THE MARCH OF THE BUZZARDS CROOK’S FLANK MARCH AT FISHER’S HILL THE ROAD TO THE VALLEY’S “GIBRALTAR" After being decisively defeated by Union Gen. Philip Sheridan at Third Winchester on September 19, 1864, Confederate Gen. Jubal Early withdrew his force some 20 miles south to Fisher’s Hill, the “Gibraltar of the Valley.” Fisher’s Hill was an imposing, fortified ridgeline that sat at the narrowest part of the Valley, stretching just four miles from Massanutten Mountain on the east to Little North Mountain (including the target property) on the west. But Early had several challenges. First, after his heavy losses at Third Winchester, he no longer had enough men to adequately man the position. Second, the height of Fisher’s Hill lessens as you move westward – making the left of Early’s line more vulnerable. The third challenge was of Early’s own making. Believing the greatest threat was on his right, he put his strongest forces there and in the middle – his strongest defensive positions. For reasons never explained, he put his weakest and most unreliable unit, dismounted cavalry under Gen. Lunsford Lomax, on his vulnerable left flank – his weakest position. Lomax placed the 8 th Virginia on his left – the extreme left of the Confederate line – on the slopes of Little North Mountain, (on the target property), little suspecting they would be right in the path of the Federal advance... The Buzzards were coming. “LIFTING ITSELF UP MENACINGLY” On September 20, the day after Third Winchester, Sheridan’s army marched south in pursuit of Early. As they approached Strasburg, they spied the daunting ridgeline of Fisher’s Hill. “We could see the hill lifting itself up menacingly to our advance,” recalled Union Capt. James F. Fitts of the 114th New York. “[The Confederates] now occupied one of the best defensive positions in Virginia.” “THEY ALWAYS STOOD SIDEWAYS” Just days before the Battle of Fisher’s Hill, Union cavalry scouts visited the Barr Farm (on the target property) on Little North Mountain, at the western end of what would become the battlefield, just as the fam- ily was sitting down to dinner. Although the family hurriedly hid in their cellar, leaving their food on the table – food the soldiers quickly wolfed down – they eventually felt safe enough to climb back up. The soldiers had disturbing news: a battle would soon be fought here. Little did the family suspect that the battle’s pivotal flank march and and attack would come right across their farm. The cavalrymen were likely from Gen. William Averell’s command, scouting ahead of the Union advance. Averell himself scouted the area on September 21, 1864, and later reported that “A line of rail and earth breastworks was reached, behind which the enemy had a strong line of infantry or dismounted men. I informed [Gen. Philip Sheridan]... that an infantry corps, by hugging the base of the North Mountain, might break around the enemy's left and render his position untenable.” Such an advance would cross rugged, uneven ground. The best troops to make such a march would be ones who were used to journeying through mountainous terrain – so used to it that they “always stood sidewise, with one foot higher than the other.” Troops that were “mostly mountaineers... grown accustomed to service in the mountains, [making] the move through the woods and brush along the mountain side... entirely practicable.” Troops like the Army of West Virginia – the “Buzzards.” 23rd Ohio Infantry. Part of Col. Rutherford B. Hayes’s brigade in the the Army of West Virginia. Courtesy of Rutherford B. Hayes Presidential Center Gen. William Averell Union Gen. George Crook’s ARMY OF WEST VIRGINIA was largely made up of regiments from West Virginia and Ohio. It was nicknamed the “Buzzards” and “The Mountain Creepers,” a tribute to its hard marching in the mountainous terrain of the Appalachians and the Valley. At Third Winchester, its flank attack had set the stage for the Union victory. Within Sheridan’s army, it operated similar to a corps – and was sometimes referred to as the 8th Corps. Gen. Lunsford Lomax Early and Sheridan
Transcript
THE MARCH OF THE BUZZARDS CROOK’S FLANK MARCH AT FISHER’S HILL
THE ROAD TO THE VALLEY’S “GIBRALTAR" After being decisively defeated by Union Gen. Philip Sheridan at Third Winchester on September 19, 1864, Confederate Gen. Jubal Early withdrew his force some 20 miles south to Fisher’s Hill, the “Gibraltar of the Valley.” Fisher’s Hill was an imposing, fortified ridgeline that sat at the narrowest part of the Valley, stretching just four miles from Massanutten Mountain on the east to Little North Mountain (including the target property) on the west. But Early had several challenges. First, after his heavy losses at Third Winchester, he no longer had enough men to adequately man the position. Second, the height of Fisher’s Hill lessens as you move westward – making the left of Early’s line more vulnerable.
The third challenge was of Early’s own making. Believing the greatest threat was on his right, he put his strongest forces there and in the middle – his strongest defensive positions. For reasons never explained, he put his weakest and most unreliable unit, dismounted cavalry under Gen. Lunsford Lomax, on his vulnerable left flank – his weakest position.
Lomax placed the 8th Virginia on his left – the extreme left of the Confederate line – on the slopes of Little North Mountain, (on the target property), little suspecting they would be right in the path of the Federal advance...
The Buzzards were coming.
“LIFTING ITSELF UP MENACINGLY” On September 20, the day after Third Winchester, Sheridan’s army marched south in pursuit of Early. As they approached Strasburg, they spied the daunting ridgeline of Fisher’s Hill. “We could see the hill lifting itself up menacingly to our advance,” recalled Union Capt. James F. Fitts of the 114th New York. “[The Confederates] now occupied one of the best defensive positions in Virginia.”
“THEY ALWAYS STOOD SIDEWAYS” Just days before the Battle of Fisher’s Hill, Union cavalry scouts visited the Barr Farm (on the target property) on Little North Mountain, at the western end of what would become the battlefield, just as the fam-ily was sitting down to dinner. Although the family hurriedly hid in their cellar, leaving their food on the table – food the soldiers quickly wolfed down – they eventually felt safe enough to climb back up. The soldiers had disturbing news: a battle would soon be fought here. Little did the family suspect that the battle’s pivotal flank march and
and attack would come right across their farm.
The cavalrymen were likely from Gen. William Averell’s command, scouting ahead of the Union advance. Averell himself scouted the area on September 21, 1864, and later reported that “A line of rail and earth breastworks was reached, behind which the enemy had a strong line of infantry or dismounted men. I informed [Gen. Philip Sheridan]... that an
infantry corps, by hugging the base of the North Mountain, might break around the enemy's left and render his position untenable.”
Such an advance would cross rugged, uneven ground. The best troops to make such a march would be ones who were used to journeying through mountainous terrain – so used to it that they “always stood sidewise, with one foot higher than the other.” Troops that were “mostly mountaineers... grown accustomed to service in the mountains, [making] the move through the woods and brush along the mountain side... entirely practicable.”
Troops like the Army of West Virginia – the “Buzzards.”
23rd Ohio Infantry. Part of Col. Rutherford B. Hayes’s brigade in the the Army of West Virginia. Courtesy of Rutherford B. Hayes Presidential Center
Gen. William Averell
Union Gen. George Crook’s ARMY OF WEST VIRGINIA was largely made up of regiments from West Virginia and Ohio. It was nicknamed the “Buzzards” and “The Mountain Creepers,” a tribute to its hard marching in the mountainous terrain of the Appalachians and the Valley. At Third Winchester, its flank attack had set the stage for the Union victory. Within Sheridan’s army, it operated similar to a corps – and was sometimes referred to as the 8th Corps.
Gen. Lunsford Lomax
Early and Sheridan
“THE SECRET MARCH” After conferring with his commanders, Sheridan ruled out a direct frontal assault and agreed to Gen. George Crook’s suggestion to send Crook’s Army of West Virginia on a long march around the Confederate left flank, along the base of Little North Mountain. “I resolved [to] move Crook, unperceived if possible,” he later reported, “Onto the face of Little North Mountain and let him strike the left and rear of the enemy's line... To do this required much secrecy, as the enemy had a signal station on [Massanutten Mountain], from which he could see every movement made by our troops; therefore, during the night
of the 20th I concealed Crook in the timber north of Cedar Creek, where he remained
during the 21st.”
Jesse Tyler Sturm of the 14th West Virginia was one of the soldiers marching with Crook. “On the morning of the 20th we started up the valley on ‘The secret march’...” he later wrote. “We were placed in camp in a heavy timber near Middletown and were not allowed to make light by night nor smoke by day, Sheridan intending to conceal Crook as to deceive the enemy as to his whereabouts. There was many a little fire built and a blanket held over it to hide the light while the boys made their cup of coffee.”
During the day on September 21, the Federals drove the Confederates off Flint Hill, just north of Fisher’s Hill, giving them a complete view of the Confederate line – and helping to hide Crook’s movement from the southerners. That night, Crook moved again, marching his men 5 miles and concealing them in “a clump of timber” behind Hupp’s Hill.
“UNDER COVER OF WOODS AND RAVINES” About 5:30 am on September 22, Sheridan ordered Crook to march to a wooded position between the right-rear of the 6th Corps and Little North Mountain. “Crook moved out to the extreme right, out of sight,
under cover of woods and ravines,” remembered Col. Thomas Wildes of the 116th Ohio. Crook reached his position, about a mile behind Gen. James Ricketts’ infantry division, by mid-morning. Meanwhile, to distract the southerners, the rest of the Federals demonstrated and probed the center and right of Early’s line. Although Confederate lookouts reported Federal movement to the west, it’s likely that they were describing the actions of Ricketts’ infantry and Averell’s cavalry.
“SO THAT NO NOISE WOULD BE MADE” At 2 p.m., Sheridan ordered Crook to move his troops, "to the eastern slope of [Little] North Mountain, and to pass around the enemy's extreme left and get on his flank and rear and drive him from his works." Col. Wildes remembered that, “We threw off and piled up our knapsacks, arranged canteens and bayonet scabbards so that no noise would be made by them, and in the lightest kind of marching order, started up the steep, thickly wooded side of Little North Mountain. Ascending for a half mile or more, we turned abruptly to the left [on the target property], and silently moved south, along the face of the mountain, each division in two lines, side by side. About 3 p.m., we got squarely on the enemy's flank, with our left past his entrenchments.”
“IT WAS TOO LATE” An alarmed Confederate Gen. Bryan Grimes spotted the movement. “About 3 o’clock we perceived two columns moving up the side of the mountain to our left,” he later wrote. He reported this to Gen. Stephen Ramseur, his superior, urging him to shift men to support Lomax’s cavalry, but Ramseur declined until he communicated with Early. “Alas!” Grimes said. “It was too late.”
As they advanced, Crook’s men encountered the skirmishers from the 8th Virginia Cavalry that Gen. Lomax had positioned on his left flank (on the target property). Confederate James D. Sedinger, a member of the Border Rangers (Company E) in the 8th Virginia Cavalry, recalled, “...General Crooks [sic] with the 8th Corps and the entire federal cavalry struck the left flank...Our regiment being up in the woods on the North Mountain dismounted, fighting as infantry. Colonel Cook ordered us to charge which we did, and struck the rear of Crooks corps who about-faced and poured a hot fire into us killing John Beckwith and capturing Sedinger [referring to himself] of the old company.”
Alerted, Lomax’s men hurried to meet the threat, but their efforts were too little and too late. Although some of the cavalrymen had been digging breastworks, at the time of the attack they were only 18 inches high. Lomax’s gunners “worked like beavers” to turn their cannon and fire, but with little effect. “The enemy opened on us with shot and shell,” Col. Wildes remembered. “Too late! The first shot was the signal to charge, and before they could make any, even the slightest, preparations to meet us, we were upon them with the bayonet.”
Crook attacked about 4 pm, the Buzzards hitting the southern line “like a thunderbolt.” As Averell and Ricketts joined in, Lomax’s overmatched defenders were overwhelmed and collapsed. The Confederate flank crumbled, and – with the entire Union army join-ing the attack – the seceding positions fell like dominoes, giving way as they were hit from multiple directions. Gen. Grimes, on the next hill over, recalled how “[The attack] came like an avalanche. The cavalry breaking, my skirmish line presented but a feeble resistance. The enemy attacked me on my left flank, front and rear at the same time.”
Early’s entire line disintegrated, his troops retreating southwards in disarray. Only the growing darkness saving his army from complete destruction.
