any objection on the matter.

Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on the chain of custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. Courts accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of police authorities, as they are presumed to be performing their duties regularly, absent any convincing proof to the contrary.39

In sum, the prosecution successfully established appellant’s guilt. Thus, her conviction must be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.Carpio (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad and Perez,** JJ.,

concur.

No. L-71410. November 25,1986.*

JOSEFINO S. ROAN, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ROMULO T. GONZALES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MARINDUQUE, BRANCH XXXVIII; THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF MARINDUQUE; THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDER, PCINP MARINDUQUE, respondents.

Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Words and Phrases; “Probable cause” defined—Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff as referring to “such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.” As held in a long line of decisions, the probable cause must refer to only one specific offense.

Same; Same;Judge should not limit his inquiry on complainant’s affidavit only.—By his own account, all he did was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only “to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same,” and only because “the application was not yet subseribed aad swora to.” The suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant’s deposition in writing and attach them to the record, together with the affidavit presented to him.

Same; Same; An application for search warrant if based on hearsay cannot, standing alone, justify issuance of that writ—In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by settled jurisprudence. The rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for a prosecution for perjury in case the applicant’s deciarations are found to be false. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It was therefore necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to_______________

* EN BANC.

688688 SUPREME COURT EEPORTS ANNOTATED

Roan vs. Gonzales

establish the applicant’s claims.

Same; Same; Ulterior motive ofapplicant’s witnesses to application for search warrant should alert the judge to possible misrepresentations.—A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be “intelligence informers,” shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the respondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made by Tohilida that they were suspicious of the petitioner because he was a follower of the opposition candidate in the forthcoming election (a “Lecarista”) did not excite the respondent judge’s own suspicions. This should have put him on guard as to the motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possible misrepresentations from them.

Same; Same; The judge should inquire into how the deponents were able to know even the caliber of the guns and the number ofguns and bullets that are allegedly being kept in the place to be searched.—0ne may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it was on the first floor or a second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really done openly, in the full view of the withesses, considering that these acts were against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and the search warrant sought was issued forthwith. The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant invalid. Nonetheless,

the Solicitor General argues that whatever defect there was, was waived when the petitioner voluntarily submitted to the search and manifested his conformity in writing.

Same; Same; Waiver; Estoppel; Conformity of person in writing for his house to be searcked by the military while serving a search warrant cannot be considered voluntary; No waiver to defects in the warrant can be implied therefrom.—We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty against a possible challenge later to the validity of the search they were conducting. Confronted with the armed presence of the military and the presumptive authority of a judicial writ, the petitioner had no choice but to submit. This was not, as we held in a previous case,

689VOL. 145, NOVEMBER 25, 1986 689

Roan vs. Gonzales

the manifestation merely of our traditional Filipino hospitality and respect for authority. Given the repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there was here, as we see it, an intimidation that the petitioner could not resist.

Same; Same; Criminal Law; A prohibited article falling under the concept of’ malum prohibitum, such as a pistol, may be seized butonly when the search is valid—Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered the

petitioner’s premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets.

Same; Same; Same; As a rule, an article, like a gun, covered by offenses deftned as mala prohibita may not be summarily seized; A search warrant is still necessary; Exceptions.—It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegalper se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. If the rule were otherwise, then the military authorities couid have just entered the premises and looked for the guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without bothering to first secure a search warrant. The fact that they did bother to do so indicates that they themselves recognized the necessity of such a warrant for the seizure of the weapons the petitioner was suspected of possessing.

Same; Same; Same; Same.—It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made without warrant and articles may be taken validly as a result of that search. For example, a warrantless search may be made incidental to a lawful arrest, as when the person being arrested is frished for weapons he may otherwise be able to use against the arresting officer. Motor cars may be inspected at borders to prevent smuggling of aliens and contraband and even in the interior upon a showing of probable cause. Vessels and aircraft are also traditionally removed from the operation of the rule because of their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state’s jurisdiction. The individual may knowingly agree to be searched or waive objections to an

illegal search. And it has also been held that prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if they are open to eye and hand and the peace officer comes upon them inadvertently.


Roan vs. Gonzales

Same: Same; Same; Same.—Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of the accepted exceptions. The respondents cannot even claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and builets for the fact is that these things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view when they were taken. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the conclusion is that the petitioner’s pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore are protected by the exclusionary principle.

Same; Same; Evidence; Seized pistol under a void warrant shall remain in custodia legis pendente lite although it cannot be used in evidence against the accused.—The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal action against him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending resolution of that case, however, the said articles must remain incustodia legis.

Same; Same; Courts; There is no need to ask for quaskal of warrant by the court that issued it when tke petition before Supreme Court raises serious and urgent constitutional issues.—Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before coming to this Court, filed a motion for the quashal of the search warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with the normai procedure. But as we said

and did in Burgos, “this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised.”PETITION to review the judgment of the Regional

Trial Court of Marinduque, Br. XXXVIII. Gonzales, J.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.CRUZ, J.;Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on the ground that it violates the Constitution. As we can do no less if we are to be true to the mandate of the fundamental law, we do annul.

One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to be left alone in the privacy of his own house That right has ancient roots, dating back through the mists of history to the mighty English kings in their fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject had his own castle where

691VOL. 145, NOVEMBER 25, 1986 691

Roan vs. Gonzales

he was monarch of all he surveyedL This was his humble cottage from which he could bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown.

That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian regimes. Their number, regrettably, continues to dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among the fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past despotism. We must cherish and protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son retuming.

That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution:“SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects

against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not

be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause

to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,

after examination under oath or af firmation of the ccmplainant and the witnesses he may

produce, and particularly describing the place to be searcheci, and the persons or things to be

seized.

“SEC. 4. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except

upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety and order require otherwise.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible

for any purpose in any proceeding.”

Invoking, these provisions, the petitioner claims he was the victim of an illegal search and seizure conducted by the military authorities. The articles seized from him are sought to be used as evidence in his prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. He asks that their admission be temporarily restrained (which we have)1 and thereafter permanently enjoined.

The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984.2 The petitioner’s house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 21,77–79.

2 Ibid, pp. 4, 23.


Roan vs. Gonzales

discovered.3 However, the officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases of ihe charge against the petitioner.4

To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the judge or some other authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. No less important, there must be a specific description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant.5

Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin inBurgos v. Chief of Staff6 as referring to “such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.” As held in a long line of decisions, the probable cause must refer to only one specific offense.7

The inclusion of the requirement for the “examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce” was a refinement proposed by Delegate Vicente J. Francisco in the 1934 Constitutional Convention. His purpose was the strengthening of the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. Although the condition did not appear in the corresponding provision of the federal Constitution of the United States which served as our model, it was

then already embodied in the Code of Criminal Procedjire. Never-_______________

3 Id., p. 5.

4 Annex"N'', Petition.

5 Sec. 3, Art. IV, 1974 Constitution; Sec. 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court;Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA

383; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299;Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886; People v. Veloso, 48 Phil.

169;People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384; Bache & Co. (PhiL), Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 82.3.

6 133 SCRA 800.

7 Stonehill v. Diokno, supra; Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312; Castro v.

Pabalan, 70 SCRA 477; Secretary of Justice v. Marcos, 76 SCRA 301; Oca v. Maiquez, 14 SCRA 735.

693VOL. 145, NOVEMBER 25, 1986 693

Roan vs. Gonzales

theless, Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights of that body, readily accepted the proposal and it was thereafter, following a brief debate, approved by the Convention.8

Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court provided in what was then Rule 126:“SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant—The municipal or city judge must, before issuing the

warrant, personaily examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may

produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any

affidavits presented to him.”

The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the respondent judge in accordance with the above rule, but this is not entirely true. As a matter of fact, depositions were taken of the complainant’s two witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them.9 It is correct to say, however, that the

complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation.

Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge declared:“The truth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quillosa personally filed his application for a search

warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before me in the company of his two (2) witnesses,

Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented to me their respective

affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator assigned to the PC-INP command

at Camp Col. Maximo Abad. As the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, I

proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain, among others, if

he knew and understood the same. Af terwards, he subscribed and swore to the same before

me. “10

By his own account, all he did was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only “to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same,” and only because “the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to.” The_______________

8 Journal of the Constitutional Convention, Vol. III, No. 22, pp. 1098–1105.

9 Rollo,pp. 102,116–121.

10 Ibid, pp. 10M02.


Roan vs. Gonzales

suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant’s deposition in writing and attach them to the record, together with the affidavit presented tohim.

As this Court held in Mata v. Bayona: .11

“Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining

Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce

and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge

may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to

hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

“We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the

Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching

them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.”

The respondent judge also declared that he “saw no need to have applicant Quillosa’s deposition taken considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the information provided by the aforenamed witnesses whose depositions as aforementioned had already been taken by the undersigned."12

In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by settled jurisprudence.13 The rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for a prosecution for perjury in case the applicant’s declarations are found to be false. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It was therefore necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to establish_______________

11 128 SCRA 388, 391.

12 Rollo, p. 102.

13 Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil 33; Rodriguez v. Villamiel, 65 Phil 230;Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689; Burgos v.

Chief of Staff, supra.

695VOL. 145, NOVEMBER 25, 1986 695

Roan vs. Gonzales

the applicant’s claims.14

Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the depositions only of the witnesses and not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions.

It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.15

A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be “intelligence informers,” shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the respondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made by TohiKda that they were suspicious of the petitioner because he was a fqllower of the opposition candidate in the forthcoming election (a “Lecarista")16 did not excite the respondent judge’s own suspicions. This should have put him on guard as to the motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possible misrepresentations from them.

The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the witnesses’ statement that they saw eight men deliver arms to the petitioner in his house

on May 2, 1984.17 This was supposedly done overtly, and Tohilida said he saw everything through an open window of the house while he was near the gate.18 He could even positively say that six of the weapons were .45 caliber pistols and two were .38 caliber revolvers.19

One may weli wonder why it did not occur to the respondent_______________

14 People v. Sy Juco, 64 Phil. 667: Rodriguez v. Villamiel, supra;Alvarez v. CFI, supra.

15 Mata v. Bayona, supra; cf. Sec. 4, Rule 126, Rules of Court.

16 Rollo, pp. 119–120.

17 Ibid, pp. 26,27,117,120.

18 Id, p. 120.

19 Id.


Roan vs. Gonzales

judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it was on the first floor or a second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at ail, or if the acts related were really done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and the search warrant sought was issued forthwith.

The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant invalid. Nonetheless, the Solicitor General argues that whatever defect there was, was

waived when the petitioner voluntarily submitted to the search and manifested his conformityinwriting.20

We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the nulitary authorities, who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty against a possible challenge later to the validity of the search they were conducting. Confronted with the armed presence of the military and the presumptive authority of a judicial writ, the petitioner had no choice but to submit. This was not, as we held in a previous case,21 the manifestation merely of our traditional Filipino hospitality and respect for authority. Given the repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there was here, as we see it, an intimidation that the petitioner could not resist.

The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum pistol and the eighteen live bullets seized from the petitioner were il~ legal per se and therefore could have been taken by the military authorities even without a warrant. Possession of the said articles, it is urged, was violative of P.D. 1866 and considered malum prohibitum. Hence. the illegal articles could be taken even without a warrant.

Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the_______________

20 Ibid., pp. 145,151,152.

21 Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770.

697VOL. 145, NOVEMBER 25, 1986 697

Roan vs. Gonzales

military officers who enterecl the petitioner’s premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets.

It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se.Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. If the rule were otherwise, then the military authorities could have just entered the premises and looked for’the guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without bothering to first secure a search warrant The fact that they did bother to do so indicates that they themselves recognized the necessity of such a warrant for the seizure of the weapons the petitioner was suspected of possessing.

It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made without warrant and articles may be taken validly as a result of that search. For example, a warrantless search may be made incidental to a lawful arrest,22 as when the person being arrested is frisked for weapons he may otherwise be able to use against the arresting officer. Motor cars may be inspected at borders to prevent smuggling of aliens and contraband23 and even in the interior upon a showing of probable cause,24 Vessels and aircraft are also traditionally removed from the operation of the rule because of their mobility and

their relative ease in fleeing the state’s jurisdiction.25 The individual may knowingly agree to be searched or waive objections to an illegal search.26 And it has also been held that prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if they are open to eye and hand and the peace officer comes upon them inadvertently.27

_______________

22 Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court.

23 Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, cited in Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857;People v. CFI of Rizal, 101 SCRA 86.

24 Almelda-Sanchez v. U.S., 37 L. ed. 2ed. 596.

25 Roldan v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336; Papa v. Mago, supra.

26 People vs. Malasigui, 63 Phil. 221.

27 Harris v. U.S., 390 U.S. 234.


Roan vs. Gonzales

Clearly. though, the instant case does not come under any of the accepted exceptions. The respondents cannot even claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the fact is that these things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view when they were taken. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the conclusion is that the petitioner’s pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore are protected by the exclusionary principle.

Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later expressly affirmed in the 1973 Constitution. While conceding that there may be occasions when the criminal might be allowed to go free because “the constable has bhmdered,” Chief Justice

Concepcion observed that the exclusionary rule was nonetheless “the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction” against abuse. The decision cited Judge Learned Hand’s justification that “only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, know that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed.''

The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal action against him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending resolution of that case, however, the said artieles rnust rernain in custodia legis.

Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before coming to this Court, ftted a motion for the quashal of the search warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with the normal procedure. But as we said and did in Burgos,“this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised."28

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1–84 issued by the respondent judge on May 10,1984, is hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside. Our restraining order of August 6,1985, is made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED. Teehankee, C.J. Feria, Yap, Fernan, Melencio-

Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., concur._______________

28 Supra.

699VOL. 145, NOVEMBER 25, 1986 699

Roan vs. Gonzales

Narvasa and Feliciana, JJ., in the resultSearch Warrant No. 1–84 null and void and

accordingly set aside.

G.R. No. 144309. November 23, 2001.*

SOLID TRIANGLE SALES CORPORATION and ROBERT SITCHON, petitioners, vs. THE SHERIFF OF RTC QC, Branch 93; SANLY CORPORATION, ERA RADIO AND ELECTRICAL SUPPLY, LWT CO., INCORPORATED; ROD CASTRO, VICTOR TUPAZ and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants; Only judges have the power to issue search warrants.—It is undisputed

that only judges have the power to issue search warrants. This function is exclusively judicial. Article III of the Constitution unequivocally states: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. [Emphasis supplied.]

Same; Same; Inherent in the courts’ power to issue search warrants is the power to quash warrants already issued.—Inherent in the courts’ power to issue search warrants is the power to quash warrants already issued. In this connection, this Court has ruled that the motion to quash should be filed in the court that issued the warrant unless a criminal case has already been instituted in another court, in which case, the motion should be filed with the latter. The ruling has since been incorporated in Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: SEC. 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file.—A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is

subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court.

Same; Same; In the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily resolve whether or not an offense exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the search warrant.—In the determination of probable cause,_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.


Solid Triangle Sales Corporation vs. The Sheriff of RTC QC, Br. 93

the court must necessarily resolve whether or not an offense exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the search warrant. Prior to the revision of December 1, 2000, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provided: SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.—A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection withone specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. [Emphasis supplied.]

Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Words and Phrases; A preliminary investigation, by definition, also requires a finding by the authorized officer of the commission of a crime.—A preliminary investigation, by definition, also requires a finding by the authorized officer of the commission of a crime. Previous to the 2000 revision, Section 1 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court defined a preliminary investigation as “an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable

by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.”

Same; Same; Search Warrants; The proceedings for the issuance/quashal of a search warrant before a court on the one hand, and the preliminary investigation before an authorized officer on the other, are proceedings entirely independent of each other.—The proceedings for the issuance/quashal of a search warrant before a court on the one hand, and the preliminary investigation before an authorized officer on the other, are proceedings entirely independent of each other. One is not bound by the other’s finding as regards the existence of a crime. The purpose of each proceeding differs from the other. The first is to determine whether a warrant should issue or be quashed, and the second, whether an information should be filed in court.

Same; Same; Same; When the court, in determining probable cause for issuing or quashing a search warrant, finds that no offense has been committed, it does not interfere with or encroach upon the proceedings in the preliminary investigation.—When the court, in determining probable cause for issuing or quashing a search warrant, finds that no offense has been committed, it does not interfere with or encroach upon the proceedings in the preliminary investigation. The court does not oblige the investigating officer not to file an information for the court’s ruling that no crime exists is only for purposes of issuing or quashing the warrant. This does not, as petitioners would like to believe, constitute a usurpation of the

493

VOL. 370, NOVEMBER 23, 2001 493


executive function. Indeed, to shirk from this duty would amount to an abdication of a constitutional obligation.

Same; Same; Same; The effect of the quashal of the warrant on the ground that no offense has been committed is to render the evidence obtained by virtue of the warrant “inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding,” including the preliminary investigation.—The effect of the quashal of the warrant on the ground that no offense has been committed is to render the evidence obtained by virtue of the warrant “inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding,” including the preliminary investigation. Article III of the Constitution provides. SEC. 3. (1) x x x. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section [Section 2] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. It may be true that, as a result of the quashal of the warrant, the private complainant is deprived of vital evidence to establish his case, but such is the inevitable consequence.

Same; Same; Same; It is puerile to argue that the court that issued the warrant cannot entertain motions to suppress evidence while a preliminary investigation is ongoing.—The Court finds this interpretation too contrived. Section 14, Rule 126 precisely covers situations like the one at bar. Section 14 expressly provides that a motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. Under the same section, the court which issued the search warrant may be prevented from resolving a motion to quash or

suppress evidence only when a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, in which case, the motion is to be resolved by the latter court. It is therefore puerile to argue that the court that issued the warrant cannot entertain motions to suppress evidence while a preliminary investigation is ongoing. Such erroneous interpretation would place a person whose property has been seized by virtue of an invalid warrant without a remedy while the goods procured by virtue thereof are subject of a preliminary investigation.

Intellectual Property Code; Unfair Competition; There is no unfair competition under Section 168 of the Intellectual Property Code where a person did not pass off the subject goods as that of another.—We disagree with petitioners and find that the evidence presented before the trial court does not prove unfair competition under Section 168 of the Intellectual Property Code. Sanly Corporation did not pass off the subject goods as that of another. Indeed, it admits that the goods are genuine Mitsubishi photographic paper, which it purchased from a supplier in Hong Kong. Petitioners also allege that private respondents “made it appear that they were



duly authorized to sell or distribute Mitsubishi Photo Paper in the Philippines.” Assuming that this act constitutes a crime, there is no proof to establish such an allegation.

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Affidavits of Merit; An affidavit of merit is not necessary where the petition is verified by an authorized officer who personally knows the

facts.—We agree with petitioners, however, that the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues when it ruled that there were no grounds for the issuance of an order of preliminary attachment. The only issue raised with respect to the preliminary attachment was whether the application for the writ should have been denied because the same was not supported by an affidavit of the applicant corporation, through its authorized officer, who personally knows the facts. Whether there are sufficient grounds to justify the order is a matter best left to the trial court, which apparently has yet to hear the matter. Thus, we sustain the Court of Appeals’ original decision holding that an affidavit of merit is not necessary since the petition is verified by an authorized officer who personally knows the facts.PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

S.P. Rivera & Associates and Romulo, Mabanta,Buenaventura, Sayoc & Delos Angeles for petitioners.KAPUNAN, J.:The petition at bar stems from two cases, Search Warrant Case No. Q-3324 (99) before Branch 93 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC), and Civil Case No. Q-93-37206for damages and injunctions before Branch 91 of the same court.

The facts are set forth in the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 6, 1999:x x x on January 28, 1999, Judge Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 93,

Quezon City, upon application of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB),

issued Search Warrant No. 3324 (99) against Sanly Corporation (Sanly), respondent, for

violation of Section 168 of R.A. No. 8293 (unfair competition).

495VOL. 370, NOVEMBER 23, 2001 495


By virtue of Search Warrant No. 3324 (99), EIIB agents seized 451 boxes of Mitsubishi

photographic color paper from respondent Sanly. x x x

Forthwith, Solid Triangle, through Robert Sitchon, its Marketing and Communication

Manager, filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Quezon City, an affidavit complaint for

unfair competition against the members of the Board of Sanly and LWT Co., Inc. (LWT),

docketed as I.S. No. 1-99-2870.

Sitchon alleged that ERA Radio and Electrical Supply (ERA), owned and operated by LWT, is

in conspiracy with Sanly in selling and/or distributing Mitsubishi brand photo paper to the

damage and prejudice of Solid Triangle, [which claims to be the sole and exclusive distributor

thereof, pursuant to an agreement with the Mitsubishi Corporation].

On February 4, 1999, petitioner Solid Triangle filed with Judge Bruselas’ sala an urgent ex

parte motion for the transfer of custody of the seized Mitsubishi photo color paper stored in the

office of EIIB.

On February 8, 1999, respondents Sanly, LWT and ERA moved to quash the search warrant

which was denied by Judge Bruselas in an order dated March 5, 1999.

The said respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by Judge

Bruselas in the first assailed order of March 18, 1999. Respondent Judge held that there is

doubt whether the act complained of (unfair competition) is criminal in nature.

Petitioner Solid Triangle filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the quashal of

the search warrant is not proper considering the pendency of the preliminary investigation in

I.S. No. 1-99-2870 for unfair competition wherein the seized items will be used as evidence.

On March 26, 1999, Judge Bruselas issued the second assailed order denying Solid

Triangle’s motion for reconsideration.

On March 29, 1999, petitioner Solid Triangle filed with Branch 91 of the same Court,

presided by Judge Lita S. Tolentino-Genilo, Civil Case No. Q-99-37206 for damages and

injunction with prayer for writs of preliminary injunction and attachment. Impleaded as

defendants were Sanly, LWT and ERA.

On March 30, 1999, the defendants filed their opposition to the application for the issuance

of writs of injunction and attachment.

On March 31, 1999, Judge Genilo denied petitioner’s application for a preliminary

attachment on the ground that the application is not supported with an affidavit by the

applicant, through its authorized officer, who personally knows the facts.



Meanwhile, on April 20, 1999, Judge Bruselas issued the third assailed order, the dispositive

portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the court directs—

1. 1)EIIB, Mr. Robert Sitchon and Solid Triangle Sales Corporation to divulge and report to the court

the exact location of the warehouse where the goods subject of this proceeding are presently

kept within seventy-two hours from receipt hereof;

2. 2)Mr. Rober Sitchon and Solid Triangle Sales Corporation to appear and show cause why they

should not be held in contempt of court for failure to obey a lawful order of the court at a

hearing for the purpose on 12 May 1999 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning;

3. 3)The Deputy Sheriff of this Court to take custody of the seized goods and cause their delivery to

the person from whom the goods were seized without further lost [sic] of time; Let a copy of this

order be served by personal service upon Mr. Robert Sitchon and Solid Triangle Sales

Corporation. Serve copies also to EIIB and the respondents Rod Castro and Sanly Corporation.

SO ORDERED.1

Alleging grave abuse of discretion, petitioners questioned before the Court of Appeals the orders of Branch 93 of the Quezon City RTC granting private respondents’ motion for reconsideration and denying that of petitioners’, as well as the order dated April 20, 1999 directing petitioners to, among other things, show cause why they should not be held in contempt. Petitioners also assailed the order of the Quezon City RTC, Branch 91 denying their application for a writ of attachment. Upon the filing of the

petition on April 26, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order to prevent Judge Bruselas from implementing the Order dated April 20, 1999.

On July 6, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment initially granting certiorari. It held that the quashing of the warrant deprived the prosecution of vital evidence to determine probable cause._______________

1 Rollo, pp. 58-61.

497VOL. 370, NOVEMBER 23, 2001 497


Admittedly, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City has filed a complaint for unfair competition

against private respondents and that the undergoing preliminary investigation is in progress.

In the said proceedings, the prosecution inevitably will present the seized items to establish

a prima facie case of unfair competition against private respondents.

Considering that Judge Bruselas quashed the search warrant, he practically deprived the

prosecution of its evidence so vital in establishing the existence of probable cause.

Petitioners’ reliance on Vlasons Enterprises Corporation vs. Court of Appeals [155 SCRA 186

(1987).] is in order. Thus:

The proceeding for the seizure of property in virtue of a search warrant does not end with the actual taking

of the property by the proper officers and its delivery, usually constructive, to the court. The order for the

issuance of the warrant is not a final one and cannot constitute res judicata (Cruz vs. Dinglasan, 83 Phil.

333). Such an order does not ascertain and adjudicate the permanent status or character of the seized

property. By its very nature, it is provisional, interlocutory (Marcelo vs. De Guzman, 114 SCRA 657). It is

merely the first step in the process to determine the character and title of the property. That

determination is done in the criminal action involving the crime or crimes in connection with which the

search warrant was issued. Hence, such a criminal action should be prosecuted, or commenced if not yet

instituted, and prosecuted. The outcome of the criminal action will dictate the disposition of the seized

property.2

The appellate court further ruled that the affidavit of merits is not necessary for the order of preliminary attachment to issue considering that the petition itself is under oath:The denial was based on the ground that the application is not supported by an affidavit of the

applicant corporation, through its authorized officer, who personally knows the facts.

We cannot go along with respondent judge’s theory. In Consul vs. Consul [17 SCRA

667 (1996)], the Supreme Court held:

Affidavit of merits has a known purpose: Courts and parties should not require the machinery of justice to

grind anew, if the prospects of a different conclusion cannot be reasonably reached

_______________

2 Id., at 61-63.



should relief from judgment be granted. We look back at the facts here. The petition for relief is verified by

petitioner himself. The merits of petitioner’s case are apparent in the recitals of the petition. Said petition

is under oath. That oath, we believe, elevates the petition to the same category as a separate affidavit. To

require defendant to append an affidavit of merits to his verified petition, to the circumstances, is to

compel him to do the unnecessary. Therefore, the defect pointed by the court below is one of forms, not of

substance. Result: Absence of a separate affidavit is of de minimis importance.3

Upon motion by respondents, however, the Court of Appeals reversed itself. In its “Amendatory Decision,” the appellate court held that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. Accordingly, the evidence obtained by virtue of said warrant was inadmissible in the preliminary investigation.x x x Under Sections 168 and 170 of R.A. 8293 (the Intellectual Property Code), there is unfair

competition if the alleged offender has given to his goods the general appearance of the goods

of another manufacturer or dealer and sells or passes them off as goods of that manufacturer

or dealer in order to deceive or defraud the general public or the legitimate trader. Also, if he

makes false statements in the course of trade to discredit the goods, business, or services of

another.

Undisputedly, the seized goods from Sanly are genuine and not mere imitations. This is

admitted by petitioners in their application for a search warrant and supporting affidavits,

Annexes “A” to “D”, inclusive, in their April 27, 1999 Submission of Annexes to this Court. It

bears stressing that there is no showing or allegation that Sanly has presented, sold, or passed

off its photographic paper as goods which come from Solid Triangle. There is no attempt on its

part to deceive.

Both Sanly and Solid Triangle sell genuine Mitsubishi products. Solid Triangle acquires its

goods from Japan on the basis of its exclusive distributorship with Mitsubishi Corporation.

While Sanly buys its goods from Hongkong, claiming it is a parallel importer, not an unfair

competitor. As defined, a parallel importer is one which imports, distributes, and

sells genuine products in the market,independently of an exclusive distributorship or agency

agreementwith the manufacturer. And, this is precisely what Sanly states as its commercial

status.

_______________

3 Id., at 63-64. Italics by the Court of Appeals.

499VOL. 370, NOVEMBER 23, 2001 499


Records show that Sanly sold its photographic paper purchased from Hongkong without

altering its appearance. It is distributed in the same Mitsubishi box with its logo and

distinguishing marks as marketed in Japan. The same brown paper with the Mitsubishi seal is

wrapped around its products. Copies of the importation documents and the certification on

imports issued by the Philippine government recognized Societe’ Generale’ d’ Surveillance

(SGS) were appended to the motion to quash search warrant.

Thus, on factual basis, the real dispute is actually between Solid Triangle and the

manufacturer Mitsubishi. If Solid Triangle feels aggrieved, it should sue Mitsubishi for damages,

if at all for breach of its distributorship. But that is between them.

Certainly, there is here no probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant based

on a criminal action for “unfair competition.”

Therefore, since there is no probable cause for unfair competition in this case, then the

quashal of the search warrant by respondent Judge Bruselas is valid. This being the case, there

is merit in the motion for reconsideration.

In ascertaining the legality of a search warrant and the validity of the search and seizure

conducted by the EIIB agents by virtue of the warrant, it is essential that a crime has been

committed or is being committed and that the things seized are fruits of the crime or the

means by which it is committed.

The validity of a search and seizure is of constitutional dimensions. The right to privacy and

the sanctity of a person’s house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and

seizures are not only ancient. They are also zealously protected.

x x x

Solid Triangle contends that the quashal of the search warrant deprived it of its right to

prove a prima facie case of unfair competition in the preliminary investigation. We initially

agreed with it.

While Solid Triangle has the right to present every single piece of evidence it can gather

and muster, however, it has no right to prove its case through the use of illegally seized

evidence secured in derogation of a constitutionally guaranteed right.

The constitutional provision that any evidence obtained in violation of the provision against

unreasonable searches and seizures “shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding”

finds application here. The goods seized without probable cause are fruits of the poisonous

tree



and cannot be used for the purpose of proving unfair competition during preliminary

investigation proceedings.

The case of Vlasons Enterprises Corporation vs. Court of Appealsdoes not apply since it

involved a different set of facts and issues.

On the contrary, it is the case of People vs. Court of Appeals [216 SCRA 101 (1992)] that

governs, where the Supreme Court ruled that with the quashal of the search warrant, the

seized goods could not be used as evidence for any purpose, in any proceeding.4

As regards the preliminary attachment, the appellate court found that there was no ground for the issuance of the writ because:x x x Sanly does not deny that it sells Mitsubishi photographic color paper. But there is no

showing that it attempts to depart from country, defraud Solid Triangle or the buying public,

conceal or dispose of unjustly detained personal property, or commit any of the acts provided

in Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as grounds for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary attachment.5

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated August 4, 2000.

In assailing the Amendatory Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners argue that:

I.

THE JUDGE WHO ISSUED A SEARCH WARRANT THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN IMPLEMENTED

CANNOT QUASH THE WARRANT ANYMORE, AT LEAST WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE FINDINGS OF

THE CITY PROSECUTOR WHO HAS THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE PROBABLE

CAUSE.

II.

IN THE PARALLEL IMPORTATION EFFECTED BY THE RESPONDENTS WITH DECEIT AND BAD

FAITH, THERE EXISTS PROBABLE CAUSE THAT THE CRIME OF UNFAIR COMPETITION UNDER THE

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE HAS BEEN COMMITTED BY THE RESPONDENTS.

_______________

4 Id., at 74-79. Italics in the original.

5 Id., at 80.

501VOL. 370, NOVEMBER 23, 2001 501


III.

PETITIONERS’ APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF ATTACHMENT CANNOT BE DENIED ON THE

GROUND THAT AN AFFIDAVIT OF MERITS IS NOT APPENDED TO THE COMPLAINT, AS THE

COURT OF APPEALS HAS ALREADY RULED, AND ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO

JUSTIFICATION FOR IT BECAUSE THE QUESTIONS PERTINENT THERETO ARE NOT BEFORE THE

COURT OF APPEALS BUT BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.

IV.

PETITIONERS CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR CONTEMPT IN NOT RETURNING THE GOODS

SUBJECT OF THE SEARCH WARRANT NOTWITHSTANDING THE REFUSAL OF THE COURT OF

APPEALS TO RULE ON THIS POINT FURTHER WHICH IS A GRIEVOUS ERROR TO THE PREJUDICE

OF THE PETITIONERS.6

Petitioners contend that the Constitution does not authorize the judge to reverse himself and quash the warrant, “especially after goods had been seized pursuant to the search warrant, and the prosecution is poised to push forward with the goods as evidence.”7 In finding that doubt exists that a crime has been committed, it is argued that the judge “trench[ed] upon the prerogative and duty of the city prosecutor.”8

The contention has no merit.It is undisputed that only judges have the power to

issue search warrants.9 This function is exclusively judicial. Article III of the Constitution unequivocally states:SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects

against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be

inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause

to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and par-

_______________

6 Id., at 29-30.

7 Id., at 20.

8 Id., at 33.

9 Salazar vs. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145 (1990).

502



ticularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. [Emphasis

supplied.]

Inherent in the courts’ power to issue search warrants is the power to quash warrants already issued. In this connection, this Court has ruled that the motion to quash should be filed in the court that issued the warrant unless a criminal case has already been instituted in another court, in which case, the motion should be filed with the latter.10 The ruling has since been incorporated in Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:SEC. 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file.—A motion to

quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and

acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has

been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search

warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is

subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court.

In the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily resolve whether or not an offense exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the search warrant. Prior to the revision of December 1, 2000, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provided:SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.—A search warrant shall not issue but upon

probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the

judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he

may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

[Emphasis supplied.]11

_______________

10 People vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 400 (1998).

11 Presently Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which now reads:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant.—A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection

with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place

503VOL. 370, NOVEMBER 23, 2001 503


Note that probable cause is defined as:x x x the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and

prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or

object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is

in the place to be searched.12

In Kenneth Roy Savage/K Angelin Export Trading vs. Taypin,13 the Court was confronted with a search warrant that was issued purportedly in connection with unfair competition involving design patents. The Court held that the alleged crime is not punishable under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code, and accordingly, quashed the search warrant issued for the non-existent crime.In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a finding of probable cause in

connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after

examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing

the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Hence, since there is no crime to speak

of, the search warrant does not even begin to fulfill these stringent requirements and is

therefore defective on its face. x x x.

A preliminary investigation, by definition, also requires a finding by the authorized officer of the commission of a crime. Previous to the 2000 revision, Section 1 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court defined a preliminary investigation as “an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a

crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.”14

Section 2 of the same Rule enumerates who may conduct preliminary investigations:_______________

to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

12 People vs. Aruta, 288 SCRA 262 (1998).

13 331 SCRA 697 (2000).

14 The phrase “cognizable by the Regional Trial Court” has been omitted in Section 1, Rule 112 of the

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.



SEC. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations.—The following may conduct

preliminary investigations:

1. (a)Provincial or city fiscals and their assistants;

2. (b)Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

3. (c)National and Regional state prosecutors; and

4. (d)Such other officers as may be authorized by law.

Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable by

the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions.15

The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation has been described as an executive function.16

The proceedings for the issuance/quashal of a search warrant before a court on the one hand, and the preliminary investigation before an authorized officer on the other, are proceedings entirely independent of each other. One is not bound by the other’s finding as regards the existence of a crime. The purpose of each proceeding differs from the

other. The first is to determine whether a warrant should issue or be quashed, and the second, whether an information should be filed in court.

When the court, in determining probable cause for issuing or quashing a search warrant, finds that no offense has been committed, it does not interfere with or encroach upon the proceedings in the preliminary investigation. The court does not oblige the inves-_______________

15 Under the Revised Rules, this provision now reads:

SEC. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations.—The following may conduct preliminary investigations:

1. (a)Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants,

2. (b)Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

3. (c)National and Regional State Prosecutors; and

4. (d)Other officers as may be authorized by law.

Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their

respective territorial jurisdictions.

16 People vs. Court of Appeals, supra.

505VOL. 370, NOVEMBER 23, 2001 505


tigating officer not to file an information for the court’s ruling that no crime exists is only for purposes of issuing or quashing the warrant. This does not, as petitioners would like to believe, constitute a usurpation of the executive function. Indeed, to shirk from this duty would amount to an abdication of a constitutional obligation.

The effect of the quashal of the warrant on the ground that no offense has been committed is to render the evidence obtained by virtue of the

warrant “inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding,” including the preliminary investigation. Article III of the Constitution provides.SEC. 3. (1) x x x.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section [Section 2] shall be

inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

It may be true that, as a result of the quashal of the warrant, the private complainant is deprived of vital evidence to establish his case, but such is the inevitable consequence.

Nevertheless, the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained through an illegal warrant does not necessarily render the preliminary investigation academic. The preliminary investigation and the filing of the information may still proceed if, because of other (admissible) evidence, there exists “sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.” The finding by the court that no crime exists does not preclude the authorized officer conducting the preliminary investigation from making his own determination that a crime has been committed and that probable cause exists for purposes of filing the information.

Petitioners also argue that Section 14, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, supra, while intended “to resolve conflicts of responsibility between courts,” “does not expressly cover the situation where the criminal complaint is pending with the prosecutor.” In such a case, petitioners submit, the public



prosecutor should be allowed to resolve the question of whether or not probable cause exists.17

The Court finds this interpretation too contrived. Section 14, Rule 126 precisely covers situations like the one at bar. Section 14 expressly provides that a motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. Under the same section, the court which issued the search warrant may be prevented from resolving a motion to quash or suppress evidence only when a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, in which case, the motion is to be resolved by the latter court. It is therefore puerile to argue that the court that issued the warrant cannot entertain motions to suppress evidence while a preliminary investigation is ongoing. Such erroneous interpretation would place a person whose property has been seized by virtue of an invalid warrant without a remedy while the goods procured by virtue thereof are subject of a preliminary investigation.

We now turn to the question of whether the facts, as presented before the trial court, constitute an offense.

Private respondents are alleged to have committed unfair competition in violation of Section 168 of the Intellectual Property Code, which states:SEC. 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and Remedies.—168.1 A person who has

identified in the mind of the public goods he manufactures or deals in, his business or services

from those of others, whether or not a registered mark is employed, has a property right in the

goodwill of the said goods, business or services so identified, which will be protected in the

same manner as other property rights.

168.2 Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by

which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or

services for those of the one having established such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts

calculated to produce said result, shall be guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to

an action therefor.

_______________

17 Id., at 303-304.

507VOL. 370, NOVEMBER 23, 2001 507


168.3 In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair

competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:

1. (a)Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of

goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the

wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words

thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to

influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or

dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the

goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his

legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor

engaged in selling such goods with a lie purpose;

2. (b)Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means

calculated to induce the false belief that such person is offering the service of another

who has identified such services in the mind of the public; or

3. (c)Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall

commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the

goods, business or services of another.

168.4 The remedies provided by Sections 156, 157 and 161 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

The same law, in Section 170, provides the penalty for violation of Section 168:SEC. 170. Penalties.—Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a

criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from

Fifty thousand pesos (50,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000), shall be imposed on

any person who is found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in Section 155,

Section 168 and Subsection 169.1.

Petitioners submit that “the importation of even genuine goods can constitute a crime under the Intellectual Property Code so long as fraud or deceit is present.” The intent to deceive in this case, according to petitioners, is “patent” “from the following undisputed facts”:

1. (a)Before marketing its product, the respondents totally obliterated and erased the Emulsion Number and Type that was printed on the



1. box/carton of the product because of which the source of the goods can no longer be traced.

2. (b)Respondents even covered the boxes with newspapers to conceal true identity.

3. (c)Being also engaged in the sale of photo equipments [sic] and having had the occasion of participating in the same exhibit with petitioner Solid Triangle several times already, respondents certainly knew that petitioner Solid Triangle is the sole and exclusive importer and distributor of Mitsubishi Photo Paper.

4. (d)Two agents of the EIIB were also able to confirm from a salesgirl of respondents that substantial quantity of stocks of Mitsubishi Photo Paper are available at respondents’ store and that the products are genuine, as they are duly authorized to sell and distribute it to interested customers.

5. (e)No better proof of unfair competition is the seizure of the goods, 451 boxes of Mitsubishi photographic color paper.18

Petitioners further expound:1. 47.We may categorize the acts of the

respondents as “underground sales and marketing” of genuine goods, undermining the property rights of petitioner Solid Triangle. The Court of Appeals itself recognized the rights of a dealer. The acts of the respondents were made to appropriate unjustly the goodwill of petitioner Solid Triangle, and goodwill is protected by the law on unfair competition.

2. 48.Petitioner Solid Triangle has established a trade or business in which it had acquired goodwill and reputation that will be protected, and so, to permit respondents to continue importing and distributing Mitsubishi Photo Paper, would be to countenance the unlawful appropriation of the benefit of a goodwill which petitioner Solid Triangle has acquired and permit the respondent to grab the reputation or goodwill of the business of another.

3. 49.x x x petitioners have a valid cause to complain against respondents for the criminal

violation of the Intellectual Property Law when the latter made it appear that they were duly authorized to sell or distribute Mitsubishi Photo Paper in the Philippines, when in truth and in fact they were not, and when they were hiding their importation from the petition-

_______________

18 Id., at 43-44.

509VOL. 370, NOVEMBER 23, 2001 509


1. ers by such acts as removing the Emulsion Number and Type and covering the boxes with old newspapers.19

We disagree with petitioners and find that the evidence presented before the trial court does not prove unfair competition under Section 168 of the Intellectual Property Code. Sanly Corporation did not pass off the subject goods as that of another. Indeed, it admits that the goods are genuine Mitsubishi photographic paper, which it purchased from a supplier in Hong Kong.20 Petitioners also allege that private respondents “made it appear that they were duly authorized to sell or distribute Mitsubishi Photo Paper in the Philippines.” Assuming that this act constitutes a crime, there is no proof to establish such an allegation.

We agree with petitioners, however, that the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues when it ruled that there were no grounds for the issuance of an order of preliminary attachment. The only issue raised with respect to the preliminary attachment was whether

the application for the writ should have been denied because the same was not supported by an affidavit of the applicant corporation, through its authorized officer, who personally knows the facts. Whether there are sufficient grounds to justify the order is a matter best left to the trial court, which apparently has yet to hear the matter. Thus, we sustain the Court of Appeals’ original decision holding that an affidavit of merit is not necessary since the petition is verified by an authorized officer who personally knows the facts.

Similarly premature is whether petitioners’ failure to return the goods to respondents constituted indirect contempt. The assailed order dated April 20, 1999 was a “show cause” order. Before any hearing on the order could be held, petitioners promptly filed a petition for certiorari. Clearly, the trial court had yet to rule on the matter, and for this Court now to hold petitioners’ act contemptuous would preempt said court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Amendatory Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 31, 2000, as_______________

19 Id., at 44-45. Italics in the original.

20 Rollo, p. 123.



well as its Resolution dated August 4, 2000, is AFFIRMED insofar as it holds that (1) the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, has the power to

determine the existence of a crime in quashing a search warrant and, (2) the evidence does not support a finding that the crime of unfair competition has been committed by respondents; and REVERSED insofar as it holds that (1) there are no grounds to warrant the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and (2) petitioners are guilty of contempt. The case is remanded for further proceedings to the courts of origin, namely, Branch 91 of RTC, Quezon City for resolution of the application for a writ of attachment, and Branch 93 of the same court for resolution of the application to cite petitioners for contempt.

Petitioners are ordered to return to respondent Sanly Corporation the 451 boxes of Mitsubishi photographic color paper seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 3324 (99) issued by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 93.

SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr. (C.J.,

Chairman), Puno, Pardo andYnares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Petition partly granted.Notes.—The purpose of the rule that search

warrants must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized is to limit the things to be seized to those and only those particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made. (People vs. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 [1998])

Preliminary investigation proper is not a judicial function—it is a part of the prosecution’s job, a function of the executive. (Gozos vs. Tac-an, 300 SCRA 265 [1998])

October 16, 2009. G.R. No. 158467.*

SPOUSES JOEL AND MARIETTA MARIMLA, petitioners,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. OMAR T. VIOLA, RTC Judge, Branch 57, Angeles City, respondents.

Searches and Seizures; A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC; Hierarchy of Courts; The general rule is

that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts, but, in exceptional cases, the Court,

for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance

of petitions filed directly before it, such as one involving the application of the rules

promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution.—

The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in

exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues

raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. In this case, the Court opts to

take cognizance of the petition, as it involves the application of the rules promulgated by this

Court in the exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution. At the heart of the

present controversy are A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC,Clarifying the Guidelines on the Application for

the Enforceability of Search Warrants, which was enacted on January 25, 2000; and A.M. No.

00-5-03-SC, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000,

specifically, Section 2, Rule 126 thereof.

Same; Same; A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive

Judges of the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications

for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal

possession of firearms on application filed by the Philippine National Police (PNP), National

Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF), and

Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF).—From the above, it may be seen that A.M. No.

99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila

and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal

gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

58


Marimla vs. People

firearms on application filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF. On the other hand,

Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the application for search

warrant shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was

committed, and (b) for compelling reasons, any court within the judicial region where the crime

was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the

judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

Same; Same; Administrative Law; Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of

the Philippine National Police (PNP), National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Presidential Anti-

Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF), and Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF)

from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search warrant to their

assistant heads.—Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-

TF and REACT-TF from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search

warrant to their assistant heads. Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the Administrative

Code of 1987, an assistant head or other subordinate in every bureau may perform such duties

as may be specified by their superior or head, as long as it is not inconsistent with law. The

said provision reads: Chapter 6—POWERS AND DUTIES OF HEADS OF BUREAUS AND

OFFICES Sec. 31.Duties of Assistant Heads and Subordinates.—(1) Assistant heads and other

subordinates in every bureau or office shall perform such duties as may be required by law or

regulations, or as may be specified by their superiors not otherwise inconsistent with law. (2)

The head of bureau or office may, in the interest of economy, designate the assistant head to

act as chief of any division or unit within the organization, in addition to his duties, without

additional compensation, and (3) In the absence of special restriction prescribed by law,

nothing shall prevent a subordinate officer or employee from being assigned additional duties

by proper authority, when not inconsistent with the performance of the duties imposed by law.

Same; Same; The guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-

SC entitled Guidelines On The Selection And Designation Of Executive Judges And Defining

Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in the

issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the

59

VOL. 604, OCTOBER 16, 2009 59

Marimla vs. People

Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) of Manila and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2

of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.—Petitioners also assert that the questioned Search Warrant

was voidab initio. They maintain that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, which was enacted on January 25,

2000, was no longer in effect when the application for search warrant was filed on February 15,

2002. They argue that the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on

December 1, 2000, should have been applied, being the later law. Hence, the enforcement of

the search warrant in Angeles City, which was outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC Manila,

was in violation of the law. The petitioners’ contention lacks merit. A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC

provides that the guidelines on the enforceability of search warrants provided therein shall

continue until further orders from this Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC are

reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitledGuidelines On The Selection And Designation Of

Executive Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly stated

that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of

Manila and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Rivera, Perico, David & Rivera Law Offices for

petitioners. The Solicitor General for respondents.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** J.:Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It seeks to annul the Order1 dated September 6, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 57, denying petitioner spouses Joel and Marietta Marimla’s Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress_______________

** Acting Chairperson as per Special Order No. 739.

1 Rollo, pp. 29-32.


Marimla vs. People

Evidence Illegally Seized, and the Order2 dated April 21, 2003 denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereof.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On February 15, 2002, Special Investigator (SI) Ray C. Lagasca of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division filed two (2) applications for search warrant with the RTC of Manila seeking permission to search: (1) petitioners’ house located on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta.

Trinidad, Angeles City3 and (2) the premises on Maria Aquino St., Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga,4 both for Violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended. The said applications uniformly alleged that SI Lagasca’s request for the issuance of the search warrants was founded on his personal knowledge as well as that of witness Roland D. Fernandez (Fernandez), obtained after a series of surveillance operations and a test buy made at petitioners’ house. The purpose of the application for search warrants was to seize the following articles/items:“Undetermined amount of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as “SHABU,”

“MARIJUANA,” weighing scale, plastic sachets, tooters, burner, rolling papers, and

paraphernalia, all of which articles/items are being used or intended to be used in Violation of

Republic Act 6425 as amended, and are hidden or being kept in said house/premises.”5

Executive Judge Mario Guariña III (Judge Guariña III) examined in writing and under oath SI Lagasca and Fernandez, in the form of searching questions and answers, and found that based on facts personally known to SI Lagasca and Fernandez, petitioners had in their possession and control, inside their house located on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad,_______________

2 Id., at pp. 33-34.

3 Id., at p. 51.

4 RTC Record, p. 61.

5 See Notes 3 and 4.

61VOL. 604, OCTOBER 16, 2009 61

Marimla vs. People

Angeles City, an undetermined amount of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as shabu andmarijuana. Pursuant these findings, Judge Guariña III issued a search warrant docketed as Search Warrant No. 02-2677, which commanded any peace officer “to make immediate search, at any time of the day or night, not beyond 10 days from date hereof, of the premises above-mentioned and forthwith seize and take possession of the properties subject of the offense and bring to his court said properties to be dealt with as the law directs.”6

On the strength of this warrant, members of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division, namely, SI Lagasca, Primitivo M. Najera, Jr., Jesusa D. Jamasali, Horten Hernaez, and Ritche N. Oblanca, in coordination with the Philippine National Police of Angeles City, searched petitioners’ house on February 19, 2002 at around 5:00 in the morning.7 They were able to seize cash in the amount of P15,200.008 and the following items:

One (1) brick of dried flowering tops wrapped in a packing tape

marked “RCL-1-2677,” (net weight – 915.7 grams); 1.

One (1) small brick of dried flowering tape ( 2.sic) wrapped in a

newsprint marked “RCL-2-2677” (net weight – 491.5 grams);

Dried flowering tops separately contained in sixteen (16)

transparent plastic bags, altogether wrapped in a newsprint

marked “RCL-3-2677” (net weight – 127.9 grams); and 3.

Dried flowering tops separately contained in nine (9) plastic tea

bags, altogether placed in a yellow plastic bag marked “RCL-4-

2677” (net weight – 18.2736 grams). 4.9

_______________


7 Id., at pp. 12-13.

8 Believed as proceeds from the earlier sale of prohibited drugs.



Marimla vs. People

On February 20, 2002, an Information10 for Violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, was filed against petitioners before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 57, presided by herein respondent Judge Omar T. Viola.

On March 25, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized11on the following grounds: (1) the application for search warrant was filed outside the territorial jurisdiction and judicial region of the court where the alleged crime was committed; (2) the court which issued the questioned search warrant committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the same because under the law it cannot issue a search warrant outside its territorial jurisdiction; (3) the questioned search warrant is void ab initio; and (4) the evidence illegally seized by virtue of the questioned search warrant is therefore inadmissible in evidence.

In support of the above motion, petitioners filed a Motion to Admit Documentary Evidence,12 asking the court to admit the following documents: (1) application for Search Warrant No. 02-2677; (2) authorization letter dated February 12, 2002 with the signature of NBI Director Reynaldo G. Wycoco

(Director Wycoco); (3) NBI ID No. 5370 of Agent Victor Emmanuel G. Lansang with the Signature of Director Wycoco; and (4) Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 00-5-03-SC (Re: Proposed Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure [Rules 110-127, Revised Rules of Court]). Petitioners claim that the issuance of Search Warrant No. 02-2677 was “defective considering the application was not personally endorsed by [Dir.] Wycoco,” and that the latter’s signature in the authorization letter is different from that as appearing in the identification_______________

10 Id., at p. 1.

11 Rollo, p. 35.

12 Id., at pp. 53-58.

63VOL. 604, OCTOBER 16, 2009 63

Marimla vs. People

card, and therefore it is “not the true and genuine signature of [Dir.] Wycoco.”13

In its Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Quash,14 the Office of the City Prosecutor, Angeles City claims that the questioned search warrant does not fall within the coverage of Sec. 2 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, but under A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC,15 which authorizes the Executive Judges and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving dangerous drugs, among others, filed by the NBI, and provides that said warrants may be served in places outside

the territorial jurisdiction of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City.

On August 14, 2009, SI Lagasca filed his Opposition and/or Answer to the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized.16 He avers that Judge Guariña III issued Search Warrant No. 02-2677 by virtue of Administrative Order No. 20-9717 issued on February 12,_______________

13 Id., at pp. 53-54.

14 Id., at p. 39.

15 Promulgated on January 25, 2000.

16 Rollo, pp. 59-60.

17 Administrative Order No. 20-97

17In the interest of an effective administration of justice and pursuant to the powers vested in the

Supreme Court by the Constitution, the Hon. Roberto A. Barrios, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court

of Manila and in his absence the Hon. Rebecca de Guia Salvador, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,

Branch 1, Manila, the Hon. Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 53,

Manila and the Hon. Edgardo P. Cruz, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila are hereby

authorized to act on all applications for search warrants filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)

by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) and by the Public Assistance and Reaction Against

Crime (PARAC), duly certified by the legal officers and personally endorsed by the Heads of the said

agencies, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, for the search of places to be particu-


Marimla vs. People

1997. He also claims that it was NBI Deputy Director for Special Investigation Fermin Nasol who signed the authorization letter in behalf of Director Wycoco, for him to apply for a search warrant in the house/premises of petitioners on RD Reyes St., Brgy.

Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City and Maria Aquino St., Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga for violation of R.A. No. 6425.

In an Order18 dated September 6, 2002, Judge Omar T. Viola denied petitioners’ Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized for lack of merit, ratiocinating as follows:

“The public prosecutor was able to point out that the search warrant issued by Judge Mario

Guariña III, the Executive Judge of the Manila Regional Trial Court, is in order considering that

AM 99-10-09-SC allows or authorizes executive judges and vice executive judges of the

Regional Trial Court of Manila and Quezon City to issue warrants which may be served in

places outside their territorial jurisdiction in cases where the same was filed and, among

others, by the NBI.

The NBI also was able to explain that the authority to apply search warrant was personally

signed by Deputy Director for Special Investigation Fermin Nasol who is authorized to sign and

that he was delegated the authority to sign for and in behalf of the NBI Director on documents

of this like. Deputy Director Fermin Nasol

_______________

larly described therein, and the seizure of property or things as prescribed in the Rules of Court, and to issue the

warrants, if justified, which may be served in places even outside the territorial jurisdiction of said courts. This order is

effective immediately and shall continue until further orders from this Court and shall be an exception to the provisions of

Circular 13 dated October 1, 1985 and Circular No. 19 dated August 4, 1987. The authorization herein granted shall cover

applications for search warrants involving illegal gambling, dangerous drugs, illegal possession of firearms and other

major crimes. The authorized Judges shall keep a special docket book listing the details of the applications and the result

of the searches and seizures made pursuant to the warrants issued.

18 Rollo, pp. 29-32.

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Marimla vs. People

having that authority to sign for and in behalf of the NBI Director, Reynaldo Wycoco, there is,

therefore, compliance with the law regarding the issuance of authority to apply search

warrant.

WHEREFORE, in view of the revelation, the Court has no other recourse but to agree with

the views of the prosecution as well as the NBI. And this being so, the Court finds not enough

ground to quash the search warrant issued against Spouses Joel and Marietta Marimla.

The motion filed by them and their supplement, is therefore denied, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.”19

On September 23, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration20 on the ground that the denial of their Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized is not in accordance with the law and existing jurisprudence. They claim that no evidence was presented by Deputy Director Nasol that he was authorized to sign for and in behalf of Director Wycoco.

Said Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by respondent court on the ground that the issues raised therein were mere reiterations of petitioners’ arguments that had already been considered and passed upon in the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized. Respondent court added:

“To elaborate, this Court believes and is of the opinion that the Deputy Director of the NBI

possesses the authority to sign for and in behalf of the NBI Director requesting for the issuance

of a search warrant and nothing in the Administrative Matter 99-10-09 prohibits the delegation

of such ministerial act to the Deputy Director who is an alter ego of the NBI Director. It is also

quite clear that the NBI Director approved said authorization for SI Ray Lagasca to apply for a

search warrant because said document was never recalled or amended by the Office of the

Bureau Director up to the present.

_______________

19 Id., at pp. 31-32.

20 Id., at pp. 46-49.

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Marimla vs. People

The Court is also of the view that A.M. 99-10-09 is still valid, binding and legal by virtue

of the fact that not even the Supreme Court (sic) did not make any pronouncement …

withdrawing and or declaring the same ineffective, hence, until such order is issued, this Court

must interpret and rule for its continued validity and applicability.”21

Hence, this petition.Petitioners claim that the search warrant was

issued in violation of A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC and Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

The pivotal issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders dated September 6, 2002 and April 21, 2003, denying petitioners’ Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized and their Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.

At the onset, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the dismissal of this petition on the ground that the filing of the said petition directly with this Court runs afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The OSG argues that while this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals (CA) over petitions for certiorari, this petition should have been filed with the CA. The OSG contends that the petitioners have not shown any compelling reason to justify the filing of the petition directly with this Court.

The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons

or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.22 In this case, the Court opts to take cognizance of_______________

21 Id., at pp. 33-34.

22 United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, G.R. No. 163858, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 574, 593.

67VOL. 604, OCTOBER 16, 2009 67

Marimla vs. People

the petition, as it involves the application of the rules promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution.23

At the heart of the present controversy are A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, Clarifying the Guidelines on the Application for the Enforceability of Search Warrants, which was enacted on January 25, 2000; and A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, specifically, Section 2, Rule 126 thereof. We quote the pertinent portions of the two issuances below:

Administrative Matter No. 99-10-09-SC

Resolution Clarifying the Guidelines on the Application

for the Enforceability of Search Warrants

In the interest of an effective administration of justice and pursuant to the powers vested in

the Supreme Court by the Constitution, the following are authorized to act on all applications

for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal

possession of firearms.

The Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Manila and Quezon

City filed by the Philippine National Police (PNP), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the

Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) and the Reaction Against Crime Task

Force (REACT-TF) with the Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City.

The applications shall be personally endorsed by the Heads of the said agencies, for the

search of places to be particularly described therein, and the seizure of property of things as

prescribed in the Rules of Court, and to issue the warrants of arrest, if justified, which may be

served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of said courts.

The authorized judges shall keep a special docket book listing the details of the

applications and the result of the searches and seizures made pursuant to the warrants issued.

_______________

23 Sec. 5, Art. VIII of the Constitution.

68


Marimla vs. People

This Resolution is effective immediately and shall continue until further orders from this

Court and shall be an exemption to the provisions of Circular No. 13 dated 1 October 1985 and

Circular No. 19 dated 4 August 1987. x x x”

A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC

Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure

Rule 126

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

2. Sec.Court where application for search warrant shall be filed.—An application for

search warrant shall be filed with the following:

(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region

where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any

court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in

the court where the criminal action is pending.

From the above, it may be seen that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous

drugs and illegal possession of firearms on application filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF. On the other hand, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the application for search warrant shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, and (b) for compelling reasons, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.69

VOL. 604, OCTOBER 16, 2009 69

Marimla vs. People

Petitioners contend that the application for search warrant was defective. They aver that the application for search warrant filed by SI Lagasca was not personally endorsed by the NBI Head, Director Wycoco, but instead endorsed only by Deputy Director Nasol and that while SI Lagasca declared that Deputy Director Nasol was commissioned to sign the authorization letter in behalf of Director Wycoco, the same was not duly substantiated. Petitioners conclude that the absence of the signature of Director Wycoco was a fatal defect that rendered the application on the questioned search warrant void per se, and the issued search warrant null and void “because the spring cannot rise above its source.”24

We disagree. Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF from delegating their ministerial duty of

endorsing the application for search warrant to their assistant heads. Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, an assistant head or other subordinate in every bureau may perform such duties as may be specified by their superior or head, as long as it is not inconsistent with law. The said provision reads:

Chapter 6—POWERS AND DUTIES OF HEADS OF

BUREAUS AND OFFICES

31. Sec.Duties of Assistant Heads and Subordinates.—(1) Assistant heads and other

subordinates in every bureau or office shall perform such duties as may be required by law or

regulations,or as may be specified by their superiors not otherwise inconsistent with law.

The head of bureau or office may, in the interest of economy, designate the assistant head

to act as chief of any division or unit within the organization, in addition to his duties, without

additional compensation, and (2)

_______________

24 Rollo, p. 14.

70


Marimla vs. People

In the absence of special restriction prescribed by law, nothing shall prevent a subordinate

officer or employee from being assigned additional duties by proper authority, when not

inconsistent with the performance of the duties imposed by law. (3)

Director Wycoco’s act of delegating his task of

endorsing the application for search warrant to Deputy Director Nasol is allowed by the above quoted provision of law unless it is shown to be inconsistent with any law. Thus, Deputy Director Nasol’s endorsement had the same force and effect as an endorsement issued by Director Wycoco himself. The finding of the RTC in the questioned

Orders that Deputy Director Nasol possessed the authority to sign for and in behalf of Director Wycoco is unassailable.

Petitioners also assert that the questioned Search Warrant was void ab initio. They maintain that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, which was enacted on January 25, 2000, was no longer in effect when the application for search warrant was filed on February 15, 2002. They argue that the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, should have been applied, being the later law. Hence, the enforcement of the search warrant in Angeles City, which was outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC Manila, was in violation of the law.

The petitioners’ contention lacks merit.A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines

on the enforceability of search warrants provided therein shall continue until further orders from this Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled Guidelines On The Selection And Designation Of Executive Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the71

VOL. 604, OCTOBER 16, 2009 71

Marimla vs. People

RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, to wit:25

Specific Powers, Prerogatives and Duties of V. Chapter

Executive Judges in Judicial Supervision

12. “Sec.Issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the Regional Trial

Courts of Manila and Quezon City.—The Executive Judges and, whenever they are on official

leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges of the

RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed by the National

Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task

Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal

possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous

Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the

Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted

by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court.

The applications shall be personally endorsed by the heads of such agencies and shall

particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be

seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive Judges

concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in places outside the

territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.

The Executive Judges and the authorized Judges shall keep a special docket book listing

names of Judges to whom the applications are assigned, the details of the applications and the

results of the searches and seizures made pursuant to the warrants issued.

This Section shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.” (italics

ours)

In sum, we cannot find any irregularity or abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Omar T. Viola for denying petitioners’ Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized. On the contrary, Judge Guariña III_______________

25 Effectivity date is February 15, 2004.


Marimla vs. People

had complied with the procedural and substantive requirements for issuing the questioned search warrant.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The Orders dated September 6, 2002 and April 21, 2003, both issued by respondent Judge Omar T. Viola of the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 57, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.Nachura,*** Brion,**** Peralta***** and Bersamin, JJ.,

concur.Petition dismissed, orders affirmed.Notes.—Inferior courts must be modest enough to

consciously realize the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation. (Villaflor vs. Amatong, 344 SCRA 570 [2000])

Considering that a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari should be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. (Honoridez vs. Mahinay, 466 SCRA 646 [2005])

G.R. No. 117412. December 8, 2000*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VALENTINO C. ORTIZ, respondents.

Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants; The general rule is that search warrants must be served during the daytime, though, as an exception, a search at any reasonable hour of the day or night, may be made when the application asserts that the property is on the person

or place ordered to be searched; Absent an abuse of discretion, a search conducted at night where so allowed is not improper.—The general rule is that search warrants must be served during the daytime. However, the rule allows an exception, namely, a search at any reasonable hour of the day or night, when the application asserts that the property is on the person or place ordered to be searched. In the instant case, the judge issuing the warrant relied on the positive assertion of the applicant and his witnesses that the firearms and ammunition were kept at private respondent’s residence. Evidently, the court issuing the warrant was satisfied that the affidavits of the applicants clearly satisfied the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The rule on issuance of a search warrant allows for the exercise of judicial discretion in fixing the time within which the warrant may be served, subject to the statutory requirement fixing the maximum time for the execution of a warrant. We have examined the application for search warrant, and the deposition of the witnesses supporting said application, and find that both satisfactorily comply with the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126. The inescapable conclusion is that the judge who issued the questioned warrant did not abuse his discretion in allowing a search “at any reasonable hour of the day or night.” Absent such abuse of discretion, a search conducted at night where so allowed, is not improper.

Same; Same; Judicial Notice; The Court takes judicial notice that 7:30 P.M. in a suburban subdivision in Metro Manila is an hour at which the residents are still up-and-about.—Petitioner submits that 7:30 P.M. is a reasonable time for executing a search warrant in the metropolis. We

find no reason to declare the contrary. The exact time of the execution of a warrant should be left to the discretion of the law enforcement officers. And in judging the conduct of said officers, judicial notice may be taken not just of the realities of law enforcement, but also the prevailing conditions in the place to be searched. We take judicial notice that 7:30 P.M. in_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.


People vs. Court of Appeals

a suburban subdivision in Metro Manila is an hour at which the residents are still up-and-about. To hold said hour as an unreasonable time to serve a warrant would not only hamper law enforcement, but could also lead to absurd results, enabling criminals to conceal their illegal activities by pursuing such activities only at night.

Same; Same; The policy behind the prohibition of nighttime searches in the absence of specific judicial authorization is to protect the public from the abrasiveness of official intrusions.—The policy behind the prohibition of nighttime searches in the absence of specific judicial authorization is to protect the public from the abrasiveness of official intrusions. A nighttime search is a serious violation of privacy. In the instant case, there is no showing that the search which began at 7:30 P.M. caused an “abrupt intrusion upon sleeping residents in the dark” or that it caused private respondent’s family such prejudice as to make the execution of the warrant a voidable act. In finding that the duration of the search could have caused “inconvenience” for private

respondent’s family, the appellate court resorted to surmises and conjectures. Moreover, no exact time limit can be placed on the duration of a search.

Same; Same; “Witness to Search” Rule; In the absence of the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family, the witness-to-search rule allows the search to be made “in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.—We find merit in the petitioner’s argument that private respondent’s wife had no justifiable reason to refuse to be a witness to the search and that her refusal to be a witness cannot hamper the performance of official duty. In the absence of the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family, the witness-to-search rule allows the search to be made “in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.” There was no irregularity when the PNP-CISC team asked the bailiff of the Parañaque court and the barangay security officer to act as witnesses to the search. To hold otherwise would allow lawful searches to be frustrated by the mere refusal of those required by law to be witnesses.PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for the People. Joaquin “Bobby” Yuseco for private respondent.455

VOL. 347, DECEMBER 8, 2000 455


QUISUMBING, J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the

decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on September 27, 1994, in CA-G.R. SP No. 301291. Thedecretal portion of the assaileddecision reads:“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly the respondent court’s Order of 25

January 1993 is hereby SET ASIDE and the firearms and ammunition irregularly and

unreasonably seized pursuant to the search warrant of 13 August 1992 are declared

inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding, consequently to be disposed of by

the respondent court pursuant to applicablelaw.

“SO ORDERED.”1

The facts of the present case, as adopted from the findings of the Office of the SolicitorGeneral, are as follows:

On August 13, 1992, operatives of the Philippine National Police-Special Investigation Service Command (PNP-CISC) were conducting a surveillance of suspected drug-pushing activities at the Regine Condominium, Makati Avenue, Makati City. Among their targeted suspects was private respondent Valentino “Toto” Ortiz. Spotting the latter alighting from his Cherokee jeep and noting that he had a suspiciously bulging pants pocket,2 the police officers immediately moved in and accosted him. Ortiz was frisked and yielded an unlicensed .25 caliber “Raven” automatic pistol SN-930291 with one magazine and seven rounds of live .25 caliber ammunition. A search of his vehicle resulted in the retrieval of a sealed cellophane packet of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu” from the glove compartment. The police then took private respondent into custody.

Later that same day, the PNP-CISC applied for a search warrant against private respondent for violation of P.D. 18663 with the_______________

1 Rollo,p.54.

2 Id.at 55.

3 The decree is entitled “Codifying The Laws On Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing In,

Acquisition Or Disposition Of Firearms, Ammunition Or Explosives Or Instruments Used In The Manufac-



Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Parañaque, Branch 77. Supporting the application were the depositions of two police officers asserting that they had personal knowledge that private respondent was keeping in his residence at 148-D Peru Street, Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila, the following unlicensed firearms: “Baby armalite M-16;4 Shotgun, 12 g; pistol cal. 9mm; pistol cal. 45 and withcorrespondingammunitions(sic).”5

On the same day, the MTC judge issued Search Warrant No. 92-94 commanding the PNP officers “to make an immediate search at any reasonable hour of the day or night of the house/s, closed receptacles and premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession”6 the personal property subject of the offense described in thewarrant.

Armed with aforesaid warrant, a PNP CISC-Special Investigation Group (SIG) team, accompanied by a representative of the MTC judge and a barangay security officer, went to private respondent’s residence in Parañaque at about 7:30 P.M. of the

same date to search said premises. Private respondent’s wife and their child’s nanny were both present during the search, but neither consented to be a witness to the search. The search resulted in the seizureof the following unlicensed firearms and ammunition:

1. “a.One (1) pistolcal. 9mm SN-19289232. b.One (1) M16 Rifle (Baby Armalite) SN-

90156203. c.One (1) 12 gauge shotgun SN-K5934494. d.Six (6) liveammo, for shotgun.5. e.One hundred eighteen (118)live ammo for

pistol cal. 9mm6. f.Sixteen (16)live ammo, for M16 rifle7. g.Thirty (30) live ammo, for pistol cal. 458. h.One (1) magazine forpistolcal.9mm9. i.One (1) magazine (short) for M16 rifle.”7

_______________

ture Of Firearms, Ammunition Or Explosives, And Imposing Stiffer Penalties For Certain Violations

Thereof And For RelevantPurposes.”

4 Properly, the US caliber 5.56 mm (.223) Colt CAR-15 or XM-177 carbine versionof the standardColt M-

16/M-16A1 assault rifle.

5 Supra Note 1,at57.

6 Id.at 58.

7 Id. at 59.

457VOL. 347, DECEMBER 8, 2000 457


Private respondent’s wife signed a receipt for the seized firearms and ammunition.

On August 17, 1992, a return of search warrant was executed and filed by the police with the issuing court.

At the preliminary investigation, the investigating state prosecutor ruled the warrantless search of private respondent’s person and jeep in Makati invalid for violating his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.8 However, the prosecutor found the search conducted in Parañaquevalid.

On August 25, 1992, private respondent was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, in Criminal Case No. 92-5475, with violating Section 1 of P.D. No.1866. The information alleged:“That on or about August 13, 1992 in the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila, Philippines

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, did then and there,

wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniouslyhavein his possession,

1. a.One (1) pistol cal. 9mm SN-1928923

2. b.One (1) M16 Rifle (Baby Armalite) SN-9015620

3. c.One (1) 12 gauge shotgun SN-K593449

4. d.Six (6) liveammo, for shotgun.

5. e.One hundred eighteen (118)rds ammo for pistol cal. 9mm

6. f.Sixteen (16)live ammos (sic), for M16 rifle

7. g.Thirty (30) live ammo for pistol cal. 45

withoutlawful authority therefore.

CONTRARY TO LAW.” 9

On September 25, 1992, private respondent moved for reinvestigation alleging that the dismissal of the charges against him arising from the illegal search and seizure in Makati also applied to the search conducted in his house in Parañaque. The trial court denied the same. Private respondent moved for

reconsideration and deferral of arraignment, but said motions were likewise denied._______________

8 CONST. Art. III, sec. 2.

9 Supra Note 7at71.



On November 23, 1992, private respondent moved to quash the search warrant on the following grounds: (1) that he was not present when his house was searched since he was then detained at Camp Crame; (2) that the search warrant was not shown to his wife; and (3) that the search was conducted in violation of the witness-to-search rule. The trial court denied the motion to quash for lack of merit.

On February 5, 1993, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, CA-G.R. SP No. 30129, for certiorari and prohibition of the order of the trial court denying his motion to quash search warrant.

On September 27, 1994, the appellate court promulgated its decision declaring as inadmissible in evidence the firearms and ammunition seized pursuant to Search Warrant No. 92-94.

Hence, the instant case anchored on the following assignments of error:

I

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EXECUTION OF THE SEARCH

WARRANT AT 7:30 P.M. WAS UNREASONABLE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE WARRANT ITSELF

AUTHORIZED SEARCH AT NIGHT.

II

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF

THE SEARCH WARRANT VIOLATED SECTION 7 RULE 126 OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE.

III

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NO RETURN WAS

PREPARED WHEN ANNEX “G” WAS PREPARED AND SUBMITTED BY CHIEF INSP. JESUS A.

VERSOZA, GROUP COMMANDER OF SIG, CISC, CAMP CRAME.

IV

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PROSECUTION

INVOKED A PRESUMPTION WITHOUT SHOWING BY LEGALLY ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THE

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

459VOL. 347, DECEMBER 8, 2000 459


SEARCH WARRANT WAS IMPLEMENTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.

Petitioner’s grounds for this petition may be reduced to one issue: Whether or not the court a quo erred in holding that the firearms and ammunition seized from private respondent’s house are inadmissible as evidence for being the fruits of an illegal search.

The appellate court ruled the search wanting in due process for having been done at an unreasonable time of the evening causing “inconvenience” to the occupants of private respondent’s house, especially as there was no showing how long the nighttime search lasted. The court a quo applied the doctrine in Asian Surety & Insurance Co. v. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312 (1973), where we invalidated a nighttime search conducted on the basis of a warrant which did not specify the time during which the search was to be made.

Before us, petitioner contends that Asian Surety is inapplicable since the search warrant specified that the search be made at a reasonable hour of day or night.

The rule governing the time of service of search warrants is Section 8 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which provides:“Sec. 8. Time of making search.—The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time,

unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be

searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or

night.”

The general rule is that search warrants must be served during the daytime. However, the rule allows an exception, namely, a search at any reasonable hour of the day or night, when the application asserts that the property is on the person or place ordered to be searched. In the instant case, the judge issuing the warrant relied on the positive assertion of the applicant and his witnesses that the firearms and ammunition were kept at private respondent’s residence. Evidently, the court issuing the warrant was satisfied that the affidavits of the applicants clearly satisfied the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The rule on issuance of a search warrant allows for the exercise of judicial discretion in fixing the time within which the warrant may be



served, subject to the statutory requirement10 fixing the maximum time for the execution of a

warrant.11 We have examined the application for search warrant,12 and the deposition of the witnesses supporting said application,13and find that both satisfactorily comply with the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126. The inescapable conclusion is that the judge who issued the questioned warrant did not abuse his discretion in allowing a search “at any reasonable hour of the day or night.” Absent such abuse of discretion, a search conducted at nightwhere so allowed, is not improper.14

As prescribed in Adm. Circular No. 13 of the Supreme Court dated October 1, 1985:“e. Search warrants must be in duplicate, both signed by the judge. The duplicate copy thereof

must be given to the person against whom the warrant is issued and served. Both copies of the

warrant must indicate the date until when the warrant shall be valid and must direct that it be

served in the daytime. If the judge is satisfied that the property is in the person or in the place

ordered to be searched, a direction may be inserted in the warrantsthatit be servedat anytime

of theday or night;”

But was the time during which the search was effected “reasonable?”

Petitioner submits that 7:30 P.M. is a reasonable time for executing a search warrant in the metropolis. We find no reason to declare the contrary. The exact time of the execution of a warrant should be left to the discretion of the law enforcement officers.15 And in judging the conduct of said officers, judicial notice may be taken not just of the realities of law enforcement, but also the prevailing conditions in the place to be searched. We take judicial notice that 7:30 P.M. in a suburban subdivision in Metro Manila is an hour at which the residents are still up-and-about. To hold said hour as

an unreasonable time to serve a warrant would not only_______________

10 RULES OF COURT, Rule 126, Sec. 9.

11 Simmons v. State, 286 P2d. 296.

12 Supra Note 7,at 56.

13 Id. at 57.

14 State v. Eichhorn, 353 NE 2d 861.

15 State v. Moreno, 222 Kan 149, 563 P2d 1056.

461VOL. 347, DECEMBER 8, 2000 461


hamper law enforcement, but could also lead to absurd results, enabling criminals to conceal their illegal activities by pursuing such activitiesonly at night.16

The policy behind the prohibition of nighttime searches in the absence of specific judicial authorization is to protect the public from the abrasiveness of official intrusions.17 A nighttime search is a serious violation of privacy.18 In the instant case, there is no showing that the search which began at 7:30 P.M. caused an “abrupt intrusion upon sleeping residents in the dark”19 or that it caused private respondent’s family such prejudice as to make the execution of the warrant a voidable act. In finding that the duration of the search could have caused “inconvenience” for private respondent’s family, the appellate court resorted to surmises and conjectures. Moreover, no exact time limit can be placed on the durationof a search.20

But was the witness-to-search rule violated by the police officers who conducted the search notwithstanding the absence of private respondent and despite the refusal of the members of his household to act as witnesses to the search?

The witness-to-search rule is embodied in Section 7 of Rule 126, which reads:“Sec. 7. Search of house, room, or premise, to be made in presence of two witnesses.—No

search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the

lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the

presence of two witnesses of sufficientage and discretion residing in the same locality.”

Petitioner submits that there was no violation of the aforementioned rule since the searchers were justified in availing of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion, after respondent’s wife_______________

16 US v. Plemmons, 336 F2d 731.

17 State v. Schmeets, 278 NW 2d 401.

18 People v. Watson, 142 Cal. Rptr 245, 75 CA 3d593.

19 US v. Young, 877 F2d 1099; US v. Escott, 205 F. Supp. 196; US v. Joseph, 174 F. Supp. 439, affd. 278

F2d 504, cert den 364 US 823, 5 L.Ed. 2d 52, 81 S. Ct. 59.

20 State v. Williams, 169 Conn 322, 363A2d72.



and maid refused. The regularity of the search is best evidenced by the “Certification of Orderly Search” and the receipt of the property seized signed by respondent’s wife.

We find merit in the petitioner’s argument that private respondent’s wife had no justifiable reason to refuse to be a witness to the search and that her

refusal to be a witness cannot hamper the performance of official duty. In the absence of the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family, the witness-to-search rule allows the search to be made “in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.” There was no irregularity when the PNP-CISC team asked the bailiff of the Parañaque court and the barangay security officer to act as witnesses to the search. To hold otherwise would allow lawful searches to be frustrated by the mere refusal of those required by law to be witnesses.

In our view, the conduct of the nighttime search was reasonable under the circumstances in this case. The unlicensed firearms and ammunition taken from private respondent’s residence pursuant to Search Warrant No. 92-94 are admissible in evidence against private respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision dated September 24, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 30129 is REVERSED and NULLIFIED. The firearms and ammunition seized from the residence of the Valentino C. Ortiz, pursuant to the search warrant issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paranaque, dated August 13, 1992, shall be admissible as evidence in proceedings instituted by the State.

SO ORDERED. Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De

Leon, Jr.; JJ., concur.Petition granted, judgment reversed and nullified.

Notes.—The place the police officers have in mind in applying for a search warrant must be the same place the Judge should have in mind when he issues the warrant. (People vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 400 [1998])

463VOL. 347, DECEMBER 8, 2000 463

Ramoso vs. Courtof Appeals

The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. (Uy vs. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 344 SCRA 36 [2000])

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