Criterion Vol 3 No 2

Criterion

April/June 2008

Volume 3, Number 2

EditorialNew Government, Old Problems S. Mushfi q Murshed 3

Governance Reforms in Pakistan Ishrat Husain 8

A Liberal Islam in South Asia A.G. Noorani 25

Muslim Radicalism, Western Concerns. Tanvir Ahmad Khan 47

The Bomber and the Burqa Farhana Ali 65

The Law of Aerial Bombardment and Civil Casualties: Kosovo and Afghanistan Prof. Hayatullah Khan 86

Security Alliances and Security Concerns: Pakistan and NATO Shahwar Junaid 121

Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto’s Legacy and the Rebuilding of Pakistan Iqbal Ahmad Khan 138

EssaysOf Tongues and Languages: The Tao of Translation Toheed Ahmad 163

Dimension and Consequences of NATOExpansion to Eurasia:Reviewing Iran’s Security Environment Arif Kemal 187

Publisher

S. Iftikhar Murshed

Editor-in-Chief

S. Mushfi q Murshed

Consulting Editor

Tanvir Ahmad Khan

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S. Mashkoor MurshedRiaz Khokhar

Aziz Ahmad KhanFiazullah khilji

Editors

Muzaffar Abbas (Executive)Navid Zafar (Research)

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Editorial

NEW GOVERNMENT, OLD PROBLEMS

Despite the imperfections of the 18 February election, the outcome

was consequential. Analysts have waxed eloquent about the rout of the

so-called king’s party and the religious right as well as the ascendancy

of moderates.

Yet indecision typified the victors of the election who, for several

weeks, procrastinated on government formation. While politicians

dithered about power sharing, chaos ensued. Extremists unleashed a

chain of suicide bombings in the main cities of Pakistan.

Negotiations for establishing a national consensus government at

the centre culminated in the Murree Declaration between the PPP and

the PML (N). The six-point document contained the following critical

element:

“This has been decided in today’s summit between the PPP and

PML(N) that the deposed judges would be restored on the position as

they were on November 2, 2007, within 30 days of the formation of the

Federal Government through a parliamentary resolution.”

Self-adulation and premature optimism ensued obscuring a

fundamental flaw in the arrangement which led to the formation of the

coalition government. Joint statements and overly optimistic banter

camouflaged a core difference between the two parties.

PPP co-chairman Zardari, like president Musharraf, is apprehensive

about the restoration of the pre-3 November 2007 judiciary. For the

former, the possibility of a reversal of the National Reconciliation

Ordinance weighs heavily while the latter fears the invalidation of the 5

4

Editorial

CRITERION – Volume 3 No.2

October presidential election.

Nawaz Sharif, despite the attack on the Supreme Court by PML

loyalists during his second prime ministerial term, has extended full-

fledged support to the lawyer’s movement on the restoration of the judges.

Any other course would have been unacceptable to civil society and

resulted in adverse political consequences. Should the two mainstream

parties fall apart, a new PPP-led coalition can be put together at the

centre while the Punjab would be governed by the PML (N). This would

be reminiscent of the friction between the centre and Punjab in the late

1980’s when the two parties were bitter adversaries.

After intra-party negotiations and inter-party conspiracies, Syed

Yousaf Raza Gillani secured a unanimous and unprecedented vote of

confidence from the National Assembly and was finally sworn in as

prime minister on 25 March 2008.

Gillani’s first act as prime minister was to free the judges under

house arrest. This resounded positively countrywide and rekindled

the hope that the Murree Declaration would be implemented in letter

and spirit. The lawyers’ fraternity accordingly decided to hold their

agitation in abeyance in order to enable the government to work out the

modalities for the restoration of the judges.

In his maiden speech the prime minister also declared: “The war

on terror has become our war, because it has posed serious threats to

our own country.” The measures enunciated by Gillani to deal with

the problem of extremist violence include a comprehensive economic

and social package for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the

prospective scrapping of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, and Madrassa

reforms.

The prime minister extended the olive branch to militants. While

addressing the parliament on 29 March 2008 he said, “We are ready

to talk to all those people who are ready to give up arms and embrace

peace.” The Tehreek-e-Taliban, in response to this offer, laid down its

own preconditions which include the imposition of Shariah and Jirga

5

Editorial

CRITERION – April/June 2008

system and severance of all ties with the US. The Taliban leaders

reiterated that their jihad against the Americans in Afghanistan would

continue and that they would oppose Pakistan if it worked for “American

interests as its ally.”

This show of confidence and arrogance on the part of the Taliban

is indicative of the dominance they have over the tribal areas and their

utter disregard for the writ of the state.

A similar situation prevails in Swat. The militants that were routed

by the army a few months ago have regrouped and returned under the

leadership of Maullanah Fazlullah. The NWFP government has been

negotiating with them and the prospect of implementing the Shariah is

on the cards.

Negotiations under these conditions and dictates should not even be

considered by the government. These miscreants and their oppressive

and obscurantist interpretation of Islam cannot be given such leeway.

Any compromise by the state will further embolden their movement.

Cowardly suicide bomb attacks on women, children and girls schools

will become a norm in all cities of Pakistan. The Lal Masjid episode,

the weak-kneed reaction of the state and the chaos that followed in the

federal capital is an example of what can be expected.

The problem is complex and multi-layered. The solution lies in a

mix of military, political, economic and ideological initiatives.

Gen Kayani has affirmed the constitutional obligations of the

armed forces and this means the military has to be depoliticised and

work in tandem with the elected government. Only then can an effective

civilian-military partnership so essential for the fight against terror be

established. The ban on army officers from associating with politicians

and their recall from civilian posts are welcome first steps.

Politically, the old administrative system of assistant commissioners,

deputy commissioners and commissioners has to be revived. In FATA,

the responsibility of dealing with the tribesmen, who should be associated

6

Editorial


with implementing state policy, must revert to the political agent.

The Political Parties Act of 1962 has to be implemented in the tribal

areas. The lack of secular political parties has provided religious outfits

an unopposed playing field through the management of mosques and

madrassas.

Madrassas have been referred to as “factories of terror” as they have

been used to train and indoctrinate militants in Pakistan. One of the

prime reasons for the success of the seminaries has been their ability

and willingness to offer basic amenities, such as board, lodging and

education, which the state has failed to provide to families living below

the poverty line.

The government has to reclaim the public services provided by

religious seminaries. Massive projects on a national level pertaining to

low income housing, educational and vocational training, health care

and employment opportunities have to be implemented. A recent study

has shown that amongst the approximate 1.8 million students enrolled

in madrassas, economic and social reasons account for 89.58 percent

of madrassa enrolment and the remaining 10.42 percent for religious,

educational and political considerations. Once these basic necessities

are met only then can the ideological battle against extremist violence

yield results.

Recently Sheykh Waheeduddin Khan, a prominent Indian scholar

stated that Dajjal, a concept that some theologians equate with the

Islamic antichrist, is not a person, but is a manifestation of violence

and terrorism. Shortly afterwards, no less than 20,000 Deobandi clerics

collectively declared terrorism as un-Islamic.

The Taliban in Pakistan are also mostly Deobandis although the

links with the Dar-ul-Uloom of India were severed after partition in

1947 and replaced by Wahabi influence and money. The question that

arises here is whether genuine madrassa reform can eventually erode the

extremist ideology taught in the seminaries of Pakistan.

7

Editorial


This four-pronged political, military, economic and ideological

approach to effectively combat terrorism can only yield results through

a collective effort involving the elected government, a reformed military

and above all civil society.

The new government faces formidable challenges. It has inherited

a constitutional crisis, terrorism, power outages, inflation and food

shortages. However, the problems are not insurmountable and can be

overcome through pragmatic measures reinforced by good governance.

S. Mushfi q Murshed

Editor-in-Chief

GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN

PAKISTAN

Ishrat Husain *

Abstract(Broad-based economic growth and social development are

inextricably linked to good governance. Through the years, various

commissions and committees have been established in Pakistan to

reform the administrative system. These have failed. The reluctance to

grant adequate provincial autonomy and over-centralization impeded

both good governance and development at the local level. The striking

down of the statutory job security guarantees, the erosion of real incomes

and political patronage have cumulatively impacted adversely on the

quality and effi ciency of the civil services. The National Commission for

Government Reforms, established in April 2006, has been working on an

agenda designed to restructure government and revitalize institutions.

The provision of education, health care, water sanitation and security

have been identifi ed as the core functions of the state. It remains to

be seen whether workable proposals are eventually formulated and

faithfully implemented for the benefi t of ordinary citizens. Editor).

Governance, Institutions and Development

The link between good governance and economic and social

development has been well established in the last few decades. Although

it is hard to have a precise defi nition of governance there is a wide

consensus that good governance must lead to broad-based inclusive

economic growth and social development. It must enable the state, the

civil society and the private sector to enhance the wellbeing of a large

* Ishrat Husain is a former governor of the State Bank of Pakistan , former chairman

National Commission on Government Reforms and presently Director Institute of Business

Administration.

9

Governance Reforms in Pakistan


segment of the population. If this defi nition is accepted then economic

growth in Pakistan is likely to become unsustainable if a widespread

perception persists that the majority of the population has not been

gaining from recent growth. This perception, whether right or wrong,

erodes political support for continuation of present economic policies

and reforms.

Why does this perception persist? The main reason is that the overall

governance structure through which economic policies are intermediated

and translated into economic and social benefi ts for the vast majority

has become corroded and dysfunctional. The governance structure of

any country consists of judiciary, executive and legislature. If access

to the institutions of governance for common citizens is diffi cult, time

consuming and costly, the benefi ts from growth get distributed unevenly

as only those who enjoy preferential access to these institutions are the

gainers. How far is this true can be gauged by reference to the current

state of governance prevailing in the region but particularly applicable in

Pakistan? The 1999 and 2005 reports on Human Development in South

Asia aptly summarize the situation in the following two extracts:

“South Asia presents a fascinating combination of many

contradictions. It has governments that are high on governing and low

on serving; it has parliaments that are elected by the poor but aid the

rich; and society that asserts the rights of some but perpetuates exclusion

for others. Despite a marked improvement in the lives of a few, there

are many in South Asia who have been forgotten by formal institutions

of governance. These are the poor, the downtrodden and the most

vulnerable of the society, suffering from acute deprivation on account

of their income, caste, creed, gender or religion. Their fortunes have not

moved with those of the privileged few and this in itself is a deprivation

of a depressing nature.”

(Human Development South Asia Report, 1999)

“Governance constitutes for {ordinary people} a daily struggle for

survival and dignity. Ordinary people are too often humiliated at the

hands of public institutions. For them, lack of good governance means

police brutality, corruption in accessing basic public services, ghost

10

Ishrat Husain


schools, teacher-absenteeism, missing medicines, high cost of and low

access to justice, criminalization of politics and lack of social justice.

These are just few manifestations of the crisis of governance.”

(Human Development in South Asia Report, 2005)

In the face of this overwhelming evidence of failure of institutions

of governance empirical work across countries suggests that economic

performance is greatly determined by the quality of institutions.

Differences in the quality of institutions help explain the gap in economic

performance between rich and poor nations. In addition to the fi ndings

linking institutions with aggregate growth, there is some association

between the distribution of income and institutional quality with very

unequal distribution of income being associated with a lower quality of

institutional development.

How have institutional reforms been successfully carried out

elsewhere? One of the key factors is that civil servants of high

professional calibre and integrity are attracted, retained and motivated

and allowed the authority and powers to act in the larger interests of

the public at large. This can be accomplished by introducing a merit-

based recruitment system, continuous training and skill up-gradation,

equality of opportunity in career progression, adequate compensation,

proper performance evaluation, fi nancial accountability and rule-based

compliance.

Another important factor is responsiveness to public demands.

The World Bank (1997) in its report asserts that governments are

more effective when they listen to businesses and citizens and work

in partnership with them in deciding and implementing policy. Where

governments lack mechanisms to listen, they are not responsive to

people’s interests. Decentralization can bring in representation of local

business and citizens’ interests.

Is there any evidence about a particular form of government that has

been relatively successful in implementing these reforms? In Pakistan as

elsewhere it has been demonstrated that the nature of the government -

military, democratically elected, nominated, selected – has not mattered

11



much. There is no systematic correlation found between the reforms of

the underlying institutions and a particular form of government. The

challenge of reforming these institutions is formidable as the vested

interests wishing to perpetuate the status quo are politically powerful

and the coalition and alliances between the political leadership and

the benefi ciaries of the existing system are so strong that they cannot

be easily ruptured. The elected governments with an eye on the short

term electoral cycles are not in a position to incur the pains from these

reforms upfront while the gains accrue later on to a different political

party. The authoritarian governments are not effective as they do not

enjoy legitimacy for sustaining reforms. Changing institutions is a slow

and diffi cult process requiring, in addition to signifi cant political will,

fundamental but tough measures to reduce the opportunity and incentives

for powerful groups to capture economic rents.

The imperatives of globalization in the 21st century have given a

further impetus to governance reforms. The pathway for countries as

to how they can successfully compete with other countries and surge

ahead is clearly laid out. The successful countries can bring about

an improvement in the wellbeing of their population through markets,

trade, investment and exchange. But the state has to play an equally

important role in nurturing and creating markets that foster competition

and provide information about opportunities to all participants, acting

against collusion and monopolistic practices, building capabilities and

skills of people to engage in productive activities, setting the rules of

the game in a transparent manner and adjudicating and resolving the

disputes in a fair and equitable manner. To perform these functions the

capacity, competencies and responsiveness of the institutions of state

have to be upgraded along with the rules, enforcement mechanisms,

organizational structures and incentives.

According to Acemoglu and Johnson, (2003) good institutions

ensure two desirable outcomes - that there is a relatively equal access to

economic opportunity (a level playing fi eld) and that those who provide

labour or capital are appropriately rewarded and their property rights are

protected.

12

Ishrat Husain


The above analysis and the future needs indicate clearly that

institutions play a critical role in economic performance and distributional

consequences. The question that arises is how these institutions can

be made effective and functional in the context of Pakistan so that the

majority of the population are accorded the opportunity to engage in

fruitful market activity and improve their wellbeing through their own

efforts and through the interventions of the state? Before the agenda

for reforms in Pakistan is spelled out, it is essential that the historical

evolution of governance is examined in order to understand the context

in which this agenda is to be implemented.

History of Governance in Pakistan

At the time of its independence, Pakistan inherited a well-functioning

structure of judiciary, civil service and military but a relatively weak

legislative oversight. Over time, the domination of the civil service

and the military in affairs of the state disrupted the evolution of the

democratic political process and further weakened the legislative organ

of the state. The judicial arm, with few exceptions, trudged along

vindicating the dominant role of the military and the civil service.

The institutions inherited from the British colonial era, suited and

were relevant to the requirements of the rulers of those times. After

independence, those requirements expanded in scope and content

while the level of expectations from the public and their elected

representatives was heightened. But these inherited institutions failed to

adapt themselves to meet the new challenges of development and social

changes and respond to the heightened expectations and aspirations of a

free people. The “business as usual” mode of functioning, the approach

and attitudes of the incumbents holding top and middle-level positions

in the bureaucracy and manning these institutions did not endear them to

either the political leaders or to the general public. Several commissions

and committees were constituted in the fi rst twenty fi ve years after

independence for reform of the administrative structure and civil

services. Some changes were introduced during Ayub Khan’s regime in

the 1960s to improve the effi ciency of the secretariats but the proclivity

towards centralized controls and personalized decision making became

13



more pronounced in this period. The reluctance to grant provincial

autonomy to East Pakistan – the most populous province of the country

- so remote physically from the hub of decision making i.e., Islamabad

led to a serious political backlash and eventual dismemberment of the

country into two independent nations.

Pakistan continued to suffer from what has been termed as “confused

federalism” in which weak local and provincial bodies are unable to

match the ability of the central government to mobilize resources and

provide services. Whether it is health or education or highways or

agriculture, the federal government has much larger programmes under

implementation than the provincial or local governments. Although the

money is spent in the provinces or districts, the inability to identify,

design, approve and implement these projects caused resentment among

the provincial governments.

In 1973, a populist government headed by the charismatic Zulfi kar

Ali Bhutto took the fi rst step to weaken the pervasive hold of the civil

services by eliminating the constitutional guarantee of job security. He

also demolished the exclusive and privileged role of the Civil Service

of Pakistan (CSP) within the overall structure of the administrative

system.

The next twenty fi ve years witnessed a signifi cant decline in the

quality of new recruits to the civil services as the implicit trade-off between

job security and low compensation ceased to operate. Furthermore, the

expanding private sector including multinational corporations offered

far more attractive career opportunities. The erosion of real wages in

the public sector over time also resulted in low morale, de-motivation as

well as ineffi ciency and, in the process, corruption became widespread

in all echelons of the civil services. The abuse of discretionary powers,

the bureaucratic obstruction and the delaying tactics adopted by the

government functionaries are all part of the manoeuvring to extract

illegal benefi ts for supplementing their emoluments. In real terms the

compensation paid to higher civil servants is only one half of the 1994

package. The low wages mean that the civil service no longer attracts

the most talented young men and women. Some of the incumbents of the

14

Ishrat Husain


civil services, in their instinct of self-preservation, became vulnerable

to the machinations of the political regimes in power and many of them

got identifi ed with one political party or the other. They also benefi ted

from the culture of patronage practised by the politicians. During the

1990s the replacement of one political party by the other in the corridors

of power was followed by changes in the top bureaucracy. This growing

tendency of informal political affi liation for tenaciously holding on to

key jobs was also responsible for the end of an impartial, neutral and

competent civil service responsive to the needs of the common man.

Loyalty to the ministers, the chief ministers and the prime ministers

took priority over the accountability to the general public. The frequent

takeovers by the military regimes and the consequential screening of

hundreds of civil servants led to subservience of the civil service to the

military rulers, erosion of the authority of the traditional institutions of

governance and loss of initiative by the higher bureaucracy.

The 2001 devolution plan dealt another major blow to the Civil

Service of Pakistan as the posts of commissioners, deputy commissioners

(DC) and assistant commissioners (AC) were abolished and the reins of

district administration were transferred to the elected nazims. To ordinary

citizens, the government was most tangibly embodied in these civil

servants. It was the DC and AC that they approached on a daily basis. The

substitution of the civil servant by an elected head of the administration

is quite a new phenomenon and will take some time to sink in. While this

transition takes place, the checks and balances implicit in the previous

administrative setup have become redundant. The police as a coercive

force has, as a consequence, assumed greater clout. The opportunities of

collusion between the nazim and the police have multiplied and in many

instances alienated the common citizens and diluted the impartiality

of the administration at the grass roots levels. The sanctity of private

property rights has been threatened in several cases when the nazims

have given orders to make unauthorized changes in the land records in

the rural areas in collusion with the government functionaries to benefi t

themselves and their cronies. The district administration is yet to grow

as an autonomous institution in the face of a hostile environment of

centralizing administration, and inequitable resource distribution.

15



Reform Agenda for Pakistan

The governance reform agenda for the future should therefore be

designed to aim at restructuring government and revitalizing institutions

to deliver the core functions of the state i.e., provision of basic services

– education, health, water sanitation and security – to common citizens

in an effective and effi cient manner and to promote inclusive markets

through which all citizens have equal opportunities to participate in the

economy. The restructuring should lower transaction costs and provide

access without frictions by curtailing arbitrary exercise of discretionary

powers, reducing over-taxation, minimizing corruption, cronyism and

collusion and ensuring public order and security of life and property.

To achieve sustained economic growth, a competitive private

sector has to be nurtured and relied upon. Therefore a major area of

reforms in Pakistan is to create space for the growth of new entrants

in the private sector by removing the constraints created by the state

in their entry and smooth operations. Despite the pursuit of policies of

liberalization, deregulation, de-licensing and disinvestment during the

last fi fteen years, the overbearing burden of government interventions

in the business life cycle looms large. The diffi culties faced by new

businesses in acquiring, titling, pricing, transferring and possessing of

land, in obtaining no objection certifi cates from various agencies, in

getting water and gas connections, sewerage facilities, reliable electricity

supply, access roads, in securing fi nances for green fi eld projects or new

enterprises using emerging technologies are still horrendous and nerve

wrecking. The powers of petty inspectors from various departments/

agencies are so vast that they can either make or break a business. The

growing trend towards “informalization” of the economy particularly

by small and medium enterprises is a testimony to the still dominant

nature of the government. Over 96 percent of the establishments reported

in the economic census of 2005 fall in this category. The attitude of

middle and lower functionaries of the government in the provinces

and districts towards private business remains ambivalent. Either the

functionaries harass the business to extract pecuniary and non-pecuniary

benefi ts for themselves or they are simply distrustful, hostile or hesitant

towards private entrepreneurs. The multiple agencies involved, too

16

Ishrat Husain


many clearances needed and avoidable delays at every level raise the

transaction costs for new entrants. Unless the ease of entry and exit is

facilitated the competitive forces will remain at bay and the collusive

and monopolistic practices of the large businesses will continue to hurt

the consumers and common citizens.

The second area is the absence of accountability for results. There

is both too much and too little accountability of those involved in

public affairs in Pakistan. On the one hand, the plethora of laws and

institutions such as anti-corruption bureaus, National Accountability

Bureau, Auditor General’s reports, Public Accounts Committees of

the legislature, parliamentary oversight, judicial activism and the

ombudsman system have created an atmosphere of fear, inertia and

lack of decision making among the civil servants. On the other hand,

instances of rampant corruption, malpractices, nepotism and favouritism

and waste and ineffi ciency have become common occurrences in the

administrative culture of the country. Too much emphasis on the

ritualistic compliance with procedures, rules and form has taken the

place of substantive concerns with the results and outcomes for welfare

and justice.

Introducing transparency through simplifi cation of rules and

regulations, codifi cation and updating and wide dissemination through

e-governance tools such as a dynamic websites, information kiosks, on-

line access to the government functionaries can help in enforcing internal

accountability standards while, at the same time, making it convenient

for the citizens to carry out hassle-free transactions. Strong pressure

from organized civil society advocacy groups on specifi c sectors or

activities from the media, the political parties, private sector and think

tanks can also compel the government departments and ministries to

become more accountable for the results.

The third area of reforms has to do with the size, structure, scope

of the federal, provincial and local governments; the skills, incentives

and competencies of the civil servants. The entire value chain of human

resource policy from recruitment to compensation needs to the reviewed

and redesigned. Similarly the division of functions and responsibilities

17



between the different tiers of the government has to be clarifi ed and

delineated. The elongated hierarchy within the ministry/division has

to be trimmed down and the relationship between the ministry and the

executive departments, autonomous bodies has to be redefi ned.

The governance agenda outlined above should not be considered

as a technocratic exercise as it is essentially a political exercise that

takes into account the existing power relationships in which the polity

is rooted. The balancing of diverse interests of the various stakeholders

involves many politically tough choices which cannot be made by the

technocrats. The sustainability of reforms requires broad consultation,

consensus building and communication to articulate the long term vision.

People should see beyond the immediate horizon and buy into the future

changes. Concerns, criticism and scepticism should be addressed. The

scope, phasing, timing, implementation strategies, mitigation measures

for the losers from the reforms should be widely discussed and debated.

If things do not proceed the way they were conceptualized, corrective

actions should be taken in the light of the feedback received. Citizens’

charters, citizens’ surveys and report cards, citizens’ panels and focus

groups should be used as instruments for receiving regular feedback

about the impact of reforms on society and its different segments.

Care should also be taken to ensure that the governance reforms are

not perceived to be driven by external donors. The resistance against

these reforms by internal constituencies is invariably quite fi erce to

begin with but any semblance that they are being carried out under

external pressure will lead to their premature demise. The argument that

externally motivated reforms ignore the domestic context and constraints

and are, therefore, unsuitable gets currency and stiffens the resistance.

However, there is no harm in looking at the successful experiences of

other countries, gain insights or learn lessons from these experiences

and apply them in the specifi c circumstances of Pakistan with suitable

modifi cations.

Guiding Principles for Reforms

The government established the National Commission for

Government Reforms (NCGR) in April 2006 and mandated it to prepare

18

Ishrat Husain


proposals for governance reforms in Pakistan. The Commission decided

that the following broad principles will underpin reforms in each area

of responsibility:

Civil Services

Open, transparent merit–based recruitment to all levels and i)

grades of public services with regional representation as laid

down in the constitution.

Performance–based promotions and career progression for ii)

all public sector employees with compulsory training at post

induction, mid-career and senior management levels.

Equality of opportunities for career advancement to all iii)

employees without preferences or reservations for any

particular class.

Replacement of the concept of Superior Services by equality iv)

among all cadres and non-cadres of public servants.

Grant of a living wage and compensation package including v)

decent retirement benefi ts to all civil servants.

Strict observance of security of tenure of offi ce for a specifi ed vi)

period of time.

Separate cadre of regular civil services at the federal, provincial vii)

and district levels co-existing with contractual appointments.

Creation of an All Pakistan National Executive Service (NES) viii)

for senior management positions drawn through a competitive

process from the federal, provincial and district level civil

servants and outside professionals.

Introduction of three specialized cadres under the NES for ix)

economic management, social sector management and general

management.

Structure of Federal, Provincial and District Governments.

Devolution of powers, responsibilities and resources from the a)

federal to the provincial governments.

Establishing inter-governmental structures with adequate b)

authority and powers to formulate and monitor policy

formulation.

Clear separation of policy making, regulatory and operational c)

19



responsibilities of the ministries/provincial departments.

Making each ministry/provincial department fully empowered, d)

adequately resourced to take decisions and accountable for

results.

Streamline, rationalize and transform the attached departments/e)

autonomous bodies/subordinate offi ces/fi eld offi ces etc.,

into fully functional arms of the ministries for performing

operational and executive functions.

Reduce the number of layers in the hierarchy of each ministry/f)

provincial department.

Cabinet secretary to perform the main coordinating role among g)

the federal secretaries on the lines of the chief secretary in the

provinces.

Revival and strengthening of the secretaries committee at the h)

federal/provincial governments to become the main vehicle for

inter-ministerial coordination and dispute resolution among

various ministries.

District level offi cers interacting with the general public in i)

day-to-day affairs should enjoy adequate powers, authority,

status and privileges to be able to resolve the problems and

redress the grievances of the citizens.

Police, revenue, education, water supply, and health are the j)

departments which are highly relevant for the day-to-day

lives of the ordinary citizen of this country. The internal

governance structures of these departments, public grievance

redress systems against these departments and checks and

balances on the discretionary powers of the offi cials have to

be introduced.

Business process re-engineering

All laws, rules, regulations, circulars, guidelines issued by any i)

government ministry/department/agency should be available

in its most up-dated version to the general public free of cost

in a user-friendly manner on web pages and in electronic and

print forms at public places.

Service standards with timelines for each type of service ii)

rendered at the district, thana and union level should be

20

Ishrat Husain


developed, widely disseminated and posted at public places in

each department.

Rules of business at the federal, provincial and district iii)

governments should be revised to make them simple,

comprehensible empowering the secretaries/heads of

departments/district coordination offi cers to take decisions

without multiple references, clearances and back and forth

movement of fi les. Post-audit of the decisions taken should be

used to ensure accountability rather than prior clearances.

Delegation of fi nancial, administrative, procurement, human iv)

resource management powers should be revisited and adequate

powers commensurate with the authority should be delegated

at each tier of the hierarchy.

Estacode, Financial Rules, Accounting and Audit Rules, v)

Fundamental Rules and all other rules in force should be

reviewed systematically and revised to bring them in line with

modern management practices.

E-government should be gradually introduced in a phased vi)

manner. Technological solutions, hardware and software

applications are the easy part of the process but the most diffi cult

aspect is the training and a change in the culture, attitude and

practices. E-government should be driven by business needs

rather than crafted as an elegant technical solution.

Proposed Approach

There are several ways to approach the task assigned to the National

Commission for Government Reforms (NCGR). One option is to spend

several years in preparing a comprehensive blueprint and plan for

bringing about the desired changes covering all aspects of the structure,

processes and human resource policies of government. This option has

the disadvantage that by the time the report is ready, ground realities

might have changed. Political support for reforms under this approach

is most likely to wane as high costs are incurred upfront in pushing

through complex, unpopular and diffi cult decisions but the benefi ts

of the reforms do not become visible in the lifecycle of the political

regime in power. The advantage of this option is that all defi ciencies and

21



weaknesses are addressed simultaneously in a comprehensive manner.

The second option is to prepare a long-term vision and direction

in which reforms should aim and move but combine this with an

opportunistic approach whereby easy to implement changes are taken up

fi rst and the more diffi cult reforms are taken up later. The disadvantage

of this option is that the changes introduced may be imperceptible and

the time taken for the whole process to complete may be too long. But

the advantage is that incremental changes that create a win-win situation

for all the stakeholders including politicians have a much better chance

of getting accepted and implemented. The Commission has adopted the

second option as the modus-operandi for its working.

The preference for this option which is less elegant and imperfect

lies in a dispassionate reading of the past history of reforms in this

country. A large number of erudite commissions and committees

have spent virtually thousands of man-years in seeking out views and

opinions from a diverse set of opinion makers and public at large,

prepared elaborate diagnostic studies and presented very sensible set of

recommendations. But except for some tinkering here and there most of

the recommendations were not implemented because of lack of political

will and courage.

The sequencing, phasing and timing of the various reforms and their

implementation will be guided by the speed at which consensus is built

among the stakeholders and the decisions are made by the top policy

makers but it is important to lay down the overall direction in which

these reforms will move

While the comprehensive reforms will be implemented incrementally

a second track will also be followed in which some quick-win reforms

will be implemented from time to time as an opportunity presents itself.

For this purpose, the Commission will follow a more fl exible route.

For example, it has decided to focus on four major areas where the

interaction between the ordinary citizen and administrative machinery

of the government is most intense. These four areas are:

Police and enforcement of laws.1.

22

Ishrat Husain


Land revenue administration2.

Education3.

Health4.

The Commission has formed four sub-committees to review and

examine the efforts being made by the government, private sector and

civil society in each of these areas and come up with solutions that will

make the existing system more effi cient and responsive to the needs

of the public in the immediate or short run. The Commission has also

formed another sub-committee to recommend revision in the Rules of

Business for removing impediments in the functioning of the government

departments/ministries/ agencies and empowering the heads of the

departments to deliver results.

The preliminary recommendations of the sub-committees were

presented to focus groups of stakeholders drawn from diverse segments

of society – secretaries committee, political leaders, businessmen, NGOs,

academic refi ned civil servants etc., – for soliciting their feedback and

views. After incorporating the feedback the sub-committees fi nalized

their recommendations which were discussed by the Commission and

then presented for consideration and decisions by the steering committee.

The high-powered steering committee is co-chaired by the president and

prime minister and consists of the four chief ministers. The committee

has decided to provide a legal cover to the Commission so that the

recommendations approved by the steering committee are implemented

by the federal and provincial governments without further reviews.

The Commission will also act as a facilitator and conduit for the

reforms formulated by the federal ministries/ provincial governments

and table them, after its own analysis for the decisions by the steering

committee.

To conclude, those who agree that there is a need for these reforms

have serious reservations about their implementation. They contend

that these reforms cannot be implemented in the real sense unless the

bureaucratic actions are insulated from political interference. According

to this school of thought, the problem of maladministration and poor

23



governance stems from this interference. It must be recognized that in

democratic forms of governance, elected leaders will have to respond

to their political constituents and the associated vested interests. The

accountability for results, rest largely on these politicians and not on the

civil servants. If the interference of the politicians is aimed at serving

the narrow parochial interests of few individuals or groups rather than

the broader collective interests of their constituencies they may end up

paying a heavy price at the time of the next elections. Their opponents,

the opposition parties and the media scrutiny will keep a watch on their

actions and expose them before their constituents. With the passage of

time and successive purges at the elections, the impulse to interfere in

the affairs of the civil servants for personal and parochial factors will

be contained and replaced by the urge to pay greater attention to the

collective interests of their constituents. No system is perfect and some

elected leaders as well as civil servants will continue to misuse their

powers and authority but the extent of such misuse will be reduced with

greater accountability.

24

Ishrat Husain


BIBLIOGRAPHY

World Development Report (1997)1.

World Development Report (2002), Building Institutions for Market 2.

(Washington D.C., World Bank.

World Economic Outlook (205), Building Institutions Chapter-III 3.

(Washington D.C. IMF September).

Acemoglu, D and S. Johnson (2000), ‘Unbundling Institutions’ NBER 4.

WP 9934 (Cambridge Mass. NBER)

Islam, Roumeen and Claudio Montenegro (2002 ‘What Determones 5.

the Qaulity of Institution?’ WB Policy Research Working Paper 2764

(Washington DC World Bank)

Kaufmann D, A. Kray and Zoid-Lobaton (1999) Governance matters, 6.

World Bank Policy Research working paper 2195 (Washington DC

World Bank)

Rodrik D, A. Subramian and F. Trebbiu (2004) “ Institutions Rule: The 7.

primacy of institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic

Development” Journal of Econ-Gmoth Vol. 9 No. 2.

Knack S. and B Keefer (1997) ‘Why don’t poor countries catch-up? A 8.

cross-national test of institutional explanation, Economic Inquiry 35

(July).

A LIBERAL ISLAM IN SOUTH ASIA

A.G. Noorani *

Abstract(Historically intellectual stagnation in the Islamic world long

preceded revivalism and its hideout offshoot, fundamentalism. Western

imperialism inspired revivalism. Its opportunism aided fundamentalism.

Accordingly, any reform in the Islamic world must grapple honestly with

four related tasks: (i) interpretation of some Quranic verses in the light

of the times, as against others which are of enduring relevance for all

time; (ii) weeding out hadith (compilation of the Prophets sayings) of

dubious credibility; (iii) rejection of the authority of the ulema (clerics);

(iv) a sound appreciation of Islam in history, especially the role of the

fi rst four caliphs, as distinct from Islam in the Quran. Author).

“What the Muslim League has done is to set you free from the

reactionary elements of Muslims and to create the opinion that those

who play their selfi sh game are traitors. It has certainly freed you from

that undesirable element of maulvis and maulanas. I am not speaking of

maulvis as a whole class. There are some of them who are as patriotic and

sincere as any other; but there is a section of them which is undesirable.

Having freed ourselves from the clutches of the British Government, the

Congress, the reactionaries and so-called Muslims, may I appeal to the

youth to emancipate our women. This is essential. I do not mean that we

are to ape the evils of the West. What I mean is that they must share our

life, not only social but also political.”1

Even when Jinnah spoke thus at the Muslim University Union in

the Strachey Hall in Aligarh on 5 February 1938, liberal thinking among

the Muslims of the sub-continent was under fi erce attack. Two of their

outstanding thinkers were obliged to compromise fl outing a strong

* A.G. Noorani is an eminent Indian scholar and expert on constitutional issues.

26 CRITERION – Volume 3 No.2

A.G. Noorani

tradition of free thinking that went back to Shah Waliullah (d.1762) and

was nurtured by the founder of the Aligarh Movement, Sir Syed Ahmad

Khan (1817 – 1898) and his yet bolder colleague, Maulvi Cheragh Ali

(1844 -95).

Iqbal gave up a projected work on ijtihad on the advice of Sayyed

Suleiman Nadvi.2 Maulana Azad suppressed the third volume of his

commentary the Tarjuman al-Quran.3

How did this come about? Iqbal explained it all too clearly in the

late 1930s in a letter to Akbar Shah Mujibabadi: “The infl uence of the

professional maulvis had greatly decreased owing to Sir Syed Ahmad

Khan’s movement. But the Khilafat Committee, for the sake of political

fatwas, had restored their infl uence among Indian Muslims. This was a

very big mistake (the effect of) which has, probably, not yet been realized

by anyone. I have had an experience of this recently. I had written an

English essay on ijtihad, which was read in a meeting here and, God

willing, will be published, but some people called me kafi r. We shall

talk at length about this affair, when you come to Lahore. In these days,

particularly in India, one must move with very great circumspection.”4

Jinnah’s secular politics did put the mullahs back in their proper

place. But in 1939, when he propounded the two-Nation theory, they

fl ocked to his support, which he accepted, more so after the 1940

Lahore Resolution on Pakistan. The Congress had begun playing this

game much earlier. It supported not only the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind

but also the Shia Conference. This Jamiat serves in India, still. The

pro-Muslim League ulema founded the All-India Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-

Islam at Calcutta (now Kolkata) on 26 October 1945, and it fl ourishes

in Pakistan under a changed name, JUI Pakistan. Another poisonous

export was the Jamaat-e-Islami. It was founded by Abul Ala Maudoodi

in 1941 at Pathankot. He opposed the demand for Pakistan as also the

tribal raid in Kashmir. In Pakistan, he took up the Ahmadiya issue in

1949 and fl ourished thereafter, with Saudi backing and, later, Zia’s.

In Pakistan, the revivalists hold the public and the State to ransom

despite electoral debacles. In India, Muslim society struggles to free

27CRITERION – April/June 2008

A Liberal Islam in South Asia

itself from their shackles. Every now and then, poets, scholars and

artists are treated to their wrath. To cite an instance, the highly respected

Director of the Khuda Baksh Library at Patna, Dr. Abid Raza Bedar, was

denounced for his reported remark, at the A.N. Sinha Institute at the

launch of Prof. S.M. Mohsin’s book, Keynote of the Holy Quran, that

the word kufr (unbelief) has been misinterpreted and has affected our

national integration.5

To what a rich tradition have the Muslims of South Asia turned their

backs. Professor Abdullah Saeed, Director of Study of Contemporary

Islam at the University of Melbourne, recalls: “Modern trends in the

interpretation of the Quran may be traced to Shah Waliullah of India (d.

1762). In the course of Shah Waliullah’s life, several monarchs occupied

the throne in Delhi. The Mughal Empire continued to decline and break

up until it was replaced by a Western power in the form of British Raj

… Shah Waliullah reacted to this changed situation for Muslims in India

by initiating his reform movement. He rejected taqlid (blind imitation

of early scholars) and advocated ijtihad (independent judgment) and the

application of fresh ideas in interpreting the Quran. In emphasizing a

move away from the blind following of tradition, Shah Waliullah rejected

some accepted views related to the principles of exegesis (usually al-

tafsir).

“Though Shah Waliullah’s reformist ideas about interpretation are

not radical from the perspective of the twenty-fi rst century, they seemed

so at the time. They became quite infl uential, particularly in the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.” According to J.M.S. Baljon,

from the end of the nineteenth century, “Shah Waliullah was loudly

acclaimed in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent as the man who discerned

the signs of his times. And when at present an Urdu-writing modernist

is looking for arguments from Muslim lore, he weighs in with opinions

of the Shah.”6

Perhaps one of the most radical attempts to reinterpret the Quran

in the modern period was by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan of India (d. 1898)

who published a six-volume work on the Quran from 1879. He believed

that Muslims needed to reassess their tradition, heritage and ways of


A.G. Noorani

thinking in line with newly emerging knowledge, values and institutions.

The gulf between Western and Islamic modes of thought was vast, and

Muslims who had been educated in the West or infl uenced by Western

education were no longer able to comprehend the religious discourse of

the ulema of the time. The widening gap threatened the very relevance

of Islam as a religion for many Muslims.

But such is the clime today that when Rafi q Zakaria pleaded with

the Vice-Chancellor of the Aligarh Muslim University, Syed Hashim

Ali, and Prof. Atiq Ahmed Siddiqui, Director of the Sir Syed Academy,

to publish an English translation of Sir Syed’s commentary on the

Quran, he found them hesitant as they feared that it might provoke a

fundamentalist backlash.7

Less known is Cheragh Ali who spent the better part of his career

in the service of the Nizam of Hyderabad. In 1833 he published from

Bombay The Proposed Political, Constitutional and Legal Reforms in

the Ottoman Empire and Other Mohammedan States. In 1885 appeared

a work which is of direct relevance to the situation in 2008. It was A

critical Exposition of the Popular “Jihad”. In 1984 the Idarah-i-Adabiyat-

i-Delli (Sic.) published a reprint. The bulk of the book was devoted to

establishing, with learning and reasoning, that Islam does not enjoin

wars of conquest “Neither the wars of Mohammad were offensive, nor

did he in anyway use force or compulsion in the matter of belief. All the

wars of Mohammad (PBUH) were defensive.”

Cheragh Ali, however, did not stop there. He submitted the Anglo-

Muhammadan law in British India, which passed for Shariah, to merciless

scorn; particularly the Hedaya. In his Conclusions he wrote: “The

Mohammedan Common Law is by no means divine or superhuman.

It mostly consists of uncertain traditions, Arabian usages and customs,

some frivolous and fortuitous analogical deductions from the Koran, and

a multitudinous army of casuistical sophistry of the canonical legists. It

has not been held sacred or unchangeable by enlightened Mohammadans

of any Muslim country and in any age since its compilation in the

fourth century of the Hejira. All the Mujtahida, Ahl Hadis, and other

non-Mokallids had had no regard for the four schools of Mohammadan



religious jurisprudence, or the Common Law.” (pp. 159 – 160).

Forty-Five years later, in 1930 Iqbal had much the same things to

say in his famous lectures The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in

Islam (Sang-e-meel, Lahore). Chapter VI on The Principle of Movement

in the Structure of Islam is particularly relevant. “I have no doubt that a

deeper study of the enormous legal literature of Islam is sure to rid the

modern critic of the superfi cial opinion that the Law of Islam is stationary

and incapable of development. Unfortunately, the conservative Muslim

public of this country is not yet quite ready for a critical discussion

of ‘Fiqh,’ which, if undertaken, is likely to displease most people, and

raise sectarian controversies, yet I venture to offer a few remarks on the

point before us. In the fi rst place, we should bear in mind that from the

earliest times, practically up to the rise of the Abbasides, there was no

written law of Islam apart from the Quran. Secondly, it is worthy of note

that from about the middle of the fi rst century up to the beginning of the

fourth not less than nineteen schools of law and legal opinion appeared

in Islam. This fact alone is suffi cient to show how incessantly our early

doctors of law worked in order to meet the necessities of a growing

civilization…..

“Turning now to the ground work of legal principles in the Quran, it

is perfectly clear that far from leaving no scope for human thought and

legislative activity the intensive breadth of these principles virtually acts

as an awakener of human thought….. Did the founders of our schools

ever claim fi nality for their reasoning and interpretations? Never. The

claim of the present generation of Muslim liberals to re-interpret the

foundational legal principles, in the light of their own experience and the

altered conditions of modern life, is, in my opinion, perfectly justifi ed.

The teaching of the Quran that life is a process of progressive creation

necessitates that each generation, guided but unhampered by the work

of its predecessors, should be permitted to solve its own problems…. In

view of the intense conservatism of the Muslims of India, Indian judges

cannot but stick to what are called standard works. The result is that

while the peoples are moving the law remains stationary.”

Turning to the Hadith (the sayings of the Prophet) he held; “we


A.G. Noorani

must distinguish traditions of a purely legal import from those which

are of non-legal character. With regard to the former, there arises a very

important question as to how far they embody the pre-Islamic usages of

Arabia which were in some cases left intact, and in others modifi ed by

the Prophet. It is diffi cult to make this discovery, for our early writers do

not always refer to pre-Islamic usages. Nor is it possible to discover that

the usages, left intact by express or tacit approval of the Prophet, were

intended to be universal in their application. Shah Wali Ullah has a very

illuminating discussion on the point. I reproduce here the substance of

his view. The prophetic method of teaching according to Shah Wali Ullah

is that, generally speaking, the law revealed by a prophet takes especial

notice of the habits, ways, and peculiarities of the people to whom he

is specifi cally sent. The prophet who aims at all-embracing principles,

however, can neither reveal different principles for different peoples,

nor leaves them to work out their own rules of conduct. His method is to

train one particular people, and to use them as a nucleus for the building

up of a universal Shariat. In doing so, he accentuates the principles

underlying the social life of all mankind, and applies them to concrete

cases in the light of the specifi c habits of the people immediately before

him. Shariat values (Ahkam) resulting from this application (e.g., rules

relating to penalties for crimes) are in a sense specifi c to that people;

and, since their observance is not an end in itself, they cannot be strictly

enforced in the case of future generations.”

Iqbal concluded his analysis by saying “It is, however, impossible

to deny the fact that the traditionalists, by insisting on the value of the

concrete case as against the tendency to abstract thinking in law, have

done the greatest service to the Law of Islam. And a further intelligent

study of the literature of traditions, if used as indicative of the spirit in

which the Prophet himself interpreted his Revelation, may still be of great

help in understanding the life-value of the legal principles enunciated in

the Quran.” Iqbal lamented “the closing of the door of ijtihad” and “this

voluntary surrender of intellectual independence.”

Far less known is another comment by Iqbal in his Presidential

Address to the All-India Muslim League at Allahabad on 26 December

1930. His advocacy of “autonomous Muslim States along the North-West



border” aroused interest. It was to be a member of the Indian federation.

Only on 21 June 1937 did he advocate partition of India “The Muslims

of North-West India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to

self-determination…. I think that the Muslims of north-West India and

Bengal ought at present to ignore Muslim minority provinces.”8 But to

what end?

On this, Iqbal was explicit in his Presidential Address: “for Islam;

an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian Imperialism was

forced to give it, to mobilize its laws; its education, its culture and to

bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and with the

spirit of modern times.”9 Iqbal’s Pakistan then was to be a State in

which Islam, shorn of the dross accumulated over the centuries, would

fi nd a liberal rational expression with the spirit of modern times. (Note

also that, unlike Jinnah’s two-nation theory, Iqbal’s “Muslim nation”

was confi ned to the north-west and Bengal).

But after independence the Muslims of South Asia had no one

of such high political stature to guide them. The Munir Report 1954

(Report of the Court of Inquiry to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances

of 1953) subjected the religious leaders’ rhetoric on Islam and on the

Islamic State to pitiless scrutiny and exposed their falsehoods.

A minority that feels besieged becomes a conservative minority.

That apart, the Muslim leadership in India, such as it was, came within

the sway of a motley crowd; comprising the Muslim League in the south

and the old pro-Congress Jamiat-ul-Ulema in the north. Aligarh Muslim

University was torn apart by factions. Since 1973 the All-India Muslim

Personal Law Board acquired a monopoly on “the reform” of Muslim

law and exerted itself to avert the day which would put its leaders out

of business.10

In Pakistan, President Mohammed Ayub Khan tried manfully to

arrest the trend. It is suffi cient comment on Indian Muslims that they

view with suspicion his Family Laws Ordinance 1960, which reforms

the law of marriage and divorce on the basis of Shariah.


A.G. Noorani

Fazlur Rahman Malik (1919-88) was a major and signifi cant scholar

of Islam. He founded the Islamic Research Institute (now attached to

the International Islamic University) in Islamabad in 1960. One fellow

researcher described him as “probably the most learned of the major

Muslim thinkers in the second-half of the twentieth century, in terms of

both classical Islam and Western philosophical and theological discourse.”

His father, Maulana Shahab al-Din, was a scholar at Deoband. Fazlur

Rahman received his doctorate from Oxford University and taught at

Durham University and McGill University before returning to Pakistan

to set up the Islamic Research Institute.

The Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan 1966-1972

contain two revealing entries about him. One of 30 April 1967 reads: “Dr.

Fazlur Rahman of the Islamic Research Institute came to see me. He was

engaged in writing a book on ideology of Islam. I read his fi rst chapter.

It is fascinating, but the language he has used is scholarly and diffi cult.

It has been arranged to attach a couple of knowledgeable people with

him so as to discuss the theme of each chapter and then put it in simple

language. The doctor can then review it to ensure that his theme has

been properly brought out. I am sure that this book, when written, will

be a real contribution in the service of Islam.”11 The President clearly

wanted to encourage the study of a liberal scholarly view of Islam. But

he was powerless to protect the great scholar.

The entry of 5 September 1968 reads: “Dr. Fazlur Rahman, Director

of the Islamic Research Institute came under countrywide adverse

criticism fanned by the ignorant and politically motivated mullahs. The

allegations, which were totally false, were made against some remarks

made in his book, Islam, which he wrote some years ago and which was

later published by the Oxford University Press. This book is a highly

scholarly work written for a European audience and an attempt to

remove some false impressions about Islam. When the criticism gained

momentum he held two press conferences refuting all the allegations.

These clarifi cations would have satisfi ed any honest critic, but the

mullah, who regards any original and objective thinking on Islam as

his deadly enemy, was not going to be pacifi ed. This sort of argument

is just the grist he wants for his mill. Meanwhile, the administrators at



the centre and the province got cold feet. Some of them persuaded the

doctor to resign. He must have also got frightened. After all, it is not

easy to stand up to criticism based on ignorance and prejudice. So I had

to accept his resignation with great reluctance in the belief that he will

be free to attack the citadel of ignorance and fanaticism from outside

the government sphere. Meanwhile, it is quite clear that any form of

research on Islam which inevitably leads to new interpretations has no

chance of acceptance in this priest-ridden and ignorant society. These

people will not allow Islam to become a vehicle of progress. What will

be the future of such an Islam in the age of reason and science is not

diffi cult to predict.”12

The tacit prediction came true. Dr. Fazlur Rahman moved to the

University of Chicago and won undying fame. His work Islam &

Modernity is a classic.13

There are three legacies from the past which Muslims must discard

– the ossifi ed Sharia which confl icts with the Quran; the notion of the

“Islamic State” which the Quran does not support and which never existed

in history; Jihad which is a perversion of the concept as propounded in

the Quran.

Accordingly any reform in the Islamic world must grapple honestly

with four related tasks: (i) interpretation of some Quranic verses in the

light of the times, as against others which are of enduring relevance for

all times; (ii) weeding out hadith (compilation of the Prophet’s sayings)

of dubious credibility; (iii) rejection of the authority of the ulema

(clerics); the fatwa is a mere opinion. During the Raj, fatwas were sold

to the British; (iv) a sound appreciation of Islam in history, especially

the role of the fi rst four Caliphs, as distinct from Islam in the Quran.

It was only a century after the Prophet’s death that the task of

compiling the hadith was undertaken. There is not the slightest doubt

about the integrity and authenticity of the Quran. One cannot say that

of the hadith. The Prophet died at Medina on 8 June 632. Al-Bukhari,

a man of piety and compiler of the most respected of the hadith, was

born in the ninth century (194 of the Hejira, he died in 256). He was


A.G. Noorani

methodical. Having collected 600,000 hadith, he retained only 7,257

omitting 4,000 repetitions.

“Thus less than two centuries after the Prophet’s death there were

already 596,725 false hadith.” Al-Bukhari told off a king who wanted

him to read some excerpts in private. “Go,” he told the emissary, “tell

your master that I hold knowledge in high esteem, and I refuse to drag

it into the antechambers of sultans.” Islamic history would have been

different if others had his integrity.

This brings us to the question, precisely what had Fazlur Rahman

done to invite the trouble. There was a long standing debate among

Muslim scholars on the distinction between Sunnah and Hadith. To

S.M.Yusuf. for example, Sunnah “refers to practice as distinct from any

documentation of it (hadith).” Practice, unbroken and untainted, is a

proof by itself.14

Fazlur Rahman’s “offence” is described well by Prof. Daniel Brown

in his work Rethinking Tradition in modern Islamic thought. To recall

the promise of that era is to realize the intellectual poverty in South

Asia’s Muslims today. He writes: “A similar but much more sophisticated

attempt to separate the authority of sunna from the strict authenticity of

hadith is found in the work of the Pakistani modernist Fazlur Rahman.

Rahman articulated his views on hadith, sunna, and other relationship

during the 1960s when he served as director of Pakistan’s Central

Institute for Islamic Research, an institution established by the regime

of General Ayyub Khan to aid in promoting modernist interpretations

of Islam compatible with the needs of the regime. His work on sunna

must be understood against the background of religious politics in

Pakistan during the 1960s and, in particular, against the background

of the controversy between Ghulam Ahmad Perwez and his opponents

among the Pakistan ulama. Perwez’s radical rejection of sunna and his

particular vision of the Islamic state as true heir to Prophetic authority

was associated in the minds of his opponents with the efforts of the

Ayyub government to bypass the ulama in order to promote modernist

Islam. A number of controversial government actions seemed to suggest

that Ayyub was sympathetic to Perwez’s ideas.



“Opponents of the government suspected, quite correctly, that

Ayyub was intent on bypassing traditional sources of religious authority

in his formulation of policy. They concluded, probably incorrectly, that

Perwez’s ideas were exercising an undue effect on government policy.

Thus the debate over the relationship between religion and state and the

relative role of the ulama and the government in formulating policy on

religious questions became focused on Perwez’s ideas, and particularly

on the issue of sunna. Attention was also focused on the regime’s major

voice in religious matters, the Central Institute for Islamic Research

and its director. Against this background of heated controversy, Fazlur

Rahman entered the fray with the publication of a series of articles on

the authority of sunna and the authenticity of hadith.”15

By his own account he was responding through these articles16 to two

quite separate, although interrelated, controversies. He was responding,

fi rst of all, to the immediate controversy in Pakistan aroused by Perwez’s

radical rejection of sunna. But he was also responding to the ongoing

international scholarly debate about Joseph Schacht’s sceptical views on

the authenticity of hadith which had been published some years earlier

in his Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence. Fazlur Rahman refuted

Schacht.

In 1981 came a vindication of sorts, belatedly, in a ruling of the Federal

Shariat Court in a case concerning rajm (stoning to death for adultery)

which is contradicted by a Quranic verse (24:2) prescribing a hundred

lashes.17 Justice Salahuddin’s remarks touched a raw nerve. “Apart from

the fact that Hadith cannot override the defi nite and clear injunctions of

the Quran, the Ahadith (particular to the case) themselves suffer from

infi rmities. In the circumstance it is neither safe nor reasonable to found

a grave punishment like that of (rajm) on such Ahadith and make it an

obligatory rule of law.”

In 1968 the mullahs decided that the debate had to be ended. Fazlur

Rahman had to go. A debate of great promise and consequence was

aborted to the loss of Muslim scholarship in the entire region. Elsewhere

it picked up speed. Fatima Mernissi, a Moroccan scholar, submitted it

to rigorous scrutiny in Women and Islam.18 It is neither the Quran nor


A.G. Noorani

the Messenger of Allah but certain hadith that have served as texts to

sanctify oppression of women.

“Al-Bukhari’s work (Sahih) has been one of the most highly

respected reference for 12 centuries. This Hadith is the sledgehammer

argument used by those who want to exclude women from politics,”

indeed from much else.

Al-Bukhari retained as authentic only 7,257 Hadith, if the repetitions,

which number 4,000 are eliminated. The great lesson to be drawn from

Al-Bukhari’s experience in coming to grips with the fl ight of time and

failing memory is that one must be true to one’s method and honour

it, by continuing to mistrust, all those who regulate their affairs with

the help of Hadith. “If at the time of Al-Bukhari – that is, less than two

centuries after the death of the Prophet – there were already 596,725

false Hadith in circulation (600,000 minus 7,275 plus 4,000), it is easy

to imagine how many there are today. The most astonishing thing is

that the scepticism that guided the work of the founders of religious

scholarship has disappeared today.”

In two whole chapters Mernissi takes two signifi cant cases of

“misogynistic hadith” by witnesses of dubious repute whose false

testimony played havoc for centuries. One is Abu Bakra, not to be

confused with the great fi rst Caliph, Hazrat Abu Bakr al-Siddiq. He

reported the Prophet as saying “those who entrust their affairs to a

woman will never know prosperity.” He recalled this and other saying

at convenient moments. He was convicted of and fl ogged for false

testimony by the legendary Caliph Umar Ibn Al-Khattab. Al-Tabari was

against exclusion of women from politics.

Another such witness was Abu Hurayra. Mernissi points out: “There

is no trace in al-Bukhari of ‘A’isha’s refutation of the Hadith. They told

‘A’isha that Abu Hurayra was asserting that the Messenger of God

said: ‘Three things bring bad luck: house, woman and horse.’ A’isha

responded: ‘Abu Hurayra learned his lessons very badly. He came into

our house when the Prophet was in the middle of a sentence. He only

heard the end of it. What the Prophet said was ‘May Allah refute the



Jews, they say three things bring bad luck, house, woman and horse.’

“Not only did Al-Bukhari not include this correction, but he treated

the Hadith as if there was no question about it. He cited it three times,

each time with a different transmission chain. Thus procedure generally

strengthens a Hadith and gives the impression of consensus concerning

it.”

Is it any wonder that both the Caliphs Abu Bakr al-Siddiq and Umar

ibn Al-Khattab forbade the citation of hadith; the latter, even whipping

the offenders.

But Sir Syed’s legacy was rejected and his intellectual heir, Fazlur

Rahman, had to quit his country. The Indian scholar Asghar Ali Engineer

remarks: “Quran gives equal rights and equal dignity to both men and

women but hadith literature is full of ahadith contradicting this Quranic

approach. For example in Bukhari we fi nd a hadith which stands in

contradiction to the Quranic verse 33:35. The hadith is narrated thus:

‘The Prophet (PBUH) urged the women to be generous with their gifts,

for when he had glimpsed into the fl ames of hell, he had noted the vast

majority of people being tormented there were women. The women were

outraged, and one of them instantly stood up and demanded to know

why that was so. ‘Because’, he replied ‘you women grumble so much,

and show ingratitude to your husbands.’ Even if the poor fellows spent

all their lives doing things for you, you have only to be upset at the least

of thing and you will say, ‘I have never received any good from you.’ At

that the women began vigorously to pull off their rings, and throw them

into Bilal’s Cloak (Bukhari 1.28. Abdu Dawud 439).

“See the content and tenor of this hadith. It is full of anti-women

attitude and women are supposed to be, in this hadith, ungrateful to

their husbands. As against this see the Quranic verse 33.35 which says:

‘Surely the men who submit and women who submit, and the believing

men and the believing women, and the obeying men and the obeying

women, and the truthful men and truthful women, and the patient men

and patient women, and the humble men and humble women, and the

charitable men and the charitable women, and fasting men and fasting


A.G. Noorani

women, and the men who guard their chastity and the women who

guard, and the men who remember Allah and women who remember

–Allah has prepared for them forgiveness and mighty reward.”

“See how in this verse Quran treats men and women equally and talks

of equal degree of forgiveness and equal reward. In the above hadith, on

the other hand, more women than men are consigned to fl ames of hell

because they are ungrateful to their husbands.”19

A team of reformist Islamic scholars at Ankara University, acting

under the auspices of the Diyanet or Directorate of Religious Affairs,

the government body which oversees the country’s 8,000 mosques and

appoints imams, is said to be close to concluding a “reinterpretation”

of parts of the Hadith, the collection of thousands of aphorisms and

comments said to derive from the Prophet Muhammad and which form

the basis of Islamic jurisprudence or sharia law.20

The Quran is the only source that escapes criticisms of unreliability.

Out of a total of 6,236 verses, revealed over 22 years, between 200 –

500 are estimated to be law-like rules.

Mutazilites were the ulema whose school of thought became

important in the mid-eighth century (Christian Era) and who ascribed a

key role to reason in their research – as opposed to those who constantly

invoked the hadiths in their creation of new laws. The Mutazilites

explained the Quran itself by constantly referring to reason. They made

reason the very criterion of religious law. In this way, they were able

to develop extremely bold legal constructs. They were hunted down as

infi dels as early as 546 (CE). Their writings were thoroughly destroyed.

It is only in the last century or less, since the rediscovery of ancient

manuscripts, that we have had direct access to their writings. With the

crushing of the Mutazilites, the spirit of imitation carried the day over

the spirit of refl ection. The gates of ijtihad (reasoning), itself a source

Islamic law, were closed.

What the founder of the Aligarh Movement wrote of the hadith over

a century ago will shock the Muslims in the subcontinent today: “It is



the most sacred of all Islamic lore, yet Caliphs Abu Bakr and Umar had

forbidden people to narrate a hadith. The latter even whipped offenders

and imprisoned Ibn Masud. Abu Darda and Abu Masud Ansari for

narrating traditions. In fact Abu Bakr burned all those traditions, which

he had collected. Evidently the collection of tradition started in earnest

only after the death of Caliph Umar (644)” whom Caliph Uthman

succeeded.21

Hafeez Malik, a distinguished Pakistani scholar records: “The

founding of four schools of jurisprudence started the decline of ijtihad.”

People began to follow them blindly – they do so to this day. Many

ulema fabricated false hadith. He set out 38 of them, which Sir Syed

Ahmad Khan had listed in 1871. Some are still in vogue.

It is, then, on the Quran that we must largely depend. Fazlur Rahman’s

“double movement” theory is brilliant: “If we look at the Quran, it

does not in fact give many general principles for the most part it gives

solutions to and rulings upon specifi c and concrete historical issues, but

as I have said, it provides, either explicitly or implicitly, the rationales

behind these solutions and rulings, from which one can deduce general

principles. In building any genuine and stable Islamic set of laws and

institutions, there has to be a two-fold movement. First one must move

from the concrete case treatments of the Quran – taking the necessary

and relevant social conditions of that time into account – to the general

principles upon which the entire teaching converge. Second, from the

general level there must be a movement back to specifi c legislation,

taking into account the necessary and relevant social conditions now

obtaining.”22

He complains that no serious effort is made to read the Quranic

verses in the order in which they were revealed. That would show the

context. If the Quran must be read in context, the hadith can do with

close scrutiny and the ulema must be properly sized up. Maududi has

been called “erudite” by some. Fazlur Rahman held that “he was by no

means an accurate or profound scholar.”

In none of the states of South Asia – India, Pakistan, Bangladesh


A.G. Noorani

and Sri Lanka – would the Muslims have welcomed such views, judging

by the recurring outbursts over trifl es; more likely than not, tolerated

Fazlur Rahman even after the fame he had won in the entire world of

Islamic scholarship.

But the problems which Muslims of South Asia face are in no hurry

to run away. They persist and will continue to persist unless they are

faced and resolved honestly and boldly. That is where this scholar’s

greatest service lies. He pointed out: “The fi rst essential step to relieve

the vicious circle is for the Muslim, to distinguish clearly between

normative Islam and historical Islam. Unless effective and sustained

efforts are made in the direction, there is no way visible for the creation

of the kind of Islamic mind I have been speaking of just now. No amount

of mechanical juxtaposition of old and new subjects and disciplines can

produce this kind of mind. If the spark for the modernization of old

Islamic learning and for the Islamization of the new is to arise, then the

original thrust of Islam – of the Quran and Muhammad – must be clearly

resurrected so that the conformities and deformities of historical Islam

may be clearly judged by it.23

Another South Asian who struck a fresh note is Shabbir Akhtar.

Born in Pakistan, he settled in Bradford, England after graduating

in philosophy at Cambridge and winning a doctorate in comparative

religion. His book A Faith for All Seasons: Islam and the Challenge of

the Modern World24 is little known.

This is one of the most stimulating and original works on Islam that

has appeared in a long while. Its main purpose is to prod Muslims to

overcome the paralysis of the mind that has affl icted them and rendered

them unable to respond to the challenges of secular modernity. “Modern

Muslims are as a group of people, embarrassingly unrefl ective: it were

as though Allah had done all the thinking for his devotees… After

developing a great national philosophical tradition, the adherents of

Islam have lapsed into an intellectual lethargy that has already lasted half

a millennium… Owing to an absence of sceptical and liberal infl uences,

itself traceable to the lack of an extant philosophical tradition, few

Muslims have even recognized the threats of secularity and ideological



pluralism that our current circumstance brings in its train.”

His counsel to Muslims is not to turn their backs on Islam, but to

discover for themselves that Islam is, indeed, “a faith for all seasons.”

He defi nes three problems which are discussed throughout the book –

the religious ban on critical assessment of revealed claims; “the true

offi ce of religion in theology” and the justifi cation for “the inquiring

mind in matters theological.” Far from turning their backs on the faith,

he emphasises the need for its renewal.

The call for Islamic liberalism is in essence a call for the renewal

of the faith. A devout Christian scholar, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, who

taught Islamic history at the Forman Christian College in the 1940s held:

“Our own view is that liberalism and humanism in the Muslim world, if

they are to fl ourish at all, may perhaps be Islamic liberalism and Islamic

humanism; or that: in any case, some basis must be found for matters of

this weight.”25

Yet another South Asian offers the same wise counsel. But he also

lives abroad. He is Muqtedar Khan. Born in India in 1966, where he

earned a degree in engineering and an MBA, he received his doctorate

in government from Georgetown University and is now on the faculty of

the University of Delaware. His forthcoming book on Islamic democratic

theory should be thought-provoking, judging by his essay in Islam in

Transition : Muslim Perspectives26 Read this: “Reason, as Imam Shafi

himself suggests, is Allah’s greatest gift to humanity. Without reason

the human agent is nothing but a beast incapable of conceiving or

realizing his/her divine purpose. Reason is the singular element that

constitutes the human and enables everything else. Even the Quran

needs reason to make itself available to us. The limitation of reason

in the theory of ijtihad has had an adverse effect on the very theory of

knowledge in Islam. The epistemological dilemma of using reason for

practical and other purposes such as medicine, while circumscribing it

in Islamic studies in order to conserve legal thinking has led Muslims

to reach and maintain mutually contradictory positions. For example,

nearly all Muslim thinkers, particularly those grounded in the Islamic

traditions and genre, maintain the unity of knowledge as a fundamental


A.G. Noorani

epistemological truth. These same Muslims continue to maintain a stated

or implicit boundary between secular and sacred knowledge. Reason

reigns in the former while the latter is supposed to be ruled by revelation.

Indeed, traditions and metaphorical thinking masquerade as revelation

in the realm of sacred knowledge. The most signifi cant consequence

of this double-think has led to the decline of both forms of knowledge

in the Muslim world. There is no doubt in my mind that the decline or

rather stagnation of Islamic thought in all realms is due to the leash that

the fuqha (jurists) have placed on reason.”

There is a vibrant movement for reversal of Islam which has been

noticed by Westerners. Nicholas D. Kristof noted that apart from “the

thread of fundamentalism” equally real is “the thread of reform.” Islamic

history has never been without dissenters and heretics. Particularly

strong is the Muslim women’s voice for reform.27

Prof. Mehran Kamrava of the California State University, Northridge

produced a timely and telling collection of writings by creative Muslim

thinkers whose views were neglected by those obsessed with the

utterances of the fundamentalists, The New Voices of Islam: Reforming

Politics and Modernity. 28 He notes that over the past two decades or so,

at a time when the forces of Islamic fundamentalism have emerged as

the dominant face of Islam in the West, “a vibrant and highly infl uential

discourse by a number of prominent Muslim thinkers is seeking to

reform and reformulate some of the main premises of Islamic theology

and jurisprudence. Throughout the Muslim world, from Indonesia and

Malaysia in Southeast Asia to Algeria and Morocco in North Africa,

there has emerged a group of highly articulate and infl uential public

intellectuals whose ideas are inspired by reformist interpretations of

Islam. Their voices might be faint and diffi cult to hear, downed by the

boisterous violence of self-righteous fundamentalists whose claims of

exclusivity leave no room for discourse and debate.”

Their writings form “part of a proud tradition of reformist Muslim

thought that dates back to at least the late eighteenth century and

even before.” Today’s reformists do not represent a novel or new

phenomenon in Islam. What they do represent is a vision of Islam and



its role in human polity that is radically different from that advocated

by orthodoxy. Included in the book are 13 of the most renowned and

infl uential Muslim reformist thinkers alive today – Leila Ahmed (Egypt

and the United States), Nasr Abu Zaid (Egypt), Moahmmed Arkoun

(Algeria and France), Hasna Hanafi (Egypt), Fethullah Gulen (Turkey),

Mohsen Kadivar (Iran), Fatima Mernissi (Morocco), Tariq Ramadan

(Switzerland), Muhammad Shahrour (Syria), Abdolkarim Soroush

(Iran), Mohamed Talbi (Tunisia), and Amina Wadud (United States.).Not

included because of space limitations are Huseyn Atay (Turkey), Rachid

Ghannouchi (Tunisia), Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari (Iran), Anwar

Ibrahim (Malaysia) and Abdurrahman Wahid (Indonesia), among

others. A notable exception is the South African Scholar Farid Esack, a

powerful advocate of the Islamic theology of liberation. Another notable

exception is the Tunisian Mohamed Charfi ’s work Islam and Liberty :

The Historical Misunderstanding.29 The work draws heavily on writings

in French by Arab and European scholars, which are not cited in English

books. The author’s analyses are based on the Quran.

He faced the problems boldly at the very outset. “Islam is no less

capable of evolution than Christianity or Judaism. But whereas, over the

past few centuries Europeans have undergone profound technological,

economic, cultural and political changes, often amid considerable

suffering and with major ebbs and fl ows, the Muslim peoples have fallen

greatly behind in all spheres. This is not a fate to which they are doomed

for ever, it is possible for them to close the gap.”

Historically intellectual stagnation in the Islamic world long

preceded revivalism and its hide-out offshoot, fundamentalism. Western

imperialism inspired revivalism. Its opportunism aided fundamentalism

(witness : Afghanistan and Somalia).

Year after year the gulf has been widening between an idealized

ancestral system, which is held sacred and disseminated through school,

and a new system that is ever more widely regarded as an alien import

contrary to Islam. This is a grave discrepancy that tears people apart

and brings them to the verge of schizophrenia for they do not wish to

sacrifi ce either Islam or modernity. They are as attached to the Islamic


A.G. Noorani

religion, as they are to the structure of the modern state, which they

insist should be genuinely democratic and representative.

The political Islamist wants his imagined historical Islam to prevail

over modernity. The modernist seldom rises to the intellectual challenge

of understanding Islam as well as modernity. “There is no credible

counter-discourse,” especially among Muslims of the subcontinent.

Most of them think in stereotypes. For the lay Muslim, the disconnect

between the faith he learns at home and the rationalism and knowledge

he acquires at school and in college is painful. He wants to be a good

Muslim; yet fi nds the Islam preached from the pulpit strange, almost

irrelevant. A Muslim student learns one “truth” at an English-medium

school, another from devout parents at home. Baffl ed, he either clings to

the faith or abandons it. Neither course does homage to reason or justice

to the faith and the role of religion in an individual’s life.

If in Muslim countries, an authoritarian state stifl es free debate, the

same job is undertaken in countries where Muslims are a minority by the

bigoted, ignorant mullah in complicity with Muslim politicians. Without

free thought and free discourse, Muslim society stagnates intellectually

and morally, even if some Muslims prosper economically.

The gravest, most fateful mistake by Muslims over the centuries is a

palpable, wilful misconstruction of Quranic messages on marriage. This

is a scripture, not a statute.

Judges say that the worst way to read a Constitution is to read it

literally and that every document must be read as a whole. Now read the

Quranic verses for yourself in the Fourth Surah (chapter) on Women.

The second verse in this Sura enjoins: “render unto the orphans their

possessions.” The third says: “If you fear that you shall not be able to

deal justly with the orphans, marry women of your choice, two or three

or four: But if you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly (with

them), then only one. That will be more suitable, to prevent you from

doing injustice.”

This verse is clearly illustrative, not mandatory. Honestly read,



monogamy is what it enjoins; polygamy is permitted in that specifi c

situation and subject strictly to the overriding condition of equal

treatment. Later on, another verse (129) in the same Surah says in

categorical terms; “And you cannot do justice between wives, even

though you (wish it).”

To the true believer the Holy Quran is in the Word of Allah. This

is His assessment of the nature of His creature, man. It implies a clear

prohibition of polygamy. Abdullah Yusuf Ali records in his commentary

on the Quran that the immediate occasion for the verse was the battle of

Uhud, which left behind many orphans and widows. This brings us to a

fundamental of Quranic interpretation – reading the text in its context.

Even those who disagree with that, cannot honestly ignore the overriding

prohibition (4 : 129). It is, however, on a dishonest reading of the Quran,

that Muslim women have suffered for centuries at the hands of men and

mullahs. They still do.

It is the same story in regard to divorce. The law in force in India

is not Islamic law of the Sharia, but Anglo-Mohammedan law, which

the courts followed during the Raj. In 1905, an English judge of the

Bombay High Court, Justice Batchelor, was honest to admit that “there

can be no doubt that talaq-ul-bidat (the triple, irregular divorce) is good

in law, though bad in theology.” These instances reveal the perversion

of the faith by men in authority; the denial of ijtihad.

It is a parlous situation. The ulema lack the intellectual equipment,

the courage and the desire to think afresh. Politicians feed on the

people’s ignorance. Intellectuals are either apathetic or seek short cuts.

The winds of change sweeping over the Muslim world elsewhere, the

intellectual ferment, stop at the shores of the South Asian subcontinent.

“Verily never will Allah change the condition of a people until they

change it themselves.” (Quran; 13 : 11).


A.G. Noorani

References:

1 Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, compiled and edited by Jamiluddin Ahmad, Sheikh

Ashraf, vol. 1, p.43.

2 Fazlur Rehman, 1982, p.120.

3 Ali Ahraf and Mushirul Hasan, Islam and Indian Nationalism, Refl ections on Abul Kalam

Azad, Manohar, 1992, p.116.

4 Muhammad S. Ikram, Modern Muslim India and Pakistan, 1970, pp.175-6.

5 Vide The Times of India, 2 June 1992 for the details of the instructive episode.

6 Modern Muslim Koranic Interpretation (1880-1960), L.J. Brill, 1968.

7 The Times of India, 26 November 1988.

8 Hafeez Malik, Iqbal, 1971, p.388.

9 Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada (Editor), Foundations of Pakistan: All India Muslim League

Documents, vol.II 1924-1927; p.160.

10 Vide the writer’s Muslims of India. A Documentary Record 1947-90, Oxford University

Press, 2003.

11 Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan 1966-1972, Edited and annotated by

Craig Baxter, Oxford University Press, Karachi, p.90.

12 Ibid., p.253.

13 Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity, University of Chicago Press, 1978.

14 S.M.Yusuf, An Essay on the Sunnah, Lahore, 1966.

15 Prof. Daniel Brown, Rethinking Tradition in modern Islamic Thought, Cambridge

University Press, 1996, p.102.

16 Published in Islamic Studies in 1962. A compilation appeared in Islamic Methodology in

History,Karachi, 1965.

17 Hazoor Baksh vs. Federation of Pakistan; All Pakistan Legal Decisions. 1981, FSC.

18 Mernissi, Fatima, Women in Islam, Blackwell Publishers, 1991.

19 Janata, weekly, Mumbai, 17 February 2008.

20 Ian Traynor Guardian, 27 February 2008.

21 Quoted in Hafeez Malik; The Religious Liberalism of Sir Sayyid Khan, The Muslim

World, Vol. LIV, No.3, 1964, p.163.

22 Islam and Modernity, p.20.

23 Ibid., p. 141.

24 Akhtar, Shabbir, Islam and the Challenge of the Modern World, 1990, Ivan R. Dee,

Chicago.

25 Islam in Modern History, 1957, p.303.

26 Donohue J John, Esposito L John, Islam in Transition: Modern Perspectives, Oxford

University Press, 2006.

27 International Herald Tribune, 16 October 2006.

28 Kamrava, Mehran, The New Voices of Islam: Reforming Politics and Modernity, I.B.

Tauris, London, 2006.

29 Charfi , Mohamed, Islam and Liberty: The Historical Misunderstanding, Zed Books,

London, 2006.

MUSLIM RADICALISM, WESTERN CONCERNS

Tanvir Ahmad Khan *

Abstract.(Religious extremism as a source of violence has a long history

and the three great monotheistic religions have grappled with issues

of just wars and illegitimate use of force for centuries. Islam has clear

injunctions on the concept of a just war and abhors coercion and

violence outside their ambit. Yet, since 9/11, western discourse has

tended to argue that violence is intrinsic to Islam. A far more

profi table approach is to contextualise current events in the Muslim

world in historical situations of external aggression, occupation and

national humiliation. There is also an urgent need to recognise that

movement of labour from the South to North is an inevitable consequence

of globalisation. Creative solutions have to be found for tensions

generated by the growing number of expatriate communities in western

societies. Author)

There is widespread concern in the West about the problems of

Islamic radicalisation in Pakistan and the region in which it occupies a

sensitive geopolitical location. It is often argued that global peace and

stability depend in no small a measure on the outcome of the so-called

war on terror now being waged by a US-led coalition of nations in this

particular theatre. Apart from the fairly large contingent of American

troops battling the resistance since the invasion of 2001, soldiers of

some European NATO member states are in harm’s way in Afghanistan.

The war they are embroiled in has divided European opinion as few

issues in contemporary history have done. According to NATO offi cials,

* Tanvir Ahmad Khan is a former ambassador and foreign secretary of Pakistan. This essay

is based on a presentation made by him to an international conference held in the Netherlands

in October 2007.


Tanvir Ahmad Khan

the future of their military alliance - easily the most powerful in modern

history - hinges on victory in that war-torn land. This rather startling

assessment is made against the backdrop of pervasive opposition to this

confl ict seen in European parliaments and in the larger battles of public

opinion.

By now the struggle in Afghanistan has become indistinguishable

from its spill-over into Pakistan. There is, indeed, a three-decade old

nexus between Muslim activism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The

hope that Pakistan could somehow ward off the inter-connectedness of

events in the two neighbouring countries ---- what in the semantics of

our times is often called a “blowback” — has turned out to be illusory

and nearly one hundred thousand Pakistani troops are stretched along a

2,500 kilometre border to contain what has been described as a “twilight

struggle against a network of non-state actors” waging a holy war.

The region also includes Iran where one of the great revolutions of

the 20th century overturned an existing internal and regional order. This

revolution which established the term ‘political Islam’ in contemporary

discourse has not run its full course; nor has it found a modus vivendi

especially with powerful states that have been seeking its reversal for

twenty eight years. A state of siege is still a cause for rekindling the fi res

of the Iranian revolution as, indeed, for the Iranian quest for defensive

space around the heartland of the revolution. In much of Central

Asia, the successor states of the Soviet Union have not been able to

accommodate even mild Muslim revivalism and have thus contributed

to its radicalisation. Since 1989, Muslim militants have challenged

Indian control of Kashmir. In fact, in the entire region a legacy of anti-

colonialism fuses with a more particular Muslim resentment against

what is widely perceived as a resurgence of imperial attitudes, a virtual

western re-conquest of the greater Middle East.

Before one turns to the question whether Muslim activism in a

country like Pakistan has become part of a seamless global Islamic

war against the West and if so to what extent and why, it is salutary

to recall briefl y the dynamics of Muslim revival in South Asia. There

was a long period of decline before Great Britain delivered the coup de


Muslim Radicalism, Western Concerns

grace and destroyed Muslim power from one end of the sub-continent

to the other. Initially, the Muslims bore the brunt of British reprisals

against the forces that tried to drive them out of India in 1857. As they

recovered from the initial shock, their responses to the tragedy of their

fall varied signifi cantly. There was the refuge offered by a quietist Sufi

interpretation of Islam that side–stepped questions of resistance. Some

of the Ulema sought to evade strife by declaring that British colonial

rule in India did not interfere with the observance of Islam and was not

manifestly unjust; India, therefore, was Darul Aman (abode of peace)

and did not need armed resistance. A different tradition exemplifi ed

by Shah Waliullah, Shah Ismail and Sayyid Ahmad of Rai Bareilly

emphasised the concept of a just war (Jihad) to save the Muslims of the

sub-continent from the emerging Sikh and Marhatta warlords as well as

from a creeping annexation of Muslim lands by the East India Company.

Sensing a danger from evangelical proselytising Christian missions, the

Muslims turned some of the madrassas like the famous Deoband into

fortresses for the defence of faith and doctrine. The revolt of 1857 was

a watershed. A section of the community concluded their introspection

on the decline of Muslim power by seeking a creative encounter with

the New Age. Led by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the founder of Aligarh

Muslim University, a group of Muslim notables saw amelioration of the

plight of Muslims in modern western education rather than in reversion

to orthodoxy and armed struggle. A fundamental difference in strategies

advocated to secure the future of Islam in South Asia thus initiated an

unfi nished dialectical tussle between tradition and modernity.

The controversial address of Pope Benedict XVI delivered at

the University of Regensburg on 12 September 2007 differentiated

between Islam and Christianity on the grounds that the Judeo-Christian

civilisation had created a synthesis of Faith and Reason through an

interaction with Greek philosophy. For the reformists in the Indian sub-

continent and in many other Muslim countries which were reacting to

the colonial dominance with a robust intellectual revival, Islam has had

its Hellenic moment long before the Christian world. They now sought

reconstruction of Islamic thought by reviving that lost renaissance

in the dominant Islamic discourse. The Islamic modernists in India

attributed the Muslim decline to the Ulema clinging to ‘an atrophied


Tanvir Ahmad Khan

and skeletal tradition’ that caused stagnation. By abandoning critical

thought and innovation, they had left Islam ‘devoid of its erstwhile

depth, diversity, and critical apertures.1 They argued that there was

no contradiction between Revelation and Reason. They went back to

the Quran to substantiate their view that ‘revelation emanated from a

divine and transcendent source within history and is understood by the

human mind.2 As his editor put it, the Pakistani Islamic scholar Fazlur

Rahman had ‘attempted to provide a complex theory of revelation that

linked philosophical and psychological arguments with a sociology

and anthropology of history. The fl ux of time demanded that Muslims

discover once again the ability to grasp the kinesis at work in a dynamic

tradition. “(The) process of questioning and changing a tradition – in

the interest of preserving or restoring its normative quality in the case

of its normative elements,” maintained Fazlur Rahman, “can continue

indefi nitely and that there is no fi xed or privileged point at which the

predetermining effective history is immune from such questioning and

being consciously confi rmed or consciously changed.”3 Though scholars

like Fazalur Rahman were unpopular with the conservative Ulema, they

were developing their radical interpretation of Islam — the word radical

being used in an entirely different sense from the current usage that

confl ates it with militancy and violence----not so much in an apologetic

response to western orientalists but by way of reconnecting with a lost

tradition within the Islamic canon. It is important to recall their seminal

work because of a tendency, particularly since the catastrophic events

of 9/11 to bury Islam under utterly untenable allegations against its very

essence. At the practical level, the modernists played an important role in

reconstituting Muslim societies and empowering them in a manner that

enabled them to accelerate decolonisation and lead to the emergence of

independent Muslim nation states, including Pakistan.

It is often said that Islam is a religion of laws. This is meant to

be a derogatory perception of the last of the three great monotheistic

religions; it is designed to underline the preoccupation with Sharia

on the part of the extremist movements that threaten to supplant the

modernists in many Muslim states and communities. This perception,

however, is fallacious. Islam’s pristine emphasis is on justice (adal)

and compassion (ihsan). The distinctive feature of Islam is the yearning



for an egalitarian, equitable and democratic social order; the denial of

such an order has been the cause of much strife within Islam. The poet-

philosopher Muhammad Iqbal who envisioned an independent Muslim

state in post-colonial South Asia was not a revolutionary in the usual

20th century sense but when it came to the new and strange gods of his

times - Capitalism, Fascism and Communism - he was an iconoclast. As

a matter of fact when lights were going out one after the other all over

Europe, the main independence movements in the colonised world were

guided largely by democratic forces.

In fact, a major fountainhead of Muslim rage that has spawned the

other kind of radicalisation that leads to much confl ict now is a pervasive

sense of injustice. This sense of injustice and the contingent outrage are

directed as much towards the Muslim rulers as towards major powers.

The modernist movements helped usher the era of freedom from direct

alien rule but failed to deliver progress and security for all partly because

of intrinsic factors and partly because of continued foreign interventions.

Palestine, Kashmir, the CIA’s successful operation to bring down

Mossadegh and the invasion of Egypt by Israel, France and the United

Kingdom became symbols of perpetual injustice and a perennial source

of a sense of victimhood amongst the Muslims to which the modernists

and reformers of Muslim thought had no easy answer. Over a period of

time, localised grievances became a global narrative of rejection and

denial by a predatory West.

Huntington’s clash of civilisation thesis owes its central motif to

the prolifi c “orientalist” Bernard Lewis. In much of the Muslim world

Bernard Lewis is synonymous with long standing plans to fragment

the world of Islam into small ethnically-based and compliant states.

Huntington is retrospectively seen as having written not an academic

dissertation but a manifesto, a virtual scheme that the neoconservatives

were to implement as soon as they seized power in the United States. It

was a scheme for an aggressive return of western armies to the broader

Middle East. It went far beyond the control of the energy resources and

the establishment of military bases to fi ll the gaps in a global deployment

of strategic forces for the new century. In the Muslim perception, every

piece fi tted into a giant jigsaw puzzle. Iraq’s 7000-year old cultural


Tanvir Ahmad Khan

heritage was ravaged and almost 3.5 millions Iraqis displaced internally

and externally to demonstrate that the only history that mattered was

that of the West. The world, it was argued, was being returned to the

era when it was divided between central, metropolitan people and the

peripheral people bound to them by tributary relations.

What turned these apprehensions into a spiral of mindless violence

by Iraqi resistance and terrifying reprisals by western armies--- Fallujha

epitomising the gory drama for history--- was partly the result of the

ever shifting grounds for invading Iraq. By the time the rationale for the

invasion of Iraq crystallised into a declaration of intent to reconfi gure

and reconstitute the broader Middle East, it had revived layers of fears

accumulated over centuries. Islam has a long and proud history of its

own and nothing could have been more provocative than to apply the

18th century concept of a civilising mission in proclaiming liberty and

freedom as the purpose of a massive military intervention. The menu

offered to the region was not only democracy but also a transformation

of its dominant faith. In his 1988 book Islamic Liberalism, Leonard

Binder made the following trenchant observation to make the point that

the world of Islam believes that it can progress without paying such a

heavy cultural price : “From the time of the Napoleonic invasion, from

the time of the massacre of the Janissaries, from the time of the Sepoy

mutiny, at least the West has been trying to tell Islam what must be the

price of progress in the coin of the tradition which is to be surrendered.”

In 1992, after witnessing murder and mayhem in Bosnia Herzegovina,

the western-educated Arab intellectual, Rana Kabbani, wrote: “How

are we to tackle our problems rationally; handicapped as we are by

an overpowering sense of grievance? Both towards a West that has

long colonised, manipulated and despised us, and towards our own

governments, which are shamefully silent, corrupt and castrated. We

have yet to earn our independence as Muslims: the rich nations amongst

us are mere vassals, the poor ones, full victims.”

Given the Quranic injunctions on a just war, the Muslim mind

should have no diffi culty in differentiating between jihad and martyrdom

on the one hand and terrorism on the other. If this distinction has got

blurred today, then there is something gravely wrong with the Muslim



imagination and the forces that are trying to bend it to their will. The

difference is so clearly embedded in the historical memory of Islam that

a true Muslim instinctively knows when there is resort to illegitimate

and impermissible violence in the name of Islam. There is the haunting

memory of Ibn Muljam assassinating the fourth pious Caliph, Hazrat Ali.

Here is the immutable difference between the terrorist and the martyr.

Then there is the awesome moment of the grandson of the Prophet

of Islam sacrifi cing his life at Karbala. This is the Muslim individual

redeeming an entire culture by standing up to the state terrorism of a

usurper. Islam refuses to resign itself to perpetual injustice and repression.

Drawing upon Ali Shariati’s “Iqbal, Ma’mar Tajdid Banaye Taffokar-I

Islami “ (Iqbal, the architect of the reconstruction of Islamic thought)

and his seminal Shahadat (Martyrdom), Mannochehr Dorraj makes the

following observation about Shariati and, by implication, about Iqbal :

“For Shariati, one of the greatest and most revolutionary contributions

of Islam to human society has been to instil a sense of devotion and

sacrifi ce in the pursuit of justice. Through martyrdom a society refi nes

itself. By sacrifi cing the most precious possession (one’s life) the

individual also affi rms his/her faith in the ideals of the collectivity and

adds to the credibility and sanctity of this ideal.” The western failure

to distinguish between lawful resistance to foreign occupation and

mindless terrorism that stalks the world of Islam today is the root cause

of the rapidly growing mutual incomprehension.

Millions of Muslim denounced in unequivocal terms the outrage in

East Africa in 1998, the World Trade Centre attack in 1993, the ghastly

tragedy of Twin Towers, the terrorist bombing in Madrid, the bombs

of Bali and every other atrocity committed in some twisted logic of

defending Islam. But what they get in return is the tarnishing of their

faith as “Islamofascism” not only by opinion-makers such as the novelist

Martin Amis who wrote an anti-Muslim polemic entitled The Age of

Horrorism in Sunday Observer but also by leading western politicians

including President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair.

In a remarkable essay entitled ‘Muslims and Democracy,’ Abdou

Filali-Ansary sought avenues of better mutual understanding and co-

existence.4 He conceded that Muslim confrontation with European


Tanvir Ahmad Khan

colonial powers in the nineteenth century gave birth to some great and

lasting misunderstandings, as a result of which Muslims have rejected

key aspects of modernity as alienation and a surrender of the historical

self to the “Other”. But then he also reminded us that ‘the rule of law is

a notion that expresses something that Muslims have longed for since

the early phases of their history, and have felt to be part of the message

of Islam.” The Muslims seek higher universalism for the concept of the

rule of law in the conduct of international relations and will not accept

another century of dominance, subjugation, humiliation and exploitation

by the West or its new surrogates.

The Muslim world does not deny that a high degree of natural

cosmopolitanism is inherent in economic globalisation; it is willing to

accept it as an evolutionary process. But it is a delusion to think that

by applying overwhelming military force, local cultures hallowed by

thousands of years can be bludgeoned into the total homogeneity of

a superfi cial western culture. In fact, it is a recipe for confl icts lasting

generations. Justifying this project as a post-Enlightenment civilisation

dragging a pre-Enlightenment culture into a creative encounter with

modernity is sheer hubris.

The events of 9/11 were a manifestation of pure primordial evil

which can never be condoned. But they signalled a new stage in a

new kind of warfare which has only been expanded by the retribution

extracted from the Taliban in Afghanistan and during a far more

indefensible invasion of Iraq. Professor Michael Mazarr speaks of

‘twilight struggles against non-state networks of evildoers.” The new

confl icts are not wars waged by regular, organised armies, however

lethally armed, across vast swathes of European or Asian land mass They

do not belong even to the tradition in which less powerful peoples made

hit and run raids to prosecute the classical anti-colonial and national

liberation movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. “We

are not fi ghting,” writes Professor Nazarr, “proto-Bismarcks, who want

nothing more than to seize power and start operating as realpolitikers.”5

It is a fi ght against a ‘fantasy ideology,” a mind set and ‘the central

route to war in such psychological dramas is national humiliation and

society-wide alienation.” For a battle for the society, for its mindsets



and psychologies, (and) to address sources of grievance and anxiety,

to shore up institutions of governance,’ Mazarr proposes a theory of

psychopolitik resting on three pillars of statecraft: restraint, compassion,

and fi scal responsibility. He is aware of the danger that the West would

persist in its faith that traditional conventional confl ict is the dominant

mode. Were it to do things differently, his recipe for at least mitigating

the threat of new radicalism, is stated thus: attend to identity; attend to

the global economy; practise the greatest restraint possible in foreign

policy; avoid humiliating others; do not become the focus of alienation.

This recipe would obviously not be acceptable to the hardcore Al-Qaeda

that is already beyond reverence for life, beyond the insights of the

three monotheistic religions, beyond the fruits of settled civilisations

and beyond the four walls of international law. But it could still make

a profound impact on thousands of radicalised young men and women

who are engaged in battles of alienation and mutual incomprehension.

As stated in the beginning of this paper, Muslim activism in

the Indian sub-continent aimed primarily at reviving a vanquished

community. In reconstructing Muslim thought its main proponents

tried to cut through cobwebs of ritualism and esoteric practices that

induced a passive acceptance of life under foreign domination. Even

when they successfully mobilised Muslim separatist sentiment and

demanded a “Muslim homeland” in South Asia, the emphasis was on

constitutionalism and democratic assertion in Muslim majority areas.

The Indian Muslims steered clear of all anti-British movements that

embraced political violence as a tool of the independence struggle.

Pakistan’s emergence as an independent state however created a

new dynamic. The founding fathers believed that they would be able to

accommodate Islamic aspirations in a largely secular state structure of an

elected parliament, independent judiciary and modernising bureaucracy.

This was challenged by Islamic parties not so much by rejecting the

state organisation as by demanding that it should be the instrument

of creating an Islamic state. The principal parties like Jam’ati Islami,

which was established by the internationally renowned scholar Abul Ala

Maududi in British India in 1941, and Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i- Islam took

up the banner of Islamisation engaging the state peacefully through the


Tanvir Ahmad Khan

established institutions. Since the early years of Pakistan’s history were

marked by a vocal if small Marxist movement that opposed military

alliances and propagated a leftist revolution, much of the energy of the

Islamic parties was expended on combating communist radicalism.

The fear of an ideology alien to Islam also created a rapidly expanding

apolitical movement - the Tablighi Jamaat - that concentrated on

reviving the basic knowledge of Islam amongst the masses through

low key frictionless contact with individuals and susceptible groups

such as students. In the 1950s and 1960s, some of the Islamic parties

in Pakistan received western support. By and large, the Islamic parties

have garnered very limited electoral support except in 2002 when they

were able to gain signifi cant representation in the National Assembly

and two provinces by exploiting the anti-American wave unleashed by

the American invasion of Afghanistan. They have failed to repeat their

success in Pakistan’s general election in 2008.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the Pakistani state responded to demands for

Islamisation with a gradualist policy of incorporating elements that did

not alter its basic organisation. Pakistan’s Constitution forbids parliament

to enact a law that is repugnant to Islam. First a state-funded Institute

of Islamic Research and then a Council of Islamic Ideology emerged

as forums for study and research on how Islam could interface with

the modern world. Pakistan also created a Sharia Court with a parallel

existence to the established system of traditional courts inherited from

the British Raj.

The subsequent drift towards radicalisation was caused by intrinsic

factors as well as by momentous changes in Pakistan’s strategic

environment. First and foremost, Pakistan experienced along with

several Arab-Islamic countries the failure of the nationalist secular elites

that had emerged during decolonisation to provide political stability and

suffi cient economic growth. In Pakistan’s case, periods of high economic

growth were marred by an accentuation of class and income disparities.

Disillusionment with the post-colonial modern state fuelled the urge

for a return to the pristine values and true tenets of Islam. The failure

of the state to provide universal education led to a rapid expansion of

the traditional seminaries, the religious madrassas, which now have an



enrolment of nearly a million young people and account for a signifi cant

percentage of literacy in a certain age group.

The external developments that radicalised Muslim politics in

Pakistan and the neighbourhood include several seminal events: the

Soviet Union’s direct military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 to save

a tottering Marxist regime; the Islamic revolution in Iran; the refusal of

Israel to withdraw from Arab territories occupied during the 1967 war

and later colonised heavily; the suppression of Palestinian intifada, the

Iran-Iraq war; the eventual American interventions to liberate Kuwait

and later in 2003 to occupy Iraq for an indefi nite period of time; and

the collapse of the Soviet Union that brought freedom to predominantly

Muslim Central Asian states. The emancipation of Central Asia---

played an important role in radicalising the Kashmiri movement against

India with attendant consequences for Pakistan’s polity; it was taken

as affi rmation of the view that a local armed struggle could change the

status quo otherwise preserved and sanctifi ed by nuclear deterrence

stability in the sub-continent.

In Afghanistan Islamist politics emerged because of the country’s

brief experiment with parliamentary democracy in 1960s. It was also

a distinct reaction to the growing Marxist trends amongst the educated

classes. Pakistan’s Islamic parties kept contact with Afghan parties

such as Hizbe Islami because they were never enthusiastic about the

irredentist claims of Afghan leaders typifi ed by Sardar Mohammad

Daoud who was to lose his life in the Marxist-led military putsch in

1978. These links played an important part in forging a formidable front

against the Marxist regime and then in organising the great Afghan Jihad

against the Soviet Union. The Jihad was largely outsourced to Pakistan’s

intelligence services which, with strong American assistance, radicalised

the Afghans Mujahidden and their Pakistani partners. The madrassas that

had imparted a conservative Sunni education based upon a centuries old

curriculum became a special focus of anti-Soviet militancy. In the mid-

1990s the madrassa students on both sides of the border constituted the

Taliban who intervened strongly in a fi erce power struggle amongst the

Mujahideen leaders. The Taliban had much of Afghanistan under their

medievalist control when they were overthrown by the American attack


Tanvir Ahmad Khan

in October 2001.

The Afghan Jihad brought thousands of Muslims, mostly Arabs,

to Afghanistan and the neighbouring districts of Pakistan. Amongst

them were Shaikhs who commanded veneration for their knowledge of

fundamentalist Islam and who raised the awareness of the Pakistani and

Afghan Islamists from the local to the global. People of both the countries

had always taken a strong interest in Muslim causes all over the world

especially in Palestine. But the Arab component of the Afghan Jihad

provided them with a conceptual framework for a perpetual struggle

against powers that continued to humiliate the Muslims and usurp their

lands directly or through indigenous surrogates. Pakistan’s reversal of

policy on Afghanistan in 2001 and the wholehearted participation of

the Pakistani army in the project to build a new democratic Afghanistan

aroused great hostility amongst this ideological enclave of the erstwhile

Afghan Jihad. Pakistan has ended up importing the ongoing confl ict in

Afghanistan where the Taliban have re-surfaced as the main resistance

group into Pakistan. Its tribal belt now has militants called local Taliban

and the losses suffered by the Pakistan’s security forces exceed the

aggregate of American and NATO losses since 2001. The Pakistan

government has not carried conviction that the country needs to fi ght

the militants for its own security and prosperity. The armed forces

are currently engaged in re-establishing the writ of the government

in Waziristan where the jihadis have created a rival authority. It is a

costly enterprise in military losses and government’s popularity ratings.

The ever widening perception in the country that the government is

fi ghting America’s war in Afghanistan by itself has become a factor in

the radicalisation of Islamists in the country. The post-election political

government in Pakistan is mindful of this factor and is currently engaged

in exploring avenues for diversifying the strategy for combating

extremism so as to include offers of negotiations with amenable groups

of militants enraged by an excessive reliance on military counter-

insurgency operations.

European Concern

As a citizen of a country from where considerable emigration to



Europe, especially the United Kingdom, has taken place one cannot

but understand the increasing anxiety about the inroads that Muslim

activism is making into Muslim expatriate communities in Europe. Nor

can one be indifferent to the reactive implications of this phenomenon

for European societies and for inter-state relations in a globalising world.

If the European liberal -left feels that Muslim radicalism has intensifi ed

the shift in the European political spectrum to extreme right, the Muslim

world is equally apprehensive of irrational Islamophobia. Not since the

crusades and the Spanish Inquisition has Islam been vilifi ed the way it

is being done in this age.

What are the easily recognisable aspects of the situation that need to

be addressed? First and foremost, it is the fear of demography. Muslims

tend to concentrate in urban centres for obvious economic reasons. They

have a high birth rate. According to Timothy M.Savage,6 there are 15.2

million Muslims in the original pre-expansion European Union (EU).

France with fi ve million, Germany with four million, the UK with 1.6

million, Italy with a million, and the Netherlands with 886,000 lead the

charts. Austria, Belgium, Greece and Sweden have Muslim populations

ranging from 300,000 to 450,000. Muslims in the New EU member

states are estimated at 290,000 out of which Cyprus alone accounts

for 200,000. One estimate visualises a doubling of Muslim population

in Europe as a whole by 2015. While it is possible to dramatise the

confessional situation in a particular city like Bradford in England, a

situation that certainly calls for appropriate interventionist strategies,

the overall demographic profi le of Europe does not justify paranoid

reactions. Surely, the cause is more qualitative than quantitative.

Three aspects of the qualitative situation stand out. The Muslims are

reluctant to shed their identity; in fact, they are mobilising themselves

more earnestly than ever before to preserve it. Even though they are

not a monolithic group, European Muslims “increasingly identify fi rst

with Islam rather than with either their family’s country of origin or the

European country in which they reside.” Here is an abiding confl ict of

values. Second, they are prone to “the seductive lure of a transnational

Muslim identity forged in foreign policy grievances, a culture of

victimisation and a sense of alienation that is only partially fed by socio-


Tanvir Ahmad Khan

economic factors.” {Jonathan Paris) Third, even for those who are not

unduly distressed by the new diversity produced by Muslim cultures,

in the plural, there is a putative threat to the state and the society.

Analysing the scene in the Netherlands, Professor Paul Sniderman

argues that multiculturalism encouraged an ambiguity of commitment;

the fundamental issue, it turns out is not diversity but loyalty. Fourth,

there is anxiety that Muslim communities in Europe, aggrieved as they

feel, may not be fully forthcoming to cooperate with intelligence and

law enforcement agencies in eliminating terrorist cells.

Unfortunately, Europe, like Pakistan, is reluctant to admit that an

uncritical acceptance of the metaphor of a global war against terrorism

has worked against the initiatives for greater harmony and integration.

The two seminal strategies--- multiculturalism adopted as a policy by the

United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Scandinavia etc., and assimilation by

France --- might have had a better chance if Iraq had not happened the

way it did and Afghanistan was not mishandled after the initial success

against the Taliban. It would be unnatural to expect that Muslims

anywhere in the world would not be outraged by the destruction of Iraq.

They were prominent in the peace marches because of their race and

religion; the demonstrations were otherwise overwhelmingly composed

of Europeans whose time-hallowed post-Enlightenment values were

grossly violated by the invasion and its sordid aftermath. The perception

that the US-led West was waging war against Islam was as much a

product of the fevered imagination of Muslim communities as of the

reckless semantics used increasingly by western leaders once it became

clear that the invasion had turned into a fi asco. The morally untenable

over-simplifi cation that any Muslim failing to show submission to the

US grand design for the broader Middle East must either be a terrorist

or a sympathetic accomplice has contributed greatly to the radicalisation

of Muslims all over the world.

One of the new clichés is that the project to build multi-cultural

societies in the West has collapsed because of ‘political Islam.’ It is

possible to revive both multiculturalism and assimilation provided they

are subjected to a critical reappraisal. The British are backing away from

multiculturalism partly because they have not as yet factored into their



assessment the blowback of the policies of the Blair era. France has

to rethink its literalist interpretation of assimilation which over-blows

issues like the wearing of scarves. Such potentially emotive matters

are often a substitute for hard solutions for the harsh realities of the

banlieues. The British academic, David Drake, pertinently asked why so

much political, intellectual and emotional energy has been spent on the

issue of a teenager wanting to wear a head scarf rather than on far more

pressing issues of integration such as the high rates of unemployment

and deprivation in the Muslim community. The explanation that the

apprehensions of the French state are rooted in the memory of the bloody

struggle for secularisation after the French Revolution and through

the counter-revolutionary movements for restoration of the old school

system does not make much impression on Muslims who consider the

scarf as an ordinary statement of identity. For many Muslim analysts,

Islamophobia is an escape from a cluster of realities. It has an undertone

of racism that the West does not want to admit. There is a touch of

imperial nostalgia that manifests itself into a hierarchical arrangement

of people from former colonies. It is also a state of denial about the fact

that many western countries have lost their distinctive status because of

globalisation, American hegemony and now a rapid shift of economic

power to the emerging Asian nations.

An effective strategy to combat the rise of radicalism will have to

address issues of foreign and security policies and those of integrating or

assimilating Muslims into European societies simultaneously. Seeking

to bring about a forcible disconnect between the two has already been

shown as counter-productive. At the psychological and emotional plane,

it is as diffi cult to make Muslims indifferent to the disastrous new wars

in the Middle East as to expect Jewish communities in the United States

and elsewhere not to concern themselves with the fortunes of Israel.

Secular western states often show an understandable bias in favour

of Christian minorities in other lands particularly when they become

victims of an oppressive majority, as was the case of East Timor under

Indonesian control. The harm done by European procrastination over a

ceasefi re in Lebanon in August 2006 was incalculable as every additional

day provided to Israel to wreak havoc in Lebanon was being carried to

millions of homes all over the world in real time. The recent history


Tanvir Ahmad Khan

of Arab-Muslim people from Palestine to Afghanistan has regrettably

highlighted how little is the impact of the mass of liberal people in the

West on the policies of their governments. It has gravely undermined

the European moral authority. With its unrivalled experience of other

cultures and climes spanning at least three hundred years, Europe is

expected to exercise a moderating infl uence on American policies. The

popular perception in the Muslim world is not only of the insensitivity

of American decision-making to honest advice but also of Europe not

even tendering such advice.

Muslims do not expect Europe to unleash an insurgency against what

is often described as the new global American empire. But they do think

that Europe can strengthen its own initiatives for Good Neighbourhood

policies towards Muslim lands across the Mediterranean and on its

eastern rim from Turkey southwards. On issues like Palestine that fuel

radicalism, Europe has not tried hard enough to present a different

profi le. If Prime Minister Tony Blair was lured to the Iraq war by a

subliminal desire to recapture the lost glory of the British Empire, then

the outcome should open our eyes. Iraq has emerged as the new epicentre

of radicalism and given Al-Qaeda a new lease of life.

Even on its own, Europe in partnership with Arab-Muslim countries

can help create a civilisational infrastructure of education, professional

knowledge, economic reforms and technology transfer that would stop the

rapid expansion of the space where deprivation and frustration translate

into radicalism. Europe can also disseminate liberal and democratic

values by demonstrating that in the fi nal analysis it is not on the side of

local despots and dictators. Unfortunately the present evidence points

to the contrary; Europe is still seen to prefer puppets that can keep the

natives on a tight leash.

Internally, Europe must make a distinction between those who

have signed up for mindless violence and the rest including those given

the derogatory title of “fence sitters.” If further recruitment is denied

the hard core will succumb before long to better law enforcement,

intelligence and international cooperation. Europe needs to deconstruct

myths being popularised by the extreme right wing and the American



evangelists trying to hasten the second coming. It is often said that the

Muslim minority is “encroaching upon the collective identity and public

values of European society.” We need to sift the truth in such assertions

from deep-seated historical prejudices which project themselves as a

paranoid fear of the “other.” Thirteen European states have been listed

as not recognising Islam as a religion. Many of them do not even bestow

minority rights embodied in their constitutions on Muslims because they

are not a recognised ethnic group. No less than 19 percent of Germans

were reported in a survey to favour a ban on Muslim worship altogether.

Several European states create serious hurdles in the construction of

mosques. Discriminated against frequently, the ghettoised mind can

only resist assimilation. That resistance is stronger amongst the young

is as much an indictment of the European societies as the false charisma

of the radicalised Imams. Loyalty comes more easily if one has a stake

in the state and society.

Reforming Islam

The present crisis in the West’s relations with the Muslim world

emanates in no small a measure from an infl exible hostility towards

what is often referred to as ‘political Islam.’ The term is becoming

synonymous with terrorism. Political Islam is considered on a priori

basis as antithetical to modernisation, democratic choice and liberal

values. Embracing an essentialist view of Islamist movements, the

US-led West seems to have taken upon itself the task of reconstituting

Islamic civilisation. Since political Islam is pathology, a surgical use

of force is considered legitimate. The fact of the matter is that the

major “Islamist” movements in Morocco, Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia

and Indonesia reject neither modernity nor development. Nearly all of

them are willing to stake their claim to political power through free

and fair election. What is, however, true is that they also share their

opposition to confl ating modernisation with westernisation. “History,”

writes Menderes Cinar, “is narrated accordingly: the pious Muslim

people reacted to the colonisation of their lands by waging a war of

independence, but since then an alienated, Westernising elite grabbed the

power of the state and acted as internal colonisers.” Cinar recommends

that Islamism be accepted as a legitimate political movement, advancing


Tanvir Ahmad Khan

a moral criticism of politics which is a sine qua non of democracy.7 This

proposal to “normalise” Islamism as an alternative vision that is willing

to fi gure in a democratic battle of ideas resonates well with much of

liberal Muslim opinion which regards the western pressure on Muslim

rulers to exclude the Islamist tendency from the equation as playing into

the hands of militants and terrorists. Muslim politics cannot be severed

by force from assertion of a Muslim identity by segments of the polity;

the balance can be found only in the adoption of democratic procedures.

The West, at the moment, is seen as clearly arrayed on the side of non-

democratic regimes willing to advance its agenda of re-establishing

control of physical resources of the Muslim world. That religion is not a

factor per se is seen in the readiness of most of the Islamic movements to

support increased ties with non-Muslim or secular states such as China

and India.

In Muslim history, a transnational awareness of the Ummah has

never abolished local identities. At best it was unity in diversity even

at the zenith of the Caliphate, a concept left far behind by modernity.

A great deal of the sacred has survived in all Christian sects despite the

Enlightenment and the Jacobeans. A great deal of the sacred will shape

the Muslim imagination wherever the Muslims live as a community. They

will imbibe modern sciences and technology and yet retain some sense of

mystery in their understanding of the Genesis and the purpose of human

life. How it can threaten European values is simply incomprehensible.

Nor would it stand in the way of Muslims integrating in non-Muslim

states as loyal citizens as they have done for 1400 years.

References:

1 Rahman, Fazalur, Revival and Reform in Islam, One world, Oxford 2006. P.7

2 ibid p 13

3 ibid p 21

4 Abdou Filali-Ansary. Journal of Democracy 1999

5 Mazarr, Michael J,www.realclearpolitics.com March 6, 2006

6 Savage, Timothy M.,, Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing, The

Washington Quarterly; Summer 2004, pp 25-50

7 Cinar, M, 2002, From Shadow boxing to Critical Understanding, Totalitarian Movements

and Political Religions, 3.1, 35-57

THE BOMBER UNDER THE BURQA

Farhana Ali*

Abstract(Since March 2003, when the war in Iraq began, the participation

of women in that country in suicide terrorism has increased by nearly

30 percent. This year alone there have been eight attacks committed by

women compared to six in 2007. The exponential increase in female

suicide bombings suggests the trend will continue to rise unless security

officials, the Iraqi government, and the international community seek

new solutions to counter the rising violence by an important non-state

actor. Author).

Introduction: Why Women Kill

Over the past six years, more Muslim women appear ready to

conduct suicide terrorism for reasons similar to their male counterparts.

On the surface, women seem to be no different than male terrorists and

appear to be equally affected by their local context, driven to suicide

terrorism in part by their personal, familial, organizational, and societal

responsibility to protect their families, communities and nations perceived

to be under attack. Many assume that women, like men, are motivated

by an extremist interpretation of Islam that promotes, if not legitimizes,

suicide terrorism (i.e., martyrdom operations) to defend the faith against

perceived infidels. While Islamic doctrine is used to encourage and incite

violent jihad, women’s communiqués, interviews and online statements

indicate that religion is the least common denominator for the would-be

female bomber.

The literature on women in armed conflict, war, and political

* Farhana Ali is a scholar and the author of several internationally published research

papers.


Farhana Ali

violence is growing, but few studies focus on the motivations that drive

Muslim women to support the violent jihad. The reality of many women

engaged in terrorist activities is that they, unlike men, are invisible

to local security forces and the outside community. Through their

anonymity, Muslim women have successfully perpetrated attacks with

the bomb under the burqa which provides them an additional layer of

protection; by wearing the burqa or the abaya (Arabic term), women are

able to mask their intentions and master the art of deceit and deception.

While recent studies of female suicide terrorists highlight the

Islamic dress, partly attributed to Western fascination with “veiling” and

“patriarchy,” this focus fails to recognize the psychological factor that

contribute to women choosing suicide terror. Therefore, by highlighting

the dress code of Muslim women, and the Islamic societies from which

suicide terrorism increasingly emerges, Western scholars have confused

Islam with terrorism.

Why and how are Muslim women recruited by male terrorists or

volunteer for suicide attacks? For terrorism analysts, the answer often

lies in the woman’s connections, direct or indirect, to the terrorist leader,

other group members, organization or the conflict. The answer may be

traced to the ideological, historical, socio-political, or economic factors

that impact their decision to choose suicide as a tactic of warfare. Some

Western scholarship on this subject has emphasized the role of female

emancipation within Islamic patriarchal societies, assuming that all

would-be female terrorists are second-class citizens.

Overcoming the increasingly accepted argument that women

commit attacks to attain equality, this article integrates some of the

unconventional norms that have unjustly been used to categorize

Muslim women into a single framework. This narrow view discounts

the important variables that reflect a woman’s decision to choose suicide

terrorism, such as culture, religious practice, and the familial/societal

role of Muslim women in any given environment. The reality is that

Muslim female bombers vary considerably along the lines of culture,

religion, national identity, as well as their own personal perceptions of

their roles within the nuclear - and extended - familial systems to which


The Bomber under the Burqa

they belong.

A full account of Muslim female activism - and by extension, the

role of men who recruit women - requires further attention, and should

consider the impact of values and norms within a particular society

that could act to persuade some women to choose violence. How these

norms are violated with respect to women is a point worth highlighting.

For example, in most conflicts today, including the non-Muslim world,

women are also victims of rape, torture, kidnappings and other heinous

crimes committed by men as acts of vengeance or simple blood-letting

and/or barbarism.

Therefore, women who do not join terrorist groups also fall victim

to violence. As victims of war, women suffer from rape, kidnappings,

and torture. Radical Iraqi men, similar to men in other Muslim countries,

exact revenge against the women of their society. In a newly released

report by the Women for Women International, created by Iraqi-born

female activist, Zainab Salbi, almost two-thirds of the 1,500 Iraqi

women questioned for the survey she conducted in Iraq said that violence

against them had increased.1 According to Salbi’s survey data, only 26.9

percent of women questioned were optimistic about the situation in

Iraq. Like Salbi, Iraqi-born Dr. Rashad Zidan, who was voted Person of

2006, refl ects the growing concerns of women, especially widows. She

exposes the conditions of Iraqi women to the West, noting the loss of

their men, including brothers and son to ongoing wars. In an interview

with US reporters, Zidan states, “I would say to the American Congress,

your war has ruined my country. You need to repair what you have

ruined and then leave us alone.”

Of equal value is the cultural psychology of men. Female acceptance

by male leaders is key to gaining access into terrorist organizations and

perpetrating suicide attacks - a tactic that has helped alter the assumption

that women are pacifi sts, moderate and non-violent. Thus, the role of

culture and ideas, as interpreted by male extremists and their followers,

can alter the choices women make and convince them that there is glory

in suicide attacks. Couched in religious symbols and language, some

Muslim women might choose to express their real-world grievances


Farhana Ali

through violence.

Although it is accepted that we may never know the full range

of motivations that female bombers might use to rationalize suicide

terrorism, and their reasons may vary from person to person, group to

group, and confl ict to confl ict, certain common themes and patterns

among female bombers can provide a framework for analysis. Drawing

on earlier research and interviews of female extremists, this author

frames the mujahidaat’s motives for suicide terrorism under broad

categories into what is called the fi ve “R’s”:

Reform • to the confl ict through a peaceful settlement and for

future generations

Revenge• for the loss of family members, and/or loss of community/

nation;

Respect • from the larger Muslim community for her sacrifi ce;

Reassurance• that she is a capable and equal partner in affecting

change in war;

Recruit• other women to follow her example.

This list is not meant to exclude other factors that could inspire

women to participate in terrorism. Professor Andrew Silke maintains

that certain factors exist within a given community that enables groups

to employ suicide. His argument assumes that groups using suicide

have a “cultural precedent for self-sacrifi ce; the confl ict is long-

running…and involves casualties on both sides; and the protagonists

are desperate.”2 In a separate article, Silke highlights the psychology

of vengeance, social identifi cation (i.e., the need to belong to a local or

international community of believers), accessible entrée into a terrorist

group, status and personal rewards, and the feeling of exclusion from

mainstream society which leaves individuals vulnerable to religious

indoctrination.3

No Two Confl icts Are Alike

Local confl icts are critical motivators, but each one is unique and

must be viewed from a specifi c set of circumstances, such as the historical



framework from which confl ict emerges, to assess the factors that drive

women in various parts of the world to suicide terror. For instance,

aside from being linked by gender, the mujahidaat in Chechnya have

little in common with women in Palestine, and women in Saudi Arabia

have absolutely nothing to share with their “sisters” in Uzbekistan.

Therefore, different people generate different reactions to local and

global confl icts.

Like men, women understand the importance of propaganda (i.e.,

the “CNN” factor) in fi ghting for a cause they believe in. No different

from men, women have chosen suicide attacks to call attention to their

confl ict, raising the level of awareness from the world community to

the heightened frustration, alienation, and despair experienced in local

confl icts. Increasing awareness with instant media coverage, however,

has not always guaranteed an end to confl ict or increased involvement

by regional or other actors, such as the United States, to mediate for a

peaceful solution to confl ict. In some cases, news of female bombers

helps to create more anger and disillusionment from the general

population, while motivating other women to commit the same act. For

example, four Palestinian women committed suicide attacks within four

months after Wafa Idris’s suicide bombing in January 2002.4

While confl icts and motivations vary, a woman’s decision to pursue

violent action is impacted by personal experiences and outcomes.

Coupled with the absence of change to her own local confl ict, of which

she is a part of, a woman is more apt to volunteer or be recruited for a

terrorist operation to end her own suffering, or that of the people she

identifi es with.

Suicide is the preferred tactic when Muslim women believe that their

social structure, which is the fabric of an Islamic society, is threatened or

has been violated by the prevailing authority. Veteran Palestinian jihadist

Leila Khaled said, “we are under attack…the Palestinians are ready to

sacrifi ce themselves for the national struggle for the respect of their just

rights,” extolling female bombers like Wafa.5 Following Idris’ bombing,

Hanadi Jaradat detonated a bomb in October 2003 in the Arab-owned

restaurant, Maxim, in Haifa, Israel, which killed nineteen people. In an


Farhana Ali

excerpt aired on 16 August 2005 on Al Jazeera, Hanadi says: “By the

power of Allah, I have decided to become the sixth female martyrdom-

seeker, who will turn her body into shrapnel, which will reach the heart

of every Zionist colonialist in my country.”6

The perceived threat against Islam also serves as a powerful

motivator that has justifi ed the use of violence as an effective means

of communication. Convinced that the local Muslim community can

no longer afford inaction, some Muslim women enlist in operations

to ensure the survival of the Muslim community. For the believer of

martyrdom, subjugation to the faith (i.e., Islam) is rewarding. The

individual, knowing that death is likely, “inspires other Muslims to

continue the struggle and the martyr’s death is kindling wood for jihad

and Islam.”7

Accepting that other motivations are likely, two factors offer

women a heightened sense of awareness of the world in which they

live: a breakdown of a woman’s societal structures (including foremost

the loss of her family and community) and increased opportunities for

women to volunteer for or join terrorist groups. Through the latter,

women - even those not living in war, occupation or armed struggle

- can become members of a larger community, or what Islam calls the

Ummah (Global Islamic Community). Scholars and psychiatrists refer

to this as embracing a “collective identity.”8 Terrorism experts Dr. Jerold

Post and Paul Horgan stress the importance of the social psychological

perspective as the “most powerful lens through which to examine

and explain terrorist behaviour.”9 Through the identifi cation process,

the mobilization of women into terrorist organizations represents an

evolving network.10

With a wide range of possibilities, it is therefore diffi cult to draw

fi rm conclusions about the motivations of all mujahidaat for a number

of reasons. First, there is limited data on women’s motivations for

suicide terrorism, particularly in emerging confl icts such as Iraq. In

older confl icts, such as the Arab-Israeli crisis, empirical evidence has

been collected over time by thoughtful researchers, although one could

argue that the bulk of this research is that of Israeli scholars and former



defence offi cials. There is little to no evidence provided by Palestinian

experts, writers, and/or activists, probably due to a lack of access to failed

suicide bombers inside Israeli prisons and/or the lack of interest.11

Second, the history of female involvement in terrorist organizations,

including secular/nationalist groups, indicates women providing

logistical support including protection for male fi ghters. In the author’s

recent interviews in Kashmir, female militants noted the wide range

of support they offered to the mujahideen, ranging from offering their

homes for protection against authorities to cooking their meals.12 Other

women join extremist groups or participate in warfare to protect their

honour and dignity. In the same region (i.e., Jammu and Kashmir),

women have formed armed groups to protect their interests, their

homes, and families from Islamic militants, rather than kill in the name

of Islam. According to one female fi ghter, “we were subjected to mental

and physical harassment by militants who would force us to provide

them with food and shelter, and in some cases, sexual favours,”13 and

this induced women to use guns and grenades for their own survival.

Third, women participating in terrorist activities suggest no clear

pattern. Existing data on female operatives render it nearly impossible

to profi le the female bomber. They are both young and old, single and

married, educated and illiterate, and few are mothers. Thus, the wide

range of women in female suicide terrorism today discounts any one

“profi le” of a female bomber. The preponderance of evidence suggests

that the mujahidaat could be anyone. The increased invisibility of the

female bomber today also makes profi ling an ineffective exercise.

Rather, an important area of research that “profi les the circumstance”

may be a more useful mechanism, but will require further exploration

before drawing preliminary conclusions.14

Female Bombers in Iraq: Why the Trend Continues

In Iraq, the trend of female suicide terrorism is unpredictable and

unprecedented. As the war in Iraq continues, more Iraqi women will

be ready to make the ultimate sacrifi ce: to use their bodies as human

shields. The US Government and other experts are asking: Why now?


Farhana Ali

Why has there been a spike in attacks in Iraq committed by women?

More important, how will the new role of women as suicide bombers

change the nature of this confl ict?

Since March 2003, when the war began, Iraqi women’s participation

in suicide terrorism has increased by nearly 30 percent. This year alone

there have been eight attacks committed by women, compared to six in

2007. The exponential increase in female suicide bombings suggests the

trend will continue to rise, unless security offi cials, the Iraqi Government,

and the international community seek new solutions to counter the rising

violence by an important non-state actor.

Over the past year, publicly available data of Iraqi female bombers

has shown that women are now the driving force of suicide terrorism.

To understand the psychological factors that stimulate such acts, there

are three likely motivations relevant in Iraq: a mother’s love for her

children - a cathartic desire for revenge that has motivated mothers, who

had lost children to sectarian violence, to become suicide bombers; a

woman’s love for her country - like men, Iraqi women are also die-hard

nationalists and have the right to protect their families against sectarian

attacks and foreign occupation; a woman’s love for her body - suicide

terrorism becomes an act of restitution for women who perceive violence

as a way to cleanse themselves of sinful acts. An additional explanation

is related to men’s exploitation of women’s vulnerability and exposure

to violence by other groups, foreign troops, and/or Iraqi security.

These factors can be summarized in the following way:

Extremes of maternal love. • The cathartic revenge mothers feel

for losing their son(s) is exceptional. No one is of more value

to an Iraqi woman than her son, for whom she will “rip out her

heart,” according to a former professor of Baghdad University.

The loss of a son, a mother’s prized possession, is turning young

mothers into “cannibals,” according to the Baghdad University

scholar. She says, “These women have no reason to live,” and are

therefore more susceptible to violence.



Survival instinct• . During Saddam’s era, many women were

given light arms training to protect their families from the threat

of Iran. Today, these same women are in charge of protecting not

only their families (i.e., when a husband dies or is not available)

but are also die-hard nationalists. Consider the fi rst suicide attack

by two women in March 2003. Both young women asserted their

national duty to save their country from the US-led occupation.

In the early days of the confl ict, other Iraqi women expressed

their primal fear of being ruled by an external force and were

thus willing to conduct acts of violence in defence of their

homeland.

To die for Iraq.• Information on Arabic websites from Iraqi-based

Sunni insurgents and Shia militias suggests that their women are

ready to sacrifi ce themselves for the “love of their country and

faith.”15The Abu al-Boukhari Islamic Network indicates that

because Islam is under attack from the Crusaders, women have

an obligation to defend their faith.16 Therefore, the restriction

imposed on women to stay in their homes is lifted in jihad. A rare

martyrdom video from 2003 shows Wadad Jamil Jassem saying,

“I have devoted myself to Jihad for the sake of God and against

the American, British, and Israeli infi dels and to defend the soil

of our precious and dear country.” Increasingly, the effect of the

occupation and insurgent attacks against women (i.e., torture,

rape, kidnapping) has invariably resulted in growing despair,

disillusionment, and depression among Iraqi women, which

could explain their decision for death over life.

Exploitation by men. • On the Internet, male extremists encourage

women to become actively involved in the confl ict in Iraq.

The evidence on Sunni and Shia websites clearly demonstrate

that women are increasingly participating in the confl ict as

fi ghters, suicide bombers, and “mothers of the martyrs.”17 This

reprehensible exploitation of women is a nightmare for Iraqi

security offi cials as well as US forces trying to counter female

violence.


Farhana Ali

Aside from conducting suicide operations, Iraqi women are

honoured for taking care of male insurgents. For example, in a pro-

insurgent web page known as the Iraqi League, an Iraqi woman from the

city of Falluja is celebrated for remaining in the city during the siege.

This woman provided her home to the insurgents, baked them bread,

and buried them in her own garden; for her efforts, she has been called

“the mother of martyrs.”18 Insurgents also encourage Muslim women to

support their husbands in jihad. The Islamic Army in Iraq, for example,

posted an article entitled “This is How Women Should Be” to carry this

message. Other women support insurgents by offering to marry them,

albeit temporarily. These women agree to marry Sunni men, accepting

no dowry in exchange for a ‘temporary’ marriage. Sunni girls who

choose to marry would-be insurgent fi ghters are seen as devout to their

religion and their country - a sign that the girls’ only wish is to free Iraq

from occupation.19

While temporary marriages were banned during Saddam Hussein’s

regime, it is a widely accepted practice in Shia culture. Known as a

“muta’a” marriage, a couple is permitted to live together as husband

and wife so long as they sign a contract and agree to a fi xed term. This

practice is used to recruit Mehdi Army fi ghters to encourage young men,

who cannot otherwise afford a heavy dowry, to join the militia. In one

statement, Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr motivated Shia girls to agree

to a temporary marriage to “provide enjoyment and pleasure in their

bodies and money to the fi ghters who are sacrifi cing their souls for the

Imam.”20

Finally, women’s inclusion in the war is intended to confuse the

enemy and make it more diffi cult for Iraqi and coalition forces to identify

the female bomber. It is the invisibility of female bombers in Iraq that

poses a grave security concern. The anonymity of the female bomber

protects her personal identity and cloaks the terror groups’ location,

membership, and activities. Because she is an invisible non-state actor,

a female supporter of terrorism makes it diffi cult for authorities to

profi le her. Only recently have security forces been able to suspect and

stop women from detonating. On 6 June 2007, a woman dressed in the

abaya who refused to respond to Iraqi police was shot at, causing the



explosives underneath her dress to explode before she reached her target.

A report from Aswat al-Iraq (Voices of Iraq)21 in January 2008 indicated

that Iraqi police had intelligence information that ten female suicide

bombers entered the province of Diyala, while in March, US troops

arrested a male recruiter of female suicide bombers north of Baghdad.

According to the later report, the male cell leader intended to use his

wife and another woman to conduct suicide attacks.22

So long as the war in Iraq continues, women could become

increasingly available and ready to commit suicide attacks. Because the

trend is recent, there is an urgent need to understand why these women –

once considered the liberated females of the Middle East - are resorting

to such extreme acts of violence. It is important to identify why, in

their misplaced zeal for jihad, they inevitably choose suicide terrorism

and will instigate others to do the same. This alarming development,

so poorly understood, demands serious and immediate research to pre-

empt the acceleration of suicide attacks perpetrated by women in Iraq.

The ultimate question is will an end to the occupation decrease

the level of violence by women in Iraq? The US withdrawal from the

country may not necessarily restore women’s rights though America

can play a leading role in helping them rebuild their lives by providing

security, economic opportunities, educational freedom, and other wide-

ranging reforms. A former Baghdad professor told the author, “Iraqi

women were equal to men under Saddam’s regime; today, women are

targeted for abuse and violence. We need to give women back what they

deserve.”

Scholars Support Female Martyrs

To isolate this study from the ideological underpinnings of suicide

terror, as delineated by some members of the Muslim clergy, would be

to misplace the importance of scripture in determining when, and how,

violence can be used. The current debate in various Islamic circles about

the utility of suicide, and conversely, the use of women in warfare, has

divided the Muslim ummah (community).


Farhana Ali

The Muslim clergy have failed to reach consensus on whether

suicide is an acceptable means of warfare, but several scholars in the

wake of September 2001 and the subsequent July 2005 attack in London

have issued various fatwas (edicts) condemning suicide bombings. The

former head of the Al-Azhar Fatwa Committee, Shaykh ‘Atiyyah Saqr,

uses references to historical Islamic literature to argue that the Prophet

Muhammad said a believer would be forbidden from entering Paradise

if he committed suicide.23 More recently, a prominent Syrian cleric,

Abdel Mon’em Mustafa Abu Halima, issued a fatwa prohibiting suicide

operations. A resident of London, Abu Halima, also known as Abu

Naseer Al Tartusi, said “whoever hurts a Miuslim has no Jihad reward,”

and quotes the Prophet as having said: “whoever murders a non-Muslim

enjoying protection under the Islamic state would never smell the scent

of Paradise.”24

Despite these references, religious extremists justify new rules of

warfare to defeat their enemies, including the use of suicide operations.

Rather than suicide, these actions are considered martyrdom operations

(‘amaliyat istishhadiyya). Using this term helps to legitimize, promote,

and activate future male and female bombers. First, martyrs are held in

high esteem in Islam, but some Islamic theologians and contemporary

jihadis distort several hadith to suggest that: 1) women receive fewer

rewards for martyrdom than their male counterparts; and 2) the male

martyr is entitled to more rewards, though his entitlement to these rewards

is mentioned neither in the Qur’an or popularly cited traditions of Imams

Bukhari and Muslim. Rather, some of the rewards attributed to male

martyrs may be intentionally circulated to motivate, inspire, and activate

the male bomber. For example, a well-known and widely transmitted

hadith of Imam Ahmad al-Tirmidhi explicitly notes that male martyrs

will enjoy the pleasure of 72 virgins in paradise. Tirmidhi’s opinion on

the rewards for the male martyr appears to be all-encompassing and

arguably enticing for a would-be male fi ghter:

The Martyr has seven special favours from Allah:

He [or She] is forgiven his sins with the fi rst spurt of blood,

He sees his place in Paradise; He is clothed with the garment

Of faith. He is wed with seventy-two wives from the beautiful



Maidens of paradise. He is saved from the Punishment of the

Grave. He is protected from the Great Terror (Judgment Day).

On his head is placed a Crown of Dignity, a Jewel better than

The world and all it contains, and he is granted intercession

For seventy people of his household to enter Paradise.25

Of the seven favours listed above, the most controversial but at the

same time widely accepted among violent jihadis is the promise of 72

“maidens of paradise” for the male martyr. The promise of 72 virgins

is even “reminiscent of the medieval Assassins’26 doctrine, involving

the paradise that awaits the holy terrorists,”27 but the concept is not

recognized by all Muslim scholars. The translation of the word “virgin”

in the hadith is characterized in a sexual manner, but other scholars

insist that the word houri is closer to ”the most pure,” a likely reference

to the Prophet’s pious companions.28 Outside of Tirmidhi’s narrative,

the Qur’an makes no reference to the black-eyed virgins or admitting 70

of the martyr’s relatives to heaven. And yet jihadi literature continues to

cite this reference to incite would-be male bombers to conduct terrorist

operations.

Well-known clerics in the Muslim world, such as Doha-based

Shaykh Yusuf Qaradawi, and the late Dr. Abdallah Azzam, along with

several Saudi sheikhs, continue to support martyrdom as a holy concept,

rejecting the Western use of the word “suicide.” They argue that women

can participate in jihad because it is not “suicide.” According to

Qaradawi, the word “suicide is incorrect and misleading,” and prefers

to use the phrase, “heroic operations of martyrdom.” In an interview in

an Egyptian newspaper, Qaradawi justifi es suicide on the basis that it is

“the weapon of the weak.29

Qaradawi fi rst issued a fatwa on the role of women in jihad

following the suicide attack by Wafa Idris, the fi rst Palestinian Muslim

woman to perpetrate an attack on 27 January 2002 when she detonated

explosives at the entrance to a shopping mall in Afula, a city in northern

Israel. First published on the HAMAS Internet site, www.palestine-

info.info in January 2004, Qaradawi said that Muslim women could

disregard certain codes of dress and Islamic law to participate in suicide


Farhana Ali

operations: “when jihad becomes an individual duty, as when the enemy

seizes the Muslim territory, a woman becomes entitled to take part in it

alongside men…and she can do what is impossible for men to do,” even

if it means taking off her hijab (headscarf) to carry out an operation.30

Before Qaradawi, one of the leading proponents of jihad was Umm

Mohammad, the wife of the late Dr. Abdallah Azzam who was Osama

bin Laden’s spiritual mentor and leader of the Afghan Arabs. In an

interview to Al Sharq al-Awsat in April 2006, Umm Mohammed said

she became the “mother fi gure” who coordinated amongst the wives

of the mujahideen (male fi ghters) in Peshawar. In a memoir from late

1990, Umm Mohammed wrote: “I ask my Muslim sisters to encourage

their husbands and sons to continue with the jihad.” Both husband

and wife supported the empowerment of women in jihad. In his book,

Defense of Muslim Lands, Abdullah Azzam, said women did not need

their husband’s permission to participate in jihad. In a separate fatwa

published in 1984,31 Azzam declared that “jihad was the action required

(fard ‘ayn) of every Muslim, regardless of gender.”32 He appealed to

Muslim women to support the male fi ghters. In Part Two of Join the

Caravan published in 1988, he wrote: “What is the matter with the

mothers, that one of them does not send forward one of her sons in the

path of Allah, that he might be a pride for her in this world and a treasure

for her in the hereafter through her intercession?”33

As Azzam states, mothers were essential to the jihad in Afghanistan

against the former Soviet Union. Through their support for male family

members, which included their sons, husbands, and brothers, women

were seen as playing a key ideological role. Similarly, the wife of the

veteran terrorist leader in Iraq, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi - also named

Umm Mohammad - posted a letter in July 2006 on the Mujahideen

Shura Council website, calling on Muslims everywhere to defend the

honour of her husband and participate in jihad. Interviews of would-

be suicide bombers have also shown the strong affi nity women have

towards securing a better future for their children. The maternal instinct

for Muslim women is powerful and rooted in Islamic doctrine. According

to the Prophet of Islam, Heaven lies at the mother’s feet and therefore, a

mother’s role in the family - and by extension, her community, society



and nation - is incomparable to the role played by men, who are seen as

providers and protectorates of the family.

The world’s most glorifi ed ideologue, Osama Bin Laden, also

extolled the role of the Muslim woman in jihad in his 1996 fatwa: “Our

women had set a tremendous example of generosity in the cause of

Allah; they motivated and encouraged their sons, brothers and husbands

to fi ght [for Allah].” Shortly after the September 11 attacks, Bin Laden

told Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir: “I became a father of a girl after

September 11. I named her Safi a after Safi a who killed a Jewish spy at

the time of the Prophet. [My daughter] Safi a will kill enemies of Islam

like Safi a of the Prophet’s time.”34 Aside from this single statement, bin

Laden is not known to support female suicide terrorists, but has glorifi ed

the auxiliary roles of early Muslim women, with specifi c reference to

Khadija, the Prophet’s fi rst wife and the fi rst Muslim convert in pre-

Islamic Arabia. Bin Laden honoured Khadija for inciting men at the

time of the Prophet to participate in jihad against the Quraysh, Islam’s

fi ercest and fi rst enemy. In his Declaration of War against Americans,

Bin Laden stated: “Our women had set a tremendous example for

generosity in the name of Allah. They motivate and encourage their sons,

brothers, and husbands to fi ght for the cause of Allah in Afghanistan,

Bosnia-Herzigovina, Chechnya, and in other countries …Our women

encourage jihad.”35

Al-Qaeda’s number two, Dr. Ayman Zawahiri also proudly cited

examples of female jihadis, probably to encourage other women to

fi ght for the cause. In an interview with Al Majallah, Zawahiri said:

“A British Muslim woman called Umm-Hafsah carried out another

operation during which she killed two Americans.”36 Religious enablers

of jihad also include key Al-Qaeda ideologues such as Yousef al-Ayyiri,

the former head of operations for Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia until he was

killed by Saudi security forces in 2004. A prolifi c writer, Ayyiri also

wrote The Role of Women in Jihad Against the Enemies; referring to the

early Muslim female fi ghters, he stated: “behind every Mujahid stood

a woman,” which suggests that women were the primary instigators of

jihad.


Farhana Ali

Today, the debate among the ulama on the permissibility of suicide

continues to divide the Muslim world; some view suicide as a legitimate

tactic while others defy it on the basis that it was never employed by

the Prophet of Islam, and therefore, suicide is haram (forbidden).

Many scholars argue that suicide is one of the major sins in Islam that

annuls one’s faith,37 and those well versed in religious text often cite the

Qur’anic verse that clearly rebukes those who kill: “He who kills anyone

not in retaliation for murder or to spread mischief in the land, it would

be as if he killed all of mankind, and if anyone saved a life, it would be

as if he saved the life of the whole people.”38

A Short-Lived Panorama

The liberal door that now permits women to participate in operations

will close once male jihadists gain new recruits and score a few successes

against the war on terror. The sudden increase in female bombers over

the past year may represent nothing more than a temporary wave of

Al-Qaeda’s success rather than an enduring feature of global jihad.

Male jihadists could fi nd it diffi cult to accept a female operative as the

revolutionary vanguard of Islam, and while younger members of Al-

Qaeda and like-minded groups are encouraging Muslim women to join

the ranks, there is little indication that they would allow the mujahidaat

to overshadow images of the male folk-hero. There is also no evidence

that Muslim female operatives will have contact with senior male

leaders, calling into question the male jihadists’ willingness to directly

deal with women on an equal footing.

The more conservative terrorist regards a Muslim woman as key

to maintaining the family structure, while the new, younger generation

of terrorists could increasingly encourage women to join their ranks to

offset the losses of male operatives. She provides the male jihadist with

multiple operational advantages, but while she is indispensable to the

war effort, she also is expendable.

While a female fi ghter might not enjoy the same status and rank as

her male counterpart, her participation in suicide bombings could, in

the near-term, provide impetus for other women to participate in future



operations. A Muslim female academic states that: “by resorting to this

tactic [suicide], women would most likely appeal to the female Muslims

in the world; that is, to those who are not aware, or have been prevented

from becoming aware of the actual teachings of the Qur’an.”39 Suicide

arguably attracts those women who have a distorted view of Islam; that

is, they have subscribed to the patriarchal interpretations of the Qur’an,

rather than understand the religious verses in their historical context.

Coupled with the dire socio-political conditions under which some

Muslims live, these women probably believe they have nothing to lose in

this life, but have everything to gain from that-world (the Hereafter).

Should suicide attacks become a trend among Muslim women, it

would be the exception rather than the rule. Some terrorism experts

understand that the jihad movement is not homogenous, and there are

places where social mores are perhaps conducive to more ‘progressive’

treatment of women’s status. Even in Muslim societies where female

fi ghters are the norm, (i.e., Palestinian territories) it still remains unclear

whether traditional societal norms will make adjustments to afford

women equal rights once the confl ict ends.

Conclusion: Empowering Women

A formidable challenge for countries where women are active

participants in war is how states integrate them into mainstream society

in the post-confl ict phase. Disrupting female networks and the conditions

that are conducive to violence, necessitates a multi-faceted approach.

This must not only serve to identify, target and counter such women

but also put in place an effective strategy for detecting male handlers,

clerics, and terrorist leaders.

A holistic approach is therefore one that aims at improving

intelligence capabilities, increasing outreach efforts between local

law enforcement with religious leaders and community fi gures, and

involving women in peace and security initiatives. The latter point is

often overlooked but studies have shown that women’s inclusion in

democratic change and institutions affords them greater opportunities

to participate and shape civil society. Giving women a chance at peace


Farhana Ali

means placing them in positions of authority to manage security issues -

often reserved for men - in order to advance the process of peace. Doing

so can help women develop relationships with women across society

and ensure that females prone to violence or vulnerable to terrorist

recruitment are included in the peace process.

With a policy platform that is inclusive of their interests, women

across different classes, traditions, ethnicities, and religious sects can

facilitate cohesion in the movement and prove invaluable for feminist

lobbying efforts to ensure that women’s agendas are heard. For example,

in the endeavour to provide radical women political opportunities,

institutions backed by state support can contribute towards reintegrating

them into society. Through amnesty for female terrorists, the state can

create an enabling environment within which they can be brought back

into the fold of society. The inclusion of former female terrorists into

women’s movements and organizations helps strengthen their efforts

to lead “normal” lives and offers them a way to mitigate divisions

with other members of the society that might arise as a result of their

participation and support for war and confl ict.

Ultimately, the next step for governments to reduce the rise of female

terrorists is to improve the lives of women by providing basic necessities

such as education for their children, protection for their families during

times of war, and equal rights to women wishing to participate in post-

confl ict resolution. By encouraging females to participate in the post-

confl ict phase, for instance as peacemakers, there is a greater likelihood

that society will be able to rebuild, particularly in the Islamic world

where the primary responsibility for rearing and nurturing the family

system falls on women.

In most cases, however, governments do not have a uniform plan

to protect and provide for women who wish to return to a “normal”

life. Governments should reconsider their current programs in favour

of a community-based approach that aims to improve the socio-

economic opportunities for women in the pre and post confl ict phase;

fund community development projects; centre activism on education

and social issues that matter to women; and support various women’s



organizations and social movements to encourage their participation in

the political process. By protecting the social and political development

of women, states can reduce, to a large extent, the rate at which females

are drawn towards terrorist groups.

References:

1 For the full report, see Stronger Women, Stronger Nations: 2008 Iraq Report, Women

for Women International, accessed at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/

RMOI-7-CF2M

2 Andrew Silke, “The Psychology of Suicide Terrorism,” in Terrorists, Victims, and Society,

Andrew Silke (ed.) (Sussex, England: Wley, 2003), pp.105-107.

3 For background of these factors, see Andrew Silke (ed.), “Becoming a Terrorist,” in

Terrorists, Victims, and Society, (Sussex, England: Wley, 2003), pp.37-51.

4 Wafa Idriss was the fi rst Palestinian female suicide operative in January 2002. She

detonated explosives at a Jerusalem shopping district, killing one Israeli and injuring over

150 people. Some analysts have argued that she was seeking revenge from occupation

and retribution from her husband for being barren and divorced. While personal reasons

are cited for her attack, it remains unclear and unknown if Wafa’s unmarried status and

other personal factors were taken into consideration before she committed the attack.

5 Westerman, Toby, “Cheerleader for female suicide bombers,” WorldNetDaily.com,

2002

6 Al Jazeera, “Al Jazeera Airs Special on Female Suicide Bomber,” 24 August 2005.

7 Lustwick, Ian S., “Terrorism in the Arab-Israeli Confl ict: Targets and Audiences,”

in Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism in Context. University Park, Pennsylvania: The

Pennsylvania State University, 1995. p. 536.

8 See John Horgan, 2005, Post, 1986, 1987, 1990

9 Jerold Post, “The Psychological roots of Terrorism,” in Addressing the Causes of

Terrorism: The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism, vol. 1 (Madrid:

Club de Madrid, 2005); Jerold Post, E. Sprinzak, and L. Denny “The Terrorists in Their

Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Mddle Eastern Terrorists,” Terrorism and

Political Violence, vol. 15, no. 1 (2003), pp.171-184; and John Horgan, The Psychology

of Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2005) and (2008, forthcoming).

10 See Mia Bloom, “Mother, Daughter, Sister, Bomber,” in Bulletin o the Atomic Scientists,

Nov/Dec 2005. Bloom indicates that historically, women have served supporting roles

but the “advent of suicide bombers has not so much annulled that identity as it has

transformed it. Even as martyrs, they ay be portrayed as the chaste wives and mothers of

revolution.” (p.56)

11 It is diffi cult to explain the lack of scholarship by Palestinians; of worth noting is that

data collected by a female U.S.-based expert, Nichole Argo, a PhD candidate at the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and former work by Nasra Hassan have proved

useful to this author’s assessment. However, there is no evidence of recent scholarship by

an Arab and specifi cally, a Palestinian of this phenomenon.

12 Interviews conducted by the author with two Kashmiri women in February 2008; these


Farhana Ali

two women were the fi rst to cross the Line of Control from India into Pakistan. They

are both celebrated and honored by male militants for the support they provided to men

during the confl ict.

13 Prakriti Gupta, “Muslim Women Take Up Arms Against Islamic Militants in Kashmir,”

10 September 2005.

14 This paper does not consider the circumstances that drive women to suicide terrorism but

rather, presents several different likely motivators for different women across different

confl icts. Because profi les no longer prove useful in terrorism studies, profi ling the

circumstances or environment from which terrorism breeds (i.e., the roots of terror) can

offer a useful framework from which to analyze the causal relationships between terrorists

and their societies, as well as look at individual relationships between the female bomber

and the male handler, leader, or source of inspiration.

15 A website called The Iraqi Diaspora in Switzerland Forum posted an article and opened

a discussion through its chat room on the subject of “The Girls of the Insurgency and the

Tempting Offer.” Accessed through http://www.iraqi.ch/forum/index.php?showtopic=64

8&pic=2512&mode=threaded&start=

16 http://www.abualbokhary.info/vb3/showthread.php?t=12910

17 Ibid. Also see http://www.iraqiarbita.org/index3.php?do=article&id=8267 and http://

vb.roro44.com/42952.html, accessed in July 2007. In the latter webpage, a woman by

the name of Noofa Ghargan, 40 years of age, is considered the fi rst Iraqi female woman

to fall at al-Qa’im battles, where she fought with men against U.S. marines in al-Anbar

province.

18 http://www.iraqirabia.org/index3.php?do=article&id=8267

19 http://www.iraqi.ch/forum/index.php?showtopic=648&pid=2512&mode=threaded&star

t=

20 Here, the imam is a reference to Imam al-Mahdi, the last of the twelve imams who is

believed to return to restore order to the world.

21 Voices of Iraq, January 22, 2008, accessed at http://www.iraqupdates.com/p_articles.php/

article/26433

22 Patrick Quinn, “U.S. captures female bomber recruiter in Iraq,” Associated Press, March

2, 2008

23 ‘Ask the Scholar,” IslamOnline.net. 21 May 2003. www.islamonline.net

24 “Salafi Jihadi Trend Theorist Turns against Al Qaeda and Issues a Religious Opinion

of the Imipermissibility of Suicidal Operations,” Al Sharq Al Awsat, 2 September 2005.

News from Al Mendhar. www.almendhar.com

25 From verse 9:111 from the Qur’an.

26 For a historical background on the Assassins, see Akbar, M.J., The Shade of Swords:

Jihad and the confl ict between Islam and Christianity (New York: Routledge, 2002),

195

27 Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 99.

28 Muhammad Asad, a Muslim scholar, translates the Arabic word to mean ”one who is

most pure” and “white” but refutes the term “virgin.”

29 “Debating the Religious, Political and Moral Legitimacy of Suicide Bombings,” MEMRI

– No. 53, 2 Ma 2001. http://memri.org

30 “Ask the Scholar,” IslamOnline.net, 22 March 2004. www.islamonline.net

31 The idea that jihad is fard, or an obligation on all members of the Muslim society,

demand that women, like men, play an active role in militant organizations. Even when

jihad is not fard and is instead, fard kifaya (duty for select male members of society),



women were not obliged to fi ght but did participate in warfare in the early days of Islamic

history, as indicated earlier. While the concept of jihad as a religious obligation for all

Muslims is not new, its reintroduction into contemporary jihadi literature signals a shift

towards mandating jihad for all Muslims worldwide, making it incumbent for Muslims

living outside of confl ict to help those in need (i.e., wage jihad). Borrowing from the

ideas of classical theologians, Azzam reinvents jihad by attaching to it symbolic drama to

propagate a consistent Al Qaeda message: Muslims comprise a single “Nation” and must

unite to resist anti-Islamic aggression through the use of obligatory defensive jihad.

32 “The Union of Good”, www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/2_05/funds_f.htm

33 Azzam, Abdullah, Join the Caravan, Part Two, (London, U.K.: Azzam Publications,

2001),

34 Cited from Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, “Lady Killer,” September 11, 2006, at

TNR Online.

35 The full text of bin Laden’s fatwa can be found on the PBS web page, accessed at http://

www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html

36 “Paper Cites Al-Zawahiri’s Al-Majallah Interview, ‘Sensational Revelations,” in Al Arab

al Alamiyah, December 17, 2001.

37 Abualrub, Pp. 209-211.

38 Verse 32.

39 Interview with female Muslim professor in the United States who teaches courses on

Islam and gender. September 2005.

THE LAW OF AERIAL BOMBARDMENT AND CIVILIAN

CASUALTIES:KOSOVO AND AFGHANISTAN

Prof. Hayatullah Khan Khattack*

Abstract(Although rules applicable during armed conflict originated in

ancient times, a universal system for regulating conduct during war

and offering protection to civilians did not exist. With the advance of

technology and the resort to aerial bombardment, war became more

deadly and civilians could no longer be insulated from the ravages of

conflict. It was in the 20th century that rules began evolving for the

protection of civilians. These included the Hague Conventions of 1907,

the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols

to the 1949 Conventions. A controversial belief also emerged that air

warfare and precision weapons had significantly “humanised war.” The

strikes against dual use and so-called emerging targets have resulted

in unacceptable civilian casualties. Furthermore, the application of

the rules of engagement during air warfare has not been uniform as is

evident from the conflicts in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Editor).

Introduction

A belief has emerged that airpower can deliver a strategic victory in

modern conflicts. In the West, and in particular the US, this perception

has been reinforced by the decisive military victories in the two Gulf

Wars, former Yugoslavia and in Afghanistan. Winning the peace is often

overlooked. Nevertheless, it is likely that the trend to rely on airpower

* Prof. Hayatullah Khan Khattak is a faculty member of the National Defence University,

Islamabad. He also chairs the Directorate of Collaboration and Publication at ISSRA.


The Law of Aerial Bombardment and Civilian Casualties

to achieve strategic victory will continue. This belief, with serious

consequences, has been extrapolated to the tactical level in the fight

against terrorism and insurgencies. From the international humanitarian

law (IHL) perspective, airpower is also credited with achieving decisive

military victories with minimum civilian casualties. Some writers have

gone so far as to proclaim:

“ … Air warfare over the past decades has significantly

humanised war - if such a phenomena is possible.

Tremendous technological strides in the use of precision

weapons, as well as development in air and space

intelligence-gathering tools, have made it far easier to

distinguish between military and civilian targets and then

effectively strike the military ones - in short, modern

warfare has reduced casualties among both attackers and

attacked”1

Much of the discussion about the adequacy of IHL revolves around

the core issue and concept of distinction. Specifically, can the claim that

the use of airpower in modern conflicts has reduced civilian casualties

be substantiated? As the armouries of very few countries can match

that of the US in terms of precision weapons, can general conclusions

be drawn from the case studies of the use of airpower’s implication for

IHL? The relevance of these questions is obvious from the criticism

such attacks in various regions have attracted especially in undermining

counter-terrorism efforts

This study will focus on Additional Protocol I of the Geneva

Conventions, specifically on the use of airpower in two areas of conflict

where the boundaries between combatant and non-combatants and

military and non-military objects are blurred. Difficulties of targeting and

distinction arise when aerial bombardment is contemplated in urban areas

as also with objects that have dual-use i.e., both civilian and military.2

This will continue to cause difficulties in spite of the increasing use of

smart weapon systems. Societies are becoming progressively complex

and institutions are acquiring both military and civilian functions. Often,

the weaker belligerent, usually a developing country, tries to draw the


Prof. Hayatullah Khan Khattack

stronger side into urban warfare.3 Predictably, therefore, issues relating

to distinction will continue to cause legal, moral and ethical dilemmas.

In the Kosovo and Afghan conflicts, Western governments have

maintained that airpower was used within the framework of the Geneva

Conventions and international customary rules.4 However, in both

instances the use of airpower has been vehemently criticised on the

ground that it was indiscriminate and in violation of international norms.

The debate continues in the Afghan conflict.

Section I – Rise of the Right to Protection of the Civilian

Jus in Bello

Homer’s Achilles brings the wrath of the gods on himself when he

desecrates the corpse of Hector. Rules applicable during armed conflict,

‘jus in bello,’ originated in ancient times.5 Sun Tzu, circa 500 B.C.

enunciated important humanitarian principles applicable to warfare

and the Viqayet, written by Arab scholars in the 13th century, covers all

aspects of a code of wartime behaviour. As Quincy Wright has noted:

“Taken as a whole, the war practices of primitive people

illustrate various types of international rules of war known

at the present time: rules distinguishing types of enemies,

rules determining the circumstances, formalities and

authority, for beginning and ending war; rules describing

limitations of persons, time, place and methods of its

conduct, and even rules outlawing war altogether.”

However, a universal system for regulating conduct during war, and

offering protection to civilians, did not exist. Belligerents entered into

bilateral agreements for a specific conflict, specific period of time and

for specific parties. Parties to a conflict set rules on themselves. But

rules there were.

As overlapping collections of conventions, treaties and customary

law, the period from 19th century onwards is where modern IHL proper

(or Law of Armed Conflict or Laws of War) sprout. If one single cause



can be identified as leading to development of “universal” rules for the

conduct of hostilities then it must be the emergence of the nation state

and modern warfare in terms of the horrors that it entailed. It was not

surprising that the 1925 and 1929 Geneva Conventions were responses

to the horrors of World War 1. The ratio of civilian to military death was

1:200 during the First Great War. During the Second World War the

ratio changed to 1:1. It was therefore natural that rules for the protection

of civilians were introduced in the 1949 Geneva Convention.6 Max

Huber, as early 1945, strikingly put it in the following terms: “war, as

it becomes more and more total, annuls the difference which formerly

existed between armies and civilian populations in regard to exposure

to injury and danger.”7

IHL, therefore, as rules governing the conduct of military operations,

the protection of civilians, and treatment of prisoners blossomed in the

20th century. The three major steps in the development of the law were

the Hague Conventions of 1907, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,

and the two 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Conventions. The

1907 Hague and 1949 Geneva Conventions re-affirmed and developed

customary law and conventions on the methods and means of warfare,

the protection of victims of war (including prisoners of war) and the rules

concerning the protection of civilians in occupied territory. This stream

of law focused mainly on international conflict. The provisions in these

treaties affirmed the limits that military commanders have in application

of use of force. The 1977 Additional Protocols further developed rules

of conduct for the protection of civilians and non-combatants from the

effects of hostilities. Additional Protocol II extended the law dealing

with non-international armed conflict.

As Geoffrey Best notes, these two additional protocols hugely

extended the protection offered to civilians and came as “a cloud burst

after a long drought. It is catching up seventy years of inaction and

inadequacy.”8 Although the central idea embodied in the Jus in Bello

concept, i.e., the idea of civilian protection or immunity from harm, can

be traced back several centuries, civilians had been largely insulated

from belligerent actions - until the appearance of modern warfare and

in particular airpower. Prior to the emergence of modern warfare, IHL



did not have to address the protection of the non-combatant. Thus Best’s

comments are true to a point: prior to the emergence of airpower, a

nation could be attacked by first destroying its army, civilians generally

were not a direct target as they were to become in the First and Second

World Wars.9 The 1949 Convention was specifically drafted to protect

civilians in the aftermath of the horrors of the Second World War. The

earlier 1907 Hague Conventions, although limited, also restricted armed

conflict in order to protect civilians and the League of Nations in 1938,

condemned the deliberate bombing of civilians as illegal. IHL reacted to

developments in warfare as new circumstances arose in a slow but sure

way. Thus, as Sandoz notes:

“in view of the rapid development of modern weaponry,

states have felt the need to impose further restrictions, in

particular the prohibition against bombing, starving or

terrorizing the civilian population as a means of forcing the

enemy to capitulate, and the principle of proportionality

between the anticipated military gains of an attack and the

risk of collateral damage to civilians and their property”10

In Europe the intellectual reasons for distinguishing between

civilians and combatants, and thus the legal and political theory of Jus

in bello, were sown by such writers as Grotius,Vattel and Rousseau

from the 17th century onwards culminating in the 20th century into the

full blown IHL as known today.11 Civilian protection, as noted above,

much predates this intellectual foundation in the 17th century but the

culmination in the 20th century of Additional Protocol I (and II) of the

1949 Geneva Conventions12 took the idea of civilian protection to new

heights and gave a clear legal statement as to the distinction of a civilian

in armed conflicts. The Geneva Conventions have also been bolstered

by other developments in IHL after 1977 that have further affirmed

civilian protection. New laws on landmines, and chemical and laser

weapons, combine with the statute of the new International Criminal

Court and the UN Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia and

the Special Court for Sierra Leone to create a growing framework for

civilian protection in war and from genocide.



The 1977 Additional Protocol I13

It was the brutalities of the conflicts in Vietnam, Middle East,

Nigeria, etc., and decolonization that gave a further impetus to reaching

agreement on the two 1977 Additional Protocols: it was an achievement

not to be belittled and “something perhaps rather great [was achieved].”14

The “greatness” was in the degree of protection that the civilian was

being given for the first time and the almost universal acceptance of

the Protocol by nation states. But even more important is the global

acceptance of the values embodied in it. This was demonstrated by

the persistent public discourse on IHL pertaining to the use of force

in the Second Gulf War. The main protagonist in the conflict, the US,

was constrained to vehemently counter accusations of violating the

Conventions although it had not even a ratified Protocol I.15

As so often in the past, it was the International Red Cross that

proposed substantial rules in 1969 to supplement existing IHL.16 Many

of these were included in UN General Assembly Resolution 2675

outlining draft rules for the protection of civilians. These Draft Rules

became the basis of the final texts of Additional Protocols I and II to the

Geneva Conventions 1949 adopted, through consensus at the Diplomatic

Conference convened by the Swiss Federal Council.

Protocol I, for the first time in the history of IHL, defined the civilian

caught in a conflict and expressly distinguished “between the civilian

population and combatants and between civilian objects and military

objects.”17 Article 50 defines a civilian as a person not directly involved

in hostilities and a civilian population consists of such persons. The basic

rule is that the parties to a conflict should distinguish between civilians

and civilian objects on the one hand and combatants and military objects

on the other, and should direct their military operations against the latter.

However, even where civilians are not directly the objects of an attack

their proximity to a valid military objective may result in it not being

attacked if the civilian casualties would be excessive in relation to the

military advantage to be gained.

More importantly, a considerable amount of ambiguity as to who is



or is not a civilian has been removed by the requirement that “in case

of doubt whether a person is a civilian that person shall be considered

to be a civilian.”18 Nevertheless, for example the Afghanistan conflict

illustrates, disputes as to distinguishing between civilians and combatants

continues to hinder the application of IHL.

Articles 51, 52 and 57 are important in that opposing forces are

required to limit their attack to military objectives but of more significance

from our perspective is Article 54 which requires protection of objects

indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. Article 51(5a)

regulates bombardment in populated areas in that it is prohibited to attack

a whole area as one target if in that area several military objectives are

located. Article 51 (5b) is worth quoting in full because it refers to the

important principle of proportionality (codified for the first time):

Among others, the following types of attack are to be

considered indiscriminate -:

“An attack which may be expected to cause incidental

loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian

objects, or a combination thereof, which would be

excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military

advantage anticipated.”

This article requires the commander to weigh the consequences

of his decision to attack in terms of the military objective as against

possible civilian casualties. This, in itself, is a subjective exercise and

depends on the prevailing situation on the field.

Article 52, though important, has generated controversy. It prohibits

attacks on non-military objects and defines military objects as “objects

which by their very nature, location, purpose or use make an effective

contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,

capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offer a

definite military advantage”

The interpretation of Article 52 has been debated extensively. For

example, when does an advantage become definite? Some states, such



as the US, have taken a liberal view of what constitutes a ‘military

objective‘19 while others have adopted a more restricted approach and

consider only those objects that have a more direct link with the military

to be a military objective.20

Article 57 reaffirms:

“.. those who plan or decide upon an attack shall:

take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and

methods of attack with a view to avoiding..., incidental

loss of civilians life, injury to civilians and damage to

civilian objects;”

The above is a summary of the salient Articles of Additional Protocol

I relevant to our study and we shall now turn to the important principles

enshrined therein and examine those.

Section II – Developments in Air Power & Legal Concepts

The 1977 Additional Protocols constitute a significant development

in the protection of the civilian. Specific steps were required to be taken for

protecting the civilian and civilian objects during international conflict.

Most of the principles and legal concepts contained in Protocol I have a

long established basis in customary international law. The main elements

relevant to our case studies are those of distinction (or discrimination),

proportionality, military necessity and military objectives. There are

difficulties in interpretations of these principles which are further

complicated by targeting policies and dual-use facilities. The increasing

impact of technological developments in weaponry and aerial warfare is

also of consequence.

Precision guided ammunitions (PGMs), satellite-launched/guided

missiles and aerial bombardment have changed the face of battle as

never before. Development in the precision of weapons has given

military planners freedom and flexibility in the use of force.21 In theory,

it is to comply potentially with the distinction requirements of Protocol

I between combatants and non-combatants on one hand and protected



property and military objects on the other. But in practice this potential

has proved controversial as our case studies will illustrate. The precision

of modern bombardment has highlighted several grey areas in IHL such as

the targeting of belligerent leadership or dual use targets. Technological

developments have had the impact of stretching the boundaries of IHL.

Developments in air power have had a particular influence in the

evolution of IHL. But are there rules and regulations restraining aerial

bombardment law? Land Warfare Law is certainly well developed and

so is, unarguably, Naval Warfare Law. Attempts have been made to

regulate aerial bombardment by treaty law but the development in this

respect remains non-existent.22 It is ironic that the advent of airpower

has had such an impact on giving impetus to development of laws for

the protection of civilians, but the rules and regulations for the conduct

of air warfare itself remains nascent. It is to this we turn our attention to

first, and, then the legal concepts within Protocol 1 so far as relevant to

air warfare.

Air Power and IHL

As mentioned earlier, before the advent of air power civilians were,

in general, immune from the effects of war unless, of course, an army was

on the march and requisitioning or the civilians were part of a besieged

town. With the development of air power, attacks could be launched well

behind enemy lines only not against the enemy’s armed forces but also

against supply depots, logistics and lines of communication. Inevitably,

and increasingly, civilians became casualties.

The changed nature of warfare in the early twentieth century was to

have other consequences. The heavy demands of the large but mobile

conscripts armies that were put into the field in the Second World War

and their increasing reliance on mechanization meant that civilians had

to be employed in factories producing weapons, warships and military

aircraft, their armaments and components, and in installations producing

the fuel to drive vehicles and the raw material such as steel needed to

build ships. The emphasis of targeting was shifting away from enemy

combatants to the equipment and supplies on which they depended, but



at great cost to the enemy’s civilian population. Though still protected

by IHL from direct attack, they were not protected from the incidental

damage caused as a by-product of attacks on war production facilities.

Bombing was still far from precise.23

The Second World War started with a commitment by all the major

belligerents to avoid casualties to civilians from aerial bombardment.

But three years into the war, the inviolability of civilians was totally

discarded, especially by the US and Britain. Civilians became deliberate

targets. The following description of the effects of a US bombing raid

could be mistaken for the attack on Hiroshima or Nagasaki:

There were reports of babies being torn by the high winds

from their mother’s arms and sucked into the flames.

Many died trapped in the burning wreckage of buildings.

Upon entering air-raid shelters, would-be rescuers found

nothing but bones suspended in congealed fat. Women

and children were charred as to be unrecognisable.24

But that was the fate of the German civilians of Hamburg where

harm was intentionally inflicted as a military policy through aerial

bombardment. Within 25 years of its first use on the western front,

Britain and the US took aerial bombardment (strategic bombing) to

new heights. Hamburg was to lose 45,000 civilian in one night whilst

Dresden, after 14 hours of aerial bombing, over 100,000. Similarly 5

Japanese cities were fire-bombed before the atomic attacks on Nagasaki

and Hiroshima. The rationale for aerial bombardment was to destroy

the enemy morale. The justification for civilian casualties was that they

had become too integrated into the military effort to be isolated from the

consequences of war.

IHL was slow to react to developments in air warfare. This was

probably because, initially, airpower was intended only for transportation

and not for bombardment.25 At the battle of Marne during the early

years of First World War, air reconnaissance proved decisive for the

French and disastrous for the German war plans. But air power, in terms

of a method of bombardment, was never even contemplated to play a



tactical role let alone a strategic one as it is now. Field Marshal Foch

had declared in 1912 that flying was a fascinating sport but not of the

slightest interest to the armed forces, notwithstanding the fact that a year

earlier the Italians had dropped bombs over Libya for the first time from

an aircraft. Hindrance to the development of the rules and codifications,

in this area have also been influenced and affected by other factors

characteristic to aerial warfare: rapid technological development,

relative recent emergence of the aircraft and its dual use as a weapon

and serving peaceful civilian purposes. It is thus not surprising that no

single set of international rules or treaty governs the conduct of aerial

bombardment. Most of the rules that are applied to aerial bombardment

are those that derive from the general rules of warfare in the Hague and

Geneva Conventions as discussed below.26

However, some specific legal regulation relevant to air warfare

was introduced in 1899 when the First Hague Peace Conference

adopted three Declarations and three Conventions. The first prohibited

the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons or similar

objects.27 The measures were temporary (lasting from 4 September 1900

until 4 September 1905) justified by the inaccuracy of such methods

in discriminating. However, the regulations were too restrictive and

hindered further developments for a permanent ban. The Hague

Declaration of 1907, once again, renounced “the discharge of projectiles

and explosives from balloons or by other new methods of similar nature.”

But application of the Declaration had been conditioned by a general

participation clause, and since the Declaration had not been ratified by

the various belligerents in the First World War, it was binding on no

one. Nevertheless, the 1907 Convention did establish restrictions on

the means used to injure the enemy and stop property being destroyed

unnecessarily. Restrictions were also placed on bombing structures such

as hospitals and places of worship during sieges and bombardment.28

Article 26 also stated that belligerents “do all in their power” to give the

civilian population warning of what was coming; but this fell far short

of the total inviolability civilians would receive in 1977. The Geneva

Conventions was to be expanded on these provisions to include medical

shipments and convoys, and hospital zones.29



Specific attempts at regulating aerial warfare and protection of

civilians from aerial bombardment by treaty, understandably, occurred

in the aftermath of the First and Second World Wars. However, these

attempts failed. In 1923, a Commission of Jurists drew up a draft of

Rules of Air Warfare, which would have forbidden aerial bombardment

of civilians or of injuring non-combatants and additionally defined

military objectives to which attacks were to be confined.30 Once again,

four years after the Second World War, the International Committee of

the Red Cross formulated Draft Rules for the limitation of the Dangers

incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War.31 These were similar

to the 1923 Rules which prohibited attack on civilian populations and

permitted attacks only on military objects. However, what militated

against the acceptance of the Rules by governments, was its prohibition

on target-area bombardment and its extensive precautionary requirements

in attack.

Although no treaty resulted from the above attempts at regulating

aerial warfare, both, especially the one of 1923, had a profound impact

on customary international law governing aerial warfare which, together

with state practice and pronouncement, contributed to the emergence of

general principles. A consensus appears to have emerged that civilians

should not be the object of attacks and that the incidental harm caused

to civilians through the bombardment of military objectives should not

be out of proportion to the military advantage to be gained and. to the

extent possible, precautions should be taken to protect civilians.32 These

principles, as we have seen above in Section I, found their way into

Protocol I. However, in this context, it is also worth mentioning the

1969 UN General Assembly Basic Principles on Armed Conflict that

had relevance for aerial bombardment. There were 8 principles and 5 of

them are of particular relevance:

2. “…In the conduct of military operations during armed conflicts,

a distinction must be made at all times between persons actively

taking part in the hostilities and civilian populations.

3. In the conduct of military operations, every effort should be

made to spare civilians from the ravages of war, and all necessary



precautions should be taken to avoid injury, loss or damage on

civilian population.

4. Civilian populations, as such, should not be the object of military

operations.

5. Dwellings and other installations that are used only by civilian

populations should not be the object of military operations.

6. Places or areas designated for the sole protection of civilians, such

as hospital zones or similar refuges, should not be the object of

military operations.33”

Air Power & Protocol I

The various provisions of the two conventions (1899 and 1907)

and the two Rules were to be the building blocs of Protocol I. Protocol

I does not specifically address aerial bombardment although Article

49 provides that all its articles concerning the protection of civilians

apply to all means of attack. As we have discussed in Section 1,

Protocol I clearly prohibits attacks against civilians, civilian objects

and protected property. Protocol I obliges belligerents to take measures

to limit loss of civilian life and damage to civilian property incidental

to attacks on military targets. The Protocol underlines the critical

concepts of distinction, military necessity and proportionality: these are

the concepts that determine any targeting decisions of planners of air

warfare. The absence of treaty law does not mean complete freedom in

the use of means and methods during air warfare. Aside from the rules

in Protocol I natural law and customary law also impose restrictions.

Customary international law restraints on warfare are premised on the

idea that violence and destruction that are unnecessary to actual military

necessity are wasteful, counterproductive and immoral. The principle of

humanity both complements and limits the doctrine of military necessity,

proportionality being central to the latter. How are these principles, and

consequently Protocol I, applicable to air warfare?



Distinction

Distinction is the most fundamental, and uncontroversial, principle

of customary international law. It provides that non-combatants must

be distinguished from combatants and military objects from civilian.

As discussed earlier, the core principle of distinction is to be found in

Article 48 of the Protocol. Under Article 50 of Protocol I, a civilian is

any person who is not a member of the armed forces in the sense of

Article 43 of Protocol I. Members of the armed forces, as so defined, are

legitimate objects of attack, except in so far as the law of war extends

protection to them in various circumstances. Article 50(2) states that the

totality of the entire civilian constitutes the “civilian population.” The

presence of soldiers within the civilian population does not deprive the

latter of its immunity nor does the presence of large number of soldiers

within the civilian population give the former immunity.34

Article 51 (4 & 5) states:“Acts or threats of violence the primary

purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are

prohibited.” However, the fact that attacks upon legitimate military

objectives may cause terror among the civilian population does not

make such attacks unlawful. Terrorising civilian populations by aerial

bombardment had been practiced during the two World Wars, and in

the 1960s, in violation of international law; the Rules discussed above

would have forbidden terrorising the civilian population. In view of this,

the above rule was inserted into Protocol I. This Article also prohibits

aerial bombardments to destroy civilian morale. Technically there may

be a distinction between terror and morale attacks but in practice they

are treated the same. What may be a morale bombing to the attacking

force will be a terror bombing to the targeted civilians. As such, aerial

bombing intended to force civilians to overthrow their government or

leadership would be unlawful bombing.

Central to the principle of distinction is the concept of the military

objective, or the legitimate target. The definition of “objects” has two

elements: (a) their nature, location, purpose or use must make an effective

contribution to military action, and; (b) their total or partial destruction,

capture or neutralisation must offer a definite military advantage in the



circumstances ruling at the time. It is a requirement that both elements

of the definition must be met before a target can be properly considered

an appropriate military objective. Without this limitation to the actual

situation at hand, the principle of distinction would be void, as every

object could in abstracto, under possible future developments become

a military objective. The drafters of Protocol I tried to avoid too large

an interpretation of what constitutes a military objective. The Protocol

I definition has been criticised by some American scholars as focusing

too narrowly on definite military advantage and paying too little heed

to war sustaining capability, including economic targets such as export

industries.35 The British view also appears to be that the Protocol

definition is too narrow and include as targets such as broadcasting and

television stations as military objectives.36

It may be that, for practical purposes, a definition of a civilian object

in the Protocol would have been more satisfactory. But because it is

not the intrinsic character of an object but the use made of the object

that defines it as a military object, military objects had to be defined.

Indeed, every object other than those benefiting from special protection

(protected property) may become a legitimate object of attack.

Perceived successes of aerial bombardment, and in particular use of

PGMs, in modern conflicts, has also raised questions as to the rationale

behind the limitation to military objectives, pointing out that the aim of

modern conflicts is the capitulation of (usually dictatorial) governments.

As Clausewitz has claimed, the aim of every armed conflict is to defeat

the enemy’s will. Acquiring a non-military advantage over the enemy

can more effectively accomplish that aim. Traditionally, Clausewitz

argued that the centre of an enemy’s gravity was its armed forces. Now

some strategists argue that the centre of gravity is no longer the armed

forces but may be the political leadership or the political support of the

civilian population.37 So, the argument goes, why limit attacks to just

military objectives?

Proportionality

Concentrating unduly on the principle of military objective might



lead one to ignore civilian casualties or consider them as collateral damage

in the course of legitimate activities. The principle of proportionality

counters this tendency by requiring a constant weighing of military and

humanitarian values. Although the term proportionality is not mentioned

in Protocol I, equivalent terms such as “excessive damage” or “excessive

injury” are used in Articles 15, 57 and 85. Therefore, notwithstanding

the customary law aspect of the concept, the principle of proportionality

clearly does bind parties to the protocol.

As the US is the major protagonist in the case studies to follow

and a non-ratifying state of the Protocol, it is important at this juncture

to comment on its attitude to the principles enshrined therein. The US

has declared its intention to be bound by those principles that reflect

customary international law.38 The US Air Force Pamphlet advises

that, in applying international legal limits to air attacks, the following

precaution must be taken:

1. Do everything feasible to verify that the objectives attacked are

neither civilians nor civilian objects….

2. Take all precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack

with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimising, incidental

loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian

objects; and

3. Refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected

to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage

to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be

excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage

anticipated.39

It will be noted that paragraph 3 embodies the principle of

proportionality while 1 and 2, embody the principles of discrimination

and humanity respectively. Therefore, the US expressly recognizes

Article 51 as a customary international law and it will not have escaped

attention that the Air Force Pamphlet enjoins attack against civilians in

terms virtually identical to Article 51.



However, whether or not a state is a party to the Protocol, its armed

forces are required to respect the customary rule of proportionality

which attempts to balance military and humanitarian consideration.

When applying this rule, those who decide upon an attack must take

into account the effects of the attack on the civilian population in their

pre-attack calculations. They must determine whether those effects

are excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage

anticipated. A balancing act must be carried out depending on various

factors:

a) the importance of the target and the urgency of the situation;

b) intelligence about the proposed target, i.e., what is being, or

will be, used for and when;

c) what weapons are available, their range, accuracy and radius of

effect;

d) conditions affecting accuracy of targeting such as terrain,

weather, night or day;

e) factors affecting incidental loss or damage, such as the proximity

of civilians or civilian objects in the vicinity of the target or

other protected objects or zone and whether they are inhabited,

or the possible release of hazardous substances as a result of the

attack;

f) the risks to his own troops posed by the various options open to

him.40

In practice the balancing test is extremely difficult to conduct as

it requires comparing and quantifying dissimilar values i.e., military

advantage and incidental injury. How, for example, is one to measure

the suffering caused to civilians during attack on a bridge against the

military advantage of disrupting enemy logistics/supplies? Furthermore,

the value attributed to a target or the incidental injury depends on who

is making the assessment and the value is never constant in practice as

it should be. Does the concept apply to individual facets of an attack or

the attack as a whole? The latter appears to “represent(s) the weight of

opinion, (although) consensus remains elusive.”41

The emphasis on precise aerial bombardment and from a safe



distance without placing the attacking force in danger has created what

Schmitt, who has made a special study of the subject, has termed a

“false dilemma regarding proportionality.” It has been argued that aerial

attacks from a safe distant create increased civilian casualties and the

attacks are therefore disproportionate. Schmitt asserts that this argument

“wrongly excludes preservation of one’s own forces as an important

military advantage to be considered when conducting proportionality

calculations.”42

Dual Use Objects and Urban Operations

Aerial bombardment of dual-use objects and of targets in urban

areas creates particular dilemmas. Precision guided munitions have, to

some extent, eased the dilemma of the military planner but experience

indicates that accuracy cannot be taken for granted. Additionally, only

a very limited number of states have the capability to deploy PGMs or

the resources to afford them. Whilst the targeting of dual use objects

raises complex issues in relation to operations in urban environments,

the ultimate question revolves around the principle of distinction and

proportionality.

The military and civilian populations often use common power

sources, transportation networks, and telecommunication systems.

Distinguishing between the military and civilian infrastructure is difficult

and it may be impossible to disable or destroy only those elements

servicing the military.

It would appear from the restrictions within Protocol I that attacks on

dual use objects may be unlawful but the issue is not clear-cut and is open

to interpretation. It is also not clear from the literature whether there is an

absolute prohibition on attacks on dual use objects in terms of customary

international law. The US, as a constant objector to and violator of the rule,

would adopt the stance that it has not been accepted as a norm. Attacks

on dual use objects can have extensive effects on the civilian population

and raise concerns about proportionality. Disagreement centres on the

weight to be given to the immediate and direct injuries to civilians or the

longer indirect effects of an attack on a civilian population. The US and



the UK adhere to the former interpretation when making proportionality

calculations43 and tend to liberally interpret “military objective” when it

comes to dual use objects.

Aerial bombardment in an urban area poses serious problems

for compliance with principles of discrimination and proportionality.

Urban environments increase the chances that military attacks will

harm civilians and even the impact of small precision munitions can

be devastating for the population. The structure and organisation of

urban centres where military and civilian institutions can be adjacent

to each other or even in the same building creates targeting restrictions

and limitations difficult to overcome. To compound these difficulties

belligerents may deliberately place military objects or combatants

within urban centres.

In the above circumstances any aerial bombardment would still have

to comply with proportionality principles and refrain from attacks likely

to result in excessive civilian casualties in relation to military gain

Section III – Operation Allied Force

Introduction

Having reviewed the legal principles underlying the protection of

civilians and the laws of war pertaining to aerial bombing, we now turn

to the use of air power in two case studies: Kosovo and Afghanistan.

Tentative conclusions will be drawn from the estimates of casualties

and the degree of adherence to Protocol I when air power is used.

Whilst it is possible to investigate and evaluate specific instances of

civilian casualties within a particular case study, it is difficult to draw

concrete conclusions for comparison purposes between the case studies.

One of the main reasons is that there are no consistent and transparent

sources for the compilation of figures on civilian casualties.

In both conflicts the US was the main air power, and the military

doctrine and air assets used were to some extent uniform. The two theatres



of operation were in different continents, under different politico-social

conditions. What was politically acceptable in Afghanistan was not so

in Kosovo. What critical examination by the media (“CNN” Effect) of

aerial bombardment in Afghanistan there was, conceding the context

of September 11, could not match that received by Kosovo. The CNN

effect was certainly important in determining the freedom of how aerial

bombardment was used. Restraint and pressures within the US-led

coalitions and the political scrutiny of force was not consistent in the

conflicts

The geography and demography of the two regions was starkly

contrasting; this in turn had consequences for the way air power was used

and the “accessibility” of targets. Population density in the target area

determined the size of causalities as well as the degree of restraint.

The type and number of munitions used were important factors: the

number of PGMs employed in the Afghan conflict was far greater than in

Kosovo. The duration of the conflicts is yet another factor: the Kosovo

war lasted for 78 days and the Afghan 103 days. The ground forces used

in Afghanistan were much larger than in Kosovo. This, of course, meant

that in the Kosovo war, air power “achieved” the goal of winning a war

on its own. The complexity and effectiveness of air defence systems,

including fighter cover, also varied: it was highly effective in Kosovo

but non-existent in Afghanistan. In both conflicts command of the air by

the US-led coalition was achieved at an early stage and air operations

took place freely and with impunity.

But the greatest obstacle to securing accurate estimates of civilian

casualties is the absence of official records and the difficulty of obtaining

information. In Afghanistan this is even more problematic because

of the country’s impenetrable terrain and the consequent inability of

independent assessors to move about freely. The virtual absence of

independent sources as well as the difficulties posed by cultural practices

such as the quick burial of the dead in accordance with Islamic traditions

collectively result in the absence of accurate data on casualties.

The Kosovo conflict was fought almost exclusively with air power.



Unlike the Afghan war, the political leadership, anticipating a brief

campaign, retained control over the use of air power.44 This ensured

greater restraint, discrimination and proportionality. NATO had openly

opted for air power to stop human rights violations and ensure withdrawal

of Serb forces. Reliance on air power alone made the achievement of

political objectives diffi cult and, after six weeks of bombing, there were

more Serb forces in Kosovo than before the campaign.

An important truism is that media presence impacts on the number

of casualties. This is amply demonstrated by the Kosovo confl ict

were media exposure ensured fewer casualties while in Afghanistan

the numbers were much higher because of the relatively weak media

presence. The latter’s watchdog role thus sensitises public opinion and,

consequently, compliance with IHL.45 In democracies, media exposure

inevitably also infl uences political direction of targeting policy and the

operational freedom of the military.46

NATO policy on the use of air power and targeting policy were well

known: fi rst targets to be hit were Serbian surface-to-air missile sites,

military installations and troop concentrations. Others included those

used by civilians and military such as communication facilities, roads

and bridges. Attacks on dual-use facilities, such as power stations, oil

and petroleum depots received particular media attention. Considerable

efforts were, therefore, made to limit attacks to military targets and

avoid civilian causalities and damage to civilian objects. Targeting was

tightly controlled by constant review of its legal, political and military

terms at the NATO headquarters (SHAPE) and national capitals of the

participating NATO members. Dual-use targets were to have a distinct

military component to secure approval for attack.47

The US-led Operation Allied Force began on 24 March 1999 when

Richard Holbrooke’s attempt at mediation failed and OSCE monitors

withdrew from Kosovo. Fourteen NATO member-countries launched air

attacks from 24 European bases and 3 aircraft carriers. The war, that was

supposed to last a few days rather than weeks, concluded after 78 days

resulting in the deaths of 500 civilian and about 600 Serb military and

police.48 NATO conducted over 37,000 sorties and used approximately



40 percent PGM.49 Two-third of the fi rst month of aerial bombardment

took place during the night and, more importantly, in the fi rst month

of the campaign 50 percent of the strike sorties were cancelled, tons of

bombs were dropped in the Adriatic due to bad weather, under the rules

of engagement imposed by the politicians.50

“Morale” Targeting

During the Kosovo confl ict several targets were hit raising worldwide

concerns and publicity. Similar incidents occurred in Iraq and later in

Afghanistan more frequently but never received the same media attention

and hence there was no important restraining infl uence. In Kosovo

such incidents included the attack on a passenger train transporting

internally displaced civilians, the Chinese embassy, bridges, Serbian

television and the electric grid systems. Some of these were targeting

errors because of faulty intelligence, some were accidents, whilst other

were deliberate attacks justifi ed by military necessity. Human Rights

Watch (HRW) found that “all too often NATO targeting subjected the

civilian population to unacceptable risks” either in its illegal targeting

or failing to take adequate precautions to verify civilians presence when

attacking mobile targets.51 The HRW reports question whether civilian

casualties were suffi ciently taken into account or whether NATO’s

strategy of psychological warfare was intended to harass civilians.

NATO’s high altitude bombing was specifi cally identifi ed as a reason

for the unacceptable risks taken with the civilian population.

The Chinese Embassy incident on 7 May 1999 was admitted as a

mistake by the US Air force and was attributed to incorrect information.52

A mobile target that was attacked resulting in large civilian casualties

was the Djakovica convoy on 14 April 1999. The target was found

to be a civilian object although NATO claimed that all the available

intelligence indicated that it was military and that the attack was called

off when it was realized that the object attacked was civilian.53 In practical

terms, air power without suffi cient ground intelligence made targeting

vulnerable to human error and NATO’s dependence only on non-ground

intelligence made it diffi cult to achieve political objectives.



The Djakovica incident raised several issues. One was NATO’s

policy of bombing from an altitude of 15,000 feet in order to minimize

risks to the pilots especially from hand held surface-to-air missiles and

ant-aircraft artillery; another was rules of engagement for air patrols

seeking target opportunities without verifi cation.54 Protocol I imposes a

duty to undertake all “feasible precautions” before commencing attack.

Hans-Peter Gasser comments:

The keyword is feasible: the law does not expect the

impossible, but it asks the Commander or the staff Offi cer

to do what he can do. The United Kingdom’s declaration

on signing Protocol I give appropriate indications for the

interpretation of this notion. ‘the word feasible means

that which is practicable or practicably possible, taking

into account all circumstances at the time including those

relevant to the sources of the military operations.55

Protocol I would require a pilot to get close to the target to identify

it correctly whilst military necessity and advantage, would require

pilots to fl y at a suffi cient height to reduce risk. Also relevant is the

rule mentioned earlier of presumption when there is doubt i.e., when

the identifi cation of a target is in doubt it must be presumed to be a

civilian. In situations where states are not party to Protocol I, customary

international law requires attacking only military objectives. Although

unclear from available literature, the level of care would not be higher

in customary international law than in Protocol I, namely “do all that is

feasible.” Clearly, the requirements of IHL and military advantage are in

confl ict and this is an area that requires further research.

Milosevic’s intransigence compelled NATO to change its strategy

and attack dual use targets plus those that would instigate the public to

exert pressure on the political leadership. Public morale thus became

a target towards the middle of the 78 day campaign, while in the Gulf

confl ict it was targeted from the start.56 Yugoslav electric installations

and industrial structures began to be hit on the 40th day of the campaign

and almost 70 percent of the power was disrupted. The HWR report,

states that targets were chosen to harass civilians and that these included



bridges and radio and television stations.

Serbian Television and Radio

In the early hours of 23 April 1999, NATO aircraft attacked the

Serbian State Television (RTS) in Belgrade killing 17 civilians. At the time

at least 120 people were in the building and the attack generated heated

international controversy: RTS was entitled to the protection granted

to civilian objects, though not absolute protection, was it therefore a

legitimate military objective? Was state control and ownership of a “pro-

government propaganda apparatus” suffi cient to regard it as a military

target especially when 17 civilians died? Alternatively, was the attack

proportional? Finally, were the civilians forewarned about the attack?

NATO argued that RTS was targeted because it had become the

mouthpiece of Milosevic and was responsible for fostering ethnic

nationalism and hatred. It however primarily relied on the dual-use of

RTS to justify its aerial bombardment: the RTS was linked to the C3

(command, control and communication) network. At a press conference

prior to the bombing, NATO declared RTS a military objective, but

apparently gave no warning to the civilians to vacate the premises.

Although not journalists,57 in the traditional sense of the word, the RTS

personnel were protected persons as Protocol I equates them to civilians

during armed confl ict.58 However, as the ICTY Committee opined, if

the additional use of the facilities was that of an integral part of the C3

network, then it was a legitimate target.59 This view approximates that

of Protocol I that a dual-use object may be a lawful military object when

the criteria of Article 52 have been met (see Section I above).

The Final Report also concluded that although civilian casualties

were high, the attack on RTS was not disproportionate. This conclusion

was reached by counterbalancing the civilian deaths with the overall

concrete and “direct military advantage anticipated” from attacking the

specifi c dual-use component of the network. The coordinated targeting

of the radio relay buildings were intended to deny communications to

Serb troops and afford NATO military advantage.



Even if the concept of proportionality affords the attacker

considerable latitude, he is required to limit damage to civilians and take

all feasible precautions as stipulated in Article 51 and 57 of the Protocol.

In this respect, serious reservations have been expressed whether NATO

did in fact take the necessary measures to protect the civilians from

harm. Its warnings were contradictory, unclear and too little.60 The Final

Report concluded that although there were confl icting testimonies,

NATO should have given suffi cient advance warning.61

Finally, the ICTY Committee concluded that the use of the media

to incite hatred may justify its destruction but propaganda alone

was not suffi cient to warrant such an attack.62 NATO’s claim was

that the destruction of RTS for its propaganda role was secondary, if

complementary, to that of its C3 function. However, it is unavoidable

that during a confl ict, state controlled media is involved in propaganda

and journalists, therefore, should be accorded protection.63

On balance, in the light of articles 51, 52 and 57 of Protocol I, the

attack on RTS was a violation of IHL. Although the Protocol was not

ratifi ed by some of the attacking states, the principles enshrined in these

articles were the same as in customary international law.

On balance, however, the degree of compliance with IHL during

Operation Allied Force was exemplary especially the extent to which

NATO forces went out of their way to avoid casualties. On the other

hand, the conditions under which Operation Allied Force took place

were exceptional and problematic for comparison purposes.

Section IV – Operation Enduring Freedom

If Operation Allied Force was characterized by restraint and is likely

to be highly scrutinised, Operation Enduring Freedom was anything but

restrained and unlikely to be scrutinised seriously because of the aftermath

of 11 September 2001. The Taliban’s harsh rule and links to Osama Bin

Laden alienated international sympathy. Furthermore, Afghanistan was

neither located in Europe nor did it have large oil reserves to generate

the sympathy of the international media. The mainly US-UK coalition



with NATO support began bombing of the Taliban regime on 7 October

2001 to bring about regime change.

Operation Enduring Freedom was fundamentally different in other

ways too. Unlike the two other campaigns, aerial bombardment did not

have any worthwhile targets such as complex industrial structures or

extensive electrical grid systems, or even dual-use facilities: the Russian

occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 and the subsequent civil war that

had raged since 1992 had left the country denuded of targets. With the

absence of civilian objects that could be bombed, civilians became

targets with little regard to proportionality or precautionary measures.

Most of the US aerial bombardment occurred over 9 of Afghanistan’s 32

provinces which comprise less than 25 percent of the country’s territory

but more than 50 percent of its population.

The context of the Afghanistan confl ict, as that of any other, is

important. The context of any confl ict determines the way adversaries are

viewed or treated. For Afghanistan, 11 September 2001 is important for

two reasons: the attitude of the US to international norms, its perception

of the threats and how it reacted to these; secondly, criticism of US

violation of IHL was muted because of post-9/11 global sympathy.

The Project on Defence Alternatives (PDA) concluded in its study

of the confl ict:

Despite the adulation of Operation Enduring Freedom as a

“fi nely-tuned” or “bulls-eye” war, the campaign failed to

set a new standard for precision in one important respect:

the rate of civilians killed per bomb dropped. In fact, this

rate was far higher in the Afghanistan confl ict - perhaps

four times higher - than in the 1999 Balkan war. In absolute

terms, too, the civilian death toll in Afghanistan surpassed

that incurred by the NATO bombing over Kosovo and

Serbia; indeed, it may have been twice as high.64

Estimates on the number of civilians killed in Afghanistan from

October 2001 till the end of March 2002, vary greatly.65 The US, as



per policy, does not maintain casualty records but various organizations

have estimated civilian deaths between 1000 and 3,400. PDA estimates

that between 1000 to 1300 civilians died as a consequences of bombing,

whilst Human Rights Watch puts the fi gure at around 1000.66A much

disputed estimate by an American academic, Prof. Marc Herold, puts the

civilian dead between 3000 - 3400 during the period under consideration.67

Compilation of data by the various organizations and individuals of

casualties have their weaknesses but all point to heavy civilian losses.68

The diffi culties with estimating casualties are compounded by the US’s

refusal to release their fi gures of civilian casualties, and also the US

decision to purchase all the exclusive rights to all the satellite images

from Space Imaging Inc.; these images would have made it possible to

corroborate damage from aerial bombardment.69

Although 60 percent of munitions used in Afghanistan were PGMs,

compared to 38 percent in Kosovo, the casualty estimates are surprising.

There were other distinguishing features: greater reliance on bombers as

compared to tactical aircraft, aircraft on longer fl ights en route to sorties,

majority of sorties were undertaken by tactical naval aircraft and fi nally

the majority of the PGMs used were satellite guided as compared to

Kosovo where laser guided munitions were more extensively deployed.70

Several other factors contributed to the higher rate of casualties: e.g.,

the lack of fi xed targets, foes’ indistinguishable characteristics from the

civilian population and reliance by the US for targeting intelligence on

forces opposing the Taleban.71 But because of the safety mechanism

inserted into Protocol I and customary international humanitarian law,

the excessive civilian casualties should still not have occurred.

In the name of targeting Al-Qaeda, scores of civilians were killed

in different incidents with no apparent respect to proportionality and

distinction. As we saw above, in the case of Kosovo, where large numbers

of civilians were killed in a few incidents the worldwide publicity and

scrutiny was understandable. However, in the case of Afghanistan no

such examination has been forthcoming in spite of the larger number

of incidents. In October 2001, for example, the following incidents

were reported by the British papers: 11th October, village of Karam was

bombed leaving over 100 dead;72 13th October, over 15 civilians killed,



US claims a stray missile was responsible for deaths;73 21st October,

bomb kills over 80 in a Herat hospital;74 and 31st October, Red Crescent

Clinic hit killing 12 civilians in Kandahar.75 The same month there were

other incidents of refugees, ambulances, wedding celebrations being

attacked from the air with sizeable civilian casualties but these remain

unconfi rmed. In subsequent months numerous other incidents occurred

where civilian casualties ran into scores.

Afghanistan’s limited civilian infrastructure did not remain intact

after a few weeks of the aerial bombardment. On 15 October the main

telephone exchange was knocked out killing 15 civilians; on 28 October

the electric grid system in Kandahar, the spiritual capital of the Taliban,

was destroyed depriving the whole province of electricity; on 31

October several attacks were launched against the Kajakai dam; and on

12 November a direct hit on Al-Jazeera news agency in Kabul raised

concern as earlier Secretary of State Powell had asked the agency to

tone down its reports of casualties in Afghanistan.76

Despite the large number of civilians killed in dubious circumstances,

no attempt has been made by either the US, UK or international non-

governmental agencies to hold an enquiry such as those held after the

Kosovo confl ict. The military was given complete freedom in targeting

policy as western politicians did not have a constituency to be concerned

about if Afghan casualties ever became known.

Emerging Targets and Civilian deaths

The vast majority of the US-UK strikes during operation Enduring

Freedom were carried out against what is termed “emerging” targets –

targets that are not pre-determined and do not exist on maps and which

require immediate military response. Air attacks against emerging

targets are inherently inaccurate and indiscriminate. It is attacks against

emerging targets that caused the greatest number of civilian casualties.

One such incident was the attack on a convoy of Afghans, including tribal

leaders, from the province of Paktia on their way to the inauguration of

the interim Afghan leader, Hamid Karzai.



The incident on 30 December when the village of Qalai Niazi was

struck is instructive as to the degree of violations of Protocol I and, in

particular, the principle of proportionality and the advance warning rule

enshrined in Article 57. The incident also demonstrates the indifference

of the western media about civilian deaths in Afghanistan compared to

Kosovo.

The US, which at fi rst denied the incident, contended that the village

sheltered Taliban and Al Qaeda fi ghters and had ammunitions dumps.

Western reporters confi rmed weapons stockpiles as well as civilian

casualties including children. British papers reported the incident in

graphic detail.77 The New York Times and the Los Angeles Times merely

touched upon the event as a backgrounder to the inauguration of Hamid

Karzai’s interim government. The Times reported a few months later that

the UN estimates of civilians deaths were 52 including 25 children;78 the

Guardian, however, estimated between 57 and 107 fatalities but added

that “innumeracy, rapid burials, damage to bodies, propaganda and

remoteness” impeded verifi able statistics.79

Granted that Qalai Niazi was a legitimate target, and there is no

evidence to indicate that the US did not genuinely believe this to be the

case, questions still arise whether suffi cient warning was given to the

civilians or whether the force used against the village was proportional

to the military advantage. The evidence gathered by journalists indicates

that the answers are in the negative.80

To eliminate the alleged presence of Taliban and Al-Qaeda fi ghters,

three waves of B-52 bombers struck the village followed by helicopter

strikes. UN sources reported that civilians, including children, were

strafed whilst running for cover. Since the attack had been planned

several weeks in advance,81 it was not an emerging target and, therefore,

the failure to give prior warning to the civilian was a violation of IHL. It

was also reported that British forces were on the scene within a day of

the attack, and this raises questions as to the method used to strike Qalai

Niazi i.e., an alternative form of attack was available.

Afghan air defences were non-existent in comparison with that of



Kosovo where NATO aircraft were constrained to fl y higher and civilians

became more vulnerable. In Afghanistan pilots fl ew at low altitudes

and made greater use of PGMs and this should have resulted in fewer

civilian casualties. Notwithstanding that casualty fi gures could have

been infl ated or inaccurately reported by the media and human rights

organizations, Afghanistan underwent the most devastating air bombing

of civilians in recent times. Human Rights Watch reported:

The US military takes precautions to minimize civilian loss

of life during its operations – but obviously not enough.

There is now a pattern of mistakes, apparently as a result

of faulty intelligence, that has led to too many civilians’

deaths and no clear changes in the way the United States

plans and carries out military operations.82

Section VI- Conclusion

A general conclusion is that efforts to comply with Protocol I when

airpower was used were exemplary especially in the discrimination of

civilians and strictly civilian objects. In neither of the case studies were

civilians directly and intentionally targeted. However, the striking of dual-

use facilities was extensive and in Afghanistan, emerging targets were

always presumed to be terrorists/Taliban fi ghters, thereby continuously

causing large civilians casualties.83 It appears that in Afghanistan, the

avoidance of civilian casualties was not accorded priority in planning

strikes. The military was given a free hand and the Bush administration

did not have political constraints.

The extent of political involvement, as opposed to allowing the

military a free hand in targeting, is important for compliance with IHL.

There are two contradictory but important considerations: politicians

desire a “zero-casualty war” on the one hand, and on the other, they

are averse to mass media projection of casualties. The CNN effect is

diffi cult to ignore because international public opinion is anti-war.

Political rather than military necessity has become the decisive factor

in targeting.



Although the two case studies are not entirely comparable, in the

1999 confl ict force was used to seek compliance with limited objectives

whereas in the Afghan confl ict the US sought the elimination of the

Taliban regime and Al Qaida. In the wake of 9/11, the objectives of the

Afghan war had domestic and international support. This enabled the

US military to adopt rules of aerial engagement in Afghanistan that may

perhaps have been unacceptable in 1999.

References:

1 Col. Phillip Meilinger, ‘Precision Aerospace Power, Discrimination, and the future of

war’ Aerospace Power Journal (Fall 2001), 1. See also George and Meredith Friedman,

The Future of War (New York: Crown, 1996). For a contrary view on the impact of

modern weapons see Charles Dunlap, ‘Technology: Recomplicating Moral life for the

Nation’s Defenders’, Parameters (Autumn 1999)

2 The term aerial bombardment includes, among other things “dropping munitions from

manned or unmanned aircraft, strafi ng, and using missiles or rockets against enemy targets

on land.” U.S. Dept of the Air Force, Air Force Pamphlet No. 110-31, International Law

-- The Conduct of Armed Confl ict and Air Operations, November 19, 1976, para. 5-1 at

5-1

3 The militia armies in and around the Mosque of Imam Ali in Najaf , Iraq being a case in

point.

4 The US may have not signed up to the 1977 Protocols “… But [the US] considers itself

guided if not bound by the relevant provisions of the most”. Amy J. Hyatt, Ordered Chaos:

The increasing complex rules of lawyers in Targeting (National Defense University,

20000) p4. The 1976 US Airforce Pamphlet and the 1991 US Rules of Engagement

Pocket Card during Operation Desert Storm refl ected provisions of protocol 1 in regard

to distinction, proportionality and necessity. See Mathew Waxman International Law

and the Politics of Urban Air Operations (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000) p12. See

also Michael Matheson, “The United States Positions on the Relation of Customary

International Law to the 1977 Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva Convention”,

American University Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol.2 (1987)

5 Many of the ancient texts such as the Mahabharqata , Bible and the Koran have references

as to how enemies during war should be treated. From a historical and from various

cultural aspects of the roots and development of IHL see International Dimensions of

Humanitarian Law (Paris: UNESCO, 1988)

6 M. Sassoli & A. Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War ?, ICRC, Geneva, 1949,

p145

7 Jean Pictet, ed., “Commentary Geneva Conventions”, Vol. IV (Geneva: ICRC , 1958),

p5

8 Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare: The Modern History of the International Law

of Armed Confl ict (London: Methuen, 1983) p325 (paperback ed.)

9 It is generally believed that civilians did not suffer that much during the First World War

but recent research has shown the opposite. See Ruth Harris, “The child of the Barbarian:



Rape, race and nationalism in France During the First World War”, Past and Present,

No. 141, 1993. Also note Clausewitz comment in reference to 18th Century warfare: “Not

only in its means but also in its aim was increasingly became limited to the fi ghting force

itself ... All Europe rejoiced at this development.” Karl Von Clausewitz, On war (Book

8) P 87.

10 Yves Sandoz, “Protecting People in Times of War”, The UN Chronicle , Winter 1999,

36:4, p214

11 For a historical development of IHL see Best, Humanity at War and also Best, War and

Law since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994)

12 Henceforth to be referred to as the Protocol I.

13 On 26th June 2004 , 161 states had ratifi ed the Protocol I see Appendix B for list of

states and dates treaty ratifi ed (source ICRC at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteen0.nsf/

htmlall/party_gc)

14 Best, Humanity at War, p320 and pp315 - 319 for a discussion of the politics that

determined the fi nal draft of the Protocols.

15 The US has indicated for many years that accepts the various parts of the Protocols but

not the whole. It has never indicated publicly which specifi c parts it accepts and which

it not and why. It would appear, however, that The US has problems with the following

provisions of the Protocol: 1) certain provisions are viewed as politically motivated: the

granting of prisoner of war status to members of liberation movements 2) provisions that

grant irregular fi ghter legal status 3) provisions that limit means and methods of warfare

including prohibition on nuclear weapons and 4) provisions that limits attack on dual-use

facilities. Thus, the US and Turkey, currently remain outside the treaty system.

16 Hans-Peter Gasser, “some Legal Issues concerning Ratifi cation of the 1977 Geneva

Protocols” in Michael Meyer (ed.), Armed Confl ict and the New Law (London: British

Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1989) p82

17 Additional Protocol I, Article 48 (See Appendix A)

18 Additional Protocol, Article 50, Para 1.

19 See Marco Sassoli, “Legitimate Targets of Attacks under International Humanitarian

Law”, IPCR Policy Brief, January 2003. See also William Fenrick, “Attacking the enemy

civilians as a punishable offence”, Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law,

7:539and W. Parks “Air War and the Law of War”, The Air Forces Law Review, 32:1

20 ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Convention

of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: Maritime Publishers, 1987) (available on on-line at http//

www.icrc.org.)

21 Development and research into precision weapons, it is argued, is in part fuelled by

desire to reduce civilian casualties See John Alexander, “Optional Lethality”, Harvard

International Review, Vol. 23:2, 2001,

22 Col. Jay Terry, “The evolving Law of Aerial Warfare”, Air University, November-

December 1975, p13

23 A. P. V. Rogers, “Zero Causality Warfare”, International Review of the Red Cross, No.

837, 31st March 2000, p166

24 O. David , The Holocaust and Strategic Bombing: Genocide and total war in 20th

Century (Boulder: Westview, 1995) p159

25 Michael Howard (ed.) , Restraints on War: Studies in the Limitations of Armed

Confl ict, (Oxford: UP, 1979) pp58-65

26 Javier Gomez, “The Law of Air Warfare”, International Review of the Red Cross, no.

323, 30th June 1998, pp 347 - 363



27 Declaration to Prohibit for the Term of Five years the Launching of projectiles and

Explosives From Balloons , and other Methods of a Similar Nature (Hague IV, I), July

29, 1899.

28 Hague Convention IV, Art. 27,

29 Geneva Convention IV, (1949), Art. 18 - 23

30 Rules of Air warfare, drafted by a Commission of Jurists at the Hague, 1923, Art. 23 and

24 (See ICRC website, www.icrc.org.)

31 Draft Rules for the limitation of the Dangers incurred by Civilians Population in Time of

War, (Geneva: ICRC, 1958), p166 (2nd)

32 Col. Jay Terry, “Evolving Law of Aerial Warfare Law”, op. cit.

33 Quoted in International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law, pp116 - 117

34 Article 50 (3)

35 A.P.V. Rogers, Law on the Battlefi eld (1996), cited in William Fenrick, “Attacking the

enemy civilians as a punishable offence”, Duke Journal of Comparative International

Law”, 7: 539. The ICRC proposed list of proposed categories of military objectives does

not include television and broadcasting stations. In respect of the war sustaining entities,

of the US perspective, see US Navy’s Commanders Handbook on the Law of Naval

Operation, in Michael Schmitt, “The Impact of High And Low-Tech Warfare on the

Principle of Distinction” , Briefi ng Paper HPCI (November 2003), p3

36 W. Hays Parks, “ Air War and the Law of War”, Air Force Law Review (1990), 32:1,

pp138

37 William Fenrick, “Targeting and Proportionality during NATO Bombing Campaign

against Yugoslavia”, E.J.I.L. (2001), p491,n6. See also Michael Schmitt, “The Impact of

High And Low-Tech Warfare on the Principle of Distinction”, pp7-8.

38 Michael Matheson, “The United States Position on the Relations of Customary

International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions”,

American University Journal of international Law and Policy, 2 (1987), pp419 -431.

39 Air Force Pamphlet No. 110-31, at 5-1.

40 A.P. V. Roger, “Zero-Casualty Warfare”, op. cit.

41 Michael Schmitt, “Rethinking the Geneva Conventions”, Crimes of War Project, 30th

January 2003, p3.

42 Michael Schmitt, “Impact of High and Low -Tech Warfare on the Principle of Distinction”,

pp 10-11

43 Kenneth Rizer, “Bombing Dual-Use Targets: Legal, Ethical, and Doctrinal Perspectives”,

Air and Space Power Chronicles, 1 May 2001, p4.

44 For a discussion of the restrictions placed on the military operating by politicians in

avoiding civilians casualties see Phillip Meilinger, “Winged Defense: Airwar, the Law,

and morality”, Armed Forces and Society, 20:1 (Fall 1993). Differing views, political

and military, within NATA was another important factor constraining compliance with

IHL

45 Although the “CNN factor” was coined during the Iraq confl ict, the media’s impact of

that war on public opinion was not comparable to that of the confl ict at the door step of

Europe and worldwide publicity of white Europeans being involved in ethnic cleansing.

NATO launched 23,000 bombs against Yugoslavia and only 20 went astray but these 20

generated more publicity and outcry then the 23,000 that hits their target.

46 Grant Hammond, “Myths of the Air War over Serbia: Some ‘Lessons’ not to Lear”,

Aerospace Power Journal, 14:4 (winter, 2000) at on-line: www.airpower.maxwell.

af.mil/airchrincles/apj/apj000/win00/hammond.htm



47 Protocol 1, Article 82 requires legal advisor to review targets and advise commanders

on targets. The Kosovo confl ict has been referred to by some writers as the “Lawyers

war”. At the time of the confl ict in 1999 Turkey, US and France were the only members

of NATO not signatory to the Protocol. Most of the NATO states had instructed their

aircrews not to take part in attacks of dubious legality.

48 Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign, (NY: HRW, 2000) at

on-line http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200-01.htm

49 Human Rights Watch, ibid. p5.

50 Timothy Thomas, “Kosovo and the Current Myth of information Superiority”, in Parameters

(Spring 2000) at on-line http://carlile.www.army.mil/uaawc/parameters/000spring/

thomas.htm

51 See Human Rights Watch, “Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign”, 12:1 (February,

2000)

52 UN, ICTY, Final Report o the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review

the NATO Bombing campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 8 June

2000, pp39-41 paras 80-85.

53 The ICTY report determined in this instance that neither the aircrews nor the commanders

showed the degree of recklessness in failing to take precautionary measures in identifying

the target that would sustain charges. Ibid, pp30-33 paras 63-70

54 Ibid. Although the Prosecutors Report did not fi nd evidence of recklessness it did fi nd

that the rules of engagements did contribute to the incident occurring.

55 Op. Cit., p88

56 As discussed earlier attacks on public morale are unlawful under the protocol. See also

the opinion of the ICTY Committee which asserted that attacking civilian morale is not a

military objective. Final Report 55 and 76

57 The casualties were technicians, make-up artists and auxiliary artists

58 Protocol 1, Article 79. The Convention does not defi ne journalism.

59 Final Report, paras 55 and 76

60 See Amnesty international, “NATO/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Collateral Damage

or Unlawful Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied

Force”, June 2000. See also Human Rights Watch, op. cit. where it is claimed that the

Yugoslav authorities did not believe that STR was in any threat. P9.

61 Final Report, para 77.

62 Final Report, paras 47 - 55

63 The BBC, in wartime, by virtue of its Charter can be enlisted in the war-time effort; does

that make BBC journalist a legitimate military target?

64 Carl Conetta, “Operation Enduring Freedom: Why a higher Rate of Civilian Bombing

Casualties”, Project on Defense Alternative Briefi ng Report, No. 11, Revised Version

24th January 2002, pp 1 -2 at online www.comw.org/pda/0201oef.html

65 Aerial bombardment, even up to now continues but the period chosen represents a

convenient cut-off point although the Talebans had given the capital, Kabul, up in the

fi rst two months of the campaign.

66 Carl Conetta, op. cit. p5. Human Rights Watch, “Civilians Deaths in Afghanistan”, 20th

June 2002, Press Release.

67 Marc W. Herold, “A dossier on Civilian Victims of United States Aerial Bombing of

Afghanistan: A Comprehensive Accounting Revised]” at online www.cursor.org/stories/

civilian_deaths.htm see also BBC, 3rd January 2002, “Afghanistan’s civilian deaths

mount” quoting Prof. Herold as saying: “I think that a much more realistic fi gure would be



around 5,000. You know for Afghanistan, 3,700 to 5,000 is a really substantial number.”

68 For the methodological weaknesses of casualty fi gures see Lucinda Fleeson, “The

Civilian Casualty Conundrum: Have American news Organisations soft-pedalled the

‘collateral damage’ of the fi ghting in Afghanistan? Or have foreign news outlets and

academic studies grossly infl ated the toll”, American Journalism Review, April 2002 at

online www.ajr.org/article_printable.asp?id=2491

69 See Carl Conetta, op. cit. p8. Talebans claimed that over 5,000 civilians were killed and

10,000 wounded.

70 ibid., p3

71 ibid., p3

72 Talebans claim over 200 dead. See the Guardian, 12th October 2001.

73 The Observer, 14th October 2001.

74 The Guardian, 22nd October 2001

75 The Times, 1st November 2001

76 Carl Conetta, op. cit. p4

77 See The Independent, 1st January 2002 (“ US accused of Killing 100 civilians”), The

Times, 1st January 2002 (“100 villagers Killed” in US Air strikes’) and the Guardian, 1st

January 2001 (“US accused of killing over 100 in Village Airstrikes”)

78 The Times, 1st April 2002

79 The Guardian, 1st July 2002

80 Despite the high rates of civilian deaths in Afghanistan there does not appear to be

extensive research carried out although what there is is by journalists.

81 The Times , 1st April 2002

82 John Sifton, Human Rights Watch, Press Release 13 December 2003

83 Even as this conclusion is being drafted the media is reporting 17 civilians, including

three children, death during an aerial attack on what was believed to be a terrorist safe

house. This has been a regularly occurrence in the Afghan confl ict. Newsnight. BBC 2

Television, 2nd September 2004.

SECURITY ALLIANCES AND SECURITY CONCERNS:PAKISTAN AND NATO

Shahwar Junaid *

Abstract

(With the end of the Cold War, NATO’s role has undergone a radical

transformation from providing collective defence to Western Europe

against a possible Soviet-led ground attack to dealing with threats such

as those emanating from global terrorism and sub-national militancy.

Today issues such as energy security and even the fallout from climate

change are also in the NATO agenda. The thrust of the Organization

has accordingly become more global than transatlantic. Consequently

NATO has evolved from a geographical concept of security to a functional

approach. Thus in the mid-1990s after the Srebrenica massacre, the US

and NATO made serious efforts to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina

which led to the Dayton Peace Accord of December 1995. NATO

deployed troops and this was its fi rst ever out of area deployment

thereby establishing a precedent. Subsequently in March 1999, NATO

forces moved to end the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. This signifi ed a

transformation from being primarily a deterrent force to using its

military capabilities to achieve humanitarian goals. The way was thus

paved for other interventions. All NATO members along with a number

of its partners have contributed troops to the International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) which is operating in Afghanistan. There have

been declarations that ISAF will remain in Afghanistan for decades in

the fi ght against global terrorism. Pakistan’s continued cooperation in

* Shahwar Junaid, a former Communications Media Consultant to the

Pakistan government, is an eminent writer and intellectual. Her latest book is

titled Terrorism and Global Power Systems, Oxford University Press, 2006.


Shahwar Junaid

this effort should be on the basis of a formal association. –Editor).

Before embarking on a discussion of specifi c issues concerning the

activities of multilateral security alliances in South Asia and the adjoining

region, as well as Pakistan’s concerns and interests in this regard, it

is necessary to examine the purpose, origin, terminology and culture

of strategic alliances - particularly those transatlantic and European

strategic alliances in the economic and security fi elds that emerged after

World War II and operated exclusively within the transatlantic arena

for about four decades. Thereafter they began to extend operations to

other regions through modifi ed mutual defence arrangements under the

umbrella of NATO and the United Nations.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Economic

Community emerged after World War II in response to concerns about

the economic, political and territorial future of a weakened Western

Europe that shared several national borders with the vast territories of

the Soviet Union1 and the emerging communist East European countries

that were its allies. The primary purpose of NATO was the collective

defence of Western Europe against a possible USSR-led ground attack by

communist states. An attack on one member state was to be considered

an attack on all NATO members. Enhancing the stability of the region

through a collective security system was expected to foster and protect

the economic reconstruction of war-torn Western Europe. A collective

security system had become necessary because of a series of events that

took place in post-World War II Europe.

Between 1939 and 1945, communist governments had been installed

throughout Eastern Europe and territorial demands were made by the

Soviet Union2. Moscow was reported to be a party to destabilizing

political developments in Greece and Iran. The Soviet Union was also

known to have acquired competence in atomic technology. These

developments prompted the signing of a common defence treaty (the

Treaty of Dunkirk) between Britain and France as early as 1947.

However, it was clear that the combined forces of both countries would

be no match for the forces of the Soviet Union in case of an attack.


Security Alliances and Security Concerns : Pakistan and NATO

Thereafter the European Recovery Plan3 was rejected by East

European states and cominform4, a European Communist organization,

was created. The 1947 establishment of Cominform led to the signing of

a collective defence treaty known as the Brussels Treaty (1948) by most

European states. It was again clear that the combined forces of all the

Western European states would be no match for the forces of the Soviet

Union in case of an attack. In January 1949, the USSR established

COMECON, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, in order to

coordinate the rebuilding and expansion of the economy of the USSR

and the war-ravaged East European states on strictly socialist lines. It

was considered the Soviet counterpart of the European Recovery Plan5

and the European Economic Community rolled into one. COMECON

branched into international trade and commerce. Subsequently it

supplied aid to the communists in China who were eventually victorious

and established the Peoples Republic of China. The blockade of Berlin

began in March 1948. It led to common defence negotiations between

Western Europe, Canada and the United States. As a result of these

negotiations the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April 1949.

NATO was created through the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Treaty itself consisted of a preamble and 14 articles. Its

purpose was to promote the common values of its members and “unite

their efforts for collective defence”6. Article 1 called for the peaceful

resolution of disputes. Article 2 pledges the parties to economic and

political cooperation. Article 3 deals with the development of defence

capacity. Article 4 calls for joint consultations when a member state is

threatened. Article 5 promises the use of members’ armed forces for

collective self-defence. Article 6 defi nes the areas covered by the Treaty.

Article 7 affi rms the precedence of members’ obligations under the

United Nations’ Charter. Article 8 provides safeguards against confl ict

with any other treaties to which members are signatories. Article 9

creates a Council to oversee implementation of the treaty. Article 10

stipulates admission procedures for other nations. Article 11 covers the

ratifi cation procedure. Article 12 allows for the reconsideration of the

Treaty. Article 13 lays down withdrawal procedures. Article 14 calls for

the deposition of the offi cial copies of the treaty in the US Archives.


Shahwar Junaid

The North Atlantic Council was designated the highest authority

within NATO7. It was composed of permanent delegates from all member

states, headed by a Secretary General to run the secretariat and handle all

the non-military functions of the alliance. The Council was the decision-

making body of NATO and responsible for general policy, administration

as well as the organizations’ budget. The secretariat, various temporary

committees and the Military Committee were expected to report to the

North Atlantic Council. The temporary committees were for specifi c

assignments determined by the North Atlantic Council.

The NATO Military Committee was expected to meet twice a

year to consider overall policy. It consists of the chiefs of staff of the

armed forces of member states. Between these meetings, the Military

Committee remained in permanent session with representatives of the

members attending, in order to defi ne military strategy on a day to day

basis. These representatives were often the Military Attaches of the

embassies of member states stationed closest to NATO headquarters.

In a number of cases they were special appointees. Below the Military

Committee various regional commands are responsible for deploying

armed forces in their areas. Policy making within NATO was, and still

remains, a matter of continuous consultation and accommodation: the

national interests and political priorities of member states may not

always coincide. When the original purpose of establishing a purely

transatlantic collective defence organization became redundant with the

dissolution of the USSR in 1991, NATO began to look into issues of

political consolidation of former Warsaw Pact states and the expansion

of its membership. A series of new threats to the transatlantic alliance

were identifi ed. These included, among others, global terrorism and

sub-national militancy. Today, energy security and even climate change

are on NATO’s agenda and its thrust is more global than transatlantic8.

Allies in the pursuit of this agenda include former adversaries such as

Russia and China.

The original signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty were twelve in

number9. The Western European powers relied on the massive nuclear

arsenal of the United States to deter a Soviet ground invasion. Eventually

NATO technology rendered the power of Soviet ground forces irrelevant.



The NATO arsenal included sophisticated psychological, electronic and

information warfare capability as well as non-lethal weaponry sourced

from member states. Greece and Turkey were admitted to the Alliance

in 1952, West Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982. In 1990, unifi ed

Germany replaced West Germany as a NATO member. In 1955, six

years after NATO was established, the Warsaw Pact, a Communist

military alliance was created by the USSR to counter NATO, signalling

the beginning of the Cold War. This was also the signal for the creation

of a powerful defence industry on both sides of the ideological divide.

The global defence industry is an important partner in any military

arrangement in the world - it has a vested interest in war because its

wares, from the sale of which it derives its income, are only utilized in

confl ict situations10. Similarly strategic alliances have a vested interest

in continuity.

In order to understand the raison d’etre, the organizational culture

and military capability of NATO during the Cold War it is necessary to

consider the sheer size of the military adversary the transatlantic allies

were facing and the intensity of the threat they felt during the period.

The boundaries of the USSR11 changed from time to time until the end

of World War II in 1945, when the last major territorial annexations

of the Baltic states, eastern Poland, Bessarabia and some others took

place. Initially established as a union of four soviet socialist republics

(Russia, Trans-Caucasian Russia, Ukraine, Belarus) the USSR grew

to contain 16 constituent republics of the union by 195612.The Soviet

Union’s growing global infl uence in the post-World War II era led to

the establishment of a communist system of states united by economic

and military agreements. COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic

Assistance, 1949) was the Communist equivalent to the European

Economic Community. The military counterpart to COMECON was the

Warsaw Pact.

During the 1970s, the Soviet Union achieved approximate nuclear

parity with the United States and subsequently overtook it. According

to estimates the USSR had a stockpile of 39,000 nuclear weapons at the

time of its dissolution. Despite its position as the second service in the

armed forces hierarchy, the ground forces of the USSR were the most


Shahwar Junaid

politically infl uential Soviet service. Senior ground service offi cers held

all important posts in the Ministry of Defence and General Staff. In

1989, ground forces had 2 million men in four combat arms and three

supporting services. This was the force that was exposed to attack in

an unfamiliar theatre as a consequence of the Soviet intervention in

Afghanistan in 1978.

The USSR was weakened by the failure of its military intervention

in Afghanistan where its forces faced cross-border resistance from

militants who were organized, supported and equipped by the United

States and Pakistan. This enterprise was the fi rst encounter between

a new generation of local militants, born after World War II and the

region’s decolonization, and United States technology. It was brokered

by Pakistan’s forces and sowed the seeds of future military and

ideological confrontation in the area. The entire region was fl ooded

with technologically advanced arms which were freely traded by

militants of different ideological persuasions. There was no common

agenda to bind them into a cohesive force. Eventually an agenda did

emerge: a conservative Islamic state supposedly based on Shariah

law was established by the Taliban in 1996, about fi ve years after the

Soviets left Afghanistan. Initially it was accepted by the United States

and its representatives were even invited to discuss cultural matters in

Washington.

After the dissolution of the USSR and the creation of the

Commonwealth of Independent States in 1991, it was estimated that

Russia, the successor state of the USSR, had an arsenal of 16,000 active

and inactive nuclear weapons13, as well as a large number of tactical

nuclear weapons. Nuclear warheads based in Belarus, the Ukraine and

Kazakhstan were transferred to Russia under the terms of the Lisbon

Protocol to the NPT (Non- Proliferation Treaty), following the Trilateral

Agreement (1995) between Russia, Belarus and the United States.

Russia’s strategic nuclear forces include land-based missile forces,

a sea-based fl eet and strategic aviation. The 1970s had begun with some

agreements as a result of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT

I) but both the United States and the Soviet Union continued to build



their respective military arsenals despite on-going efforts at détente. In

2002, the United States and Russia agreed to reduce their stockpiles

to not more than 2200 warheads each in the START treaty. In 2003,

the US rejected the Russian proposals to further reduce both nations’

nuclear stockpiles to 1500 each. This refusal was considered a sign of

US aggression: Washington was accused of leaving the danger of US and

Russia’s mutual destruction, in place. According to the Russian military

doctrine published in 2003 tactical nuclear weapons could be used to

prevent political pressure against Russia and its allies in Moscow’s

“near abroad.” Russia continues to produce and develop new nuclear

weapons. Since 1997 it has manufactured Topol-M (SS-27) ICBMs

(Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles). After the dissolution of the USSR

the two million strong Soviet ground army, which had been hard hit

by the war in Afghanistan, began to disintegrate. Under treaties signed

with the United States and others, the defence industry of the former

Soviet Union was wound down and plants were established with US

funding to destroy stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. The

protection of technology and related human resources in the territories

of the former USSR and Warsaw Pact became a major concern during

the period14. Russian technology and arms were available on the black

market at throwaway prices and they began to surface in Third World

countries

During the late 1980s, political upheaval led to the removal of

communist governments in Eastern Europe and East Germany was

absorbed into West Germany to form the Federal Republic of Germany

(FDR) in 1990. After the formal end of the Cold War in 1991 the original

raison d’etre for the creation of NATO, the protection of territorial

boundaries, practically ceased to exist. A great restructuring of military

resources at the disposal of NATO began. The restructuring was primarily

limited to the traditional transatlantic theatre. Consultations that took

place between NATO members led to plans for a systematic reduction

of troops and restructuring to create highly trained and technically

competent expeditionary cadres that would be available to respond to

crises anywhere in the world at a moment’s notice. The United State’s

Missile Defence Program was introduced. Under this program secure

and armed missile defence units, controlled by the United States, were


Shahwar Junaid

to be established at strategic locations across the globe. States were

offered incentives in order to provide territory for setting up these

missile defence units.

In the London Declaration of July 1990, NATO heads of state and

government called for “a process of adaptation commensurate with

the changes that were reshaping Europe.” In an effort to foster better

relations with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent

States, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. It

was a forum for consultations between NATO members, East European

states and the former Soviet republics. The adoption of the New

Alliance Strategic Concept in November 1991 led to NATO’s Long

Term Study to examine Integrated Military Structure and put forward

proposals for related reforms15. This provided guidance for defi ning the

scope of missions for NATO with which the command structure would

have to cope. By this time the process of enlargement of NATO was

contributing to the development of the European Security and Defence

Identity. Consultations culminated in the presentation of a proposed,

new military command structure to Defence Ministers on 2 December

199716. Implementation commenced in 1999. The Cold War Command

Structure was reduced from 78 headquarters to 20 headquarters, with two

overarching Strategic Commanders (Supreme Allied Commanders), one

for Europe and the other for the Atlantic. Three regional commanders

were assigned to the Atlantic SAC and two regional commanders were

assigned to the Europe SAC. During this period new security challenges

of the 21st century, were identifi ed and further changes were made to the

command structure to allow for an effective response to such threats.

Consensus on the approach to tackling international terror and sub-

national militancy as well as commitment of resources for the purpose,

proved elusive.

Apart from setting up the North Atlantic Cooperation Council as a

consultative body, in 1993 NATO members endorsed a proposal to offer

former Warsaw Pact members limited association with NATO under the

Partnership for Peace (PFP). This program was a means of extending

the NATO umbrella of security cooperation throughout Europe. It

was to include information sharing, joint exercises and participation



in peacekeeping operations, with full membership as a possibility

after the fulfi lment of membership requirements with NATO military

development assistance. In March 1999 Hungary, Poland and the Czech

Republic joined the alliance. In 2002 Russia became a limited partner

in NATO as a member of the NATO-Russia Council. The PFP program

has 26 participating members.

Between 1995 and 1999 two signifi cant initiatives were taken

by NATO. These followed a great deal of soul searching within the

transatlantic alliance. After the Srebrenica massacre, the seizure of UN

peacekeepers as human shields, the failure of the United Nations mission

and EU-led Peace Plans, the United States and NATO began serious

efforts to bring an end to the continuing war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The genocide of Bosnians was threatening European stability. After

weeks of air strikes, the Bosnian Serbs were ready to negotiate and

eventually signed the Dayton Peace Accord (December 1995). At the

height of the campaign, NATO deployed a force of about 80,000 troops

from 32 countries. Thereafter NATO deployed another multinational

Implementation Force (IFOR) to monitor and enforce the ceasefi re in

Bosnia. A year later this was replaced by a Stabilization Force which

has helped rebuild Bosnian security institutions. This was NATO’s fi rst

ever out of area land deployment and created a precedent.

In March 1999 NATO forces moved against the Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia which had begun the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo leading

to the eventual exodus of over a million civilians from the province. Air

strikes were launched after Yugoslavia refused to accept an international

peace plan that would have put an end to ethnic cleansing and granted

limited autonomy to Kosovo. Instead of capitulating, the Serbs intensifi ed

violence forcing the largest mass migration in Europe after World War

II. A NATO force was sent in. The Kosovo peace keeping force (KFOR)

at its height numbered 50,000 troops from 39 NATO as well as non-

NATO countries. A force of about 16,000 is still in place to guarantee

security. When Kosovo declared independence in March 2008, KFOR

personnel were attacked by groups of ethnic Serbs and sustained one

casualty.


Shahwar Junaid

The Bosnia and Kosovo interventions exposed differences of opinion

within the expanded membership of NATO and the diffi culty of sustaining

military action that requires the consensus of the entire membership of

an expanded military alliance. It highlighted the differences of opinion

that can arise as a result of unique cultural and historical links, not shared

by all members within the expanded membership. NATO had moved

from being a primarily deterrent force to using its military capability to

achieve humanitarian goals. This paved the way for other interventions

and signalled a fundamental transformation within the transatlantic

alliance: NATO moved from a geographical concept of security to a

functional approach17. In keeping with this a military transformation

also took place: The reorganization of NATO, after the dissolution of the

USSR, led to the development of expeditionary capability for operations

at a distance from the alliance’s Euro-Atlantic theatre. This has led to a

perception that long before the actual invasion of Afghanistan through

ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), supposedly in retaliation

for the 9/11 attacks on US territory, and the subsequent invasion of Iraq

in pursuit of non-existent weapons of mass destruction, NATO was

planning to expand its area of operation and sphere of infl uence through

global interventions

After the dissolution of the USSR, there was a period during

which US ascendancy in global affairs was a reality. It was no longer

clear where US foreign policy ended and that of the United Nations,

refl ecting the interests of the international community, began. This

preponderance of US infl uence in world affairs added a new dimension

to the transatlantic alliance and collective defence concepts. An alliance

is defi ned as a “formal association of states for the use (or non-use) of

military force, in specifi ed circumstances, against states outside their

own membership”18.

A strategic alliance is also defi ned as a formal arrangement between

two or more independent parties engaged in the pursuit of common

goals, or, working to meet common critical needs. Such alliances may

be formed in any fi eld of activity, including business and trade19 and

at the bilateral, regional or international levels. NATO, for instance, is

strengthened by social, economic and trade ties between the states of the



European Union, the United States and Canada. Such ties can create a fund

of political goodwill that is helpful when governments take a position on

international security issues that do not have a direct impact on their own

country but do have an impact on allies. However, the transformation

of NATO from a geographically limited alliance to a functional one20,

acting in consort with other multilateral and international agencies, with

an interest in nation-building subsequent to military intervention, has

altered the strategic concept within which the alliance functions: there

is a need to review the political rather than merely military determinants

of NATO in the present security environment21. For instance views on

the legitimacy of pre-emptive military action differ within NATO and

the EU states. This is particularly important vis-a-vis the policy of the

United States towards Iran’s nuclear program and the massing of battle-

ready US warships off the coast of Syria and Lebanon22. An American

force is already stationed in the Gulf and these are reinforcements.

Observers are concerned that this strengthened presence presages a US

military operation in the region.

Post-Cold War security realities have been transformed by events

in the regions in which NATO is operating today. Before making

commitments under a new NATO agenda, member states may need to

consider their domestic political agenda and the fallout of casualties

and other losses during military operations that do not have a direct and

immediate impact on their national security. A review of the political

consensus within NATO which gave direction to administrative change

and military policy after the dissolution of the USSR has also become

necessary. All NATO members have contributed troops to ISAF which

is operating in Afghanistan. So have a number of NATO partner states.

A number of nations are now reconsidering their position as present

policies fail to produce results23.

Nevertheless, there have been declarations that ISAF will remain

in Afghanistan for decades to come: the objective of such a deployment

without policy change with the intention of securing outcome, is

questionable. Some conspiracy theorists even believe that the repeated

publication and reproduction of texts and cartoons that are offensive to

Islam in NATO member states is deliberate and orchestrated to provoke


Shahwar Junaid

violent reaction in conservative Muslim states in the region. Violence

will provide an excuse for prolonging military intervention in a region

that remains aloof and out of the sphere of infl uence of the transatlantic

alliance regardless of NATO’s presence there.

The 18 March-1 May 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent

occupation of that country by a coalition of forces took place because Iraq

was supposed to have stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. Not

a single stockpile was found. Nevertheless, Coalition, United Nations

Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) as well as NATO forces and a

large force of American military contractors continue to occupy Iraq. As

of 23 August 2006 twenty seven countries, including the United States,

were listed as contributing troops to the occupation of Iraq. Australia,

New Zealand and Japan, lying outside the geographical sphere of the

transatlantic alliance, have contributed troops and consider themselves

potential partners of NATO. The questions that need to be asked today

are: What are all these countries getting out of the occupation of Iraq?

What is the return on their investment in human and fi nancial terms?

For the answer to these questions analysts will need to re-examine

the meaning of various terms that have been used to describe strategic

arrangements and the implication of the offshoots of these arrangements.

These offshoots include the terms “international coalition”24 and

“strategic networks”25. These terms are used to indicate differences

and gradations in the purpose of a strategic alliance, and its operational

and functional limits. All these terms are current in modern security

terminology and applicable to security alliances that are operating in

various parts of the world at this time under various multilateral and

international arrangements sanctioned by international law.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an example of a full-

fl edged regional strategic alliance with the collective defence of its

members as one of its major goals. A “coalition” is simply defi ned as

a temporary combination into one26. The purpose of combining forces

and resources on a temporary basis implies that the parties concerned

share an immediate need but may not necessarily share long-term goals

or a vision of the future. For instance, ISAF (International Security



Assistance Force) is the name of a NATO-led security mission that was

established by the United Nations Security Council on 20 December

200127. A series of coordinated suicide attacks that had taken place on

US territory on 11 September 2001 were thought to be the work of Al

Qaeda, which was based in Afghanistan. ISAF was expected to remove

the Taliban government, secure Kabul and the surrounding area from

the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other militant factions and pave the way for

the establishment of the Afghan Transitional Administration which was

to be headed by Hamid Karzai28. In October 2003, the United Nations

Security Council authorized the expansion of the ISAF mission to cover

the whole of Afghanistan. This expansion took place in four phases.

The main headquarter of the mission continues to be in Kabul. There

are fi ve Regional Command Centres under which there are Provincial

Reconstruction Teams that have a fl exible mandate. On 31 July 2006

NATO-ISAF took over the administration of Southern Afghanistan.

Attempts to transform international coalitions into full fl edged

security alliances are not likely to be successful unless the objectives of

all members of the coalition are served by such a transformation. This

has not happened in Afghanistan and this is the reason why the United

States, the senior partner in ISAF, is fi nding it diffi cult to muster troops

from the original members of the coalition and has been trying to induce

states in the region to come to its assistance one way or another.

Stages of Alliance Formation

The typical strategic alliance formation process involves a number

of steps. These include strategy development, partner assessment, and

negotiation of terms of association, command structures and operating

procedures as well as the conditions for terminating the alliance. Apart

from identifying objectives and rationale for creating an alliance, the

feasibility of establishing it must also be examined. Selection criteria will

have to be established in order to analyze the strengths and weaknesses

of potential partners, their motivation for joining the alliance as well

as their ability to contribute to it. These contributions will determine

the status of various partners within the policy making and command

structure of the organization. This will include an evaluation of existing


Shahwar Junaid

arrangements dealing with the objectives of the proposed alliance as

well as other issues and challenges to the establishment of the alliance.

As far as Pakistan and its contribution to ISAF in particular is

concerned, it is essential for policy makers to remember that Pakistan

has existing arrangements dealing with situations that the United States,

NATO and ISAF would like to tackle in the Tribal belt of the country, in

Balochistan and the North West Frontier Province, which share a border

with Afghanistan. The government of Pakistan merely needs to perform

its duties and fulfi l its obligations to the people of the area as a guarantor

of their freedom, security and sovereignty. When the people of the

region voted to become part of the country that was to be Pakistan at the

request of Quaid-e-Azam, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, they were counting

on association with a competent federation that had the capability to

negotiate with external forces and bring prosperity to their area.

A clear delineation of common goals and objectives makes it

possible for partners within a security alliance such as NATO to arrive

at arrangements for pooling resources and efforts for the achievement

of those goals while remaining independent entities and pursuing

independent policies in other matters. Partners within the arrangement

may contribute funds, human as well as physical resources, knowledge

and expertise, equipment and logistic support. Such individual

contributions create synergy which multiples the strength of the

collective effort, despite the divergent strategic cultures of members of

the alliance29. A key component of pooled resources within strategic

security alliances is the geographical location of partners within the

alliance. This element of strategic security alliance culture creates a

unique and infl uential niche for associates and partners who may not

qualify for full membership on the basis of other criteria for membership.

Now that NATO is undertaking function-based tasks and moving out

of its traditional geographic mode it may need to reassess established

criteria for membership of its policy-making command institutions and

the protection and support that is available to their members. Without the

possibility of a formal association of this nature, countries like Pakistan

should not even consider compromising their existing external policy

arrangements.



The perception in Pakistan is that no good has come out of the

collaboration between the United States and Pakistan’s military as a

result of NATO’s counterterrorism presence in Afghanistan. There

is little public support in Pakistan for association with US military

initiatives anywhere in the world. Institutional support has been provided

by Pakistan to ISAF initiatives secretly and without knowledge of the

public30. This is no basis for considering a formal partnership with a

security alliance. Any windfall in the form of fi nances or hardware has

been of limited and superfi cial benefi t to some military institutions in

Pakistan. On the other hand, association with US and NATO expeditions

have wiped out grassroots public support for the institution as a whole

and have weakened it. The militarization and brutalization of Pakistan’s

territory bordering Afghanistan, where US guided missile attacks on so-

called terrorist hide-outs without regard for massive collateral damage

have become commonplace, and have created an untenable situation.

This is the sum total Pakistan has gained from its military association

with the most powerful member of NATO, the United States and its

regional coalition, ISAF.

In fact Pakistan’s citizens have been facing the fallout of escalating

violence as a result of US and NATO activities in neighbouring

Afghanistan for some time now. In Afghanistan, the nature, size and

capabilities of the adversary NATO forces are facing, is radically

different from any they have encountered before. The mindset they are

facing is alien to them. The terrain is different, so is the culture of the

countries surrounding the theatre of war. For these countries, including

Pakistan, the rewards of any cross-border military cooperation with an

offshoot of NATO remain dubious. Just as the intent and purpose of

NATO intervention in Afghanistan remains dubious. A great deal must

change before there can be fruitful cooperation. Above all, Pakistan

must make peace with its own people fi rst.


Shahwar Junaid

References:

1 (i) USSR : December 30,1922- December 26 1991 : Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

a constitutionally socialist state with a total land area of 22, 402,200 (1991) and a

population density of 13.1 per sq. km, spanning the continents of Europe and Asia

and including the Caucasus.

(ii) War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West

(Cass Series on Security Studies): Editors: Vojtech Mastny, Sven Holtsmark and

Andreas Wenger: Routledge: one edition: May 30 2006 .

2 (i) Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World: Polity: October 20,

1997 : 272 pages, P. 38, p.142 etc.).

(ii) Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy 1917-1991; R. Craig

Nation: Cornell University Press: September 1992: 360 pages

3 (i) The Marshall Plan.

(ii) The Marshall Plan: America Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe 1947-

1952 (Studies in Economic History and Policy: USA in the Twentieth Century::

Cambridge University Press: January 27 1989 : Pages 544. 4 Cominform: offi cially referred to as the Information Bureau of the Communist and

Workers Parties, also known as the Agency of International Communism: established in 1947. It was dissolved by Soviet initiative in 1956: Encyclopaedia Britannica 2004.

5 The Marshall Plan6 North Atlantic Treaty.7 Ruhle, Michael: The Evolution of NATO: Expanding the Transatlantic Tool Kit: American

Foreign Policy Interests, 29, 237-242: 2007: Copyright 2007 NCAFF.8 Transatlantic Relations in the 21st Century: Frank Walter Steinmeier: Hampton Roads

International Security Quarterly: Portsmouth : April 15 2007 : P. 39-42.9 Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,

Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States.10 Cohen, Eliot A: A Revolution in Warfare: Foreign Affairs: Vol 75, No.2: Pages 39-42:

March/April, 1996.11 Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World: Polity: October 20, 1997:

272 pages.12 Armenia , Azerbaijan , Belarus , Estonia , Georgia , Kazakhstan , Kirghizstan , Latvia ,

Lithuania , Moldavia , Russia , Tajikistan , Turkmenistan , Ukraine , Uzbekistan . After the reorganization of Karelo-Finnish SSR on July 16, 1956 , the total number of constituent republics of the USSR was 16.

13 Russia ’s Nuclear Capabilities: Adrian Blomfi eld: Telegraph: 5 June 2007.14 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Joint Fact Sheet July 2006: http://

en.g8russia.ru/docs/7/html)

15 (i) Duffi eld, John S.: Nato’s Functions After the Cold War: Political Science Quarterly:

Vol 109, No.5: 9Winter 1994-1995: Pages 763-787.

(ii) NATO Europe spends UDS 12 billion a year on research and development. See

Stephen Flanagan, “Sustaining IS-European Global Security Cooperation”: Strategic

Forum (No.217) September 2005 Pages 1-6.



16 Solomon, Gerald B:The NATO Enlargement Debate 1990-1997: the Blessings of Liberty (The Washington Papers): Praeger paperback: March 30 1998:208 pages.

17 The Evolution of NATO: Expanding the Transatlantic Tool Kit: Michael Ruhle: American Foreign Policy Interests, 29: January 2008: ISSN: 1080-3920 Copyright 2007 NCAFP: Pg 237-242.

18 Snyder, Glenn: Alliance Politics: Ithaca , N.Y:Cornell University Press, 1997: page 4.19 Strategic Alliances-An entrepreneurial approach to globalization: Yoshino and Rangan,

Michael Y. and U. Srinivasa: 1995: Library of Congress Catalog ISBN 0-87584-584-3.20 The Evolution of NATO: Expanding the Transatlantic Tool Kit: Michael Ruhle: American

Foreign Policy Interests, 29: January 2008: ISSN: 1080-3920 Copyright 2007 NCAFP.21 War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West( Cass

Series on Security Studies): Editors: Vojtech Mastny, Sven Holtsmark, Andreas Wenger: Routledge: May 30, 2006 : Pages 324: P.73. etc

22 Kramnik, Ilya: Invisible US Forces in the Middle East: reproduced in The Nation, World Focus, March 16, 2008.

23 Read:Benjamin Scheer, German Institute for International and Security Affairs and Asle Toje, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies: Financial Times: March 12, 2008.

24 Porter and Fuller:1986.

25 Jarillo: 1988.26 The Little Oxford Dictionary of Current English: compiled by George Ostler, Third

Edition revised and supplemented by J. Coulsen: Clarendon Press: London 1941.27 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 S-RES-1386 (2001) May 31 2001

(UNSCR 1386) retrieved 21.09. 2007.

28 The Nation: Page 9: Friday, December 28, 2007.29 NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the

Age of Terrorism: Alexander Moens, Loenard J. Cohen and Allen G. Sens: 216 Pages: Praegar Publishers: March 30, 2003.

30 The Monks of War: Barnett Thomas P.M.: Esquire: March 2006: Pages 214-215.

ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO’S LEGACY AND THE REBUILDING OF PAKISTAN

Iqbal Ahmad Khan *

Abstract(The present PPP-led coalition government faces problems of

Himalayan proportions. The country, following eight years of military

and quasi-military rule, sits on the brink of a precipice. The situation is

not much different from that inherited by the founder of the PPP, Zulfi kar

Ali Bhutto, in December 1971. Yet, despite overwhelming odds, within

the space of a few years he managed to build a new Pakistan which

was democratic, vibrant, confi dent and progressive. That was no mean

achievement. As the government of Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani takes its

fi rst steps to rebuild the country, it should seek inspiration and guidance

from the words and deeds of Pakistan’s most popular prime minister.

This would be the greatest tribute to him and to the bravest daughter of

Pakistan, Ms Benazir Bhutto. Author)

Following a long period of military and quasi-military rule, Pakistan,

not for the fi rst time in its history, stands at the edge of a precipice. The

constitution embodying the fundamental principles and laws governing

the state and society lies emasculated, victim of a military dictator’s

lack of understanding and contempt for human rights and liberties, the

hallmark of a civilized society. The state, confronted with the breakdown

of institutions, appears impotent in discharging its basic responsibilities

of protecting the life and property of its citizens and providing basic

amenities. Despair and hopelessness, engendered by iniquitous economic

policies, crumbling and unresponsive state institutions and lack of

fundamental freedoms, has enveloped the people from the Khyber to

Karachi and from Chaman to Tharparkar. It is ironical that the national

* Iqbal Ahmad Khan is a former Ambassador of Pakistan.


Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Legacy and the Rebuilding of Pakistan

security of Pakistan in which successive governments, in particular

those led by the military, have invested the major chunk of the country’s

meagre resources to maintain the armed forces, have not been able to

successfully confront the threat from a small ragtag body of religious

extremists.

On 17 October 1999 after his coup, General Pervez Musharraf

described the prevailing situation in the country in the following

words:

“Today, we have reached a stage where our economy has crumbled,

our credibility is lost, state institutions lie demoralized, provincial

disharmony has caused cracks in the federation and people who were

once brothers are now at each other’s throat. In sum, we have lost our

honour, our dignity, our respect in the comity of nations.” Anybody

reading this and unaware of its timing cannot be blamed for assuming

that it was a description of contemporary Pakistan. The accuracy of this

depiction of the situation prevailing in the country in autumn 1999 is

debatable. However, with the exception of the economy, which has not

crumbled, but could very well be heading towards a partial meltdown, it

is a precise portrayal of present-day Pakistan eight years after Musharraf

removed the democratically elected government of Prime Minister

Nawaz Sharif. In the same address, General Musharraf promised to:

a. Rebuild national confi dence and morale.

b Strengthen the federation, remove inter-provincial disharmony

and restore national cohesion.

c. Revive the economy and restore investor confi dence.

d. Ensure law and order and dispense speedy justice.

e. Depoliticize state institutions.

f. Bring about the devolution of power at the grass-roots level.

g. Ensure swift and across-the-board accountability.1

The performance of the various governments during Musharraf’s

rule has been pathetic. He cannot claim to have achieved even one of his

objectives. His popularity can be gauged from an opinion poll conducted

in June/July 2007 by the reputable United States’ International Republican


Iqbal Ahmad Khan

Institute (IRI). The fi ndings of the IRI, which had in previous years been

touted by the government to demonstrate the president’s popularity,

revealed that 64 percent opposed Musharraf’s re-election as president

and 62 percent wanted him to resign as the chief of army staff.2 The

benighted country is, by all accounts, worse off today than it was when

Musharraf usurped power eight years ago.

All the four military governments that the people of Pakistan suffered

in the past 60 years painted the politicians as devils out to spread nothing

but evil, promised the nation the moon and fi nally departed leaving behind

a desolate graveyard to be tended to and transformed into a blossoming

garden by the very ‘devils’ they claimed to have exorcised. This pattern

has not only been observed in Pakistan, but also in Latin America and

Africa where former colonial control gave way to military dictatorships

which left in their wake political and economic wastelands. In many

instances callous external powers, normally the former colonialist or a

neo-colonialist power aided and abetted the coup-makers to further its

narrow strategic goals.

Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto himself a victim of a general’s lust for power

undertakes an in-depth analysis of military coup d’etats in his remarkable

book, “If I am Assassinated,” written in his “stinking death cell” with the

paper “resting on my knee.” In the process of analyzing the extremely

important and relevant subject of civil-military relations, he reaches the

following conclusion.

“The events of the last twenty years have made me arrive at the

unambiguous conclusion that, at present, the greatest threat to the

unity and progress of the Third World is from coup-gemony. The era of

colonialism is all but dead. Only a few places remain where colonialism

has still to be buried. In those places also, the burial is at hand. The Third

World has to guard against hegemony, but the best way to guard against

hegemony is to prevent coup-gemony. The biggest link of external

colonialism is internal colonialism, which means that hegemony cannot

thrive in our lands without the collaboration of coup-gemony. Military

coup de’etats are the worst enemies of national unity. Coup d’etats

divide and debase a free people. If there was any doubt on the subject,



the events in Pakistan have shown that the people of the Third World

have to primarily guard against the internal enemy, if foreign domination

or hegemony is to be resisted. Coup-gemony is the bridge over which

hegemony walks to stalk our lands.3

Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto is of the view that unlike Africa or Latin America

there is a historical and deeply entrenched democratic tradition in South

Asia. This was manifest in the panchayat system, in the fact that the

subcontinent was a huge land mass with an enormous population, in the

numerous people’s uprisings and movements that had taken place since

the time of Asoka and fi nally in Britain conceding successive instalments

of democracy to the people of India leading to total independence in

1947. For over three decades, Bhutto states, civilian leaders like the

Quaid-e-Azam,and Gandhi led the masses of the subcontinent in

intensive struggle for independence and freedom. Without political

consciousness, without political awakening, agitations against the salt

tax, the Khilafat movement, the Quit India and Direct Action movements

would not have been possible, and without those convulsions the pillars

of British Raj would not have collapsed. “Nowhere in Latin America

or Africa or in the Middle East, had the lesson in mass awakening been

so long and so persistent as it had been in the subcontinent. The people

of the subcontinent, both the Muslims and the Hindus, aroused and

inspired by their civilian leaders, struggled and sacrifi ced not to merely

hoist two new fl ags but to get the fruits of freedom and democracy.

Nowadays we are told ever so often that Pakistan was created in the name

of Islam. This is true, but who created Pakistan? The Muslim masses,

galvanized under the civilian leadership of the Quaid-e-Azam and not

under a coterie of generals, created Pakistan. This country came into

being by the massive movement of the Muslim masses and not through

a midnight coup d’etat. The Muslim population and not the military

generals created Pakistan. The country was created by the people and its

independence can be sustained only by the people through their chosen

leaders. Only those who created Pakistan in the name of Islam can order

their chosen representatives how to ordain that name. A usurper or a

coterie carries no mandate to fulfi l the task. Nor has the usurper or his

coterie been empowered by the people to determine whether this State

is being administered in the name of Islam. The interpretation has to be


Iqbal Ahmad Khan

done collectively in Parliament and not by an individual or a gang with

guns in their hands. The name of Islam does not come out of a barrel of

a gun.”4

Bhutto then narrates an incident wherein he asks General Zia ul Haq

for his views on the 1973 Attock Conspiracy case. The general gave him

a detailed account of his evaluation of the causes and impulses behind

the plot. “After hearing him patiently I was struck by the personal and

selfi sh factor that aroused the conspirators. Not a trace, not even the

pretence of an objective motivation was available in the cause of that

attempt. What made it more melancholy was that it came so soon after

the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. This meant that the historical

tragedies arising out of military rule meant nothing to power blind

individuals. The fl ow of blood was like water down a duck’s back. The

blunders of military regimes, both internal and external, were not eye

openers. The pollution of the armed forces by its involvement in politics

had not conveyed any message. The catastrophe of East Pakistan

and the surrender of 90, 000 prisoners of war did not teach a single

elementary lesson.” These impressions recorded by Bhutto in his book

reveal perhaps an “appetite for aggrandizement, the unquenchable thirst

for naked power” on part of the armed forces which in his words could

become “a habit-forming drug.”5

Military-civil relations in Pakistan have been adversarial and

mutually suspicious. Inherent in the word civilization, is supremacy of

civilians; yet for more than half of Pakistan’s history it is the military

that has been in charge of the country’s affairs and during the remaining

period its shadow has loomed menacingly over the civilian set-up.

The consequences of this state of affairs are there for all to see and

lament. The presence of the military on-stage or back-stage has proven

to be disastrous for peace, progress and prosperity of the country. On

occasions it appears that the negative implications of military rule are

appreciated by the military itself. In a rare display of courage and candor

several hundred retired military offi cers on 31 January 2008 called upon

General (Retd) Pervez Musharraf to hand over power to the deposed

Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry and to hold elections under

a neutral caretaker set-up. The chairman of the meeting Air Marshal



Asghar Khan expressed solidarity with the lawyers and journalists and

assured them full support on behalf of the servicemen in their struggle for

the independence of the judiciary and freedom of the press. Regrettably,

the assembled generals, air marshals and admirals were evasive when

queried regarding their respective roles in previous martial laws. Air

Marshal Asghar Khan was among the strongest supporters of General

Zia ul Haq’s martial law and Lt. Gen. Chisti was Commander 10 Corps

at the time of Zia’s takeover and became his partner in all the despicable

actions taken by the military dictator. Those assembled were simply not

prepared to admit any wrongdoing.6

It is against this background of the experience and fate of their

leader Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto and the mind-set of the military that the new

PPP led coalition government has taken over the reins of the country.

As the government faces a mountain of problems, it would be wise

to remember the fear expressed by the founder of their party, Zulfi kar

Ali Bhutto: “If a coup d’etat becomes a permanent part of the political

infrastructure, it means the falling of the last petal of the last withered

rose. It means the end.” Merely remembering Mr. Bhutto’s words will

not suffi ce. Too much water has fl own under the bridge. The government

needs to act upon this warning from the death cell, so that history does

not repeat itself. “Martial law is not law,” he asserts. “A regime not

established by law is devoid of the attribute to dispense law. A regime

which puts in a bunker the highest law in the land does not have the

moral authority to say that nobody is above the law. I do not want to

escape from the law. I do not want anybody to escape from the law. But

I defi nitely want to escape from the lawlessness of Martial Law. I want

the whole nation and every citizen to escape from this lawlessness. My

struggle for the restoration of the Rule of Law shows that I do not want

anybody to escape from the majesty of law.7 The government must take

steps to ensure that now and in future the armed forces function strictly

in accordance with the provision of the constitution which clearly lays

down that the armed forces “shall, under the direction of the Federal

Government, defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of

war, and, subject to law, act in aid of civil power, when called upon to

do so.”8


Iqbal Ahmad Khan

In the event the Armed Forces deviate from their constitutional

duty, and in particular violate Article 6 of the Constitution, the full force

of law should be brought to bear upon the violators. Professor Rasul

Bakhsh Rais, a perceptive political analyst, concludes one of his recent

articles titled “The Third Transition” by drawing his readers’ attention

to the debate in the country about trying the perpetrators of the treason

committed on 12 October 1999. “That call must be heeded because a

vigilant civil society, free media and the accountability of coup-makers

are essential in saving the country from military takeovers in the future.”9

Some observers contend that had Mr. Bhutto brought to trial the top

brass of the army for their acts of commission and omission in East

Pakistan following the debacle in December 1971 and exposed to the

public their wrong-doings perhaps the 1977 coup might not have taken

place. Accountability and transparency must be the hallmarks of the new

government so that some amongst us are disabused of the impression

sedulously created by the coup-makers that the politicians are the bane

of our society and essentially responsible for all its ills.

That the new political dispensation emerging from the 18 February

elections is deeply conscious of the cancer of militarization of Pakistan’s

body-politic seems obvious from a reading of the Charter of Democracy.

The Charter was signed on 14 May 2006 by former prime ministers

Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in London, where both were living

in exile. The present coalition government in Pakistan is led by Benazir

Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party and Nawaz Sharif’s Muslim League is

its principal partner. Not only have the two leaders drawn attention to the

damage caused by military governments and military’s interference in

political affairs, but outlined measures to lend accountability and ensure

civilian control of military affairs. Some of the salient points contained

in the Charter include:

- Military dictatorships have played havoc with the nation’s destiny

and created conditions disallowing the progress of our people and

the fl owering of democracy. Even after removal from offi ce they

undermined the people’s mandate and the sovereign will of the

people;



- Drawing history’s lesson that military dictatorship and the nation

cannot co-exist – as

military’s involvement adversely affects the economy and the democratic

institutions as well as defence capabilities, and the integrity of the

country - the nation needs a new direction different from a militaristic

and regimental approach of the Bonapartist regimes, as the current

one;

- National Security Council will be abolished. Defence Cabinet

Committee will be headed by the prime minister and will have a

permanent secretariat.

- An effective Nuclear Command and Control system under the

Defence Cabinet Committee will be put in place to avoid any

possibility of leakage or proliferation.

- No party shall solicit the support of the military to come into power

or to dislodge a democratic government.

- All military and judicial offi cers will be required to fi le annual

assets and income declarations like Parliamentarians to make them

accountable to the public.

- The ISI, MI and other security agencies shall be accountable to the

elected government through Prime Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry

of Defence, and Cabinet Division respectively. Their budgets will

be approved by DCC after recommendations are prepared by the

respective ministry. The political wings of all intelligence agencies

will be disbanded. A committee will be formed to cut waste and

bloat in the armed forces and security agencies in the interest of

the defence and security of the country. All senior postings in these

agencies shall be made with the approval of the government through

the respective ministry.

- Defence budget shall be placed before the parliament for debate and

approval.


Iqbal Ahmad Khan

- Military land allotment and cantonment jurisdictions will come

under the purview of defence ministry. A commission shall be set

up to review, scrutinize, and examine the legitimacy of all such land

allotment rules, regulations and policies, along with all cases of state

land allotment including those of military urban and agricultural

land allotments since 12th October, 1999 to hold those accountable

who have indulged in malpractices, profi teering and favouritism.10

In addition to the commitment made in the Charter of Democracy

to remove military’s shadow over civilian life, it would also appear

worthwhile to read and implement some of the points made by Sherry

Rahman, Secretary Information of the Pakistan People’s Party and

member National Assembly of Pakistan, in her article published in the

English daily newspaper Dawn on 29 June 2005 under the title “Enigma

of the defence budget.” The highlights of her article are given below:

- Despite defence absorbing more than a quarter of the national wealth,

the subject has become inured from public debate and exempt from

any Parliamentary accountability.

- Without explanation, the formal defence allocation account appears

as a two-line statement divided into defence administration and

defence services in the federal consolidated fund in the demands for

grants and appropriations every year.

- Given the constant talk of transparency and good governance

emanating from the government, it is not just surprising but shocking

that the defence budget in Pakistan remains above public scrutiny as

well as the law.

- If lawmakers in Pakistan cannot discuss, let alone question the

allocations and management of this chunk of the country’s wealth,

then it is clear that once again, almost 30 per cent of the budgeted

amount will remain out of parliament’s purview. This in turn means

that the army’s business interests will also remain outside the public

accountability mechanism.



- When parliamentarians or donors read the allocation for defence

over the next fi scal year, it will not include the military pensions,

which now run into 35.6 billion rupees. Nor will the defence outlay

include allocations for the combatant accounts of the defence

division which include the Maritime Security Forces, salaries for

defence production, allocation for the civil armed forces, Pakistan

Rangers, Frontier Constabulary, Pakistan Coast Guards, nor the

substantial amount set aside for military schools, cantonments and

other residuals.

- Why does Pakistan need a huge defence budget that is close to four

per cent of its GDP, when India is spending 2.8 per cent? The entire

justifi cation for maintaining a high defence budget is negated by

the welcome downturn in hostilities with India; the rationale for

Pakistan remaining hostage to its Cold War garrison-state identity

should also naturally be under review. For a country that has fallen

behind all of South Asia in its human development index, including

Nepal and Bhutan, an urgent redefi nition of outdated concepts of

national security is surely expected.

- The question of maintaining the eighth largest standing army in the

world, when huge undisclosed amounts on the nuclear option are

disbursed, becomes critical, for the simple reason that the nuclear

deterrent capability was meant to substantially reduce the need for

such a large conventional force. As it stands, one of the many reasons

for continued high defence spending remains a large percentage of

wasted resources which has arisen out of lack of oversight from

non-military sources. While purchases of bullet proof limousines

by the cabinet division can be questioned because they fall under

civilian oversight, no such queries can be directed at the luxury

cars and goods purchased by the military, its appointment of

surplus employees, nor the expenditure accruing from duplication

of activities or wrongdoing. From 1977 onwards, when Ziaul Haq

began the practice of maintaining funds by the corps commanders

who were at liberty to use them at their discretion, many scandals

over money being siphoned for political activities have surfaced.


Iqbal Ahmad Khan

- The inter-services intelligence agencies remain above the law

and unaccountable, even though they reportedly absorb seven

to 11 per cent of the military’s budget and use secret funds and

ghost bank accounts to destabilize civilian political parties and

their governments. The Mehran Bank scandal is an example of

such fi nancial corruption, when bribes worth Rs 14 million were

unearthed as paid out by the ISI to manipulate the 1990 elections, a

fact which was admitted in court by General Aslam Beg, the former

COAS.

- Despite public clamour about the military’s vast real estate holdings,

no equation is factored in to provide for the creeping militarization

of the mainstream economy. The issue which is now constantly

questioned without any satisfactory response is the size and quantum

of the military’s holdings in what are traditionally commercial

sectors.

- The military’s four major welfare foundations are increasingly the

subject of growing public disquiet because they pay no direct taxes

on their corporate activities, operate as virtual monopolies, and

elbow out civilian private enterprise in their subsidized operations.

They function as military welfare trusts but provide a haven for

retired and serving military offi cers who run a multitude of corporate

ventures ranging from sugar, cereal, fertilizer production to running

airlines, real estate, education, advertising and others.

- The four military foundations — the Army Welfare Trust, the Fauji

Foundation, Bahria Foundation and Shaheen Foundation — for

instance, now run a parallel commercial empire, but end up leaving

scant traces of the net fi nancial burden they impose on the public

sector, because large allocations are made from the opaque defence

budget.

- Despite the fact that most of the foundations were raised with initial

funding from the public sector and the sale of evacuee properties

after 1971, their profi ts remain sky high because they remain above

scrutiny even in their tendering for contracts and other market



activities. The fact that government service rules prohibit public

servants from running private enterprises is often ignored, while

the military control of Pakistan’s public sector continues unabated

as retired generals and brigadiers pick up lucrative posts and double

pensions to run everything from public utilities, universities and

accountability and national reconstruction boards.

- The military as a class does itself a disservice when it allows

rumour to replace public disclosure. Perhaps many of its legitimate

procurement and modernization demands will then not be eclipsed

by the paper-trail of undocumented purchases and irregularities

unearthed by the auditor-general for Defence if it develops an

institutionalized mechanism of requisitioning public money for its

needs.

- The people are not opposed to the military’s spending money

in principle. They don’t even mind occasionally upgrading the

proverbial barracks, but only if they know where the money is

going. 11

The measures referred to in the Charter of Democracy and Sherry

Rahman’s article can only be implemented in phases. For them to see the

light of day continued commitment of the principal political players, sound

understanding and effective cooperation and coordination between them

and backing of the people are essential pre-requisites. The fundamental

motivation in restricting the armed forces to their legal role emanates

from the belief that no individual and no institution transgresses the role

that is envisaged for it in the constitution of the country. Deviations from

this sacred document and absence of accountability for the deviators

constitute the underlying causes of political and social instability in

Pakistan.

In his historic and brilliant letter that Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto wrote from

his death cell to his daughter Benazir Bhutto, he expresses his “greatest

satisfaction in giving the country an all-party constitution by democratic

means. The Constitution of 1973 was the fi rst unanimously approved

constitution by a democratic assembly to bless Pakistan with a fundamental


Iqbal Ahmad Khan

framework based on Islam, democracy and autonomy. It was the

voice of the people of the four provinces of Pakistan articulated in a

constitutional document by their chosen leaders. Autonomy, which

had defi ed solution for over a generation and which had been the

bane of the politics of the Subcontinent from time immemorial, was

at long last settled to the satisfaction of the people and their chosen

representatives. I experienced the kind of joy, the thrill of happiness

which brings tears to the eyes. With high expectation and new-born

confi dence we started to function under the umbrella and discipline of

the Constitution of 1973. Provincial autonomy had been democratically

defi ned. It began to function in all the four provinces. This was a

spectacular accomplishment.”12

The Constitution indeed was a historic achievement. Passed

unanimously by the fi rst-ever directly elected 146-member National

Assembly of Pakistan it represents a lasting tribute to Zulfi kar Ali

Bhutto. In his fi rst address to the nation Mr. Bhutto assured his countrymen

that he would give top priority to the rule of law and to the making of a

constitution. “And this constitution will not be my constitution because

I am an elected representative of the people of Pakistan. I am not making

an empty promise. My dear brothers, friends and sisters, I will give you

a constitution according to your requirements and actually what you

want.”13

Considered in historical perspective, no other Constitution had the

full backing of the people of Pakistan as did the one of 1973. It was

framed by a legislature directly elected in the freest general elections

in the history of Pakistan. The opposition parties were consulted by the

ruling party before fi nalizing the draft of the Constitution. The result was a

consensus. By virtue of their complete unanimity, the Constitution can be

taken to have satisfi ed the existing demands and aspirations of the people.

According to the offi cial website of the Pakistan People’s Party, “Time

has shown that it cannot be replaced. Constitution making in Pakistan

was bedevilled, since the birth of the State, by three unresolved issues:

(i) The role of Islam in the State, (ii) the degree of Provincial Autonomy,

and (iii) the Nature of the Executive. Mr. Bhutto managed to bring all

the political parties to agree to a consensus on the Constitution, thus,



permanently resolving all the three issues. A new institution, the Senate

of Pakistan, was created in which the provinces had equal representation,

in order to redress the balance of power in Pakistan, probably the only

country in the world where one federating unit has an absolute majority.

The creation of Council of Common Interest also gave to the provinces

a greater weight in the federal dispensation. Islam was declared to be

the State religion and the Council of Islamic Ideology given charge of

Islamisation of laws. The never ending tussle between the Head of State

and Parliament was resolved by empowering the Prime Minister. No

better tribute can be paid to the foresight and sagacity of the martyred

leader.”14

The importance of restoring the constitution to its pre-12 October

1999 glory by clearing it of the distortions introduced by General

(retd.) Pervez Musharraf and his rubber-stamp parliament is certainly

not lost upon the new government. This would be in consonance with

the understanding contained in the Charter of Democracy wherein the

leaders of the two major parties in the coalition government have agreed

to revive the Constitution as it existed on 12 October 1999; to entrust

the chief executive who is the prime minister with the appointment

of governors, the three services chiefs and the Chairman Joint Chiefs

of Staff Committee; to set up a commission which would formulate

recommendations for appointment of judges to the superior judiciary

and forward a panel of three names for each vacancy to the prime

minister, who shall forward one name for confi rmation to a joint

parliamentary committee for confi rmation of the nomination through a

transparent public hearing process; to forbid any judge from taking an

oath under any Provisional Constitutional Order or any other oath that

is contradictory to the exact language of the original oath prescribed

in the Constitution of 1973; to set up a Federal Constitutional Court to

resolve constitutional issues, giving equal representation to each of the

federating units and to increase the strength of the Senate of Pakistan to

give representation to minorities in the Senate.15

But for the rebuilding of Pakistan to succeed, an atmosphere of peace,

security and stability is essential. The indispensability of a conducive

environment was fully appreciated by Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto as he worked


Iqbal Ahmad Khan

day in and day out to cement together the socio-economic and political

fabric of the country. In order that Pakistan evolved into a self-suffi cient

and self-reliant nation, peace with India became the prerequisite. “We

should be free from the strains and burdens of an armaments race so

that both India and Pakistan can devote their energies and resources to

productive development,” Bhutto wrote in an article “Pakistan builds

Anew” in the American journal “Foreign Affairs.”16 The result of Mr.

Bhutto’s vision and strenuous efforts was the Simla Accord signed by

him and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at Simla on 2 July 1972. The

agreement expressed the resolve of both governments to “put an end to

the confl ict and confrontation that had hitherto marred their relations”

and asserted their determination that “the principles and purposes of the

Charter of the United Nations shall govern relations between the two

countries.”

When he went to Simla, the Pakistan army lay defeated and

demoralized, 90,000 soldiers languished in Indian captivity, thousands

of square miles of territory in West Pakistan was under Indian occupation

and the economy was in tatters. Yet, during one week of intense and back-

breaking negotiations with the victorious Indians he was able to stitch

together an agreement which started a process and ultimately brought

back the POWs and vacation of Pakistani territory by Indian forces. The

Accord has generally preserved peace between India and Pakistan since

1972. Both Siachin and Kargil are exceptions to the rule and call for an

enquiry commission to ascertain their causes and implications.

The Simla Accord was a master stroke of diplomacy on Mr. Bhutto’s

part. Behind it lay days and nights of hard work, extensive consultations

and strategy sessions and above all a clear sense of the direction in

which to steer the ship of state. In a marathon address on 14 July 1972

Mr. Bhutto informed the National Assembly of Pakistan that “we made

all the preparations that were humanly possible, because as I have said,

we had nothing in our hands. We had no trump cards; we had no levers;

the only lever was to consult our people, meet them, and also to visit

foreign countries, fraternal countries, friendly countries, Russia and

China. It was a fatiguing endeavour, but it was done in the supreme

national interest and I think it paid dividends.”17



The importance that Mr. Bhutto attached to the power and will of

the people in the Herculean tasks that he set about to undertake was

also evident in the realm of foreign policy. On his return from Simla,

Mr. Bhutto arrived at the Lahore airport on 3 July 1972 and told the

huge crowd assembled there that as promised he had not made any fi nal

decision on Indian soil. “Whatever decision would be reached between

the two countries as a result of negotiations would be subject to your

approval. You have seen now that I have adhered to that promise. The

agreement that has been arrived at with India can be accepted or rejected

by the National Assembly of Pakistan which represents you. The fi nal

approval will, therefore, rest with you. My Government will not decide

on our future relations with India. The decision in this respect shall be

made by you, the people of Pakistan and by our valiant soldiers. The right

of consent is yours. With that end in view, that is, to obtain your verdict

on the agreement and on our negotiation with India, I am convening a

session of the National Assembly which will debate this issue and each

member will have full liberty to express his views on it. Members will be

free to point out its defects, and I would be very happy to learn if there is

anything wrong with it. But I want to tell you that there is nothing wrong

with it. This is a comprehensive and successful agreement.”18 The Simla

Accord was hotly debated by the people’s representatives sitting in the

National Assembly of Pakistan which approved it on 14 July 1972 and

the instrument of ratifi cation was delivered to India on 18 July 1972.

Students of politics and international affairs observe the sharp

contrast in the manner in which the Simla Accord was achieved and

the veiled and arbitrary decision taken by a coup-maker and his coterie

enveloping Pakistan in the war on terror. No wonder, both the decision

and Pakistan’s participation in the anti-terror campaign have not only

become controversial but also counter-productive. This is not to say that

the war on terror is solely America’s war and that by placing itself on

the frontline in the war Pakistan was fi ghting America’s war; it is not

to say that the rise of terrorism and religious extremism is not a threat

to democracy; it is not to deny that the ideology of the extremists runs

counter to that of the founder of the nation Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad

Ali Jinnah who had envisioned Pakistan as a moderate and democratic

welfare state. The terrorist killings of Pakistani political leaders, of the


Iqbal Ahmad Khan

armed and paramilitary forces, police and government offi cials and

ordinary labourers and workers can never be justifi ed and condoned.

It is for this reason – the fact that the terrorist has struck at the very

historical and ideological foundations of Pakistan and spread terror and

fear among the citizenry - that the war on terror is far too important to be

left in the hands of a few generals. In 2007 more Pakistanis were victims

of terrorism than in all the years from 2001-06 put together. There is,

therefore, an urgent need to undertake a wide-ranging review of both the

policy and strategy related to the war on terror.

At this stage it would be useful to heed the remarks that the late

Benazir Bhutto made at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York

in August 2007. “We cannot allow parallel armies, parallel militias,

parallel laws and parallel command structures. Today it’s not just the

intelligence services that were previously called a state within a state.

Today it’s the militants who are becoming yet another little state within

the state, and this is leading some people to say that Pakistan is on

the slippery slope of being called a failed state. But this is a crisis for

Pakistan that unless we deal with the extremists and the terrorists, our

entire state could founder.” Ms. Bhutto claimed that there existed a broad

consensus in Pakistan between the major political parties that General

Musharraf had taken the right step in joining the war against terrorism.

Both the PPP and Nawaz Sharif’s Muslim League were committed to

fi ghting terrorism and extremism. But while it may have been a diffi cult

decision for Musharraf at one level, there was a consensus within

Pakistan that terrorism was a threat to the outside world as well as to the

people of Pakistan. The linkage of a people with the government and,

in particular, a people who have benefi ted in terms of jobs and schools

and drinking water, helped create a vested interest and the will for the

people to save their own community. But when there was a government

that was non-representative, the public became alienated, and turned

against the government. It was in this way that a democratic government

was stronger because it could reach out to the people and it could pull

together the law enforcement. Terrorism was as much a military situation

as it was an investigative criminal situation. Her party, Ms. Bhutto said

had the ability to eliminate terrorism and give the people security, which

would bring in the economic investment that would help reverse the



tide of rising poverty in the country, which in turn would undermine the

forces of militancy and extremism.19

A welcome emphasis on the process of decision-making was

manifest when the newly elected Prime Minister, Yousaf Raza Gillani,

reportedly told a visiting delegation of senior US offi cials that in future

all key decisions would be made in consultation with the representatives

of the people sitting in parliament.20 The US delegation was in Islamabad

to exchange views with Pakistani leaders on different aspects of US-

Pakistan relations and to ascertain, in particular, the thinking of the new

government on the issue of terrorism. Explaining his position on the

issue, Prime Minister Gillani reportedly made the following points:

a. The new government was determined to fi ght terrorism in all its

forms, because it concerned Pakistan.

b. His party’s approach had been consistent and its sacrifi ces

included the martyrdom of its leader Benazir Bhutto.

c. Pakistan backed the US-led war on terror.

d. The new government favoured a comprehensive approach

which included political solutions.

e. Economic development of the tribal areas was important in

addressing the curse of extremism.21

The terrorism question is arguably the most important issue facing

the new government. It has endangered the lives and property of

ordinary citizens as also the vision of the founder of the state. It calls for

immediate attention. Hard work, diplomatic skills, political consensus

and popular support ensured the success and durability of the Simla

Accord. If the terrorism issue is addressed in the same fashion as the

Simla Accord, it will only be a matter of time before it is consigned to

the dustbin of history. As the government directs its energies towards

eliminating this scourge, emotionalism will have to be eschewed so that

objectivity and realism can prevail.

The challenges before the new government are multifarious and not a

single one has a simple and immediate solution. Civil-military relations,

the use of force in the tribal areas and Balochistan, the restoration and


Iqbal Ahmad Khan

building of institutions and the war on terror are indeed few among the

multitude of problems facing the government that cannot brook delay

and cry out for solutions. Ironically, the most pressing of the problems

is the extreme economic distress to which the overwhelming majority

of the population is subjected. Ironically, because both General (retd)

Musharraf and former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz never ceased to

remind the people that they had wrought an economic miracle in Pakistan.

The World Bank’s Vice President Praful Patel has warned that unless

Pakistan made painful adjustments it risked a slowdown.22 There is

particular concern about the widespread and extremely annoying power

outages that have affl icted the country, in particular the mega-city of

Karachi, the shutdown of industries and manufacturing facilities, rise in

unemployment, the huge balance of trade and current account defi cits,

rising infl ation and falling production, food shortages, increasing poverty

levels and escalating oil and food prices.

The economy inherited by Mr. Bhutto was in shambles. Both the

industrial and agriculture sectors, subject to strains of various kinds,

were gripped by stagnation and uncertainty. Production in the mills and

factories was down as was the output in the farmlands. Side by side

with laying the groundwork of a democratic polity, Bhutto launched an

elaborate series of major socio-economic reforms designed to level up

inequalities and iniquities of Pakistani society, to end an unjust status-

quo and foster a welfare state and an egalitarian society. In his article

“Pakistan builds Anew” in the April 1973 issue of the American journal

“Foreign Affairs” he outlined the purpose of his socio-economic program

in the following words: “Our target in our socio-economic program is not

only a statistically gratifying increase in the GNP but an improvement

in the lot of the common man, in the living standards of workers and

peasants and a radical change in the social milieu. Such a change has to

be felt by the people and not only measured by economists, if it is to be

real.”23

Among the many disservices that the different governments under

Musharraf’s rule have done to the country, perhaps the worst has been

the cynicism that it has bred among the people. Neither the elite, which

incidentally has benefi ted immensely from the rich-friendly policies of



these regimes nor the ordinary citizen have any faith in the credibility

and effi cacy of the whole state apparatus. Unless the new dispensation

is able to restore the trust of the citizen in the government’s ability to

safeguard his life and property and promote his welfare, it will not be

able to mobilize the power of the people in support of its policies.

It is the theme of people’s power that forms the leitmotif of Zulfi kar

Ali Bhutto’s rule and to a great extent explains some of his astounding

successes in extremely adverse circumstances. In his letter to Benazir

Bhutto titled “My dearest daughter” he extols the virtues of people-

friendly policies. “Your grand-father taught me the politics of pride,

your grandmother taught me the politics of poverty. I am beholden to

both for the fi ne synthesis. To you, my darling daughter, I give only

one message. It is the message of the morrow, the message of history.

Believe only in the people, work only for their emancipation and

equality. The paradise of God lies under the feet of your mother. The

paradise of politics lies under the feet of the people. I have quite a few

achievements to my credit in the public life of the subcontinent but, in

my memory, the most rewarding achievements have been those which

have brought smiles of joy to the weary faces of our miserable masses,

achievements which have brought a twinkle to the melancholy eye of

a villager. More than the tributes paid to me by the great leaders of the

world, within the four walls of this death-cell, I recall with greater pride

and satisfaction, the words of the widow in a small village who told

me “Sadko Warryian solar sain” when I sent her only peasant son on a

foreign scholarship.”24

Even if the vehicle that Mr. Gillani’s government prepares to extricate

the Pakistani nation out of the present mess is sturdy and durable, it

might fi nd it diffi cult, indeed impossible, to reach its destination safely

and securely if it is powered by fuel that is contaminated. In other words,

policies and measures may be excellent and intentions unimpeachable,

but if corruption, wastage, sifarish and lack of accountability, the bane

of our society, are not confronted boldly the government may fail to

inspire confi dence among the people towards whose welfare the policies

are directed. In his very fi rst address to the nation, which was extempore,

Mr. Bhutto warned that he would come down with a very heavy hand on


Iqbal Ahmad Khan

corruption. He told the bureaucracy to do its job and work like he worked

night and day and to be at the service of the people. He underscored the

importance of the ordinary citizen who should be able to get his work

done without ‘sifarish.’ “I have no relations, I have no family. My family

is the people of Pakistan….So it must be known clearly to everyone that

there will be no “sifarish” from anyone, no nepotism, no corruption and

no maladministration.”25

As the new democratically elected government endeavours to bring

the nation out of the shadow of eight years of military and quasi-military

rule, it would do well to remember the inspiring words of Zulfi kar Ali

Bhutto on his assumption of offi ce as the president of Pakistan. “I want

to tell you my dear countrymen that I have come in at a very late hour,

at a decisive moment in the history of Pakistan. We are facing the worst

crisis in our country’s life, a deadly crisis. We have to pick up the pieces,

very small pieces, but we shall make a new Pakistan, a prosperous

and progressive Pakistan, a Pakistan free of exploitation, a Pakistan

envisaged by the Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, founder of the

nation, a Pakistan for which the Muslims of the subcontinent sacrifi ced

their lives and their honour in order to build this new land. That Pakistan

will come, it is bound to come. This is my faith, and I am confi dent that

with your cooperation, understanding and patience, we will emerge as a

stronger and a greater state. I have no doubt about it.”26

The greatest tribute that the present government can pay to Zulfi kar

Ali Bhutto, the most popular prime minister of Pakistan and Benazir

Bhutto, the bravest daughter of the soil is to tirelessly dedicate itself to

the building of a strong and democratic Pakistan.



References:

1 Address to the nation by General (retd.) Pervez Musharraf on 17 October 1991.

2 Public opinion poll conducted by United States International Republican Institute (IRI)

in June/July 2007.

3 Bhutto, Zulfi kar Ali, If I am Assassinated.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 The News, 1 February 2008.

7 Bhutto, Zulfi kar Ali, If I am Assassinated.

8 Article 245 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

9 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, “The Third Transitions, Daily Times, 25 March 2008.

10 Text of “Charter of Democracy,” 14 May 2006.

11 Sherry Rahman, “Enigma of the Defence Budget,” Dawn, 29 June 2005.

12 Letter by Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto “My dearest daughter,” to Benazir Bhutto/

13 President Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto’s address to the nation, 20 December 1971.

14 Website of the Pakistan Peoples Party.

15 Text of “Charter of Democracy,” 14 May 2006.

16 Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto, “Pakistan Builds Anew,” Foreign Affairs, April 1973.

17 Speeches and Statements by President Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto, published by the government

of Pakistan.

18 Ibid.

19 Ms Benazir Bhutto’s address to the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, August

2007.

20 Daily Times, 27 March 2008.

21 Ibid.

22 Daily Times, 28 March 2008.

23 Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto, “Pakistan Builds Anew,” Foreign Affairs, April 1973.

24 Letter by Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto, My dearest daughter, to Benazir Bhutto.

25 Address to the nation by President Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto, 20 December 1971.

26 Ibid.

Essays

OF TONGUES AND LANGUAGES:The Tao of Translation

Toheed Ahmad *

Abstract

(Pakistan does not seem to have grasped the meaning or signifi cance

of translation. A close nexus exists between translation skills and national

development. The promotion of a translation culture is also important to

foster values of tolerance and peaceful coexistence among faiths, races

and countries. The paradigm of Dialogue/Clash of Civilizations is best

tackled through book translations rather than leaving the fi eld open for

the media which are in a hurry to sell their daily and hourly products in

an increasingly noisy marketplace of ideas. Author).

The fi sh swims in the water but they don’t realize ‘the water.’

The birds fl y riding the wind but they don’t realize ‘the wind.’

The man exists inside The Tao but they don’t realize ‘The Tao.’

The Tao is formless.

The Tao exists since the beginning.

The Tao have no beginning and ending.

The meaning is very complex and diffi cult to understand. The meaning

is too wide, so it is very diffi cult to be explained by the word clearly.

The simplest meaning of The Tao is “The Way” or can be said too as

“The Law,” “The Rule” and others.

Lao Zi, the grand Prophet of Taoism

In Pakistan we don’t seem to have grasped the meaning or

signifi cance of translation. Yet we are a multilingual society where people

use Translation (or its oral equivalent of Interpretation) daily. Imagine

a Sindhi speaker reading the English newspaper Dawn or the Urdu

Jang, a Punjabi speaker reading The News or Nawa-e-Waqt, a Balochi

* Toheed Ahmad is a former Ambassador of Pakistan.

Essay


or a Brahvi speaker watching the news bulletin of Aaj TV, or a Pashto

speaker tuning in to PTV’s Khabarnama. They are all translators. Its

time we wake up to the importance of this subject and study the process

of Translation rather than solely consuming its products – whether in the

literary or education fi elds or for commercial, legal, scientifi c texts and

documents, or in the burgeoning media world (fi lm sub-titles, television

voice-overs, radio broadcasts) newspaper/magazine content, book

publishing industry, computer literacy and software localisation or in

international marketing and brand promotion. A close nexus thus exists

between translation skills and national development.

Though ancient as the hills, Translation has emerged as an academic

discipline only in the last thirty years or so. In the late 1970s, the subject

began to be taken seriously, and was no longer seen as an unscientifi c

fi eld of enquiry of secondary importance. Throughout the1980s interest

in the theory and practice of Translation grew steadily. (In that decade

we were one with the world when in the early December of 1985 the fi rst

National Seminar on the Issues in Translation was held in Islamabad. In

the same decade the National Language Authority issued several books

on the subject). In the 1990s, Translation Studies fi nally came into its

own for this proved to be the decade of its global expansion. Today

interest in this fi eld has never been stronger and the study of Translation

is taking place alongside an increase in its practice all over the world.

But in Pakistan we have neither formal education in this area nor any

mentionable training programme for translators. The biggest casualty

of this gap is the Urdu-English-Urdu area, which is ironically the most

common area of our nation’s use of translation and interpretation. (For

example, in a recent conversation with me, the Vice Chancellor of the

Government College University, Lahore, lamented that people of his

English Department did not liking talking to the people of the University’s

Urdu Department). Barring a few gifted and brave individuals, quackery

rules this profession much like we saw in architecture during the fi rst

four decades after independence, and in photography and fi lm making

even in the seventh decade of our national existence.

We have all heard of the great Translation enterprises of Abbasside

Baghdad and Muslim Andalusia, and yet are content to believe that

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those Muslim translators were salvaging ancient knowledge in science,

medicine, philosophy and the arts to serve the cause of European

Renaissance, implying thereby that these Muslims had no intrinsic use for

this artful skill. George Saliba, Professor of Arabic and Islamic Science,

Columbia University, notes that: “No civilization has experienced a

renaissance in its history in one form or another without that renaissance

being preceded or coming contemporaneously with a translation

movement. Whether it was the ninth century Baghdad or in Europe’s

Renaissance age, the translation movements ushered in remarkable

periods of cultural upsurge.” Later we shall examine this unparalleled

translation enterprise of human history. In our own times, the evolution

the European Union is the biggest translation project in the world.

Working in over 20 languages, the EU is the single largest employer

of translators and interpreters followed by the UN which deploys these

skills only in its six offi cial languages. What are we missing here?

“The fi rst step towards an examination of the processes of

translation must be to accept that although translation has a central

core of linguistic activity, it belongs most properly to semiotics, the

science that studies sign systems or structures, sign processes and sign

functions” writes Prof Susan Bassnett of University of Warwick in her

famous book, “Translation Studies,” (latest edition 2002). She goes on

to say: “Beyond the notion stressed by the narrowly linguistic approach,

that translation involves the transfer of ’meaning’ contained in one set

of language signs into another set of language signs through competent

use of the dictionary and grammar, the process involves a whole set of

extra-linguistic criteria also.”

“Language is a guide to social reality...human beings are at the

mercy of the language that has become the medium of expression for

their society. Experience is largely determined by the language habits of

the community, and each separate structure represents a separate reality.

No two languages are ever suffi ciently similar to be considered as

representing the same social reality.. and no language can exist unless it

is steeped in the context of culture, and no culture can exist which does

not have at its centre the structure of natural language. Language, then,

is the heart within the body of culture, and it is the interaction between

Essay


the two that results in the continuation of life-energy. In the same way

that the surgeon, operating on the heart cannot neglect the body that

surrounds it, so the translator treats the text in isolation from the culture

at his peril.”

According to Prof. Bassnett, “the purpose of translation theory

is to reach an understanding of the processes undertaken in the act of

translation, and not as is commonly misunderstood, to provide a set of

norms for effecting the perfect translation.” She then goes on to pose the

question whether there can be a science of translation or is translation

a secondary activity. Believing that any debate about the existence of a

science of translation is out of date, she says that “there already exists,

with Translation Studies, a serious discipline investigating the process

of translation, attempting to clarify the question of equivalence, and to

examine what constitutes meaning within that process. But nowhere is

there a theory that pretends to be normative, and (we are) a long way from

suggesting that the purpose of translation theory is to be proscriptive.”

Here she gives the last word to Octavio Paz, the 1990 Noble Laureate

for Literature, who made a case for Translation Studies, and translation

itself. All texts, Paz claims, being part of a literary system descended

from and related to other systems, are ‘translations of translation of

translations,’” and she quotes him saying: “Every text is unique and at the

same time, it is the translation of another text. No text is entirely original

because language itself, in its essence, is already a translation: fi rstly, of

the non-verbal world, and secondly, since every sign and phrase is the

translation of another sign and another phrase. However, this argument

can be turned around without losing any of its validity: all texts are

original because every translation is distinctive. Every translation, up to

a certain point, is an invention and as such it constitutes a unique text.”

I would like to tell you about this latest Translation initiative in the

Arab world. Kalima, a non-profi t company is based in Abu Dhabi and

funded by the Emirate’s Authority for Culture and Heritage. While its

aim is to “address a thousand year old problem” principally by getting

100 books of knowledge translated into Arabic and published every

year – an awesome ambition indeed. Its driving philosophy is that

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“Translation is not just some base skill but a key to a glorious treasure of

thinking, ideas and invention from all around the world that can provide

a platform for more advances.” Its website (www.kalima.ae) lists the

following four objectives that they wish to achieve:

To fund the translation and publication of books from other (i)

languages into Arabic.

To support marketing and distribution initiatives.(ii)

To support and promote the Arabic book industry on the (iii)

international stage, like International Book Fairs.

To invest in translation as a profession, to encourage more and (iv)

better quality translators.

There are 250 million Arabic speakers in the world, but only a very

small proportion of translated foreign material available to read. To put

this into context:

Spain translates in one year the number of books that have been •

translated into Arabic in the past 1000 years and

For every one million Arabs only one book is translated into •

Arabic each year

(Source: UNDP Arab Human Development Report, 2003)

Add to this inconsistent product quality, poor distribution and piracy

and it’s no wonder that interest in books has suffered in the Arabic

world.

What is this “thousand year old problem” that Kalima aims to

address? What was happening in Baghdad, a thousand and more years

ago, on the translation front? The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts,

has recently issued a book of Prof George Saliba under the title “Islamic

Science and the Making of the European Renaissance” which takes an

in-depth look at the enabling socio-economic factors for the rise of world

beating science and technology in the Islamic lands. He postulates that

“scientifi c and philosophical ideas fl ourish through open discussion.”

Language mediation or translation played a crucial role in the emergence

of pioneers of astronomy, mathematics, physics, chemistry, philosophy,

Essay


geography etc. Translation of Greek, Persian, Syriac and Sanskrit texts

into Arabic enabled the Muslim scholars to converse freely with the

great minds of these civilisations and thus while preserving the jewels

of the ancients through translations into Arabic, they also created new

knowledge. The great philosopher Al-Farabi once wrote that philosophy

was fi nally freed (of persecution at the hands of Byzantine emperors and

Christian Church) when it reached the lands of Islam.

Many of the Baghdad scientists, mathematicians, physicists, and

philosophers were also translators. Two of the most sophisticated Greek

scientifi c texts – the Almagest of Ptolemy and Elements of Euclid – were

translated into Arabic by al-Hallaj. The language of these translations,

says Saliba, is impeccably good, Arabic technical terms and all and the

Arabic translation even corrects the mistakes of the original Almagest.

Who taught al-Hallaj the technical terms and who taught him how to

correct the mistakes of the original asks Saliba. “Early translations

usually struggle with technical terminology and usually do not go beyond

the letter of the text and would never have corrected its mistakes, if they

could understand the text in the fi rst place,” he observes.

“Furthermore we know that al-Hallaj’s translation of those scientifi c

works was not the fi rst. In fact, we are told by some sources that those

two books were already translated (into Arabic in Baghdad).... and

thus we must allow for a longer period of translation so that more than

one generation of translators would create enough output to produce

technical terminology and teach the sophisticated mathematics and

linguistic skills that were required to render Almagest, the Elements,

and similar books into the kind of coherent Arabic in which they are

preserved.”

Let’s take a look at the genesis of astronomy and algebra and the

role played by translation as narrated by Saliba. “During the reign of al-

Ma’mun, we also witness the creation of the new discipline of Algebra

by Musa al-Khwarizmi (circa 830 AD), already in a mature format –

treating, for example, the fi eld of second-degree equations in its most

general form. This happened before the translation of the work of

Diophantus and other Greek sources. This does not mean that classical

Essay


Greek sources, or for that matter ancient Babylonian sources, did not

include algebraic problems, but the coinage of the new terms for algebra

(al-jabr), and the statement of the discipline in general as different from

arithmetic, required a kind of maturity that could not have come with

the fi rst generation of translators.

“Similarly, a few years later, or even contemporaneously with

Khwarizmi, we witness the creation of the discipline of Hay’a

(astronomy), as ‘ilm al-hay’a, which also did not have a Greek parallel.

And that too could not have come about, as it did in the work of Qusta

bin Luqa (e.g. translation of Arithmetica of Diophantus, still preserved

in an Oxford manuscript), during the fi rst generation of translators.

Moreover, it is remarkable to note that Qusta himself, like other

accomplished translators of his time, was already composing his own

new scientifi c books, like his book of Hay’a just mentioned, while he

was still translating older, more common Greek scientifi c texts. Hunain

bin Ishaq (outstanding physician and translator) did the same, and so did

many others in this period.

“All that could not have come about at the hands of people who were

translating for the fi rst time, and needing to create the new technical

terminology for their translations as well as their original compositions.

In Qusta bin Luqa’s Arabic translation of Arithmetica of Diophantus

there is a clear adoption of the algebraic language that was developed

by the Arabic-writing algebraists of Qusta’s time, as is evident in from

Qusta’s reference to the title of Diophantus’s work as sina’at al-jabr (Art

of Algebra), a term that does not exist in Greek. This kind of liberty with

the translation clearly demonstrates the dynamic nature of the translation

process of the early ninth century. Classical Greek scientifi c texts could

easily be acclimatized within the current Arabic sciences of the time,

thus transforming the translation process into a simultaneous creative

process as well. Furthermore, the remarkable advances that were made

by Habash al-Hasib (circa 850 AD) in the fi eld of trigonometry and

mathematical projection go far beyond what was known from the Indian

and Greek sources, and they could not have been accomplished by

someone who was only a benefi ciary of an early stage of translation.”

Essay


Let us examine the coinage of scientifi c terms carried out in the early

decades of the last century at Osmania University, Hyderabad Deccan

(established 1917), where medical, science, and engineering education

was imparted in Urdu. Although I have not seen any analytical study of

their translation process, I have seen the two volume dictionary of these

terms published by the National Language Authority. While we can

see the quaintness of these terms, I suspect that these translators were

not of the category of al-Hallaj, Qusta and Hunain mentioned above.

The Deccan translators were just that and did not produce any original

work in Urdu in any of the scientifi c fi elds for which they established

voluminous books of terminology. As fi rst generation translators of

terminology (though some work had been accomplished at Sir Syed

Ahmad Khan’s Scientifi c Society) we salute their achievement but fi rst

it was not the kind of work that had gone in Abbasside Baghdad, nor was

it followed up by a second and third generation of translators to affect

refi nement and improvement. May be the abolition of the Nizamate and

the Urdu-Hindi controversy in the Freedom Movement was the undoing

of this ‘experiment.’

For did not Marshal Hodgson, the infl uential author of The Venture

of Islam (published 1975) note: “It is hardly accurate, despite certain

West Pakistani claims, to call Urdu an Islamic language, in the strict

sense. It was the insistence of some Muslims on treating it that way, and

opening a meeting on fostering Urdu with Qur’an readings, that drove

Urdu-loving Hindus away from it and may, in the end, have meant the

ruin of Urdu in its motherland.” Hodgson chose not to talk about the

other side of the debate when the Hindu culture chauvinists denounced

Urdu as the brainchild of the British imperialism, specifi cally William

Gilchrist, Principal of the Fort William College, Calcutta, for having

produced hundreds of translations and manuals and dictionaries, with the

aim to divide and rule in colonial India. I dare say that Urdu was ruined

in Pakistan too, where ironically it was upheld as the national language.

While Teaching of English is being offered as a specialised subject at

post-graduate level in many universities of Pakistan, teaching of Urdu,

to my knowledge, exists as a subject for elementary level teaching only.

Here we don’t even need to mention the highly developed British export

industry of Teaching of English to Foreigners. Do we have anything

Essay


comparable for spreading Urdu at least among the six million overseas

Pakistanis – we should not then wonder why our diaspora’s cultural

connection with the homeland is limited to observance of the rituals

of Islam (Imagine the cultural alienation of the non-Muslim Pakistanis

abroad).

Meanwhile the world has moved on. In the last 30 years, Translation

Studies has come to be accepted as an academic discipline and is being

increasingly taught at many universities. In fact the drive to create

knowledge-based economies has led many countries to actively promote

Translation Studies. As per the World Competitiveness Report 2006,

just one Arab country, Jordan, ranks among the top 60 countries. It is

directly related to the much lamented fact that the total number of books

translated into Arabic in the last 1000 years is less than the number

of books translated into Spanish in one year. The other three Muslim

countries in this list are Malaysia, Turkey and Indonesia – all three

countries with active state-sponsored translation programmes. Malaysia

is the only Muslim country to have its universities ranked among the top

200 in the world today. Signifi cant books produced in major languages,

and important journals, are reproduced in Bhasha and Turkish almost

instantaneously. Iran is doing something similar - there people are thus

kept abreast of what the world is thinking. Our elites, while maintaining

a strict knowledge censorship for the masses, restrict themselves to the

Anglo-Saxon worldview. Small wonder then that Pakistan is yet to fi nd

a mentionable place on this Competitiveness Scoreboard.

The Competitiveness criteria relevant to our discussion of

translation, language skills and culture are as follows;

1. University Education: Whether University Education meets

the needs of A Competitive Economy

2. Economic literacy: Is economic literacy generally high among

the population

3. Education in Finance: Does education in Finance meet the

needs of enterprises

4. Language Skills: Are Language Skills meeting the needs of

enterprises

Essay


5. Knowledge Transfer: Is Knowledge transfer between

companies and universities highly developed

6. Attitudes towards Globalization: Whether attitudes towards

Globalization are generally positive in the country

7. National Culture: Is the national culture open to foreign ideas.

If you are not an entrepreneur, put the above questions to any factory

owner, banker, university student/lecturer, media person, a bureaucrat or

any labour leader in Pakistan. The answer will be a resounding no. Our

competitiveness gurus are missing this whole point. The truth is there is

no place to hide anymore.

It is said that ambition is fundamental to competitiveness.

The conclusion of the World Competitiveness Report 2006 is that:

“Successful nations and fi rms have the ability to raise the general level

of ambition everywhere and for everybody. Such an attitude may very

well be the ultimate engine for competitiveness.” And this is further

borne out by a truism in Translation Studies that most of the work done

in translation is in the area of scientifi c, technical, commercial, legal and

administrative or institutional translation. Despite this our literati think

of translation as primarily a literary phenomenon. “The full signifi cance

of non-literary translation in cultures is drastically underestimated. This

is not because, as is commonly thought, literary translation enjoys a

monopoly of attention and prestige in the academy (it does not) but

because the cultural and intellectual stakes of non-literary translation are

rarely spelled out in any great detail and are generally referred to in only

the vaguest possible terms – ‘promoting understanding,’ ‘encouraging

trade’” (Prof. Michael Cronin, cited below).

URDU TRADITION OF TRANSLATION

According to Prof Nisar Ahmed Qureshi, the foundations of early

Urdu poetry and prose appear to have been mainly laid by translation.

The plots of ancient Deccan masnavis were taken from Persian and

Arabic sources. The earliest known prose translator was Shah Meeranjee

Khudanuma of Deccan who translated the Arabic language book

“Tamheedat Hamadani” into Urdu in the early 17th century. (Turjuma:

Rivayat va Fun, 1985, National Language Authority, Islamabad). The

Essay


late Mughals also added translation to the court arts taught to the

royalty. It was thus that the unfortunate Prince Dara Shikoh (1615-

1659), elder brother of Emperor Aurangzeb, translated selections from

the Upanishads from Sanskrit into Persian. These texts were further

translated into Latin by Anquetil Duperron in 1801, which according to

Prof. Annemarie Schimmel, “so deeply infl uenced German philosophy

of the 19th century” and thus became Europe’s fi rst introduction to

Hinduism.

While Shah Waliullah (1703-1762) fi rst translated the Quran into

Persian, his sons Shah Rafi uddin and Shah Abdulqadir separately

translated the Holy Book into Urdu in 1785 and 1790 respectively. The

fi rst Urdu translation of the Bible appeared in 1748. So the Bible was

available to the Indian populace several decades before the Quran. All

these were essentially individual projects involving translations from

Persian, Arabic and Sanskrit into Urdu. The fi rst institutional Urdu

language translation was seen at the Fort William College, established

in 1800 at Calcutta to train British civil servants and army personnel

for service in India. According to Schimmel, “The abolition of Persian,

the old language of higher instruction – (it) had been the depository of

the cultural and intellectual heritage of Indian Islam and had produced

a large literature, local languages possessed more or less only religious

or folk poetry – opened the way for the development of Indian regional

languages which started, from the scientifi c point of view, at Fort William,

and which entailed not only a large literary output in the different local

languages but brought into existence little by little the art of translation

which produced adaptations of European literature and technical works”

(Gabriel’s Wing, A Study into the Religious Ideas of Sir Muhammad

Iqbal, 1962).

Dr. John Gilchrist, the College Principal, who had produced an

English-Urdu dictionary in 1796, assembled scholars and writers from

all over the country and tasked them to produce books in simple Urdu

and also Urdu versions of masterpieces of other languages, this time

including English. This galaxy included stalwarts like Mir Aman Dehlavi,

Haider Buksh Haideri, Mir Sher Ali Afsos, and Nihal Chand Lahori who

were the fi rst generation of professional and paid translators.

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Similarly, the Delhi College, established 1792, pushed Urdu

translation further and produced local versions of scientifi c and scholarly

texts between the years 1842 and 1877. According to Gail Minault’s

article on Delhi College and Urdu (www.urdustudies.com), in the early

1840s, Principal Felix Boutros started the Vernacular Translation Society,

which translated books in medicine, law, sciences, economics and

history from English into Urdu. Teachers and students both participated

in the work of translation, creating their own textbooks in the process

– an interesting blending of the oral and written traditions. Individual

local benefactors helped fi nance the fi rst translations and publications.

The sales of texts helped the effort along. The government also agreed

to fi nance the translations of math and geometry texts in Urdu to bring

western sciences to students in the oriental section of the College.

The list of the Society’s publications includes basic textbooks such

as Euclid’s Elements, and histories of England, Greece and Rome and

the geography of India. Science texts included both natural philosophy

and Tibb (also from Arabic). The famous names associated with this

movement were Mamluk Ali Naunatvi, Maulana Altaf Hussain Hali,

Maulana Mohammed Hassan Azad, Maulvi Zakaullah and Maulvi Nazir

Ahmed. The Vernacular Translation Society made it possible for students

of Delhi College to participate in both the revival and improvement of

Urdu literature and the promotion of the knowledge of the sciences.

Incidentally, the Delhi College was the precursor of two supposedly

opposing centres of Indo-Muslim cultural revival and reform in the 19th

century, Aligarh and Deoband.

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898) the great visionary of Indian

Muslim culture, established the Scientifi c Society of Aligarh, the fi rst

scientifi c association of its kind in India. Modeled after the Royal Society

and the Royal Asiatic Society, the Society assembled Muslim scholars

from different parts of the country. The Society held annual conferences,

disbursed funds for educational causes and regularly published a journal

on scientifi c subjects in English and Urdu and translated Western works

into Urdu. Sir Syed felt that the socio-economic future of Muslims

was threatened by their orthodox aversions to modern science and

technology.

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It is interesting to make a quick comparison of these Urdu translation

enterprises with that of the Bait-al-Hikma of Abbasside Baghdad. While

they helped popularise western subjects, these projects, do not seem to

have inaugurated any worthwhile knowledge movement. Three main

points come to mind:

1. While the Bait-al-Hikma was patronised by the Caliphs of Islam

and their courts, the Urdu translation enterprises were “sponsored”

early on by the colonial British authorities. While Fort William

College was meant to produce vernacular texts to train the colonial

offi cials, the goal of Delhi College, Sir Syed’s Scientifi c Society,

and Osmania University to provide the Indian Muslim community

access to modern education. It was a slave-master paradigm that

drove these Hindustani initiatives.

2. Though both Arabic and Urdu were in their early stages of

development as prose languages when the Muslims embarked upon

their great translation enterprise in Syria and Iraq and when fi rst

foreign texts were produced in Urdu, the Bait-ul-Hikma’s knowledge

catchment area was vast and varied, ranging from Transoxania in

the east passing through the grand Sassanian civilisation of Iran,

the splendour of the Byzantine libraries and Greek and Roman

treasuries of knowledge to Andalusia in the west. Urdu’s knowledge

outreach, by contrast, was limited to what was available in the

subcontinent in Persian, Arabic, Sanskrit and English. Calcutta,

Delhi and Hyderabad, unlike Baghdad, had no pretence of creating

new science or of devising technologies to apply them. Hindustani

translation energies were mostly consumed by literary and religious

texts, while only a few books, mainly teaching texts, were produced

in the fi eld of science.

3. The Urdu-Hindi controversy which burnt many a creative spirit

raged on during most of the 19th century and beyond. Scholars were

pushed into taking sides and, ironically, felt the safest inside their

language trenches. The chorus of the slaves in Hindustan was but

a whimper unlike the raging Muslim intellect that informed the

Baghdad translation projects.

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The translation situation in Pakistan remains a hangover of this

controversy, as its early proponents had all cut their teeth in a linguistic

version of the Two Nation Theory and could not shake off their minority

syndrome. Though a Translation House was established in Lahore and

some work was done by the Pakistani version of the Urdu Development

Society in Karachi, the agenda remained the same – to produce texts

for education of the ‘Muslim community.’ The predominant concern of

our literati then was to get the Urdu language promulgated as the sole

national and offi cial language. There was no vision beyond the trenches

in which these scholars had been born. Apparently no one had access to

the details of the Baghdad translation initiative, and may be no one still

bothers about analyzing it to draw lessons for us today.

The fi rst serious attempt to examine the situation was made at

a three-day seminar arranged in Islamabad by the Urdu Language

Authority in December 1985. Scholars and academics from around the

country examined issues in translation during three sessions, in the areas

of science and technology, law, as a working language, and in media

and literature. After the formal opening, the fi rst session was devoted

to Overview of the situation. The next year, the National Language

Authority published the proceedings of the Seminar in Urdu, edited

by Ijaz Rahi, who contributed a pithy introduction to the volume. He

wrote that the participants agreeing that translation was our national

requirement discussed various problems and issues around translation.

The need for translation, he wrote, was felt by those nations who yearned

to acquire knowledge. In history, the nations which excelled in spiritual

and material fi elds were those who gave a high priority to learning

from the knowledge of other nations. In this outreach, translation,

always served as the diplomatic bridge. In the glory days of the Islamic

civilization, Muslims scoured the world in search of knowledge, and

through translations, empowered their scholars and scientists.

Science and technology, he further wrote, were fast changing and

developing and no society could hope to progress without keeping pace

with the world. It has been established that in order to benefi t from

world knowledge, nations have to acquire the ability to translate the new

knowledge in their own languages. Ijaz Rahi goes on to make a seminal

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point that post-colonial societies whose languages were damaged and

downgraded under foreign rule have the twin challenge of repairing and

then restoring the centrality of their languages, and at the same time to

keep abreast of the world in knowledge. A tough call indeed!

In its concluding session, the Seminar passed 16 resolutions. Below

I reproduce texts of 10 of those resolutions with their original serial

numbers to highlight the various dimension of our national translation

imperative.

No 1. This Seminar recommends that a Joint Committee of National

Language Authority and the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting

be set up which may prepare a Dictionary of words and terms used in

Media and Communications giving their standard Urdu equivalents,

including new words and terms, and supply it to Media Institutions.

This Joint Committee may work on a permanent basis.

No 2. In view of the importance of scientifi c and literary translations,

this Seminar recommends that Translations be included as a category

for books awards.

No 4. This Seminar recommends that all fees paid to Translators of

scientifi c, literary, technical and scholarly texts should be exempt from

income tax.

No 5. Recommended that all Universities of Pakistan, which

currently do not have this practice, should admit Translations of portions

of any book as dissertations for Masters Degrees.

No 6. Recommended that the Translation House of the National

Language Authority should be upgraded on a large scale for which

necessary funds should be provided to the Authority.

No 7. Recommended that the National Language Authority should

establish a specialised library of all old and new Urdu translations as

part of the Library of its Translation House.

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arrange for translations of the most important books into Urdu and

publish them.


be given the authority for authentication and standardisation of terms

coined by various individuals and institutions. Only such terms should

be used for all Urdu books and publications.

No 11. Recommended that in view of the shortage of good translators

a Translator Training Centre should be established under the aegis of

the National Language Authority. Teaching of Translation should be

introduced at all Universities of Pakistan.

No 16. Since use of new machine technology has facilitated

translation between the national language and the regional languages,

recommended that necessary measures be taken to utilise this facility.

You will see that in the year 1985, these scholars were dimly aware

of the machine translation facility but had not yet heard of computer

aided translation or computer literacy which were subjects, it must be

said, that had just begun to surface in the west. These scholars were not

yet aware of the trade related needs of translation skills, nor were the

subject of translation and external promotion of Pakistan or industry-

university linkage broached at the Seminar. Given the grim translation

gap in Pakistan today, we can safely assume that the recommendations

of this important seminar were forgotten. Its 23 years now, no follow-

up event has been reported from any quarter in Pakistan. Nor has

any mentionable book been produced on the subject of Translation

Studies, nor is it a subject at any Pakistani university or college. And

these precisely were the decades that the world woke up and adopted

translation as a serious academic discipline and upgraded the profession

to the highest level.

An area of particular concern in this domain is the near-total

absence of the science of linguistics in the Urdu tradition. I had a phone

conversation with the Vice-Chancellor of the Karachi University which

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once had an active Translation Centre. “No more active” was his reply

to my query. To be fair to him he did ask the Dean of the University’s

Arts Faculty to follow this up who called me a few days later to assure

me of their interest in pursuing this conversation further in view of the

importance of the subject. Recently I visited the Oriental College of the

University of Punjab, where I was told that Translation was formally

taught only as part of the Master of Arts courses in the Arabic language.

They had no linguistics expert of any of the languages taught there.

I had a conversation on this subject with Dr. Saleem Malik, Head of

the Urdu Department of the College, who told me that he had earned

a Masters degree in Linguistics from Karachi University which he had

stowed away in his desk and never felt the need for the subject. He

confessed he had earned his living off his Urdu degrees. Some years ago

I had a similar conversation with the Brigadier-Rector of the National

University of Modern Languages, Islamabad, who confi dently told me

that a special group of his academics were doing a translation project

relating to the Chinese supplied equipment at the Heavy Mechanical

Complex, Taxila. So much for the understanding of the subject from the

head of the nation’s premier languages university. While the Kinnaird

College showed no interest to my proposal on Translation Studies, the

Beaconhouse National University and the English Department of the

Punjab University seemed interested but reported no follow up. Lahore’s

University of Management and Technology offers a Ph.D. in Applied

Linguistics which has a module on Translation. The situation is grave

indeed for Translation Studies in Pakistan.

Another building block of the inter-disciplinary area of Translation

Studies is Comparative Literature, which like Urdu linguistics, is another

glaring gap on our academic map. No university or college in Pakistan

teaches the subject of Comparative Literature. We don’t have academics

trained in this area of literary studies. Not long ago I happened to see

the result card of someone who had passed the examination to get a

Master of Arts degree in Urdu of the Punjab University. One of the

subjects he had passed was called Alami (World) Classics. Upon my

asking he told me that he had read a Shakespeare play and extracts from

Milton’s Paradise Lost, Maupassant stories, selections from Goethe,

some Chekov stories and Attar’s Conference of the Birds and some

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tales from Rumi’s Masnavi, all in Urdu translation. So here we have

the early stirrings of Comparative Literary Studies. I doubt if any of our

university’s English Departments offers a similar course.

Foreign Language education is another connected area for the

promotion of Translation Studies. “Language learning, without

which translation is impossible, is, if nothing, a form of prolonged

interaction with another people, language and culture. It is diffi cult,

unpredictable, occasionally humiliating and often exasperating, like all

other engagements with difference. Remove language and the risk is a

multicultural sweetshop of tamed, sanitized differences, the dangerous

ingredient of linguistic diversity corralled off backstage in kitchens and

call-centres,” writes Prof Michael Cronin (cited below).

We have a long tradition of teaching English, Persian and Arabic

languages. Some degree courses are also offered in French and German,

while the National University of Modern Languages also offers degree

programmes in Chinese and certifi cate level instruction in Russian,

Turkish, and Bhasha etc. It is interesting that except for Persian and

Arabic, which are taught through Urdu, the medium of instruction for all

other language courses is English. Why are we not teaching French and

German and Chinese through Urdu? For one this is censorship by default

– to deny our Urdu knowing masses access to advanced knowledge in

languages other than English. Secondly, it needs hard work by scholars

and academics to erect such linguistic bridges. Why should anyone

bother about any other language when our ruling elite have “command”

of sorts over English? A Translation Studies programme will necessitate

a wholesome and rigorous foreign language education programme at the

tertiary level.

It is said that writers create national literature while translators

create world literature. One of the reasons the world knows so little

about us is that so little of our rich literature, of Urdu and other Pakistani

languages, has been translated into the major world languages. Most

of what has been translated into English has been done by Pakistanis

with no pretension to knowledge or training in Translation Studies. The

golden rule here is that translators can effectively translate only into their

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native languages. I witnessed a demonstration of this principle recently

in the offi ce of Mr. Shahzad Ahmad, Director, Majlis Taraqqi Adab

(Board for Advancement of Literature), Lahore, when a Pakistani friend

who owns a language company in London was visiting the offi ce of the

Majlis. We were talking about the standard of translation in Pakistan.

He saw a book of English translation of short stories of the late Ahmed

Nadeem Qasmi lying on a corner table and picked it up. Opening its

fi rst page, he offered to get its fi rst paragraph reverse translated in to

Urdu through his London offi ce. We met up again after a fortnight and

he read out the Urdu translation. Mr. Shahzad Ahmed and we all were

shocked to fi nd that the two texts had nothing in common. The Pakistani

translator did not realise that his target language was not English but

gibberish. Unfortunately much of what passes for English translations

of Ghalib, Iqbal, Faiz etc., is really an unintelligible language. Though

some great translations have been made into German (by Annemarie

Schimmel) and French (by Eva de Vitray-Meyerovitch) and Arabic (by

Abdul Wahab Azzam and Ali Sawi Sha’lan), poor Iqbal has yet to fi nd

a quality English translator, of the kind that Rumi and Tagore found.

Way back in 1920 Prof. R.A. Nicholson put the Secrets of Self into

English followed by Prof. A. J. Arberry’s Persian Pslams (1948). Victor

Kiernan’s translation effort remains a labour of love.

Mr. Amjad Islam Amjad, the famous poet-playwright, once told me

that the literature produced in Urdu between the 1930s and 1960s must

rank as among the highest literature produced in any world language.

While he is an honourable man, there is no way this claim can be proved

in the absence of world quality translations in the major world languages.

To illustrate the power of translation as a medium of external projection,

let me quote a paragraph from Annemarie Schimmel’s Gabriel’s Wing:

“Some time after the publication of my Turkish prose translation of

the Javidname, I received a letter, its very bad Turkish orthography

manifesting that the writer was an unlearned man; but he expressed his

admiration for Iqbal’s work, and asked for more books of his Turkish

translation. He was a bearer (he wrote ‘karson’) in a restaurant in a small

town of Eastern Anatolia – that seems to be suffi cient proof for Iqbal’s

unquestionable appeal to simple minds too, who do not grasp properly

the philosophical implications of his poems but are moved just by the

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energy they feel, even through the medium of translation.”

Now that we are talking of the power of translation, let me tell you

about one of my historic achievements relating to this fi eld. Chachnama,

the account of the Arab conquest of Sind, was translated from Arabic

into Persian by Ali son of Mohammed Kufi , a resident of Uch, in 1216

A.D. It is said to be the oldest book of history of the subcontinent. The

original text was lost, only its Persian translation survived in several

editions and disparate parts. Mirza Kalichbeg, Deputy Collector,

Naushahro, Hyderabad District pored over several texts and published

the complete book for the fi rst time in English translation, in Karachi in

1900. Later, Dr. N. A .Baloch, the celebrated scholar of Sindh, worked

hard to piece together the Persian text of the Chachnama and published

it as a parallel English-Persian edition titled Fatehnama Sindh. He gifted

me a copy which kept lying in my books. Once Dr. Baloch visited

Syria during my posting there, and this led me to dream of getting the

Fatehnama translated back into the original Arabic. I was able to secure

the agreement of the Arabic translator of the Iranian Cultural offi ce in

Damascus to take on the project. This is how this great text of sub-

continental history was published after it was checked and authenticated

by Dr. Sohail Zakar an eminent Syrian historian.

In this information age, literacy has been redefi ned. If you don’t

know computer operation, you are illiterate. The world now consist of

knows and knows-nots. A lot is being said and written about this Digital

Divide. To keep up with the world, nations face an urgent challenge – to

make their populations computer literate, and fast. For this to happen

societies must be wired and languages made computer compliant.

Pakistan is making commendable progress in providing the internet and

telecom infrastructure. By the middle of this year, more than 50 percent

of the population will be connected through mobile communications,

including the fi rst in the world nationwide roll out of the state of the art

WIMAX technology. Broadband penetration is set to rise dramatically

in the next three years. What is lacking is the language compliance.

There is no machine translation capability in any Pakistani language.

Some initial work has been done at the National Language Authority’s

Centre for Urdu Informatics and at the Centre for Research in Urdu

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Language Processing at the Lahore Campus of FAST National University

of Computer and Emerging Sciences. Yet it is said 90 percent of the

work remains to be done. Without speedy localization, the vast majority

will remain devoid of computer use. While mobile communications

provides voice connectivity, data processing is all done via English.

Given the present very low rate of English literacy in Pakistan, we can

never hope to get our computer literacy ratio into double fi gures. Are we

then doomed to remain a nation of knows-nots?

But there is hope on the horizon. The Punjab government has recently

agreed to fund a modern Translation House at the Majlis Taraqqi Adab,

in Lahore to be headed by Mr. Shahzad Ahmad. At a recent meeting in

his offi ce setting up of a machine translation group was under discussion.

Also present were Dr. Jamil Jalibi, the formidable scholar of Urdu and

Dr. Majid Naeem, Head of the Computer Science Department at GCU.

Dr. Naeem was requesting for provision of two experts of linguistics – of

Urdu and English – and offered to arrange for funding and promised to

provide the fi nal machine translation capability for Urdu in three years.

So the effort is on.

According to Dr. Jalibi’s magnum opus History of Urdu Literature,

the fi rst grammar of Urdu was written in Dutch language by John

Kettler, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Netherlands to the Mughul

court. Called Lingua Hindostanica, it was published in 1743. At that

time, and for centuries to come, the Urdu discourse was dominated by

religious writing. No wonder today we lack expertise in Urdu linguistics

and grammar in Pakistan. Here you will also see some rationale for the

comment of Marshall Hodgson on the poverty of Urdu language given

above.

An area of substantial growth in the translation industry over the last

two decades has been the activity of software ‘localization.’ Localization

clearly relates to the translation needs generated by the informational

economy in an era of global markets, states Prof Michael Cronin in his

book, “Translation and Globalization.” It essentially involves taking a

product that has already been designed and tailoring it to the needs of a

specifi c local market. For 1999, the world market for software and web

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localization was estimated to be $ 11 billion, expecting it to rise to $ 20

billion by 2004. More than 80 percent of e-mail and data content in the

world, and 91 percent of secure websites are in English language. 70

percent of the books published today are in English, French, Russian

and German languages. More and more countries are seeking to provide

these technologies to their people in their native languages, the biggest

of them being China, Japan, Korea, Germany, France, Italy, Russia and

Iran. In this localization drive, Prof Cronin sees the new opportunity for

English speaking Asians. For us in Pakistan the preparations will begin

with foreign language competencies and Translation Studies.

Prof. Cronin, who heads the Centre for Translation and Textual

Studies at Dublin City University, Ireland, begins his book by a reference

to a novel The Last War, or the Triumph of the English Tongue, written

by Samuel W. Odell in 1898. “The new world is now the United States of

the World and the ‘English race’ has conquered the globe. The triumph of

the English language is made easier by the mobilization of 1500 airships

laden with bombs and an unquenchable primitive fi re. Faced with certain

death from the air, speakers of languages such as French, German and

Chinese decide that translation is the better part of valour and they set

about translating themselves into the language of the superior airpower.

In Odell’s book of revelation, when the tongues of fi re descend, the

message is not to go out and preach in diverse languages but to stay

inside and speak one.”

This is the paradigm for Cronin’s thesis on the increased signifi cance

of translation in this era of globalization, especially for the minority

cultures which face extinction because of the raging might of the

languages of major powers. (Here we have nothing to fear from the

“language-less” India, its constitution recognises 22 spoken languages,

besides the classical Sanskrit and the co-offi cial English; the country is

fast becoming an ape-civilisation of US). “Translation, and by extension

translation studies,” he says, “is ideally placed to understand both the

transnational movement that is globalization and the transnational

movement which is anti-globalization.” He examines this aspect in

some detail with a view to “showing those outside the discipline that

translation engages with questions which are of real importance for the

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past, present and future of humanity.”

An active sense of citizenship must involve translation as a core

element. While discussing translation-interpretation as vital skills for a

knowledge-based foreign policy, he states that “Imperial Rome, Classical

France and Romantic Germany accord translation a privileged role as

a means of bolstering the position and standing of the vernacular” as

well as their economies and national power. Should it surprise us that

we have failed to market our export products in language rich societies

like the Arab world, Japan, China, Germany, Russia, Brazil, and Spain?

A customer always buys in his own language. So it is incumbent on

the seller to know the language of his target markets. I don’t think

that this truth has sunk in with our Trade Development Authority. Our

manufacturers certainly are aware of this but lack facilitation advice or

support.

“The Comparative Advantage of nations is to take the waiting

out of wanting. Peripherality is no longer geographically defi ned, but

now is chronologically defi ned. It is defi ned by the speed with which

information-rich (fi nancial products, on-line support, telemarketing of

products and services) and design-rich (popular music, web design, and

advertising) goods and services can be delivered to potential customers.”

Again “objects created in the post-industrial world are progressively

emptied of their material content. The result is the proliferation of signs

rather than material objects.” This has been called ‘aestheticization.’

Taken together this highlights the fact that industrial and business

creativity now increasingly depends on the translation capabilities of a

society.

Promotion of a translation culture is also important to foster values

of tolerance and peaceful coexistence among faiths, races and countries.

The paradigm of Dialogue/Clash of civilisations is best tackled through

book translations rather than leaving the fi eld for the media which are in

a hurry to sell their daily and hourly products in an increasingly noisy

marketplace of ideas. “Making knowledge and information available

in minority languages is not only an effective way of extending the

range and usefulness of the language concerned but it also allows the

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regional, the national and the global to be made local in a way that

is politically enabling and allows for the beginning of a recovery of

control over people’s political, economic and cultural fates.” Its the

translation stupid!

DIMENSION AND CONSEQUENCES

OF NATO EXPANSION TO EURASIA:

REVIEWING IRAN’S SECURITY

ENVIRONMENT

Arif Kemal*

Abstract

(NATO expansion on Iran’s northern flank is a reminder of the

latter’s encirclement which reached a pinnacle earlier in the decade

with the US ventures in Iraq and Afghanistan. However the driving

force behind NATO expansion in the Eurasian region is energy and

trade centred thereby signifying an obvious European dimension. A

“new Great Game” is being enacted in the region in which Czarist

Russia and Imperial Britain have been replaced on the one hand by

the US-led coalition and, on the other, by Russia and China. A neo-

Cold War could be in the making. To achieve the multiple objectives of

energy security, trade corridors, stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan and

stemming the resurgence of the Taliban, co-opting rather than isolating

Iran is essential. Policy revisions, therefore, need to be made by both

Washington as well as by Tehran. Editor)

NATO expansion on Iran’s northern flanks is a reminder, if any

were needed, of the country’s encirclement. Earlier in the decade,

the process had reached its zenith with the US military ventures in

Afghanistan in the east, and Iraq in the west. Yet the accretion in the

‘encirclement’ caused by NATO’s expansion is primarily motivated

by energy and trade interests thereby signifying an obvious European

connection which, in turn, implies that it is not patently Iran-specific.

The measure lacks the potency to outweigh Iran’s geo-political standing

* Arif Kamal is a former Ambassador of Pakistan

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or to deny it the dividends that are built into the very opening of the great

landmass of Central Asia and the Caucuses to Europe and the Indian

Ocean. Furthermore, NATO presence in the region faces competition

from Russia and China, which casts doubt upon its sustainability. The

‘New Great Game,’ being played out on Iran’s northern flanks, therefore,

presents both challenges as well as opportunities that are critical to the

country’s current strategic environment as it confronts, in parallel, the

sanctions’ regime imposed by the US after the 1979 Revolution.

‘The New Great Game’ in the contemporary Eurasian scene is a

replay of the 19th century contest for advantage in the region. The old

actors, Czarist Russia and Imperial Britain, have been replaced by the

US-led coalition with a sizeable West European interest on the one

side, and, on the other by Russia (as well as China). The competing

players do share common ground on the perceived threat emanating

from ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’ in the backdrop of 9/11. However,

the game as it emerges today, essentially relates to control over energy

resources, development and pricing, and supply routes that are vital to

the Western economies. It has already set in motion NATO’s active

engagement, both economic and military, with newly independent states

in the region, and has led to an evolving response from Russia and China

that smacks of a neo-Cold War in the making. Concurrently, the contest

holds the promise of greater openings in trade to and from Central Asia

and of its long-term development. In the scenario, Iran ought to be seen

as the foremost gatepost in the neighbourhood and thus very much in

the fall-out range.

To recall, NATO’s ascent in Central Asia was at first identified

with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Programme started

in the mid-1990s and later with the high visibility gained with its

military presence. The alliance has, since 2003, successfully negotiated

military transit agreements and other support arrangements with several

Central Asian governments in order to linkup with its operational bases

in Afghanistan. It is now designated as an area of NATO’s “special

focus.”1

The core US objectives in Central Asia relate to “securing access

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to energy resources”2 (energy supply routes in more specifi c terms),

besides efforts to limit ‘terrorism’ and ‘Islamic extremism,’ as well as

promote human rights and democracy. The primacy of energy in its

agenda is based on the premise that, in the coming decades, energy

scarcity and manipulation are likely to become the most likely causes

of armed confl ict in the European theatre and the surrounding region.

In this context, NATO has a new “expanded role in energy security”3

and, towards this end, is forging strategic partnership equations with the

energy-rich states in Central Asia and the Caucuses.

The focal points of the Western interest to-date are the evolving

route maps of energy supply to Europe, whether potential or actualized,

and the investments that come in the way. Interestingly, these ventures

rest upon the premise of minimizing the Russian and Iranian connections

and thus denying these geographically contiguous powers any leverage

they could possibly exercise. The case in point is the BTC pipeline,

“designed to challenge Russian hegemony over energy in the Caspian

region”4 and already regarded a success story. It “relives Azerbaijan from

dependence on Russia”5 and brings dividends to Azerbaijan as well as

Europe. Similarly, the option to carry Turkmen gas to the Indian Ocean

via western Afghanistan, by-passing Iran, has been in the offi ng for quite

some time. It would serve “as a symbol and milestone”6 analogous to the

window that BTC is already providing. These developments are seen as

“a help to break the Russian and Iranian energy transit monopoly.”7

Conversely, Russia’s drive in the region aims at enforcing its role as

the source and conduit of energy supply to Europe. Moscow’s economic

goals extend to ensuring that its fi rms participate in developing the

region’s natural resources and the “Central Asian oil and gas exporters

continue to use Russian pipelines.”8 In pursuing the objectives, it would

like to maximize its inherent geographical advantage and interdependence

from the Soviet era, including transport infrastructure for oil, gas and

electricity. Concurrently, Russia continues to increase, in qualitative

terms, its military activity in Central Asia around the erstwhile nucleus

it inherited from the Soviet era.

The evolving Russian posture in the contemporary setting relates

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to “restoring Moscow’s infl uence”9 in the region as a matter of priority

rather than acquiesce with its exclusion. (Interestingly, President Putin

is reported to have described the Soviet Union’s collapse as one of the

greatest catastrophes of the 20th century”).10 Russia’s message across the

board in Central Asia is to caution against the US presence as a major

source of instability, in the wake of its drive for ‘democratization’ and

‘human rights,’ and to call for greater interdependence within the region

to ward off US pressure.

The resurgence of Russia–China ‘community of interest’ in check-

mating the American inroads into Central Asia, even though in low key,

is a phenomena of considerable interest. Both have shared an ‘unease

at the elevated US deployment’11 in Central Asia since 2001 and have

cooperated to “reduce the US infl uence in the region.”12 Besides the

traditional Russian stakes, a newer driving force in the direction is

China’s growing energy needs and efforts to acquire greater assets in

the fi eld. Their leverage to prevent US encroachment into the spheres

of infl uence would enlarge as they accrue more Central Asian energy

assets. Contrary to earlier projections, the post-Soviet era Central Asia

is “not an object of rivalry”13 between Moscow and Beijing but ‘rather a

major unifying element’ in their relationship.

An overarching objective in the Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership

(1996) and its culmination in the Good Neighbourly Treaty of Friendship

(2001) (‘love thy neighbour camaraderie’14), is to ‘limit US infl uence in

Central Asian geo-politics.’15 This came to the fore with the 2005 Sino-

Russian military exercises, seen as a ‘grand affair’ that took place to the

exclusion of US troops even though located in proximate bases. In the

current scenario, the Shanghai process has emerged as a fl ag-carrier of

the new direction. The process though initially precipitated by a drive

against ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism,’ is now vital from the standpoint of

its core participants: energy-rich Central Asians, and from the agenda

that can take shape from a Sino-Russian convergence of interests.16 The

SCO summit (2005) caused a stir when it called the US and its allies

“to set a timetable for their military withdrawal”17 from the region. The

non-renewal of the US base in Uzbekistan in the period was indeed a

test case in this regard.

Essay


What does the contemporary Eurasian scene signify for Iran and

its security preoccupations? The region’s proven oil and gas reserves18

are indeed tempting and perceived important as a strong alternative to

the Persian Gulf energy.19 It offers the possibility to ‘reduce the West’s

perennial vulnerability to price increases and threatened cut-offs.’ The

West is not ready to overlook the potential threat from political turmoil or

terrorist threat in the Middle East and from the vulnerability of the Straits

of Hormous, the lifeline of oil fl ow from the Gulf. “The use of energy as

an overt weapon” is no more seen as theoretical.20 Only a halt in Iran’s

export of 3.5 million barrels a day carries the potential of destabilizing

the world energy market.21 In more specifi c terms, a contracting interest

in Iran as a viable energy source even though a distant possibility, raises

questions regarding Iran’s economic security. Secondly, the development

of Eurasian energy potential and related infrastructure would not be

unwelcome in the contemporary globalized environment. However,

Iran’s exclusion in an expanded development, especially related to

infrastructure linkup with Europe, would run counter to the country’s

long-term interest. It is therefore, in Iran’s benefi t to avail opportunities

to participate in Central Asian infrastructure development projects, even

as a minor investor, so as to keep its foothold in the arena, work towards

eroding the US sanctions regime and thus relieve pressures. The ‘Great

Game’ in which Russia and China are players, also holds the promise of

dividends for Iran as a gatepost.

NATO’s operation on Iran’s northern fl ank has unfolded a mix

of the alliance’s ‘soft power’ (expressed in funding through the Euro

Atlantic Partnership Programme) and ‘hard power’ (military bases/

transit facilities) in line with activation of its energy–related interests.

The military presence, though ostensibly a bridgehead for Afghanistan,

tends to accentuate Iran’s fears arising from the US policy of containment.

The northern factor, however small and transient, remains fl agged

in the wake of the massive US presence in Afghanistan and Iraq and

operational bases in the Gulf. At least on the psychological level, this

acquires particular signifi cance amidst the oft-repeated possibility of

surgical strikes against Iran’s nuclear installations.

Threat perceptions, whether rhetorical or real, have fuelled the fi re of

Essay


turbulent relations between Iran and the West, particularly the US, in the

past decades since 1979. The Islamic Revolution was regarded a strategic

loss22 to the West’s primary interests in relation to Middle Eastern oil

and Israel’s defence. The fears of what is seen as the country’s role in

promoting ‘terrorism’ and now the focus on the nuclear programme, are

only sequential to this concern. In the long journey through the sanctions’

regime, Iran has been viewed as the “single country that may pose the

greatest danger to US interest.”23 This, in turn, has convinced the US

about the need to clip Iran’s wings and pursue a policy of containment.

The US policy of containment that overshadowed Iran’s security

environment since 1979, is indeed up for a ‘reality-check’ so as to

gauge its potency in the contemporary scene. Since the unfolding of the

Islamic Revolution, Iran’s relations with the West and its proxies in the

neighbourhood have been turbulent. The country “felt politically isolated,

insecure and, above all, threatened24” in the backdrop of its exposure to

WMD-capable Iraq, an unstable region and lack of international support.

Almost three decades later, however, ‘most conditions have changed in

Iran’s favour.’25 Hopes for a change of regime have faded away. With

the demise of al-Baath, there is no real threat to Iranian security from

Iraq. In contrast to past decades, Iran enjoys good relations with most of

the states within the region (Israel excluded) and is establishing growing

economic relations with major powers. The sanctions’ regime has not

bought about the isolation of Iran that was intended.

Ironically, the containment of Iran carried with it the seeds of

reverse effect as well. Iran has been the greatest though un-intended,

benefi ciary of the US ventures in Afghanistan and Iraq: the fall of the

Salfi -driven Taliban and of the Saddam-led Al-Baath. The collapse of

the rivals on both fl anks had, in turn, opened fl ood gates of Iranian

infl uence beyond the traditional realm.26 It also generated fears amongst

the status quo forces regarding the so-called Shia Crescent which, in

effect, transcends the sectarian divide.27 There is a climatic change: Iran

is acknowledged and respected as a regional player,28 not just feared or

dismissed as a coordinate point of radical forces. Rather than isolate

and put the ‘squeeze’ on Iran, it would serve Washington’s interests

more, if it pursues the opposite policy. Through co-opting Tehran, the

Essay


US would be better placed to unknot the Iraqi quagmire and to stabilize

Afghanistan so as to thwart the resurgence of the Taliban.

The potency of any particular threat from the north is perceptibly

marginal in the overall containment scenario faced by Iran. Moreover,

it carries greater inbuilt safety valves when compared with other fl anks.

First, Iran’s geographic disposition and its position as the region’s point

of access to the outside world is indeed greater and more enduring

than what any contrary assessment may like to project. Second, this

advantage is re-enforced by institutional arrangements29 which now

extend to coordination and response to encroachments that come from

extra-regional forces. Iran’s entry as an observer in the Shanghai process,

besides being a member of the Economic Cooperation Organization and

the club of Caspian region, adds to the strength30 of the argument that it

is relevant to contemporary security concerns in the region. Third, an

organic linkage between ‘Russian resurgence’ and its ‘strategic stakes’

in Iran is indeed a vital factor in the current scenario.31 The competing

interests of Russia (and of China) in Eurasia provide Iran suffi cient time

and space to increase its economic engagement in the region, specially

a foothold in energy-related infrastructure investment, and thus, further

erode the impact of the sanctions’ regime.

The American sanctions regime already suffers from fatigue and

erosion32 and therefore, newer steps unfolded in the direction are out

of touch with reality. The US pronouncements and actions vis-à-vis

Iran, though impregnated with negative images, continue to carry

acknowledgement of the country’s important standing as a repository

of the third largest oil and second largest gas reserves in the world and

its ‘central location between Asian and European markets.33 Today, the

prime interest for stability in the oil-bearing region would be best served

through a better understanding of the Iranian situation on three counts:

First, Iran is now a front-ranking regional power in spite of the sanction-

ridden history. Second, what Iran seeks today is recognition of this status

rather than exporting revolution. The nuclear issue ought to be seen as

one major denominator of this urge. Third, isolation of the Iranians is

likely to push them back to the psyche of the post-revolutionary period,

which should be avoided. Notwithstanding the neo-conservative mindset

Essay


and Israeli interests, it is important from the standpoint of American

interests to have a re-engagement with Iran even though incremental,

and to benefi t from the Iranian factor in assuring long-term stability in

the region. This may come in time with the increasing US need to fi nd

an ‘exit strategy’ from Iraq and for that, a reduction of tensions with Iran

would be needed.34

The Russia-China convergence of interests in response to NATO’s

expansion in Eurasia and their appreciation of Iran’s standing, is indeed

a source of strength for the Iranian endeavour to look beyond the ‘era of

containment.’ This also raises questions about the very sustainability of

NATO’s presence in the region. Iran can hopefully rely upon this factor

as a balancer while factoring in the need for a future reconciliation with

the US.

References:

1 Richard Weitz, “Averting a New Great Game in Central Asia”, The Washington Quarterly,

(Summer 2006), pp. 155-167.

2 Ibid.

3 U.S Sen. Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Dick Lungar, “Lungar Speech in

Advance of NATO Summit”, The Power and Interest News Report, (November 22,

2006).

4 Michael Piskur, “The B.T.C Pipeline and the Increasing Importance of Energy Supply

Routs”, (The Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, August 8,

2006).

5 Nicklas Norling and Niklas Swanstrom, “The Virtues and Potential Gains of Continental

Trade in Eurasia”, Asian Survey, Vol. XLVII, No. 3, (May/June 2007).

6 Ibid.

7 Ariel Cohen, “US Interests and Central Asia Energy Security”, Backgrounder # 1984,

(The Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, November 15,

2006).


(Summer 2006), pp. 155-167.



Essay


2006).


(Summer 2006), pp.155-167.

11 Ibid.



2006)


(Summer 2006), pp.155-167.

14 Priyanka Singh, “Russia and China Joint War Games: What Lies Beneath?”, (September

8, 2005): http://www.ipcs.org/China_east_asia_articles2.jsp?action=showView&kValue

=1848&keyArticle=1009&issue=1009&status=article&mod=a

15 Ibid.

16 Rukmani Gupta, “The SCO: Challenging US Pre-eminence?”, (June 20, 2006): http://

www.ipcs.org/China_east_asia_articles2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2056&issue=1

009&status=article&keyArticle=1009&mod=b


(Summer 2006), pp.155-167.

18 According to the Energy Information Administration of the United States, Kazakhstan’s

proven oil reserves amount to 40 billion barrels per day whereas her natural gas reserves

range between 65-100 T cf. Proven oil reserves of Caspian region in totality range from

17-49 billion barrels per day and its natural gas reserves currently amount to 232 T cf.

Persian Gulf region, on the other hand possesses oil reserves of 728 billion barrels per

day i.e. 55% of world’s proven oil reserves, whereas its Natural gas reserves currently

stand at 2509 T cf i.e. over 40% of world’s total natural gas reserves



2006)

20 U.S Sen. Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Dick Lungar, “Lungar Speech in

Advance of NATO Summit”, The Power and Interest News Report, (November 22,

2006).

21 Tariq Fatemi, “Is US determined to attack Iran”?, Dawn Newspaper, (February 18,

2006).

22 Dr. Subhash Kapila, “Iran: United States - Strategic Options Re Examined”, South Asia

Analysis Group, (April 18, 2007): http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers23%5Cpaper2213.

html.

23 Jim Saxton, “Iran’s Gas and Oil Wealth”, The Joint Economic Committee Study of United

States Congress, (March 2006)

Essay


24 James E. Doyle and Sara Kutchesfahani, “Time for a US/Iran Patch up”, (March 21,

2006): http://www.carnegieendowment.org/fi les/LosAlamos_Iran.pdf.

25 Ibid.

26 Geoffrey Kemp, “Iran and Iraq: The Shia Connection, Soft Power and the Nuclear

Factor”, Special Report 156, (November 2005): http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/

sr156.pdf.

27 The term “Shia Crescent” has been used by Jordan’s King Abdullah twice during 2004-

2006 to denote the expanding Iranian infl uence among states and non-state actors in West

Asia. A convergence of interest amongst the non-state actors across the sectarian divide,

was repeatedly expressed in the period: e.g Hizbullah and Hamas shared fora to mobilize

political support. Similarly, Iraq’s Shia leader Muqtada Sadr proclaimed himself as the

“beating arm of both Hamas and Hisbullah….” (Khutba at Kufa Grand Mosque during

2004 revolt in Faluja).

28 Ray Takeyh and Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Pragmatism in the Midst of Iranian Turmoil”,

The Washington Quarterly, (The Centre for Strategic and International Studies and the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Autumn 2004)

29 Priyanka Singh, “Russia and China Joint War Games: What Lies Beneath?”, (September

8, 2005): http://www.ipcs.org/China_east_asia_articles2.jsp?action=showView&kValue

=1848&keyArticle=1009&issue=1009&status=article&mod=a.

30 Rukmani Gupta, “The SCO: Challenging US Pre-eminence?”, (June 20, 2006): http://

www.ipcs.org/China_east_asia_articles2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2056&issue=1

009&status=article&keyArticle=1009&mod=b.

31 Dr. Subhash Kapila, “Iran: United States - Strategic Options Re Examined”, South Asia

Analysis Group, (April 18, 2007): http://www.saag.org/%5Cpapers23%5Cpaper2213.

html.

32 Lt Col Robert C. Dooley, “Iran: Threat or Opportunity? A Selective Economic Engagement

Strategy Proposal”, (Washington: National Defence University, National War College:

http://www.ndu.edu/library/n4/n045601I.pdf.

33 For insights into the American view of the Iranian potential, see: “Iran’s Gas and Oil

Wealth”, The Joint Economic Committee Study of United States Congress, (March

2006).

34 For a fuller review of the subject, see International Crisis Group, “Iran in Iraq: How much

Infl uence?” (March 2005, Brussels)

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