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DOI 10117708969205010270030401

2001 27 74Crit SociolDaniel Egan

the Multilateral Agreement On InvestmentThe Limits of Internationalization a Neo-Gramscian Analysis of

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What is This

- May 1 2001Version of Record gtgt

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THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONALIZATIONA NEO-GRAMSCIAN ANALYSIS OF THE MULTILATERAL

AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT

Daniel EganDepartment of Sociology

University of Massachusetts-Lowell

Abstract

The OECDrsquos attempt to create a Multilateral Agreement on Investment providesa useful case study with which to examine the process of the internationalizationof the state Transnational historical materialism sees the development of supra-national institutions such as the failed MAI as part of the neoliberal strategy of anemerging transnational capitalist class However in de ning internationalization interms of the national state becoming a transmission belt for global capital transna-tional historical materialism adopts a deterministic reading of Gramscirsquos theory ofhegemony A more dialectical reading of hegemony suggests that internationaliza-tion will be uneven and contradictory The suspension of negotiations for the MAIreveals how hegemonic con icts both within and directed against the transnationalcapitalist class impose important limits on internationalization

Commentators point to globally integrated production the increas-ing internationalization of services and the hypermobility of nancialcapital as signs that the national economies once characteristic of cap-italism have since the 1970s been replaced by a truly global market(Barnet and Cavanagh 1994 Ohmae 1990 Reich 1991) Globalizationhas it is argued produced such fundamental economic changes thatnational states are no longer capable of regulating economic activitywithin their borders This argument has been subjected to a strong cri-tique (Carnoy 1993 Gordon 1988 Hirst and Thompson 1996 Sassen1996 Storper 1997) which argues that the globalization thesis is over-stated suggesting instead that territorially speci c resources and nationalstate policies are still central to economic activity Others have notedthat in its suggestion of inevitability the globalization thesis has beena powerful tool for justifying neo-liberal national state policies regard-ing trade and investment and simultaneously demobilizing opposition tosuch policies (Hirst and Thompson 1996 Piven and Cloward 1997)The neo-liberal world is one where rational actors are allowed to pursuetheir own self-interest in the context of ldquoeconomic openness limitationson the scope of state intervention in the economy and the primacy of

Critical Sociology 273 74ndash97 at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on September 15 2012crssagepubcomDownloaded from

the limits of internationalization 75

the private sector and private initiative in production and exchangerdquo(Gill 1990 21) In this world state managers apparently have lsquono choicersquobut to discipline labor and free capital from any kind of social regula-tion if they wish their national economies to remain competitive Thuseven if the globalization thesis is not correct state managers may infact be losing (or more precisely giving up) their ability to regulateeconomic activity as a result of a widespread acceptance that they arepowerless to stop globalization1

The failed attempt to create a Multilateral Agreement on Investment(MAI) represents an important case study for understanding this debateIn contrast to the international trade rulesmdashthe General Agreement onTariVs and Trademdashin eVect during the post-war period there was noanalogous mechanism for governing foreign investment The need forsuch a mechanism became more apparent as the ldquoglobal movement ofcapital [became] the nerve center for the globalization of the interna-tional economyrdquo (Petrella 68) During the 1980s foreign direct invest-ment (FDI) ows which grew at an average annual rate of 34 percentgreatly outstripped the 9 percent average annual growth in world trade(Hirst and Thompson 1996 55) Among the major Western economiesof the United States Japan and Western Europe outward stocks ofFDI increased from 66 percent of GDP in 1971 to over 11 percent in1993 (Bairoch 1996 189) MagdoV (1992) sees this shift as a responseto the stagnation of the post-war world economy which forced capitalto seek new opportunities for pro t It is notable that this increase inFDI ows has been highly concentrated among three poles the UnitedStates the European Community and Japan Bairoch (1996) indicatesthat this triad accounts for 97 percent of all international foreign invest-ment and that 85 percent of their FDI out ows go to other triad mem-bers (183) The high degree of concentration of FDI can also be seenat the level of the multinational corporation (MNCs) the largest 100multinational corporations control one-third of the total FDI stock and14 percent of total FDI ows (Hirst and Thompson 1996 53)

The Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations which eventuallyled to the creation of the World Trade Organization included discus-sion of a number of investment issues including trade-related invest-ment measures (TRIMs) such as investment incentives and performancerequirements and trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) suchas copyrights and patents Hirst and Thompson (1996) see this linkageas re ecting traditional assumptions of the close connection betweentrade and investment but such a connection is increasingly problem-atic Storper (1997) argues that FDI can be a mechanism for increasing

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76 daniel egan

trade or a substitute for it Foreign investment by MNCs for examplemay serve major regional markets rather than provide the basis forintra- rm trade between subsidiaries and headquarters The potentialfor a de-linking of trade and investment made a mechanism for gov-erning foreign investment independent of existing mechanisms for gov-erning trade more important

In 1995 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD) called for a strong comprehensive investment agreement thatwould remove restrictions on the global movement of capital Such anagreement ldquowould provide a benchmark against which potential investorswould assess the openness and legal security oVered by countries asinvestment locationsrdquo and ldquowould be an important step on the road toa truly universal investment regimerdquo (OECD 1995) The OECD arguedthat MAI would complement existing international bodies on trade(World Trade Organization) and nance (International Monetary Fund)thereby further developing a global infrastructure for capital (OECD1997c) In addition the OECD pointed to the fact that the vast major-ity of foreign direct investment ows are concentrated among OECDmembers as justi cation for creating MAI within the OECD (OECD1997c) Because the OECD consists of 29 of the worldrsquos wealthiest coun-tries the narrow membership base of the OECD provided considerableopportunities for these countries to de ne the nature of international-ization with regard to investment However the process did not workas smoothly as OECD members might have anticipated Negotiationsbegan in September 1995 and were expected to be completed by May1997 but this deadline was subsequently moved back to May 1998 andthen to October 1998 At the October 1998 OECD Ministersrsquo meet-ing negotiations were suspended inde nitely

The Neo-Gramscian Perspective on Internationalization

In this paper I make use of the neo-Gramscian literature on inter-national relations (Augelli and Murphy 1988 Cox 1981 1987 1993Gill 1990 1993 Murphy 1994 Robinson 1996a 1996b 1998 Rupert1995 van der Pijl 1984 1998) to examine the MAI This literature isgrounded in the Gramscian theory of hegemony (Gramsci 1971) Gramsciargued that the dominance of the ruling class is not simply based oneconomic power or political-military coercion but also is a function ofits ability to provide cultural and moral leadership In this context aclass is hegemonic to the extent that it oVers an integrated system ofvalues and beliefs that is supportive of the established social order and

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the limits of internationalization 77

which project a particular set of class interests as the general interestHegemonic power is not imposed on subordinates but instead is a nego-tiated process Both within the dominant coalition of capital state man-agers and organic intellectualsmdashwhat Gramsci refers to as the historicalblocmdashand in its relations with subordinate social forces dominant groupsmust negotiate (within historically speci c conditions) with subordinategroups in order to secure the latterrsquos consent to the rule of the formerThis process of negotiation can make some accommodation to the eco-nomic interests of subordinate groups and may even appropriate theirsymbols and discourse but it will not question fundamental social rela-tions Although hegemony seeks to incorporate subordinate groups withinthe existing social order however the negotiated nature of hegemonymeans that this incorporation is never complete or absolute In momentsof crisis subordinate groups may question the dominance of the his-torical bloc The result of such a hegemonic crisis will depend on thebalance of social forces If the subordinate classes are unprepared ororganizationally underdeveloped they will be unable to challenge thehistorical bloc in its eVorts to restore hegemony While the restorationof hegemony may require social and economic change this takes theform of a lsquopassive revolutionrsquo in which opposition forces are co-optedby the historical bloc Gramsci refers to this process as trasformismo (seeGramsci 1971 58) Hegemonic crises do however provide opportu-nities for more thorough social change from below through a lsquowar ofpositionrsquo in which subordinate classes create new social institutions andcultural practices in an attempt to replace those of the historical blocRather than a full frontal assault on the centers of power the war ofposition is a coordinated strategic process of mobilization and devel-opment within civil society that seeks to construct a counter-hegemony

The internationalization of production and nance according to theneo-Gramscians re ects the emergence of a transnational historical blocof capitalists state managers and intellectuals that seeks to construct anew transnational hegemonic order Such a historical bloc representsa major movement away from the nationally-based historical blocs char-acteristic of earlier periods of capitalism This coalition of capitalistsstate managers and intellectuals transcends any one class and is boundtogether through common identities and interests by material and ide-ological structures The transnational historical bloc is characterized byldquoa legal and political strategy for separating economic forces and policiesfrom broad political accountability securing management of the economyin the hands of central bankers and technocrats responsive to transnationalcapitalrdquo (Gill 1997 1) which Gill de nes as ldquonew constitutionalismrdquo

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78 daniel egan

Gill identi es three components of new constitutionalism disciplinaryneo-liberalism which refers to the development of policy rules that rein-force government credibility and investor con dence panopticism whichrefers to the development of more powerful forms of market-orientedsurveillance and market civilization which refers to creation of a mate-rial culture in which increasing marketization and commodi cationbecome normalized This strategy requires a fundamental reorientationof the national state toward supporting global rather than national cap-ital accumulation a process that Cox (1987) refers to as the interna-tionalization of the state

Cox identi es three components of the internationalization of thestate First he argues ldquothere is a process of interstate consensus for-mation regarding the needs or requirements of the world economy thattakes place within a common ideological framework Second partic-ipation in this consensus formation is hierarchically structured Thirdthe internal structures of states are adjusted so that each can best trans-form the global consensus into national policy and practicerdquo (1987 254)Elsewhere Cox states that the internationalization of the state is de nedby the conversion of the state ldquointo an agency for adjusting nationaleconomic practices and policies to the perceived exigencies of the globaleconomy The state becomes a transmission belt from the global to thenational economy where heretofore it had acted as the bulwark defend-ing domestic welfare from external disturbancesrdquo (1996 302) The inter-nationalization of the state converts national states ldquointo transmissionbelts and ltering devices for the imposition of the transnational agendardquo(Robinson 1996a 19 see also Robinson 1996b 368) ldquo[t]he function ofthe nation-state is shifting from the formulation of national policies tothe administration of policies formulated by the transnational elite act-ing through supranational institutionsrdquo (Robinson 1996b 373) As partof this process there is a shift in state functions away from redistribu-tion and the regulation of capital and toward the facilitation of capitalaccumulation as well as the insulation of new international economicinstitutions from democratic accountability

In its role as a transmission belt for global capital the national statecontributes to global capital accumulation in a number of ways It adoptsthe scal and monetary policy necessary to maintain economic stabil-ity creates the basic infrastructure for global economic activity andprovides social control and stability (Robinson 1996a) It also helps tosecure a generalized acceptance of globalization as a common sensedescription of an uncontrollable inevitable and ultimately desirableprocess Since hegemony is a negotiated process in which the consent

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the limits of internationalization 79

of subordinate social forces is essential the ideology of globalizationplays an important role in the internationalized statersquos eVorts to win theconsent of its population to neo-liberal policies The ideological con-struction of globalization makes it appear reasonable for states to empha-size policies that support lsquocompetitivenessrsquo and this is used to justifyweaker or lax enforcement of labor laws and regulations on environ-mental protection as well as the elimination of restrictions on trade andcapital movements

The neo-Gramscian perspective provides a number of important toolsfor understanding the statersquos role in global capitalism With its focus onmoral and political leadership it sees the state not simply as a coercivepower acting either on its own interests (Gilpin 1987 Keohane 1984)or on behalf of capital (Lenin 1939) Instead the state is also an ldquoedu-catorrdquo (Gramsci 1971 247) that attempts to win the consent of its citi-zens to the existing social order At the same time hegemony cannotbe reduced to material interests hegemony reinforces the existing socialorder yet it maintains a relative autonomy from that order (Sassoon1987) This means that the rule of the transnational hegemonic bloc issimultaneously material (through ownership of the means of productionand the exercise of state power) and ideological In this context nego-tiations to liberalize trade and investment serve the dual role of seek-ing to free capital from regulation as well as to construct a commonsense understanding of the inevitability and desirability of doing so

This review of the advantages of a neo-Gramscian framework forstudying internationalization raises an important critical point Trans-national historical materialists have acknowledged the contested natureof internationalization (see for example Augelli and Murphy 1988 Cox(1993) and Gill and Law (1993)) However to the extent that someneo-Gramscians speak of the national state as becoming a lsquotransmissionbeltrsquo for global capital and argue that sociologyrsquos national state-centrismneeds to be replaced with a new transnational paradigm (Robinson1996 1998) the possibility that internationalization may be an uneven andcontradictory process remains underdeveloped This re ects what Germainand Kenny (1998) see as a tendency for neo-Gramscians to totalize hege-mony Germain and Kenny are critical of transnational historical mate-rialism for its tendency to ldquosee this hegemony largely as a one-dimensionalpower relationship hegemony is fashioned by this elite transnationalclass on its own terms and then forced or imposed on subaltern classesThese subaltern classes in turn either resist such frontal assaults as bestthey can or capitulaterdquo (Germain and Kenny 1998 18) This criticism isreinforced by Drainvillersquos (1994) conclusion that transnational historical

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80 daniel egan

materialism has ldquoan exaggerated view of the coherence of neo-liberal-ismrdquo that comes from its emphasis on ldquoan organic unity of global elitesand the political cogency of transnational concepts of controlrdquo (111)Likewise as Panitch (1997) argues understanding the internationali-zation of the state as a process in which the state becomes a trans-mission belt for global capital is ldquotoo lsquotop-downrsquo in its expression ofcontemporary power relationsrdquo (93) Moran (1998) makes a similar crit-icism stating that the neo-Gramscians ldquoadopt an idealized model of thestaterdquo and conceptualize globalization ldquoas a one-sided process centeredon transnational elites in the staterdquo (58)

These critiques suggest that transnational historical materialism hasinadequately addressed the methodological core of a ldquoGramscian mate-rialismrdquo which asks us to see social reality as dynamic multifacetedand contradictory (Sassoon 1987 xvii) The dialectical relationshipbetween the material and ideological found in Gramscirsquos concept ofhegemony suggests structural possibilities for con ict that can under-mine the power of the hegemonic bloc as well as the likelihood ofuneven development ldquo[b]ecause one is acting essentially on economicforces reorganizing and developing the apparatus of economic produc-tion creating a new structure the conclusion must not be drawn thatsuperstructural factors should be left to themselves to develop sponta-neously to a haphazard and sporadic germinationrdquo (Gramsci 1971 247)In turn the resolution of particular hegemonic con icts changes the ter-rain of con ict itself as each hegemonic compromise serves as the foun-dation for the next round of con ict ldquowhat is this eVective reality Isit something static and immobile or is it not rather a relation of forcesin continuous motion and shift of equilibriumrdquo (Gramsci 1971 172) Tothe extent that transnational historical materialism posits a correspon-dence between the internationalization of capital and the international-ization of the state it assumes a highly deterministic understanding ofhegemony thereby undermining one of the great strengths of Gramscirsquoswork which is its ldquonon-deterministic yet structurally grounded expla-nation of changerdquo (Germain and Kenny 1998 5) This tension betweenthe substance and method of transnational historical materialism is notedby Panitch (1996) who states that Coxrsquos conceptualization of the inter-nationalized state as a transmission belt is ldquoagainst the spirit of Coxrsquosapproachrdquo(93) Rather than seeing the national state becoming a trans-mission belt for global capital therefore a neo-Gramscian perspectivemore appropriately sees internationalization as a highly contested processin which national states capital and social forces negotiate and struggleover the form and content of the new internationalized state It is thisGramscian materialism that serves as the basis for my analysis of the MAI

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the limits of internationalization 81

The Draft Treaty 2

The draft MAI prohibited discrimination against foreign investorsthrough the use of national treatment and most favored nation treat-ment (now known as permanent normal trade relations) standards Thestandard of national treatment ensures that foreign investors are treatedno less favorably by member states than they treat national investorswhile most favored nation treatment gives to foreign investors treatmentno less favorable than a member state provides to investors of any othermember or non-member state If one standard were to provide morebene ts to investors than the other member states would be requiredto grant that level of treatment Indeed the standard of lsquono less favor-ablersquo treatment would have left room open for states to provide foreigninvestors with treatment that was better than that provided to domesticinvestors To ensure that member states upheld the standards of nationaltreatment and most favored nation treatment the draft Agreement com-mitted member states to uphold the principle of transparency in whichlaws regulations procedures administrative rulings and judicial deci-sions that may aVect foreign investors are made publicly accessible Thiswould provide foreign investors with the resources for them to judgewhether they were being treated in a discriminatory manner

In addition to these treatment standards the draft Agreement extendeda number of protections to foreign investors Member states were toprovide ldquofair and equitable treatment and full and constant protectionand securityrdquo (OECD 1998a 57) to foreign investors and in the eventof losses suVered by foreign investors due to war or other forms of vio-lent con ict restitution or compensation was to be no less favorable thanthat granted to domestic investors Member states were prohibited fromexpropriating or nationalizing foreign investments unless it was doneldquoon a non-discriminatory basisrdquo and with the provision of compensa-tion at fair market value (OECD 1998a 57) They were required togrant temporary entry stay and authorization to work to foreign investorsas well as to executives managers or specialists who are essential tothe enterprise In addition member states could not prohibit foreignnationals from serving on corporate boards of directors The draftAgreement also prohibited member states from imposing requirementson foreign investors that mandated performance-related criteria for the establishment of an investment such as domestic content requirementsand requirements mandating levels of local employment or the use of locally provided goods and services3 Because this section of thedraft Agreement was not speci cally covered by the national treatmentstandard states were unable to impose universal performance requirements

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82 daniel egan

that apply to both national and foreign investors As a result while theAgreement prohibited the application of performance requirements toforeign investors member states were free to impose them on nationalcapital

Unlike the World Trade Organization in which only declared sec-tors are covered by the agreement the MAI was intended to apply toall sectors except those explicitly excluded in the text Exceptions wereprovided for essential state functions although the de nition of thesefunctions was particularly narrow ldquoessential security interestsrdquo includ-ing those taken in time of war or armed con ict those relating to theimplementation of agreements restricting weapons of mass destructionand those associated with a statersquos ldquoobligations under the United NationsCharter for the maintenance of international peace and securityrdquo (OECD1998a 77) Temporary exceptions were allowed in the event of seriousbalance-of-payments and or other nancial crises but these exceptionswere required to be proportionate to the problem and consistent withthe Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund Finallymember states were allowed to lodge country-speci c exceptions to MAIbut these exceptions were subject to the principles of standstill and roll-back lsquoStandstillrsquo prohibited new exceptions after the member state rati edMAI and those that were made prior to rati cation had to be speci cand precise lsquoRollbackrsquo reduced and eventually eliminated those excep-tions with which member states entered MAI The combination of stand-still and rollback was intended to produce a ldquolsquoratchet eVectrsquo where anynew liberalization measures would be lsquolocked inrsquo so they could not berescinded or nulli ed over timerdquo (OECD 1998b 60) Should a mem-ber state seek to withdraw from MAI such withdrawal could occur onlyafter MAI was in eVect for ve years and even then (former) memberstates would be required to subject investments made after the rati cationof MAI to its terms for another fteen years

Finally the draft Agreement called for the creation of two sets ofdispute resolution procedures one for disputes between member statesand one for those between investors and member states Member statescould seek consultation with other members concerning disputes aboutthe interpretation or application of MAI and could seek multilateralconsultations with the Parties Group which was to consist of all MAIsignatory states If the dispute required arbitration a three-member tribunal would be jointly selected by the disputing parties from a ros-ter of ldquohighly quali ed individualsrdquo (OECD 1998a 65) maintained bythe Parties Group The tribunal could either at the request of a dis-

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the limits of internationalization 83

puting party or on its own initiative request a report from a scienti cor technical review board ldquoon any factual issue concerning environ-mental health safety or other scienti c or technical matters raised bya disputing Contracting Party in a proceedingrdquo (OECD 1998a 66) Theprovisions for investor-state dispute settlement were similar to the state-state mechanisms Their signi cance lies in their elevation of investorto a legal status equal to that of the state with standing to enforce MAIas well as the unidirectional nature of the investor-state mechanismsInvestors from one member state were eligible to submit to arbitrationa dispute with another member state in which an action by the latterin violation of MAI caused loss or damage to the investor Likewiseonly investors could receive awards including restitution or monetarycompensation in arbitration

MAI and the Internationalization of the State

The draft MAI re ects a legal and political strategy by MNCs andthe major capitalist states to separate capital from the constraints ofpolitical accountability available at the level of the national state Assuch it re ects an eVort to institutionalize neoliberalism While MAInegotiators emphasized the contributions of foreign direct investment oneconomic growth and productivity in justifying the need for an invest-ment agreement4 the draft MAI de ned investment in very broad termsldquo[e]very kind of asset owned or controlled directly or indirectly by aninvestorrdquo (OECD 1998a 11) This de nition of investment went wellbeyond foreign direct investment in enterprises to include portfolio invest-ment rights under contract claims to money or performance intellectualproperty rights concessions licenses leases and mortgages Thus whilethe draft Agreement indiscriminately extended protections to all formsof capital including more speculative and unproductive forms it framedthe liberalization of investment as essential for development and eco-nomic prosperity rather than an opportunity for private gain This strate-gic decision regarding how best to demonstrate the necessity and legitimacyof MAI was an essential part of the OECDrsquos hegemonic project

In order for this project to succeed MAI required a reconsiderationof the national state Referring to the signi cance that capital places onbringing key personnel to manage investments as a sign of a ldquoliberalbusiness climaterdquo Michael Grau from the German Permanent Delegationto the OECD stated at the April 1997 meeting on the MAI in Seoul that

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84 daniel egan

[t]he problem of the key personnel provision resides mainly in the politi-cal weight of labor market policies under the pressure of persistent massunemployment in some OECD countries and of migration Labor ministriesare closely monitored by Parliaments which often tend to restrictive short term measuresagainst unemployment The political support for a generous treatment of foreigners asa way to improve growth potential in a longer perspective is not always assured (OECD1997e 25 emphasis added)

The assumption here is that the lsquolong-termrsquo perspective open to theneeds of global capital is more likely to be found in a new internationalregime such as MAI than in the national state (as well as in a shift ineconomic policy making toward less accountable units of the state suchas central banks and nance ministries) where the interests of popularforces such as labor environmental and other social movements canbe more directly expressed Likewise OECD Deputy Secretary GeneralJoanna Sheltonrsquos comment at the October 1997 symposium on the MAIin Cairo that the purpose of the investor-state dispute resolution pro-cedures ldquois to avoid that disputes end up in the political arenardquo (OECD1997h) is an implicit recognition that the OECD intended MAI to befree from pressures for democratic accountability from below Internation-alization is framed as a purely objective legal-technical process requiringexpert rather than popular participation MAIrsquos provisions for trans-parency of national laws and regulations did not apply to capital andso there were no obligations for capital to provide information neces-sary for citizens to judge the desirability of speci c investments Therewas no provision for public comment or participation in the mechan-isms for dispute resolution5 and although the nal decisions and awardsof tribunals were to be made public any party could classify informa-tion presented in the proceedings as con dential or proprietary Morespeci cally since there were no binding obligations for investors in thedraft MAI the investor-state dispute resolution mechanisms were notavailable to member states much less civil society for redressing con ictswith capital6 The principles of standstill and rollback and the compli-cated process for withdrawal from the Agreement would eVectively con-strain future member state governments that might be more critical ofliberalization from challenging MAI In addition to these proposed lim-its on state power to regulate capital the draft MAI sought to createa new transnational form of economic citizenship that applied only toglobal economic actors (see Sassen 1996) Apart from member statescapital was the only other global actor recognized as possessing legalstanding to seek relief for breaches of MAI Finally the draft Agreementrsquosnarrow de nition of essential state functions emphasized both the statersquos

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the limits of internationalization 85

responsibilities for protecting private property and the neo-liberal chal-lenge to the statersquos social welfare functions that developed in responseto popular struggles

Thus instead of capital lsquoescapingrsquo the national state an analysis ofthe draft MAI suggests that capital is more correctly being lsquoliberatedrsquoby national states through their participation in the creation of multi-lateral economic institutions This suggests a degree of agency for statesand state managers that is missing in discussions of the globalizationthesis Indeed the draft MAI far from rendering the national state irrel-evant de nes a very important role for the national state in global cap-italism This is most clearly seen both within the draft MAI text andthe debates among negotiators with regard to discussions of social envi-ronmental and labor issues in MAI In response to growing oppositionfrom labor and social movements (see below) the OECD acknowledgedthe necessity for responsible behavior by investors but this is clearly ofsecondary concern in the draft MAI Since 1976 the OECD has hada set of voluntary standards for the behavior of multinationals in hostcountries (OECD 1997f ) The most signi cant of these guidelines atleast in the context of MAI are the sections on employment and indus-trial relations and environmental protection which were added to theGuidelines in 1991 The OECDrsquos Guidelines on Multinational Enterprisesencourage corporations to respect workersrsquo rights to organize tradeunions engage in collective bargaining and avoid discrimination in theiremployment policies as well as to take environmental and environ-mentally related health consequences onto account in their decision mak-ing The May 1997 report by the MAI Negotiating Group (OECD1997d) indicated that the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprisescould be associated with MAI without changing their legal status asnon-binding recommendations The preamble of the draft MAI pointedto the Guidelines as a model for corporate social responsibility butdespite language that MAI be implemented ldquoin a manner consistentwith sustainable developmentrdquo and that member states commit to theldquoobservance of internationally recognized core labor standardsrdquo (OECD1998a 89) it is clear from the text that these points had little sub-stantive authority At the time negotiations were suspended there wasno agreement as to whether corporate social responsibility referred torespect for universal or domestic labor and environmental standardsalthough ldquo[m]ost delegations preferred lsquodomesticrsquo which was recognizedas wider in scoperdquo (OECD 1998b 54 Note 124) This perspective isalso the one most closely aligned with the OECD Guidelines onMultinational Enterprises which state that ldquothey should help to ensure

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86 daniel egan

that the operations of these enterprises are in harmony with nationalpolicies of the countries where they operaterdquo (OECD 1997f 43 empha-sis added)

The contrast between this language and the rest of the draft Agreementis striking There were no enforcement mechanisms included for any ofthese guidelines Not only were they not subject to the MAIrsquos disputeresolution mechanisms but member states were prohibited in the draftAgreement from enacting policies that targeted investors in other coun-tries for violations of social environmental or labor standards as aform of discriminatory treatment such policies would themselves be aviolation of the Agreement for which investors could seek compensa-tion Thus unlike the strong and enforceable provisions in the draftAgreement for liberalizing global movements of capital the degree ofsocial regulation permitted by the Agreement was to remain voluntaryunenforceable and national As a result the inclusion of language refer-ring to labor and environmental standards in the draft Agreement wasnot only an ultimately unsuccessful eVort to win legitimacy for theOECDrsquos eVorts it also had the more latent function of outlining theproper role for the national state in a neo-liberal global capitalism Notonly is the national state essential for protecting private property in itsgeographically speci c forms and for maintaining public order whichhave been longstanding responsibilities of capitalist states (Barrow 1993Carnoy 1984) but in a global capitalism the national state maintains aweak and fragmented system of social regulation that reinforces thepower of capital relative to other social forces7 By keeping the socialregulation of capital national within the context of the broader inter-nationalization of capital the OECD sought through MAI to institu-tionalize the market discipline that would ensure that state policy isconstrained along neo-liberal lines The OECDrsquos stated respect fornational labor and environmental standards provides a degree of ideo-logical cover suggesting that economic growth and environmental pro-tection and respect for workersrsquo rights are not incompatible (see Cavanagh1997 Levy 1997) It also however at the same time provides a struc-tural foundation for the power of international capital ensuring thatthere are no strong enforceable international regulatory standards toplace limits on its operations In this way the draft MAI suggested thatthe national state is an essential element of neoliberal globalization notits unfortunate victim

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the limits of internationalization 87

Hegemonic Conict and the Derailing of MAI

To this point the proposed MAI appears to be a model of transna-tional historical materialismrsquos concept of the internationalized state Itre ected a consensus among the advanced capitalist states for increasedliberalization of investment and it sought a dramatic shift in nationalstate functions toward the protection and expansion of global capitalHowever the fact that negotiations for MAI have been suspended sug-gests that internationalization is not an inevitable process The derail-ing of MAI was the result of hegemonic con icts both within the historicalbloc and between the historical bloc and subordinate social forces

Con icts over the MAI emerged at the very beginning in choosingthe appropriate forum for an agreement European Union countriesmany of which face the political constraints of established left partieswith representation in both national parliaments and the EuropeanParliament initially argued for MAI to be negotiated in the WTOwhich has a much broader membership than the OECD While theWTO would have provided greater legitimacy for an agreement itwould also however have provided opportunities for poorer countriesto express opposition to increased liberalization or at least for theirinterests to be taken into account in the nal agreement The UnitedStates which does not face the same level of political opposition to lib-eralization argued forcefully and successfully for using the OECD asthe proper forum for MAI Following the failure of MAI negotiationswithin the OECD in part because of Francersquos withdrawal from nego-tiations prior to the October 1998 OECD meeting there have beencalls from European negotiators to try again in the WTO (EuropeanCommission 1998) This proposal has been met coolly by US negotia-tors which instead have paid increased attention to changing theInternational Monetary Fundrsquos Articles of Agreement to create a de factoMAI (see Fischer 1997) With voting power in the IMF based on mon-etary contributions the United States has an eVective veto and wouldthus have suYcient power to ensure an Agreement in line with its com-mitment to maximum liberalization The fact that with the suspensionof negotiations within the OECD this con ict remains unresolved re ectsthe continued signi cance of national states and national balances ofpolitical forces in constructing an internationalized economy and aninternationalized state

Con icts between national states were not limited to the choice offorum for developing MAI For an agreement that was supposed toremove national barriers to the global movement of capital there was

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88 daniel egan

considerable eVort to protect states from the core elements of MAI Forexample Australia (OECD 1997a) reserved the right to reject foreigntakeovers of Australian businesses and the establishment of new busi-nesses by foreign interests that were contrary to the national interestto place limits on foreign ownership of media and to maintain or adoptany performance requirement in any sector Canada (OECD 1997b)likewise reserved the right to protect cultural industries and to placelimits on the acquisition of Canadian businesses by non-Canadians Inaddition to concerns over the protection of cultural industries the con-straints on national state sovereignty contained in the Agreement led toFrancersquos withdrawal from the MAI negotiations in October 1998 Forits part the United States sought to reserve the right to exempt subsi-dies given by US states and localities (Dougherty 1998) and also soughtto maintain the Helms-Burton Act which imposes sanctions against for-eign companies investing in Cuba in response to strong European oppo-sition8 In all over 400 speci c exemptions were made suggesting thatthe particular interests of national states signi cantly interfered with theconclusion of a strong inclusive agreement9 Statesrsquo participation in inter-nationalization is thus a function not only of historically speci c levelsof political organization and commitment to political-economic valuesbut also of nationally speci c levels of organization and instrumentalpower among economic sectors The resulting diVerences between stateswill place constraints on the degree of and institutional forms associ-ated with internationalization

In addition to con icts between states subordinate social forces playeda major role in the fate of MAI Although the OECD negotiations wereconducted in secret and excluded any popular participation and althoughthe draft Agreement did not recognize popular forces as a legitimateglobal actor negotiations stimulated considerable international opposi-tion by labor and environmental groups especially after the February1997 draft treaty was leaked and posted on the Internet National andinternational campaigns by non-governmental organizations such asFriends of the Earth Public Citizen the Council of Canadians and theThird World Network were of suYcient strength to compel the OECDto recognize them at least informally The inclusion of language in theAgreement however weak and tentative concerning labor and the envi-ronment was the OECDrsquos attempt to grant concessions to subordinatesocial forces which did not challenge the core elements of the AgreementThis attempt to coopt MAI opponents ultimately failed When MAInegotiators met with representatives of NGOs for an lsquoinformal consul-tationrsquo in Paris in October 1997 the NGO representatives called for

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the limits of internationalization 89

an immediate suspension of MAI negotiations (ldquoJoint NGO Statementon the Multilateral Agreement on Investmentrdquo 1997) More substan-tively the NGOs rejected MAIrsquos combination of strong enforceablesupranational provisions for liberalizing global movements of capital andvoluntary unenforceable national regulations on capital Such a frag-mented system of regulations it was feared would lead to a downwardspiral in which states relax standards so as to encourage inward invest-ment Instead the NGOs called for binding supranational agreementson environmental labor health safety and human rights standards andthe elimination of investor-state dispute resolution mechanisms and theirreplacement with ldquodemocratic and transparent mechanisms which ensurethat civil society gain new powers to hold investors to accountrdquo Incontrast to the OECD NGOs appeared to prefer strong supranationalregulatory regimes that ensure a harmonization of standards in the inter-est of labor and the environment

Finally MAI has stalled because those forces that would most directlybene t from its creationmdashglobal capitalmdashbegan to question whether thisparticular agreement could deliver what they sought The major cor-porate lobbying groups pushing for a MAI included the US Councilfor International Business the Union of Industrial and EmployersrsquoConfederation of Europe the International Chamber of Commerce andKeidanren (the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations) For exam-ple the USCIB provided technical advice to US negotiators and brie ngsto state oYcials and business leaders in major US corporate centers tobuild support for MAI It was opposed to the inclusion of any languageeven non-binding language referring to labor or environmental stand-ards As OECD negotiators granted concessions on labor and the envi-ronment in the hopes of winning the consent of subordinate social forcesthey progressively alienated the USCIB to the point where continuedbusiness support for the Clinton Administrationrsquos eVorts to continue theprocess was as one business journal reported ldquo lsquonot even an inch deepmdashitrsquos skin deeprsquordquo (ldquoOECD Members Likely to Water Down Plans forInvestment Pactrdquo 1998) Likewise Helmut Maucher president of theInternational Chamber of Commerce stated that he was ldquonot that sup-portive of the MAI because they added social wording in at the verylast momentrdquo (ldquoIs Business Leaving a Sinking MAIrdquo 1998) At the sametime the volume of country-speci c exemptions from capitalrsquos per-spective so restricted the applicability of MAI as to lead Herman vanKarnebeek Chairman of ICC Netherlands to state ldquoWhat then weare beginning to ask ourselves is in the MAI for usrdquo (ldquoBusiness StatesIts Views on OECD Investment Agreementrdquo 1998) In reporting on a

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90 daniel egan

January 1998 meeting between a delegation of business representativesbrought together by the OECDrsquos Business and Industry AdvisoryCommittee and MAI negotiators one business journal reported withconsiderable understatement that ldquobusiness expressed concern that nego-tiatorsrsquo attempts to respond to con icting pressures by various interestgroups would undermine prospects for a meaningful agreementrdquo (ldquoBusinessStates Its Views on OECD Investment Agreementrdquo 1998) For capitalthe combination of signi cant country-speci c exceptions and the inclu-sion of language on labor and the environment rendered MAI so prob-lematic that no agreement was preferred to a watered-down agreementwhich did not deliver maximum liberalization

These three sets of con ictsmdashbetween OECD member states betweenthe OECD and subordinate social forces and ultimately between theOECD and important elements of multinational capitalmdashreveal the con-tradictory nature of the transnational hegemonic bloc that is at the coreof transnational historical materialismrsquos analysis of internationalizationThe failure to reach agreement on MAI suggests that rather than fol-lowing an inexorable or monolithic path of development the interna-tionalization of the state is a dynamic contradictory process shaped bycon ict between capital state and subordinate social forces Despitetheir commitment to a neo-liberal global economic order state man-agers from OECD states are still dependent upon national political andeconomic interests for legitimacy and material resources and bothtransnational capital and national states are not so all-powerful that theycan ride roughshod over social forces opposed to liberalization Thiscontradiction between the national statersquos active role in liberating cap-ital globally and its continued structural dependence on national politi-cal and economic forces places an important limit on internationalizationThe backdrop of recent nancial crises in Russia Asia and Latin Americahas made it even more diYcult to construct a consensus for global lib-eralization of investment

The failure of MAI reveals the possibility for an alternative form forthe internationalization of the state MAI opponents oVered a vision ofa democratic non-market oriented internationalized state that wouldstrengthen an emerging global civil society (Lipschutz 1992 Shaw 1994)rather than global capital While such an alternative is unlikely to becomecounter-hegemonic in the near future it has made a mark that willhave to be recognized in coming rounds of con ict over liberalizationThis is clearly illustrated by the mass protests at the November 1999WTO meeting in Seattle discussions to set an agenda for technicalnegotiations for the further liberalization of trade ultimately failed as a

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the limits of internationalization 91

result of eVorts by opponents of neo-liberalism to de ne the negotia-tions as an anti-democratic attempt to subordinate labor environmen-tal and cultural standards to the demands of the market The roleplayed by the defeat of MAI in stimulating the rise of an anti-capital-ist movement that has increasingly challenged the operation of multi-lateral economic institutions cannot be underestimated what were oncequiet gatherings of technical experts and government oYcials have nowbecome opportunities for mass protest and criticism of global capital-ism The defeat of the MAI has also contributed to a broader trendwithin multilateral economic institutions toward increased attention ifonly at a relatively super cial level to the relevance of democracy sus-tainable development environmental protection and other non-marketissues (OrsquoBrien et al 2000) The terrain for future negotiations over lib-eralization has changed and this could not have occurred without theearlier failure of the MAI negotiations a failure that revealed after the creation of the World Trade Organization and the approval of theNorth American Free Trade Agreement the extent to which popularconsent for global capitalism continues to be problematic

Conclusion

Sklair (1997) provides the pithy comment that ldquo[c]apitalism does notjust happenrdquo Instead global capitalism ldquois a social system that has tostruggle to create and reproduce its hegemonic order globallyrdquo (Sklair1997 514) Although the historical bloc possesses great material andcultural power it is simultaneously vulnerable to internal contradictionsand to external opposition This means that the internationalization ofthe state is not a determined process but rather will be uneven andcontradictory The case of the Multilateral Agreement on Investmentillustrates this The OECD sought to construct a global political-economicstructure permitting the liberalization of investment and institutionaliz-ing consent to the power of global capital This eVort was ultimatelyunsuccessful foundering on an accumulation of con icts within the his-torical bloc and resistance from outside the bloc More speci cally theeVort by the OECD to construct a hegemonic coalition in favor of theMAI produced a kind of negative hegemonic feedback in which eVorts(ultimately unsuccessful) to secure the consent of subordinate social forcesby including language on labor and environmental issues had the unin-tended consequence of weakening the unity of the power bloc As aresult the transnational historical materialist argument that the inter-nationalization of the state is de ned by the national state becoming a

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92 daniel egan

transmission belt for global capital must be modi ed A neo-Gramscianperspective that makes full use of Gramscirsquos anti-determinist methodol-ogy will conclude that while an emerging transnational historical blocmay seek such a form of internationalization the extent to which thiswill happen is an empirical question that is dependent upon a partic-ular historically speci c balance of forces

As a result ldquothe characterization of a correlation between nationalcapital and the national state as against international capital and theinternational state is in many ways inaccurate and unhelpfulrdquo (Picciotto1991 46) This analysis of the MAI reinforces Levy and Eganrsquos (1998)distinction between market enabling institutions which are orientedtoward enhancing possibilities for global capital accumulation and reg-ulatory institutions which are oriented toward addressing the social con-sequences of capital accumulation Levy and Eganrsquos study of the KyotoProtocol on restricting greenhouse gas emissions found that the goals ofcapital state managers and subordinate social forces in the context ofregulatory institutions are the opposite of those concerning marketenabling institutions In contrast to their support for strong suprana-tional market enabling institutions such as MAI forces supportive ofincreased liberalization are more likely to seek regulatory institutionsthat are voluntary and national in scope On the other hand in con-trast to NGO opposition to market enabling institutions such as MAIorganizations seeking to defend workersrsquo rights or the environment aremore likely to support strong supranational regulatory institutions thatcould place limits on national states accommodations to capital Thusto the extent that the state is being internationalized in a neo-liberalmanner the emerging transnational historical bloc appears to be pur-suing a two-track strategy in which the relevance of national or supra-national institutions is based on their perceived function At the sametime opposition from below places limits to the extent that the nationalstate can serve as a transmission belt for global capital Indeed asOrsquoBrien et al (2000) argue global social movements that challenge insti-tutions such as the World Bank IMF and WTO have ldquoreinforced theimportance of the domestic political process for global governancerdquo (210)at least for states at the core of the world system

This strategic understanding of the relationship between capital andthe state points to the relevance as yet unrecognized of the work ofNicos Poulantzas (1975 1978 1980) for a transnational historical mate-rialism that truly satis es the spirit of Gramscirsquos work10 The analysis ofhegemony is central to the work of both Gramsci and Poulantzas andPoulantzasrsquo understanding of the state as simultaneously a condensation

at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on September 15 2012crssagepubcomDownloaded from

of a relationship of forces representing and organizing the long-termpolitical interests of the power bloc and a site of class struggle paral-lels Gramscirsquos analysis of civil society11 Despite the aYnity between thework of Gramsci and Poulantzas however it is striking that transna-tional historical materialists have all but ignored Poulantzasrsquo examina-tion of the internationalization of the state Of particular importancehere is Poulantzasrsquo concept of the relative autonomy of the state whichhas its parallel in Gramscirsquos rejection of the base-superstructure metaphorThe state organizes the long-term interests of the power bloc becauseit is relatively autonomous from particular class fractions but this taskis simultaneously made problematic because of the class contradictionsthat characterize the state ldquoThus an institution destined to reproduceclass divisions is not and can never be a monolithic bloc without crackswhose policy is established as it were in spite of its own contradic-tionsrdquo (1978 132) The inherent contradictions of the capitalist state havetwo important consequences for the continued development of transna-tional historical materialism First the relative autonomy of the statefrom capital means that discussions of the internationalization of thestate ldquocannot be reduced to a simple contradiction of a mechanistickind between the base (internationalization of production) and a super-structural cover (national state) which no longer lsquocorrespondsrsquo to itrdquo(197578) Second recognizing that the state ldquois not a monolithic blocbut a strategic eldrdquo (1978 138) makes it easier to acknowledge howpower can be shifted from one state apparatus to another in responseto challenges to the power bloc from subordinate forces12 To the extenttherefore that supranational institutions are of interest to capital thisdoes not necessarily represent the eclipse of the national state Thenational state remains essential for mobilizing popular support for andcontaining challenges to neo-liberalism and at the same time the powerbloc makes strategic choices as to which speci c state institutions (includ-ing those of the national state) it can best act upon to advance its inter-ests The internationalization of the state is thus best seen as a con ictover the particular combination of national and supranational institu-tions that are to characterize global capitalism rather than a transitionin the nature of the state from the dominance of the former to that ofthe latter By making more explicit use of Poulantzasrsquo work to com-plement its Gramscian roots transnational historical materialism wouldbe able to acknowledge more fully the contradictory uneven nature ofinternationalization

the limits of internationalization 93

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94 daniel egan

Notes

The author thanks Levon Chorbajian Randall Germain and David Levy as wellas anonymous Critical Sociology reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versionsof this paper

1 Throughout this paper I use lsquoglobalizationrsquo to refer to a particular set of acade-mic and public arguments (lsquothe globalization thesisrsquo) rather than as a descriptive term

2 The suspension of MAI negotiations means that an analysis of the draft Agreementmust take into account its un nished nature In many places the text of the draftAgreement contained several alternatives for unresolved provisions and where these arerelevant I have taken note of them

3 Although the draft Agreement prohibited performance requirements as conditionsfor foreign investment it did allow them in return for an advantage granted a foreigninvestor by a member state

4 See for example the comments of William S Dymond Canadarsquos Senior Tradeand Investment Negotiator (OECD 1997c) and William Witherell OECDrsquos Director forFinancial Fiscal and Enterprise AVairs (OECD 1997h)

5 In comments at the February 1997 Brasilia MAI meeting Manfred SchekulinAustriarsquos Chief Negotiator for the MAI and Vice-Chairman of the OECD Committeeon International Investment and Multinational Enterprises stated that ldquoit is clearly notthe intention of MAI negotiators to give rights and especially standing in dispute set-tlement procedures to any natural or legal person but only to investors in relation totheir present or future investmentrdquo (OECD 1997c 11)

6 In addition to having no binding requirements on capital MAIrsquos focus on pro-hibiting discriminatory practices by states does not apply to those engaged in by capi-tal Applying MAIrsquos standard of non-discriminatory treatment to private companies wasrejected ldquoas unduly interfering in private company aVairsrdquo (Robert Let Head of theOECD Division on Capital Movements International Investment and Services DivisionDirectorate for Financial Fiscal and Enterprise AVairs) (OECD 1997e 18)

7 In the context of the proposed MAI as well as the WTO the national state isalso an essential element of global capitalism in that it is through the national state thatrulings of supranational tribunals would be and are enforced

8 The Clinton Administration was also constrained by its 1997 defeat in Congressover the extension of lsquofast trackrsquo negotiating authority for trade agreements Althoughthe US was among the strongest supporters of maximum liberalization it also had totake this opposition into account this in part helps to explain US negotiatorsrsquo willing-ness to include language on labor and environmental issues in MAI

9 Despite the fact that it was the Clinton Administration that pressed for MAI nego-tiations to take place in the OECD there was remarkably little consensus among thoseUS government agencies most directly concerned with investment issues The Agreementwas supported by the State Department and opposed by the OYce of the US TradeRepresentative The Treasury Department took little interest in the negotiations (Dougherty1998)

10 Panitch (1996) provides a valuable discussion of Poulantzasrsquo work on the inter-nationalization of the state but one that is oVered from outside the transnational his-torical materialist framework

11 In his later work ldquoPoulantzas does for the State what Gramsci did for civil soci-ety Poulantzas takes the Gramscian concept of dominant-class hegemony in all its com-plexity and pervasiveness and articulates it for the Staterdquo (Carnoy 1984 124)

12 This point is made in reference to the challenges faced by left-wing administra-tions which might win control of one part of the state apparatus only to nd that oth-ers come to take on decisive roles that end up constraining the left

at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on September 15 2012crssagepubcomDownloaded from

the limits of internationalization 95

References

Augelli Enrico and Craig Murphy 1988 Americarsquos Quest for Supremacy and the Third WorldLondon Pinter Publishers

Bairoch Paul 1996 ldquoGlobalization Myths and Realitiesrdquo in Robert Boyer and DanielDrache (eds) States Against Markets New York Routledge pp 173ndash192

Barnet Richard J and John Cavanagh 1994 Global Dreams Imperial Corporations and theNew World Order New York Simon amp Schuster

Barrow Clyde W 1993 Critical Theories of the State Madison University of Wisconsin PressBlock Fred 1987 ldquoThe Ruling Class Does Not Rule Notes on the Marxist Theory of

the Staterdquo in Revising State Theory Philadelphia Temple University Press pp 51ndash68ldquoBusiness States Its Views on OECD Investment Agreementrdquo 1998 ICC Business WorldCarnoy Martin 1984 The State and Political Theory Princeton Princeton University Pressmdashmdashmdash 1993 ldquoMultinationals in a Changing World Economy Whither the Nation-Staterdquo

in Martin Carnoy Manuel Castells Stephen S Cohen and Fernando HenriqueCardoso (eds) The New Global Economy in the Information Age University ParkPennsylvania State University Press pp 45ndash96

Cavanagh John 1997 ldquoThe Global Resistance to Sweatshopsrdquo in Andrew Ross (ed) NoSweat Fashion Free Trade and the Rights of Garment Workers New York Verso pp 39ndash50

Cox Robert W 1981 ldquoSocial Forces States and World Orders Beyond InternationalRelations Theoryrdquo Millennium Journal of International Studies 10(2) 126ndash155

mdashmdashmdash 1987 Production Power and World Order New York Columbia University Pressmdashmdashmdash 1993 ldquoGramsci Hegemony and International Relations An Essay in Methodrdquo

in Stephen Gill (ed) Gramsci Historical Materialism and International Relations NewYork Cambridge University Press pp 49ndash66

mdashmdashmdash 1996 ldquoGlobal Perestroikardquo in Approaches to World Order New York CambridgeUniversity Press pp 296ndash313

Dougherty Carter 1998 ldquoUS Poised to Seek Extension of Deadline for OECDInvestment Pactrdquo Inside US Trade February 13

Drainville Andreacute C 1994 ldquoInternational Political Economy in the Age of Open MarxismrdquoReview of International Political Economy 1(1) 105ndash132

European Commission 1998 ldquoWTO New Round Trade and Investmentrdquo BrusselsEuropean Commission

Fischer Stanley 1997 ldquoCapital Account Liberalization and the Role of the IMFrdquo Textof speech presented at the Seminar on Asia and the IMF September 19 1997International Monetary Fund Washington DC

Germain Randall D and Michael Kenny 1998 ldquoEngaging Gramsci InternationalRelations Theory and the New Gramsciansrdquo Review of International Studies 24 3ndash21

Gill Stephen 1990 American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission New York CambridgeUniversity Press

mdashmdashmdash (ed) 1993 Gramsci Historical Materialism and International Relations New YorkCambridge University Press

mdashmdashmdash 1997 ldquoAnalyzing New Forms of Authority New Constitutionalism Panopticismand Market Civilizationrdquo Paper presented at the Non-State Actors and Authority inthe Global System Conference Warwick University October 31ndashNovember 1 1997

Gill Stephen and David Law 1993 ldquoGlobal Hegemony and the Structural Power ofCapitalrdquo in Stephen Gill (ed) Gramsci Historical Materialism and International RelationsNew York Cambridge University Press pp 93ndash124

Gilpin Robert 1987The Political Economy of International Relations Princeton PrincetonUniversity Press

Gordon David 1988 ldquoThe Global Economy New Edi ce or Crumbling FoundationsrdquoNew Left Review 168 24ndash64

Gramsci Antonio 1971 Selections from the Prison Notebooks (edited and translated by QuintinHoare and GeoVrey Nowell Smith) New York International Publishers

Hirst Paul and Grahame Thompson 1996 Globalization in Question Cambridge Polity Press

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96 daniel egan

ldquoIs Business Leaving a Sinking MAIrdquo 1998 Corporate Europe Observer Issue 2 (October)ldquoJoint NGO Statement on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)rdquo 1997

27 October ParisKeohane Robert 1984 After Hegemony Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy

Princeton Princeton University PressLenin VI 1939 Imperialism The Highest Stage of Capitalism New York International PublishersLevy David 1997 lsquoEnvironmental Management as Political Sustainabilityrdquo Organization

and Environment 10(2) 126ndash147Levy David and Daniel Egan 1998ldquoCapital Contests National and Transnational

Channels of Corporate In uence on the Climate Change Negotiationsrdquo Politics andSociety 26(3) 337ndash361

Lipschutz Ronnie D 1992 ldquoReconstructing World Politics The Emergence of GlobalCivil Societyrdquo Millennium 21(3) 389ndash420

MagdoV Harry 1992 ldquoGlobalizationmdashTo What Endrdquo in Ralph Miliband and LeoPanitch (eds) Socialist Register 1992 London The Merlin Press pp 44ndash75

Moran Jonathan 1998 ldquoThe Dynamics of Class Politics and National Politics in Global-ization The Marginalization of the Unacceptablerdquo Capital and Class 66 53ndash83

Murphy Craig N 1994 International Organization and Industrial Change Cambridge Polity PressOrsquoBrien Robert Anne Marie Goetz Jan Aart Scholte and Marc Williams 2000 Contesting

Global Governance Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements New YorkCambridge University Press

OECD 1995 ldquoA Multilateral Agreement on Investmentrdquo Paris Organization forEconomic Cooperation and Development

mdashmdashmdash 1997a ldquoAustralia Revised Schedule of Preliminary Reservationsrdquo Paris Organiza-tion for Economic Cooperation and Development

mdashmdashmdash 1997b ldquoCanada Revised Draft Reservationsrdquo Paris Organization for EconomicCooperation and Development

mdashmdashmdash 1997c ldquoThe Multilateral Agreement on Investment State of Play as of February1997rdquo Paris Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

mdashmdashmdash 1997d ldquoMultilateral Agreement on Investment Report by the MAI NegotiatingGrouprdquo Paris Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

mdashmdashmdash 1997e ldquoMultilateral Agreement on Investment State of Play in April 1997rdquo ParisOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development

mdashmdashmdash 1997f ldquoThe OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprisesrdquo Paris Organizationfor Economic Cooperation and Development

mdashmdashmdash 1997g ldquoProceedings of the Special Session on the Multilateral Agreement onInvestment Held in Paris on 17 September 1997rdquo Paris Organization for EconomicCooperation and Development

mdashmdashmdash 1997hldquoSymposium on the MAI 20 October 1997mdashCairo Egyptrdquo ParisOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development

mdashmdashmdash 1998a ldquoThe MAI Negotiating Text (as of 24 April 1998)rdquo Paris Organizationfor Economic Cooperation and Development

mdashmdashmdash 1998b ldquoCommentary to the MAI Negotiating Text (as of 24 April 1998)rdquo ParisOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development

ldquoOECD Members Likely to Water Down Plans for Investment Pactrdquo 1998 Inside USTrade October 30

OVe Claus 1984 ldquoTheses on the Theory of the Staterdquo in Contradictions of the WelfareState Cambridge MIT Press pp 119ndash129

Ohmae Kenichi 1990 The Borderless World Power and Strategy in the Interlinked EconomyNew York HarperBusiness

Panitch Leo 1996 ldquoRethinking the Role of the Staterdquo in James H Mittelman (ed)Globalization Critical Reections Boulder Lynne Rienner Publishers pp 83ndash113

Petrella Riccardo 1996 ldquoGlobalization and Internationalizationrdquo in Robert Boyer andDaniel Drache (eds) States Against Markets New York Routledge pp 62ndash83

Picciotto Sol 1991 ldquoThe Internationalization of the Staterdquo Capital and Class 43 43ndash63

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the limits of internationalization 97

Piven Frances Fox and Richard A Cloward 1997 ldquoBreaking the Social Compact TheGlobalization Hoaxrdquo in The Breaking of the American Social Compact New York TheNew Press pp 3ndash14

Poulantzas Nicos 1975 Political Power and Social Classes London New Left Booksmdashmdashmdash 1978 Classes in Contemporary Capitalism London New Left Booksmdashmdashmdash 1980 State Power Socialism London New Left BooksReich Robert 1991 The Work of Nations New York Vintage BooksRobinson William 1996a ldquoGlobalization Nine Theses on Our Epochrdquo Race and Class

38(2) 13ndash31 mdashmdashmdash 1996b Promoting Polyarchy Globalization US Intervention and Hegemony New York

Cambridge University Pressmdashmdashmdash 1998 ldquoBeyond Nation-State Paradigms Globalization Sociology and the

Challenge of Transnational Studiesrdquo Sociological Forum 13(4) 561ndash594Rupert Mark 1995 Producing Hegemony The Politics of Mass Production and American Global

Power New York Cambridge University PressSassen Saskia 1996 Losing Control Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization New York Columbia

University PressSassoon Anne Showstack 1987 Gramscirsquos Politics London HutchinsonShaw Martin 1994 ldquoCivil Society and Global Politics Beyond a Social Movements

Approachrdquo Millennium 23(3) 647ndash667Sklair Leslie 1997 ldquoSocial Movements for Global Capitalism The Transnational Capitalist

Class in Actionrdquo Review of International Political Economy 4(3) 514ndash538Storper Michael 1997 ldquoTerritories Flows and Hierarchies in the Global Economyrdquo

in Kevin R Cox (ed) Spaces of Globalization New York Guilford Press pp 19ndash44Teeple Gary 1995 Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform Toronto Garamond Pressvan der Pijl Kees 1984 The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class London Versomdashmdashmdash 1998 Transnational Classes and International Relations New York Routledge

at UNIV MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on September 15 2012crssagepubcomDownloaded from