e Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare Volume 11 Issue 2 June Article 2 June 1984 Critical Criminology, Traditional Crime, and Public Policy Ronald C. Kramer Western Michigan University Follow this and additional works at: hps://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw Part of the Criminology Commons , Public Policy Commons , and the Social Work Commons is Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Social Work at ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Recommended Citation Kramer, Ronald C. (1984) "Critical Criminology, Traditional Crime, and Public Policy," e Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 11 : Iss. 2 , Article 2. Available at: hps://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol11/iss2/2
Transcript
The Journal of Sociology & Social WelfareVolume 11Issue 2 June Article 2
June 1984
Critical Criminology, Traditional Crime, and PublicPolicyRonald C. KramerWestern Michigan University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw
Part of the Criminology Commons, Public Policy Commons, and the Social Work Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Social Work atScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please [email protected].
Recommended CitationKramer, Ronald C. (1984) "Critical Criminology, Traditional Crime, and Public Policy," The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol.11 : Iss. 2 , Article 2.Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol11/iss2/2
CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY, TRADITIONAL CRIME,AND PUBLIC POLICY
RONALD C. KRAMERWestern Michigan University
ABSTRACT
Critical criminologists have oftenignored the serious problem of traditionalor common street crime. As a result, crimeprevention policy has been forfeited to thepolitical right or to those who advocateineffective liberal reforms. This paperargues that critical criminology can make acontribution to the formulation of publicpolicy concerning traditional crime.Recent theoretical developments within thecriitical perspective on crime, as.well asa variety of supporting data, are reviewedand specific policy recommendations toreduce traditional crime are offered.These progressive recommendations cons-titute an important alternative to theindividualistic approaches (liberal orconservative) which now dominate crimeprevention policy.
Until very recently, most criticalcriminologists, and the political left ingeneral, have not paid sufficient attentionto the problem of traditional crime. There
are a variety of reasons for this neglectas Greenberg (1981) has pointed out. Whatconcerns me here are not the reasons, butthe consequences. The most importantconsequence of this neglect has been theforfeiture of crime prevention policy toconservative forces. To many progressivecriminologists this is an unacceptablesituation. Traditional street crime is aserious social problem in our society. Bywhatever measure, there appears to be moreof this -crime than most of us are willingto tolerate.
A related reason for progressives to beconcerned about traditional crime concernsthe victims of these offenses. LEAAvictimization surveys have found that thehighest incidence of violent and propertycrime is "among the poor and unemployed,specifically, the superexploited sectors ofthe working class" (Platt, 1978). Thus,the most likely victims of traditionalcrime are those the political left sees asits primary constituency; the workingclass, the poor, and minorities. Even -ifthe members of the working class are notvictimized directly by street crime, thefear of such crime erodes the quality oflife undermining collective solidarity inworking class neighborhoods. As Gross(1982) has recently suggested, the leftmust take seriously popular anxiety aboutcrime and link these anxieties to progress-ive political positions.
A number of recent works by criticalcriminologists (Platt, 1978; 1982; Taylor,1981;1982; Gross, 1982; Browning, 1982;Bute, 1982; Currie, 1982; Michalowski,1982) indicate a new willingness to face upto the question of what "causes"traditional criminal acts, and the issue ofhow best to control or prevent these acts.This development is especially important
-253-
given the repeated failures of crimecontrol policy based on individualisticperspectives which attempt to eitherrepress individual offenders of "cure"them.
This paper reviews recent theoreticaldevelopments within the critical crimin-ology perspective, along with some sup-porting empirical evidence, and thensuggests specific policy recommendations toreduce traditional crime. Thus, the paperis an attempt to contribute to the ongoingpolicy debate concerning crime preventionby suggesting some progressive alternativesto current practices.
CAPITALISM, CLASS STRUCTURE, ANDTRADITIONAL CRIME
The critical criminology perspective isrooted in Marxist social theory. One ofthe strengths of Marxist theory is itsinsistence that any social phenomenon mustbe examined within the context of ahistorically emergent social totality.Crime, therefore, must be analyzed in thecontext of its relationship to the struc-ture of society as a whole. Mainstreamcriminological theory in general does notdo this. Instead, mainstream theoriesfocus on the attributes of individuals orthe immediate social settings of theseindividuals. As David Greenberg (1981:17)points out concerning these theories:
The society itself rarely appears.The possibility that its organization- its way of producing and distribut-ing material goods, and of organizingits political and legal institutions,for example - might have majorimplications for the amount and kindsof crime present in a society, as well
as for the character of its crimecontrol apparatus, is not evenconsidered.
Critical criminology, as a generaltheoretical principle, asserts that crimeis based in class conflict and thestructured inequalities of class society.The class divisions and their associatedforms of inequality under advancedcapitalism, therefore, generate the problemof traditional crime. The criticalperspective, however, must not fall intothe trap of merely asserting that there isa relationship between the social formationof capitalism, especially its political andeconomic structure, and traditional crimewithout specifying what the linkages arebetween the larger social order and crimin-al behavior.
This section of the paper reviews,theory and research on the concrete waysthe political economy of advanced capit-alism generates crime. Four specifictopics are examined: 1) the surpluspopulation which is produced under theconditions of late capitalism; 2) struc-tured unemployment; 3) income inequalityand relative deprivation; and 4) captial-isim and the destruction of cooperativesocial relationships.
The Surplus Population
From the critical criminology perspec-tive, "An understanding of crime in oursociety begins with the recognition thatthe crucial phenomenon to be considered isnot crime, per se, but the historicaldevelopment and operation of capitalistsociety" (Quinney, 1980:39). An under-standing of the emergence and reproductionof class divisions and their associated
-255-
forms of inequality are especially impor-tant in this regard. To explain tradi-tional crime, in particular, we first needto see how the historical development ofcapitalism creates a surplus population oreconomic underclass which commits crimepartially as a response to problems ofsurvival and the brutalization of sociallife.
Marxist social theory provides astarting point for an analysis of thehistorical development of the politicaleconomy of capitalism. Marxism breaks withphilosophical idealism and insists that aproper understanding of human action mustbegin with the existing material conditionsand social relationships of people.Marxist theory, thus, starts with ananalysis of the forces and social relationsof production and moves on to examine thedialectical relationship between the modeof production and the other cultural andsocial structures of a society. Marxismanalyzes society as a social formation, anarticulated totality of economy, state,ideology, and so on.
Immanent change is a fundamental char-acteristicof social formations due to thecontradictions which exist within them.These Lcontradictions are both necessaryfor, and yet destructive of, these forma-tions. The existence of classes and classstruggle is the fundamental contradictionof capitalist society. According to Marx,class it not an attribute of an individualor group; it is a social relationship.Classes are constituted by the socialrelations of production. Under capitalismthese class relations are inherently ex-ploitative and unstable. The existence ofclasses implies class struggle and classstruggle implies change. As Quinney(1980:45) notes, "All past history that
involves the development of capitalism isthe history of class struggle."
This class struggle is carried on, ofcourse, between workers and owners,proletarians and capitalists. But classdivisions are also more complex. InCApilal, Marx, (1867) introduced the terms"relative redundant population" and"industrial reserve army" in his analysisof the effect of the growth of capital onthe working class. As Greenberg (1981:6.2)notes:
Marx argued that capitalists respondto the posibility of rising wages byintroducing machinery that displacesworkers. The ratio of constantcapital (machinery, raw materials) tovariable capital (wages) thus tends torise. Workers who lose their jobs inthis process, or who are never hiredin the first place, constitute therelative redundant, surplus popula-tion. Marx goes on to argue that theexistence of this population furtherdepresses wages, since employedworkers can be replaced by members ofthe "industrial reserve army" if theydemand excessive wages.
Capitalism, therefore, systematicallygenerates a "surplus population", an"unemployed sector of the working classeither dependent on fluctuations in theeconomy or made obsolete by new technology"(Quinney, 1980:55). This surplus popula-tion or economic underclass lives undersocial, economic, and political conditionswhich can be described as devastating (TimeMagazine, 1977, Auletta, 1982). It is herein the marginalized, demoralized, and superexploited sector of the working class thattraditional crime often takes root andflourishes.
It has long been noted by crimin-ologists that there is a strong rela-tionship between social class andcriminality (as measured in officialstatistics). Despite the attempt of someAmerican criminologists to prove that thisrelationship is a myth (Tittle, Villemez,and Smith, 1978), the bulk of the evidencecontinues to show that lower class peopledo commit traditional crime at a muchhigher rate than other classes. AsBraithwaite (1981:38) points out, "... ithas been demonstrated, with a degree ofconsistency which is unusual in socialscience, that lower class people, andpeople living in lower class areas, havehigher official crime rates than othergroups."
Critical criminologists argue thatpredatory crimes, such as burglary,robbery, drug dealing, and hustling, areoften pursued by the members of the surpluspopulation out of the need to survive. AsPlatt (1978:30) notes, "For this populationthe economic conditions of life areunusually desperate and degrading. Thehigh level of property crime and pettyhustlers cannot be separated from theproblems of survival."
The surplus population is also heavilyinvolved in intra-class acts of inter-personal violence, as well as increasinglycross-class acts of violence. Rape,assault, child and wife beating, andhomicide result from the brutalization anddemoralization of life conditions for thesurplus population. As Quinney (1980:61)observes, these "...conventional criminalacts ... are pursued by those who arealready brutalized by the conditions ofcapitalism."
-258-
While the life conditions of thesurplus population under advanced capital-ism are undoubtably related to criminalbehavior, there are other, more specific,factors to be considered if we are todeepen our understanding of the relation-ship between social order and traditionalcrime.
Structural Unemployment
One of the most significant of theadverse conditions facing the surpluspopulation is a deep rooted and pervasivelevel of structural unemployment. Struc-tural unemployment, of course, also in-creasingly effects millions in the skilledworking class and service oriented middleclass as well. High levels of unemploymenthave a very strong relationship to asvariety of social problems, including, ofcourse, traditional street crime. AsMichalowski (1983:16) notes, "One of themost enduring pieces of data about streetcrinme is that they are overwhelmingly com-mitted by the unemployed and under-employed."
The evidence linking traditional crimeto unemployment is impressive. In a seriesof brilliant studies, M. Harvey Brenner(1975, 1976) has shown that between 1920-3.940 and 1947-1973, in the United States,Canada, England, Wales, and Scotland, therehas been a significant direct relationshipbetween unemployment and a wide variety ofmeasures of criminal activity.
Brenner's research is not limited to anexamination of the relationship betweenunemployment and crime. He has also demon-strated, in a study of New York mentalpatients over a period of 127 years, thatthe only significant factor accounting for
the rise and fall in admissions to mentalhospitals is employment (Brenner, 1973).In addition, he has shown that such diversephenomena as cardiovascular disease, suic-ide, and child abuse are correlated mosthighly with unemployment rates. Brenner,however, makes the strongest claims regard-ing the existence of significant causalimpacts of the economy on traditionalcrime. In a report to the Joint EconomicCommittee of the U.S. Congress, Brenner(1975) argued that a 1.4% rise in unem-ployment during 1970 was "directly respon-sible" for 7,660 state prison admissionsand 1,740 homicides. Later in the samestudy, he concludes that a 1% increase inunemployment sustained over six years wouldbe associated with. approximately 3,340admissions to state prisons.
Other recent studies corroborateBrenner's findings, for example, the U.S.Bureau of Prisons has reported a correl-ation of .77 between their inmate popula-tion and the unemployment rate for 15months earlier over a 20 year period. TheBureau's report (1975) argues that unem-ployment can be shown to be an effectivepredictor (if not cause) of the crime rate.Phillips, Votey, and Maxwell (1972:503)have demonstrated through the methods ofeconometrics that a "...labor force/not-in-the-labor force formulation has greaterexplanatory power than the not workingformulation, demonstrating the importanceof participation rates relative to unem-ployment rates in explaining crime rates."This is because unemployment rates under-estimate the actual number of people out ofwork. Thus, labor force participation maybe a crucial element in "... explainingcrime because participation rates capturelong-term trends as opposed to cyclical,short-run fluctuations that are more likelyto be reflected by unemployment rates"
ployment and traditional crime can also belinked to the notion of a structurallygenerated "surplus population" by way of"segmented labor market theories." Conven-tional economics uses a "human capital"theory to explain labor market success andcrime (labor market failure). This model,of course, hypothesizes that potentialoffenders behave like rational economicactors. That is, they choose between legaland illegal options after weighing thecosts and benefits of each. This modelalso argues that labor market success isrelated to individual differences inproductivity. Productive workers, ofcourse, are rewarded with jobs and highwages. Workers become more productive byacquiring a stock of human capital(education, training skills, work exper-ience). In this pro-foundly individual-istic view, workers who fail to "invest"their time acquiring human capital will beforced to settle for low wage jobs orunemployment. Crime, then, is a rationaleconomic decision which can be deterred byiDcreasing the costs (punishment) to theindividual.
Segmented labor market theories, on theother hand, argue that the source ofstructural unemployment and chronic povertylies in the heavy constraints exerted onindividuals by structural economic condi-tions. As Doeringer and Piore (1975:72)point out, "...the problem of unemploymentis rooted less in individual behavior (thefailure to acquire human capital) than inthe character of institutions and thesocial patterns that derive from them."Segmented labor market theories see capit-alist economies as divided into two dis-tinct markets. The primary market offersjobs with high wages, good working con-ditions, stability, security, and oppor-tunity for advancement. The secondary
-262-
(Thompson, Sviridoff, and McElroy,1981:52).
How can the empirical relationshipbetween joblessness and crime be explained.First and Foremost, critical criminologistspoint out that unemployment enhances theattractiveness of crime as a source ofincome. As Michalowski (1983:16) notes,unemployment "...depresses wages to thelevel that some prefer crime over seekingout low-paying jobs, while increasing thetemptation to commit crime for those whoare unemployed or able to find onlysporadic or part-time work." Second,Michalowski (1983:17) argues that unemploy-ment:
...tends to isolate individuals fromfull integration into the society,thus weakening the social bond betweenthe individual and the society. Thus,even where individuals are not indesperate economic situation, theirmarginalization provides fertileground for the growth of criminalincentives.
In addition, Michalowski notes that theexpectations of unemployment among youthwho have not yet sought jobs can producethe same sense of marginalization.Finally, Michalowski (1983:17) points out:
"...the loss of self-worth associatedwith being without work is often abasis for a generalized anger whichcan find its expression in crime andviolence, when it is not turned inwardthrough such things as depression,addiction, mental illness, andalcoholism."
At the theoretical level, thesefindings on the relationship between unem-
sector has jobs which are decidedly lessattractive. According to Piore (1977:94)"They tend to involve low wages, poorworking conditions, considerable variab-ility in employment, harsh and arbitrarydiscipline, and little opportunity toadvance. The poor are confined to thesecondary labor market."
It is the existence of dual orsegmented labor markets under advancedcapitalism that generates the surpluspopulation. The structural unemploymentand under-employment of the secondary labormarket breeds the social conditionsconducive to traditional crime described byMichalowski. Under such a view, crimeprevention policies should not be directedtoward individuals (increasing the costs ofillegal behavior), but instead toward theeconomic and political structure whichgenerates illegal behavior. As Thompson,Sviridoff, and McElroy (1981:19) pointout:
The disagreement between conventionaleconomics and the SLM theories is notso much over whether individual labormarket participants, especially thepoor, are acting "rationally" incommitting crime, but over whether itis necessary to account for an arrayof structural, institutional, organi-zational features of the economy inorder to arrive at a satisfactoryexplanation of economic behavior.
Structured Inequality and RelativeDeprivation
Thus far, it has been argued thattraditional crime is rooted in the polit-ical economy of advanced capitalistsociety. The class structure and segmentedlabor market of capitalist society system-
atically generates a surplus populationwhich is faced with structured unemploymentand chronic poverty and turns to crime aseither a means for survival or as aresponse to the brutalized social condi-tions of life it experiences. While thistheoretical statement constitutes a strongexplanation for traditional crime, itremains incomplete. To this statement wemust now add the concepts of structuredincome inequality and relative deprivation.
There is a growing body of empiricalevidence which shows a high correlationbetween income inequality and officialrates of crime. What is especially inter-esting to note about this research is thatis reveals a direct relationship betweenincome inequality and rates of violentcrime, as well as rates of property crime.For example, Messner (1980), in a cross-national study, demonstrates a significanteffect of income inequality on societalmurder rates. As he puts it (1980:193),"The data, in short, indicate that highmurder rates tend to accompany high levelsof inequality in the distribution ofincome." Furthermore, when Messner entereda measure of the overall affluence orpoverty of the population into theregression equation, the effects of theinequality variable did not disappear. Inan earlier, less sophisticated cross-national study, McDonald (1976) also founda positive association between incomeinequality and the murder rate.
Research on income distribution andcrime rates within the United Statessupports the proposition that incomeinequality is a significant determinant ofserious criminality. Danziger and Wheeler(1975:113) used an econometric model totest the hypothesis that "...shifts towarda greater degree of inequality in the
-264-
distribution of income and increases in theabsolute level of income when the distrib-ution is constant, are both accompanied bymore crime." They analyzed the UnitedStates for the period 1949-1970 and foundthat "...fluctuations in crime rates aregenerated by changes in the level anddistribution of income in the manner pre-dicted by the theory" (1975:113). Loftinand Hill (1974) present evidence to showthat economic inequality is the mostimportant predictor of homicide rates whenAmerican states are compared. Both Ebertsand Schwirian (1968) and Braithwaite (1979)demonstrate that United States StandardMetropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) witha high level of income inequality have highcrime rates. In a more recent study, Blauand Blau (1982:121) present data on the 125largest American SMSAs which show that"...income inequality in a metropolis sub-stantially raises its rate of criminalviolence." They conclude (1982:126) "Highrates of criminal violence are apparentlythe price of racial and economicinequalities.
These studies add an important dimen-sion to our understanding of the relation-ship between economic conditions and crime.It is the distribution of income whichappears to be the primary variable whichexplains this relationship. Poverty, perse, does not explain traditional crime. Itis the degree of inequality which is theimportant factor here, not the size of thepoverty population. The crimes of thepoor, therefore, may be less a matter ofsurvival than of relative deprivation. AsBraithwaite (1979:216-217) notes this is afinding of some theoretical significance:
The finding that the size of the gapbetween the average income earner andpoor families is correlated with
-265-
crime, but not the number who, arepoor, is of considerable theoreticalimportance. It may be that, whenthere are only a small number of poor'families in a city, these familiesfeel a far more acute sense of missingout on the benefits of the GreatSociety than do poor families who arein cities where they are surrounded bymany other families in exactly thesame plight. Policies that reduce thenumber of poor people should certainlyreduce the propensity to crime ofthose people lifted out of poverty,but do they at the same time createeven greater despair, frustration, andcriminality amongst those who remainpoor?
The importance -of the concept ofrelative deprivation in explanations of therelationship between economic factors andcrime was recognized as far back as thetime of Quetelet and Guerry (Messner,1980). Marxian criminologists have madeuse of the concept too. Bonger (1916:91)pointed out that, "it is not the totalamount of wealth, but the manner of itsdistribution that bears most importantlyupon criminality." In summary of Bonger'swork, Austin Turk (19'69.11) commented:"The potency of economic want as a factorin crime causation is mainly determined bywhether or not poverty is experienced asrelative deprivation, in a social context(capitalism) wherein people are taught toequate economic advantage with intrinsicsuperiority and disadvantage withinferiority."
Much of the literature on relativedeprivation and crime suggests that thisformulation can best be used to explainproperty crime. And indeed, there is aconsiderable amount of empirical evidence
to support this proposition (Chester,1976). However, many of the studiesreviewed above demonstrate that there is astrong relationship between incomeinequality, relative deprivation, and ratesof violent crime too. As Blau and Blau(1982:122) point out "...the relativedeprivation produced by much inequalityrather than the absolute deprivationproduced by much poverty provides the mostfertile soil for criminal violence." Thesocial process inferred by Blau and Blau isthat inequality creates alienation,despair, and pent-up aggression which isoften expressed in acts of criminalviolence. As they note (1982:119):
Ascriptive socioeconomic inequalitiesundermine the social integration of acommunity by creating multiple para-llel social differences which widenthe separations between ethnic groupsand between social classes, and itcreates a situation characterized bymuch social disorganization andprevalent latent animosities. Pronoun-ced ethnic inequality in resourcesimplies that there are great richeswithin view, but not within reach ofmany people destined to live inpoverty. There is much resentment,frustration, hopelessness, and alien-ation.
From the critical perspective, thesestructured inequalities which result inperceptions of relative deprivation arerooted in the political economy ofcapitalist society. Thus, only radicalsocial structural change can reduce thelevel of inequality and hence reduce thelevel of crime. Before this suggestion andother crime prevention policies which flowfrom a Marxist analysis of crime can bediscussed, however, it is important to
-267-
examine one final dimension of theperspective's approach to crime causation.
The Destruction of Cooperative SocialRelationships and Community
The structural level forces we havebeen examining must be the starting pointfor any analysis of crime, as the criticalperspective rightly insists. There are,however, other levels of analysis that mustalso be considered. Paul Friday (1981:191)argues that theories of crime tend to focuson one of three possible levels: Thestructural level, the system level, and theindividual level. Structural leveltheories, such as Marxism, attempt toexplain crime as -a product of forcesexternal to the individual and beyond hisor her control. Political economy, struc-tural unemployment, and income inequalityare examples of structural level forces.System level theories explain crime as afunction of social institutions such as thefamily, peer groups, community organ-izations, and schools. As Friday(1981:191) points out: "Each of thesystemforces are directly related to structuralconditions., but the individual has someinteraction with a unit of each system, andhas some impact on that unit in turn." Thefinal level is the individual level, whichconsists of theories which focus on theconditions surrounding the act itself.
An adequate theory of crime, and onethat will have the greatest policy implica-tions, is one which succeeds in integratingthese levels, demonstrating the linkagesbetween them. As Friday (1981:192) notes"Explanations which have been restricted toonly one level of analysis have limitedutility." The Marxist explanation ofcrime, therefore, cannot remain forever on
-Z67-
the structural level. The theory mustexplain how larger political and economicstructures impact on systems levelinstitutions and on individuals. While thestructural forces discussed above are thecenterpiece of a Marxist theory of crime,we need to understand how these forces aremediated through other social institutionsand the processes by which these forcesdifferentially shape the conditionssurrounding the individual act. For asFriday (1981:194) points out:
The individual act cannot be explaineddirectly by the urban industrialstructural conditions. These condi-tions, none-the-less, contribute indi-rectly to it by differentially affect-ing the institutions responsible fordeveloping commitments to conformity:the family, school community groups,and work. Forces affecting the crim-inal act at the institutional levelreflect the fact that all societieshave norms and expectations which arelearned through socialization in thefamily, in school, and through vol-untary and neighborhood groups in thecommunity.
Critical criminologists, in general,have been slow to address this issue. Theyare content to remain at the level of thepolitical and economic structure since thesocial formation as a whole is so oftenignored in criminological theory. A fewcritical criminologists, however, havestarted to explore the relationships be-tween the larger structures of society andits "soft" institutions, and the implica-tions of these relationships for crimin-ality. For example, Elliott Currie (1982)has noted the relationship between economicconditions, family life, and developmentaldisturbances. One parent (usually female)
-209-
families, according to Currie (1982:22)"...produce a disproportionate amount ofaggression and violence in children notbecause they have one parent of becausethat parent is a woman, but because theytypically lack enough outside resources,human and material, to insure an adequatedevelopmental environment." The develop-mental disturbances that result in crime,according to Currie, are not attributableto the absence of the father, but to thestresses and lack of support systems thatalter family functioning. "The samedevelopmental damage" argues Currie(1982:22) "is equally likely to take placein two parent families plagued b% severeinternal conflict or abuse."
The family, in other words, is beingbuffeted and often ripped apart by largerstructural conditions such as unemployment,inequality, and alienation. And the impactof such forces is not confined to thefamily, but affects peer relationships,schools, and community organizations, aswell. Under monopoly capitalism, coopera-tive social relationships within thesesocial institutions are destroyed. As TonyPlatt (1978:31) points out:
Monopoly capitalism emiserates in-creasingly larger portions of theworking class and proletarianizes thelower strata of the petty bourgeoisie,degrades workers' skills and compe-tency in the quest for higher product-ivity, and organizes family andcommunity life on the basis of itsmost effective exploitability. itconsequently makes antagonism ratherthan reciprocity the norm of socialrelationships.
Under the political economy of advancedcapitalism, Platt (1978:31) goes on to
argue, "...family and peer relationshipsbecome even more brutal and attenuated."All individual, family, and social needsbecome subordinated to the market andreshaped to serve the needs of capital.Capitalist development results in theatomization of social life and human coop-erative relationships are increasinglyreplaced by impersonal market transactions(Braverman, 1974). These conditions exertenormous pressures and strains on thefamily in particular, and they areprofoundly hostile to all feelings ofcommunity in general Delinquency, vio-lence, and other forms of social pathologyare the direct result of the materialfoundations of cooperative social relations
capitalist s~ociety° As Michalows iLJA ) notes.
The frustraticn, alienation, and senseo competitivencss generated bysocially-structured ineqvu ality mostofter turns the less powerful againstone another either in emulation ofthe predatory, exploitive, and appar-ently rewarding practices of the morepowerful, or in simple expression ofimpotent fury with their lives.Humans do not generally attack theperson or property of those with whomthey feel a sense of community.Inequality, however, tends to destroycommunity, thus making almost anyonefair game to exploit for personal ends
This propensity is fueled by bothideological and material forces whichtend to weaken or even prevent theemergence of any real sense of soli-darity with the working class,
Another dimension to this analysis isadded by T, R. Young (1978). He arguesthat the loss of social standing or social.significance of indJvidualIs under capital-
-271-
ism is the key to understanding traditionalcrime (1978:11):
It is not the poverty of the surpluspopulation which is the interestingdynamic in crime - poor people inJapan and China don't commit crime.The important variable is the loss ofsocial standing (social honor, socialsignificance, social status, Stande orsocial relationships) which is thecentral dynamic. One does not rape,rob, or assault those who have socialstanding in the eyes of the aggressor.
As Young (1978:11) goes on to note:
It is intrinsic to the nature ofcapitalism that- social relationshipsand community be destroyed in asociety. If one has nothing to ex-change in a capitalistic society, oneis not provided goods and services.Social standing depends upon funds -without cash or credit one is deniedstanding by virtue of the rule ofcapitalism: exchange for profit.Community is destroyed as well. Infolk society, the surplus value oflabor is used to provide community inthe form of ceremonies, festivities,games, and other collective endeavor.In capitalism, the surplus value oflabor is appropriated to the capital-ist or tO his/her agent for privateuse rather than communal use....With the loss of socialrelationship and community; with theindividualism of the capitalist mode;with the use of every social good orservice as commodity, the self-centered quest for material wealth wecall call crime proliferates.
As these writings suggest, Marxist or
-272-
critical criminologists are beginning tocome to grips with the question of howstructural forces impact on systems levelinstitutions as part of a complex processof crime causation. The political and eco-nomic structures of capitalist society areviewed as undermining cooperative socialrelationships within the family, peergroups, and the community. These struc-tural forces, thus, differentially affectthe ability of these institutions to effec-tively socialize the young and develop rolerelationships conducive to non-criminalbehavior. It is at this point that main-stream criminological theory might be ablet be integae into a Mrxian theory ofcrime. And, it is a.lso at thi-Js point, t v.,o
cri.tcal crimino log ists mtay be abLe 0develop miore specii Ic ir 0 'ri t0Pro 1~ C i. ItII is to this issu of:(control, p oicy that we now turn
CRIME PREVENTION POLICY: A CRITICA-LPERSPECTIVE
If the social structure is an impor-tant constraint on the behavior ofindividuals and institutions, thenthere are limits to the change that ispossible to induce in individuals orinstitutions without changing thesocial structure. Vocational trainingfor prisoners for instance, will noteradicate unemployment or do away withlow wage industries. Even when indi-viduals can be helped the largerproblem remains. To deal with crimeby "treating" individuals is liketrying to empty the ocean with abucket (Greenberg, 1981:18).
The arguments of this paper, thus farrcan be briefly summarized. First of all,the question of "law and order", of the
-273-
prevention of traditional street crime, isboth real and important. For too long,critical criminologists have not addressedthemselves seriously to the problem ofstreet crime, and the fears and anxietiesit produces for people in their everydaylives. Furthermore, the victims of suchcrime are disproportionately members of theworking classes in late capitalist soci-eties. The victimization and demoral-ization of working class neighborhoods andpopular anxieties about crime withinsociety as a whole must be a major concernof critical criminology.
Second, this paper has argued that mosttraditional crime control policies andprograms, based on individualistic perspec-tives on crime, are doomed to failure.Approaches to crime prevention which at-tempt to punish or treat individual actorscannot succeed, in the long run, in re-ducing criminal behavior. This is becausecriminal behavior is rooted in the funda-mental structural features of a society,especially in the political and economicstructure of late capitalist societies.
This point leads to a third element ofthe paper's argument. There is now develop-ing a critical theory of traditional crimewhich advances considerably our under-standing of this kind of crime. A roughoutline of this theory was sketched outabove and the empirical research lendingsupport to it (not all of it by criticalcriminologists to be sure) was reviewed..The question that now needs to be addressedis what implications does such a theoryhave for crime prevention policy?
Although space limitations prevent anextended discussion, several crime preven-tion strategies that flow from the criticaltheory outlined above are presented. Two
-274-
distinct levels are addressed. First, abroad societal level which concerns majorchanges in the political and economic or-ganization of late capitalist societies isdiscussed. Second, the question of spec-ific policies within existing capitalisticstructures is considered.
The Reconstruction of Socialist Policy
Progressive criminologists generallyagree that any resolution to thecontemporary problems of crime willnecessitate a ie form of transition tosome form of socialism. This view isbased on the recognition that bothworking class varieties of commoncrime and the more organized anddestructive forms of social injurycommitted by, or in service to, thepowerful are grounded in the socialconflicts and exploitative relationsthat characterize life in classsociety. (Mischalowski, 1983:13)
If traditional crime is indeed rootedin the structural features of capitalistsociety, one obvious solution to the crimeproblem would seem to be radical structuralchange. Many Marxist criminologists haveargued that the overthrow of capitalism andits replacement by socialism will leavesociety crime free. Stripped of itsutopian overtones, there is considerablemerit to this idea. It can be arguedconvincingly that there would be far lesscrime in a more equal, more just, socialistsociety. As the British criminologist IanTaylor (1982:xv-xvi) has put it:
So - although it will appear as adogmatism - we can assert that theessential significance of a very highrate of interpersonal and property
violence in a society is that itexpresses the lack of socialism in thepersonal and social relations of thatsociety. And we can define the absentsocialism here, quite conventionally,as a political and social formationwhich guarantees equality of life-chances and mutual regard betweenpeople, irrespective of race, age, andsex. It is the obverse, therefore, ofthe conditions that exist in anunreformed class society like Britaintoday.
From this perspective, therefore, thesingle best crime prevention strategy wouldbe to replace capitalism with socialism.Aside from the fact that this is anexceedingly simplistic idea, there areproblems with the notion that socialismwill drastically reduce the level of crimein society. As Braithwaite (1979:243) hasargued, "...the overthrow of capitalism isnot a panacea for crime which knows nolimitations. The overthrow of capitalismcreates merely the potential for a moreequal and less segregated society."Braithwaite goes on to point out that grossinequalities in wealth and power persist inthe so-called socialist societies that doexist, and the available evidence suggeststhat the lower classes in these societiesalso-have the highest rate of crime.
One obvious problem in this kind ofdiscussion is the fact that there are manydifferent conceptions of socialism and manydifferent existing social for~ations thatcall themselves socialist. There doesappear to be, however, two major traditionsof modern socialism, both of which areseriously deficient, according to Alan Hunt(1982:16):
The "revolutionary" tradition looks to
a revolutionary upheaval which has notcome and which seems more distanttoday than it was when the socialistmovement was born. The "socialdemocratic" tradition, after long andvaried experiences of exercisinggovernmental power in many Europeannations, has not produced any decisivesocial, political or economic changethat reveals the possibility of a newsocialist order. Indeed, in theirdifferent ways, both traditions havecreated political and state systemsthat are distant from the people andhave not released democratic andpopular participation in social,economic, and political life. Theauthoritarianism of the socialism ofthe East and the paternalism of thesocialism of the West have bothcontributed to an undermining of thepopular appeal of socialism.
If' the creation of a socialist societyis to be a primary way of reducingtraditional crime (among many other socialproblems) then we will have to develop anew socialist tradition, one which willrelease democratic and popular partici-pation in social, political and economiclife. As Taylor (1982) has argued, we needto have a "reconstruction of socialistpolicy." The argument for socialism onceagain, has to be made. This time, however,socialists will have to develop a morespecific blueprint for a democraticsocialist society which offers a positivealternative conception of the Welfare Stateto replace the "tattered and discreditedreality we still defend." (Deacon,1981:46).
What would a "reconstructed socialistpolicy" look like? What elements would itcontain? Again, space prohibits an extended
-277-
discussion, but we can examine some of thearguments Taylor (1981; 1982) has advancedin LAM and Order: Arguments for • aIi m-.and elsewhere. First of all, Taylorclearly rejects the anti-statism of alibertarian character which ran throughmuch of the early literature of the radicalcriminologists (Hunt, 1982). He (1981:100)insists upon "...the recognition of a stateform as a necessary element in theadministration of complex industrialsocieties...o Thus, in the current periodit is important to enter into the struggleover state policy in all areas. Secondly,Taylor argues the necessity of "socialorder" and thus of the necessity for someform of criminal justice apparatus. Theissue, for him, is to create a "new" social.order ("a social order for all", p. 123)and a democratization of the criminaljustice process.
The key element in Taylor's socialiststrategy is the thoroughgoing democratiza-tion of the entire social order. Thisaspect of social reconstruction must beginat the local level to fulfill immediate,pressing needs. Economic decision-makingmust be democratized, Production must beorganized rationally to fulfill continuingand often unmet social needs for goods,services, and employment'. This notion ofeconomic democracy has recently taken holdover the left in the United States. Theessence of economic democracy is totransfer economic decision-making from thefew to the many; from private groups topublic councils; from the corporate eliteto workers, consumers, and localcommunitieso Econowic democracy, thus,requires, "the shift of irnvesment controlfrom corporate domination to the, public;and the reconstruction of economic decisionmaking through democratic worker - andworker/consumer - controlled production"
-278-
(Carnoy and Shearer, 1980:4).
The state itself, according to Taylor,will have to be democratized from within.This would include such things as thedemocratization of policing, of the staff-ing of correctional centers, and even ofthe judiciary. Over and over, Taylorstresses the importance of the state in thereconstruction of socialist policy. He isaware of the Dangers of reformism, but heunderlines (1982:xviii) "...the importanceof creating a set of demands for alter-native and socialist arrangements in everyarea in which the state imposes itself onthe citizens of our unequal class society."
The reconstruction of socialist policyas outlined by Taylor is an importantsource of ideas about what kind ofsocialist society might replace late cap-italism and even welfare state capitalism.These ideas and others must now be workedover, developed, and linked to a viablepolitical strategy if we are serious aboutcreating a new social order in which therewill be far less crime (and far fewersocial pathologies in general) then wecurrently experience under the politicaleconomy of capitalism. As Taylor (1982:13)points out, however, this will take a lotof hard work to accomplish:
A vast amount of work needs to be doneon the reconstruction of orthodoxsocialist policy. But the requiredfeatures of any reconstructed socialdemocracy are clear: the fragmentedworking class will only be mobilizedwhen it sees an economic and socialstrategy which transparently (andtherefore democratically) fulfills itsimmediate, pressing social needs. Thesocialism which does this must'obviously be clearly distinguishable
from the authoritarian state form or"social deomocracy" of the earlierperiod, constructed in defense of anallegedly equal partnership of capitaland labor. ...A popular desire forsuch a socialism may emerge out of theprocess of community dislocation,which is now in full flow in cap-italist societies, but it will requiresocialists working in politicalparties and engaging openly andpublicly in ideological strugglesagainst the Right in order to sustainand advance it.
Specific Pol _tQ_ _ght Crime
While the reconstruction of socialistpolicy in the west is critically important,it is only one level at which work must goon. If we are truly concerned about reduc-ing the amount of traditional crime thatplagues our societies and alleviating thevictimization of working class neighbor-hoods, we must formulate and fight forspecific policies that will operate rightnow, within the structure of the existingpolitical economy. These policies willhopefully be, in Taylor's (1982) words,"prefigurative socialist programs," but thecriterion by which we should judge them iswhether or not they will reduce crime.
The specific recommendations to bepresented here, are derived primarily froma recent article by American criminologistElliot Currie (1982). He lists three keyareas of intervention which recent evidencepoint to as likely to have the greatesteffect on crime rates. These areas ofintervention are the labor market, thefamily, and the network of communitysupports. Each Will be discussed in turn.
-280-
The first and most important recommen-dation that can be made to reduce existingcapitalist societies is to recommend theadoption of a full employment policy. AsCurrie (1982:21) notes concerning thesituation in the United States, "It'shardly accidental that every advancedsociety with a lower level of violent crimethan ours has also historically had a muchmore effective and humane employment policyproviding better cushions against thedisintegrative and degrading effects of'market' forces." Attaining a full employ-ment economy is not only a major steptoward a less crime ridden society, it is,as Michael Harrington (1980:82) has pointedout, the "precondition" of any progressivesolution to the problems which confrontlate capitalist society.
The central importance of a full employ-ment policy in reducing crime appears to bewell understood in the west. Yet there islittle movement toward such a policy,especially in the United States and GreatBritain. The main reason for this is thefact that governments in capitalist societ-ies prefer to rely on the private sector toproduce jobs. The private sector, however,as has been well demonstrated (SeeHarrington, 1980), cannot and will not moveus in the direction of full employment.The only way a full employment economy canbe reached is through the provision ofpublic jobs and planned social investment.Even the Reagan administration in the U.S.began to get that message, and in early1983, backed the passage of a public jobsbill (a rather inadequate jobs bill, but ajobs bill nonetheless). More such billsare necessary if we are at all seriousabout reducing crime.
Still, the provision of jobs alone isnot the only issue to be considered from a
-281-
crime prevention standpoint. As Currie(1982:21) points out, "The economic contextof crime is not just the rate of unemploy-ment itself, but the more general cond-itions of the secondary labor market." Hereviews a RAND study of California "repeat-ers" which illustrates the strengths ofthis connection. As Currie (1982:21)notes:
This [study] suggests that job qualityand stability are the real issues.Simply forcing the urban unemployedinto new variants of low-wage, meniallabor as much current [Reagan] admini-stration urban policy proposes, won'tbegin to come to grips with urbancrime. Nor can we expect much helpfrom a strategy- of general economicexpansion if it doesn't include well-targeted employment and trainingprograms for the kinds of peopletypically left behind.
A strong jobs policy, therefore, onethat deals with the issue of job qualityand stability, must be our first order re-sponse to the crime problem (especiallyyouth crime). The state must be pressuredto pursue this course. Not only is it moreeffective to create jobs than to buildprisons, but is is also less expensive.The left must stay the course on this issueand attempt to counter the resistance ofthe private sector to public jobs programs.
A second area of intervention to reducecrime, according to Currie is the family.Given the evidence of the fragmentation offamilies and the developmental disturbancesthat can occur within them due to theadverse impact of economic factors, it isimportant to develop comprehensive multi-service programs for high risk families.Currie (1982:22) quotes psychologist E. M.
-282-
Hetherington who has said, "it is criticalto develop social policies and interventionprocedures that will reduce stresses anddevelop new support systems for singleparent families." Currie (1982:22) thencomments that "changing the pinched anddeeply stressful state of dependent poorfamilies can have an impact on youth crimein fairly short order."
What kind of service programs for dep-endent poor families would help to reducecrime? Currie cites the Child and FamilyResource Programs (CFPR) sponsored by theU.S. Department of Health, Education andWelfare as an exemplar. These programsprovided the following kinds of services topoor families: crisis intervention, educa-tion against child abuse, family counsel-ing, Head Start and tutoring programs,meals for children, and pre- and post-natalhealth counseling. All of these programswere designed to encourage parent involve-ment in policymaking. The results of theseprograms, overall, were excellent. Currie(1982:23) cites the conclusions of a U.S.Government Accounting Office evaluation ofCFPR in summarizing the impact of familyintervention programs on crime rates:
The GAO argued that these early child-hood intervention programs wouldreduce delinquency mainly throughimproving early parent-child relationsand school performance, and bothpossibilities fit well with what agrowing body of research has to sayabout family and developmental influ-ences on youth and adult crime. Wedon't know how much crime we couldprevent by developing a better rangeof supports for early child develop-ment. We do know that there are verygood reasons for especting the effectsto be substantial.
-283-
In addition to the family, a third areaof intervention for crime reduction is thenetwork of community supports. Although"community" has become a kind of predic-table buzzword on both the left and right,and although just about everybody agreesthat-"community" is important in preventingcrime, Currie (1982:23) argues that"...nearly everyone has a different concep-tion of what community means and what mightbe done to create or restore it." Hereviews the variety of community crimeprevention programs initiated in the UnitedStates in the 1970s by the Law EnforcementAssistance Administration (LEAA), Theresults of these efforts, he argues, wereambiguous. He sees nothing wrong in Vrinc-iple with such progr-ams as "'NeighborhoodWatch" or the organization of civiliananti-crime patrols, but he cautions thatsuch programs are ".-likely to havelimited impact as long as the larger forcesripping apart the community's infra-structure.are left intact."
What's most important in communitycrime prevention, according to Currie(1982:24), are "the broader forces thatmake fo commuinity stability and sustainlocal social networks." He argues(1984:24) that, "one of the most damagingflaws in liberal tinkWing about socialpolicy has beeiA ils tendency to downplaythe importance of socikal bonds and communalsukpp)orts in pevenlting or miLtigating socialpathology." A nAmber of radical criminolog-ists, in addition to Currie, have recentlyechoed these sentiments and have begunexploring the issue of community critteprevention (Browning, 1982, Bute, 1982,Gross, 1982).
The most compelling approach to crimeprevention on the community level,
-284-
according to Currie, is the idea of creat-ing "mediating structures" to prevent Var-ious kinds of social pathologies. By "med-iating structures" is meant intermediateinstitutions such as neighborhoods, kinshipstructures, and ethnic organizations, whichlay between individuals and larger bureau-cratic structures. One example cited byCurrie is Philadelphia's House of Umoja, acommunity based residential program forblack youth gang members. Reviewing theevidence on the crime-preventing role of"mediating structuresu, Currie (1982:24)concludes:
A large and growing body of researchhas demonstrated the importance ofcommunal networks of support in miti-gating the impact of social andeconomis stress, with very significantconsequences not only for crime, butfor physical and mental health aswell.
A number of cross-national studies alsosuggest the significance of communitynetworks of support in preventing crime.Currie (1984:24) points to Japan andSwitzerland, and argues that the low crimerates in these two countries can be tracedback to the fact that economic developmentin these nations appears to have takenplace "within the bounds of pre-existingties of kinship and local community."Currie (1982:25) concludes that, "One clearimplication of this is that much could begained, over the long term, through inte-grating community programs specificallydesigned for crime prevention with broaderstrategies of locally based economic devel-opment."
CONCLUSION: THE STATE MUST SERVE AS APOSITIVE FORCE FOR CRIME PREVENTION
-285-
Critical criminologist argue that thecauses of traditional crime are located inthe political and economic structure ofcapitalist society. A reduction in crime,therefore, depends upon major political andeconomic changes. The crime preventionstrategies recommended in this paper allrequire positive interventions by the statein the social and economic organization ofsociety. In all Western nations, particu-larly in the United States and GreatBritain, conservatives, both in and out ofgovernment, insist that "government" ispowerless to do anything about the causesof crime; that the governments' only properrole is to punish offenders and maintainlaw and order. As Currie (1982:25) pointsout, however:
In fact, of course, the opposite istrue. "Government" in the UnitedStates is already deeply implicated inpolicies that cause families andcommunities to disintegrate, and indeflecting policies that might helphold them together. "Government,"indeed, can fairly be said to havefollowed a pro-crime policy for years.Government tax and- subsidy policiessupported the vast' uprooting of pop-ulation through a "modernization" ofagriculture closely entwined with thedisintegration of the social fabric ofthe cities. Government spurred theout-migration of industry and jobsthat aggravated it further. Govern-ment regularly induces unemployment,community decline, and geographic up-rooting in the service of the putativefight against inflation. Governmenthelps subsidize the multinationals'cataclysmic reordering of social lifein the "developing" world... Under theauspices of the right, "government"
-286-
will certainly do so even more, byaligning itself ever more closely withthe most disintegrative forces of theprivate market.
In support of the interests of capitalthe state promotes policies that bear alarge part of the responsibility for thehigh levels of crime and violence thatplague many western nations. But the stateis not simply a tool or instrument of cap-italistic interests. The state in latecapitalism is an autonomous power and anobject of class struggle. Critical crimin-ologists and the left in general must enterinto the struggle over state policy. It isonly through political action and pressureon a variety of fronts that we will be ableto achieve significant reforms now and theeventual democratization of the socialorder as a whole in the future. Not onlydo we hope to achieve a more equal and justsociety in this process, but also asignificant reduction in the level oftraditional crime. While the punishment(even by incarceration) of individualssurely has a place in any future crimecontrol strategy, as does the rehabilita-tion or treatment of troubled individuals,only the kind of structural changesproposed by critical criminologists willalleviate the victimization of our societyby crime.
REFERENCES
Auletta, Ken1982 The n_ _%. New York:
Vintage Books.
Blau, Judith R. and Peter M.
-287-
1982 "The Cost of Inequality: Metro-politan Structure and ViolentCrime". American SociologicalReview, 47 (February): 114-128.
Bonger, William1916 Criminality and Economic Condi-
tions. Boston: Little, Brown.
Braithwaite, John1979 Inequality. Crime,__And_ Public
Polic. London: Routledge andKegan Paul.
Braithwaite, John1981 "The Myth of Social Class and
Braverman, Harry1974 Labor and Monopoly Capital. New
York: Monthly Review Press.
Brenner,1973
Brenner,1975
Brenner,1976
M. HarveyMental Illness and the Economy.Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard Univer-sity Press.
M. Harvey"Estimating the Social Costs ofNational Economic Policy:Implications for Mental andPhysical Health and CriminalAggression." Prepared for theJoint Economic Committee,Congress of the U.S. Paper No.5. Washington, D.C.: U.S.Government Printing Office(October).
M. Harvey"Effects of the Economy onCriminal Behavior and theAdministration of Criminal Just-
ice in the United States,Canada, England and Wales, andScotland." Prepared for theUnited Nations Social DefenseResearch Institute. EconomicCrises and Crime. PublicationNo. 15. Rome: UNSDRI (May).
Browning, Frank1982 "Nobody's Soft on Crime
Anymore." Mother Jones, 7(August): 24-31, 40-41.
Bute, Joseph1982 "Crime and Community:
Strategies for the Left." CXipand Social Justice, 18 (Winter):34-36.
Carnoy, Martin and Derek Shearer1980 Economic Democracy, White
Plains, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
Chester, C. Ronald1976 "Perceived Relative Deprivation
as a Cause of Property Crime."Crime and Delinquency, 22(January): 17-30.
Currie, Elliott1982 "Fighting Crime." Working
Pper.k. 9 (July/August): 16-25.
Danziger, Sheldon and David Wheeler1975 "The Economics of Crime:
Punishment or Income Redistrib-,ution." Review of Social Econ-g-my, 33 (October): 113-131.
Deacon, Bob1981 "Social Administration, Social
Policy and Socialism." Clitig1Social Policy, 1 (1) (Summer):43-66.
Doeringer, Peter B. and Michael J. Piore1971 Internal Labor Markets and Man-
power Analysis. Lexington, Ma.:D. C. Heath.
Eberts, Paul, and Kent P. Schwirian1968 "Metropolitan Crime Rates and
