CTC Sentinel Vol 2 Issue 8

8/8/2019 CTC Sentinel Vol 2 Issue 8

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The extremist environment

in the Philippines continues

to improve. The main

organizations that have

traditionally been at the oreront o

national security concern are either

exhibiting a continued readiness

to engage in negotiations with the

government in Manila or are variously

suering rom battleield losses,

criminalization or reductions in

popular support. Although there has

been an increase in kidnappings by

the Abu Sayya Group (ASG), this isactually a sign o the groups weakness

and declining capabilities. Moreover,

the United States and Australia remain

committed to underwriting assistance

packages to the Armed Forces o the

Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine

National Police (PNP), both o which

continue to make steady advances in the

struggle against violent extremism.

This article will outline the domestic

security environment in the Philippines

by examining the current state o thre

main organizations: the Abu Sayya

Group, 1 the Moro Islamic Liberation

Front (MILF)2 and the New Peoples

Army (NPA).3 The article will then

discuss the main parameters o U.S

1 The ASG is a sel-styled Moro jihadist group that seek

the creation o an exclusive Islamic State o Mindanao

(MIS). It has been tied to regional and international ter

rorist movements, including Jemaah Islamiya and al

Qaìda.

2 The MILF is the largest Moro insurgent group in Mind

anao. For much o its existence the movement sought the

creation o an independent Muslim state in Mindanao

but moderated its demands to enhanced autonomy ol

lowing the death o Hashim Salamatthe MILFs hard

line ounderin 2003. The group is currently engaged in

sporadic peace negotiations with Manila.

3 The NPA acts as the military arm o the Communist

Party o the Philippines (CPP). Its stated aim is to replace

the existing Filipino political and economic structure

with a socialist system through a protracted strategy o

peoples war.

The Phiippines ContinuedSuccess Aainst ExtremistsBy Peter Chalk

Contents

FEATURE ARTICLE

1 The Phiippines Continued Success

Aainst Extremists

By Peter Chalk

REPoRTs

5 The Evovin Roe o Uzbek-ed

Fihters in Ahanistan and Pakistan

By Jeremy Binnie and Janna Wright

7 Triba Dynamics o the Ahanistan

and Pakistan InsurenciesBy Hayder Mili and Jacb Twnend

11 A Review o Reconciiation Eorts

in Ahanistan

By Janna Nathan

14 The Absence o Shià Suicide Attacks

in Iraq

By Babak Rahimi

17 Factors Aectin Stabiity in Northern

Iraq

By Ramzy Mardini

20 Trainin or Terror: The Homerown

Case o Jamiàt a-Isam a-Sahih

By Jerey B. Czzen and William Renau

24 Recent Hihihts in Terrorist Activity

28 CTC Sentine Sta & Contacts

AUgUST 2009 . VoL 2 . IssUE 8

About the CTC SentineThe Cmbating Terrrim Center i an

independent educatinal and reearch

intitutin baed in the Department scialscience at the United state Military Academy,

Wet Pint. The CTC sentinel harnee

the Center glbal netwrk chlar and

practitiner t undertand and cnrnt

cntemprary threat ped by terrrim and

ther rm plitical vilence.

The view expreed in thi reprt are the the authr and nt the U.s. Military Academy,the Department the Army, r any ther agency the U.s. Gvernment.

C o M B A T I N G T E R R o R I s M C E N T E R A T W E s T P o I N T

o B J E C T I V E . R E L E V A N T . R I G o R o U s

CTC SENTINEl

Humvees with U.S. soldiers on board secure a bombing site in Jolo in the southern Philippines on July 7, 2009. - STR/AFP/Getty Images


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and Australian security assistance to

the Philippines and identiy some o the

main shortalls that continue to hamper

the overall eectiveness o Manilas

counterterrorism eorts.

Abu Sayya group

Despite occasional bombings and

attacks against inrastructure, the

ASGs current threat level is the lowest

in years. As o April 2009, the group

was estimated to have no more than 100

hardcore militants (and less than 350

weapons) at its disposal, supplemented

by at most 200 part-time militants

and maybe 30 oreign terrorists

(predominantly Indonesians associated

with Jemaah Islamiyas pro-bombing

action). 4 According to sources in the

PNP, these members are split between

at least 18 separate cells across Sulu,

Basilan and Zamboanga and lack anysense o organizational, much less

operational, cohesion.5 The ASG has yet

to select an amir(leader) that is accepted

by the entire group. Radullah Sahiron is

the closest person to such an individual.

He is old, however, and suers rom

acute diabetes and commands the

loyalty o only approximately 60% o

the groups ighters.6

The ASGs return to criminal enterprise,

namely kidnapping or ransom, relects

the relative decline o the group and its

capacity to perpetrate violence againstthe state. Western analysts in Manila

believe this relects a diminution in

the groups ideological ocus with the

main aim now being purely inancial

in nature (allegedly to underwrite the

campaigns and agendas o co-opted local

politicians).7 The AFP and PNP both

view this development as positive

in the sense that cadres motivated by

money are ar easier to bribe and turn

than those who remain irm in their

religious convictions.8 Certainly this

has been the experience in Colombia

and is considered to be one o the main

4 Personal interviews, AFP ocials, Manila, June 2009.

5 Personal interviews, PNP ocials, Manila, June 2009.

6 Personal interviews, AFP ocials, Zamboanga, Janu-

ary 2008. See also Peter Chalk, Angel Rabasa, William

Rosenau and Leanne Piggott, The Evolving Terrorist

Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment(Santa Monica,

CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), p. 52.

7 Personal interview, Western ocial, Manila, June

2009.

8 Personal interviews, AFP and PNP ocials, Manila,

June 2009.

actors accounting or Bogotas success

in iniltrating the highest echelons o

the Revolutionary Armed Forces o

Colombia. 9

Moro Isamic liberation Front

As o April 2009, the MILFs overall

strength remained at levels on par

with those o 2007-2008. According

to the AFP, the group could count on

11,600 members equipped with around

7,700 weapons. 10 The overwhelming

majority o the MILF believe that a inal

peace settlement and autonomous rule

in Mindanao is still possible; indeed,

in June 2009 the Fronts political

spokesman, Ghazali Jaaar, speciically

described the peace process environment

as getting better, conirmed that

the group accepted the governmentsdisarmament, demobilization and

reintegration policy and voiced hope

that negotiations would resume soon.11

The rejectionist action within the

MILF remains at 30%, or approximately

3,400 o the groups total membership.

It presents a challenge to any peace deal.

The mainstream elements cooperating

with the government, however, will

likely inhibit any splinter actions

ability to disrupt a inal settlement. 12

Obviously the rejectionists will need

to be monitored3,400 militantscould cause considerable instabilit y

although with the mainstream o the

MILF cooperating, they will have less

9 Personal interviews, Colombian police ocials, Bo-

gota, March 2009.

10 Personal interviews, AFP ocials, Manila, June

2009.

11 Mindanao: Peace Process Getting Better: MILF, Sun

Star, March 9, 2009.

12 Personal interviews, AFP and PNP ocials, Manila,

June 2009. See also Chalk et al., pp. 40-42.

latitude to engage in disruptive attacks

than they otherwise might enjoy.

As with the ASG, there are also signs o

an increasing criminal element creeping

into the Fronts activities. The MILFs

current budget is estimated to be in the

vicinity o Ps107 million (approximately

$2.2 million), o which Ps100.8 million

(approximately $2.1 million) comes rom

extortion.13 As in the case o the ASG,

it is more manageable to deal with an

economically-motivated group than one

driven by strict ideological convictions.

The MILFs increase in criminal activity

could work to the direct advantage o

the AFP.

New Peopes Army

In June 2009, the AFP estimated

the NPAs combined strength to be

4,874 guerrillas organized acrossapproximately 60 ronts. This is the

lowest number o guerrillas since

the mid-1980s. 14 In addition, the

organization is inding it diicult

to procure advanced weaponry,

which is greatly hindering its ability

to undertake concerted operations

against the military. 15 Relective o

these dynamics, the majority o the

communist campaign now takes the

orm o political (as opposed to military)

struggle, consuming as much as 90% o

the movements overall resources. 16 In

broad terms, the main priorities appearto be solidiying popular support,

generating income and de-legitimating

the Philippine state (through the so-

called oust Arroyo campaign). 17

Problematically or the NPA, however,

its political wingsthe Communist

Party o the Philippines (CPP, which

is illegal) and the National Democratic

Front (NDF, which is legal)are

encountering signiicant challenges in

attracting high-caliber recruits rom

traditional hubs such as the University

o the Philippines (UP), Ateneo deManila and Delasalle. Academics in

Manila believe these diiculties relect

13 Personal interviews, AFP ocials and Philippine

analysts, Manila, June 2009.

14 Current NPA Strength Down to Lowest Level Since

the 80s, Philippine Star, June 28, 2009.

15 Personal interview, Philippine academic, June 2009.

16 Personal interviews, PNP ocials and Philippine aca

demics, June 2009.

17 Personal interviews, PNP ocials, Manila, June 2009

See also Chalk et al., p. 86.


The ASG has been

reduced to isolated pockets

o militants scattered

across the outlying islands

o Mindanao with no

apparent leader or unied

ideological agenda to tie

the group together.


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dramatic reductions in tuition assistance

packages to the extent that it is now

only the middle and upper classes who

can aord to attend these institutions

neither o which have a natural ainity

to the communist message. As a result,

recruitment eorts have increasingly

been ocused on second- and third-tier

universities, leading to an inlux o

cadres who are not as gited in terms o

eectively convincing local populations

to support the CPP/NDF agenda. The

inevitable consequence has been a

gradual but growing reduction in the

communist base. 18

The AFP asserts that it is on track to

achieve a strategic victory over t he NPA

by 2010meaning a 75% reduction in the

groups current strength and inluence.

Although independent commentators

question the ability o the army to meetthis target on the basis o its current

tempoat least 50 guerrilla ronts

would have to be ully dismantled in

less than a yearthey believe that it

could be achieved by 2011. 19 The larger

problem may be how to eectively

reintegrate those who agree to enter

into government-sponsored amnesty

programs and ensure that they have

suicient opportunity to support their

livelihood in a civilian context. 20 With

the current global economic downturn

having a signiicant negative impact

on the Philippines, Manilas ability tosuccessully support the transition o

NPA ighters, possibly at the same time

as having to manage a similar process

with regard to the MILF, cannot be

taken or granted.

U.S. Security Assistance to the Phiippines

In rough terms, most U.S. security aid

to the Philippines is allocated to the

AFP while Australian support ocuses

primarily on the PNP. In both cases,

however, the majority o assistance

is directed toward acilitating the

campaign against the ASG. Thisdisposition relects Manilas general

reluctance to accept external help in

mitigating the NPA threatwhich it

18 Personal interview, Philippine academic, Manila, June

2009.

19 Personal interviews, Philippine analysts and academ-

ics, Manila, June 2009.

20 Under the program, the government oers every

NPA cadre who surrenders up to Ps50,000 ($1,040) or

the return o their weapons and a single cash payment o

Ps20,000 ($415) to help support their livelihood.

regards as a purely domestic issueand

awareness that any such involvement

would signiicantly complicate the

ongoing peace process with the MILF.

Washingtons support to the AFP

continues to be channeled through the

Joint United States Military Assistance

Group (JUSMAG) and is primarily

aimed at supporting the Philippines

own initiatives to oster a holistic,

all o government (AOG) approach to

its counterterrorism strategies. 21 Th e

general consensus is that these eorts

have borne considerable dividends in

not only balancing kinetic and non-

kinetic responses to the ASG threat,

but also institutionalizing responses

that have been able to draw on the

combined expertise o the governmental,

private sector, civil and military

communities.22

Through these endeavors, the AFP has

been able to win over large (but not all)

segments o local populations in terrorist

hot spots. Furthermore, by employing

Moro Muslims as the eyes and ears

o the security orces, the AFP has

substantially augmented the scope o its

own surveillance eorts on the ground.

Indeed, the Philippine model has been

so successul that oicials are now

looking at whether it could be replicated

in other conlict zones. Although there

are no active discussions yet, one placewhere it could have particular relevance

is southern Thailand.23

Despite the gains made in the AFPs

counterterrorism strategy, several

problems remain. First, comparatively

little eort has been devoted to

developing an overall strategy that is

directed against militant groups as a

whole. The emphasis has rather been

on intensiying local oensives in

particular areas. The utility o such an

approach makes little sense given the

armys limited resources and the actthat degrees o tactical cooperation

are believed to take place between the

ASG and renegade MILF commands, as

21 For an in-depth look at the U.S.-Philippine security

assistance relationship, see Peter Chalk, U.S. Security

Assistance to Philippines: A Success Story Against Ter-

rorism, CTC Sentinel1:3 (2008).

22 Personal interviews, AFP and Western ocials, Ma-

nila, June 2009.


2009.

well as between Moro and communis

militants (in areas where they operate

in close proximity to each other).

Second, insuicient ocus has been given

to improving civil local governance

comprehensively. This is a signiican

gap as perceptions o administrative

abuse are one o the main catalysts or

joining the ASG (as well as the MILF

and NPA).

Third, the army remains the lead agency

in terms o counterterrorism. This is not

only urther stretching already limited

resources, but it is orcing the military

to undertake roles or which they are

not trained (a act that has been very

apparent in the ailure to ensure the

sanctity o orensic evidence at crime

scenes).

Finally, the balanced AOG approach

to counterterrorism is not shared by

all AFP senior oicers, a number o

whom continue to insist on the primacy

o hard responses despite the adverse

eect these can have in terms o winni ng

hearts and minds.24

Austraian Security Assistance to the

Phiippines

The bulk o Australias security

assistance has been directed toward the

police. The main emphasis has been on

capacity building in critical areas suchas crime scene management, strategic

reporting, intelligence collection

orensic evidence gathering and

improvised explosive device signature

track analysis. Australias Federa

Police has allocated roughly A$5.5

million ($4.6 million) to these various

endeavors since 2006, in addition to

helping establish a dedicated bomb data

center and integrated case management

system. 25

There are deinite indications that the

PNP is making progress in these areasAccording to Western oicials, the

police orce has developed an enhanced

ability to think strategically and is now

beneiting rom the input and direction

o some competent oicers. Moreover, a

number o airly innovative structura

ideas have been orthcoming. One o the

24 Personal interviews, Philippine analysts and academ

ics, Manila, June 2009.

25 Personal interviews, Australian ocials, Manila, June

2009 and Canberra, July 2009.



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more notable comes rom the current

PNP director general who intends to

make Mindanao the center o terrorism

intelligence collection and analysis. His

concept envisages establishing satellite

data reporting stations that transmit

raw intelligence to a dedicated hub

where it can be assessed, analyzed and

disseminated back to the originating

source. I enacted, this will avail an

eective two-way inormation conduit

or counterterrorism intelligence and

inormation. Australian oicials laude

these eorts and generally believe they

are indicative o a bureaucratic cultural

context that is now highly receptive to

institutional orce development and

progress. 26

One signiicant limiting actor in police

reorm, however, is the issue o size.

Roughly 96% percent o the PNPs budgetis allocated on salaries. This leaves

little money to underwrite substantive

areas o police work such as orensics,

investigative techniques and technological

platorms. Australia would like to reduce

this percentage ratio to around 80%,

arguing that this would provide much

greater leeway or its own training and

support initiatives to take root. 27

In addition to the basic issue o

resources, Australian oicials

identiy several areas where the PNPs

counterterrorism eectiveness could beuseully enhanced, namely:

a) Improving coordination o eort

understanding how the actions o one

agency will impact on the actions o

another;

b) Dealing with corruption and kickback,

which is endemic across the orce;

c) Increasing the proessionalism o the

orce, especially in terms o respect or

human rights;

d) Reducing duplicity o eort;

e) Developing appropriate legislative tools

or prosecuting terrorists.28


2009.


2009 and Canberra, July 2009.

28 Personal interviews, Australian ocials, June 2009.

Although the country has an anti-terrorism law in

the guise o the Human Security Act (HSA, which was

passed in 2008), the legislation has only been used once

on account o the highly draconian penalties or alleged

misuse o the statute. O particular note is the provision

that should someone be detained under the HSA subse-

Concusion

The Philippine terrorist environment

appears manageable. The ASG has been

reduced to isolated pockets o militants

scattered across the outlying islands

o Mindanao with no apparent leader

or uniied ideological agenda to tie the

group together. The MILFs mainstream

continues to insist that it is prepared

to engage Manila in peace talks, and

there has been no substantial increase

in the size o the so-called renegade

commands despite periodic clashes

with the military throughout 2009.

Finally, the NPAs strength is at its

lowest level since the 1980s, while its

political wingsthe CPP and NDFind it increasingly diicult to build a

solid mass base. Complementing these

positive developments are ongoing

improvements in the Philippine military

and law enorcement communities,

which despite various shortalls appear

to be making progress operationally,

organizationally and doctrinally.

Both the United States and Australia

have been active in supplying security

assistance to the Philippines, and there

is little doubt that this support has

had a meaningul impact on the AFPand PNP. Future challenges will lie in

sustaining and ully institutionalizing

the progress achieved thus ar and

moving to mitigate enduring problems

such as corruption.

quently be ound not guilty, liability and responsibility

or nancial compensation alls to the individual arrest-

ing ocer(s) concerned rather than institutionally to the

PNP as an organization in its own right.

Perhaps the biggest hurdle to the

eective translation o counterterrori sm

assistance into meaningul action lies

with the domestic environment o the

Philippines itsel. Internal politica

developments within the state are such

that sudden, unexpected shocks to the

system are not only possible (indeed

the country is presently grappling with

and highly divided over the question o

constitutional change29 ), but are also

able to quickly and decisively unrave

reorm attempts in the security sector

As one Western oicial remarked: The

Philippines is on a knie edge and I don

think either Washington or Canberra

ully appreciate how ragile the domestic

situation has become. 30 The continued

success o security assistance programs

cannot be considered a given under

these circumstances.

Dr. Peter Chalk is a senior Policy Analys

with the RAND Corporation in Santa

Monica. He is Associate Editor oStudies

in Conlict and Terrorism and serves

as an Adjunct Proessor with the Post

Graduate Naval School in Monterey and

the Asia Paciic Center or Security Studies

(APCSS) in Honolulu. He was a Proessor

o Politics at the University o Queensland

in Brisbane, a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the

Australian National University (ANU) in

Canberra and has experience with the UK

Armed Forces.

29 Arroyo is presently seeking to change the Philippine

constitution, arguing, in part, that this is necessary to

meet Moro demands on ancestral domainthe main

sticking point hindering the current peace process with

the MILF. Critics, however, charge that the real intention

is to abrogate presidential term limits so that she can con

tinue in oce ater 2010.


2009.


The Philippine model has

been so successul that

ocials are now looking

at whether it could be

replicated in other confict

zones. Although there are

no active discussions yet,one place where it could

have particular relevance

is southern Thailand.


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protocol and telephoned Pakistani

journalists to claim that he personally

masterminded the attack. 10 A ew

days later, the IJU released a written

statement to Turkish language jihadist

websites that claimed credit or the

bombing and identiied its perpetrator

as Cneyt Citci (also known as Saad Abu

Furkan), a German national o Turkish

descent. The IJU claim was supported

by the subsequent release o a video

showing Citci cheerully helping to

construct his VBIED, heaping bags onto

the back o a small truck to disguise the

explosives. The video included ootage

o the explosion.11

The video propelled Citci into the

jihadist hall o ame and also shed

light on the complexity o the Aghan

insurgency. All three o the ostensibly

rival claims were accurate. The attackwas a joint operation by the IJU and

the Haqqani network, and the Aghan

Taliban claimed ormal responsibility.

Since then, with the exception o one

attack in Jalalabad, all the suicide

bombings claimed by the IJU have

been carried out in the Haqqani

networks sphere o inluence in

eastern Aghanistan, demonstrating the

continuing close relationship between

the IJU and the Haqqani network.

Turkish Connection and A-Qaìdas Infuence

The IJUs growing internationalprominence is underpinned by its

Turkish language propaganda drive

since 2007, which has made the group a

ocus or Turkish jihadists. This public

relations campaign is presumably the

work o internet savvy Turkish speakers

who translate and republish statements

rom the IJU and other groups. The

IJU and sympathetic websites such as

Sehadet Zamani (Martyrdom Time)

encourage Turks to join or support

the jihad and promote slain ighters as

martyrs worthy o emulation. It is not

clear how these Turkish cyber-jihadiststeamed up with the IJU, but there is some

evidence that Turks who are arriving in

the Pakistani tribal areas to ight with

the Taliban are being assigned to the

Haqqani network.

10 Regarding the Talibans claims, see Taliban Attack

US Military Camp in Kost, The News, March 4, 2008.

11 The video can be ound at www.sehadetzamani.com/

haber_detay.php?haber_id=1911.

This embedding process was outlined

by Commander Abu Zer, the leader o a

Turkish group called Taietul Mansura

(Victorious Sect). In an interview

published by the Eli Media, Abu Zer

said his group had been ighting in the

North Caucasus or 15 years, but had

moved to Aghanistan in early 2009

where it had been assigned ansar12 (local

helpers) with whom to work. 13 Another

statement released by the same group

in June announcing the death o two

o its members in Khost suggested that

the Haqqani network is the ansar in

question. 14 While there is no evidence

o an explicit link between Taietul

Mansura and the IJU, Turkish volunteers

are apparently being channeled toward

the Haqqani networks bases in North

Waziristan Agency in Pakistan, where

there are established contingents that

speak their language.15

There have been hints o al-Qaìdas

involvement with the IJU-Haqqani

alliance, and al-Qaìda likely considers

the IJUs connections to the Turkish

jihadist community an asset. The

development o operational links

between the groups would allow al-

Qaìda to tap into new networks that

could be used to acilitate attacks in

Turkey and Europe, or allow the IJU

to use al-Qaìdas expertise or its own

operations in Central Asia.

The clearest example o al-Qaìdas

connections to the IJU occurred when

al-Qaìda leader Abu Yahya al-Libi

appeared alongside IJU leader Abu

Yahya Muhammad Fatih in an IJU

video dated May 28, 2009. 16 This was

the irst time an al-Qaìda leader has

12 The word ansaris a reerence to the citizens o Yath-

rib/Medina who helped the Muslim exiles rom Mecca,

known as the muhajirin, during thehijra (622 AD). Con-

temporary jihadists use the words ansaror local orces

and muhajirin or oreign ghters.

13 The interview can be ound at www.elimedya.word-

press.com/2009/05/29/17/.

14 The statement can be ound at www.elimedya.word-

press.com/2009/06/22/zulum-son-buluncaya-kadar-

savasacagiz/.

15 It is not clear how this process is organized. Some

likely arrrive in Peshawar where they are eventually di-

rected to Turkish speakers in North Waziristan. Others

are probably led in by acilitators. For example, see Paul

Cruickshank, The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATAs Ter-

rorist Pipeline, CTC Sentinel2:4 (2009).

16 The video can be ound at www.sehadetzamani.com/

reklam_detay.php?id=79.

publicly endorsed the IJU. Shaykh

Saìd Mustaa Abul-Yazid, al-Qaìdas

general commander or Aghanistan

then released a statement on June

10 appealing to Turks or inancia

support. 17

When pushed by an al-Jazira journalis

to explain al-Qaìdas support or the

Taliban, Abul-Yazid said in a recen

interview:

Last years operation in Khost was

reported in the media. It was an

attack against the U.S. command

headquarters at the Khost airport.

God be praised, this was arranged

by al-Qaìda with the participation

o our brother Taliban. This was

one o the major operations in

which we participated. Many o

the martyrdom operations thattook place in Khost, Kabul and

other areas were planned by our

brothers and we participated in

them. 18

This is almost certainly a reerence to

attacks on Forward Operating Base

Salerno, a major U.S. base near Khost

city, on August 18-19, 2008. 19

Al-Qaìda is clearly trying to associate

itsel with the perceived operationa

success o the Haqqani network and

trying to capitalize on the IJUs ability tomobilize the Turkish jihadist community

It seems plausible that al-Qaìda has

played a role in networking between

the Uzbeks, Turks and the Haqqan

network, but there is insuicient open

source evidence to conclude that al

Qaìda was instrumental in developing

the IJU into a repository or non-Arab

ighters joining the Taliban.

17 The Turkish translation o the Arabic statement can

be ound at www.taietulmansura.com/71811_Seyh-Ebu

Yezidden-Mesaj-Var.html.

18 The interview was broadcast by al-Jazira on June 21

2009.

19 Personal interview, U.S. military intelligence source

FOB Salerno, Aghanistan, February 2009. For more de

tails o the attack, see Unravelling Haqqanis Net. The

incident was also mentioned in a document summarizin

the interrogation o Bryant Neal Vinas, a U.S. al-Qaìda

recruit captured in Pakistan in November 2008. Vinas

said it was planned by al-Qaìdas leaders and that i

went badly. He identied one o the suicide bombers as

a Turk, although the IJU does not seem to have claimed

him as one o its own.



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Separately, the IJU proved it is more

than a Taliban proxy by carrying out

an attack in its homeland on May 26,

2009. Uzbek authorities conirmed

that a police checkpoint was attacked

near Khanabad on the border with

Kyrgyzstan early in the morning and

that a suicide bomber blew himselup later that day in Andijan. The IJU

claimed responsibility or the incidents

in its May 28 video, thereby proving

that it was still determined to carry

out attacks in Uzbekistan that are

completely unrelated to the insurgency

in Aghanistan.

The IMU Avoids Bein Overshadowed

Like the IJU, the IMU now appears to be

heightening publicity or its operations

in Aghanistan and Pakistan. In January,

March and April o 2009, it released

its own videos eaturing Germansencouraging their ellow countrymen

to join them in Aghanistan.20 On July

11, 2009, the IMU released an Uzbek-

language video claiming that one o

its members carried out a suicide

bombing on April 4 in Miran Shah in

Pakistans North Waziristan Agency.

This corresponds to an incident that

reportedly killed one Pakistani soldier

and seven civilians.21 This seems to be

the irst time that the IMU has explicitl y

claimed a suicide bombing. 22 That

video identiied militants rom various

countries, including China, Germany,Russia, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

The location o the suicide bombing

claimed by the IMU relects the

targeting priorities o its host. While

the IJU is likely embedded with the

Haqqani network and has ocused on

Aghanistan, the IMU has been ighting

or Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah

Mehsuds action since April 2007

when it was evicted rom the Wana area

o South Waziristan by rival Taliban

commander Maulvi Nazir.23 Baitullahs

20 Links to the IMU video released in April can be ound

at www.ansarnet.ino/showthread.php?p=8113.

21 Eight Killed in Miranshah Suicide Bombing,Daily

Times, April 5, 2009.

22 Links to the video can be ound at www.ansarnet.

ino/showthread.php?t=1998.

23 The alliance between Baitullah Mehsud and the Uz-

bek jihadists has been well documented by the Pakistani

press and was urther evidenced by ootage o Hakimul-

lah Mehsud, a key lieutenant o Baitullah at the time,

driving a captured Humvee in the IMUs Soldiers o

Allah video.

action and its allies have been engaged

in an escalating war with the Pakistani

state, during which the Uzbeks have

earned a reputation as loyal and capable

ighters. The IMU also operates in

Aghanistans northern Zabul Province

and southern Ghazni Province. 24

Concusion

Both the IMU and IJU are competing

to showcase their international

memberships and their enthusiasm or

carrying out suicide bombings. The

IJU apparently has permission to claim

attacks independently o the established

Taliban propaganda system: as the

groups hosts, the Haqqanis would be in

a position to end the IJU claims i they

disproved o them. This is probably a

relection o the perceived useulness o

the propaganda campaign in recruiting

more volunteers to carry out similarattacks, thereby ensuring a steady

supply o ideologically committed

bombers.

The IMU now seems to be pursuing a

similar strategy, and can be expected

to claim more suicide bombings. It

will probably claim bombings carried

out on behal o the Pakistani Taliban

and targeting security orces, rather

than civilians, to ensure the attacks

are widely perceived as legitimate. I it

continues to emulate the IJU, the IMU

will also look to return to action inCentral Asia, thereby demonstrating to

its core audience that it can conront the

regimes o the ormer Soviet republics.

For al-Qa`idas part, it will continue

to associate itsel with the IJU in an

attempt to gain access to the groups

network in Europe and Turkey and to

achieve propaganda gains rom the IJUs

increased requency o attacks.

Jeremy Binnie is the senior terrorism and

insurgency analyst at IHS Janes. He is the

editor o Janes Terrorism & SecurityMonitor and an associate editor (terrorism

and insurgency) o Janes Intelligence

Review.

Joanna Wright is a journalist who spent eight

months working on assignment or Janes in

Iraq and Aghanistan in 2008-2009.

24 Personal interview, U.S. military intelligence source,

FOB Sharana, Aghanistan, January 2009.

Triba Dynamics o theAhanistan and PakistanInsurencies

By Hayder Mili and Jacb Twnend

there is a renewed public appreciation

or the role o tribal allegiances and

tribal governance in the Aghanistan and

Pakistan insurgencies. This is indicated

by the U.S. governments announcement

o an inter-agency eort to study

the insurgencies tribes, including a

search or reconcilable elements.

The behavior o most insurgent groups

along the Aghanistan-Pakistan border

is conditioned by tribal identities

allegiances and interests. Some ighters

are motivated by pan-tribal or globa

religious sentiment. Most, however, are

strongly inluenced by the interests anddemands o their tribe. Tribal leaders

are oten orthright in explaining tha

their decision to support or undermine

the Taliban revolves around triba

interests, not through belie in the

insurgencys inherent virtue vis-

vis the Aghan government or oreign

orces. 2 Many young men are committed

to the insurgency by their elders

becoming indistinguishable in batt

rom other ighters who belong to the

Taliban proper or to the Haqqan

network. In theory, these tribal ighters

could be separated rom the insurgencyby persuading tribal leaders to withdraw

them.

I attempts to employ tribes against

insurgents are to succeed, the emphasis

must be on Pashtun tribes. Although

other ethnicities participate in the

insurgency, their role is in large part

deined by their relationship to the

Pashtun tribes that saturate the region

This is true o groups such as the Uzbek

ighters, whose ortunes and strength

have been heavily conditioned by the

hospitality o their hosts, such as theDarikhel, Tojikhel and Yarghukhe

(sub-tribes o Ahmadzai Wazir in

Pakistans Waziristan).3

1 Bryan Bender, US Probes Divisions within Taliban,

Boston Globe, May 24, 2009.

2 See, or example, Darin J. Blatt et al., Tribal Engage

ment in Aghanistan, Special Warare 22:1 (2009); Je

rome Starkey, Tribal Leaders to Sabotage Wests As

sault on Taliban,Independent, December 4, 2008.

3 Vern Liebl, Pushtuns, Tribalism, Leadership, Islam

and Taliban: A Short View, Small Wars and Insurgencie



8/28

8

This article ocuses on the intersection

o tribalism and insurgency. It provides

a history o the three major Pashtun

conederations in Aghanistan and

Pakistan; examines how the Haqqani

network and global jihadists have

exploited Pashtun tribalism; and

identiies how tribal militias have

recently been used to combat the Taliban

in both Aghanistan and Pakistan.

Dritin to the Durrani

Approximately two-thirds o Aghan

Pashtuns belong to the Ghilzai and

Durrani conederations.4 The tribes

o the smaller Karlanri conederation

live in Aghanistans eastern and

southeastern provinces,5 providing the

strongest kinship bridges into Pakistan.

Ghilzai and Durrani tribes, however,

are numerically dominant in most o

Aghanistan. As a general rule, tribal

allegiances and systems o governance

are stronger among the mountainous

tribes o the Ghilzai and among the

Karlanri, while Durrani governance

rests more on cross-tribal structures o

eudal land ownership. 6

A broad historical view o the Pashtun

tribes would depict the Durrani tribes

as political leaders and the Ghilzai

as providing the ighters. 7 From

Aghanistans ounding to the Talibans

ascendancy, all o Aghanistans rulers

have been rom Durrani tribes with the

exception o the ill-ated Mohammad

Noor Taraki (and a brie interlude o

nine months in 1929). For some, the

18:3 (2007): pp. 492-510.

4 A 1996 estimate suggested that Durrani tribes com-

prised 29% o Aghan Pashtuns and the Ghilzai 35%. The

estimate appeared in Aghanistan: A Country Study,

Federal Research Division o the Library o Congress,

1997.

5 Tribes o the Karlanri conederation are demographi-

cally strong in Aghanistans Paktia, Paktika, Logar,

Khost, Nangarhar and Kunar provinces.

6 The strength o tribal governance derives rom eco-

nomic, demographic and political circumstances. The

Karlanri, or example, tend to inhabit isolated commu-

nities with small land-holdings and an overwhelming

dominance o a single tribe in each village. See Thomas

H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, No Sign until the Burst

o Fire, International Security 32:4 (2008); Thomas J.

Bareld, Weapons o the Not so Weak in Aghanistan,

in Hinterlands, Frontiers, Cities and States: Transactions

and Identities, Yale University, February 23, 2007; David

B. Edwards,Beore Taliban (Berkeley, CA: University o

Caliornia Press, 2002).

7 Bareld.

conrontation between the Durranis

Hamid Karzai and the Ghilzais Mullah

Muhammad Omar is a continuation o

the conederations traditional roles as

rulers and insurgents, respectively.

Fighting between tribes and sub-tribes o

the same conederation is one indication

that the conederation level o analysis

has never been adequate. 8 A notable

shit in the current phase o insurgency,

or example, has been the groundswell

o Durrani ighters beneath the Ghilzai-

dominated Aghan Taliban leadership.

Distinguishing cause and eect is

diicult, but the increasing prominence

o Durrani ighters and commanders

correlates with the geographical

spread o the insurgency through

Durrani areas in Helmand, Nimroz,

Farah and Herat provinces. Durrani

are being recruited at lower-levels and

their traditional leaders are becominginsurgent leaders, with varying degrees

o integration into the Taliban proper.

Some intra-insurgency tensions appear

to be the result o locally-empowered

Durrani Taliban commanders disliking

the rotation o senior Ghilzai Taliban

commanders into their territory.9

Notably, in 2008 such tensions included

disagreement over tax revenue, with

a speciic concern or drug-derived

money. 10

8 The conederation level o analysis reers to the no-

tion that the confict is mainly between Durrani and

Ghilzai. As stated by the International Crisis Group,

animosities between particular Durrani tribes ar ex-

ceed any ill eeling between Durrani and Ghilzai. See

International Crisis Group, Aghanistan: The Problem

o Pashtun Alienation, August 5, 2003.

9 Personal interviews, ISAF intelligence ocials, May

11, 2009.

10 In previous years, little opium tax actually made it

up to the senior leadership. In 2008, there appeared to

be a concerted eort to move more revenue to the higher

levels. This caused tension or two reasons: 1) low-level

commanders use drug tax or subsistence purposes, not

The result is that a governmen

dominated by Tajiks and Durranis is

acing o against a Ghilzai-led Taliban

that has incorporated signiican

numbers o Durrani ighters. 11 To the

extent that the power bases o the

Durrani in government depend on rura

constituencies in provinces such as

Helmand and Farah, they must balance

oicial interests with maintaining

tribal satisaction in anti-governmen

areas. Moreover, within this mix are

the Karlanri tribes, providing major

ethnic bridges between the Aghan and

Pakistani Taliban by virtue o straddling

insurgent strongholds in southeastern

Aghanistan and the tribal areas o

Pakistan.

The Zadran and the Haqqani Network

The Haqqani network is an excellen

example o how global jihadists and

Taliban ighters have been able to

exploit Pashtun nationalism. Jalaluddin

and Sirajuddin Haqqani are prominen

members o the Pashtun Zadran tribe

and a great deal o their political capita

was amassed by Jalaluddin in ighting

the Soviets. Former U.S. Congressman

Charlie Wilson amously called

Jalaluddin goodness personiied1

and he received a disproportionate

share o U.S. money. 13 The Haqqanis

have also been eective in attracting

Arab donations due to their tactica

eiciency and assisted by Jalaluddins

marital and linguistic connection to

the Gul states. 14 The present strength

to mention their own enrichment; and 2) tribal leaders

with whom the Taliban have varying degrees o integra

tionresented eorts to send money out o their com

munities (or the same reason they resist governmen

taxation that appears to redistribute revenue out o th

villages). Personal interviews, ISAF personnel, May 24

2009. David Manseld also reers to increasingly antag

onistic relations over taxation between insurgents and

the population: it was suggested that thiswas a resul

o many o their ghters in Helmand and Kandahar not

being rom the local area. See Sustaining the Decline?

Aghan Drugs Inter-Departmental Unit o the UK Gov

ernment, May 2009.

11 This evolution has oten been described as neo-Tal

iban.

12 George Crile, Charlie Wilsons War(New York: Grove

Press, 2007).

13 Interview: Steve Coll, PBS Frontline, October 3

2006; Anand Gopal, The Most Deadly US Foe in A

ghanistan, Christian Science Monitor, May 31, 2009.

14 Haqqani Network, Institute or the Study o War

available at www.understandingwar.org/themenode

haqqani-network.


The Haqqanis reliance

on Zadran territory is not

a atal vulnerability, but itdoes oer the possibility

o constraining their

operational capability.


9/28

9

o the Haqqani network owes much

to Jalaluddins ighting prowess,

accompanying undraising skills and

the power these skills gave Jalaluddin

in the Zadran tribe.

Much o the Zadran population live in

Aghanistans Spera (Khost), Zadran

(Paktia) and Gayan (Paktika) districts,

which have long histories o resisting

oreign inluence.15 The arrival o

international orces in 2001 energized

a struggle or control over the Zadran

between the Haqqanis and Padcha Khan

Zadran, a warlord with his power-

base in Khost Province. The latter

was hardly pro-government, but he

positioned himsel as anti-Taliban and

utilized oreign assistance. 16 In that

sense, Padcha Khan was an old-style

leader who placed tribal power and

independence over external allegiancesand interests. 17 Since 2002, the Haqqanis

reversion to jihadist-aligned resistance

has leveraged Jalaluddins continuing

ame and obtained protection rom the

Zadran in much o their territory. By

contrast, Padcha Khan has entered the

Wolesi Jirga (Aghanistans upper house

o parliament) and his power-base has

narrowed, a move supported by Hamid

Karzai in an eort to neutralize his anti-

government appeal.18 By cooperating

with the Karzai government, Padcha

Khan has allowed the Haqqanis and, by

extension, al-Qaìda and the Taliban to become the Zadrans main option or

resisting international and government

inluence.

The Haqqani networks solid control o

Miran Shah in Pakistan and most Zadran

15 A CIA assessment in 1980 noted Paktia as an area o

strength or the insurgency, drawing on the most tra-

ditionally minded tribes. See CIA Directorate o Intel-

ligence, The Soviets and the Tribes o Southwest Asia,

CIA Declassication Release, September 23, 1980.

16 Michael Hirsh and Scott Johnson, A Deant Warlord

Threatens to Sink the New Aghan Leader, Newsweek,

February 13, 2002; Michael V. Bhatia, Paktya P rovince:

Sources o Order and Disorder, in Michael V. Bhatia and

Mark Sedra eds.,Aghanistan, Arms and Conict(London:

Routledge, 2008).

17 At one point, Padcha Khan was ghting Tani tribal

leaders, resisting the governments writ and attempting

to undermine Haqqanis infuence over the Zadran. See

Illene R. Prusher, Scott Baldau and Edward Girardet,

Aghan Power Brokers, Christian Science Monitor, June

10, 2002.

18 Personal interview, Western intelligence ocial, Ka-

bul, June 16, 2009.

districts in Khost, Paktika and Paktia

in Aghanistan19 gives it an eective

base or operations in Aghanistan. The

Haqqanis have consistently pledged

their allegiance to the Taliban, but

United Nations and ISAF sources agree

that the Haqqanis have demonstrated

greater imagination, intent and

capability or complex attacks than

regular Taliban commanders. 20 While

diicult to conirm, the Haqqanis have

also been credited or driving the growth

o suicide bombings in Aghanistan. 21

The Haqqanis continuing eectiveness

draws on and reinorces their long-

standing relationship with al-Qaìdas

leaders. Historically, this was

demonstrated in Usama bin Ladins

choice o Haqqani territory or al-

Qaìdas irst signiicant training camps

in Aghanistan.22

Currently, Westernand Aghan intelligence oicials assess

that al-Qaìda places greater trust and

accompanying unding in the Haqqani

network to execute complex attacks.23

The Haqqanis reliance on Zadran

territory is not a atal vulnerability, but it

does oer the possibility o constraining

their operational capability. Jalaluddins

apparent implacability and Sirajuddins

turn toward greater radicalism 24 make

it highly unlikely that Zadran areas can

be paciied through engagement with

the Haqqanis. A better strategy wouldwork rom the ground up, particularly

in Paktia, where leaders combine

aection or Jalaluddin with an oten

stronger concern or the local welare

o their tribe. 25 In the short-term, the

19 UN assessment o district-level control, provided in a

brieng to the author in May 2009.

20 Personal interviews, UN and ISAF ocials, Kabul,

June 2009.

21 Gopal; Haqqani Network; Jonathon Burch, Q+A: A-

ghanistan Who are the Haqqanis? Reuters, March 23,

2009.

22 Marc W. Herold, The Failing Campaign,Frontline

19:3 (2002).

23 This appears to be a generalized trust, however, in-

stead o one requiring consultations with al-Qaìda on

targets and tactics. Personal interviews, UNAMA, ISAF

and ANDS ocials, Kabul, May-June 2009.

24 Haqqani Network; Burch; Imtiaz Ali, The Haqqani

Network and Cross-Border Terrorism in Aghanistan,

Terrorism Monitor6:6 (2008).

25 Personal interviews, UNAMA ocials, May 2009.

While the Haqqanis receive widespread respect as war-

riors, this does not necessarily translate into obedience

rom tribal leaders who must answer directly to their

most realistic accomplishment would

be to increase the reluctance o Zadran

community leaders to allow direct

access to and through their villages

by the Haqqani network. As in othe

pro-insurgent areas, some Zadran

communities would prove willing to

cooperate with the government when

enjoying an ongoing security presence

and constructive engagement to

support sel-policing and immediate

reconstruction beneits.

lashkars and Arbakees

The Aghanistan and Pakistan

governments have also tried to leverage

tribal networks to support their

objectives. Both countries have armed

and supported anti-insurgent tribes

to combat the Taliban, the Haqqan

network and al-Qaìda. In FATA, this

has taken the orm o lashkars, tribamilitias ormed either within one tribe

or through an alliance o several tribes

ollowing a jirga decision.

The Mamond tribes and the Salarza

tribe (a small sub tribe o the Tarkan

Pashtuns who live in two valleys o

Bajaur Agency) have raised their

ow n lashkars and can be legitimately

considered anti-Taliban/al-Qaìda.2

The price has been high and scores o

tribal elders have been assassinated

since the start o the movement. For

example, in November 2008 ourelders o the Mamond tribe and

several Mamond lashkar members were

killed ater a suicide bomber detonated

at a tribesmans house in Bajaur. 27 Other

tribes that reportedly raised lashkars

are the Orakzai o Orakzai Agency in

FATA. 28 This has naturally created

tensions between the Orakzai and more

militant tribes such as the Mehsud in

South Waziristan.29

communities. In the words o one village elder in Hera

Province, speaking to the author on July 16, 2009, they

[Taliban leaders] have respect or being good ghters, bu

ghting does not always bring us bread. In southeastern

Aghanistan, Darin Blatt and colleagues suggested tha

all the tribes are concerned mostly with providing o

their immediate uture. See Blatt.

26 It should be noted, however, that individuals belong

ing to these same tribes have joined the Taliban.

27 Dawn, November 18-24, 2008.

28 Shaheen Buneri, Pashtun Tribes Rise Against Tali

ban In Pakistan Tribal Area, AHN, July 19, 2008.

29 Shazadi Beg, The Ideological Battle: Insight rom

Pakistan,Perspectives on Terrorism 2:10 (2008).



10/28

10

Overall, however, these eorts have

not resulted in any signiicant losses

or the Taliban. In act, until the recent

orays by the Pakistani military against

the Taliban, the Taliban encountered

relatively little tribal resistance as they

quickly and brutally established their

hold across FATA and the NWFP. The

tribes in FATA are quite scattered and

little unity exists, particularly against

a Taliban movement recruiting rom

almost every tribe (excluding Shi`a

Turis). This ailure was most obvious

in North and South Waziristan when

th e lashkars o 2003 and 2007 were

eectively impotent.30 Nevertheless, the

lashkars have had some positive eects

in pressuring the Taliban; or example,

Taliban spokesman Maulvi Omars

August 2009 arrest was credited to thework o a lashkar in Mohmand Agency.31

Another region where Pashtun

tribal militias have been utilized is

in southeastern Aghanistans Loya

Paktia, the area encompassing Paktika,

Khost and Paktia provinces. 32 In this

region the Aghan equivalent o lashkars

exists. Apparently an institution limited

to Loya Paktia,33 th e arbakee (guardians)

are the traditional tribal security o the

30 Mukhtar A. Khan The Role o Tribal Lashkars in

Winning Pakistans War on Terror, Terrorism Focus

5:40 (2008).

31 Noor Mohmand, TTP Mouthpiece Nabbed, Nation,

August 19, 2009.

32 Masood Karokhail, Integration o Traditional Struc-

tures into the State Building Process: Lessons rom the

Tribal Liaison Oce in Loya Paktia, Tribal Liaison O-

ce, 2006, available at www.tlo-aghanistan.org/lead-

min/pd/SchAgahnEn.pd.

33 In Paktia specically, the tribal structures were pre-

served and have emerged more or less intact rom com-

munist rule and years o confict. This includes a unc-

tioning system o traditional justice.

southeast. The arbakees (like the lashkars)

do not exist permanently in every

district, but are an ad hoc and reactive

orce. The arbakee is also used by the

jirga as a law enorcement tool, which

makes the jirga in this region ar more

powerul than in southern and eastern

Aghanistan where this tradition does

not exist.34

The capacities o Aghan military and

law enorcement are minimal in Loya

Paktia and they oten count on the

support o arbakees. The tribal elders

identiy those citizens who will be used

to support the police to ensure eective

interventions. According to the Tribal

Liaison Oice, a European-unded

NGO,

Despite the act that each

arbakee has a clear leader ( amir),accountability goes back to the

tribal council (jirga or shura) that

called upon the arbakee, which

in turn is accountable to the

community. Furthermore, arbakees

only unction within the territory

o the tribe they represent. Their

ighters are volunteers rom within

the community and are paid by

the community. This emphasizes

again that their loyalty is with

their communities and not an

individual leader.35

One important demonstration o the

governments reliance on arbakees wa s

the continuous unding until at least

2007 or 40-60 arbakee members in each

district in the southeast, including a

sizeable expansion o orce numbers to

secure the 2004-2005 elections.36

Concusion

As Aghanistans and Pakistans

insurgent conlicts drag on, the stress

on tribal structures will continue,

34 Karokhail.

35 Karokhail. This cooperation between tribal levees

and Aghanistans proper military has a long tradition.

Indeed, the 1929 rebellion was catalyzed by the govern-

ments attempt to change the system and recruit the army

on a national basis, cutting through the role o tribal lead-

ers in organizing sel-deense. The ANA is considered a

relative success partly because it is recruited and rotated

nationally, yet ew Pashtuns in the ANA come rom the

areas in which arbakees are common.

36 B. Schetter et al., Beyond Warlordism: The Local

Security Architecture in Aghanistan, Internationalie

Politik und Gesellschat2 (2007).


pressured by jihadists and the

international community alike. Both

antagonists have a long-term interest

in undermining tribalism, but both also

have an interest in using tribalism to

support immediate military aims.

For the governments o Aghanistan

and Pakistan and their internationa

supporters, this implies a diicult

trade-o. Immediate military interests

in bargaining with tribes require

subordination o interests in issues

such as human rights and good

governance. Notably, as the arbakee

tradition illustrates, a resort to tribally

mediated security structures implies

a continuing devolution by the centra

government o its core responsibilities

This may be unctional in the short

term, but will likely leave unchanged

the uneasy relationship betweenrelatively progressive governments

and conservative tribal traditionsan

uneasiness that proved ertile ground

or jihadism in the irst place.

Hayder Mili is an independent researcher

He has published analytical and academic

articles on terrorism, the drug trade and

law enorcement responses. He holds

masters degrees in Strategic Studies and

International Relations rom the Sorbonn

University in Paris. He is currently based

in Central Asia.

Jacob Townsend is an independent analys

ocused on insurgency and transnationa

organized crime. He has worked with the

United Nations in Central Asia, South

Asia and the Asia-Paciic. He is currently

based in Kabul.

As Aghanistans and

Pakistans insurgent

conficts drag on, the

stress on tribal structures

will continue, pressuredby jihadists and the

international community

alike.


11/28

11

A Review o ReconciiationEorts in Ahanistan

By Janna Nathan

to achieve stability in Aghanistan,

there is a growing emphasis on political

solutions with insurgents. The reality,however, is that such eorts so ar have

been ragmented and oten contradicto ry.

There remains no agreement within the

Aghan government and international

community, or between them, on what

the concept is, who it is aimed at, and

most importantly its place within

wider stabilization strategies. Amidst

an increasingly violent insurgency,

the temptation has been to attempt

local or grand bargains with insurgent

leaders. Even i desirable, this strategy

is unrealistic because amorphous anti-

government elements show no desire

or such deals. It urther dangerously

distracts rom enduring political

solutionsaimed at the Aghan people

rather than at insurgentso ensuring

better governance and more equitable

representation.

This article oers a short summary

o post-2001 reconciliation and

outreach eorts. It examines how

since 2001 the international community

and Aghan government have ailed

to pursue a coherent policy even in

deciding which strata o the Taliban

should be targeted, isolated or engaged.

Furthermore, reconciliation eorts

have or the most part been narrowly

premised on a paradigm o amnesty

and surrender rather than true peace-

building. Moreover, operating distinctly

rom wider nation-building programs,

they have ailed to tackle underlying

dynamics. 1 Given that the insurgents are

widely perceived to have the strategic

momentum, having a demobilization

program or ighters as a centerpiece

o such eorts is redundant at best.

Political solutions must not be treated

as a quick exit strategy when the aim is

ongoing stability. Success will require a

ar greater commitment to coordination

by all players, a nuanced understanding

o the complex nature o the insurgency

1 Regional issues will not be included in this article or

reasons o space and ocus. Indeed, while realigning ex-

ternal equations is essential to long-term stability, this

has too oten been used as an excuse to distract rom nec-

essary internal measures.

and political system, and a ocus on

strengthening broader governance

activities to cut o potential community

support or the insurgency rather than

rewards or violent actors.

The Eary Years: lack o Coherence

In 2001, the treatment o individuals

associated with the Taliban regime

proved remarkably arbitrary. In many

cases, the use o airpower or arbitrary

detentions was the result o inormation

provided to U.S. orces by new allies

seeking to settle old scores, the very

randomness (and/or inaccuracy) o

action contributing to early alienation. 2

Taliban camp cooks were reported to

be on trial while a ormer international

spokesman went to Yale.3 Some ormer

Taliban leaders were detained at

Guantanamo Bay, while others worked

or the government with no transparentcriteria or such decisions.

There was never a legal bar on regime

members taking public roles. For

example, a ormer Taliban deputy

minister and a ormer envoy o

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (a ormer Taliban

rival whose action o Hizb-i-Islami has

joined the insurgency in a loose alliance)

were appointed to the Senate. In the

2005 National Assembly elections,

at least two ormer regime members

were elected to the lower house.4 Soon

aterward, a group o Hizb-i-Islamiclaiming to have split with Hekmatyar

registered as a political party (Hizb-

i-Islami Aghanistan), boasting more

2 International Crisis Group, Aghanistan: The Prob-

lem o Pashtun Alienation, August 5, 2003; Martine

Van Bijlert, Unruly Commanders and Violent Power

Struggles: Taliban Networks in Uruzgan, in Antonio

Giustozzi, De-Coding the New Taliban: Insights rom the

Aghan Field (London: Hurst and Co., orthcoming). Van

Bijlert provides a detailed account o one province

Uruzganand how such events helped drive some com-

manders (back) into the arms o militants.

3 Guantanamo Prisoner says Taliban Forced him to be

a Cook, Associated Press, August 11, 2005; Chip Brown,

The Freshman,New York Times, February 26, 2006. In

this case, the suspect was apparently accused beore the

U.S. military tribunal o being an assistant cook.

4 The winners were Zabul commander Mullah Salam

Rocketi and the ormer Taliban Bamiyan governor Mo-

hammad Islam Mohammadi (later murdered). Among

those who stood but lost out were ormer Taliban oreign

minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, ormer deputy inte-

rior minister Mullah Khaksar (also later murdered) and

head o the Taliban vice and virtue department, Maw-

lawi Qalamuddin.

than 30 supporters in the lower house

(o 249 seats). Many other ormer

members o Hizb-i-Islami, a grouping

always dominated by proessionals

and technocrats, took poweru

positions in the administration. These

examples highlight the complex web

o overlapping identities and shiting

allegiances that has characterized the

post-2001 government.

Amidst a highly personalized, patronage

based system, the administrati

has jealously guarded its primacy in

reconciliati on eorts, but has ailed to

provide a serious strategic approach to

more equitable and responsive systems

Instead, there has been continued public

rhetoric oering succor to the Talibans

top leadership and attempts at opaque

behind-the-scenes deal-making wi

individuals. The disjointed programssuch as the Allegiance Program and

Takhim e-Solhoten seem largely

aimed at capturing donor unding or

entrenching avored networks rather

than strengthening governmen

institutions and tackling sources o

alienation. 5

Members o the international community

have also not acted cohesively. They

have undertaken a series o unilateral

bilateral and multilateral eorts despite

the theoretical lead o the United Nations

Assistance Mission in Aghanistan(UNAMA). The latter holds a speciic

mandate to

provide good oices to support,

i requested by the Aghan

government, the implementation o

Aghan-led reconciliation programs,

within the ramework o the Aghan

Constitution with ull respect or

the implementation o measures

introduced by the Security Council

in its resolution 1267 (1999 ).6

5 For more on the current political set-up, see Martin

Van Bijlert, Between Discipline and Discretion: Policies

Surrounding Senior Subnational Appointments, A

ghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), May

2009; Antonio Giustozzi and Dominique Orsini, Cen

tre-Periphery Relations in Aghanistan: Badakhshan be

tween Patrimonialism and Institution Building, Centra

Asian Survey, March 2009. For an account o how com

munity exclusion can eed directly into the confict, see

Graeme Smith, Inspiring Tale o Triumph over Taliban

Not All it Seems, Globe and Mail, September 23, 2006.

6 See UN Security Council Resolution 1868 (2009).



12/28

12

In act, Resolution 1267, 7 which

institutes a travel ban, asset reeze and

arms embargo on listed members o

the Taliban, has remained cut o rom

eorts on the ground. Originally created

in response to al-Qa`ida-directed

bombings in Arica and the Talibans

reusal to hand over the suspects, it is

now unclear whether it is supposed to

be a ixed list o past regime members

under continuing sanction or, as the

current 1267 committee chair wants,

a dynamic list that addresses the

evolution o the threat posed by Al-

Qaida and Taliban. 8

Currently it is neither, with many

member states not ensuring enorcement

nor aiding its update. Hekmatyar was

listed in 2003, but there has been

only minimal change to the Taliban

entries. O the major powers, onlyRussia has demonstrated a deinite

policyblocking the removal o any

names, even the dead. Today, the list

o 142 individuals associated with the

Taliban is disconnected rom both the

current ight and the current political

ramework. 9 Abdul Hakim Monib, who

acted as Uruzgan governor in 2006-

2007,10 and others who have long worked

with the government remain on the list

while a new generation o ighters is

largely absent. By October 2007, only

two listed individuals were in the top

12 wanted insurgent igures on separatelists developed by international and

Aghan security agencies and only 19

among the 58 considered current key

leaders. 11

7 For more inormation, see Security Council Com-

mittee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999)

Concerning al-Qaeda and the Taliban and Associated

Individuals and Entities, available at www.un.org/sc/

committees/1267/index.shtml.

8 Statement by the Chairman o the [1267] Committee

Delivered at Brieng to Member States, United Na-

tions, July 1, 2009, available at www.un.org/sc/commit-

tees/1267/latest.shtml.

9 The list was always airly ad hoc, ocused on those who

held administrative rather than military positions in the

regime. For instance, Mullah Dadullah, who destroyed

the Bamiyan Buddhas and massacred local Hazara com-

munities, became the Talibans southern commander a-

ter 2001, yet he was never included on the list.

10 See, or instance, Colum Lynch, UN, US actions

Sometimes at Odds over Aghan Policy, Washington

Post, July 5, 2007.

11 Letter Dated 13 May 2008 rom the Chairman o the

Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to

Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning al-Qaeda and the Tal-

The 2005 Aeiance Proram and Proram

Takhim e-Soh

An early speciic Taliban reconciliation

eort by the U.S. military was the

Allegiance program launched in 2005.

One o the ew open source reerences

by then chie o sta o Combined

Forces Command-Aghanistan, Colonel

David Lamm, stated that ater brieing

the ambassador and gaining Aghan

government approval,

the command rapidly developed a

reconciliation program or ormer

Taliban, and began a release

program o 80 ormer Taliban

each month rom U.S. detention

acilities, again involving the

Aghan government in a central

role.12

A contemporaneous newspaper reportquoted Lamm as saying that he expected

most o the Talibans rank and ile,

whom he estimated to number a ew

thousand, to take up the amnesty oer

by summer. 13

Its Aghan government successor,

launched the same year in close

coordination with the U.S. military, was

Program Takhim e-Solh (Strengthening

Peace, commonly known as PTS) headed

by Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, a religious

elder and leader o President Hamid

Karzais wartime action.14

Mujaddediwas quoted stating there was no bar

to the inclusion o even Mullah Omar

and Hekmatyar or reconciliation:

our terms are i they lay down their

weapons, respect the constitution and

obey the government, we dont have

big conditions or them.15 While he

iban and Associated Individuals and Entities Addressed

to the President o the Security Council, United Nations,

available at daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/

N08/341/88/PDF/N0834188.pd?OpenElement.

12 Colonel David Lamm, Success in Aghanistan Means

Fighting Several Wars At Once, Armed Forces Journal,

November 2005.

13 Victoria Burnett, US Extends an Olive Branch to Tali-

ban Moderates, Boston Globe, January 2, 2005.

14 Both programs are discussed in Carlotta Gall, The

Talibans Rocky Road Back to Aghan Reconciliation,

New York Times, March 21, 2005.

15 Amnesty Oer to Taliban Leader, BBC, May 9,

2005. While the PTS program does not have an ocial

website, the online biography o Mujaddedi states: Since

its establishment, the commission has had remarkable

success in convincing thousands o Taliban supporters

and their allies to lay down their arms. In addition the

quickly backtracked, President Karza

has publicly repeated such oers. 16

In practice, however, the main ocus o

both programs was grassroots ighter

and the release o detainees, with PTS

claiming some 4,599 reconciled

individuals by September 2007. 17 Since

monthly individual reconciliations are

the main yardstick o progress, there has

been a strict ocus on the short-term; a

small-scale UN survey apparently ound

that 50% o reconcilees were no

genuine ighters. 18 This supports tales

rom the southern and eastern insurgent

heartlands o returning reugees and

others being induced or threatened to

sign up to boost numbers. 19

Indeed, PTS multimillion dollar budget

provided by various Western countries

has been the source o continuing

allegations o maleasance. Interna

British correspondence wryly observed

the opening o a bank account or one

o the programs 11 provincial oicesWhilst this in normal terms this would

not be seen as an achievement, in the

case o this project i[t] should be viewed

as a considerable one. 20

commission has also secured the release o hundreds

o Aghan prisoners rom jails and detention centers in

Aghanistan and abroad. Those who had reconciled and

denounced violence lead a peaceul lie today. See Biog

raphy o Proessor Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, available a

www.mojaddedi.org.

16 Ron Synovitz, Karzai Conrms Amnesty Oer is o

all Willing Aghans, Radio Free Europe, May 10, 2005

17 Inormation Relating to British Financial Help to

Aghan Government in Negotiations with the Taliban,

Foreign and Commonwealth Oce, July 8, 2008, p. 1.

18 Ibid., p. 13.

19 Personal interviews, civilians, Jalalabad and Kanda

har, 2007 and 2008.

20 It continues: Initially when the PTS Commission

was established in May 2005 a bank account was opened

but donors instead preerred to provide unding in cas

in U.S. dollars. This has resulted in many problems with

accountability and transparency. See Inormation Re

lating to British Financial Help to Aghan Government in

Negotiations with the Taliban, p. 8.


Both the Allegiance and

PTS programs suered an

absence o monitoring and

ollow-through.


13/28


14/28

14

What the people are highlighting is

the broader issue that the insurgency

is being treated as the disease rather

than as a symptom o wider malaise.

Aghanistan is a multi-ethnic, multi-

regional state that has been in an

almost perpetual state o conlict

driven by, and exacerbating, multiple

issures and ractures or more than

three decades. The current ocus is too

much on reacting to violence where it

maniests itsel rather than tackling the

underlying conditions.

It is oten stated that in ighting an

insurgency military eorts must

ocus on protecting the population

and not the insurgents. The same

logic o concentrating outreach

and empowerment eorts on local

communities rather than violent actors

has yet to be applied to so-called politicalapproaches.

Joanna Nathan has been based in Kabul

since 2003 working irst or the Institute

or War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) and

then as senior analyst or the International

Crisis Group (ICG). She has ocused on

security sector reorm and the state o the

insurgency. Ms. Nathan has just started a

Master o Public Policy at the Woodrow

Wilson School at Princeton University.

The views expressed in this article are her

own.

The Absence o ShiàSuicide Attacks in Iraq

By Babak Rahimi

it is widely recognized that the

rise o suicide attacks in Iraq since

the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 has

been predominately a Salai-jihadi

phenomenon. 1 While some suicide

attacks are also strategically used by

other insurgent actions (both Islamist

and nationalist Iraqi groups), most o

the known perpetrators are non-Iraqis

who are globally recruited or voluntarily

come rom neighboring countries (such

as Saudi Arabia) or other parts o the

world. 2 Despite a decline o attacks

since 2008partly due to the U.S.-

led troop surge and the bolstering o

the state armed orcesIraq remains a

breeding ground or suicide operations.

These operations are organized by

either Sunni Iraqi groups (Islamists

and nationalists) who use such military

tactics against U.S. and Iraqi orces, or

the global jihadist groups such as al-

Qaìda in Iraq (AQI) that mainly target

the Shià civilian population to weaken

the Shià-dominated government in

Baghdad by deliberately creating a

sectarian or communal conlict. 3 In

the context o the U.S.-led occupation

and the ensuing sectarian violence,

however, one question has remained

largely ignored by analysts: Why has

Iraq not experienced suicide violence

on the part o the Shià?

1 On the globalization o al-Qaìda-led suicide attacks,

see Assa Moghadam, The Globalization o Martyrdom:

Al Qaeda, Salaf Jihad, and the Diusion o Suicide Attacks

(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008).

2 For a quantitative study o suicide attacks in Iraq be-

tween 2003 and 2006, see Mohammed M. Haez, Sui-

cide Terrorism in Iraq: A Preliminary Assessment o the

Quantitative Data and Documentary Evidence, Studies

in Conict and Terrorism 29:6 (2006). For a more updat-

ed study, see Brian Fishman, Bombers, Bank Accounts &

Bleedout(West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center,

2008).

3 Although the wave o suicide attacks has recently shit-

ed toward the Kurdistan region, especially the city o Mo-

sul, many Shià-dominated urban regions have remained

the main target o al-Qaìda in Iraq. Sadr City in Baghdad

and the shrine city o Samarra, a target o two major at-

tacks in 2006 and later in 2008, have played a critical

role in the sectarian confict in the post-war period.

Given the dearth o evidence regarding

suicide attacks by Shià militants in

Iraq, this article examines possible

reasons or the strategic logic o Shià

abstinence rom suicide operations

Such preliminary analysis provides

relection on why Shià Iraqi militants

have rerained rom the use o suicide

attacks against a perceived interna

enemy (Sunnis or other rival Shià) or

a oreign occupying orce (the United

States).

Understandin the lack o Shià Suicide

Attacks

Unlike Sunni Islam, Shià theology

is amous or promoting a cult o

martyrdoma discursive-mythica

paradigm that is symbolically rooted in

the multiaceted narrative o the sel

sacriice o the Prophet Muhammads

beloved grandson, Husayn, who believed to have died a noble deat

at the plains o Karbala at the hands o

the evil army o Caliph Yazid in 680

AD. When Moqtada al-Sadrs Mahd

Army battled against the United States

and, later, Iraqi orces between summer

2004 and spring 2008, martyrdom

operations, known or their Shià

Lebanese origins, played no role in the

militias anti-occupation campaigns

Moreover, various militant Mahdis

groupssome o which are oshoots o

the Mahdi Armyvying or power over

the Shià leadership between 2006 and2008 abstained rom the use o suicide

attacks against other more poweru

Shià militias such as the Badr Brigade

or the Shià-dominated Iraqi armed

orces. There are our explanations

or the lack o Shià suicide attacks in

Iraq.

First, the pivotal element o Shià

militias strategy o conronting

Baghdad and U.S. orces has remained

and continues to be political. While

orging alliances o convenience through

party politics based in Baghdad, Shiàmilitias have largely avoided military

conrontation and, thereore, relied

heavily on the political wing o their

actions to advance their position within

the state apparatus and the larger Iraq

society. With the all o the Sunni-led

Baàthist regime and the subsequen

rise o Shià politics since 2003

the militia branches o the politica

organizations have usually played an

auxiliary role o reinorcing the politica

status o the movement in Baghdad and



15/28


16/28

16

martyrdom o Imam Hussain);

these actions make us like animals

(haiwan) or like the Sunnis. 7

In this statement, the Islamic ruling

against latam highlights the clerical

inluence over ethical behavior in the

course o warare. Such rejection o

suicide attacks, however, has less to

do with a complex theological doctrine

and more with a pragmatic attempt to

preserve the ace o civility or the

Shià Iraqi community. In such a public

relations strategy, more conventional

orms o asymmetrical warare have,

accordingly, given militias strategic

depth in the heart o the Shià Iraqi

community, which translates into a

legitimacy actor. This is especially true

or a younger generation inspired by the

story o Husayns martyrdom in regular

warare at the battleield o Karbala.

Concusions

On an analytical-theoretical level, an

in-depth study o the dearth o Shià

suicide attacks in Iraq would require

a multidimensional approach across

individual, organizational, cultural

and structural levels o analysis. 8 In

this short study, however, three broad

conclusions can be drawn.

First, suicide attacks are not necessarily

a consequence o territorial occupation

although such military operationscontinue to play a signiicant role in the

anti-government and anti-occupation

activities o a number o non-al-Qaìda

Sunni insurgencies.9 Depending on

the strategy o insurgent groups and

their changing relations with the state,

suicide attacks can also be a liability or a

militant action seeking to legitimate its

political authority through an electoral

process o a transitional democratic

state.

7 Personal interview, Mahdi militant, Naja, August 4,

2005.

8 See Ami Pedahzur,Root Causes o Suicide Terrorism: The

Globalization o Martyrdom (New York: Routledge, 2006);

Mohammed M. Haez, Rationality, Culture, and Struc-

ture in the Making o Suicide Bombers: A Preliminary

Theoretical Synthesis and Illustrative Case Study, Stud-

ies in Conict and Terrorism 29:2 (2006).

9 This claim ultimately undermines Robert Papes a-

mous argument that suicide terrorism is mainly a strate-

gic response to oreign occupation.

A second preliminary inding is that

local politics and shiting alliances in

the context o a competitive political

landscape play an important role in the

emergence and thus also the absence o

suicide attacks. Contrary to the Hizb

Allah-Amal conlict in Lebanon during

the 1980s, when suicide attacks were

used as a way or the actions to outbid

each other to gain more popularity and

legitimacy within the Shià community,

the Iraqi case o Sadr-ISCI rivalry has

hardly given way to the emergence o

suicide military campaigns. This is

primarily because the nature o Sadr-

ISCI competition within local Iraqi

politics diers greatly rom that o

their Lebanese counterpart: while Iraqi

militias already held relative political

power within the Iraqi state in the post-

war period, the two Lebanese groups

lacked political authority due to aweak state and the highly marginalized

and then-minority status o the Shià

community within Lebanese society.

A third aspect is the role o religious

doctrine. Ideas matter insoar as they

can be strategically interpreted by

individuals, groups or elites in response

to shiting conditions on the ground.

The key is the discursive process o

interpretation and how an idea or a

tradition can be reconstructed to justiy

action (suicide attack) or a particular

objective in a given moment. By avoidingcertain discursive arguments in avor o

suicide attacks within the ramework o

classical Shià traditions o martyrdom,

Shià clerics, along with various non-

clerical leaders o Shià militias, have

successully prevented the Muharram

narratives o sel-sacriice to attain a

suicidal military signiicance. Unlike

the Iranian martyrdom operations by

the Basiji militias during the Iran-

Iraq war, largely inspired by the story

o Husayns martyrdom in Karbala

narrated by mid-ranking clerics in

the early years o the 1979 revolution,Shià Iraqis have ocused more on the

narrative o Muharram in the medium

o ritual commemorations o Ashura,

with its perormances made legal ater

2003. Whereas in the Iranian case the

narrative o Muharram was externally

reenacted in a perceived military

battleield against the Baàthist army,

the Shià Iraqi case has shown how noble

sacriice can be symbolically internalized

through ritual action perormed in the

communal public spaces.

By and large, what the absence o Shià

suicide attacks brings to light is not

merely the signiicance o strategic

ways by which actors, organizations

and elites can select or choose not

to conduct suicide operations in the

shiting context o local politi

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