74
rsr «> • 0 C h e n g c h i Law Review A+: -OOra^ + r/fftftf UNIV. OF MICH. APR 1 3 2005 ilL mm LAW LIBRARY Furman, GreggHAtkins51 153 XjZM mytm (=-)
| Date post: | 24-Oct-2021 |
| Category: |
Technology |
| Upload: | annafause |
| View: | 1 times |
| Download: | 0 times |
rsr « > • 0
C h e n g c h i L a w R e v i e w
A+: -OOra^ + r/fftftf
UNIV. OF MICH. APR 1 3 2005
ilL mm LAW LIBRARY
Furman, GreggHAtkins51 153
XjZM
mytm
( = - )
3SA+-SB
a ya A •• #•**
m m m - - #.»«• SiSSM
5H.#r-f- > *j&1T " f t f i t o - X . - ISHfeff " *»T«# ' #-ib£
PUflH (#JF*3)
I5#. Ok. - l&sMfc ^ lit R, - - -#" £- N
- I*. A# - #.»«• ^ 5Mfr-^ - 4«4*. ' IPWA
#«IX - #.S£- - *i»4 * ' BM£-ff *
$&di - i&ifc - - Pfc^t-g- " *§#* "
fTtf# * ^-Jt^r - ii£tt - $1# ' #-*.*:
PSS* (8&0O
sfc&Jjll
*r*&
vfnm#
l*3fc«. *&A*SM*#BfeBfe-ft:
/»*#• #ia«, £5*A*$fc4*#»U!fctt
««•* a ^j|LJbA#^W#fc«
SOHHS = *!*«: * sa^tjil
tBR&g = ift>S*^;£^P?G mt- i3itimim2WLM%t UK : 02-29387055/fUK : 02-29390212
S8M = 7BiaffliE&?B m±- t n j f i tm i s i8 9 j5« IBS • 02-23756688 /&M '• 02-23318496
5£«:
TO 200x; !Tra-¥AW 1200 x (#^aa») tMS^ : 19246890 . PHx • 7BH£H®SIB&fli Iffilt: www.angle.com.tw
ISSN 1023-9820 GPN 2009003514
0 *
— : 1
l i f :
i&fj-Furman, Gregg#|Atkins =. # Z-$hM* 43
i&tt 91
M & &
159
I f c & R . (.=.) 225
±tk it : (116) f; |# : 2938-7054 h j j r h m = » 0 ^ - K f t - • + — t u n s .
P£ 4 H*
*«j( vaporware)
iwwtT%z-mm-- m$ M±, r%nmkJ
- > $ m M - m m ?m
H rl'Jfr«j &'»l±
Mi r#^j &**T|jJ»*£ Mi r#^j iirl
R$f a mmmm jci m mrnmm
"[T] he key to success for the whole thing was getting ubiquity on the [browser] side ..If you get ubiquity, you have a lot of options, a lot of way to benefit from that. You can get paid by the product that you are ubiquitous on, but you can also get paid on products that benefit as a result. One of the fundamental lesson is that market share now equals revenue later. Another fundamental lesson is that whoever gets the volume does win in the end. Just plain wins."
—Marc Andreessen—
( S J D ) • M % M
mmfemfflmmttmrnmuBb • iitt-imm • • **
R.H. Reid, ARCHITECTS OF THE WEB: 1,000 DAYS THAT BUILT THE FUTURE OF BUSSINESS 31 (1997).
&WB83 : i+-¥A££B : ggf'JaBW : *E«TF = ««*
-225-
2
IK H (new economy)
Uf & ( antitrust law ) Mffc "fr#-& # ft # & 1 £ M A « « • ' « m & / «i«* > «*&•&# - - i^^iijifttit^w ft tH «•'« &#&&&&8f &JSS i'j E * n @ M *r HI aj W r^Pet j Jli^^jt&A ' j tt)&3&3Ufc + A*$&f-fr& • AAi^ r«&#j ih-
It - -
Hit - 0&Jfci;m:fc'tejfc£*ifc*2Ofc&#r&#&Jli& i L s ^ l J U i m & M J i ' J ° A A « > $ « t £ f t j K .
ft & IS III
J# & # fr • SfcW % ft tk t a M&•¥•& ft & * W t' A A M M ' £ - A g ; £ i M M « £ J §
r f # j s £ r # « j r i i f t j f t f t & f t f a ' W « 7
fi^ftAMM^ft • M±i ' *#£$19 I2*&£W r ^ f t f j » i k M T , & W f f ! j f t r ^ F ^
«¥- j •& -Wfc ' M7 ih-^Aifl'J ' $ ft&-¥ &£*> #itk & &tfc H - -fit J#Mf-ft M tb ^M H jft ^0# ' . &jtb&R!; ' *« mmp)f%£Mm%m > UR. ^t'J&ftftl r#Sif|iJj ft£ifl±° •a? = mmm > agr»$ - &t£&m - &¥&£% - mm * m
aura* * * tinm* - maa* * <~mmm ttmmij
-226-
T-mts (^) 3
1.4mm A i & # W M i l f r p a t e n t a r o u n d T
# j - W O T £ f r i t '
^invent aroundff^ ° £ H |[
4M # & # H # ' £ « M £ t O T « t y i « W « ' a
& & £ £ & £ t B # 7
( g e n e f r a g m e n t ) ' £ i t A t b * t
M t l p ^ T i I f ^ i l t t l > ' @ & * T 3 U L W £ ' # t S c H f t
£ t # r » w * * j - i s # # - w @n&' wmmmnmM.fr •
& « « 2 3 5 '
f- •
£ 1 W $ * B # ' M l s a » * W « • 2 0 0 3 ^ W
sars (iimmM&>f<immi%m) m > ztp&7&-Rm#$
234 M$0 ' Human Genome Science, Millennium, SAbgenix^^^g^g^^f^^-W] > iff
*i»g«*ffiB«3BMT#2ttfieffl»m» • Rai • IWJE232 . M817 . 235
$01!® Novartisf^WJ^gg^fflElgfg^gGenomics Institute ; rfnffJS (Pfizer)
M^ikM±LffrtS^Jr dfe££Wiitcl3'i> J ( Global Research and Development Center) > • Rai, id. • GlaxoSmithKlinelHR • ti2^2001^
mmwsAiLTm^'b • • see
Drug for the Poor: Exotic Pursuits, ECONOMIST 54 (Feburary lsl, 2001).
-227-
4 &*&*** #/V-h=J&
• g£MSARSWI%A-ftM«jl*]B4 >
- Mi236 ' jj^A^MIfSARS
• H H ft tf *»J
( Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ; CDC ) -fe * J| # ft
MM TSARS • I'j^w^-^^sim^Tm^i'jsARs^# - wn
' &*#*] •
2 .*##
' patent aroundft^#i£ > W g 31-§"* g 4*
ft ' •
Ifc 1 311ft ft ft IS If ' HBI1995#- Zo/m5 v. Borland—
ef#J3T#itlj (spreadsheet) IfcffQuattroftQuattro Pro#' ft
JH TLotus^fJ^ft^f^di^^Il^^lfcllLotus 1-2-3 «J ft
(menu commands) rfiifc ° Borland# Mil ft# (#ft #" JlftjH Quattro
ifcH^Lotusft^I^^iP:^^^. ; ft^f^t^Lotus 1-2-3, Quattroftf#
#g #*IS^Ill»t238 ° ' Lotusfa«#fe
Borland# # £ ft ft tft & ' ± 3ft Lotus 1 -2-3 # i ft * # # # % A £ £
M f t M ^ f l ^ ' B o r l a n d * # # £
& « » £ & + •
Antonio Regalado, Scientists' Hunt for SARS Cure Turns to Race for Patent Rights, The Wall Street Journal Online (May 5, 2003). 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995). IRISuB • H8io •
-228-
• WM • SKM ' »£Windows 95Jjfc* ' mvm
Windows « M & ' £ if #J Windows 98« » |jJ
I'J ^ $1 ME& r$r#$&fcU£j ( Add/ Remove Programs )
' £ ipOEMjft ft $&$«!&#«/$*. • %9\ '
& i % « i ! ' « £ w i n d o w S 9 8 »
B# > <MM#fS(MM239 ° it
$t ill Netscape ilil 5£ ^Navigator #j $ ;£. °
3.«*
Ifc# BHfc rfo "e ' ft If # A #J r pBp ft- it $[ j( brand proliferation)
T£li£^#tf(ready-
to-eat cereal; "RTE" )fti:5Jftft*ftteii}ftte$0rlfl8j$rP RTE
^fr-&240 ° JtSRTEMI^AM ' '
Tt6*£lftM£^95%^£^ • «^ith-itmf'J « ' if
^tt-f-^ii ARTE^^^iJ^^f-^ # (ftH'ft ° #^Schmalensee
« ' ; W#i|P*MM#RTE
±5£ftJlftft WiSftilft;S.3&;£'fc$$Ji£- (excessive promotion
or advertising ) ° IfitllTF ' $£.1950JiJ 1972^ fal ' 6A±H
U.S. v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 65-66 (D. C. Cir., 2001). 240
$ tf5 liZ T /Zl IS ' i §? 7b # # Richard Schmalensee, Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-eat Breakfast Cereal Industry, 9 Bell J. Econ. 305 (1978).
- 229-
6 ifcAiMMMfr
W&tttM T80«^ P^RTEP°PJ#241 • t^RTEifr
J (localized) #f242 ' I^MfMP (relative immobility)' &
#& ' ##$*!>]•&&& • *f A ' ERTEr^
f c + ' 1$ f M P * & £ ' I f t i f i M s t ' j f t f f i t t f t f c # # &
«#t ' Mt&#«£l*jRTES# ' tf^ft&AfclHi
tbirRTEP0P^ ' £&#$* ' MlilMI.
4. ? -Mil IcteWSfr ' ««A«g '
A9f«MA '
' | i j j g •
MB ' •
Silk > AA^A|»&ftft«MfUBM«A
PIituE • H306 « 242
SH»«S» r m m t j > • tas-fflaw^* ( j p R T E m p i m ) m m
mffr&wm' • id., at 309. itt-#wjhskjmnm ' TbffflSm r^rfJ# j ( sub-market) Wt1& ° David T. Levy & James D.
Reitzes, Product Differentiation and the Ability to Collude: Where Being Different Can Be an Advantage, 38 Antitrust Bull. 349, 367 (1993). ?
Schmalensee - |SIhuE ' H310 •
-230-
Tl+jUH--n (=.) 7
tk ' • t a t ' »
-tJi W £ jh&&*# IM ££###£&*$#&Witftft ££
± • ' 4±i|RTE-St ' &HFTC#££Schmalensee:$fl8
•&TO^M¥M&244 = 1 >1$fff (divesture)' l^|$M&TjfJ&£
+ J £ ' • M t f e M M f - I M M , ' M
M^7 ' 2 > ' «*M^&£245 ' 3 •
$} r ±^cltf!) j ( shelf-space plan)» -tMP |£jh
MMSI ' °
• 0Jih '
& & w t • ? r «
• « # ; # « '
tfimtnn > ( sequential innovator) I'J fr W1$ 3 W UUP 1*1 ' # M *7/ H T
IRIMS ' H321-23 • 245 IRIBUE • E35 « 246 ,=.^.=4. RBUE ° 247 John H. Barton, Patent and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and
Sequential Innovation, 65 Antitrust L. J. 449, 460-61 (1997).
-231-
8
0 - -Mmutmim > ±g«x
f H i $ & M f t $ $ ' J $ 1 # 5 * ' | ± A A A PI' & t f & n r & M ¥ - » A ^ t t # A M ¥ - A j ' j f i ' j - u s «
' r H f j
$•#.% ' &MU&BM%t%,3L% @ ft ft#M& '
#MS£'lift;fr& '3U£#It#Aft&£&<i]$r&:fcx;#|a|ft-¥-ffi '
i|fH® (fine-tuning) X# ° ®ik ' AAl^TAJ/'J $t
I'mMAR-H H &' &## Mtt PrtM jH #
(l)
«*• fttss. $ - & wm a t? & a t $m%a nm%mt s ft je at m ff
&' > #&&&&&$#& • rnmmm S^f f ' :ttA||ft2r)£ ' KP tc fi 0" •# f !l 14 (patentability) left1}1
ftfftfli (utility) g#«i&,&t#ft»248 ' Wfi^iiAMA
#*^]£&:t**^#x&.w«if£ft&i#^«h£Wf*fc£*Ut
ftAAM«A249 • ' x5£)t£
)4 Prcl966A ft Brenner v. Manson— J|250 ° A
MiiJfUlS! (steroid) ftMfl (process)'
(Patent and Trademark Office; PTO ) )& 0 4 ft A A ft A A t A A '
248 XHSSTF • SlS#flJ^if3g . S^^iUTX5*®5f^ : B8f£tt(novehy) :
(non-obviousness) ; QKffitt » 35 U.S. C. 101-103 (2000). Rai > H3K232 > R839 •
250 383 U.S. 519(1966)
-232-
^L+=.iF-+—^ (.=.) 9
ftft * J&l'Jfr' XH *t f * ( substantial) M251 ;
£ # r $ # W * ' ] # r l * J # ' t t l U r 4 @ f
2& it- 4--E j ( "where specific benefits existed in currently
available forms") ft ft & - gij yf j$ 4 fij £ ft ^252 . * & f g fjf >
( hunting licenses ) ' r$£#j
( s e a r c h ) ' W & f i & # f t W J ® # # * ( s u c c e s s f u l
conclusion) (ft$LiH|253 °
MMManson-$%±T VJL r f f j # r * f j M
f • Hilb ' HHPT0^2001#^jE^-^^ r#fiJ $ ffrMM j
( Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under 35 U.S.C.
1 1 2 ) ' ° » f f i g ' & i M ' J i m f
lc$ ' (well-established) #J&jf| > s&
&flf ( specific ) * fg (substantial)' —
;# f lf M pI J§- ft it ( credible ) ff practical) $C ill255 ° W •& IE f'J
' P T O f t f t f t s m M $ ' J £ T r « i | ^ # j
(training materials ) ° ' fit ft $ rftftj '
if : MtMifcJfl ' — (usage);
If flA&Jfl ' ( real world use ) tfjljg>
IrIME ' H535 252
IRJsuE ' H534-535 -
IRHWE ' H536 • 254
66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001). |5]mJl± • pf 1098 ; see also Joshua C. Benson, Note: Resuscitating the Patent Utility Requirement, Again: A Return to Brenner v. Manson, 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 267, 287 (2002).
-233 -
10
i t - # 9 F 5 f c & ' % m & % * I k % * ¥ # . % ' I ' J jr&M '•
A^$ri3.£p ( well known) • A A BR W 0® II (immediately apparent) *
I&7 ( patent scope) «
Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co.— fjl tp257 >
KM M Lilly J|£0 AH jH M % % (insulin)' t?5 M H M jp M A
ft - ' «
Hftft0® j (written description) ° ' $-ft $tftA$k
' M * W J L f t « A ' # f l £ f
4 M 4 t € M # T A A ' # M £ ± t M 4 £ B r & # $ * t £ t f e # $ A # r
K # T ' » u & n m « b * * 0 f t ( structure ) ( physical
characteristics) A l M1H ' f-&Ub A 4 # A If M I? #DNA(P] A & - ] & £ M M M D N A A S - & W ' J k 4 4 ! 5 l ^ f t M D N A A
' @ & * H A £ * * P i f e S l J » l & * D N A - f c f t H # M ; & A
2fDNAg.#&g#j)f ^ijf H\,259 . #%Lilly% > ^ H P T O - f e ^ 2 0 0 l 4 ^
ti ^^m\ZQ0-m\z.^±^nn^xmiiiy
Benson • [n]|fjl£ ' M288 ° 8 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
IrIMK • Ml566 = 259
IHWK ' Ml567 . 260
Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, PI, "Written Description" Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099 (January 5, 2001).
-234-
y L + = - - £ + — ( = . ) 1 1
- « m i m® « « . > * * n
f r & t t & f c j • mv&±$tBorland-%* • £ H « 0 $-±1* if Sg
« ' KP£^ r l«^j AlfJ i# r t#3F&j (method o f operation) < # & jf | ij <fi fft % it >
HIeM-M ' ^0TLotus^1'f#ff^2 6 2 »
• , t^Boudin^#ms^ - rt*
« # w M M ^ j w i + t « r # « * j ? ' J A # M ' f t
n r t « ^ j ' $ H L « t If IS $H& ° Boudin# iS - )$ If # A#f W & ffl Quattro H ' M F lc 0
#Lotus#J r^|p-lH^j ' W ^Borland#§r#:!i + ft# 1 ^'J^-Lotus^llTJi/^264 - gjlh ' ff Lotus M "g ' A it Borland# it f t # # H 6 ' M ^ F f ' J A J l ' ' 6 0 M
ttLotusl-2-3tt£ft#ftftffi#f!lf f 0|* • «Lotus 1-2-3-
Rai • [R]If 232 • H841 • 262
49 F.3d 815.
2 6 3 RMif - ics 15-819. jygrrffw • SKIES • mms rsiidJSj 7Mg rxmi^
*-kmmm»s*i»w¥g • j t&Hitt •
: Rftfcl • $n£
-iMmmifiimwmRmm&m • roAisiraijisM •
S > E.i igBlftA5£*ffi®;A - IRIhuK - H815 « 264
[RIhuE ' H820 °
-235-
12
Quattro
&**«$$*.• Borland^# jT^265 •
(2) WIStTil^Jti^l l&T &iiMf ' l'J«
- z u & ' X j L f r r i M M 3 t
#'] #P ' & r MMAgreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights > TRIPs) j^31(1)# +
r j (the second patent) ' %t>)'6 it ## j (the first patent) 0# > # $ B # #J £ & # ' M $-#*]**] • Jth-ltt j (dependent patents) Mf'J*
• M M M # ' + ^ j (fairuse) jj^|ij ° ^EAi|.Ror/o«^
— £ + ' Boudin#f gpgH . pf # iS Borland ft M Lotus 1-2-3
' & A « # r 3 t * $ ^ j f i L o t u s # r ± 2 L * ] & '
*11 ' &##Jt&JlIQuattro$f 0A#WM Lotus 1-2-3$ A M-f-266 • 3# ' RTE-££H&J&Jii|f#r&tBtt
' - & & & y w m w m m • - f e g p ' $ £ r t e £
ID WE • M821 • 266^Jiffillt-a«Bt • Boudin&WfeTIP • SS^BorlandWfT®®^ r®$lfiMi j
( commercial use SGM J fCW: {BSM - MJSIO®ESSS]S«lfflmi!Jig - SflftT"ISM
• wwe •
-236-
M & & f t & 2 6 8 » ' « 1 & P ° P f m t l r « -
# &•£ ft £- tt ffiIIT it fr& $' & A 0 P°P $ Iff t W* t i# iP tf-ft
•#• °
r i » f l i t j ' £ # # # • f f i t t f r *
+ t i i t i f i r i t t i i t j ' nmmm&&%
^ f ^ ^ ^ t E m 2 6 9 -
r I M * & ; j f e 3 I # j - S M - =
# - > ^ P t ^ r i l ' &
S i f t ; S ^ # | i J f f # ^ f # t t * ! l & '
&$fty£;3&MJk r M.#"^ W II J ( competitors-blind )
207 Schmalensee ' |oJif240 ' It 321 °
268 IrIWE • H322 • 269 mmz ' ®Kffi®#:Wwindows©:®s^®^f!lS*W^a •
mmmim • fflkwm&ZM&m • tf&®T2oooa3ooo»ffcg:i$ - mmrm tmm.mmm.^n^ • mfc£is*«ift«t5ii - srtgfips-«»^«jiff • Mark Furse, United States v. Microsoft: High-tech Antitrust, 13 Int. Rev. Law Computers & Technology 237, 247 (1999).
- 237 -
14
i&ftn •
&&«$.%&!&%&&&#•&&) T ' i t ' iff* 3MI g ttffi&ttf-Sft • l^TRIPsi^^fm#^^31«
(&&%©%)> (M#t^(a)S^G)JI)° * f - t ' #**:&«
' &WJk& - mp ' $
' £ & @ ttf-ftfr&B* ' #*£#(b)3f ( $
H(f)^ ( S*^±5@ W ' « a w h w ^ j# ) # n t'j m £ • m ax m & & % a h # f y & #•-t+
#- - mv*±MM r iMMgit j i^Hir ' £*£«« ft & n f 'j fmit jh &' j# & gi ih w ai 3i & t £ # w i >J $r i & j&» ' AMflij &*/itM t • #It W ' Mit &J31 f'Jft # & & ' &ft & f'J ft « # FM ft Jfl ft # £ ' fr ft ^ «• * $ f &
(TRIPs#31##(l)Jf '
-238-
(-) JMW,r(vaporware)
( product pre-announcement) &<J7f S » $ WIt M pP W
S I r ' A M f r
K M ' ' » ' T M M
f S M I &
t ' M % * S % n W t' M t - £ Z W «J«270 'l&MFarrel
& S a l o n e r « 2 7 1 ' t t t £ # « + ' ' T
S i i # # # t f t P p P '
m ' m s^tPpPP°Pf
I ^ A f S | P p P R t ^ F « ^ f 2 7 2 ' M « « « & £ * $ ' XDriLW#!PpP ft«« > MlPpP%&mMM
Robert Prentice, Vaporware: Imaginary High-Tech Products and Real Antitrust Liability in a Post-Chicago World, 57 Ohio St. L. J. 1163, 1173-75 (1996); David Dranove & Neil Gandal, The DVD vs. DIVX Standard War: Empirical Evidence of V a p o r w a r e 2 0 ( W o r k i n g p a p e r , N o v e m b e r 9 , 2 0 0 0 ) ( " a D I V X K ® J t r f J HSBA • fitDVDMffis^TM#±WMA • itffijnMTDVDajfflmwwaiJi • > ~F(R Stl http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPCO 1-016/
271 J. Farrel & G. Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibality: Innovation, Product Preannouncements and Predation, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 940, 942-43 (1986). F. Fisher, J. McGowan, & J. Greenwood, FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND MUTILATED: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF U.S. v. IBM 289 (1983).
-239-
16
% + ( STANDARDS) ITF-^GLJ^LT;^273 °
' ££=#&& ' ££,#;« FT IFA# ' $LML
AMI']TTJH.8T»
& ' ' £&&**! AT £*#*M -
M 0 « * # I A 2 7 5 • W 5 8
> &#&£$* =TF$*TTJT&<MIM • F 581
£AFT#£ ' IL^F&£-J|B# >
TFE$!]F'J& ° # JJF_H^M PP^IRSLLIS ( REPEATED PURCHASES ) $J
#F ' J8*#»£.FTFCM&E-TK,"#-@AKIIFFM •
*M?£ • A • 1+FINS DVD I&DVIX ( DIGITAL VIDEO EXPRESS )
&9F& + ' DRANOVE & GANDALM ' GPFTDVIX^#:
&&&&&'£.W^-276 ' I^^DVIX^^^1997^9H ^£M!PBPJI
- M&M7-FR«MWD£«IIJ[277 . MMW
(DVDO ««&#!» (DVD) '
I&JS^IFC^LB^$&-?"5£JIL!HJFNE|JTG ; <@.DRANOVE & GANDAL-T^M^ ' A
' ±F M^AF TJ
273 " ~ FARREL & SALONER, supra NOTE 271, AT 942; M. LEMLEY & DAVID MCGOWAN, Legal
274 Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 481, 505 (1998). PRENTICE • FAJI±270 - M1201-1202 °
275 PFFIB ' H1205-1206 °
276 WIWDIVX^ITBTTJIILFTLRS . |F#HDRANOVE & GANDAL > BB270 • GLO-12 -mmm• MI9»
-240-
ip278 ° £ ' £ t M H 1 1 ' B a y u s , J a i n , & R a o ( B J R ) « >
• fl| ft £ 1985-1995# fB] - HH123«*&ft£_L iji
0 $ « / * « + ' ' f t
- ^ ^ t 2 7 9 ' S t i '
Wffi^lpDP±^ 0 l ' I ' J i t M I r ' # # £ £ r M % ^ £ ± ^ 0 i « M ' B J R ^ t ^ ^ ± l l h - i E
f t i # • « ( « « « « t $ c (
ft# l&ftfc281 •
K ' m i ® f t $ • & & & £ . & - £ & » i &
4.If ft ftf If ° ^'J fv &ILC Peripherals Leasing Co. v. IBM Corp. —
HI + 282 ' Jg#±3feIBM^1973#^^-BpjKF±#ft)!Bi&-^f!lS^;
( network control program; NCP ) > $L3 ft '
RhuE ' *20 ° 279 Barry L. Bayus, Sanjay Jain, & Ambar G. Rao, Truth or Consequences: An Analysis
of Vaporware and New Product Announcements, 37 J. Marketing Res. 3, 5 (2001). 280 RiTOB • *7 ° 281 ROTE • *n ° 282
458 F. Supp. 423 (N. D. Cal. 1978).
-241-
18 #/V+.=J(I
Jiffj - •
' f P B P ^£0«Jn j5 ' ' #
IMP « ft * # f -• K 5 IBM# j| j( knowingly false)
( consent decree ) + '
IS: ' - Ufafot0#
' f ' f '
i • W j N ' f e B e r k e y P h o t o - % $ Z B Q > f ^ K o d a k - ^ ^ J t # t i f
t 5p#3 t&3&tB AiIB$£ ' 7£I%4I t '
*« t f l i tS I£WlfUi fe - W#f t*3fe#*sHr i$ ' M
f (de min imis ) ' «
jpMis287 -
3. /Mt
m-kBr^ ' BFt t i&f j I t f f f^ i^ ' £#$£•*!&££
HWK ' H436 » 284
IhHWE ' H442 ° 285
MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN RESPONSE TO THE COURT'S INQUIRIES CONCERNING "VAPORWARE", Til §
286 httP://www-usdo-i-gov/atr/cases/f0000/0050.htm Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (1979); cert denied 444 U.S.
2g7 1039 (1980). IHIHUE ' H288 • |f41 <•
-242-
III • AAM ' ih-A«# ' J®#
ffttSitl^^ > J®^«#-&-t^M • M ' f
w • #* ' Mia'ri#j M#' $£&«&#£«.*«£ ±JMtl*fcJfeffiBrffWff • ®& ' ###«& ' f M
D^mjx' ' w *r ' ^I'J ' itk—pJt&'l±$.
*if& • #JS'J&£M&i*#mT ' MM®£$»A + ' «f A & fc| &j M&/£ A' £ ft % U ft ft £ %M ft W A A * 0 >& & lb t M A' I'JSHMI&T ' MAIM?!#
M#' !• f tt tB A •
«##J»B#' «&jl«J& '
288 fiPffiffi AMpn0 ^K)SBnBffi ' ffim&mmgm&mmffimn, c, d£,s.6»
-243-
20
> &%n w i £ r $ - «
ftlM-#/ifc*&ftif&;&&4M£*Ttifttl#$ .• a£##r;R.' M
> • & « « & « •
® ^ 3@. _L National Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers v. Ayerst Labs.— |t/if§ 289 ' ^ M&tm > -
r$tlSj (deception) ^ lift tfjlE^ Ufa >
t i t '
M * ' & & & & * * M * y £ £ «
£) tJI/Ti^^l^rptI^*-^'fk|!|3B^'llPp^|l
Jl & lOII&M^'fti (standardization) 3g,^. » ^ Iff M "pf J# I3
« f^,290 ' • fcl# ' *-M
&- > «««£«*!« ' #MQilbWSL&&m• - M&i&ftm&iMfelt ' itWMilT «tS«PBn«
/ng .
850 F.2d 904, 916 (2nd Cir. 1988). 290
*»a*&wt±m' mmmmmft > • m n«tt& • wm
• ps&protocoi^^. jaxi99o^ft • mmwtffiffl%7m»n • $a&nm
' tt^^Ban^gg»ffi««3pan®ilirs*4ai&PS®# • Hovenkamp, Lemley & Janis, 2 IP and Antitrust 35-6 (2002). a - & ~ 3gS8fi<J&t&®S5£g
-244-
FhI tih $&%£&( compatibility )' il ilj j| PDP M,#- #J 3& ^ &T
P^291- '
P°PJti§3 ^
16 • spitimib ' Urt&teAM >
IS» '
f>m&^ 2 9 2 ° «»&</«£ '
% > %n %, # mm ##?%%£&%• • bp % sa» »« P p P tM^^f-»^ i ia i5 i 2 9 3 •
MMff 0 ?'] A# 1 ' I'J « & iJL Farrel & Saloner^f# AM#-#
ftiJijt R J ( excessive inertia ) #J "SJ M'liiii^i^294 •
Farrel & Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 Rand J. Econ. 70, 70-71 (1985).
292 [SJMIi ' H72-74 •
293 [SMBE • H75-79 • 294 Farrel & Saloner • [WIS271 »
-245-
22
0 & + ' l.i&.Berkey Photo—' ftfil£ftKodak'&§]}t
mipbP»^«' - w«t £
l iS^ r i§.1& j (superior) - $• Appp^^J «° "£-•«&
: ff iKgjg*# 8 «««-«« ' ##* ftK««^,M£t££p2 9 5 ° j
f t ' t«
? ff£ . &|£<t&#tf£&«/#
& ' £ if ' »
I tWIfp ' • Si tu ' r*p
#J#i£ (coercion) » > «#ffl£ftfS£t£fpBP« £W1pbP«M2 9 6 ° j
«•]£# '
I t ' f TRtfUftM^' M lp°p • ft -
W S f t f - ^ 4 * • f t ^ P ' I B M / A 1980ftf t > t*MlpD P i | f t -MlpBP ftft #&#•#& ' SP?|^E
603 F.2d 287. 296
-246-
A & ( S L ) 23
s i i t t » -° ^ECalifornia Computer Products v.
IBM— Hi t}3297 ' IBM@&j|*J&*fl|*|-gtt&3Mft ' ' &
« « M « ^ M l B M M ' W f t £ l # I B M f ; M # M
«CalCom «!&#&&)! r&#Nlftj (technological manipulation) > If it pp
i'mt& • &IMJI ' jlh--#«7
' $ » # $ # & * * ' £ f t
CalComjfc£te«fliiffi#£tlSm #£*# + #!* &#&£&$& tt«»299 °
#J3&M ' ° femiftttjCR Bard Inc. v. Mi System /nc.300-tt ' % Bard^ ii] ft ^ * f'Hf « f& ' ±^M3 Systemil # 7 Bard^fMi£ #J #" ft $. M #" ( biopsy gun ) #fij ; M3
613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979). 298 iHlffllf ' K744 • 299
Rnuli ° 300 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed.Cir., 1998).
-247-
24
S y s t e m | i j ft Bardft £ 4 f t f t & & i | & & f t & J j f & & » W &
M - M 3 S y s t e m # # ^ f t ' B a r d ^ f % f t i f @ $ ' £ &
S y s t e m # r £ l ^ $ A # « | + s f « '
S I ^ B a r d ± 5 R : i t M ^ ^ ^ ' ^ ^ M 3 S y s t e m l + I f f f # 7 # - f t
' f e & l £ l & # f f i ^ J & B a r d f t f t & i i & 7 & f t & J ( | r & - I t
# B I W ± ¥ 1 f c & * t f t
£ # & # » # & $ B a r d t m £ U ± i f t t f f l ^ p ° p » # & t T J l f t
f t - J ? | ' J ± ' » ^ # & 5 £ | & l ! j i £ p B p f £ # « / £ , & ' « - # - « &
# & & £ $ * ! . & '
f ' J i k W M # - ^ ^ 3 0 2 °
$ c ? t & $ 3 3 B a r d & I I # # f t * 1 p b p M # W f ' J M 3 S y s t e m # # "
W i i - & & * # & & & & • * ; $ ' ' t ^ B a r d ^ & M #
f ' J t ? : ® . $ J 1 l t 5 p ' 0 i h ' £ M 3 S y e t e m 0 B a r d j i p p # f t f f ^
M & m i t & ' M ' J & K f t * ' ] & f t - I IW6L#- if I'J tU t W It« JLt #
3 0 1 I R I h u E • H 1 3 6 9 '
3 0 2 I R I b u E ' H 1 3 7 0 •
303 I R J B U E -
-248-
A,+X#-+.r^ ( =.) 25
ra - RfEeJPrffiSff«»®0ffiT^fll»fTS^a«O: I1I&*
xmz r««3»»j
#^Aghion&Bolton^iH304 'r«S5#£b ttHA-MAT M
m m % ' t m X | L £ l « i W « M W 1 r ' M M & . Z 8 8 &
( economic rent)
+ ' W l £ 7 W M M & M • 3 3 # ' i f e f c i f
£ j f t f -=# m & ft jth—m # m#-$ A ' m & Jt $ &*r @ & w M •&
Hazeltine^^^fW^W-#^ft3i»r^^^*f SWMt305 '!
m m > • « # * m
- ft-£Wl^!!£tt#f<J£306 ° &*£&£#* f A
#l^£MMAl^rS!m^j'Mt««A«j!mazeltine
Aghion& Bolton • [i]|f 162 > Jf389 • 305
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
306 339 U.S. 829.
-249-
26 j&A
Hazeltine|L^f-ft If @ Ifffe307 ° Hf* ft ftM ' & i U
« # : £ + • £ & f t # ^ A t ; t f & O E M j ! f c f f i f t £ $ & > £ £ f t + ' I t
&£###If lj|t ft#A«Ml ' W If Ifc ft $# Windows
t i f f t « « l ' 5 £ A M £ 7 M f t « M f 1 '
J f ^ ' J ' r M f t t £ j
r M f t f £ j f t & « f - & £ # & & t £ f t «
t309 • «ft£ ' zllfifiiJ^^ Aghion & BoltonM
r « f L f t f t j l i f t # f & f t T | f
* E f t & # M S ' J f F & # > J & f t 3 l l i 3 3 1 0 ' f t & & # - & £
-4MN5. » WA&&|LffTiJt^#ft#S#i]lM^ •
United Shoe— M %&%.&&&>
• & * * » w « t
Bradley & Ching-to Albert Ma, Contract Penalties, Monopolizing Strategies, and Antitrust Policy, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 1184.
3QgU.S. v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
(liquidated damages ) • JIHS8il&i£JSI0±»Sf±fl5®S •
®*«±' * mm±m.mmmmm±m,m*&L&*m ie^sjmjiw r»i4 j mm m •
° Bradley & Ma, supra note 307, at 1 179.MlftAliffi^f!!JII^I!'J
±«JK:fciTff$A»eifiifc£«i3i4aM&& -ft • ®SSffiS250fft|H252)®fiP®jlt^aKl3iS ° Bradley & Ma - [sUfffB > M 1181-1182 °
310 ' m#MBrodley & Ma - fnJMB . Ml 182 •
-250-
&311 ° W«HazeltineM-A» + ' HM
Hazeltine ft #*!]&*$ ft.
^ $] tf f& ' III M ^ Hazeltine #J tt •& # f!) iH iH ( patent
m i s u s e ) > 0 & & & f l £ A H I f
f']£ • ' M*A«#it' *&% 7
#7g«£j313 •
? l &HarlanA& f ' # m • Harlan mi ' Hazeltine ft # M A fm 7^«
1SS4314 • ?l Jfl f^BaxterMt315 • Harlan^ffl
S & & * ' W T - & • # - ' « # A M M & 7 > 1 £
t . a t ' i M A = # - » ^ m a m i s m m x a ^
^ ^ ^ T ^ f p # 3 1 7 • r J ( C o m p e t i t i v e I m p a c t
Statement) - DOJMMMf MA ' SfOEMJfcffiW B ' ^
f c f i ' i t t f f t f t f l t t l f M -
311 Brodley & Ma > [rJbu1£ ' H1177 ° 312
339 U.S. 833. 313
395 U.S. 135-36, 139-40. 314
395 U.S. 144. 315 William Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An
Economic Analysis, 76 Yale L. J. 267 (1966). 316 395 U.S. 145. 317
56 F.3d 1452.
-251-
28 AA^Iftk
' &$A1 > &@iJ m
£ M & T ' f t # r * f l * * j l i t
#'J ' Hill ( Elopak Italia v. Tetra Pak) — H.319 ° Tetra Pak|blfc#t)H
• i?P ^United Shoe - Tetra Pak^E
# « « « ' f £ # #
TetaPak3t£*itG^&)%a&&*10% ' •
*$-&«!* >iLTetraPak^]tflft«;f«
f-ff-f- ' 1£«d}M£i§^#itM ' jll^fiTetraPakftft#
£ # m M & @ M « a } » « + 3 2 1 • * * • « « ¥ « '
@tj8L#ifc'£ ( European Commission) ^ * Tetra Pak #7% $7## ' &
##**m mm&13 mm mm (*s## *82#) #r * ju « ifels j ( abuse of dominant position ) ff $ • S| & M Tetra Pak $7 r IS
« 3 # & j ' > * £ p m h i « * = £ « #
^ ^ T e t r a P a k j a U M # * * * ; Wm @ # J ' # £ & &
t322 •
# & i h — # # ' & # •
*«&* - f «
59 Fed. Reg. 42845, 42848-49. 32Q 4 C.M.L.R. Antitrust Rep. 551 (E.C. Comm'n 1991).
IRIbuE ' H567 * 603-605 ° 321
IRIME • H616-617 • 322
HWE ' H617 * 618 •
-252-
A-t =.-*•+-;§ *-frA S (X) 29
• & t z ' r l f 3 ^ t j ' H
• S J K ^ W f
j * « « f i * # * * 1 W # l « f t l ' W
r « « i j f c e / S f e j
•
# A ' t f e * * i ^ i i S J « ' ) i t T f W i t f e K * ' - * 1 ^ 5 # + * M l
' f i f e " " « « ! $ & j
« i 5 « / r a « • & « r H l f * H * j M T '
HJ323 ' *£*«|Eil8£ : f f^«A ' £ft)L rMMj *
' m 7 t • • T & M ^ P w - u m •
Mm324 -
im ' H M A M « r » « i K 7 i f e j " f l l # ' P o s n e r ^ E I f % United
S h o e - % * $ f t & > ^ i H j t ^ ' t t l T f f ^ T ^ ' r M $
« M f f A # S i ^ $ 3 2 5 • £ T f r M ^ « i f « ¥ - « m
$ ' IfMtM#'rflffttj fciMHittflilE ' &
- « f f c & f f c f l l f M f - f
Ji^XSSrttBSiWt&tt##? • 324
[RJhu§£ ° 325
POSNER ' |WIi£35 ' H231 •
- 253 -
3 0 #A+.=J&
£
' W M # £
M •• A&# £ ' f ' «
H f t l l & A & f S l f t i i t l & ' M # # -
1® r 51 'ti W ^ ^ j ( rational ignorant) •
f «326 °
0 # - W # t T ' & £ & H
& $ £ # • M W # M f r « $ ] ' $ « A W f ' J $ t i « A *
« £ # « # = # - * > « * * * & « < & & r M # j ! f c j M « «
- f f i £ - - A *
* - W & i & M M 3 2 7 - t e * p £ T j f $ t # - H S & 8 M I A
f « # A A M # J L ^ & ; § - « > '
326
m?t&7fi*3r£ # in.]it~mmmmtammwm«^*«jigii'»§S#M *imm.m wfrffi • 327
POSNER • [B]i£35 ' H231 •
-254-
ah-=.*+:^H (=.) 31
A ' f « # # S * » t ^ M f t A f u l : # « '
i m m - » > w m m s
I B ! & A 5 * £ - « / * ) & £ . & £ £
i f • f f i s i ' l i i # # ' i f & # £ & & & &
•fc-gWS&tM-ttftf-* -• »« ' f JfcJW#ir#*ftftltA0r
A t ' i t k £ f «
^ i t I f M t * « | t I f 3 2 8 •
£ = ' fiJjH rMlftj iL##Jftlf ' ®ffM,MtfA-&-
' £ & * 8 f l t M * '
#•:#$.;£# 0 > tf-tf I.' "$"^#-il#.A^:i!lHEH: te
$ = « # r t f i ^ i c j $ & 4 i a j ® # ' - n . f f l « ' a ^ t i l ' £ f t * # • # '
I T t t r M , ^ i C j ° f t # # B r o d l e y & M a & t j U ? ' I T * A & & ^
' & ± # « / # - # # f t - ' f c l * P ' % t * A £ W
0 # ' & # # # S J A & * r « « l J i t J & j i t J U l
F4# ' itf ' te!A€«M329 °
f ^ A f c
*^«®&zF£®i£aS7fc2gl31 . 329
Breodley & Ma • |R)!£307 - H1202-1203 °
-255-
32 ^/V+-JW
W . - M £ & £ 4 £ ; ' i f c
*M&ITJ331 °
* t ' B P f t r M & i i C j
' *8.
n 7 T W f t &&®ft% 8 f m m $ & 3 3 2 •
^ l A J ^ ' - E I A ^ A ^ M >
JH '. W^F (salvage value) •> r H fj $J Sfc j *1
* A « « £ J E M I M A ' $
Pi - ttasa
A * ' ' • £ + # £ W * f t * 4 r
XJSA8-
iRlstiii - H1203. 331 RHUI£ ° 332
See S.E. Masten & E.A. Snyder, The Design and Duration of Contracts: Strategic and Efficiency Considerations, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 63 (1989); Masten & Snyder, United States versus United Shoe Machinery Corporation: On the Merits, 36 J. L. & ECON. 33 (1993); William P. Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 15 Rand J. Econ. 39 (1984).
-256-
• «*h «
MH&A3: ' £&•&•&#* H • a,Rft&#r
« & - # i t a ' « & £ » & * m&wnfc
• nmaM£&m+ '
« f s i - # < &
W^HJr 0
£ - 7J Ifc7 &^&£tt£#T&ftfc«W4Mfr>h ' **I2*T
ft&^A«M*SftiLll -• «#M > ##««#&* * ' M r^#^:±*^^^j $/«&• &WtMfr • &BP • :sfc&££;$Hir«±&3S# W «£iHbtt££ - ^MEMIR^ ' 75«&0l&f 3LM
fiff ? EMtt£ - - IfcT @*t;& r « j - # & £ & « / « & ' &vxx#$rnnj&&.
-257-
34
5 # •• ia & # 14 tr f w -§-' in u n n ft & & •& % t /& % 0 n -i± w1r« n & j &i'j' ' # & &
w' tft'
S ' £#1f + ' MMM » M#=£#
b# - J§ » #£#
« • 4H;fcWSfifc-fc&&igWI&$lfc#l$ ' #ltMSSNIP(small
but significant and non-transitory increase of price ) i£ if ± jfl $/ $1
Hf M I'] • & BP & #&fc* tt If # iB «•' ^ *ft t iLtetfc® £ =# ( * p 1 # ) ( f t
5%) 0# -«ft333 ° • am.
> 1 & 0 J H 4 M ' i i * # ) # if «#- ( ±Mi4MW:|A«^#iilf« ) • a H ' A - I S J I i ' ' H k f c S S S - l * * * * •• - « * * | f c - £ A W M » ' $
. j i
333 ##jtHl992^-£-f#*fMlJ . 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992).
-258-
~%&%%}HTZ-%S ( =.) 35
$ % ' #tl>% = ftE9j&USSNIPft&TlrJ##£#i%
$ • ' &#£#&! «M«0# '
^«imiPBP«# v fm&m%m^j w
Itti £=# ttrfrJ#W«4> • £f'J««' S'J jtb—
' JftftiNM/f WWi» &m
£HiLBIt£> T^MMiftaiAWt
# ) .
**&####-«• - I^m#M-B*$*
i t #
M^bis • ' '^^•ussnip^IIJW
T f l f & t B l » J ' £ # * « #
SSNIP^IIJEPJ^ ? #fc*ra&ft&»afr3iifr#&S'miHi#«ji8]8
JiW#JASSNIP&!!]+ ' Wftf 3&Jgfl'J ?
Iti: •
H rtiji/frtiiij wi?^aim#s'ijsit
IHi' *H^f-±f«l^i995^^ r«#^|.Jj + 'JHMBSbftt
g - lit±JL&toiKH*%%#iM8rnift&&jj -
- 259 -
a•M•�•fiAt��Mrlf•■Mz-�-�Aftl¾�•m
{jj�x · �2001�� r liflttir�•tHi �14-jtJI}Jj{lj J � 11Y1f t
�-�•*��a•��•Mtt���•••m�••���•
•�-��M$�.z..-·ft&•¾·��-�-�*·W�•m•
••:•�¥��-��.����-���--@�•�9�M
����•*��•ffM§����fi��¾�Aff�-��
I�•���MA�4� tt·W�-�A���A�tt•M•��
-�-rlf�? r �-•�J00�-�JM�Aff���¥#·��
•a&A���-m�IB-��---�����t�tt•·�R
#���-�M�i£�•�•#•·���#-•m�Riliz�•
•h�8i�tz••·��-��£&rlf•t�A�M•M•·
1li*•1uA�i1J•rlf� t .z..tt-t• ( r �-•ju J �3.2.31f !ltJ�
4 )· �i{Jtl.�1�Jl-ff.�¥-# · W1{ J:.�iuMM*�iuMw:ti•·�
••�-�M�MW·ffi�z·���-Wffl�lli��-••Ml
-�-�-•tt•t*••#���••·••··��-�-�
•�£�• 1 w�•••�&Atm•�R#�•••·��•�
��-h��-�-J:.�•••*�••-tt¼•�•w•••
��iu.rlf:l:Jz1� · ���#I·rlf� t • r 1J,�*J ¥\JI. r *j}j_ff!,, J
���·--f�-�-��·-••-�«�----�-�
,.��-M-�tt•�--J:.�•¥ tt•·�i-�9-���
334 !Uffir!'i�i¥Jffll� , ffl������l 9844'.pfri!JUJEZ. r �*-€i-f1flilfj'c$; J (National
Cooperative Research Act) .L-)J?<Jm:B-��$�1»!�-€i-{#1¥JBZ::!=f;tif:Wf$1U� • itiW�rm§ , :u:#i:�77m-�ffim5i�m�m�im�1¥Jm�-11, P..J.�1�•iffi�fi-€i-liJJ�E_f�l§.§.t.lR&tt!.5LWi'#i:1¥Ji.\� , Clovia Hamilton, Adequacy of the 1995 AntirustGuidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property in Complex High-Tech Markets,7 Comp. L. Rev. & Tech. J. 23, 25-26 (2002).
335 Azam H. Aziz, Note: Defining Technology and Innovation Markets: The DOJ's Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 24 Hofstra L. Rev.475, 502 (1995).
-260-
If - £ I'J Dt $ 0r W £ # ffi #' f & 0 W f & f * i intellectual c a p i t a l ) ' l i t ' r « j (knowledge) M£
^Titi|337 ° *ff^t-M«PpP« ' « • ' r l ! ] f r « j
- £ $ * & & & & &
- f B # f l
£ « « « « « i ^ ° # J ^ m « « £ l § l P p P M ( * S « # • « / » * « # ) # £ ' £ % %
W 0 * ' B # * & ^ « # l P p P W f « S M W & '
#-=£ - M £«fStf ; %£.&$•#%&
• B t z . ' > s s n i p &
I ' J t t r i f « # - j f f i ^ l P p P « f £ | I ] * / ] N ^ I H ^ € S '
Jil'Jirfr^t«M«1f f «**&£ ' fcff rl'J fr"^^ j °
IrWuE - H503-504 ° 337 Hamilton • [SI (£3 34 • J|26 °
- 2 6 1 -
38
(=) SB rS^j
r t ? j ^ r « i j • M^'Kodak
^ - # £ # £ 7 M r & •t^i# j ( submarket) t - -fcEp - ±f #M^T W
«t l7 r i>«j &-!&«# > MKodak^t&f • ^1970^f5
MP«3 3 8 - ««$£4kpim ft 31 in ' • #1# • £9l#3JHB#r%^Wtl r j + 3 3 9 -
£ ' JUE^M
' M - # E ^ 7 f & t i f i # - - f t f t i t f t - « t £ t it^ +x^r i m y§n > a » % %% # r & « J ' M^^^Pft |! :ff#&jlh-#«^iS ' I 'J^#W£P ° r«
(horizontal) ' &&««$-
«^7ft&ttlM«H± ' »&<J ' t*-<« *« #4 (vertical) M# + ' M7«MW4-
M i f f
• #§1962^6<)U.S. v. Brown Shoes—^ • 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). 339^**^0910001896§rt •
-262-
(recognition) > M P P T Z I ! } # A H ' l i ( p e c u l i a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ) - f t
^ A ^ ^ A j| !£;>& ( unique production facilities ) > #JSH
#f $1 ( specialized vendors ) ^ Afl K % fa ^340 ' & lbKodak% $r #§
it ft R * t A t fft* f j" £ A # 0L' W A # ft - t fa H fa fa jH M % ft.
- $0
fa'fa£««MI«ft#&Mfaft±£#!]itm^'*fa A
A' MSkt 1£ t5%ftAftfa > 0«f m*sj
# - »ft£ > %*%£&%. - &*ffi4*ft#A£j&#f#*fttefa
0 » faAftl&fal^faAAfa«AMf ;£ • M&ft '
Mti - MfaMfa' ±gfa«^£fa95%ftf|» £ft^ft
f & • ft£f*_L&*lft - faMfaWT-M& • #- ' spft
A###950/oftftfi&##ftlM& ' '
M i i i f t ' A f a ^ $ & ^ f a f t 5 % M t A ' M ; & A A - f a
' WfrM#MfafaiH - l'J£*f-ft*f < A
> 1 1 ) 8 f ^ f a f a A ' A I 1 • M f l f t f a t
^#r£A«ft£' - &p«,fa#
• BPfa;l:£lpDPMft;££»«T - fafaltf-Mf£
&-8.1KMIS ft - fafa*&-faft r«j 38*=# • l&fa#*A
340 370 U.S. 325.
- 263 -
40
t t£0*ff l .*£#j£JI :@j8* # t tAt^*3l ' l£38*t t# '@£$ ftj tT^Wt: r ^jMHII# ' XXIIf J#f i » • **
fctt ' M&f «/ • - feni ih ' ' XXfX»«#
' mmmtk > f t ' # « • 4ht t f t«f «$t#XI&^: t :&'l±#!]gfrW"e » • fctZ-' %i& 1ft W #} r t* j Pi t t • '
P i t t • r A«j #jX^ ' I± : *pM#4£f t l» t t
SSNIP&| i ]» ##± » ? ih-F^MHll^ n % - * n • > M »i i^^w
' Tfr t t j f t f -WWtt ' lM«1f $- ' &&& 1#*p*£ > f t j fc&g t t£ ' $*##3M8*g 'If >
' XAIMX« • ' « ;& ' *&&p.5 | . SSNIP^ | i J^«W r f f iA#!»£X
3 H i j £ t t - X M $ f f t # £ t f t « m a & ^ r M ^ j M - -&SP ' H t t£##J« tttt ' W&W
£ ft t t 38 t # Alfc^;^ £ S'J t t f t t t J f t f t & f ' J H '
-264-
«fSIE • W&£)8* # r« «j ? &$£&&$ £ 4 M & % f i # R & £ f r f i > % # # & & & ) * $ &
« : ' W r * # * j l # I - J f E M ^ r t ^ f c A ^ M i f ! # J » M
f t# '*&%* ? w « t «
r Mjf1%i iff j ( revealed preference) ^tHH&'fl-#341 '
# f ' £ » « « « &
mit - 1 rJf 0j =
« # « « « ' & £ # & & & r H i @ j
I S - M M f W ^ W ^ K i m 3 4 2 '
0 Sit rg$j
$ • • & t A • A > * T » y f
' f e t & * # £ & £ $ & £ ' # * r
# J A « H ° r l # ^ J l M ! i j j £ £ + '
^41 mfflw rn^®?j HCIIJ • • rues**!-
° David D. Friedman, Price Theory — An Intermediate Text 25 (2nd ed. 1990).
342 Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the Future in Collaborations Among Competitors 461, 482 (Eleanor M. Fox & James T. Halverson eds„ 1991); £»SnPitofsky«gffiW . $nUaiSfc£±£«BIJK:g ' 8fJ£
r f f l nm^ j • mm r ^m«j «s^*s«2: ° Robert Pitofsky, New Definition of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust in Fox & Halverson » jWjHtfK ' JC491 - 501 °
-265-
42
> its *^:ti«
f $ •» > tnm&J&frBrif-ttti rf ( &-tftJ2(i)fc$C
t t ) ( # D f t ) - ? ] £ *
• aw
343 o
mi® ft f t tn ft f t % % ' ' & & $ & $ %
#}*%&&' Hith '
£91* '
f t ' tM*.Xft3L% ' &£Wft&fr%f in&&&&&&##.%& ±AGM&f t£%' t t t &&.$M%.Wt ' 5 | - t k « S ^ T • W # & $ £
®#n%MM,&ii£ftrm : « = # ] & « # * « £ » w f i «
^ - - i t s w t m
343 mm' ^ m&m&mm&w m • • spwpfflft^is • st±
• m$:ffi&R2.mtifflm9m • m r«^pna^K««^tc®(4j -ri»igiKg«ttj * - &,Rrmmmuzfc
»14j t? - W^fytSlIMIfSf^ , • mim ^ffigfiasxsffl^A^. rw^j r*2£j an • wim^mmwmm ^sra# ° •«= mnmrnwrnmrn^mmmmaL-wR^mtL »2:W«t»J3 • m^.mm.m&.mm^^mmmmmmrn^cm > Hies-187. 1999^11^ °
344 _ ffiftMte • *#^«^AX*«I¥5®jih-«lR] • /AzP#H-JSSMStSH- E^
' ®aijssaTfiJi«Biffi r«i±aife j xsam-f-Afcss- - -*Ais:^j»f««^fTSg®e^spmsfr^tca • m
-266-
&+=.$•+—ji & (=.) 43
^mpg^n^iga' rmm^m^m^mzmm • mwmnz.'&m&mr7 «Tfi« (3WtenP&tt) tMcib M*# • » »?'JA
• J W5ISS^ ' gffe£®i87JCSff 130 • «i - mm?' m^mr ^ &^z m^mmta >r mtrnwrnshzmmm • cm mm^mmmmm^) • scRffla^aj&ras^siRisft^^nHiii^att • mtt±mmmwft&®tm&mmzf>mm$°j mm&% 'immi-^ • ^¥#SRr • sp
• <St£a»±tMr' « » • nBmwm&^m&jmm&wnmmitiM&zm • 7 1 ®
SfctfctSESsWKW*® • 31 • • xmsttss • a
• imMm^mmmzmm •
4 • mica' &?m rmnm&ms,zfcm'&j ut • ffiWWW - *£ « ®-»#SS • jjLR®*«7^&fWBnpWSil • X® • •ussttit • it A® -kxbihh^sswi • wacft«{gsoftw
®s5rSMK«j m' immfm^mmzmmmmm^ntmimm mmmxm • rmwi£wm j • %Z ° ' IrHWK • M174 - 183 - 185 o 7KZF7tJ«(SW$SI-tfe,®S^/r#^ rnzmmz-' mmm-m-^nsmm • ° mm&nm
tm^m • f0«»sf5iags^^BH ? mmM-mwm • mm%mm±wi7 m' (35%s4o%) - &z • mmm Hffi (3%) » ' RBttK ' Mi77fiP|g92 - 93 • ttSfr ' ^*#1=07 m • an«Hs^am«teW¥ws w • \%m.Wii%m«i - MW rumznim&j m • aim • mwmm ntnw ojtgttffls^s - • ummw.£n&}Mm^m&]
; RZ • ' ffiJgK^m«teW^ F!® • • fmsH&Kaa rii{giUffij mm • IE^h 7 wagttffilg • ill® i87» AS££flr*
- 2 6 7 -
44 *A+.=4bi
*& -» • m «
tA ' t ' M^Kodakt^-t
t ^ - A M i r M n ^ ] p A m m m i % ° - « «
*Ai£itMII;^^$HW ,J&
M > j M - « A ± f •
nm, Kodaks^fct^^t # & 7
7 £ 40 S* A#ft SS ft ^ Itll • W ftf! •& & & $ ffi<&
WAA> ^$ltft
±HL«Mm«A t • M«Ah - MjmAA^-hitMAW
- l : ^ i M t i f t i M f e l r M S f i » 4 i W % &
• m^KodakiiM&AK
M W « M f
A 0#' ft^ & # £ Jfl A i# &it ft t«P<3 &' 111 jm |pj A A£SIt1" $
t t f t j W M M A ' -
3?H'J ' It ««$']«« '
wmm^p m.m& • • i.m±%mmmtamm&mmmM
ttwmtgttwiu®^ • nsfflsisig±iJ9MH • w m f m m & • m^mm -
- 2 6 8 -
• Wf •
A A ' A l ^ 7 K A « » A i i & P m ' W * « A M M ) t k
M ^ A t M A A ' # 1 ^ r ^ A j • & & ' A M t A I E
i t M A r A A 1 j A & H f r & f c @ A « A M
& ' • ScaliaA&f ^Kodak-
H + K P & & A ' A ^ & $ & l H / # i £ A I W # £ l i J & i y i f t & # r £
» >&mn£% mmm$L±%%L%* wt M+ -
t f t & « ± 3 * ' i f a & # * > ! « » ' &
i mMil ' M « # J i l ' « « » «
• & £ W £ l » r ' O M L S i l t t t f e # *
S ' « H 0 ; & f * A f « # # ] M ? t # £ £ * £ # • & « ] £
# i ° A # . & p m ' M I M A M # -
' Mif ft ' $*A'I6&&&&
$ a • w m p )rM$ £ * % m M %fc% M n & m & ® 3 4 6 -345 504 U.S. 489. Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis after
Kodak, 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 43, 58 (1993); Alan H. Silberman, The Myth of Franchise "Market Power", 65 Antitrust L. J. 181, 183 (1995); Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino Pizza, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1055, 1062 (E.D.Pa. 1996) (
• mMmmmmmzmm ° .
*jscm&m#i&7k2Pfiim2L&&mtfte ( ) & • m.nmmm.&jh • rsfea»f j m r^s®j • - f iss^smefif r^£>wp j
n rfT^® j • w%mm^mm2o • 21 - jamii#. mimmw •
-269-
46
. i & & i a i & i & * H & * £ #
%m$-j-> $ - & + & & » £ * £ * # & r i ^ P f « » M '
• %t\ > • n ^ t
M t f # « j i 5 U ^ & 3 r + A « - f £ i L r M « ^ f £
J J ' J f t & j • & & « $ # & $ I I J W T ' t t t t £ * M 3 4 7 '
Jfc & & J# It $ ft ^ ff • & # It ftl ii ft ffl *T ft 4£ H •*t it T IB 'li W #
f t • r f $ — l « « t >
i&fi • # + ' ' K
^mwa^sssnM • ^Ji«fr^MSiSffi»mis • jttmmffi&Rzmnmm (^zpSjiffig Wfflii^fiJISSt#) > %£k&-$M\m$2. • lEJth • *
• ^5fe • ' SiSS
riSSlESj (intuitive justice) 65®S5!jfb ' W S^zFSmKjElfl-L^m^M^SSIiJISStepgs • ffit£Rtgpfr?i?i$«^ rPB At®* J 5tWP« • • EPttifc&liS; > s ' m^jtMimiia r%Lmmjmm - tssi • ^frn®^*l»^ - (fit > MS®#«^Jffi&^jEfrii^ - 2ra±^i£gimai« WfrlPS ? ^imsfTft • mmw&^m^njz ? mmz. • m r&Mj w j g^g*ii. s^j&tiiEi'tt' £®ri£)3:^ ' *H£S1llfi^g&]B|ftHf«j&ffiH . jtt-^ifc^J^^JI^^ • #
• e^««HtB3itMy^##ApBi > ifffgeasfs r*j n rsr _, ±^*Kafl - mm^-scttm • jtt~&&
» i £ R ' mm2.
-270-
£fc - #rMit #1 S ( =.) 47
3L#±lfc -
l f c | l f M « W l r ' ¥ # ± 3 f e W r « f M J I f f M t t A M A f • M « « t £ # J t ' M & & & * & * f M 4 £ W r t J j - 1 ^ 0
± & > f t t ' # 1 ^ r m n ^ i 5 j « / j g « &IMt348 • «&£;& ' fiMf£«M#-J&Mf,!ii^AiF-& '
$»¥•«/ r * H j r t t t « j ?
« - « « t ' j M t & H a ^ s - i t * 4 £ A ¥ £ # + t e t t * * * t ' & « # & & # & £ £ Mtj ±& • mtz.' muuit
' & # « « < tm
E M r i $ M $ E # j ( I T - I S ; ) - r ^ f j ( S - S t ) r i E f S i f j ( # = f t ) ' A r M J ( & E 9 & ) M t ' i M M E t t t l t t t & H t • # = # > r t n # +
# J r $ * j i M - M ' & X & A « / 9 F & • • ' M « M » r M ' l ± t T l * j & * &
it I^Fisher$f$|{t} A °
848 HIT# ' IrH£154 . H180-81 -
- 271 -
48 ******
rohhm%%j «m
^0#. w r«tnwj tfj7T& > s s5^ft®«IJ^it t§ ' feb«##0.067t ( #^il3.67t ) 6<jf * •
te£#uHJ* A + *mnm & $ H ft 4? f t«t£«' M P#M^t w f ^5^111.770 ' «f;f t^«t£P4f M#^6TC ! &
8-#-+**' r omm^I j » ' ««+*
« t£ 3# & & 3Lill'I f ' w # & & # # £ rj? J# % % i$ J# + £» £ 71
de-averaging)
( t^^^67fciL
' K'J«P4 •
+ ( UTm r4C« j) ' • - f e r 4 C t | j + f t g i f t $ = # $ & £ '
rH £*£*&&$*>]$ - tT£»tt iL« ' &««« &«' If ' «
i.«^trif«#. (tJ#^ ' £ & * & = # £ $ « ) •
-272-
2 . M t H H i t r f l r # « « # « « • 3 .
j $ l S A M A ; £ A A M « - K J M t i E f S i i i •
« r 4 C M j f i t # 1 - ^ 1
& ' r « ! f l H £ J M ' t e # t £ ' t e * r
& # # * * # & $ : # - - w £ - i t a t ' i £
# 4 # j A & • £ » i t h ' l ' J t m « 0 M £ ' ' U m m a H M A ' ?
A A ' MDH)(. r^^TIfj %3E.%mm t' f^Mfcl'lifT
f A r $ * ± « j
^ i ^ ^ + # ^ 0 | i : ^ f # ^ r # ' f t f e i l j l l ^ ^ i t k i a f f ^ j ?
A A M r ^ i t » i £ j S ' J f f i i ; A t « f «
A A M > ! * & & & ¥ * # • # •
4 H H M E J f $ 0 r & 3 ! i & * p * M t i t « / £ $ * ' £
M + A # $ 3 # : : t i ^ r f J # j A A ' « # - ^ « M A $ i l l
& £ # A f r M £ A i / 0 ^ ; M - « & - ^ - - # j t « # 3 4 9 • ^
A ^ j t ' - M
& « A « M r - M - ^ j A f c # j « - m & # f c * A ± &
« « t « # 'm > j l # « &
§ » ' ' f t # A « - M # - x * '
04Q fflmosMis^ • mm^mrm • me 154 • HI53-58.
-273-
50
& t t ' & R 4 f $ J k : $ i t M £ . f r j f t Z m ' SiJ^^fPSJ350 - S&tffB
$±%T > -&&$ *T$ ? I'J&&#*» • j # r # » &
S - 7 C « # t t J ' • « # ' ' A * P H & A
s f t f - ' ' m%.%.-% • ' i l ' MA!351 •
- & •
AtfrWftib - + AM rft
rf!)t§ j ' A#>])lTJMff I^AAAiiii&ti^jt A$J A If •
r WA«f-AJlAiij!l#l j ' «A$l $ + A#«Mf-AJl#jMgft'§ S f c r ^ f - ^ R j r A A A ' l i j ' # # £ ^ r M « A H i i t f t f j fr&nti • M^J»f ita > E' &gp » £#&&«&£
> | i J J R r f M & j ; j * . A > £ A & A r A A A j ' H & A 9! m • III tii fir &r 4-mM I'J j T • to&ft & f* Mftf- &m$ &£ •
rT^Mj i±i^pft« ? &1+ > HM3T + A &&&+&£$££ - #$ = &<# Eft* A#3&4ijftfAT-& - ^ £ $ i f £ A # 3 £ j £ f i m A & ' ' E & ^ A M
IrHWE ' *155 . 351 fBjWE • *156 .
-274-
M t & f l H @ & + ' # t r W I ^ 3 l j A °
• t » £ # # # # & * £ r ^ A ^ j r ^ a
& f M M J ' * f _ t & - « r # £$# j (tautological) AMUAA - MJSlftMttfM m ° •
' M # H I C & A f A ? 1*1«. » U j #if • St&ti- * #*«!£&#&#&&
tT^A?f«lfr«^^ii£A • @& r1IISflt^j *T&£0 &&& <& rAjf «j ' fe#*#, r1& flr&#-*!.& J ' flfvmM. rMM1faM J # rAjf a#j' -&J»JE«t o -&@jtb - rMMj jfc rAJf $
• BT$ ' I W & r n f c t t j g m ' u & t i t r 4 m W j l i f r f f
Afa - •
h > m§r^iR«|gt«fTd^:@F^
ft $ It 1 % ft & IP # * 'J A * f M M m f 'J & VX ft tt A A' M M # &
- 2 7 5 -
5 2 *a+.=4»
• ^RRCSItT ' AA#&J^t TlP^f'J
A & r f e ^ £ I j > r t t # A l ! ] f r j ^ f p r l i a t j # A A '
A J & « A • « @ > A f t M
f ' J W ^ 5 ' l i > f ' J A & f i t + ^ J I l •
^Hjfr 4 M^f!l#F##^AWAA °
(-)
&#,&# f ffl t' It Miff!] SL ® S f A A & 1 5 * < & * t A t £ r A
- o i m ; ' &
M W f M • « r ^ f - J W # r ^ f " ^ J
' i ^ A r « A t j « / # £ -
fP MM » #t± # A r t SH #
& j f - t f t - M M M A f t & M + f * r # £ j
$T£ftZ£-&&ftj#i tr • t%' f r « $ ' j £ * « * & # «
M M ' S f i f l i H i A A
r l i t t t ^ j # r t M # M I 6 f f l ^ f « i j J t M d i
$ ] * . & # • & £ • • W A - £ f f ^
A A & A A i ^ M f t , • l f c ^ # W A - A A 4 ^ j i & E I # 7 A 1 ^ & '
^ M ' i M P A A A & M + A M
-276-
T ' W W t r i£%Mir-& ' A - SH£MA« + mm WM
i t* ( *p# —+ 0i t ) •
(=)
t fc i t*A|LM/i lW if ' #««« '
WA^0Sfe«| r#i&36^^^1l! l^iL^j-«M^' ^ '^E r4C
• &^A«3r+«f m• &&-&# ' T i t ' «A«tfMt##£«A@^ ' M r£H t i j $mii&Mteifcm03Hil8!8£ r&*A«j fr& • &
Iti& XI & 0 0# ' *T ft-* 14£& pj t JH it+ A it % — #£r A $ £
&£#/&* • 'Ki t* r»f«-j -^AAtAt - m m «*««# - Mi£i3H&«*A^#£«l&«*M# ' & & i i k « I I ] t t « A # i ' W r M j
@Jth -f r& • f t*# A H« ' M««] ' M*rM 31 £&&&#£ '
'** r«Wjff! l«WitA '
t t i j r M j f t&*Y> > « A A A # ' f c - - * » ! # * ] &
-277-
54 &*&*** # A.+— $
&£# r MM#-]£M^f^Jlj ( $ + i l#) ' & r £l^ff £ §&/* j ( • «¥-s i&«t#£#
ft ' tfrtWJ W- «-$?ft ' $fc»
* 0 & & & m ftft#r&£ W < 1' M M # MM
Bl&l^flerfcry Photo M $i °
imfi±i&M«^B)i ' &M&$528*£B - f - t i i i tT r &¥£#&ft-+0M#l |3 l f tS l J 3 5 3 J • t ' MtI^T^f- + 0 i t r £«f J it $ &M $ f ' 1^ &$- + 0##&
+ r «^jf | iJj nfcfc ' M ' %&&%%%.%>& ' Wtr^<t^it -#MI63L^50# ' i t /0 °MJ3£«AHMi&y#'Ji t f Js i i f f j l t t* Jl ' Wja> r^#Aic^#* > i£M#£* ASA •
MJIMlf<14 j • «#*&*-» > W*itJ0£-+ H#i iM • mmtz.'
ft if & & & t £ - M ft f t S i X M # # f & n ft i t S t PJf f t f t W n-fe ( ) ' n&±lP)f3LWc&13L%-& ' M#£ • %ty ' MtftBMM ' r Pi
JMuB3464^I8;H)3 » 353 91. 1. 9.fi-®^|g0910000252^® •
-278-
f ' JMf- j n r ^A«#- j r Mj & r I l£A ° » > m r £ t « j
&&&&&&%*%
f a > J f r i t f f $ J 0 J i b t i ^
^^^i i+Eg#i t i l ]^^«l ' l i t fO@ ' MMJEW^tt •
• & & & & & & % r m ^ A ^ j n m > mmm m *
' M-aikm^ r ^i j #«
M j > W i t h t t t - &«5£ • #& ' M
—+ E3#-#7±& g ft ' t f «MJH*t M «#* ' 0ih 'MA HMM ' • Mb- i t fMf« ' 75 A¥
r $ £ M j # r * £ - t i f r '# : !MBIM « /#**#-
^ I M J H W r * A ¥ j M r ^ S j ' M
m t t > u & f e t k f - m •
Mi/HMl. > # f f#±£«±W£l»rg#- ;&t-+0f tWt ' 0 & m % & # i f a # i & f a ' j s*mrc«g# r £«f mm j M
• MMMJf IMAMMt ' ' t£ - fesp r MMA®&f A« '
-279-
56
• i ^ A M S $ J « # W M # - i f f ^ • f f e l J t o # T ' M i / p M f l f t W M i r - M S > Wftfa-JkU r R
*» r«£A^j -*M - imft^^^jHMI&ifMf lJ^cl:I
' **0HI tW«M«£A •
(H) lSS15lJ|f T
JL ' - ^JUiitHiM# '
& & & ¥ % % & J - £ 3 5 4 ° « | l f * A ^ M t i i '
M ^ M W A A ' & # £ £ ACD-RA€#ft#i«$i£±t!ii£ - jfcitMM&tffcft&Ufcft '
m ' £ i t « * A
& - >
A * l^Mp^tf A«MWM ' ffcjg*#W#& ^#7^*11 PP#ftii ' ' # |& 7 CD-RH & |i!l ft &f # M1 & *P CD-RW &DVD A € tf M & 1*1 -M« ' ifiia rCD-RA€tft#Tj #$Ht«IIWM« * W«-«T • « hamipaiwm ftiMMJft&N ft] ' ft t f 4tCD-RA€>T-
+ » m m H C D - R A M l t M s j C M A A - - t + u i J i - & « f W i l t
354 2^*fg0910003750§ •
-280-
««#-! & > & . ' m • #J-*3frCD-R#*#£tet
f M ' ' MjgiE #- ' fm»*AA#f femnmfr - A^I<J &?I JH
3T + «0# r#MJSiir$ilMMT&J Mlt' &¥*«& > flffBW rM j' ' #£##&&#£ ^ *^F > ft it ft# r#WM j-t4 MM4& j -r ££&#«/«$ j>rM l-W-rl
t e t t & J f l J r « A * f • £ # > a H E J
«JS'J ? «A4l!l«#£ r$£j>r,t#j> # rf£j A*h ? m«it • #4' &&¥*«/£& - mm wr#
j nmx r« • f!]M4MsiA.&±giMi4j° m «&«!' £#A^M4«A MFm^M ' H * ^^0if#Awx#i##f w#t ' • ^fcmA>rumm&iftt3E.%mj' u&gjtfc&mm®
- ®m%L&&$ii$iiL$ii%mik* > m% %m Aftt^&y-' fci&fcffiiif• AXM%, • &¥*«/$ $+«««' • p f M ' # 4 ' « A £ | L « $ § £±lk«Wfttt* ra£j.«Al^imt' ±fM«#
- 2 8 1 -
5 8 *A+i«
& # # & - m w M > # « « £ # >
- z.te&mA%te)g.$i ? t « A « ^ - t A $ #
J 4 H & ^ M % M « A r £ « « j a r » i t j t%m>
i t r fS -R #tf #A j Wt"' fey- i t & M •#* + ' l+fJip ' *r $U & i k£4T &
° ^ '1^4 90^3^1 8 0 ^^4 8 7 ^# - t - t 3 5 5 ' £ •¥"#•
f t 1 r t H # &»t Pfc^ 1 £ H^f t f l £# t P&&*J # ft > 3*
j ' ®
«3 0H7fcM#J«£ ' i t JLf t^ i t^ j w f t £ am I A • AI
' « «
• < & ¥ * # # f t S t f c 7 5 ' B P f t + & f t & * $ « £ « / £ £ f t
f t > M ^ r M t i ^ & j
- + &*» I - #
f lr f l l # . # f t t ^5 0 H7 t Hl 2 l 7 t ' &#f£££$ f«
ft f tM. • 8 A > -
355 r SS#Sfc ®a i f l j • I g5^gg3j® - M46-48 ' 2001^ 5^ 310 °
-282-
H ' Wk '
&.%•$! ft m •
• <i .#Aghion & Bolton r nn®tk j &#«m;j#t&3 5 6 ' &
t« '
M£#£#&&fc#r#*r=£' # A i | # £ i t f-& W S & i -•&$ 1# it #7 £•# JS. & w $ $ m f j m t & m & m f t a * » * * . # & ¥ * & £ r ^1^—i—# r&^#$f&:ift i t&3t$&j ' $t%Mi$l
- ¥ff-t ' £#&$b(pJ&#££ife$ift i$«l At ' + ' «#^f ' ft&sMtft
«« >
Zft&m&mT ' m#MF1«#' &.##}&% W^«^#JjE# M#l° ' KPi£^#18%|$"ifrJ#
*M + rMj 0# -I W ? 3 | & f i t - j f r t e l f r R R C & A g h i o n
& BoltonBtg& > &#*&$£#£# ' A
3 5 6«fitB« - • immmmmMmRumm^mmmm • W • 5feG5>ftg£il»ffl • *£<mit3tWmfB
- 283 -
60
I'JWt '
$ » A ? t t & i t f t & l f c & f t s m f t
' l»&MP°P«jMiiiift '
g f c m i i j j T A l t ; ' ±
9 1 ^ 1 1 £ 2 1 0 ' & y - * & % 5 7 6 # . £ n i t * ' * f c r £ i f l £ t
£ ' ^ A f - & £ - + 0 # A M £ ' # i U T ^ ^ A i t ^ W ^ 3 5 8 "
S l r t t m a j t W ' M W ^ A M A t '
S # t t & m # ' W » r « « * * & f f t ® j f c g f t t E $ l &
' M-&A
£ $ ^ * A f i f r * M ^ 9 9 £ M M £ > « 3 o o H 7 t & m ? £ A
357 a«« • • EHi«»*6& > as-iiffiioosTc • ^aiu
• tm mssum • tintfin • • ^a^iiiiftiT-uri: mmm f# • g Sl*±ffPw1li( 91^3^ 17 0 ) ° ±^§ http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2002/ new/mar/17/today-e8.htm S®^091189^ •
-284-
J H S f l A t i £ & « & j A * f < ] ' « * £ # = £ *
^ > AM&tt I £MAAII£A
Aft# - «24#M& • j
'^MJf>fmiLfi#Ma ? AA« •
£#jf Ji ' » f ««• SP«««&|L
AM>«:#M#«Mit! i i i ' tM rmh ft** ' ' fliWyL&te&$i&%jSL&m*m8L& ft •&tz.' A^1SM^«£ v3kj I
<&# r f *«/&£• l&ASJ^+#*!«#**# (£ ^A«t£* » «««*#)'Aghion&BoltonMARRC3l
i t ' •
m%im
— - tpx
1. **«* & j f . ' >*168-203 (*t
$«-#" ' 1999^11^ )•
+ ' 1697-739 ( A¥£# #** ' 2002$6M )•
( R g 8 9 ^ ) -4. «««—
- 2 8 5 -
62 3SA+^$
+ ' % + M ' 1313-362 ( 2000^-3ft ) • 5 . - & « S » > N » J £ J '
' 163-100 ( 1999^1 £ ) • 6 . * £ # * ' r ^ a E W ^ l > a i ' J S S j ' S M & ' ' S 6 2 " 6 8
(2002#5£ ) •
1. Azam H. Aziz, "Note: Defining Technology and Innovation Markets: The DOJ's Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property", 24 Hofstra Law Review 475 (1995)
2. Phillipe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, "Contracts as Barriers to Entry", 77 American Economics Review 388 (1987)
3. Phillip A. Areeda & Donald Tuner, "Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act", 88 Harvard Law Review 697 (1975)
4. Phillip A. Areeda & Donald Tuner, Antitrust Law (1978) 5. Phillip A. Areeda, "Essential Facility: An Epithet in Need of Limiting
Principles", 58 Antitrust Law Journal 841 (19891 6. Phillip A.Areeda, "Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past
and the Future" in COLLABORATION AMONG COMPETITIORS 461 (Eleanor M. Fox & James T. Halverson eds., 1991)
7. Robert G. Badal & Hilary E. Ware, "U.S. Company Compelled to License Its Software by E.U. Antitrust Authorities: The Case of NDC Health v. IMS Health" http://www.hewm.com/use/articles/imshealth.pdf.
8. J. S. Bain, "A Note on Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopoly", 39 American Economics Review 448 (1949)
9. Jonathan B. Baker, "Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective", 62 Antitrust Law Journal 585 (1994)
10. David Balto & Robert Pitofsky, "Antitrust and High-tech Industries: The New Challenge", 43 Antitrust Bulletin. 583 (1998)
11. John H. Barton, "Patent and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth and Sequential Innovation", 65 Antitrust Law Journal 449C19971
-286-
A+JMH--J3 (=.) 63
12. William J. Baumol, "Quasi-Permanence of Price Reduction: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing", 89 Yale Law Journal 1 (1979)
13. William Baxter, "Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis", 76 Yale Law Journal 267 (1966)
14. Barry L. Bayus, Sanjay Jain, & Ambar G. Rao, "Truth or Consequences: An Analysis of Vaporware and New Product Announcements", 37 Journal of Marketing Research 3 (2001)
15. Joshua C. Benson, "Note: Resuscitating the Patent Utility Requirement, Again: A Return to Brenner v. Manson", 36 U.C. Davis Law Review 267 (2002)
16. Stanley M. Besen , Willard G. Manning, Jr. & Bridger M. Mitchell, "Copyright Liability for Cable Television: Compulsory Licensing and the Coase Theorem", 21 Journal of Economics 67 (1978)
17. David Bestanko, David Dranove& Mark Shanley, ECONOMICS OF STRATEGY (1996)
18. Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Broadly & Michael H. Riordan, "Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy", 88 Geogia Law Journal 2239 (2000)
19. Malcolm R. Burns, "Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors", 94 Journal of Political Economy 266 (1986)
20. Guido Calebresi & A. Douglas Melamed, "Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral", 85 Harvard Law Review 1089(1972)
21. Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, "Antitrust Intent", 74 South California Law Review 657 (2001)
22.Brodley & Ching-to Albert Ma, "Contract Penalties, Monopolizing Strategies, and Antitrust Policy", 45 Standford Law Review 1161 (1993)
23. Ronald H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost", 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1 (1960)
24. Thomas F. Cotter, "Intellectual Property and the Essential Facilities Doctrine", 44 Antitrust Bulletin. 211 (1999)
25. William S. Comanor & H. E. Freeh, III, "Predatory Pricing and the Meaning of Intent", 38 Antitrust Bulletin 293 (1993)
- 2 8 7 -
64 ****** **+•=•»!
26. Bradford Delong & Lawrence H. Summers, "The 'New Economy': Background, Historical Perspective, Questions, and Speculations", in Economic Policy for the Information Economy (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2001) http://www.kc.frb.org/Publicat/econrev/Pdf/4qO 1 delo.pdf.
27. Denger & Herfort, "Predatory Pricing Claims After Brooke Group", 62 Antitrust Law Journal 541(1994)
28. Frank A.Easterbrook, "The Limits of Antitrust", 63 Texas Law Review 1 (1984)
29. Frank A. Easterbrook, "Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies", 48 University of Chicago Law Review 263 (1981)
30. Nicholas Economides, "United States v. Microsoft: A Failure of Antitrust in the New Economy", 32 U. West L.A. Law Review 3 (2001)
31. Nicholas Economides & Frederick Flyer, "Compatibility and Market Structure for Network Goods", (discussing paper EC-98-02, Stern School of Business, N.Y.U, 1998)
32. Nicholas Economides, "The Economics of Networks", 14 International Journal of Industrial Organization 673 (1996)
33. Aaron S. Edlin, "Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing", 111 Yale Law Journal 941 (2002)
34. David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, "Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis in Dynamically Competitive Industries", (NBER Working Paper 8268, May 2001) http://www.nber.org/papers/w8268
35. J. Farrel & G. Saloner, "Installed Base and Compatibality: Innovation, Product Preannouncements and Predation", 76 American Economics Review 940 (1986)
36. J. Farrel & G Saloner, "Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation", 16 Rand Journal of Economics 70 (1985)
37. Franklin M. Fisher & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, "U.S. v. Microsoft: An Economic Analysis", 2001 Antitrust Bulletin 1 (2001)
38. Franklin M. Fisher, J. McGowan, & J. Greenwood, FOLDED. SPINDLED, AND MUTILATED: ECONOMICS ANALYSTS OF U.S. v. IBM (1983)
- 2 8 8 -
39. David D. Friedman. PRICE THEORY—AN INTERMEDIATE TEXT (2nd ed. 1990) 40. Mark Furse, "United States v. Microsoft: High-tech Antitrust", 13
International Review of Law. Computers & Technology 237 (1999)
41.Clovia Hamilton, "Adequacy of the 1995 Antirust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property in Complex High-Tech Markets", 7 Comparative Law Review and Technology Journal 23 (2002)
42. Garrett. Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons", 162 Science 1243 (1968) 43. Harold Gruber, "Learning by Doing and Spillovers: Further Evidence for the
Semiconductor Industry", 13 Review of Industry Organization 697 (1998) 44. Michael A. Heller, "The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition From Marx to Markets", 111 Harvard Law Review 621 (1998) 45. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, "Can Patents Deter Innovation?--
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research", 280 Science 698 (1998) 46. Herbert Hovenkamp, M. Lemley & Janis, IP AND ANTITURST (2002) 47. Herbert Hovenkamp, FEDERAL ANTITURST POLICY (19941 48. Keith N. Hylton, "Economic Rents and Essential Facilities", 1991 B. Y. U.
Law Review 1243 (1991) 49. Douglas A. Irwin & Peter J. Klenow, "Learning-by-Doing Spillovers in the
Semiconductor Industry", 102 Journal of Political Economy 1200 (1994) 50. Y. J. Jung, J. Kagel, & D. Levin, "On the Existence of Predatory Pricing: An
Experimental Study of Reputation and Entry Deterrence in the Chain-Store Game", 25 Rand Journal of Economics 72 (1994)
51. Edmund W. Kitch, "Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property", 53 Vanderbit Law Review 1727 (2000)
52. Benjamin Klein, "Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis after Kodak", 3 Supreme Court Economics Review 43 (1993)
53. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, "Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price", 96 Yale Law Review 209(1986)
54. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, "Competition and Cooperation in the Market for Exclusionary Rights", 76 American Economics Review 109 (1986)
-289-
66 *A+iK
55. M. Lemley & David McGowan, "Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects", 86 California Law Review 481 (1998)
56. Stan J. Liebowtz & Stephen Margolis, WINNER. LOSER & MICROSOFT: COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY (1999)
57. David T. Levy & James D. Reitzes, "Product Differentiation and the Ability to Collude: Where Being Different Can Be an Advantage", 38 Antitrust Bulletin 349 (1993)
58. Abbott B. Lipsky & J. Gregory Sidak, "Essential Facility", 51 Standford Law Review 1187 (1999)
59. John R. Lott, ARE PREDATORY COMMITMENTS CREDIBLE?—WHO SHOULD THE COURTS BELIEVE? (1999)
60. John McGee, "Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case", 1 Journal of Law and Economics 137 (1958)
61. S.E. Masten & E.A. Snyder, "United States versus United Shoe Machinery Corporation: On the Merits", 36 Journal of Law and Economics 33 (1993)
62. S.E. Masten & E.A. Snyder, "The Design and Duration of Contracts: Strategic and Efficiency Considerations", 52 Law and Cnntemooarv Problems 63(1989)
63. David McGowan, "Networks and Intention in Antitrust and Intellectual Property", 1999 Journal of Corporation Law 485 (1999)
64. Robert P. Merges, "Comments: Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property", 94 Columbia Law Review 2655 (1994)
65. Robert P. Merges, "Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations", 84 California Law Review 1293 (1996)
66. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, "New Theories of Predatory Pricing", in INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE IN THE NEW INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 112 (Bonanno & Brandolini ed. 1990)
67. Rich Miller, "The New Economy Lives On", Business Week on Line (May 10, 2001)
68. David Neumark & Deborah Reed, "Employment Relationships in the New Economy", (NBER Working Paper 8910, April 2002),
-290-
yL+x-^+^ (=.) 67
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8910 69. Sergio Baches Opi, "The Application of the Essential Facility Doctrine to
Intellectual Property Licensing in the European Union and the United States: Are Intellectual Property Rights Still Sacrosanct?", 11 Fordham Intellectual Property. Media and Entertainment Law Journal 409 (2001)
70. Robert Pitofsky, "Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property", 68 Antitrust Law Journal 913 (2001)
71. A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics (1989) 72. Michael E. Porter, "Towards a Productivity-based Approach to Evaluating
Mergers and Joint Ventures", 46 Antitrust Bulletin 919(2001) 73. Richard A. Posner, "Antitrust in the New Economy", 68 Antitrust Law
Journal 925 (2001) 74. Arti K. Rai, "Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical
Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust", 16 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 813 (2001)
75. Antonio Regalado, "Scientists' Hunt for SARS Cure Turns to Race for Patent Rights", The Wall Street Journal Online (May 5, 2003)
76. R.H. Reid, ARCHITECTS OF THE WEB: 1.000 DAYS THAT BUILT THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS (19971
77. William P. Rogerson, "Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract", 15 Rand Journal of Economics 39 (1984)
78. Daniel L. Rubinfeld, "Antitrust Enforcement in Dynamic Network Industries", 43 Antitrust Bulletin 859 (1998)
79. Garth Saloner, "Predation, Mergers, and Incomplete Information", 18 Rand Journal of Economics 165 (1987)
80. Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, "Raising Rivals' Costs", 73 American Economics Review 267 (1983)
81. Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, "Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft", 7 George Mason Law Review 617(1999)
82. R. Selton, "The Chain-Store Paradox", 9 Theory and Descision 127 (1978) 83. Richard Schmalensee, "Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-eat Breakfast
- 291 -
68
Cereal Industry", 9 Bell Journal of Economics 305 (1978)
84. William G. Shepherd, The Economics of Industrial Organization (4th ed. 1997)
85. Alan H. Silberman, "The Myth of Franchise "Market Power"", 65 Antitrust Law Journal 181 (1995)
86. Lawrence A. Sullivan, "Is Competition Possible in High Tech Markets?: An Inquiry into Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and Broadband Regulation as
Applied to "The New Economy"", 52 Case Western Reserved Law Review 41 (2001)
87. Lawrence A. Sullivan & Anne I. Jones, "Monopoly Conduct, Especially Leveraging Power from One Product or Market to Another", in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS ("Thornas M. Jorde& David J. Teeceed.
1992)
88. Laura D'Andrea Tyson, "Why the New Economy is Here to Stay", BusinessWeek Online (April 30, 2001)
89. Oliver E. Williamson, "Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis", 87 Yale Law Journal 284 (1977)
-292-
The Current and Future Regulation of Predatory Conduct—
An Evaluation Under the New Economy System(3)
Andy C. M. Chen
Abstract
The advent of the "New Economy" system has drastically changed the ways goods are produced and competition is waged. The ability of antitrust law to regulate market competition has been challenged as well. Antitrust commentators—referring to various characteristics prevalent in the New Economy, including high fixed/low marginal costs, network effect and informational asymmetry—question the effectiveness of applying current antitrust doctrines to regulate anticompetitive activities in an economic system in which "knowledge" is commonly regarded as the major production input and "intellectual property rights" the principal desired output. They urge that new doctrines be introduced to allow antitrust to adapt to the needs of this system.
This study evaluates the validity of this rather "apprehensive" view toward the consequences likely to arise from the interaction between antitrust law and the New Economy system. By investigating the applicability of current
*
Assistant Professor, Department of Public Administration, Tamkang University (Taiwan); SJD, Northwestern University (1998).
Received June 5, 2003; accepted September 1, 2003
- 293 -
*A+
doctrines to arrangements suspected of having market predation effects, I attempt to show that however inevitable the impact of the system on antitrust law might be, it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the creation of new rules is required or even mandated. Most predatory arrangements in the New Economy could be properly confined within the scope of current antitrust law if enforcement agencies could adhere to the main legislative purpose of antitrust, i.e., protecting competition and not competitors, and making pertinent decisions and interpretations thereupon. More importantly, law enforcement agencies should avoid being misguided by the popular "lock-in" theory and devoting disproportionate enforcement resources to considering whether one party to a contract at issue has "vertically" used a stronger bargaining position to exploit another party. Instead, concern should primarily be placed upon the potential of the contract to create "horizontal" entry barriers. The analysis concludes by applying the policy implications suggested in this study to an examination of the relevant decisions and guidelines made by the Fair Trade Commission of Taiwan.
Keywords: New Economy, innovation competition, antitrust, Fair Trade Law, Predation, Intellectual Property Right, abuse of monopoly power, relevant markets, market power, essential facility doctrine
-294-
![Predatory Unfair Trade Practices · Predatory Pricing The Danger of Penalizing Competitive Conduct “[C]utting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of competition.”](https://static.documents.pub/doc/80x56/5e70734cde43f0502a7af28a/predatory-unfair-trade-practices-predatory-pricing-the-danger-of-penalizing-competitive.jpg)
