We shall witness

Witness, for sure, we will

The day that has been promised

The fate that has been preordained

The day when the enormous mountains of tyranny

Will blow away like wisps of cotton

When the earth will tremble thunderously

Beneath the feet of the oppressed

And on the heads of the tyrants

Streaks of lightning will strike

We shall witness

Faiz Ahmad Faiz

1

ContentsContentsContentsContentsContents

INTRODUCTION 2

The Social Underbelly

I. KANDHAMAL VIOLENCE: ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT & OTHERS 4

1.1 The Sinister Prelude – The Violence of December 2007

1.2 How the Pogrom Started in August 2008

1.3 The Saga of Violence and Barbarity

1.4 Response of the Government of Orissa

1.5 Role of the Sangh Parivar

1.6 The Kui Coordination Committee (KCC)

1.7 Role of the Media

1.8 Human Solidarity

II. THE ISSUE OF LAND: A HISTORICAL SKETCH 19

2.1 A Brief Note on Kandhamal

2.2 Socio-Economic Contours of Kandhamal

2.3 Land, Alienation and Contention

2.3.1 Under the British Raj

2.3.2 Independent India

III. POLITICS OF DOMINATION: PAST AND PRESENT 28

3.1 Social Equation: Adivasi, Pano and Oriya

3.2 Christianity in Kandhamal

3.3 Hindutva Politics in Kandhamal

3.4 The Conversion “Debate”

IV. CONCLUSION 40

2

Poverty, dispossession, land alienation,conflict between two socially andeconomically underprivileged groups—Christians and Kandho Adivasis—aggressive Hindutva assertion, electoralpolitics, detrimental state policies, alongwith the perceived threat of growingMaoist presence by the state have madeKandhamal a seething cauldron.

After the killing of LaxmananandaSaraswati on 23 August 2008, aHindutva-led pogrom against DalitChristians started in the Kandhamaldistrict of Orissa. Till now, according toofficial reports, 39 people have beenkilled. Nearly, 50,000 people have beenhounded out of their villages, theirhouses have been gutted and theirbelongings have been looted. When allthis was happening, the OrissaGovernment and the districtadministration, to put it mildly, lookedthe other way and allowed the pogromto continue for almost two months.

The Social Underbelly

In Kandhamal, more than 30 percentpeople are landless and 75 percent livebelow the poverty line. Kandhamal isranked 29 among the 30 districts ofOrissa in terms of the HumanDevelopment Index and has the highestInfant Mortality Rate at 169 perthousand (State Human DevelopmentReport prepared by the UNDP). Femaleliteracy rate among the Scheduled

Castes is 40.3 percent and among theScheduled Tribes is 23.4 percent.According to government reports, thehighest number of deaths due to malariahas taken place in Kandhamal duringthe last year. The Orissa Government isonly busy “modernizing” Orissathrough huge, capital-intensiveindustrial projects that displace millionsof poor people from their livelihoods. Inthis carnage, the government’s tacitsupport and partisan role of the localadministrative machinery oversaw oneof the worst communal carnages of thecountry, where the affected have beenhistorically the most disenfranchisedfrom the basic needs that today’s urbansociety takes for granted. This reportattempts to contextualize thisexploitation in history and documenthow dominant interests have used thissituation of chronic poverty inKandhamal to suit their agenda.

Our understanding of the Kandhamalcontext is also deeply linked to themounting people’s resistance against aseries of coercive “development”measures led by the Orissa Governmentand capital, foreign and national. Large-scale alienation of lands and livelihoodis the reality of a large number ofdisplaced and dispossessed Women,Adivasis, Dalits, OBCs and other poorsections in Kashipur, Niyamagiri,Jagatsinghpur, Keonjhar andKalinganagar. The BJP–BJD alliancegave a free hand to the Hindutva forces

IntroductionIntroductionIntroductionIntroductionIntroduction

3

to dispossess yet another 50,000 peoplein Kandhamal and in the processconsolidate majoritarian politics andterrorize the disenfranchised.

Kandhamal is associated with meriah(human sacrifice) in our school bookknowledge. Till the mid-19th century,the Kandhos, one of the oldest Adivasicommunities in India, had sacrificedhuman beings in a turmeric field withthe belief that the Dharni Penu (MotherEarth) would give a good yield. Now,the Dalit and Adivasi Christians havebeen made the meriah. Which crop willyield better with this sacrifice? And, whois going to harvest the crop?

Issues in Kandhamal are complicatedand multi-layered. We do not claim tohandle them in all their ramifications.We have only tried to capture the broadpattern of related events and issues,underlining in the process our ownconcerns and questions. To do this,between September and November2008, we talked to the victims in somerelief camps (G. Udaygiri, Bhubaneswarand Cuttack), survivors who soughtrefuge in Berhampur, victims in thehospital at the MKCG Medical College,Berhampur, leaders of the Kandho andPano communities and journalists. Wealso tried to draw upon some secondarysources, accounts of scholars onKandhamal and media reports.

We are presenting this report with aview to:

Document the systematictargeting and hounding of the Adivasiand Dalit Christians and the sharpening

of conflict between Panos and Kandhos.The Dalits of this region are referred toas Panos.

Provide a glimpse of this century-long conflict, which has been used bythe dominant forces such as the state,its policies and institutions,institutionalized religion and Oriyas(who are the caste Oriyas), along withother players.

Generate an informed debate onthe Kandhamal context.

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1.1 The Sinister Prelude:The Violence of December 2007

Before dealing with the current violencein Kandhamal, we need to mention theevents of December 2007. In hindsight,these events seem to be a prelude. TheKui-Cordination Committee (KCC), anumbrella organization of the Kandhos ofPhulbani, has been agitating on a set ofdemands: snatching of reservationbenefits by Pano Christians throughforged caste certificates; demand for STstatus by Kui-speaking Dalits andgrabbing of tribal land by Dalits. In thisconnection, the KCC had called for a two-day bandh (24 and 25 December 2007)in Kandhamal. On 24 December 2007,Laxmanananda was alleged to haveentered into an altercation with Christiansat Darsingbadi, which resulted in afisticuff. After this incident, Christiansand their institutions were attacked insome parts of Kandhamal. AlthoughLambodar Kanhar, the Secretary of KCC,issued a statement that KCC had nothingto do with the communal violence andthat “opportunists” had taken advantageof the bandh call, it is not difficult to seethat both sections (KCC and Hindutvagroups) joined hands against Dalits,particularly, the Dalit Christians.Four people were killed in the violenceof December 2007. Several churches andhouses were either burnt or damaged.

In one village, houses of the Hinducommunity were also set on fire. TheOrissa Government had instituted aJudicial Commission of Inquiry, headedby Justice Basudev Panigrahi, a retiredjudge of the Orissa High Court. TheJudicial Commission was still workingwhen the August 2008 violence began.

The National Commission for Minoritieshad visited Kandhamal in January andApril 2008. Among others, thecommission had recommended thefollowing:

The State Government must look intothe speeches of Laxmanananda Saraswati todetermine whether they amount toincitement of violence and take appropriateaction.

The State Government must issue aWhite Paper on the conversion issue to dispelfears and suspicions that have beenassiduously raised about the Christiancommunity and the role of its institutions.

The State Government must take thenecessary steps to set up a statutoryMinorities Commission for safeguarding therights of the minorities.

The confusion created by the HighCourt Order needs to be swiftly cleared toprevent further outbreak of tensions betweenSTs and SCs.

The confidence of the people in theimpartiality of the law-enforcingadministration and the sanctity of the rule

I. Kandhamal Violence: Role of the Goverment and OthersI. Kandhamal Violence: Role of the Goverment and OthersI. Kandhamal Violence: Role of the Goverment and OthersI. Kandhamal Violence: Role of the Goverment and OthersI. Kandhamal Violence: Role of the Goverment and Others

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of law must be re-established through speedyand concrete measures to bring to book theguilty in the riots. The guilty must beidentified and named as early as possible.

The Orissa Government had not caredto implement any of theserecommendations when the secondphase of violence, of a far greatermagnitude, began in August 2008 inthe district.

1.2 How the Pogrom Started inAugust 2008

On the night of 23 August 2008,Laxmanananda Saraswati was killed inhis Jaleshpeta ashram along with hisfour disciples. A few days ago, he hadinformed the local police station aboutthe threat to his life. A letter, reportedlysigned by the Maoists, had reachedLaxmanananda. The letter had warnedthat unless Laxmanananda stopped hiscommunal activities, he would be killed.The police was informed of this letter.But, the police failed in providingsecurity, and Laxmanananda was killed.Reportedly, a crowd of 40-50 armed mencame to the ashram and shot deadLaxmanananda and his disciples.

The police sources immediatelysuspected the hands of the Maoists inthese killings. Next day, all localnewspapers reported about the Maoistinvolvement, quoting police sources.The Sangh Parivar, however, inventedand publicized the theory that“extremist Christian groups” wereresponsible for the killing. And,neither the government nor anyenlightened individual, group, body of

educated middle-class, or any politicalparty with claims to secularism cameforward to contest this theory. Rather,senior BJP ministers issued statementssaying that Maoists were not the realculprits (Biswabhushan Harichandan,Minister of Law, quoted in The Samajon 26 August 2008), which in a way,was the government’s position on theissue of killing.

In Kandhamal, the Sangh Parivar usedthe killing as an excuse to carry out itspolitics of hate. It took out a funeralprocession, carrying the dead bodiesfrom Jaleshpeta ashram, whereLaxmanananda and his disciples werekilled, to Chakapada, his main ashram.The procession covered a distance ofnearly 150 km, passing through manysensitive areas, such as Baliguda, Raikia,G. Udaygiri, Tikabali, Phulbani andPhiringia. The administration hadinvoked Section 144 in the district, butdidn’t stop the procession. Instead, theprocession was allowed to pass throughsome areas, which did not fall in theroute between Jaleshpeta andChakapada. The communally chargedcrowd in the procession attacked theChristian settlements and religiousplaces on the way and thus, the SanghParivar fanned the anti-Christian frenzy.

In Kandhamal, attacks on Christianshad begun since the morning of 24August 2008 and continued till theend of September. It is difficult toprovide a complete picture of suchlarge-scale violence. However, tounderstand its nature, we arepresenting some of the incidentsnarrated by the victims themselves.

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1.3 The Saga of Violence andBarbarity

Families of Christians in Rupagaon,located at a distance of 2 to 3 km fromthe Chakapada ashram, were warned bythe local police to be alert of attacks byHindus. But, the police didn’t take anysteps to protect the Christians. “Wecontacted the SP over the mobile phonefor police protection. But, he wasn’tthere. As we heard that 20,000–30,000had gathered at the ashram and werecoming to attack us, we fled to theforests. The sheer number was scary; wecannot resist them as we had done inDecember 2007. Hiding on tree-tops, wesaw nearly 300–400 people marchingtowards our village with swords, clubsand mashals in their hands; some hadtied a red head-band. Even 20–30women were in the crowd; some withswords in their hands. All of them wereshouting, Bajrangbali ki jai. RasanandaPradhan, a paralytic patient couldn’tcome with us. From our hiding place inthe forest, we could see that our houseswere being burnt. They didn’t spareRasananda. They burnt him alive.” Infact, these people were among the firstgroups of people to reach Bhubaneswarand sheltered in the YMCA building.“We walked through the forests for days,without food and water, carrying littlechildren,” they told us.

A woman from Sipaiju village inKatingia Gram Panchayat (GP), who hadtaken shelter in YMCA, Bhubaneswar,narrated how the riots started in hervillage. “Prior to the attacks, there wasa meeting on Sunday in which RSS

people from the GP as well as outsidersparticipated. We got to know about themeetings from some people. We all fledto the forests, hiding from the attackers.Walking through the forests, we reachedG. Udaygiri, and from there, we cameto Bhubaneswar. There are about 45Christian families and about 50 Adivasifamilies in our village. All the houseswere burnt. Ranjit Pradhan is an AdivasiChristian. His cousin, Anatha Pradhan,who lives in the same village, is not aChristian. He was told by the Hindugroups to attack his own relatives.”

A woman from Tiangia, sheltered in thesame camp, said, “For the first time,there was conflict between the twocommunities in the village after theDecember riots, which took place inother parts of the district. But, thesarpanch, who was a Hindu, wassupportive of the Christians. So, therewas no attack on the Christians last time.This time, we were told how thesarpanch could not do anything. TrinathNayak of Prisubali village (of TiangiaGP) was hacked to death. Parikhit Nayakof Tiangia-Gudaripada was hacked todeath in the forest. Bikram Nayak, aHindu, of Tiangia was killed because hewas mixing with the Christians.”

“Mahadev, (a Sundhi, caste Hindu) theshopkeeper, was the main organizer ofthe attacks against the Christians in ourGP. He supplied kerosene to burn thehouses. When the attackers came toattack us, they shouted slogans,Bharatmata ki jai and Bajrangbali ki jai.They threatened us saying, ‘We will doto your young women what you have

7

done to our mataji’; ‘wherever you seeChristians, kill them’; ‘even if you returnafter 20 years, we will kill you’; ‘we willkill all children of Christians so that theywill not be there to take revenge’.”

An elderly man of about 70 years, wholives in a hamlet near Baliguda, said,“On 24 August 2008, around 8 P.M.,nearly, 50-60 people (Paika, Brahmin,Patra and Majhi of nearby places whoare not personally known to him) camewith axes, crow-bars, barchha and lathisshouting the slogan, ‘kill the Christians,chase them out.’ There were also womenwith them. Except me, rest of our familymembers (his wife, son, daughter-in-lawand grand daughter) fled to the jungle.They did not give me time even to askwhat my fault was or why they havecome. They fixed the axe on my neck andslapped and asked, ‘Will you renounceChristianity?’ I said no. Again, theyslapped and asked, ‘Will you renounceChristianity?’ I said no. Then, theydragged me to the nearby mango treeand tied me to it. The beating continuedand the same question was askedrepeatedly, and I was giving the sameanswer. Finally, they dragged me to amuddy area (it was a rainy day) andthrust my face into it and tonsured myhead (a violent symbolic assertion ofconversion to Hinduism). They were notonly rioters, but also looters. They tookaway two of my goats.”

In the MKCG Medical College,Berhampur, we met several peoplegrievously injured and brought there bythe police. They had no one to look afterthem and they had no idea where they

would return and with what means.Some had a couple of local relatives whowere in fear of visiting them. Localchurch people would get these patientssome food once a day.

A 35-year-old daily wage worker froma village in Raikia block was pushed tothe ground and a huge stone thrownon his chest on 27 August 2008 as a mobattacked his village. His rib cage wasfractured and he had difficulty walkingor talking. He was most worried whenhe would begin working because hisfamily was penniless. His wife said theyonly want some fare to go back to therelief camp. She had received the newsthat her two children were in theBhubaneswar relief camp and threechildren were in yet another relief campthat she did not know. She was anxiousto locate them. The local newspaperhad reported how the 75-year-oldLallaji Naik from G. Udaygirisuccumbed to his injuries inBerhampur. His 65-year-old wife,whose head and neck bore deep cuts,was still in a precarious condition. Shehad just been told about her husband’sdeath and she silently showed her scarsand cuts. They were from Goddogudain G. Udaygiri and attacked on 1October 2008. Such assaults werecontinuing even more than a monthafter the violence had begun.

Children were also brutally assaulted. A 42-year-old woman was nursing her 8-year-old son who had received deep cuts in hishead from an axe. He had miraculouslysurvived. The woman shut her eyes andsaid I pray to god to forgive them. She said

8

how they would have known that we werestill grieving my husband’s death thathappened only a month ago. She said sheis lucky that her daughter is safe. Yetanother 15-year-old girl was in the nextward whose left side was completely burntand in bandages. Her mother only weptsilently and said there is nothing to say;they pulled her hair, put kerosene on herand struck a match.

Similar stories of torture, violence,burning, killing, damage to houses andChristian institutions and loot ofproperty pour out from village aftervillage. Ultimately, all this human lossand suffering become cold governmentstatistics: 39 deaths, 3 missing, 415villages affected, 3,776 houses and 195churches and prayer houses damagedand 25,177 people in relief camps. Basedon the accounts of the victims and thelocal people, who have not suffered somuch of violence, we will attempt tomap the broad patterns of the pogrom:

1. Before the attack, the local RSSunits conducted meetings in thepanchayat offices, schools, anganwadicentres and distributed notices,informing the time at which theHindutva groups will come and attackthe village.

2. The Christian families were servedthis ultimatum: consider entering theHindu fold or be prepared to be killed.

3. Almost all families sought refugein the nearby jungles.

4. The Sangh Parivar masterminded,provoked, organized and planned thepogrom.

5. Neighbours and nearby villagersactively participated in the violence.

6. Women, with weapons, gotdirectly involved in the pogrom. Thetraders provided kerosene andtransportation to the rioters. And, therioters were rewarded with food and, insome places, with alcohol each evening.

7. A rumour heard in several areaswas, “Christians from our villages hadparticipated in the killing; they hadbrought swamiji’s flesh and blood andcelebrated in the churches.”

8. The district-level governmentmachinery, at least for a month, did nottake any effective steps to protect the lifeand property of the people.

9. Everywhere, Christiansirrespective of their caste or tribe wereselectively targeted. All those who madephone calls to the thanas, approached thethanas and, in rare cases, tried to registerFIRs, got no response from the police.

10. Loot and damage of propertywas methodically carried out, with themotive being economic ruination of theChristian community.

While the victims, in large numbers,were in search of refuge in relief camps,hospitals and relatives in other towns,the perpetrators had begun registeringtheir victory marks. Saffron flags wereflown atop the destroyed churches. JaiSriram and Om Ram Rajya were writtenon the walls. In one case, the cross wasremoved from the church building, andit was converted into a Hindu mutt.Saffron flags were flown on shops not

9

only in trade centers of G. Udaygiri,Raikia, Tikabali, but also in the interiorvillages atop the undamaged Hinduhouses. As someone in G. Udaygirishared in fear, “Every one did not wantto put the flags on rooftops; out of thefear of the VHP/RSS people we had to.”

The violence was not confined only toKandhamal; it spread to other parts ofOrissa as well. Christian communitiesand their institutions were attacked inGajapati, Koraput, Bargarh, Sambalpur,Kalahandi, Rayagada, Sundargarh,Khurdha and Balasore districts. InGajapati, near Kandhamal, a number ofchurches and Christian houses wereburnt. One man was burnt alive. Schoolbuses, jeeps and motorbikes were set onfire. In the Golamunda block ofKalahandi, a day-care centre and aprayer hall were burnt. In Bargarh, theMissionary Training Centre atKhuntapalli, near Padampur, wasattacked. Here, Rajni Majhi was burntalive and a Christian priest was brutallybeaten up. Institutions were alsoattacked in Sohela and Gaisilat in thisdistrict. Christian orphanages andschools were torched in Muniguda ofthe Rayagada district.

1.4 Response of the Government ofOrissa

“From the very start of these horribleand shameful incidents of communalviolence, my government has takenwhatever steps it possibly could to bringnormalcy and peace back to thatdisturbed district,” said Naveen Pattnaikin an interview on a TV channel withKaran Thapar in early October. Let us

examine how the BJD–BJP coalitiongovernment responded to the situationin Kandhamal.

When the Sangh Parivar gave the call fora bandh across Orissa on 25 August 2008,the BJP, a coalition partner in the stategovernment, announced to join thebandh. All that the Chief Minister didwas to appeal for a “peaceful” bandh.During the bandh, Christians across thestate suffered brutal violence in thehands of the Sangh Parivar. The ChiefSecretary to the Orissa Government,said the bandh was “complete, undercontrol and peaceful.” When one half ofthe government (the BJP) participated inthe bandh, thereby in the anti-Christianviolence, could one expect thegovernment to protect the Christians?No wonder, it simply chose to allow theattackers to have a free hand. And, thepolice remained mere onlookers, orworse still, friendly with theperpetrators. “The police failed to stopthe crimes and did not protect me fromthe attackers; they were friendly withthe attackers. They tried their best that Idid not register an FIR or make anycomplaints against police. The police didnot take down my statement as Inarrated in detail. I was raped and now,I don’t want to be victimized by theOrissa police. I want a CBI enquiry.”Sister Meena, who was raped on the 25August 2008 in K. Nuagaon said this ina written statement to the press. Boththis rape and the killing and burning ofRajni Majhi happened on the same day.

The government, as a routine,suspended the Superintendent of Police,Kandhamal and the Officer-in-Charge of

10

the Tumudibandha police station forfailing to provide security toLaxmanananda. Some high-rankingofficers were sent to Kandhamal to takecharge of the situation. The governmentalso announced the instituting of aJudicial Commission of Inquiry to lookinto the killing of Laxmanananda andthe violence that followed. It has becomea habit of the BJP–BJD government toinstitute a judicial commission andforget about it. The commission set upto inquire the 2007 December communalviolence in Kandhamal is yet to submitits report. The judicial commission setup for the Kalinganagar police firing isyet to submit its report, though morethan 3 years have gone by.

Unprecedented as it is, the governmentdidn’t allow political leaders, humanrights organizations or relief agencies toenter the district till 2 September 2008.Only media agencies were allowed.Sriprakash Jayswal, Minister of State,Home Affairs, Government of Indiareturned to Delhi without being allowedto visit Kandhamal. Reportedly, theOrissa Government advised him not tovisit the district as it was risky. On thecontrary, VHP leaders like PraveenTogadia and BJP leaders were allowedto travel through the district and attendthe funeral rites of their leader atChakapada. On 3 September 2008,Shivraj Patil, the Home Minister,Government of India, visited the district.

Despite these visits of central and stategovernment leaders, the violence inKandhamal did not stop, rather a blamegame started between the leaders on theneed for the number of paramilitary

forces. In any case, Christian families, tosave their lives, were running to reliefcamps or leaving the district for othertowns and cities. A look at the wretchedconditions of the relief camp wouldtestify to the government’s indifferenceto the plight of the inmates.

The failure of the government to curbthe violence forced people to leave theirvillages and take shelter in policestations. When the attacks intensifiedand spread to more villages, more andmore people fled from their villages. Thedistrict administration had no option butto accommodate people in schoolbuildings or in make-shift camps inschool premises or in the nearby openfields. It was raining those days and onecould imagine the condition of the reliefcamps. In the absence of sanitaryfacilities and non-availability of usablewater, the conditions worsened. Smallchildren were defecating in the campsiteitself and dogs and cows were freelyroaming around the camp. As a result,gastroenteritis and fever spread veryfast. People had to run away from theirhouses with whatever they had on theirbody. In the relief camps, they had tomanage with only one set of clothesprovided by the government (one saree,one petticoat and a blouse for women; adhoti, a shirt and one pant for the men;and a shirt or frock for children). Peopleoften complained of the rotten rice anddal given in the camp. The condition ofwomen was more precarious. They werenot provided with sanitary napkins orclothes during the time of menstruation.Due to the trauma and the long trek inthe forests, some pregnant women

11

suffered miscarriages. According tonews reports, 26 babies have beendelivered in the relief camps till mid-October. Despite all these horribleconditions in which people were living,the government was stubborn enoughnot to allow other groups to providerelief material. It only left the people tosuffer and rue their fate.

People had fled to the relief camps forphysical security. But, even in the reliefcamps, they were not secure. Bombsexploded near the relief camp in G.Udaygiri and K. Nuagaon. Reports ofwater tanks being poisoned and yetanother incident of a mob of lathi-wielding women trying to forcibly enterthe Raikia relief camp further intensifiedthe trauma of the people.

While Christian people, particularlyfrom Kandhamal, were going throughall these, the Sangh Parivar was gearingitself to intensify its anti-Christiancampaign across the state in the form ofthe Kalashyatra (soil fromLaxmanananda samadhi would be takento each village in Orissa). Again, thegovernment did nothing and chose toremain tight-lipped. Only when theSupreme Court, hearing a Public InterestLitigation, asked the state governmentwhat measures it had taken to containfurther violence, the governmentsubmitted an affidavit stating that theKalashyatra would not be allowed to takeplace. However, the governmentallowed the Sangh Parivar to organizethe Shradanjali Sabha in Bhubaneswarwhere the Hindu fundamentalistleaders vowed to wipe out the

Christians from Kandhamal. Themeeting was attended by the BJP statepresident, among others.

The government’s inaction in thebeginning not only led to the rise in thedeath toll, but also to the increase in theattacks. Victims complained that thelocal police stations refused to accept theFIRs. In certain cases, when the FIRswere accepted, the accused were notarrested. Rather, some of the accusedbecame members of the so-called peacecommittees sponsored by the districtadministration. When the pressuremounted in the national andinternational level against the failure ofthe government to protect Christiansand the issue of the imposition of Article355/356 rose, the government was forcedto take some actions. It is worthwhile tomention that 38 days after the lodgingof the FIR by the nun, the governmentarrested some people and handed overthe case to the Crime Branch. Somearrests also took place in the first weekof October. The Chief Minister himselfadmitted in an interview to CNN-IBNin early October that many of thearrested people belong to VHP andBajrang Dal.

By the beginning of October, there wasa decline in the incidents of overtviolence. And, the government began toclaim that normalcy was being restoredin the district. However, the situationwas far from normal. The perpetratorsof violence were still at large. But, thegovernment claimed that people wereleaving the relief camps and returninghome. It also claimed that the number

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of people in the relief camps had comedown to 13,000 from nearly 24,000.However, all people were not returninghome. Thousands of people left the reliefcamps and went to several towns andcities in search of work so that they couldsurvive. These people had no confidenceto return to their villages and rebuildtheir lives. One section of people didreturn to the villages, but only afteraccepting the Sangh Parivar’s conditionthat they convert to Hinduism. Whilemost of the vernacular media was silenton this, some of the national dailies didhighlight the fact. Conversion to Hinduisma condition for Christians to return home inKandhamal—The Hindu reported on 10October 2008. Photocopies of applicationforms, expressing one’s desire to returnto Hinduism, were circulated in therelief camps. People were asked to signand return it to the local RSS leaders.Without addressing this issue of forcedconversion to Hinduism, theadministration continued to persuadepeople to return to their villages. Theonly thing the government did was tosupply a register in each relief camp forpeople to record complaints of forcedconversion, if there were any.

The violence intensified as thegovernment was hesitating to take anyresolute action to stop it. Only afterinternational pressure, arrests began.Some innocent people were alsoarrested in the process by the police.Even some school children, it isalleged, were arrested. The situationworsened with the midnight raids onthe villages by the Central ReservePolice Force. On the one hand,

thousands sought safety in the reliefcamps. On the other hand, an equalnumber, in fear of police atrocities,sought refuge in the jungles nearby.

Even continued clamping of curfewaffected normal life adversely. Dailywage earners were the worst affected.The lack of mobility and employmentmeant that their meager savings gotexhausted. Due to curfew, the peasantsalso could not market their vegetableand it was wasted. Thus, it was a hugehumanitarian crisis as well.

The Orissa Government announced thesetting up of two fast-track courts inKandhamal for expediting the trial ofcases related to the violence. However,these courts are yet to function till thetime of writing this report. Thegovernment declared the following reliefand rehabilitation measures for thevictims: Rs. 2,00,000/- (two lakhs) to thenext of kin of the deceased; Rs. 20,000/-for partially damaged houses and 50,000/-for fully damaged houses; Rs. 15,000/- toRs. 40,000/- for damaged shops and Rs.2,000/- for loss of bicycle. On the adviceof the Supreme Court, the governmentalso declared assistance for buildingchurches and prayer houses. In addition,the government announced to open 8new tehsils in the district to hold specialcamp courts at the Revenue Inspectorheadquarters to look into the land issue,to appoint a team of 10 police inspectorsto inquire into the allegations of fake castecertificates and to recruit 500 Adivasiyouths as Special Police Officers.

While the state’s response in preventingand containing the violence in

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Kandhamal was a failure, other parties,such as the Sangh Parivar were active inmany ways to perpetuate the violence.The media too through its silence oncertain issues and its assertionsvalidating the incidents largely, failed toplace people’s suffering or the barbaricviolence in perspective. We look at therole of the Sangh Parivar first.

1.5 Role of the Sangh Parivar

From the beginning, the Sangh Parivarrejected the police’s suspicion of Maoistinvolvement in the killing ofLaxmanananda and his disciples. Itcontinued to reiterate that he was killedby Christian groups for opposingconversion and cow slaughter. Evenafter the Maoist leadership admitted oncamera on 5 October 2008 on NDTVabout its role in the killings, the SanghParivar refused to accept the fact. Afterthe communal violence of December2007, the Sangh Parivar hademphasized the Maoist connection withthe evangelists. The Organiser, theSangh Parivar ’s mouthpiece, (13January 2008) had written, “Involvementof Maoists in the Kandhamal violence isbecoming increasingly clear. They weresummoned by the missionaries of thisdistrict to attack the Hindus. The nature ofattack and arms and ammunition beingused for that purpose make their suspectedinvolvement more clear.” But, after thekilling of Laxmanananda, the Organiser(7 September 2008) took a complete u-turn. It wrote, “It is a well-known fact thatthe Naxals generally attack such rich peoplewho possess much money, property orammunition. In order to snatch them away

from them, Naxals make them target. ButSwami Laxmanananda who dedicated hisentire life for the poor, downtrodden,Harijans and Vanvasis did possess nothingso valuable, then why would the Naxalsattack him? Naxals have no business withreligious matters. All the previous 10attacks were made by the Christians, notby Naxals. It will not be out of place tomention here that in 2006, in an interviewwith this correspondent Swamiji hadnarrated about some true incidents howNaxals used to come to his reformationprogrammes and attend his religious,cultural programmes. Swamiji had norivalry with Naxals. Hence thegovernment’s Naxal attack plea is not atall believable.”

After the Jaleshpeta incident, seniorleaders of Sangh Parivar started visitingOrissa and Kandhamal. PraveenTogadia of the VHP landed there evenbefore 24 hours had elapsed toparticipate in the last rites. We havealready discussed the consequences ofthese visits. The Sangh Parivar lost notime to announce a series ofprogrammes to spread the anti-Christian venom and hatred in the entireprovince of Orissa. The first one in theseries was the “Orissa Bandh” on 25August 2008. As already mentioned,during the bandh, there were attacks onthe Christians and their property andinstitutions. This made the Organizersay, “the swamiji is even more powerfulin death.” The next in the series was theplan of a Kalashyatra. Under pressurefrom the Supreme Court, the OrissaGovernment did not allow this. Thethird issue was the Shradanjali Sabhas—

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memorial meetings—throughout theprovince. In all these meetings, anti-Christian hate speeches, threats andprovocative statements were madeconsistently. Almost all the meetingsmade the following demands: End toconversion and end to cow slaughter torestore peace in Kandhamal. On 6September 2008, the Shradhhanjali Sabhaheld to pay homage to Laxmananandapassed four resolutions. These were: (1)conversion will not be allowed (2)people who converted to Christianitywill be brought back to Hinduism (3)cow slaughter will not be allowed and(4) cattle transportation to slaughterhouses will not be allowed. Later in themonth, BJP leader L.K. Advani visitedthe state and condemned the violencein the district, but called for a nationaldebate on conversion.

The fourth set of programmes was aboutmobilizing sadhus , sanths and theMaharaja of Puri, Shankaracharya for ahate campaign against the minorities.The sadhus sat on a dharna anddemanded: (1) the murderers ofLaxmanananda be arrested and (2)action be taken against Sister Meenabecause her allegation of rape is false.The objectives of the yagyanas organizedby them were to eliminate the enemiesof Hinduism.

The Gajapati Maharaja of Puri andShankaracharya of Puri GovardhanPitha have been vociferous indemanding an end to conversion andcow slaughter in the state. “The killingof swamiji is not an attack on this person;it is an attack on the Indian culture. It is

a ‘do or die’ situation for our religion andculture. If we don’t understand it, fiftyyears from now, we Hindus will not beable to come out of our homes,” saidDivyasingh Dev, the Gajapati of Puri,presiding in one of the ShradanjaliSabhas. The Nikhil Utkal Matha-Mandiradhish Seva Sangh, anorganization of assorted Hindu religiousorganizations, demanded, amongothers, the expulsion of non-Hindusfrom Orissa.

In the long campaign of violence againstminorities, the Sangh Parivar used its petslogans as “minority appeasement,”“religious conversion” and “Hindusbecoming a minority in India.” It will notbe out of place here to talk about itsstrategy of violence and spreadingmyths and lies.

Since the colonial times until the Gujaratpogrom, the Sangh Parivar has alwaysattacked minorities with two-foldobjectives: (1) to terrorize the minoritiesand (2) to push them into misery. As thisis not widely opposed, the fears andvulnerability of the minorities intensifyand consolidate. Therefore, religiousidentity becomes their sole defence.They then develop a parochial mindsetwhere the religious, or sometimes evenfundamentalist, leaders influenceminority opinion and gain furtherlegitimacy. In addition, the basicquestions of livelihood anddevelopment become less important orunimportant. On the other hand, theSangh Parivar by spreading the myth ofthe threat from minorities gainsacceptability and emphasizes a

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monolithic Hinduism. Thus, itsuccessfully glosses over the caste-classdivide within Hinduism.

It is common knowledge that the SanghParivar looks at Hitler and Nazis as itsideals. Hitler’s Propaganda MinisterGoebbles had the following strategy:repeat a lie a hundred times and it willbecome the truth. This is most religiouslyfollowed by the Sangh Parivar. The issueof religious conversion thus was cleverlymanipulated in Kandhamal as the onlyissue that the Sangh Parivar is out to setright. Through this campaign, theyrendered basic issues as secondary inKandhamal.

1.6 The Kui Coordination Committee(KCC)

As in the violence of 2007, the KCC’s roleduring the violence of August-September 2008 needs to be seencritically. As mentioned earlier, theSangh Parivar and the KCC convergedin seeing the Dalit Christians as theirenemy. Before commenting further onKCC—an organization proclaiming toprotect the interests of Adivasis ofKandhamal—it needs to be told thatexcept Lambodar Kanhar, no othervoices are coming from KCC, at least inthe media. Some Adivasi leaders haveinformally told us that he is the self-proclaimed secretary, and nobody haselected him. In the light of this, we needto see the shifts in his statements as theposition of KCC.

At a yajna organized by the VHP in April2006 at Chakpada, Lambodar Kanhar

had issued a leaflet emphasizing aseparate religious identity of theAdivasis and thereby, contesting theVHP’s position that Adivasis areHindus. He had even gone to challengethe VHP to allow Adivasis to pour liquorinto the pit of the yajna (because Adivasisuse liquor in yajna as opposed to theHindu practice of using ghee). But, tomaintain a separate identity, the KCC,led by Kanhar, neither followed anyconsistent plan of action in the past nordid it do anything later. Rather, KCC’santi-Dalit position, primarily, on thequestion of fake caste certificates veeredtowards an anti-Christian positionwithout considering the fact that a largenumber of Adivasis (whose interestKCC wants to protect) followChristianity. The KCC’s positionmanifested itself in a bandh call on theoccasion of Christmas in 2007, though itdenies any communal connection.

In the present communal violence,Lambodar Kanhar, giving interviews tovarious people or organizations, toldthat he was not against the Christians.However, he blamed the Christians forLaxmanananda’s murder (The Sambad, 9November 2008), endorsing the view ofthe Sangh Parivar. He even went on tosay, “the 2007 communal violence wasthe result of the exploitation and tortureby the Panos and Christians (The Sambad,15 October 2008).” Although he had saidthat opportunists had taken advantageof the bandh call, he claimed that noAdivasi was involved in the recentcommunal violence (The Hindu, 1October 2008). “We have urged our tribal

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brothers to keep a safe distance fromboth the warring groups.” But, inanother interview, boasting that hecould stop the violence, not the gun ofthe government, he says, “so, I gave themessage, don’t burn and break churches.The attack stopped” (Tehelka, 14February 2009).

When in early October, large-scalearrests started, he raised his voiceagainst the arrests and demanded thewithdrawal of CRPF from Kandhamal.And, so did the Sangh Parivar. It ispertinent to mention that in the 2008communal violence, several AdivasiChristians have suffered, but KCC didnot utter a word about it. Whenquestioned about this issue, Kanhar hasremained evasive.

1.7 Role of the Media

It is commonly perceived that the dutyof the media is to question, investigateand report facts. In the context ofKandhamal, the unquestioningacceptance by a large section of themedia of what the Sangh Parivar wantedpeople to accept is a matter of seriousconcern. For example, the New IndianExpress (25 August 2008) reported, “TheState Government again harped on theMaoist theory a day after the brutal killingof Swami Laxmanananda Saraswati. But, isit not too convenient to be true? The leftradicals have always stayed clear of religiousissues and there has been no precedence ofany attack on such grounds. Why would theMaoists, whose armed struggle thrives onthe very faith of the local and indigenous

populace, target a leader who enjoyed such asupport base in a tribal district? This issomething that defies logic. While theGovernment has a point behindmasquerading the reason, it is about time itcame to terms with the rise of Christianmilitancy in the State.”

On the same day, The Samaj questionedthe Maoist connection and gave its owntheory. It argued, “the activities ofLaxmanananda were not opposed toMaoists’ interests. So, why would theMaoists attack Laxmanananda and hisdisciples? On the other hand, there wereattacks on Laxmanananda several timesin the past. His dedicated work to stopconversion and bring back the Christianconverts to Hinduism had become aproblem for some people, particularlyfor those who, by taking advantage ofthe poverty of the Dalits and Adivasis,were converting people through manykinds of allurements.”

A large section of the media refuted theMaoist connection and blamed theChristian community without anycredible evidence. The remarkablefeature of this reporting was the strikingsimilarity it had, in terms of language,logic and details, with the reports of theRSS mouthpiece, The Organizer. So,can’t we say that these reports wantedus to believe what the RSS wanted?

Let us now see what a section of themedia wanted to and could hide. Byrelying on the baseless theories ofreligious conversion and blaming theChristian community, rather cunningly,it could camouflage the organized role

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of the Sangh Parivar in the violence. Thisrole was not analysed with anyobjectivity. During the campaign ofbarbarity and violence against theminority, the forced conversionsconducted by the Sangh Parivar did notfind any mention in the media. Instead,citing VHP statements, it was said,people converted voluntarily (Dharitri,30 August 2008). Why was not OFRAapplied in this case—this remaineduncontested in the media. The mediahad no scruples in believing andpropagating that during a phase ofintense violence, people chose to“return” to the Hindu fold “voluntarily.”Finally, when the Maoists distributedtheir pamphlet, gave statements in theelectronic media, owning responsibilityof the death of Laxmanananda, none inthe media—who had been slanderingthe Christian community—thought ofowning moral responsibility andtendering an apology.

The rape of the nun on 25 August 2008initially did not find the prominence itdeserved. After The Hindu reported itin detail on 30 September 2008, the localdailies picked up the thread. The Samaj(24 October 2008) carried the headline,“The Nun’s Rape is a Big Lie,” and wenton to say, “that the two lady doctors havesaid the nun is in the habit of sexualintercourse.” Dharitri (28 October 2008)opined that “the said nun is used tosexual relations.”

The rape charges are to be decided in thecourt of law. Before that, why is the mediaengaged in a slander of this kind?Further, the allegation of rape and the

private sexual life of the victim—how arethe two related? And, with what objectivehas it been presented to the public by themedia? Does that mean women with asexual life can never bring about chargesof rape? Or, is it that raping sexuallyexperienced women is justified?

There were pictures of consequences ofviolence shown in newspapers, but itdid not represent the situation of thevictims in the relief camps. Statementsmade by Sangh Parivar leaders foundlots of place. But, when it came to thevoice of the victims of the violence, itwas miserly. The Press Council of Indiastipulates that the media during violentriots should primarily be the vehicle ofpeace and goodwill. But, in theKandhamal violence, the mediacompletely ignored the people whowere brave to fight for human valuesand some of them gave their lives for it.

On the whole, the role of the media wasanything, but professional. Here, wewould clarify that the lack ofprofessionalism does not rest on thepoorly paid or unpaid reporters andjournalists. Rather, it is the work of theowner-editor-publisher that we arereferring to. As has been opined byProfessor Mrinal Chatterjee of IIMC,Dhenkanal, (Oriya Language Press:Status, Problems and Prospects,presented at the University of Pune inFebruary 2007) that the major vernaculardailies are always partisan, and aremostly controlled by the politicians. Andon this occasion, we would like to addthat their partisanship bordered on theunethical and the fascist.

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1.8 Human Solidarity

Amidst the madness of violence, hatredand mistrust, there have been a numberof instances of human fellow feeling andsolidarity that stand out as beacons ofhope. One such instance is that of theresponse of the people of MalikapodiPanchayat. Jamesh Chandra Pradhan,the sarpanch of this panchayat, said,“After the killing of Laxmanananda, theincidents of violence started pouring infrom various places. The atmospherewas so scary that people did not ventureout after sunset. I decided not to allowany kind of violence to happen, at least,in my panchayat. I toured village tovillage and organized meetings, metChristians and assured them of fullsecurity. We organized night vigils atvarious places. Despite all this, someChristian families went to the G.Udaygiri relief camp. It saddened me.Each day, I went to the relief camp totalk to them and to persuade them toreturn to the village. After three days,they returned. In their absence, theirhouses remained untouched. Neither isa house damaged nor is anyonephysically injured in my panchayat. Ifeel very happy about it; I was able todo my human duty. Some evil elements(did not say clearly who they are) weretrying to create mischief; they eventhreatened me. I did not care. I thinkGod will judge me if I have done rightor wrong.”

Dandapani Mallick of Damikia (BodukiaPanchayat, Baligurha Block) says, “In2007 December, the RSS people were

planning to attack Christians. Sensingthis, we formed village committees in 4villages and did not allow anybody toenter. This time also afterLaxmanananda’s killing, we sat on theroad and did not allow the RSS peopleto enter our villages. They came on 27and 28 August 2008, but we did notallow them.”

Santanu Pradhan, Vice President,Nikhil Utkal Kui Samaj Union (G.Udaygiri), Kanbageri says, “In theperiphery of G. Udaygiri NAC, weorganized meetings and told people notto participate in the violence. We alsotook a decision not to allow anybodyto create mischief in our area.”

As people poured out fromKandhamal and sought refuge innearby kasbas and towns, relativesliving on scarce means themselvesbegan sheltering many families each.We met people living in groups of 30–35 each and incognito for fear of beingtraced by the local Bajrang Dalelements. Relatives outside Orissa toowere taking in people. With thecurrent reality of high cost of livingand unaffordable housing options,one can well imagine to what extentvillage acquaintances and relativesstretched their resources to stand upin support. And, they too shared theanxiety and trauma they felt as wellas the risks involved.

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The Orissa Government in one of itsreports to the Centre on the Kandhamalsituation has said that “the ongoingconflict in Kandhamal district has its genesisin the age-old ethnic divide and discordbetween Kandha (one of the ScheduledTribes) and Pana (one of the ScheduledCastes) communities… There are longstanding disputes between Kandhas andPanas on issues arising out of land alienationand certain other perceiveddiscriminations… The ethnic divide betweenthe Pana and Kandha communities gotaccentuated on religious lines due toconversion of large number of Panas to adifferent religious community. Thecommunal riot in the district in December,2007 was also a fall out of such issues. Inthis backdrop of mutual distrust andanimosity, the tenuous bonds of peacefulcoexistence between the two communities gotdestroyed by the brutal murder of SwamiLaxmanananda Saraswati, who was in theforefront of the campaign against the allegedforcible conversion of Hindus” (Communaland Ethnic Conflict in KandhamalDistrict, Government of Orissa).

There are a few recurring themesaround the situation in Kandhamal thatlead to differences in perspectivewhether it is with some intellectuals,the Sangh Parivar, the OrissaGovernment, journalists or even amongpeople in Kandhamal. These pertain toissues of land, ethnic tension betweenKandhos and Panos, the politics ofHindutva, and the religious conversion

and reservation politics. These themesor issues, it appears, have longhistories. We shall provide here aglimpse of the histories beginning witha brief history of Kandhamal.

2.1 A Brief Note on Kandhamal

As an administrative unit, Kandhamaltoday, has a much shorter history thanthat of the Kandhos and Panos. It is quitechequered also as its territory andboundary underwent changesrepeatedly by those in power. A fewpoints from that history are as follows.

Till the colonial period, the social historyof Khondmals (the Kandhamal sub-division of the present Kandhamaldistrict) is hardly known except for somesketchy references here and there.During the process of the Meriahsuppression, the British annexedKandhamal on 15 February 1855 as partof the Feudatory State of Boudh. “It isnoteworthy that the maps preparedunder the directions of the SurveyorGeneral of India shows that even up tothe year 1903 there was no line ofdemarcation between Baudh andKhondmals. The name of Khondmalsdoes not even find a place on that map.It is only later that the southern hill tractsof Baudh have been designated asKhondamals by Government”(Completion Report of the BaudhSettlement of 1907 quoted in Boudh-Khondmals District Gazetteers 1983).

II. The Issue of Land: A Historical SketchII. The Issue of Land: A Historical SketchII. The Issue of Land: A Historical SketchII. The Issue of Land: A Historical SketchII. The Issue of Land: A Historical Sketch

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After this conquest, the BritishGovernment appointed a Tahsildar(Dinabandhu Pattanaik) to administerthe tract under the charge ofSuperintendent of Tributary Mahals. In1891, it became a sub-division under theAngul district and continued to remainunder it till 1936. It became part of theGanjam district after Orissa became aseparate province in 1936. The Baligudasub-division of the present Kandhamaldistrict was part of the Ganjam AgencyArea under the Madras Presidencysince its occupation by the British. In1949, it was attached to the Boudh-Khondmals district.

The Kandhos and the Panos, in theirdispersed hamlets and settlements, it isoften said, were relatively autonomous.In 1837, Mr. Ricketts reported that theBoudh Raja had no power over hisKhond subjects, and in 1844, Mr. Mills,another administrator of the region,stated, “the Khonds had long been atfeud with him (i.e. the Boudh Raja), paidno revenue, were under no kind ofcontrol, and were in the habit of makingencroachments on the lands of the Raja”(O’ Malley, Bengal District Gazetteer,Angul, 1908). But, this statement wasmade at a time when the British weretrying to systematically bring thesubjugation of the Kandhos and Panosas revenue producers. And, it has beenseen at times that such statements werebargaining statements by the Raja (andother intermediaries) to give less to theBritish, despite collecting regularly fromthe Kandho and Pano peasants.Madhaba Kanhara and NabaghanaKanhara were two influential chieftains

who defied the authority of not only theRaja, but also the British authoritiesduring this time.

2.2 Socio-Economic Contours ofKandhamal

Kandhamal, or the hills of kandhos, waspart of the erstwhile Boudh-Phulbani.After the reorganization of districts, itbecame Phulbani on 1 April 1994 withtwo sub-divisions, Baliguda andKandhamal. Later, in June 1994, it wasagain renamed as Kandhamal. It is oneof the centrally located districts withRayagada in the south, Ganjam in thesoutheast, Nayagarh in the east andKalahandi in the west. The entire districtis full of hills and forests; cultivable landis scarce. According to OrissaAgricultural Statistics 2006–07,published by Director of Agricultureand Food Production, Bhubaneswar, outof the total geographical area of 8,02,000hectares, 571,000 hectares (71.19%) isunder forest cover and the net sown areais only 1,15,000 hectares (14.37%).

Demographically, Kandhamal is a tribalmajority district. According to the 2001census, tribals constitute 52.7%. Amongthe tribes, Kandhos are numericallysuperior though there are Gonds andSaoras. Dalits account for 16.9% of thetotal population of which Panos form themajority. Others include Ganda, Ghasiand Dom. The remaining 30.4% consistof Christians (mostly Dalit Christians)and various other Hindu caste groups,such as Khandayat, Karan, Brahmin,Sundhi and Suda. In Kandhamal, thesecaste groups are referred to as Oriyas.

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In spite of scarcity of cultivable land,agriculture has remained the mainstayof the district’s economy. It is dominatedby marginal and small peasants (fordetails, see pp. 25–26). The majority ofthe workforce (cultivators 33.47% andagricultural labourers 36.1%, Census2001) is engaged in agriculture. Despitethe region being in the KBK zone, noefforts have been taken to effect anychange in agriculture or in the patternof land ownership. So, the agriculturaleconomy of the region has remainedcrisis ridden and at subsistence level.

Collection of forest produce and its tradeis another major economic activity.Slash-and-burn cultivation is one of themain occupational activities of thelandless Adivasis. Beside kandulo(pulses), turmeric and ginger are largelygrown in forest lands. Siali leaves, salseeds, tamarind and mangoes are alsocollected from the forest by the Adivasis.Though we cannot precisely assess thenumber of people dependent on suchminor forest products or the proportionof earning as constituted by theseproducts from the district or state leveldata, there is some indication of it invillage level statistics. A study of villageBuluburu (Belghar) conducted by theTribal and Harijan Research andTraining Institute, Bhubaneswar stateshow Adivasis of the village depend onfruits, tubers and leaves collected fromthe forest for almost eight months in ayear for their survival (Orissa’s Kandhos,pp. 396). We have also learnt from thevictims of violence that many earn theirliving by collecting and selling firewoodfrom the forest.

However, the marketing of these minorforest products is not under the controlof the Adivasis. Places like Tikabali,Raikia and Baligurha are importanttrading centres for forest products.According to the Gazetteer, Tikabali isnoted for trade in minor forest productslike tamarind and siali leaf. Raikia isnoted for trade in turmeric, hill-broomsand tamarind. Baligurha is known forpulses, niger and mustard. The tradersat these places are mostly non-Adivasisand “outsiders,” known as Oriyas, whodetermine the prices of the products.

2.3 Land, Alienation and Contention

Over centuries, the Adivasis havecleared forests and made themcultivable or agricultural lands. Later,they were pushed out of these lands bymore powerful people and rescinded toless fertile hilly lands — whether it isthe ‘dangar’ cultivation in Rayagadadistrict or the ‘mal’ as in Kandhamal.According to anthropologists andhistorians, this process of pushing theAdivasis to interiors began in the 10thand 12th century A.D. F. G. Bailey, whostudied the Kandho culture during the1960s, has said, “the Oriyas from theplains have settled here for 900 yearsand many of the new settlers are land-grabbers” (Caste, Tribe and Nation byF.G. Bailey). One can get similarinformation from the myths and lore ofthe Kandhos that have developedaround it. (Religious Ceremonies,Ordeals and a Legend about Oriyainfiltration in Kondh Hills - U. N.Pattnaik, Adibasi, January 1970).

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Moreover, when land defines economy,it not only becomes the source oflivelihood, but also the source of dignityand power. F. G. Bailey observes, “Thelarge Oriya villages are sited in thewider valleys, where the greatestamount of land suitable for ricecultivation is to be found. They occupythe best cultivating sites in the valleys,while the Konds occupy sites which aresmaller and in remoter valleys. The factthat they occupy the best land indicatesthat Oriyas have established adominance of some sort over the konds,who were unable to retain the bestcultivating sites.”

2.3.1 Under the British RajWhen the British forced its way intoKandhamal in the early part of the 19thcentury to suppress the meriah sacrificeand abolish female infanticide, itencountered stiff resistance from theKandhos. The resistance was due to thefear that the British snatch their landand impose a tax on them. After thisconquest by the British, the politicaland revenue administration ofKandhamals was organized throughthe Mutha system. 1

The period from 1830 to 1870 saw a spateof rapid changes in the Adivasi society.After the entry of money economy andexcise duties on the Kandhos’ liquorproduction, we see increasingindebtedness among the Kandhos. Thisprocess was engendered largely by thecolonial state. Poor Adivasis werefurther impoverished and were forced

to give up their land while thedomination of the money lender or thebuyer of land began to grow. New courtsor the judiciary did not help the poorAdivasis. The Kandhos were tricked intoparting with their lands as is the casewith Adivasis across the country underthe colonial regime. The Kandhosrejected the modern colonial judiciaryand viewed it with suspicion becausethey were being coerced to part withtheir land. With justice inaccessible andfurther impoverished, they were left tothe despotism of the money lender andshundhi, the liquor trader. Most certainly,the Oriya shundhi was the worstexploiter of the Kandhos.

In 1902, the colonial administrationpassed an order that no land can betransferred to non-tribals without theprior consent of the DeputyCommissioner. Again, Angul LawsRegulation of 1913 was promulgated tothat effect. Despite these legalprotections, tribal people lost land tonon-tribals because they did not haverecord of rights and due to thesustained unscrupulousness of therevenue officials.

In 1921–25, the first survey andsettlement operation was undertaken inKandhamal. Out of the 50 muthas inKandhamal, all villages in 9 muthas weresurveyed because in those villages, non-Kandhos owned land. A survey revealedthat more than one fourth of the landheld by the tribals had passed on to thenon-tribal. (District Gazetteer, 1983)

1 A mutha is a cluster of villages with a Sardar as its head with one or two assistants called Mallik. The head ofthe Mutha was appointed by the colonial administration to collect revenue and maintain law and order in theMutha. In return, the Sardars were getting 12.5% of the gross demand of the land revenue as commission.

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We are constrained by fragmentaryhistorical evidence to talk of theBaligurha sub-division only and not thePhulbani sub-division, as it was undera different administrative authorityduring the British times. The revenueadministration in Phulbani may not bea replication of that of Baligurha, but thefate of the peasant producers, it appears,was not greatly different from those inBaligurha. Throughout the latenineteenth and early twentiethcenturies, the British tried manypermutation and combination ofrevenue administration: the muthadarsystem, the zamindari system, then backto the Collector as revenueadministrator and so on. Many landsurveys were necessitated by theseexperiments, though the surveys werenot covering the entire region or notcompleted at times (as in1924). Landalienation from the Kandhos continued.Finally, the British passed The AgencyTracts Interest and Land Transfer Act Iof 1917 that “prohibited all transfer fromhill men to non-hill men without expresspermission of the authorities.”

2.3.2 Independent IndiaTo protect tribal land, the OrissaGovernment passed the OrissaScheduled Areas Transfer ofImmovable Property (by ScheduledTribe) Regulation 1956. Despite suchacts, the question of land alienationsurfaced repeatedly and becamecontentious. In 1966–68, a landgrabbing movement had started underthe leadership of Ugrasena Mallick in

Khajuripada area against sundhis(interview with Krushna Majhi, one ofthe leaders of the Kui Samaj SevaSamiti). The District Gazetteers (1983)mentions, “In 1970, the Adivasis of theKhondamals subdivision had started anagitation for the restoration of theagricultural lands of their forefatherswhich had been allegedly usurped bythe non-Adivasis. They were beinginstigated by the Kui Samaj Samiti tocommit offences of trespass andforcible reaping of paddy involving thelands under the occupation of the non-Adivasis. This for sometime had givenrise to a serious problem of law andorder in the district.” In the presentstate of historical research, it is difficultto know more about land movements.However, after independence, the firstsurvey of land started in 1977–78, butthat too was not completed.

The issue of land remained unresolved.In 1994, when the Panos of Linapadaentered the Shiv temple, it triggered anethnic riot and spread to Phiringia,Khajuripada. During this riot, theAdivasis occupied the land of manyPanos. After the riots subsided, thegovernment announced the setting upof Camp Courts to settle land disputesas well as promised to set up reviewcommittees to monitor the situationevery two months. Krushna Majhi said,“some Panos went to the High Courtregarding the disputes and after the riotsthe government also showed littleinterest to settle the land disputes. Noprogress was made in that regard.”

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Again, in 1998, to make the reviewcommittees work, the KCC organized ademonstration of 7000 people. In 2000,there was tension between the Adivasisand the Dalits on the issue of land inKotgarh block (Subarnagiri, Majaguda,Judabali). Shyam Patmajhi, leader of thePahadi Sangram Manch, says, “The sub-collector, after inquiries into records,returned the land to the real Adivasiowner. But, during the harvesting time,by the provocation of Nakula Nayak,local Dalits did not allow the Adivasisto reap the crop. As a consequence, therewas a riot in which Adivasis damagedthe houses of the Dalits and attackedthem physically.” Again, in June 2002,such a conflict arose in DaringabadiBlock (Jhinjhiriguda and Brahmanigaonpanchayats). Around 500 Adivasis with80 pairs of bullocks started cultivatingthe land under the possession of Dalits.The district administration didintervene, but had to bow down to thewishes of the organized Adivasis; theDalits left their village in fear, seekingrefuge in the police station (Prajatantra,7 July 2002).

In Gahana (Gadaguda panchayat ofG.Udaygiri), Binod Mallik said, “there isno land conflict in our Panchayat. Poverty

drove the Adivasis to sell their lands.”Budhia Singh, the former Chairman ofG.Udaygiri block claims that there are noland disputes in Padangi.

During the 1990s, small radical groupshad organized landless people aroundthe issue of land. Perhaps, thegovernment, due to pressure, tried tochange the 1956 Regulation in 2002 bymaking a provision that all landtransfers from ST to non-STs between 4October 1956 and 4 September 2002 mustbe verified to ascertain theirgenuineness, and the personspossessing such land must prove to thesub-collector by 4 September 2004 (laterextended to 2005) that the transfer waslegal. In all probability, this was inresponse to the growing tensionsaround land transfer from the Kandhosand the insistence of the KCC to lookinto these matters.

A look at the tables below will indicatethe systematic transfer of land fromthe Kandhos.

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Scheduled Caste

S.No.Size ofHolding

IndividualHoldings Joint Holdings Total Holdings

(in ha) Number Area Number Area Number Area

1 Marginal 9892 4129 65 33 9957 4162

2 Small 2028 2676 65 86 2093 2762

3 Semi-Medium 503 1256 30 67 533 1323

4 Medium 80 446 0 0 80 446

5 Large 5 74 0 0 5 74

6 All Classes 12508 8581 160 186 12668 8767

Scheduled Tribe

S.No.Size ofHolding

IndividualHoldings Joint Holdings Total Holdings

(in ha) Number Area Number Area Number Area

1 Marginal 29980 17600 180 116 30160 17716

2 Small 18475 25764 210 297 18685 26061

3 Semi-Medium 7576 19981 155 402 7731 20382

4 Medium 1525 8358 35 198 1560 8556

5 Large 145 2024 0 0 145 2024

6 All Classes 57701 73727 580 1013 58281 74739

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From the above tables, it can be seen thatnearly 77% of the total land held by thesethree groups (ST, SC and Other) is inthe hands of STs, 9.03% with SCs and13.97% with Others. Again, if we analyzethe land holding pattern within thesocial group, the disparity is obvious.For example, among the STs, theMedium and Large holdings constituteto 2.91% of the total holdings, whereasthey hold 14.19% of the total area. Onthe other hand, the Marginal and Smallholdings constitute 83.80% of the totalholdings, whereas they hold 58.56% ofthe total area. As regards SCs, Marginal

and Small holdings constitute 95.12% ofthe total holdings, whereas they hold78.97% of the total area; Medium andLarge land holdings constitute 0.67% ofthe total land holdings, but they accountfor 5.93% of the total area. AmongOthers, Marginal and Small holdingsconstitute 90.58% of the total holdings,and they hold 65.87% of the total area.Medium and Large holdings constitute2.05% of the total holdings, whereas theyhold 13.69% of the total area.

From the above account, it is evident thatAdivasis constitute about 52.7% of the

Others

Marginal: Upto 1 ha., Small: 1 ha. to 2 ha., Semi-medium: 2ha. to 4 ha.

Medium: 4ha. to 10 ha., Large: 10 ha. and above (Source: Agricultural Census 2000–01).

S.No.Size ofHolding

IndividualHoldings Joint Holdings Total Holdings

(in ha) Number Area Number Area Number Area

1 Marginal 9612 4715 70 28 9682 4743

2 Small 3099 4169 20 26 3119 4195

3 Semi-Medium 1015 2707 25 66 1040 2773

4 Medium 255 1472 5 37 260 1509

5 Large 30 348 0 0 30 348

6 All Classes 14011 13411 120 157 14131 13568

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population and own 77% of total landin Kandhamal. On the other hand, Dalitsare about 16.9%, but they own about9.09% of total land. As the DalitChristians are included in othercategories, the percentage of Dalitownership of land may increasemarginally. A study conducted by agovernment research institution statesthat the sundhis have grabbed land. And,therefore, how true is the allegation thatDalits (Panos) are land grabbers? Thetables also show that in all categories,there is small section that owns a largeamount of land. But, in Kandhamal,there is no struggle against large landowners, which is generally seen in otherland movements. The official statisticson the land holding pattern does notclearly reflect the ground reality. It istherefore obvious that no proper surveyof land or settlement records have takenplace. Who should be blamed for thislapse, the state government or the Dalitsin Kandhamal?

Further, though Lambodar Kanhar,alleges that Panos are land grabbers, hecould hardly cite cases of land grabbing.This is despite the fact that he submitteda list of 503 fake caste certificate cases tothe district administration. Interestingly,Brahmananda Behera, Secretary of PanaKalyan Samiti in a writtenmemorandum submitted to the ChiefMinister of Orissa dated 2 October 2008

has invited KCC to cite cases of landgrabbing by Panos so that the land canbe returned to the Adivasis. But, KCC isyet to respond to that.

Finally, for the sake of argument, onemay concede that there are a few casesof land grabbing by Panos. But, does thatjustify blaming an entire communityand creating an atmosphere of hatred?

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3.1 Social Equation: Adivasi, Pano andOriya

Panos, numerically the minority socialgroup in Kandhamal and judging byeconomic indicators the most depressedas well, is made out by the media to bethe villain of the drama that is takingplace in Kandhamal. They are alwaysreferred to as thieves, cheats, molestersand rapists, or even in the memorandumdated 29 September 2008 submitted bythe Secretary, KCC. This socialostracization runs deep in history too.

Macpherson, the British Officer incharge of meriah suppression inKandhamal, wrote in 1865 “ the Panwais proverbially indispensable to everyKhond hamlet. His duties are to providehuman victims…. ; to carry messages,such as summons to council or to thefield; to act as a musician at ceremonies,and to supply the village with cloth…They use both the khond and Oriyalanguages…. They are treated with greatkindness, but as an inferior andprotected, perhaps a servile race. Theyare never neglected at a feast; any injurydone to them is promptly resented. Butthey are never allowed to bearthemselves as equals”. This graphicallymaps their status in the society. And thisreflected in their material possessionsand existence as well.

O’ Malley, another British official,observed in 1908, “In the Khondmals,the Pans were the serfs of the Khonds.

They worked on their farms and wovecloth for them, in return for which theyobtained a small area of land, grain forfood and all their marriage expenses;they used also to procure victims for themeriah sacrifices. Their serfdom was sowell recognized that if a Pan left hismaster and worked for another, it causedserious dissensions among the Khondcommunity. To this day there is asettlement of Pans – a kind of Ghetto-attached to every large Khond village,where they weave the cloth the Khondsrequire and work as farm labourers”.This is indicative of the wretchedexistence the Panos were condemned tolargely by the neglect of the civil societyand the state.

A century after Macpherson’sobservations, the Boudh- KhondmalsGazetteer 1983 confirms, “the pictureremains more or less the same today exceptfor the Meriah sacrifice”.

Yet, the equation of master-serf, patron-client between Kandho and Panocommunities is more metaphorical thanreal. In Kandhamal, the agrarianeconomy of the hilly and least fertileterrain could barely support both theKandhos and the Panos even atsubsistence level. Economy apart, theirdegree of mutual dependence in mattersrelating to socio-cultural life was quiteconsiderable. The equations betweenthese communities were different indifferent areas. For example, inKandhamal (blocks like Phulbani,

III. Politics of Domination: Past and PresentIII. Politics of Domination: Past and PresentIII. Politics of Domination: Past and PresentIII. Politics of Domination: Past and PresentIII. Politics of Domination: Past and Present

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Phiringia, Khajuripada), the Panos areuntouchables to Adivasis so also toOriyas; the social segregation is quitesharp. But in Baligurha subdivision(Kotagarh, Raikia), it is difficult todistinguish between Pano and Kandho.Economically and culturally, in mattersof language, food, and so on, they aresimilar. Untouchability was non-existent between these communities. Sowhen Nikhil Utkal Kui Samaj Union wasformed in 1929, many people from Panocommunity were also its members(interview with Krushna Majhi).

It is but natural and human to break theyoke of subordination. In the absence ofany political process to redeem thesituation, sometimes, individuals take tostealing as a strategy for survival. Tolabel the entire community of Panos asthieves is unjustified and exaggerated.But the image of Panos as cunning andunscrupulous persists and isperpetuated by political leaders too;bureaucrats too talk in the samelanguage though informally.

The Panos being outcastes of Hindusociety were forced to migrate to these lessfertile and rocky terrain. Some of themwere also bought by Kandhos to work astheir farm labourers. And it had beenhappening for over a century, as testifiedin the records of the British times.

During the British period, the openingof the roads and communication, regularmarkets offered opportunities. Panostook to small trades, worked ingovernment-sponsored works as dailylabourers, supplementing their work asfarm labourers. On the other hand,

though some Kandhos availed of suchopportunities, relatively they remainedless exposed to the changes andremained confined to their material andcultural moorings. Some of them, ofcourse, thought it was beneath theirdignity to take to trading activity, notedF.G.Bailey. The colonial state certainlysubverted the clan structure of socialorder of Kandhos, the Mutha system etc,substituting it with modern bureaucracyand judiciary. This meant a decline intheir political power. Moreover, it wasdifficult for the Kandhos to interact withsuch institutions because of theirlanguage. Panos, on the other hand,were conversant in both languages.Therefore, their importance grew.However, it was the Oriyas who couldmake the best use of the moderneducation that the colonialadministration provided. In addition,Oriyas benefited most from colonialarrangements in terms of the economicand political power. During thecampaign against meriah suppression,some of them had rendered theirservices to the British. This created anopportunity for them to be close to theadministration. After the conquest,Dinabandhu Pattanaik, the de-factoruler of Kandhamal went to the extentof appointing some Oriyas as MuthaSardars, thus combining economic andpolitical power in one hand. He openedup liquor trade in Kandhamal and gavelicenses to Sundhis which became acause of land alienation of tribal people.This became so much of a problem thatin 1872 some Kandho Sardars appealedto the administration to impose tax onliquor shops.

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Besides these changes in economy andpolitical power, Christianity had abearing on the social situation inKandhamal during colonial period.Kandhos had suffered defeat at thehands of the British in the course ofmeriah suppression and they saw themissionaries as part of the foreignpower. Secondly, culturally they were amuch settled community having theirown religious practices. So, initially afew of them embraced Christianity. Butthe situation for Pano was totallydifferent. Even in a tribal set-up, the tagof untouchability did not leave them.They had to suffer social exclusion. HereChristianity offered a sense of meaningand identity to their existence. It wastruer in case of the poorest in thecommunity. During colonial times, itwas the Dalit community that wasattracted to Christianity more than anyother community.

After independence, a new set of rules andinstitutions were in place to emphasize asense of equality which undermined theold equations. Mutha system wascompletely abolished, thereby abolishingthe powerful symbol of the old powerstructure. The Temple Entry Act waspassed in 1949. This provided the Panocommunity, who were not allowed to enterthe temple, with an opportunity to asserttheir rights by entering the temple. But thisassertion was strongly opposed by thevillage Oriya community. It did not resultin any physical conflict; rather the matterended with Pano community building theirown temple. However, this culturalassertion clearly shows the shiftingequation in the social relations: subservience

is no more acceptable. The reservation ingovernment jobs and education had a roleto play also. Compared with Adivasis,Dalits fared better. But again the lion shareof education and job-reservation went tothe Oriyas.

Significantly, the temple entry attemptwas the reason behind the 1994 Kandho-Pano conflict. Even the Pano KalyanCommittee, in a pamphlet of 14 June2006, states, “even now, at many placesin the district, people are prevented entryinto the temples. This social malaiseshould be opposed soon.” This meanstemple entry has been a point of culturalassertion by the Dalits. The emergenceof the traders as an “influential”community in the 1960s and 1970s inKandhamal is an important dimension ofthe social reality. According to the DistrictGazetteer of 1983 (p. 50), many peoplemigrated into the Phulbani, Baliguda andG. Udaygiri regions during 1961–71,which was the boom time for trade andcommerce. This was one of the reasonsfor the sudden spurt in the districtpopulation. The traders in Raikia andTikabali are also immigrants. Thesepeople are known as Kumuti, Patro orsimply Oriyas. These people solelycontrol the marketing of both agriculturaland forest products of the Kandhamaldistrict. Their economic position madethem influential both socially andpolitically. Commenting on thecommunal tensions in Phulbani duringthe 1980s, Nazir Akhtar says, “thoughrioting was led by men of VHP andmissionaries, there is another set ofpeople behind the scene…. They are thebusinessmen and money-lenders, who

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have been exploiting the Advasis sincemany decades. Their invisible hand hasfanned the flames of communal riots. Tospread their influence in the region, theyare engaged in fierce competition whichhas led to the communal tension andconflict. The businessmen of theneighbouring districts also have activelyparticipated in this. To safeguard theirown vested interests, they systematicallypushed the Advasis into a communalcauldron. The invisible hand of thetraders is becoming sharper in relief. Inthe destruction of the Catholic Church inRaikia on 26 August 2004, some tradershad actively participated” (The IndianExpress, 17 March 1989, CommunalTension in Phulbani).

The victims testify to the role of thebusinessmen in the recent riots. Whenasked why the businessmen wereagainst Dalit Christians, a riot victim ofBaliguda said, “I opened a provisionstore in our lane. Previously, peopleused to go to the shop of the Kumuti.Now they are coming to mine. So thereis a drop in his sales and profit. Thegrudge is due to that only.” A journalistin G. Udaygiri, said, “you see the shopsof Kumutis, Patros and Brahmins intowns. Now in panchayat headquarters,harijans have opened shops. Earlierpeople only used to buy from the shopin the towns. So there is a drop in profitof these town-based people.”

3.2 Christianity in Kandhamal

Christianity is nearly one-and-a-halfcentury old in Kandhamal. After theBritish conquest, Baptist missionariesstarted their activities during 1859–63 in

Kandhamal from Russelkonda(Bhanjanagar). Working in Kandhamalwas not easy for them. Kalazar andsmallpox took a heavy toll. In the early20th century, the Baptist missionaries setup camp at G. Udaygiri. The RomanCatholics worked from their stations atDigi and Katingia in the 1880s. Afterseveral years of work, in 1914, Bisi andhis family members first converted toChristianity (Barbara M. Boal, TheKhonds). And, in 1920, on theKumbharikupa hill, the foundation forthe first church building was laid.

These missionaries were the pioneers insetting up modern centres of educationand health in Kandhamal. Anyachievement that the district has todayin these fields is because of the effortsof the missionaries. The first MiddleEnglish school in the whole of Boudh-Khondmals was established in 1914 atG. Udaygiri (Gudripari) and two UpperPrimary schools were established inMalikapodi and Konbagiri and two highschools, O. J. Milman High EnglishSchool and Hubback High EnglishSchool, were established in G. Udaygiriby the Baptists. For medical facilities,they set up the Moorshead MemorialChristian Hospital in 1939. The RomanCatholics also established Primary,Middle English and High Schools inRaikia area. These schools went a longway in providing education not only toChristians, but also to non-Christians(The District Gazetteer, 1983).

In the colonial times, it was Dalits whomostly converted to Christianity in theG. Udaygiri, Raikia and Tikabali areas.Post-Independence, Christianity spread

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to other areas of the Baliguda sub-division like Kotagarh, Tumudibandhand Daringbadi where mostly Adivasisadopted Christianity. DiscussingKandhos’ acceptance of Christianity inpost-independent India, anthropologistFelix Padel writes, “Christianity offersa strong support system, including skillsof literacy and an ideology of justice andequality that helps counteractexploitation by non-tribals. Since these,including the majority of Governmentofficials now, are mostly Hindus,Christianity offers an alternativeidentity that has a powerful appeal”(Sacrifice of Human Being).

However, he further says it created somefrictions in the tribal community,especially at the time of observing ritualsand festivals. And, Barbara Boalobserves, “to be a Christian in these hilltribes is still on the whole to gainprestige, though joining a localcongregation undoubtedly leads tofragmentation within the village.”

But, Christianity in Kandhamal grew,and so did the churches. The charge thatmissionaries, taking advantage ofpoverty, are converting Adivasis wasraised during 1960s. The then SwatantraJana Congress Government passed theOrissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967and declared to take action against themissionaries. As a result, several of theEnglish missionaries were arrested in1968 and later released.

During our visits to Kandhamal, we heardsome allegations against Christians havingdisrespect towards traditional customs andpractices of the Adivasis. Jamesh Chandra

says about an incident in Nilungia, “SukantaNayak, a teacher, is an influential man inthe village. He is a Dalit Christian. He cutdown two trees disregarding the opinionsof the Adivasis of the village. That was asacred place for them. Although they didnot do anything, they resented this action.Secondly, the Christians disrespect theirtraditions. When a person dies, they do notuse the usual bathing place till the ritual isover. But, Christians do not follow thispractice and use the bathing place”. SantanuPradhan questions, “Why do they (Christianpreachers) have to tell in a derogatory waythe Adivasis are worshipping stones, trees,hills and jungles?”

These allegations are few and farbetween and there was no case of violentantagonism between Christians and non-Christians till Hindutva politics gainedascendancy in Kandhamal. It is notuncommon to see Hindu Adivasismarrying Christian Adivasis or observingrituals and festivals together. We had achance to meet the villagers of Gahana(Gadaguda GP) when a Mada (death)ceremony was about to begin. “Thedeceased was a Hindu and his wife is aChristian. They would perform therituals according to their tribal traditionand there is no conflict over this,” thevillagers told. Binod Mallick of the samevillage said, “My grand father, a Hinduhad given land for the church here. I amalso a Hindu and have given land for thegraveyard because the earlier one wasnear the roadside and children feared togo by that road. We lived in harmony.”

From Church sources, it has been learntthat by the year 2006, there are about 521churches and prayer halls in

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Kandhamal. (Communalism in Orissa,IPT Report,2006) In Kandhamal, theChristian population, according to theCensus report of 2001 stands at 1,17,950,which is 18.19 percent of the totalpopulation of the district. It has beenargued that the percentage of Christianpopulation is increasing at an“alarmingly higher rate” and unlessthey put an end to conversion, theHindus or Adivasis are going to be aminority in a few years time. It is truethat there has been an increase in theproportion of Christian population inKandhamal and the growth rate ishigher than that of the Hindus.However, their percentage rise of theirpopulation is exaggerated wildly,willfully ignoring that it is due to a lowbase starting point. (See Table below.)

While discussing the growth rate of aparticular community, the normalpopulation growth should also be takeninto account. We are giving thesepictures to show the real state of affairs

and for an informed discussion to beginso that wild exaggerations andprevarications being paraded as “fact,”“truth” in a Goaeblean style can bechecked. It is important to note that therehas been an increase in the Christianpopulation in some districts of Orissa.(See Table on p. 34.) However, thegrowth of population of a faith does notper se give rise to communal violence.Had it been so, Gajapati, Sundergarhwould have seen violence of the samemagnitude as that of Kandhamal. Whatdistinguishes Kandhamal from otherregions is the interplay of Hindutvapolitics in the district for a considerableperiod. Following is an account of therole of the Hindutva politics.

3.3 Hindutva Politics in Kandhamal

While understanding the exponentialrise of Hindutva politics in Kandhamal,we need to understand how Hindutvapolitics entered Kandhamal.

Year 1971 1981 1991 2001

Total Population 393773 448914 (14.00)546281(21.68)

648201(18.65)

Christians 4040642152(4.32)

75597(79.34)

117950(56.02)

Percentage ofChristian populationto district population 10.26% 9.38% 13.83% 18.19%

(Figures in brackets indicate decadal growth rate of the community)(Source: Census of India)

Decadal Population Growth of Kandhamal District

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As the Dalit movement of the 1960s alertedthe RSS to the fact that Hindu society wasnot as homogenous as it seemed, the RSSstarted talking against untouchability.

Secondly, Adivasis who did not formpart of the institutionalized Hindureligion began embracing Christianity.Thus, RSS created the Vishwa HinduParishad (VHP) in 1966 to systematicallywork among these sections to create aHindu consciousness to convert them toHinduism. Anti-Christian missionarypropaganda was part of the RSS agendasince its creation (Swami Shradhananda,Hindu Sangthan: Saviour of the Dying Race,1926). The Bharatiya Jan Sangh, thepolitical front of the RSS, organized ananti-foreign missionary week inNovember 1954. It seemed to the RSSthat by providing educational andmedical facilities, the Christianmissionaries were able to convertAdivasis, and so the RSS followed suitto win Adivasis over to the Hindu fold.

In 1969, with this agenda, Laxman Sethi,known as Swami Laxmanananda

Saraswati, came to Chakapada, nearly 50km from the district headquarters,Phulbani. He had already been part of theGoraksha Andolan (Save the Cow Campaign)and was a member of the VHP. He set upan ashram and a Sanskrit school in apredominantly Adivasi area. (In 1979,Vanavasi Kalyan Ashram, another outfit ofRSS, specifically created to work amongAdivasis, took over the management of thisashram.) Interestingly, this place is withina range of 30–40 km from G. Udaygiri,Raikia and Tikabali where Christianity andits institutions developed in the initialphase. Secondly, these were emerging astrade centers of the district and remain soeven today and traders, who were mostlyupper caste Oriyas, sensing economicopportunities, rushed to these places fromGanjam, Aska, Nayagarh, etc.

In this ashram-run school, thoughstudents from other social groups areadmitted, Adivasis constitute nearly 90percent and 80 percent of the studentsreside in the ashram. Students get astipend and teachers their salary fromthe state government. All of themparticipate in the shakhas conductedoutside the ashram premises. Theinmates get regular training in the RSSdoctrine. They also propagate Hindureligious practices, rituals and festivalsand campaign against aspects of Adivasiculture, such as dhangda-dhangdi dancein which unmarried boys and girlsdance together, which is also a socialmechanism to choose partners. This wasviewed by the ashram as kusanskar.Besides this, the ashram organizesreligious congregations like namsankirtan and yajnas once or twice a year

Name of theDistrict

Percentage of Christianpopulation to the totalpopulation of the district

Gajapati 33.47

Kandhamal 18.20

Sundergarh 16.85

Rayagada 6.64

Sambalpur 4.15

All Orissa 2.44

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and campaigns against liquorconsumption with the support of theadministration. The ashram also helpslocal peasants in farming and cattlerearing. (Pralay Kanungo, RSS’ Trystwith Politics).

In 1989, a Chakapada-like ashram wasset up at Jalespeta, for girls only, calledShankaracharya Sanskruta Kanyashrama.Again, it was a Sanskrit school run onthe lines of Chakapada. Here too, thestudents, the majority of them Adivasi,get a stipend from the state government.They have been made members of theRashtra Sevika Samiti, the women’swing of the RSS. They propagate variousHindu rites and rituals among Adivasiwomen. The pass-outs of the ashramschools help in spreading “Hinduconsciousness” across Kandhamal, anda number of them, subsequently, becomeSangh Parivar activists (Interview withKedar Mishra, a journalist of Oriya dailyAnupam Bharat who has extensivelywritten on Kandhamal).

Besides these, Malanchal Chhatrabas, ahostel for tribal students at Raikia andtwo dispensaries at Cutingia andKurtamgad were opened by VanavasiKalyan Ashram (VKA).

In the 1970s and 1980s, VHP/VKAconcentrated on the campaign againstbeef eating and other anti-Christianpropaganda. Most people had regardedLaxmanananda as a Baba who is doingsomething good. But his campaignincurred resentment from someKandhos as well as Panos in areas likeKotagarh, Tumudibandh, and Ghati areaof G. Udaygiri as it was their food.

(Interview with Krushna Majhi).However, it was the anti-Christianpropaganda that kept growing. NazeerAkhtar in a report in The Indian Express(17 March 1989) writes that the anti-Christian voices became strident in 1981due to the efforts of Swami LaxmananandaSaraswati. The Swami gave a concrete shapeto an organized agitation againstChristianity. With a view to arouse religiousconsciousness among the tribals andHarijans, the Viswa Hindu Parishad hadbeen taking out in procession, a JagannathRath, to different villages.” They alsoorganized satsangs in villages wherethey discussed national problemsblaming the two minorities, Muslimsand Christians. During the RamJanmabhoomi campaign, when theSangh Parivar was organizing anti-Muslim campaign all across India, VHP/VKA was trying to intensify anti-Christian propaganda in the tribaldominated areas of Phulbani, Gajapati,Mayurbhanj, Keonjhar and Sundergarh(Pralay Kanungo – RSS’s Tryst withPolitics). Finally, the VHP/VKA went forthe reconversion or paravartan drive.For the first time in 1987, attacks againstthe Church began in Kandhamal(Interview with Bijay Pradhan, a RSSsakha leader till 1992, now works in anNGO- World Vision). As a result of theseconcerted efforts, communal violenceincreased in Kandhamal (specificallyRaikia, G. Udaygiri, Tikabali,Bamhunigan areas).

This report also mentions, “in 1985, therewere 12 clashes, but in 1986 and 1987,the number of clashes rose to 13 and 20,respectively.” It also states, “A leader of

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VHP, Swami Laxmanananda Saraswati,has so far reconverted about 18,000converted Christians into Hinduism.”The twin activities of the Hindutvaforces (attacks on churches andreconversion) continued in Kandhamal.Some of the incidents given here arecollected from the book, Faith Under Fire.

1. On 2 and 3 October 1988, Christianswere brutally attacked in Katingia.

2. On 24 January 1989, a priest and achurch were attacked in the Sadingivillage, Pobingia GP.

3. Churches were attacked inSahaliguda, Duringpodi, Budaguda,Nuagan and Madhiguda.

4. In 1997, in the Betticola village (G.Udaygiri) Christians and a church wereattacked.

5. On 26 August 2004, the Lady ofCharity Catholic Church, Raikia wasvandalized.

6. In Chakapada, around April 8-10,2006, about 342 Christians werereconverted to Hinduism on the occasionof the birth centenary of M. S.Golwalakar, the second RSS Chief. Theceremony was attended by Biswa BhusanHarichandan, the Minister of Law andother ministers, MLAs and MPs.

The trend continued to 2007December and then to 2008 Augustwith more virulence.

3.4 The Conversion “Debate”

The invoking of the debate onconversion by the BJP and its allies is

done each time a brutal assault onChristians happens anywhere in thecountry. However, converting or gettingconverted cannot be a reason forbarbaric violence on large sections of aparticular community. Even as a fewreports and voices against this injusticeget expressed, the larger goal ofHindutva is fulfilled — casting a doubtamong the silent majority of this countryof India being the land of Hindus andpeople of all other religions as beingextraneous to this identity. Thisundermines the latter ’s citizenship,rights, and freedom of expression andsimultaneously exposes them to thetyranny of populist opinion that isengendered by conservative anddivisive forces. It is therefore imperativeto address a few crucial points of the so-called “debate”.

The concept of conversion as invoked bythe Sangh Parivar and its allies is quiteproblematic. Firstly, conversion has beendealt with as an act by which somebodyis made to change one’s faith. The role ofthe preacher and missionaries becomesdominant in this definition. The one whochanges faith is robbed of her/his agencyand becomes a non-entity. Her/his voice,thought, imagination and experience arerelegated to the background. Primary tothe act of changing one’s faith shouldideally be the considerations of the personwho decides to change her/his faith.

If the convert were the famous singerSuman or author Kamala Das, the mattermight be different. But, in the SanghParivar–sponsored debate onconversion, the consideration,experience and imagination of the

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Kandho or Dalit convert has no place atall. Following is the account of a fewexperiences of the converts.

A Christian Adivasi, an old man fromBaliguda, said “I became a Christian sinceI was young. I gave up alcohol since. Ihave become a good man. I have neverfought with anybody. I have learnt to livein peace and with truth. Our Adivasireligion also has peace and truth. But itsfestivals/celebrations are expensive.”

A middle-aged man from Kalingapanchayat says, “I was ill. I was vomitingblood. I was with my brother. Doctorstried hard, but my vomiting did not stop.It was early in the morning. I dreamt ofa bearded old man with a stick standingbeside me. After that I recovered. Iremember having seen a similar dreamduring my school days. I believed Jesushas cured me. And I became a Christian.I was the secretary of the Shiva templecommittee of our village for seven toeight years. When I converted toChristianity, of course, my village folkswere sad.”

A woman of Katingia said, “we becamemore clean after converting toChristianity. We had good clothes. Andhad education.”

A 67-year-old-man from Raikia said, “Iwas not forced to be a Christian in 1956as we are being forced today to becomeHindus. It was only after conversion thatwe were able to raise our heads insociety. And please do not ask me howlife was before becoming a Christian.”

Do these voices figure in the “conversiondebate”? And, do they not tell us of the

deep-seated inequality of the oppressivecaste structure from which peoplestepped out?

Secondly, it undermines a citizen’s rightto choose one’s own faith and to practice,profess and propagate one’s own religionas guaranteed by the Constitution of India(Article 25.1). Therefore, citizenship andnationality are not based on religion. But,in the definition of the Sangh Parivar,dharma bhumi is pitrubumi—nationality isbased on religion. People followingreligions that originated outside India,such as Islam and Christianity, areforeigners or outsiders. Therefore, theymust be eliminated or at the least reducedto second-rate citizens. Madhusudan Daswas a Christian and he was the foundingfather of Oriya nationalism. Will the SanghParivar call him an outsider or a foreigner?

Allurement is another plank in this“debate”. People who level suchcharges do not define what allurementis. They only allege that conversion ishappening only because the Christianstake advantage of the poverty of theDalits and Adivasis. They also pointfingers at the Christian-aided schoolsand hospitals. But, such debates do notever address the fundamental questionas to why the Adivasis and the Dalitsare so poor.

In cities in Orissa, there are Christian-run schools and other institutions ofhigher education. And, children fromaffluent families study there. But, themotives of those schools andinstitutions are never questioned. Is itbecause those institutions cater to theneeds of the rich?

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Hinduism is eulogized when peoplefrom the West embrace it as their faithor when new temples are built. Noallegation of allurement is broughtforward then. Pralay Kanungo writeshow 10,00,000 Christians have convertedto Hinduism, Sikhism, Islam andBuddhism. Since 1960s, the HareKrishna movement and shakhas haveproliferated in huge numbers. How doesone interpret this? Will it be justified tosay that these conversions happenedthrough deceit or were forcedconversions through allurements?

2.8 Politics of Reservation

There have been caste and ethnic tensionsin Kandhamal in the recent past. It isalleged that Panos, identifyingthemselves as Kui-speaking (Kandhospeak the Kui language), are demandingST status and privilege. According to thepress note (dt. 26 September 2007) of thePhulbani Kui Jan Kalyan Sangh, “In 1980–81, when the Kuis were registered asPanos on revenue documents, there wasprotest. Consequently, the Governmentof Orissa wrote to the Government ofIndia, recommending inclusion of Kuisin the list of tribes. This recommendationhas become a Presidential Order since thelast 23 years.”

The Presidential order of 2002 accordedtribal status to the Kuis, and it wassubsequently notified in the OrissaGazettee (12 June 2003). Following this,the Kui Jan Kalyan Sangh moved theOrissa High Court praying that therevenue records wrongly mention Kuisas Panos, and this may be corrected. The

High Court granted them relief, askingthe Orissa Government to makecorrections in the revenue records.

But, which community in Kandhamalshould be called Kui became acontroversial issue. Kui Jan KalyanSangh states that Kui is the name of atribe that is different from Kandhos andothers. The KCC states that Kui is theself-reference of the community referredto variously as Kandho, Khond, Kond,Cond by the Britishers in the 19thcentury. That means Kandhos are Kuis.Kui is also the name of the languagespoken by the Kandhos. KCC allegesthat the Kui-speaking Panos, in thedesire of cornering the reservedgovernment jobs and land for theKandhos, want the ST status forthemselves by being named Kuis. Theadministration did not resolve the issueand the KCC agitated and theatmosphere became tense. The NationalMinority Rights Commission hadsuggested the government to resolve theissue after the 2007 riots as mentionedin the beginning of this report.

Baliguda, we mentioned earlier, wasunder the administrative jurisdiction ofthe Madras Presidency. In thatpresidency, administrative records dorefer to some “hill tribes” and Panos areincluded in it. Till 1950, the Doms andPanos of the Kandhamal district wereincluded in the list of Schedule Tribes (TheKondhs: A Handbook for Development,R.K.Nayak, Barbara Boal, Nabor Soreng).In 1951, by a presidential order, they wereincluded in the list of Schedule Castes,along with the implementation of thereservation policy.

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The problem actually lies in thisreservation policy. Although publicsector jobs are reserved for both STs andSCs, religion has been added only to theschedule castes. If members of SCconvert to Islam or Christianity, they losetheir SC status and become ineligible forreservation benefits. People of SCremain religiously discriminated in apolicy of positive discrimination. At thenational level though, manyorganizations are demandingrecognition of Dalits across religiouscommunities. In Orissa also, Dalitorganizations are making similardemands. The National Commission forReligious and Linguistic Minorities, inits report of 2007, has recommended SCstatus for Christian and Muslim Dalits.

In Kandhamal, Kui Jan Kalyan Sangharaises the issue as one to set right ahistoric treachery. KCC, on the otherhand, thinks the meagre governmentjobs and other benefits underreservation policy becomes less ifanother community is added to the listof beneficiaries. Two mostdisenfranchised communities are atloggerheads because of the reservationpolicy. This kind of conflict is alsowitnessed in other parts of ourcountry. Since the 1990s, under thenew economic policy, the employmentopportunity in public sector isbecoming lesser by the day. On theother hand, the serpentine queues ofthe educated unemployed people infront of government offices arebecoming longer. Kandhamal is alsowitnessing this, despite the fact thateducation is not that widespread in

Kandhamal. Even going bygovernment records, by the end of2003, there were 4648 unemployededucated among the Advasis and 3077amongst the schedule castes. (DistrictStatistical handbook). Given the stateof the economy, it is not surprising thatthe recognition as STs or ‘grabbing’ ofcaste becomes a volatile issue.

Forged caste or tribe certificates haveadded to this social conflict. KCCcomplains that Panos, are cornering thebenefits meant for the Advasis by usingfake caste certificates. The Pano KalyanSamiti also states that if there has beensuch a case of forgery, the culprits shouldbe booked but the entire community ofPanos should not be slandered. After theAugust–September 2008 riots started,the government announcedappointment of 10 police inspectors tolook into the alleged cases of certificateforgery. According to newspaper reportsso far, 801 cases have been broughtbefore the special inspectors, who areinvestigating the matter. (Samaj, 10March 2009)

The Sangh Parivar has made efforts tocapitalize on the situation. It has usedeven this contentious issue for anti-Christian campaign. The Organizer (13January 2008) used the followingheadline, “The demand for reservationbenefits by converted Panos is the rootof the problem.”

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After presenting an account of theKandhamal violence and examiningits historical roots, we raise thefollowing points.

First, in Kandhamal, people havebeen opting to follow Christianitysince 1914. But, conflicts alongreligious lines took place only in the1980s, after a decade ofLaxmanananda’s activities and whenHindutva was raising its venomoushead in national politics. The rise inpopulation of any faith or religiousgroup does not by itself lead tocommunal conflict. Had it been so,shouldn’t the districts of Gajapati andSundergarh in Orissa have witnessedanti-Christian violence because theChristian population in these districtsis higher than Kandhamal in terms ofabsolute numbers? It is our belief thatsocial division or difference, be itcaste or religion, does not lead tocommunal strife. Rather, strifehappens when that difference ismanipulated to create an atmosphereof hatred against the perceived ‘other’community, exactly as Hitler and hisfollowers targeted the Jews in the1930s. Isn’t there a frighteningsimilarity between these two?

The state government allowedLaxmanananda’s funeral procession topass across the district when Section144 was imposed and allowed Pravin

Togadia to participate and makeinflammatory speeches in the funeralrites. However, neither the CentralMinister of State and opposition leadersof the state were allowed into thedistrict nor was relief by NGOs andothers allowed in. The state not onlyabdicated its responsibility ofprotecting the lives and belongings ofthe people, but also gave a free hand toanti-Christian elements to further theirheinous agenda of BrahminicalHinduization and hatred. Whattranspired is not a saga of failure of thestate but its connivance in thebutchering of Christians. As this reportis going to press, the coalition of the BJDand BJP has broken down. And theSecretary of the BJD has made a publicstatement, “As per its hidden agenda,the BJP sowed the seeds of hatred inKandhamal, Gajpati, Sundergarh andMayurbhanj and the Kandhamal riotsare a consequence of this… Being partof the cabinet of ministers, the BJPleaders put pressure on the governmentnot to arrest the perpetrators ofviolence.” (The Samaj 21 March 2009).This statement only reconfirms theconnivance of the government in theviolence for over two months.

Second, the violence was so methodicaland organized that the so-called“spontaneity” is nothing but a lie. Thistheory tries to rationalize the violenceas a spontaneous reaction to the murder

III. CONCLUSIONIII. CONCLUSIONIII. CONCLUSIONIII. CONCLUSIONIII. CONCLUSION

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of a very popular saint. This was largelymouthed by the right wingers of allvarieties. Before an attack, a meeting ofthe perpetrators was held in nearbyschools or anganwadi centres and theviolence was carried out as planned.Houses of Christians were selectivelydestroyed and their belongings looted,but the neighbouring Hindu housesremained untouched. The motive was toruin the Christians economically sothoroughly that they would not be ableto stand on their feet for years to come;in our view, in some ways, it’s areplication of the Gujarat carnage of2002. It is interesting how TumudibandhBlock, where Laxmanananda and hisdisciples were killed, remained by andlarge peaceful.

Blocks like G. Udaygiri, Raikia andTikabali that are between 80 to 100 kmfrom the place of killing are the worstaffected areas. These are the areas wherewe see the first Christian convertsduring the British Raj. These alsodeveloped as important trade centres ofthe district. In the 1970s, traders fromnearby areas of Ganjam, Nayagarh,Bhanjanagar, sensing economicopportunities, immigrated into thisdistrict. They continue to dominate thetrade in these areas. Around the sametime, Laxmanananda set up his ashramat Chakapad and started his campaignagainst cow slaughter and Christianmissionaries. The immigrant traderssupported Laxmanananda’s project.Over the last 40 years, Laxmananandamanaged to have a sizeable following inthe area. His supporters played different

roles in attacking the Christians afterLaxmanananda’s killing.

Third, the ethnic theory, peddled by thegovernment and endorsed by sectionsof the media and some intellectuals asthe entire saga being an Adivasi-Dalitconflict seems far-fetched. Such anapproach not only undermines theactual ground realities but alsooverlooks the planned and systemicviolence on Christians and the range ofinjustices inflicted on them by the SanghParivar, irrespective of whether they areDalit or Adivasi. Barring a few incidents,Christians everywhere, both Adivasiand Dalit, bore the brunt of communalattacks in Kandhamal.

Yet another explanation of the violencerests on the assertion that DalitChristians have grabbed the lands ofAdivasis in the region. However,nowhere has land been forcefullyoccupied by the aggrieved party, as wasseen in the 1994 ethnic violence. Thoughland remains a contentious socio-economic issue in Kandhamal, it haslittle to do with the present communalviolence. The present and all previousgovernments are solely responsible fornot conducting a thorough land surveyand issuing Records of Rights to theoriginal owners of the land.

Fourth, the absolute indifference of thegovernment of Orissa towards theremoval of abject mass poverty inKandhamal, has left the field open tovarious vested interests to manipulatethe situation to their advantage. It’s theduty of the government to provide

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education, health-care for the people.When there is a vacuum of any realdevelopment with people as the centreof the development paradigm, there’sonly marginal economic relief or amodicum of spiritual fulfillmentprovided by other social forces.However it is never an emancipatoryagenda leading to the dignity and self-emancipation of the Dalits and Advasis.Though both the Christian missionaryorganizations and the Hindufundamentalists claim that they areworking for the poor, neither of themhave really ever addressed the questionof land and forests, which are primaryfor the life and livelihood of people.

No tools or measures have beenprovided ever by anyone for the peopleof Kandhamal to go beyond theirpoverty. With mass poverty as thebackground, it can hardly be said thatconversion or change of faith hascontributed to anything beyondsymbolic changes in the material life ofpeople. That conversion does not changethe economic life has already beenattested to in the PUCL report on theKilipal (Jagatsinghpur) conversion case.Rather, this has led to socialostracization of the converts. Therefore,the Hindu allegation of conversionthrough allurement is baseless.

Fifth, the CPI (Maoists) killingLaxmanananda was like a spark todynamite. Their method of combatingcommunal and right wing politicsactually contributed to 39 deaths and50,000 people being displaced. Whatever

semblance of life or family or livelihoodpeople had put together through hardlabour over years were wiped outovernight. Did the Maoists have anyidea of the ground reality or anticipatewhat would follow their action? Wherewere they when village after village wasraided by sword-wielding mobs of 300to 400 in the most planned and systemicmanner? More than a month later, CPI(Maoist), Orissa State OrganisationalCommittee issued a booklet, Why wasLaxmanananda awarded death sentence?claiming responsibility for the killing.The booklet gives justification for the“death sentence”. We ask whether deathsentence is the only means to deal withideological and political opponents – inthis case Laxmanananda? Had theordinary Christians who suffered mostauthorized the Maoists in any way to doit? In the entire booklet, neither have theMaoists mentioned anything about theloss of lives or property of Christians noruttered a word of apology to the victimsand living survivors of the dead.Presumably then, these are thecalculated losses in the “war” they wage.

At the same time, for those who areskeptical of Maoist violence as a meansof checking the rapid, sinister spread ofthe Sangh Parivar and its Hindutvapolitics, we need to think hard how bestto strategize against the right wing bothideologically and otherwise. Theviolence in Kandhamal continuedunabated for over two months. Yet,barring a few sporadic protests, peopleacross Orissa and the rest of the countryremained quiet. Is it because the victims

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were Adivasis and Dalits? If it were tohappen to some influential Pattnaik orMohapatra or a Jachuk, would themiddle-class have remained as silent? Isit class or caste prejudice that was atwork or both? As women, sexualminorities, workers, Dalits, peasants andAdivasis, we have a lot at stake for ourown selves and the future generation incombating communalism. The silencearound Kandhamal is far too deafeningfor us to remain quiet anymore.

Finally , aggressive capitalismcharacteristically paves the way forconservative forces and the ruling classgives them a free hand. As Orissa is onthe brink of “modernization” with theushering in of mega mining projects andentry of multinationals, the leadingparty in power turned a blind eye toevents in Kandhamal as its coalitionpartner called the shots. Looking back,we have seen too closely in the last manyyears the hand-in-glove nature of therise of Hindu right and the agenda ofaggressive neo-liberalism. It was thedefeat of the Bombay textiles strike in

1982 that struck an enormous blow tothe consciousness of the working peopleand enabled the champions of Hindutvato make inroads in wide areas. A decadelater, the economic policies brought inby the Congress at the centre, coincidedwith the demolition of the Babri Masjidand assault of Muslims across thecountry followed by the Gujarat carnagein 2002. Since then the attack on theChristian community in Gujarat,Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Karnataka andother places has been well planned andcarried out with impunity. The tentaclesof Hindutva ideology have meanwhilebecome all-pervasive, and allinstitutions of the Indian “democratic”polity are today infested by theseinimical forces. To combat the rise ofcommunalism and carve a way forward,we need to learn from our historicalexperiences and lessons. And it canhappen as we unite with all progressiveand democratic forces in the struggle fora society of our own making. We makehistory or history makes us.

‘It is not the violence of a few that scares me,

it is the silence of many.’

Martin Luther King Jr

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