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Cutting to the Chase: Carl Schmitt and
Hans Blumenberg on Political Theology
and Secularization
Pini Ifergan
The termpolitical theologyconceptualizes an attempt to rediscover and expose
the theological dimension entwined within the fabric of politics. Political theol-
ogy must be understood against the backdrop of the common perception of the
political in the modern era, at least since the publication of Thomas Hobbess
Leviathanin 1651. On this view, among the distinctive features of the political
are its complete independence from any and all lofty theological notions and,
conversely, its preoccupation with the here and now. This effort to reexpose the
relations of dependence between the theological and political does not entail
moving theology or religion back to the center of human existencea position
that these beliefs lost after the profound changes in the modern Wests under-
standing of the world and humanity. Needless to say, religion has not disap-peared in the modern epoch, and its place on the pedestal has indeed been
subsequently restored. Be that as it may, the motivation for clarifying the rela-
tions of dependence between the theological and the political is not religious,
but emerged from within modern political and legal thought itself, as it endeav-
ored to answer the following question: to what extent is modern political the-
ory based on or independent of the theological realm?
The philosopher most closely identied with elucidating the modern
attributes of the political is Carl Schmitt (18881985). In Political Theology
New German Critique 111 Vol 37 No 3 Fall 2010
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150 Schmitt and Blumenberg on Political Theology
(1922), Schmitt formulated political theologys principal argument: All the
quintessential concepts of the theory of the modern state are secularized theo-
logical concepts.1From a normative standpoint, this statement can be inter-
preted as a neutral observation. In other words, rather than make a principled
judgment, Schmitt merely points to a conceptual analogy or resemblance
between the underlying theoretical principles of the modern state and those of
Christian theology. That said, this succinct sentence can just as easily be read
as a normative observation on the question of modernitys liberation from the
legacy of theological thought. In fact, this statementand political theology in
generalhas drawn criticism from both adherents of theological worldviews
and those committed to the tenets of modernity. The former lash out at the
attempts to eviscerate political thought of what they believe to be its rudimen-tary theological content, whereas the standard-bearers of modernity bemoan
the absence of a political theory that is radical enough to completely extricate
itself from the grips of the religious worldview. Schmitt is chiey responsible
for the ambiguity over political theologys fundamental position, as he persis-
tently refrained from spelling out his motives. In consequence, the normative
ramications of his position remain an open question. This veil of uncertainty
does not emanate solely from Schmitts position, however, as his oeuvre clearly
points to his theological leanings.The ambiguity also stems from a broader and more principled issue,
which is well reected in Schmitts position: the view of modern consciousness
as a self-contained and self-derived system of well-dened norms that strive for
self-justication. Only through this unique form of justication will modern
self-consciousness be able to reafrm that it is an all-inclusive system of norms
and absolutely distinct from the Christian theological framework, which the
founders of modernity saw themselves as breaking away from. This funda-
mental objective, which has yet to be attained, has accompanied the Wests
intellectual history since long before the appearance of Schmitts theological-
political thesis. However, the latter molded this entire issue into a particular
form that sets it apart from its previous manifestations.
Schmitts approach is unique for two reasons. To begin with, when Polit-
ical Theologyrst came out, the trenchant Nietzschean critique of the origins
of modern consciousness and, above all, Max Webers sociological-historical
characterization of the modern eras social and political institutions were
already in the background. More specically, Friedrich Nietzsche and Weber
had substantially deated the self-condent attitude of modernitys defenders
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Pini Ifergan 151
who were certain that modern consciousness was a historical phase in which
humanity had cast off the shackles of the Christian theological worldview.
The second reason is much more local. Schmitt wrote his seminal works
(Political Theologyincluded) during the nascent stages of the Weimar Repub-
lic. The founding of the new political order on the ruins of the imperial gov-
ernment in the immediate aftermath of Germanys defeat in World War I trig-
gered an extensive discussion on the edgling regimes stability and strength,
or lack thereof. Schmitt adopted a critical line toward the new government.
Focusing on the concept of sovereignty, he claimed that it had lost some of
its validity because of the inherent ambiguity over who holds the decision-
making power in the Weimar Republic. It was in this highly tangible context
that political theologys underlying principlethat secularized theologicalconcepts undergird the theory of the modern statecame into being. This
position allowed Schmitt to launch a lucid discussion on sovereignty, which
he identied with the age-old theological belief in a divine ruler. The concept
of sovereigntys legitimacy, in Schmitts view, can be rehabilitated only if
we assume that there is a succession between the terminology of Christian
theology and that of the modern state. Put differently, his secularization
argument must be understood primarily as a way to shore up the sovereignty
of governments (most notably the Weimar Republic) in the modern politicalsphere, so that they may overcome their inherent instability. However, the spe-
cic political context of Schmitts argument eventually took a backseat to the
discussion on secularization, especially in all that concerned modernitys
demand to view itself as a new historical epoch, which derives its legitimacy
from itself, alone.
While the history-of-ideas movement, which jettisons central ideas in
favor of the marginal, partly contributed to this shift to a much wider context,
it was primarily the result of the deep rupture that beset the modern West
because of, among other events, the Weimar Republics collapse and its replace-
ment with a totalitarian government. These events rendered the discussion on
sovereignty, certainly in all that concerns Schmitts local points of emphasis,
irrelevant and even illegitimate (Schmitt was personally involved with the Nazi
regime). Instead, the desire to explain the deep rupture caused by the horrors
of World War II spurred on the need to analyze the ideological origins as well
as question the legitimacy of modern consciousness. This imperative was
manifest in works as varied asDialectic of Enlightenment, by Max Horkheimer
and Theodor W. Adorno (1944), andMeaning of History, by Karl Lwith
(1949). As part of this same discourse, Hans Blumenberg (192096) proposed
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152 Schmitt and Blumenberg on Political Theology
consciousness of the crisis plays a major role and also in his innovative focus
on demonstrating that secularization was not a factor in the advent of modern
consciousness. Blumenberg clearly distinguishes his own work from the criti-
cism on modernity. In so doing, he situates himself in a unique position.
Blumenbergs emphasis on the dynamics that spawned the change,
while emphatically ignoring its ramications, led him to focus his criticism
on those schools of thought that held that secularization is the key to under-
standing the workings of the historical dynamic. According to Blumenberg,
this explanation is inappropriate for modernity and is based on a misunder-
standing of its very nature. But Blumenbergs overt effort to distance himself
from the critical-normative discussion on modernity means not that his posi-
tion lacks a normative dimension but that it merely disguises it. In Blumenberg-ian thought, the modern eras normative obligation may be ascertained from
the account of the dynamics of historical change, which assumes a patently
modern picture of humanity and the motives behind human actions in the
world. These motives are not openly declared but gradually revealed to be the
components of this same account.
Blumenbergs unique strategy bears a certain resemblance to the one
that Schmitt adopted in his critique of modernity. Neither directly confronts
the problem of modernity itself, as their views on the topic rise to the sur-face within the framework of the theological-political debate. The similarity
between the two philosophers mode of argumentation heightens our interest
in their exchange of letters. Not only does their correspondence enable us to
further understand their positions, but above all it points to an unusual way to
contend with the problem of modernity. By refusing to place themselves in the
seat of either the theologian (Schmitt) or the advocate of the Enlightenment
(Blumenberg), both philosophers deviate from the standard framework wherein
the contours of the debate between the supporters and detractors of modernity
are clear-cut. Instead, the two correspondents reevaluate these positions and
alter their meaning while nevertheless remaining within the boundaries of the
important discussion on modern consciousness.
Blumenberg initiated the correspondence with Schmitt, which ran
between 1971 and 1978 and was published in 2007.2In the rst letter, from
March 1971, Blumenberg ascribed his decision to solicit his colleague to a
2. Alexander Schmitz and Marcel Lepper, eds.,Hans Blumenberg Carl Schmitt Briefwechsel,
19711978, und weitere Materialien(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2007). The letters appear on
10358. All references to the correspondence between Schmitt and Blumenberg are to this book
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154 Schmitt and Blumenberg on Political Theology
the secularization category in various contexts of religious knowledge but to
shed light on the categorys normative elements, which transcend its ostensibly
neutral role. Although Blumenberg joined others in exposing the exploitation
of the secularization category, his work is unique in that it does not accuse
those philosophers who availed themselves of this category of consciously
attempting to undermine the justication of the new historical age. According
to Blumenberg, their efforts should not be attributed to a preconceived norma-
tive motive. Instead, they should be understood as the result of a neutral theo-
retical consideration that pertains to the nature of the historical period, espe-
cially in all that concerns the changes that it has reputedly ushered in. Deeming
the historical-conceptual category of secularization one of the causes behind
the genesis of the modern age essentially delegitimizes the notion that it isindeed a new epoch, for it lends credence to what Blumenberg referred to as
a quasicultural debt of the new historical age to its predecessor. In Blumen-
bergs estimation, this claim can be refuted only if secularization is perceived
as a reoccupation of the position held by the religious-theological outlook,
whereby completely new ideas supplanted the old context, as opposed to a
process of copying extant religious-theological notions into a new format that
preserves the original content. Thus Blumenberg contended that the historical
transition to the modern era consisted of the evisceration of the old content andthen the appropriation of the vacated framework on the part of new elements,
thereby giving rise to what is deemed a new epoch. In contrast to the use of the
secularization category by the critics of modernity, which Blumenberg consid-
ered a travesty, the legitimacy that he demanded for the new age was pre-
sented as the minimal criteria for inaugurating something new, even if that
same phenomenon is notand can never besomething created ex nihilo.
This extremely brief summary of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age
focuses on the projects complex and nebulous normative standing. Blumen-
berg launched his attempts to dispense with the normative vagueness, or at
least explain it, in the second (1974) edition, as part of his effort to respond to
the various critiques of the rst edition. As noted, one critic who forced Blu-
menberg to amend his rst version was undoubtedly Schmitt, whose philoso-
phy focuses on the modern states legal system. The nature and magnitude of
Schmitts criticism are somewhat surprising, given that Blumenberg hitherto
referred to his work only in passing; to wit, in the rst edition Schmitt is but
one in a long line of philosophers for whom secularization is a fundamental
category in their analysis of the modern era. Nonetheless, Blumenberg proba-
bly viewed Schmitt from the outset as one of the more prominent thinkers to
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Pini Ifergan 155
TheologySchmitt asserted that all the signicant concepts of the modern
doctrine of the state are secularized theological concepts.8In the epilogue to
Politische Theologie II, however, Schmitt contended that Blumenbergs fail-
ure to distinguish between his own unique use of this category and that of the
other cited scholars had led Blumenberg to misunderstand his theological-
political thesis and the role that secularization lls therein.
More specically, Blumenberg failed to distinguish Schmitts position
from those motivated by ambiguous metaphysics and thus depicted his view
supercially. Schmitt also surveyed some of the positions espoused by the
other philosophers targeted by Blumenberg, such as the correlation between
the notion of modern progress and the messianic-eschatological impulse in
monotheistic theology, or the view that Western rationalism in its modernform incarnates the religious praxis of asceticism. In characterizing these
views as metaphysical, Schmitt partly accepted Blumenbergs criticism of the
secularization category, whereby the latter homed in on the metaphysical
premise that underpins the enduring historical substance that the seculariza-
tion category undertakes to explain, including certain modications it under-
went. Nevertheless, Schmitt endeavored to show why Blumenbergs inclusion
of his work in this category was misguided. As far as Schmitt was concerned,
his own use of the category is predicated on a highly specialized tradition ofthe theory of state and law according to which the transition between its rst
and second phases, which are based on the Catholic Churchs interpretation
of this theory andIus Publicum Europeum(the international European law or
order), respectively, entail the secularization of one stage in the terms of the
other. Schmitt assumed that this shift pertains to the rewriting of the inter-
national rules of war and constituted the primary historical venue in which
the coming of the new era played itself out. In other words, the transition to
modernity released humanity from the theological context in which these
laws were previously understood. In both Politische Theologie IIand his per-
sonal letter to Blumenberg, Schmitt directed his readers attention to Alber-
ico Gentili, the renowned international law scholar (15521608). According
to Schmitt, Gentilis exhortation that theologians should keep quiet about a
matter outside your eldthat is, the eld of historymarked the threshold
of the new era.
At this early juncture in the debate, Schmitt already proved an extremely
ironic critic who, at least to some extent, was inclined to assume a self-induced
navet. For example, Schmitt made use of Blumenbergs own terms to describe
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156 Schmitt and Blumenberg on Political Theology
the dawn of the new age, which the former considered a process of reoccu-
pying the position of the erstwhile rules of war with those practiced in the
modern era. The evocation of Gentilis command also contained a bit of nuanced
irony, as immediately after the citation Schmitt alluded to the fact that Gentili
was a contemporary of Giordano Bruno, who was also persecuted by the Inqui-
sition. What is more, Bruno was cast as a leading protagonist in Blumenbergs
account of the rise of the modern era. In resorting to irony, Schmitt apparently
sought to point to the propinquity between his and Blumenbergs positions by
distancing his theory from the other objects of his correspondents criticism and
by taking the trouble to hint at the structural resemblance between his own line
of thought and the Blumenbergian alternative. In other words, Schmitt adopted
this approach to blunt the sting of his critics assault and to cloak himself in ashroud of navet as if something had been imputed to him that he neither
intended nor had the power to do. Schmitt thus presented himself as having
been falsely pegged as a member of the camp that aspires to undermine the
efforts to distinguish modernity from the previous epoch. This critical irony
and self-induced navet that he brought to bear on his polemic with Blumen-
berg can hardly be considered chance strategies of a master rhetorician of
Schmitts caliber; they were calculated to serve a highly specic purposeto
safeguard and justify Schmitts theological-political categorywhich consti-tutes a mainstay of his entire philosophy. In fact, Schmitt expressly noted that
his decision to lock horns with the Blumenbergian enterprise stemmed from the
fact that he considered it the most updated and nontheological attempt to render
his theological-political category superuous:
This book positions the nonabsolute as an absolute and undertakes to scien-
tically negate every political theology. The negation is understood to be
scientic only from the standpoint of a scientic term that is free of all rem-
nants of continued inuence, or reoccupation, on the part of the redemp-tion gospel, which, for its part, is valid only within a religion that positions
itself as absolute. That same reoccupation, which preserved a link to that
same theology, is perceived by him [Blumenberg] as merely a tragic debt
to eras past. The tireless efforts to cancel that same debt are attributed to
the worldliness of the new age, which was eviscerated theologically, and it
remains the ongoing critical mission of modernity.9
Accordingly, Schmitt devised two approaches for contending with Blu-
menbergs project. The rst, ostensibly neutral, points to the methodological
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Pini Ifergan 157
resemblance between their stances, whereas the second considers Blumen-
bergs work a frontal attack on the conceptual standing of his political theol-
ogy. These two strategies indicate the ambiguity that informs Schmitts own
position: the dual commitment to a supposedly neutral scientic objective ver-
sus his largely normative and theological outlook. Schmitt and Blumenbergs
dialectics inevitably lead us to ask whether political theology is indeed a neu-
tral category that explains the changes the theory of law and state underwent
during the transition to the modern era through, among other things, an anal-
ogy between political theology itself, or the Christian theory of law and state,
and modernity. Alternatively, perhaps any understanding of the modern era
must preserve a Christian-theological dimension, for any explanationand
perhaps justicationof the modern era that lacks this element is bound to bewanting, if not defective.
The polemic between the two philosophers provides us with an opportu-
nity to dissipate the cloud of ambiguity surrounding the theological-political
category. Schmitt projected the general debate over this issue onto the Blu-
menbergian enterprise by exposing the fact that behind his correspondents
so-called neutral explanation for the genesis of the new era, which Blumenberg
refrained from couching in terms of the secularization category, stands an
unequivocally antitheological motive. In so doing, Schmitt afrmedboth dejure and de factothe existence of a strong theological impetus behind the
theological-political category, even if it was broached solely as an analogous
explanation for the rise of the new historical era. In addition, Schmitt contrived
to trap Blumenberg in his own problematics and compelled him to take part in
the theological debate over the enduring presence of Christianity in the politi-
cal-public sphere.
For the most part, Schmitt conducted this polemic with theologians
who assumed that the political-theology category should be removed from the
public discourse on account of the distinction they drew between the divine
and temporal city, as well as the theological realms inherent incompatibility
with politics. Conversely, the dialectic with Blumenberg over secularization
was waged on an entirely different front. Blumenberg mainly pitted himself
against critics of modernity who contended that the new era is still in thrall to
the conceptual frameworks of Christian theology. After being dragged into the
fray by Schmitt, Blumenbergwho joined others in contending that moder-
nity has been remarkably successful in detaching itself from its Christian
rootsfound himself lumped together with those same theologians whom his
interlocutor accused of undermining the validity of the theological-political
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158 Schmitt and Blumenberg on Political Theology
those who believed that modernity has failed to extricate itself from its theo-
logical origins. In fact, he apparently found conrmation for his view in Blu-
menbergs assumption that an intentional effort was being, or had been, waged
to oust religion from the public sphere. For his part, Blumenberg deemed
Schmitt and his ilk his sworn ideological enemies, so that it was incumbent on
him to dispel their persistent theologically motivated attempts to undermine
the legitimacy of the modern age. In sum, Schmitt sought to lure Blumenberg
into the debate, while Blumenberg entered the fray of his own volition. There-
after the two philosophers began to gather evidence for the ongoing struggle
between the proponents of monotheistic theology and the proponents of the
modernist worldview (including the conceptual framework that the latter is
predicated on), even though members of both sides claimed that the strugglehad already been decided or had never actually taken place.
Blumenbergs willingness to participate in the debate within the connes
of Schmitts ambiguous framework is evident from his very rst letter. Blu-
menberg unreservedly accepted Schmitts contention that he had compartmen-
talized the latters usage of the secularization category together with that of
other philosophers and had failed to discern its uniqueness. Notwithstanding
his acceptance of Schmitts criticism, Blumenberg did not, at least in this par-
ticular letter, explain how he understood his addressees use of the category tobe different from the rest. Instead, he undertook, in this of all contexts, to dis-
close the dynamics that led him to the concept of legitimation. It turns out that
what made Blumenberg reassess the historical change in terms of reoccupy-
ing or reconquering the position was the desire not to defend the new epoch
but to uncover the element of illegitimacy that was latent in its various detrac-
tors use of the secularization category. Only by dint of this new understanding
could he consider the possibility of tying secularization to legitimation. In his
rst letter to Schmitt, Blumenberg described the meteoric rise of this concept
within the context of attempting to convey the utter contingency of the legiti-
mation argument as strange and almost paradoxical.10More specically, it
did not derive from an established conceptual system, according to Blumen-
berg, but is among the arbitrary results of the dynamics of historical change.
The objective behind this brief genealogy of the Blumenbergian concept of
legitimation was to muster a riposte against Schmitts contention that Blumen-
bergs use of the term legitimacywas misleading and the suggestion that his
true intention was to argue on behalf of the new ages legality. Schmitt showed
that the terms usage contains a bona de historical dimension in which the
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present is considered a legitimate successor of the past if it fullls certain con-
ditions of succession that render the transition legitimate or justied. However,
this sort of justication model is obviously predicated on an interpretation that
preserves the idea of a succession between past and present. Schmitt argued
that this was not the justication that Blumenberg was referring to. According
to Schmitt, Blumenberg essentially advocated a rational justication model
whereby the modern eras legitimacy derives from a system of unbending and
historically self-contained laws, so that the epochs adherence to the law is the
sole criterion for its standing. In crafting this argument, Schmitt endeavored
to lure Blumenberg into becoming another representative of modernity who
sought to justify the epoch by trumpeting it as the Age of Enlightenmentan
era that, from a historical standpoint, embodies reasons perennial and manda-tory system of laws. Although Schmitt indeed pushed in this direction to posi-
tion himself as a champion of the Enlightenment and enemy of religion, his
primary objective was to thwart Blumenbergs criticism concerning the use of
the secularization category. By claiming that Blumenbergs concept of legiti-
mation essentially refers to legalization, Schmitt could argue that the legaliza-
tion of the modern age is merely a secularized reincarnation of the theological
idea of the law.
Blumenberg was well aware of Schmitts tactics and knew that the shortgenealogy was meant to be the rst step toward a possible answer. His compre-
hensive response would have to wait, however, until the expanded second edi-
tion of The Legitimacy of the Modern Ageappeared in 1974: The objection
that under the title of legitimacy, what I was concerned about was only legality,
puts in question the status of the books problematic and its thesis as historical.
As a criticism this could hardly be stronger.11Blumenberg insisted that his
proffered conception of legitimation should be considered a historical category
or, more accurately, a category that arises from an understanding of historical
dynamics rather than a logical or temporary antecedent to the actual historical
event. His rm stance should be viewed as a conscious attempt to distinguish
his theory from those aimed at justifying the Enlightenment and from those
premised on the fact that the only substitute for this line of thinking is to return
to the theological apologetics of yesteryear, namely, the position that was the
object of criticism of the Enlightenments supporters. In claiming that Blu-
menbergs concept of legitimation refers exclusively to legalization, Schmitt
11. Blumenbergs criticism of Politische Theologie IIappears in the second edition ofLegiti-
mitt, published in 1974. It is concentrated in the chapter Political Theology I and II. See Legiti-
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160 Schmitt and Blumenberg on Political Theology
sought to trap the former in a pincer movement, which would force him either
to adopt the outlook of the Enlightenment, so that he could accuse Blumenberg
of essentially being interested in the self-empowerment of man,12which tes-
ties to the fact that human reason is the only source of justication, or to
acknowledge the huge debt that the modern era owes to the same theological
forms of justication that Blumenberg sought to extricate himself from, lest he
be accused of what Schmitt described as a form of justication whose imma-
nent characteristic is that of autism.
However, Schmitt turned a blind eye to a third option whereby that same
self-empowermentor what Blumenberg referred to as self-assertion and
self-determinationis an inherently historical reaction, which assumed the
form of an enduring (atemporal and ahistorical) set of laws and is to be con-ceived as a replacement for the earlier explanatory framework. Insofar as Blu-
menberg was concerned, the emphasis need not be on the self-depiction of that
same system but on the specic historic function that it fullleda function
that can be dened in terms of self-assertion and self-determination.13In his
own detailed account of the genesis of the new age (a topic beyond the purview
of the present article), Blumenberg explained why this rational system, which
derives from the individual himself or herself, is essentially a historical reac-
tion to the implosion of the theological system. The reason behind Schmittsmisunderstanding of the unique alternative that Blumenberg introduced is
twofold. He ignored its existence and overemphasized the self-characterization
of that rational systema description putatively unconnected to the historical
conditions that paved the way for that system. Blumenberg portrays Schmitts
oversight thus:
Self-assertion determines the radicalness of reason, not its logic. An extreme
pressure toward self-assertion gave rise to the idea of the epoch as a self-
foundation . . . that emerges from nothing. It must seem paradoxical to Carl
Schmitt that the legitimacy of an epoch is supposed to consist in its discon-
tinuity in relation to its pre-history, and this paradox prevents him from
thinking that anything else could be at issue but mere legality vis--vis a
hypostatized reason that decrees positive law.14
Schmitts misunderstanding of Blumenbergs conceptual alternative also
prevented him from appreciating the difculties that pertain to secularization,
12. Schmitt,Materialien, 39.
13 Blumenberg Legitimacy 97
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for he basically viewed it as a means for legitimation. As a result, Schmitt
approached the historical past as a source for reorienting and thereby stabiliz-
ing contemporary reality, which seems on the brink of collapsing into a rud-
derless state of serendipity, by maintaining its connection with that same past.
According to Schmitt, the secularization category fosters legitimacy for the
new historical state of affairs by deeming it an indivisible part of the ongoing
construction of a historical identity whose attendant transitions are similarly
characterized and justied by secularization. Assuming that this sort of histori-
cal identity renders secularization into a particularly attractive category insofar
as legitimation is concerned, as it engenders the requisite succession for con-
templating a historical identity that negates the possibility of a radical new. In
fact, it is this very negation that exposed the stratum of illegitimacy in the cat-egory of secularization. Schmitt was careful not to disclose the dening attri-
butes of his version of historical identity. Instead, he preferred to undermine
the claim for a new age by pointing to the inherent absurdity of attempting to
create anything ex nihilo. From Schmitts vantage point, it was clear that there
exists a something whose multifarious reincarnations or phases can be tied to
a single identity, which will constitute the source for explaining the change. In
addition, that same something will impart meaning to the exceptional or
aberrant. This is of utmost importance to Schmitts hypothesis because in theabsence of that identity, the aberrant is bound to constitute a lingering threat to
the systems stability. At this juncture, it is worth asking whether Schmitts
concept of identity is akin to god, a metaphysical substance, existence itself,
or whoever embodies the principle that the sovereign is who decided on the
exception at any given moment.15Or perhaps it is a dichotomous pair, such as
friendfoe or sealand, whose constituent parts express that same identity in
concert. To anyone who reads Schmitts writings, he clearly oscillated between
these possibilities. Be that as it may, the present article is not the venue to decide
which option is best suited to Schmitts stance or best conveys the relationship
of these antitheses. Yet Schmitts deep commitment to this sort of concept of
identity, which in his estimation stands at the heart of historical events, is what
essentially sets his position apart from that of Blumenberg.
Blumenberg, who is considerably more skeptical as to whether there is
such an identity, replaces it with a functional constraint that recognizes the
need for a system which confers order and signicance. But Blumenbergs sys-
tem is not intrinsically tied to any claim of identity. The quest to validate the
modern era does not entail the need to justify the attempt to reveal the essence
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162 Schmitt and Blumenberg on Political Theology
of human rationality, the system of order, or the ultimate meaning of exis-
tence. Moreover, it does not express the zenith of the historical or theological
process but merely contends that the new historical epoch is a legitimate and
unique framework for coping with the ineluctable demand for order and mean-
ing. It was Schmitt, of all people, who concisely phrased Blumenbergs inten-
tions in the concluding paragraph of his 1942 book Land and Sea: Human
trepidation of the new is frequently as great as the trepidation from the void,
even when the new is . . . [aimed at] overcoming . . . the void. Therefore, many
see but an incomprehensible lack of order upon hearing the ring of the new
understood.16In fact, Blumenberg advocated this very denition on chroni-
cling how the new era came into being and humanitys efforts to cope with the
disappearance of a meaningful order by instituting a new one that derives fromthe individual. As such, this solution endows the new order with a legitimation
not dependent on the previous one. According to Schmitt, this transition to a
new framework proceeds through an apparent void and is constantly reined in
by erstwhile phases, which inltrate the present system and provide the frame-
work for crafting a new meaning and order. Notwithstanding its novelty, the
modern age is not incommensurate with either the past or its forms. In light
of the above, must we assume the existence of an enduring identity to con-
tend that this sort of transition from old to new indeed transpired? Does everychange basically consist of reappareling an existing identity?
The fact that the debate between Schmitt and Blumenberg ultimately
came down to this fundamental metaphysical issue can be gleaned from two
subsequent stages of their correspondence, wherein Blumenberg assumed the
lead in trying to pinpoint the differences between them. In the same epilogue
to Politische Theologie II, containing Schmitts original critique of Blumen-
berg, the former put forward an interpretation to the epigraph of the fourth part
of Goethes autobiography, Poetry and Truth. The epigraph states that nemo
contra deum nisi deus ipse (no one can stand against a god unless he is a god
himself).17Although Goethes aphorism reects on a notion of a unity, it leaves
more than enough room for the possibility of an embedded dualism. For
Schmitt, this passage must be understood in a theological-political context. In
other words, it contains a kernel of instability or friction that is liable to alter
16. Carl Schmitt,Land und Meer: Eine weltgeschichtliche Betrachtung, 3rd ed. (Cologne:
Hohenheim, 1981), 107; my translation.
17. See Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, From My Life: Poetry and Truth, in The Collected Works,ed. Thomas P. Saint and Jeffery L. Sammons, trans. Robert R. Heitner, vol. 5 (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
t U i it P 1987)
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164 Schmitt and Blumenberg on Political Theology
To Schmitt, the connection is so obvious that he did not even bother to elabo-
rate on why this passage should be viewed as an expression, much less the
origin, of Goethes epigraph.
This omission obviously warrants criticism, but it is peripheral to the
debate with Blumenberg. The crux of Schmitts argument lies in the need for a
theological key to unlock the mystery surrounding the position of Goethe, who
can hardly be suspected of religious fanaticism. If Goethe indeed espoused
this view, it would bolster the argument that the theological dimension cannot
be dislodged and can even be found in decidedly political contexts. The pres-
ence of a theological matter at the heart of a historicopolitical situation rein-
forces the argument that an underlying theological basis is requiredbe it con-
sciously or notto understand the political, and the theological may very wellserve as the basis of its meaning. Schmitt subsequently quotes from a conver-
sation between Goethe and Chancellor Friedrich von Mueller on October 10,
1823, which Goethe documented in his diary: His doctrine with respect to
the divinity of Jesus, Goethe wrote, is in need of a despotism, perhaps
even more than despotism needs it.22Although Schmitt cited this passage to
soften the impression that Goethe was ambivalent toward Christian theology,
it apparently encapsulated his own theological-political position.
As noted, Blumenbergs concerted effort to plumb the differencesbetween himself and Schmitt commenced in his very rst letter to his critic.
Blumenberg mentioned how surprised he was to nd that they both inde-
pendently sought to interpret and track down the source of Goethes cryptic
epigraph. But in contrast to Schmitts Christological exegesis, Blumenberg
offered a polytheistic reading that revolves around the image of the rebellious
god Prometheus. Blumenberg took the trouble (perhaps for the sake of show-
ing his correspondent that they shared a similar point of departure and his
interest in Goethes epigraph served no ulterior motive) to inform Schmitt
that he had rst tackled Goethes aphorism a year before the publication of
Schmitts book (in a conversation with Gershom Scholem and Hans Georg
Gadamer). The premise behind Blumenbergs interpretation is rather straight-
forward and is connected to the fact that toward the end of the third part (the
installment before the epigraph), Goethe discussed a scandal that was prompted
by his Ode to Prometheus and that subsequently gave rise to the so-called
pantheism polemics (whose main protagonists were Gotthold Ephraim Less-
ing and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi). In Goethes words, the ode was the
tinder for an explosion which revealed and brought to discussion the most
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23. Goethe, Poetry and Truth, 469.
24. Blumenberg eventually turned this issue into the main topic of his book on myths, whichalso refers, albeit briey, to the polemic with Schmitt. See Hans Blumenberg,Arbeit am Mythos
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1979) For an English translation see Work on Myth
secret concerns of worthy men, concerns which, unknown even to them, slum-
bered in an otherwise very enlightened society.23Controversy aside, within
the narrow scope of Schmitt and Blumenbergs relationship, I am more con-
cerned with how the latter used the polytheistic context to undermine Schmitts
theological-political interpretation that is dependent on a strong principle
of identity. Blumenberg appears to argue that the riddle of Goethes apho-
rism yields to a polytheist reading that allows for the rise of a new order that,
unlike Schmitts position, is not limited to modifying a single, strong identity
that appears in different guises. Instead, the era is forged either by a struggle
between separate forces or by the petering out of one force and the emergence
of another from the ruins of the former. Even in the absence of a detailed expla-
nation or justication for his interpretation, Blumenbergs mobilization behinda polytheistic reading of that epigraph constitutes, among other effects, an
assault on the underlying premise of Schmitts political theology and its mono-
theistic Christian context. As such, Blumenberg assumesand Schmitt was
in no rush to deny itthat the sense of succession from a past epoch is man-
ifest only under the assumptions of monotheistic theology, whereas the shift
to a polytheistic mind-set pulls the ground out from beneath the theological-
political category and its instrument of implementationthe category of secu-
larization. As opposed to Schmitt and his Christological rendering, Blumenbergapparently adopts the explanation that Goethe himself gave for his excitement
over what the latter referred to as the poetic gure of Prometheus, which
he contrasted with Satan, the poetic gure of the monotheistic theological
tradition:24
The Titans are the foil to polytheism, just as the devil can be viewed as
the foil to monotheism. But neither the latter nor the One God to whom he
stands in contrast is a poetic gure. Miltons Satan . . . remains in a disad -
vantageously subaltern position as he attempts to destroy the splendid cre-ation of a superior Being. Prometheus, on the other hand, has the advantage
of being able to create and form in deance of higher beings. Also, it is a
beautiful thought, one appropriate for poetry, to have human beings created,
not by the supreme ruler of the world, but by a lesser gure who, however, is
sufciently worthy and important to do this because he is a scion of the old-
est dynasty.25
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166 Schmitt and Blumenberg on Political Theology
26. Carl Schmitt, Drei Stufen historischer Sinngebung, Universitas: Zeitschrift fr Wissen-
schaft und Literatur8 (1950): 92530.
27. The book was originally written in English and published in the United States; see Karl
h h l l l f h h l h f
The second occasion on which Blumenberg sought to underscore the dif-
ferences between himself and Schmitt took place after a three-year silence
between the two in the aftermath of their initial exchange. In a relatively long
letter, Blumenberg responded to an article penned by Schmitt, The Three
Phases of Providing Historical Understanding, which the latter attached to
one of his letters.26Like the correspondence on Goethes epigraph, the two
philosophers availed themselves of this opportunity to demarcate more sharply
their positions. What is more, the article introduced Lwith to the mix. Lwiths
work, especially his bookMeaning in History, played a central role in Blu-
menbergs decision to embark on a treatise on modernity in the rst place.27It
also had a signicant impact on the theological-political theory of Schmitt,
who praised and made direct reference toMeaning in Historyin the above-noted article. The books well-known theory, which has long become a main-
stay in the theoretical discourse of the history of ideas, posits that the modern
phenomenon of the philosophy of history should be understood as a later, sec-
ularized incarnation of the Judeo-Christian eschatological outlook. Of course,
this theory further enhanced Schmitts theological-political position, as his
contribution to the theory of the modern state seems in keeping with Lwiths
contribution to the historical-ideological sphere, which undergirds the dis-
course of modern consciousness. However, this substantive resemblancebetween Lwiths and Schmitts thought does not extend to their motivations.
Although Lwiths theory debunks the modern camps pretension for auton-
omy and liberation from its theological origins, Lwith did not espouse this
view in the name of either theology or secularized modernity. Instead, he
wielded this theory against both schools of thought on the premise that mod-
ern consciousness can be explained only from a theological standpoint; that
is, it is deeply indebted to the eschatological idea. In contrast, Schmitts case
against modernity appears to focus on its adherents inherently false pretenses
of detaching themselves from their theological roots, which Lwith revealed in
his book. Schmitt averred that this can be remedied if modernity recognized
its debt to its theological past. By dint of Lwiths fundamental historical dis-
tinction between circular (Greek-pagan) and linear (Judeo-Christian) time,
Schmitt put forward his own characterization of historical consciousness,
which informed his own day and age. More specically, Schmitt asseverated
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28 Schmitt Drei Stufen historischer Sinngebung 929
that time is neither circular nor eschatological but is entirely limited to the
individual who presents and determines the meaning of historical time and
constantly transforms it into a framework of meaning for himself or herself
and other human beings. As such, history is no longer understood as a mani-
festation of either cosmic time or a divine plan; it is merely a way to bestow
meaning on oneself and then apply it to or force it on others. Though Lw-
ith shared Schmitts view according to which historical consciousness is a
later incarnation of the perception of eschatological time, the latter eschewed
Lwiths conclusion that humankind must reembrace some version of circular
time to avert the problematic outcome of eschatological time. To wit: Schmitt
insisted that it is possible to dovetail eschatological faith to historical con-
sciousness. It seems rather odd, however, to ascribe this view to Lwith, giventhat he viewed historical consciousness as a reincarnation of and dependent on
eschatological faith.
It is precisely at this point where the disparate motivations driving
Lwith and Schmitt come to light and, for my purposes, array the former and
Blumenberg against Schmitt. Lwith linked his criticism of modern histori-
cal consciousness to eschatological belief to show that at the very moment the
West unfettered itself from the promise of the redemption, which heretofore
had kept it in check, humankind turned into a destructive force. So long aseschatological faith was emphasized and undisputed, it had the wherewithal to
prevent the advent of a historical consciousness that would distort the accepted
meaning of the historicalthat is, a longing for the end of time or redemption.
Schmitt, who endeavored to demonstrate that eschatological faith continues to
exist within the framework of the new form of historical consciousness, insisted
that a way could be found to bridge the two. With this in mind, he turned to the
theological idea of the katkhon, the restrainer, which appears in Pauls Sec-
ond Epistle to the Thessalonians (2:7). The bridge rests, according to Schmitt,
on the image of the power that delays the apocalyptic ending and defeats
evil.28In other words, modern consciousness lls the role of the restrainer. As
such, it merely delays the coming of the end; it does not go so far as to eradi-
cate eschatological faith. Since it is the individual who imparts meaning onto
history, the theological system is exible enough to encompass this delay and
even shield humankind from the collapse that Lwith warned against.
In his letter to Schmitt, Blumenberg wondered if I have already man-
aged to point out the crux of the difference between us.29Nevertheless, he
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168 Schmitt and Blumenberg on Political Theology
took another stab at it by responding to Schmitts above-noted article. Unlike
Schmitt, Blumenberg espoused a view somewhat reminiscent of Lwiths,
whereby historical consciousness and eschatological belief are beyond rec-
onciliation. Once again, Blumenberg undertook to justify the newmodern
historical consciousnessby offering a divergent interpretation of the said
katkhon. Blumenberg asked whether the postponement of the end of time
and the enervation of eschatological faith remain within the same eschato-
logical purview, or perhaps signify the abandonment of the entire outlook.
He answered, in his patented style, that the modern perspective advocates not
the simultaneity of history and eschatology but the inversion of their meaning.
Consequently, the prospects of the redemption still retain the form of an escha-
tological promise, but now it entails suspending the eschatological denoue-ment. Blumenberg offered a comprehensive interpretation of this inversion
whereby the hopes for redemption were dashed time and again. In the process,
the signs that were supposed to herald the beginning of the end were metamor-
phosed into something so atrocious that humankind was left with no choice
but to stop it from coming to pass. According to Blumenberg, the katkhon
is but an expression of the radicalization of the eschatological craving at this
moment in history. As such, Blumenberg left the interpretation of the katkhon
within the theological framework, thereby upholding his refusal to view it asthe conceptual basis of historical consciousness.
This notion of the radicalization of a religious concept that triggers the
evisceration or disappearance of that concept, and the emergence of another
one in its place, constitutes the linchpin of Blumenbergs depiction of the rise
of modern consciousness. Nevertheless, his account revolves around the con-
cept of God as an absolute power, rather than the notion of eschatological
redemption. What sets this particular instance of radicalization apart from the
similar process that Blumenberg believed to have transpired in the theological
nominalism of the late Middle Ages is that in the latter the theological frame-
work managed to contend with the resurgent yearnings, whereas in the Enlight-
enment the radicalization led to the collapse of that framework and the con-
struction of another. Consequently, Blumenberg wrote to Schmitt that, from a
conceptual standpoint, the rise of the modern consciousness must have been
preceded by a marked waxing or waning of the force of eschatological paraly-
sis. However, its emergence could have transpired only against the backdrop
of an absolute negation of the eschatological forceas opposed to a mere
transformation or modicationfor otherwise it would have been capable of
restraining the eschatological element. In light of the above, Blumenberg real-
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30. See Blumenberg to Schmitt, August 7, 1975, in Briefwechsel, 13036.
among other purposes, to connect eschatological belief and historical con-
sciousness. On the other hand, Blumenberg endorsed a much weaker, func-
tional concept of identity that enables us to keep track of the entire process
the evisceration of a framework of meaning that induced a reaction whose
implications can no longer be explained in terms of that framework.30Blu-
menberg elaborated on the weak identity that he advocated in the fourth part
of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, where he contended that reoccupa-
tion is the key concept for comprehending the new historical era: The con-
cept of reoccupation designates, by implication, the minimum of identity that
it must be possible to discover, or at least presuppose and to search for, in even
the most agitated movement of history.31
Blumenbergs efforts notwithstanding, Schmitt was under no obligationto accept his correspondents depiction of his own position. If Schmitt indeed
rejected Blumenbergs reading, we would then be forced to formulate another
explanation for Schmitts insistence on nding alternative bridging or tran-
sitional categories for preserving the succession not of the historical as such
but of the historical as an entity predicated on the theological. As Blumenberg
argued, Schmitts notion of an unceasing effort to bridge the conceptual gap
between the theological and what seeks to detach itself from the theological
can be understood as a practice that assumes, and is dedicated to, a strongmetaphysical notion of identity, which embodies its debt to the Christian theo-
logical worldview. However, Schmitt could have eschewed this metaphysical
assumption by asserting that this commitment is merely ethicotheological and
not metaphysical; in other words, it is a perspective motivated by a normative
worldview in which the historicophilosophical discourse is only a means for
justifying this stance. The exposure of this discussions metaphysical strata
apparently stemmed, at least partly, from Schmitts inclination to keep a safe
distance from the normative or theological sphere while taking advantage
of conceptual analogies that fall between the theological and other areas of
human endeavor. This tendency was put to the test during the correspondence
with Blumenberg, who agreed to participate in the conceptual exchange
according to the rules that Schmitt laid down in his initial critique. Blumen-
berg then proceeded to expose Schmitts underlying metaphysical point of
departure by compelling Schmitt, who sought to avoid the metaphysical realm,
to articulate a normative-theological commitment in its stead, which under-
girds his position. The fact that this disclosure transpired during the dialogue
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170 Schmitt and Blumenberg on Political Theology
with Blumenberg is no accident. For Blumenberg, the point of departure, which
disclosed Schmitts above-noted leanings, is a conceptually neutral discourse.
That said, disclosure was neither Blumenbergs express purpose nor even his
intention. The normative strata naturally surfaced during the debates clarica-
tion process, at the very moment the conceptual description was jettisoned.
Indeed, the correspondence shed light on Blumenbergs loyalties in equal mea-
sure. Schmitt described Blumenberg as the most cogent representative of the
opposing viewpoint and was cognizant of the role his younger colleague played
in elucidating his own position. Blumenberg was unwittingly cast by Schmitt
in the role of the most eloquent voice of a worldview that he was not interested
in championing. Schmitt, of all people, provided a succinct survey of this out-
look in his initial critique of Blumenberg (i.e., the appendix to Politische The-ologie II, which was the last work that Schmitt was to publish in his lifetime).
Schmitt offered a lucid yet satirical look at this same worldview as
early as 1918, through a ctional character named Buribunken:
I write therefore I am; I am, therefore I write. What do I write? I write myself.
Who writes me? I myself. . . . What is the content of my writing? I write that
I write myself. What is the principal driving force that saves me from the
self-serving cycle of the I? History! If so, Im a letter in the typewriter of
history; Im a letter that writes itself. Yet if we are to be precise, it is not I who
writes me, but merely the letters that are me which write. However, it is
through me that the global spirit perceiveswritesitself, so when I per-
ceive my own self the global spirit is perceived. . . . In other words: I am not
only the reader of world history, but . . . the one who writes it.32
It may very well be that that same innervation that Schmitts critical response
aroused in his colleague was connected to Blumenbergs desire to wash his
hands clean of this sort of gure, which ostensibly represented the impetus
behind his attempt to bestow legitimacy on the new age. Blumenberg with-
stood the temptation of afliating himself with this gure or directly renounc-
ing it. Instead, he dug himself in behind a neutral discourse that revolves
around the possibility of historical change, which at times appears to be his
only commitment to modernity. In other words, the notion that this worldview
possesses a clear normative dimension derives solely from his unwavering
commitment to a conceptual analysis that shuns basic metaphysical assump-
tions, be they hidden or revealed. Nevertheless, his inability to remain com-
pletely ambivalent to the normative dimension that Schmitt had thrust on
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his shoulders points, at the very least, to the fact that he recognized the pos-
sibility of a normative dimension, even if he sought to distance himself from
it and preferred to view it as no more than the product of, rather than the
reason behind, a conceptual decision. Likewise, it may be said that Blumen-
bergs insistence on critiquing Schmitt by emphasizing his theorys underlying
metaphysical premise, instead of its conspicuous theological dimension, indi-
cates that same desire to refrain, as much as possible, from routing the polemic
onto a normative track. However, here too, Blumenbergs adamancy ultimately
engendered his own commitment to the normative sphere, which may perhaps
be dened as modern. This is manifest in Blumenbergs critical aversion to
the notion of a strong, substantive identity that he found looming over whatever
Schmitt had to say. Against this backdrop, Blumenberg refused to accept theimage that Schmitt tried to foist on him of an individual creating himself and
his world. In so doing, however, it soon became evident that Blumenberg cast
doubt on the existence of anything that may be characterized as absolute.
His refusal to recognize the existence of an absolutebe it God, humanity,
existence, or the self-constitutive subject itselfis the only motive that would
appear to express, albeit in an admittedly circuitous fashion, a normative com-
mitment to modernity that may be ascribed to Blumenberg.
Blumenbergs inclination to extricate and distance himself from theabsolute stands in stark contradistinction to Schmitts unremitting desire to
locate and reinforce the presence of that same absolute. Hence it appears that
Blumenberg and Schmitt needed one another to activate the normative dimen-
sion that both were inclined to obfuscateeach in his own wayas part of a
conscious effort to assume the role of the singular outsider within the frame-
work of a discussion they were expected to take part in. Just as Schmitt accom-
plished this objective through the discussion on theology, Blumenberg did so
in the philosophical discourse on modernity. In my estimation, the correspon-
dence between Schmitt and Blumenberg indeed repositioned each participant
in the coveted role of outsider or, at least, a unique thinker.
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Cutting to the Chase: Carl Schmitt and Hans Blumenberg on Political
Theology and Secularization
Pini Ifergan
Is modernity a distinct historical epoch that can be radically distinguished
from the one that preceded it? What are the implicit philosophical
assumptions regarding our understanding of historical time that determine
the sort of answer that we are inclined to give to this question? The debate
between Carl Schmitt and Hans Blumenberg concerning the conceptual status
of secularization as an explanatory category for the emergence of modernity
provides us with a paradigmatic case that sheds light on those questions.
With the recent publication of the correspondence between Schmitt and
Blumenberg, I suggest in my article a reading of the debate that exposes
how they use each others argument to sharpen their distinctive evaluation of
modernity and its relation to Christian theology. These two arguments and
their unique dynamic transcend the common ways of either defending or
criticizing modernitys claim to be a distinct and legitimate historical epoch.
The suggested conceptual reconstructions of the Schmitt-Blumenberg debate
point to a revaluation of the terms of the quarrel over modernity, Christian
theology, and the relations between them.
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