+ All Categories
Home > Documents > Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Date post: 14-Jan-2016
Category:
Upload: keefer
View: 52 times
Download: 0 times
Share this document with a friend
Description:
Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM. Sudhanshu Khanna Ben Calhoun RLP VLSI Group, University of Virginia. Outline. Privacy and Security threats of RFIDs Technical Challenges in implementing cryptography in RFIDs Proposed Solutions: NVRAM is key Chip plans. RFIDs: Widespread and Ubiquitous. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Popular Tags:
27
Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM Sudhanshu Khanna Ben Calhoun RLP VLSI Group, University of Virginia
Transcript
Page 1: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Sudhanshu KhannaBen Calhoun

RLP VLSI Group, University of Virginia

Page 2: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Outline

Privacy and Security threats of RFIDs

Technical Challenges in implementing cryptography in RFIDs

Proposed Solutions: NVRAM is key

Chip plans

Page 3: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

RFIDs: Widespread and Ubiquitous Supply Chain Management & Retail

Wal-Mart, Gillette, Benetton

Wireless Payment Systems EZ-Pass, Speedpass

Building Access Cards, Car Keyless Entry

Page 4: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Privacy & Security Concerns

Tags respond to any reader that queries them

Tags can be queried wirelessly

Tags maintain no record of being queried

Users often don’t know they are using RFID

Page 5: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Adversary Models

Corporate Espionage: Gather competitors supply chain data, inventory

status Gain access to customer preferences/patterns

without their consent Wiping out inventory data Denial of service by spamming RF

Page 6: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Adversary Models

Personal Privacy Threats: Tracking an individual using knowledge of the

RFID he holds. E.g. People have shown how to track anyone using Nike+, which uses an active RFID tag.

Leaking of personal information. E.g. Prescriptions

Finding individuals who hold some (valuable) item based on the items RFID tag

Cloning a EZ-pass or Building access card

Page 7: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Existing Privacy Features on Tags Kill command

E.g. Kill a tag on checkout But you can’t use the tag anymore…. E.g. your “smart-

refrigerator” wont be able to detect that your milk is too old

Passwords Tag only responds to a reader that gives the correct

password Thus, if all tags use same password, the system becomes

to vulnerable. Alternatively use per-tag password Need to maintain extensive tag-password binding

Page 8: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Implementation Challenge

Main security challenges come from resource constraints.

EPC tags ~ 5 cents. Gate count, memory, power, performance,

die space, are all tightly constrained

Encryption solution should add only a fraction to above resources !

Page 9: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

What are the resources?

Die Area 0.5mm2 (in 130nm)

Read Performance 100 read operations per second.

Power Consumption per Read

10 μWatts

Features EPC Gen2 RFID protocolAnti-Collision SupportRandom Number Generator~10K – 30K gates

~100K bits in EEPROM

Page 10: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Example Tag

0.5mm2 Tag:

Digital ~ 30%

EEPROM ~ 20%

RF + DC reg ~ 20%

Others (RNG, Charge Pump, support functions): 30%

Barnet et al, “A Passive UHF RFID transponder for EPC Gen2 in 0.13um CMOS” (TI’s gen2 tag) ISSCC 2007

Page 11: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Existing Encryption Solutions

Private Key Schemes not secure: Break a tag, break the system Having per tag key results in key-database maintenance

issue

Public Key Schemes: Standard algorithms like RSA are way too expensive Alternative weaker algorithms like ECC, NTRU, or XTR are

also too expensive

Most schemes are not scalable…. Security decreases dramatically with key size (and thus resources)

Page 12: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Proposed Solution: Scalable Security Key Size determines power, performance

Each Tag has unique small private key

Reader can decryption all tags using same large private key that reader holds Reader doesn’t need to maintain tag-private key binding

Ease of breaking a tag depends on tag key size But even if you break a tag, it doesn’t give you any clue on

how to break the next… thus the system remains secure

Page 13: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Proposed Solution & CBRAM

This scheme was chosen because its heavily dependent on memory, and memory gives denser implementation than logic-centric schemes

Key is unique to each tag ROM can’t be used Solution is NVRAM, or OTP

NVRAM dominates both performance, power, and area Unique opportunity to leverage CBRAM advantages CBRAM crucial in making the Encryption scheme feasible

Page 14: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

What goes on the ADESTO chip CBRAM Macro

64Kb – 128Kb Sub-VT

Power, Perf, Area all constrained

VCO Random Number Generator Random Logic Arithmetic Logic: adders Total Area ~ 0.2mm2 (~40K gates)

Page 15: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Block diagram

NV-RAM64kb – 128kb

AddersControl

RNG

Output

Data_In, Addr

RD, ER, PR, EDO, EDI

EDO, EDI, RD, Addr

External RNG

Pins:

•Data (8)•Address (14)•Rd, ER, PR, EDO, EDI•Ext_RNG (8 bit)•Start_enc•Done_enc•Scan_In•Scan_Out•Ciphertext (serial out)•Clock

•Supplies:•Array•Periphery•RNG•Adders•Control•VCO Control•Others•VSS

VCOControl Voltage

Start_Enc

Done_Enc

Scan_In, Scan_Out

Clock

Ciphertext

Page 16: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Detailed Block Diagram

Ext Clk

Static Settings

Clk

Static Settings

Ext RNG

RNG Enable

RNG

Ext clocks

Various internal signals

S0-S3

Out0-4

Clk

Static Settings

Addr

Ext Addr, Data

Addr

Data

Data, Addr

Clk

RNG

RNG Enable

Encryption Logic

Logic-Mem Interface

Memory

Snan_in Settings

Static Settings

Snan_in Addr

Ext Addr

Scan Reg Scan Reg

Clock Block

Out Mux

RNG Block

Page 17: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Goals and Papers

Memory Energy reduction Performance (SA) Impact of variation

VCO ULP, Low phase noise, jitter, drift

RNG Logic

Hold time solution

Page 18: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Timeline

May 1st: Tapeout

April: Layout, P&R

March: Schematic, RTL Design, Ideas

Feb: Generating ideas

Page 19: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Memory Size

Total number of rows not fixed Number of rows vary from 256-1024 Data width simultaneously varies from 14-56 bits Block size simultaneously varies from 12 to 3

Unused blocks may have capability of being switched off

Page 20: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

NVRAM Energy-Delay vs. Supply Voltage What are the most appropriate voltages

(VDD, VCC) to read, program, erase?

Setup: All analysis done using 64kb BLS simulation

model No variation in transistor or PMC parameters At all VDD, VCC, the RP and ER pulse widths are

set such that PMC RLOW and RHIGH are the same

Page 21: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Read Energy-Delay vs. VDD

VDD is the common periphery supply, going everywhere except the bit-lines during PR, ER

Setup: RD (1) – PR – RD (0) sequence is used and read delay and

energy are measured. It is ensured that the RD after PR gives ~15% VDD

Sweep VDD with WL voltage kept at: VDD for RD Constant 0.4V for PR

VCC is kept constant at 0.6V for PR

Page 22: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Read Energy-Delay vs. VDD

Read (1) Energy is capacitive in nature, thus its increase with VDD is clear

Read (0) Energy components are partly capacitive and partly due to the static current draw between SA Rpull-up and PMC. As VDD increases, both Rpull-up and access transistor become stronger, and static current rises. Simultaneously pulse width becomes smaller. But power increases faster because VDD is increasing too. Overall, energy increases with VDD

Page 23: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Erase Energy-Delay vs. VCC

Erase pulse width irrelevant because most of the current dies out once the cell is successfully erased

As VCC increases, erase time drops exponentially but current increases only super-linearly as RLOW is constant across VCC

As VCC increases further, capacitive energy starts dominating, and energy starts increasing

Page 24: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Program Energy-Delay vs. VCC

Program pulse width is kept at 2x the program time (to take into account any variation)

As VCC increases, program time drops exponentially but current increases only super-linearly as RLOW is constant across VCC

Most of the energy is consumed after the cell is already written, during the 2x timing margin, which makes program different from erase

Page 25: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Summary

Page 26: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Questions

Theoretically explain the components of rd pr er energies

Specifically: Where is the read 1 energy going?? Why is program delay decreasing sl slowly with

VDD??

Page 27: Cryptography Enabled RFID and NVRAM

Thanks


Recommended