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Cyborgs and Replicants: On the BoundariesAuthor(s): Alice RaynerSource: Discourse, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Spring 1994), pp. 124-143Published by: Wayne State University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41389337Accessed: 28-01-2016 13:38 UTC
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Cyborgs
and
Replicants:
On the
Boundaries
Alice
Rayner
"Monsters,"
s
Donna
Haraway points
out,
"have
always
defined
the imits fcommunitynWesternmaginations"222). A recent
collection
of
essays
dited
byJames
J.
Sheehan and
MortonSosna
examines
such limits
hrough
the
lenses of
philosophy,
cience,
and
history, iscussing
uch various
issues as
monsters,
iology
and
culture,
Artificial
ntelligence,
nd machines.
As the titleof
the book
asserts,
oundaries are the
ssue. "Since the
Fall,"
James
Sheehan
puts
t,
man's
place
in
nature has
always
een
problem-
atic"
(Sheehan
and Sosna
27).
His
subsequent
historical
urvey
rightly
uggests
hat
the
terms
or the
question
of human bound-
aries
are
contingent upon particular
cultural
conditions. He
pointsout thatearlyChristians oncerned themselveswiththe
status f the soul
in humans
and
animals,
while
by
the
eighteenth
century,
the
question
centered more
on
rationality
nd the
mechanistic ifference
etween
humans, nimals,
and machines.
For
Descartes,
animals functioned
"automatically,"
ike "ma-
chines,"
where
humans were
distinguished
by
free
will,
intelli-
gence,
"soul,"
and
language.
Arnold .
Davidson,
n his
essay
The
Horror of
Monsters,"
laims that
certain monsters
n
the
history
of horror
can show
"systems
f
thought
hat are concerned with
the relation
betweenthe orders
of
morality
nd of
nature"
36).
Clearly ny description
f the boundaries willbe
implicated
in
and
by
culture to the
degree
that
creating
boundaries
is a
cultural
dentity roject, contingentupon language, place,
and
history.
he
contemporary
ersion
of the
questions
about human
boundaries tends
to center
on
the relation of humans to their
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Spring
994
125
own
technologies:
n whether hehuman
being
can be
distinguished
from"thinkingmachines;"1on whether we can be duplicated
through
Artificial
ntelligence
or
genetic
engineering;2
n the
status f virtual
ealities
hat
an be
experienced through
echno-
logical
means
alone;
on whether
machines can
develop
conscious-
ness;
on the
creation of
"impossible"
ensations
of
technological
sound
and
sight
hat annot
be taken
n
by
the human sensorium
but are nevertheless
ctual
n
the sense
of
measurable
nd
present.
Technology
is the source
for
images
of "monsters"
n the
contemporary
orld
as humans
grapple
with
theirown
power
to
transformhemselves. t has become a site at the conceptual
intersection
f science and
myth,
n
the sense
that,
as Roland
Barthes
so
acutely
detailed
it,
humans create
mythical
ites for
holding
contradictory
esires and fears toward
even the most
mundane
phenomena
of
the
world.
Technological
creations
eem
to elicit the same
combination of wonder
and horror and the
same
concerns about
transgression
nd order as the
monsters f
the
sixteenth
entury.
And
in
the chronic
contradictions
n
atti-
tudes
toward
echnology,
he
Promethean
myth
s
lurking.
While
would
resist
ny
assertion
f the
continuity
n the
images
of
mon-
sters n theWesternmagination, would suggest persistence n
the
uses of those
images
to
identify
nd
clarify
he tensions
be-
tween
"morality
nd nature"
that reside at the
boundaries of
cultural
dentity.
The
imaginative
figures
of
cyborgs,
ndroids,
and robots
help
to locate both
the
mythic
orce
nd the
ethical,
political,
nd
social
implications
n
the
technologies
that
challenge
the bound-
aries
of
humanity.
Haraway,
for
example,
sees
in
the
cyborg
a
figure
f an
unbounded,
playful
dentity
hat
responds
both
to the
call for
responsibility
n
social relations
nd to a need fordissolu-
tionof universal nd unitarydeas ofidentityhatwould imagine
an all-natural
uman,
freeof
technological
dditions.
A
cyborg
ody
s not
nnocent;
t
was
notborn
n
a
garden;
t
does not eek
unitarydentity...;
t takes
rony
or
ranted....
Intense
leasure
n
skill,
machine
kill,
eases
to be a
sin,
but
an
aspect
of embodiment.
he machine s not an it to
be
animated,
orshiped,
nd
dominated. he machine s
us,
our
processes,
n
aspect
four embodiment.
222)
Yet, in many ways,those created figuresmightbe seen not to
dissolve the
boundaries of the
human and the
technological
but
to serve as
clarifying
mirrors
for the human. The
image may
appear
as a distortion
f a
conceptual
ideal
but
it does
provide
n
instance
of the
very
elf-division
hat constitutesWestern
ubjec-
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126
Discourse 6.3
tivity.
articularly
n
fictional
forms,
but
implicitly,
think,
n
scientific nd philosophical arguments, he imaginary, echno-
logical
humanoid
figures
are means of
displaying
the human
encounterwith tself.
If
one takes such
figures
to be
contemporary
ersions of
monsters,
avidson's
essaygives
clue about
how
such
monsters
can
be used to issue
warnings
nd
inspire
we. He
specifies
how
a
pamphlet published
by
Martin
Luther and
Phillip
Melancthon
n
1523,
translated nto
English
in
1579
as
Of
two
wonderfulopish
monsters
illustrates he
way
that the
interpretation
f monstrous
imagesserved o reflect anger.
On
the one
hand,
there s
a
prophetic
r
eschatological
i-
mension...
n
which
monstersnd
prodigies...
eretaken o
be
signs
f
fundamental
hanges
bout o affecthe
world....
The
other
dimension,
hich...
e can call
allegorical,
s the
one withwhich
his
pamphlet
s most
preoccupied...
ach
monsters
a divine
ieroglyphic,
xhibiting particular
ea-
ture f
God's wrath.
37-39)
Davidson
later
quotes Jean
Delumeau's
history
f fear
in
which
Delumeau notes that hepreoccupationwithmonsters nd prodi-
gies
at the
end of
the fifteenth
entury
s
in
the
context of a
"global
pessimistic
udgment
on
a time of
extreme wickedness"
when
"monsterswere to
be
understood as illustrations f
these
sins"
(40).
Monsters,
n
other
words,
are unnatural
products
of
nature,
ndicating
God's
wrathful
udgment upon
the sins of
the
worldbut
also
helping
to institute
ertain
prohibitions
n
human
activity.
avidson takes
the textof
Ambroise
Par,
Des
monstrest
prodiges
with ts
causal
classifications,
mong
which s "the
fusing
together
f
strange pecies,
which
render the creature
not
onlymonstrous ut
prodigious,
hat s to
say,
which s
completely
b-
horrent nd
against
Nature"
44).
Par
links
horror,
urthermore,
to "the
normative
elation
betweendivineand
human wills"
50).
The
interpretation
f
monsters,
avidson
points
out,
is a means
by
which
"high
culture"
demonstrates he
consequences
of
par-
ticular
behavior
n
order to
control that
behavior. More
generi-
cally,
however,
monstrosity
s seen
as an
"unnatural"
grafting
f
twodifferent
indsor
species
of
beings,
not unlike
the
cyborg.
If
horror n
the
sixteenth
entury
was articulated
primarily
by highculture "scientific,hilosophical, nd theologicaltexts")
as a
means of
proving
he
sinfulness f
the world and
aiming
to
correct
unpalatable
beliefs nd
behavior,
horror n
the
late-twen-
tieth
entury
s
primarily
phenomenon
of mass
culture.
A
hor-
ror
towards
echnology
nd
technological
nvention an
be
found
almost
everywhere,
ocusing
often
on the
fear of the
possible
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1
28
Discourse
6.3
Three
"Borg" episodes
of the television
eries,
Star Trek:
he
NextGenerationprovidea particularly onvenientstarting lace
for
discussing
he
ways
n
which
high
culture debates
in
science
and
critical
theory
re translated nto low
or
popular
culture
concerns about human boundaries.
That
is,
those
episodes
enact
conventional
nxieties nd resolutions hat ndicate
both the his-
tory
f
apprehension
towards
echnology
nd the fears
f technol-
ogy
as a
transgression
f the
boundaries
of both
biological
and
culturaldefinitions f the human.
The
Borg
s a
great
ube
traveling hrough
he outer imits
f
space and approaching "our" galaxy. t is simultaneouslyn en-
tity,
civilization, race,
and a machine with
human
components.
It is a
collective
singularity.
We
are
Borg," says
any
one
of its
humanoid
parts.
t is a
civilization
hat ssimilates nd annihilates
other races and civilizations.
Resistance s futile" s its
repeated
warning;
nd even the
usually
wise and tolerant
Guinan testifies
that
virtually
er entirerace was
destroyed y
the
Borg,
nd
that t
cannot be resisted. he
Borg
accumulates
the
knowledge
f other
races before
nnihilating
hem;
t s self-correctivend
self-regen-
erating,
nd thus cannot be
destroyed y
conventional
weapons.
Its humanoid parts are identical to the collectivewhole and
"single-mindedly"
ocused on its
imperative
o assimilate
every-
thing
n
its
path.
That total
self-absorption
n
its own
imperative
and
computercapacities precludes
emotions ike
sympathy,
om-
passion,
or fearand
recognition
orthe "otherness"
f the
other,
which also
precludes
negotiation
and
dialogue,
identification,
and
difference.
In
the
first
pisode,
the
Enterprise
rew
confronts t and
is
forced to
recognize
thatthere
s no
negotiation,
hat the
Borg
is
virtually mnipotent,
nd that t s
coming
toward he
galaxy.
t is
the meanest cube in the cosmos. The only response s flightnd
warning
o others.
n
the second
episode,
there s direct onfron-
tation,
nd the
Captain,
Jean-Luc
Picard,
s taken
n
and
assimi-
lated
by
the
Borg,whereupon
he
is
hooked
into the machine and
gets
a new
name, Locutus,
whose
knowledge
about
Federation
technology, apacities, trategies, istory
nd values become
part
of the
Borg's
information
ystem.
icard is an
unwilling
aptive
forwhom "resistance
s futile."But he has also lost
his
identity
s
Picard
to
the
degree
that Picard is an addition to
the
Borg
and
therebybecomes Borg.
He becomes alien to his crew and
to
himself s he was. But more
specifically,
is
identity
s an autono-
mous, intentional,
willing,
ommanding,
nd
desiring
ndividual
is
utterly uppressed by
the
imperative
f
the
Borg
collective
suppressed
but not
eliminated,
for afterhis rescue and the deli-
cate
operation
to
excise his
machinery,
e maintains
memory
f
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994
129
being
Picard-as-Borg.
t's a
trauma
sufficient
or Picard
in
the
third pisode to forgethis usual tolerancefor other civilizations
and
to desire the
annihilation
of
the
Borg.
He
plans
to
implant
one of its
captured
humanoid
components
as
a virus
that will
destroy
t.
Only
as that
captured
humanoid
unit s found
to have
the
capacity
to individuate
and
acquire
a sense
of
separate
selfhood
(primarily
hrough
a
combination
of "humane"
treat-
ment and human
language)
does
Picard
recognize
that reintro-
ducing
that
component
to the
Borg
as an individual
might
erve
to transform
he
Borg
rather han
destroy
t.
By
ntroducing
he
imperfections that constitute the human
-
imperfections
grounded
in
the values
attached to
separateness,
ndividual au-
tonomy,
will,
and emotion
-
Picard
retains his
public
value as
a
tolerant
humanitarian
while also
overcoming
he
omnipotence
of
the
Borg.
In
manyways,
he third
pisode
reiterates
he values
insisted
upon
by
Star Trek's
irst
eneration
Captain
Kirk: that t is
indi-
viduality
nd
human
imperfection
hat not
only
define
humanity
but
give
t reason
to
struggle,
o
improve,
grow,
nd,
above
all,
to
"tolerate."
he actual
achievement
f
perfection
n
either
techno-
logical, ntellectual, r socialutopias n the StarTrek eries eads to
cruel,
totalitarian,
nd inhumane
exercises
of
power.
The "hu-
man"
in
short,
s defined
by
both
itsdistance
from
perfection
nd
by
the
way
hatdifferences ithin
he human
community
reate
a
demand for
communication,
negotiation,
nd
recognition
f
the
"otherness"
f
the other.
The
Borg
is
clearly
n
instance
of conventional
fearsabout
absolute
power
nd
prodigious
technology.
t
is a
graft
f technol-
ogy,
human
bodies,
and
human consciousness.
The
celebration
of
imperfection
n the
episodes
further
erves
o
identify
he
human
community s an "us" that s made of distinct nd discreet ndi-
viduals
with
unique capabilities.
The
fear of the
Borg's omnipo-
tence
s
specified
by
the fear
of a loss of
autonomy,
free
will,"
nd
separateness,
ut also of a
fearof
absorption
nto a
mass,
collec-
tive
dentity,
nd an
undifferentiated
echanism.
As a
political
llegory,
f
course,
the
episodes
also
instate he
value
that underlies
the
hierarchical,
allegorical
order of
the
Bridge
crew.3
ach member has
its distinctive
unction:
he
Cap-
tain
who listens
to
multiple
viewpoints
ut
finally
akes
responsi-
bility odecide; theCommanderRiker, NumberOne," who also
gives
orders but
is allowed to
express
a sexualized
identity;
he
empathie
Deanna
Troi who feels
across
distances;
the
Klingon
warrior,Worf,
eady
at all moments
to
fight;
he blind
engineer
LaForge
who sees
patterns
f
heat
with
technological
device
and
who
has
almost miraculous
capacity
o
fix
technological glitches;
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30 Discourse
6.3
the android
Data,
who has all information
n
the
known
universe
but no emotion except a certainwistful uriosity o know the
experience
of human
emotions;
and the
boy
wonder,
Wesley
Crusher,
naive but
uncannily
mart and
capable,
to whom
the
whole
adolescent
fantasymaybelong
in
the first
lace.
The
Borg,
nonetheless,
s a
technological
monster
nd like
mostmonsters f fictionmustbe
destroyed
r transformed.
ut it
is
distinct
rom other
technological
monsters ike Frankenstein
who indicate an
essentially
reudian
anxiety
hat he creationwill
overcome
the creator the son
will
killthe
father.
n
this
ase,
the
autonomyof the creationis of less concern than the threatof
absorption
nto
an undifferentiated holeness. t
is
not
difficult
to cast the fearof
absorption
nto the collective f the
Borg
n
this
light, uggesting
hat
n
Freudian terms he ssue of boundaries s
not
simply
one of the
delineation
of
individuality
nd
essence
against
what s and is not
human,
but a definition f the human
itself s masculine
individuation
gainst
the
absorption
into a
maternal,
material mass. The
Borg
levels the
hierarchy
hat
is
comprised
of
unique
individuals nd
composes
itself s an undif-
ferentiated elf-sameness
hat,
ike a
mechanical
version of The
Blob, absorbsall in itspath. It is possible,of course,to find the
Freudian
spin
in
thisfear as well. Andreas
Huyssen
describes the
historical
phenomenon
in
modernism that associates mass cul-
ture with
the
feminine.
n
his
analysis
of
the
film
Metropolis
he
further
oints
out
how
technology
s
embodied
in
the seductive
femalerobot.
Historically,
hen,
wecan conclude hat s soon s themachine
cameto be
perceived
s a
demonic,
nexplicable
hreatnd as
harbinger
f chaos nd destruction...riters
egan
o
magine
the Maschinenmenschs woman. here regroundsosuspect
thatwe are
facing
erea
complex rocess
f
projection
nd
displacement.
he fears nd
perceptual
nxieties
manating
fromvermore
owerful
achinesre
recast nd reconstructed
in
terms f themalefear f
female
exuality,
eflecting
n
the
Freudian
ccount,
hemale's astration
nxiety.
70)
The Freudian versionof the
anxiety
oward he
technologi-
cal
"other," however,
maintains
a
rather
simple opposition
be-
tween
bsorption
nd
differentiation,
ale and
female,
onscious-
ness and unconsciousness.One of the contemporaryppeals in
Star Trek TheNextGenerations that t does not leave off t
simple
enmity
nd
destruction f
one
by
the other. t does
not,
n
fact,
assert that the individuated
yborg
will maintain ts
ndividuality
after
returning
o
Borg.
The last
shot
in
the
episode
is a
glance
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Spring
994
131
between
the
cyborg
nit,
Hugh,
and
LaForge.
That
glance
offers
possibility ithout certaintyor eventualtransformation;t is a
reminder of "evolution"
but
an
open question
of
whether
the
Borg
will forever
nnihilate
others.
But more
importantly,
he
crew has
recognized
the
Borg
as
having rights
o exist.
Certainly
the
program
validates
and reinforces he value
of
individuality
and
hierarchy
board
the
Starship
Enterprise,
but that value
is
based
on the individual's
capacity
to resistdestruction f others.
In
place
of the
simple opposition
between
selfhood and
other,
individuation
nd
absorption,
a more
complex question
about
whatto do n the face ofsuchan entityppears.This is stillrelated
to values attached
to
subjectivity,
ut
I
want
to hold off that
discussionuntil
ater.
For the
question
becomes
more
complex
when the
figure
f
the
cyborg
s seen
not
ust
as a
boundary uestion
between
human
and
machine,
but as a carrier f
technology's ncreasing bility
o
simulate
the human dimension
and make the human
indistin-
guishable
from he
technological.
The
Borg
episodes
insist n the
distinction
nd
rely
n clarification.
ut a
film
ike Blade
Runner
based
on,
but
very
different
rom,
Philip
K. Dick's
novel,
Do An-
droids reamofElectricheep?, ortrays irtually erfectreplicants
and offers nother
set of
questions. Replicants
n
the
generation
known s Nexus
6 are
produced
by
the
TyrellCorporation
o work
as slave abor
in
the
"hazardous
exploration
and colonization"
of
the "Off-World."
he
replicants
are
"superior
in
strength
nd
agility"
nd
"equal
in
intelligence
o their
genetic engineers"
but
are
designed
to have
no
emotions.
The
mind-designer,
r.
Tyrell,
fearing
hat
n
time
uch
perfect eplicants
mightdevelop
human
emotions,
built
n a
fail-safe,
elf-destruct
rogram
that imits he
replicant ife-span
o four
years.
The
renegade
replicants
s well
as
the experimentalversion knownas Rachael have memory m-
plants
of a
past
that create a
"cushion" for the emotions
they
might
encounter
in
a
short
period
of
time,
but
that
memory
serves
to control the
replicants'
behavior more
efficiently.
he
Blade
Runner,
Deckard,
gradually
alls
n
love withthe
replicant
Rachael. For
these
replicants,
s
the
leader
Roy Batty isdainfully
points
out,
are
not
computers,
we
are
physical."
The
technology
of
biomechanics,
n
other
words,
has
produced
a version
of
the
human
that is coextensive with
the human
by
virtue
of both
functionalmemories
nd emotions that re added
to their
supe-rior
strength
nd
agility"
nd
"intelligence qual
to their
genetic
engineers."
n
what
might
be
an
ironic nod
to Hubert
Dreyfus's
point
that
omputers
will
neverbe able to beat
him
at chess since
theyrequire
intuition nd
experience,
the
replicant
uses a chess
move
to trick his
way
into
Tyrell's
inner sanctum. Unlike
the
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32
Discourse
6.3
cyborg,
which is an
addition or a
graft
upon
the
human,
the
replicant s a duplicationor simulacrum.
Jean
Baudrillard
escribeshis
concerns bout such
simulacra
in
his book
Simulations. or
him,
the
proliferation
f
simulation
has eliminated ll
oppositional
force
n
differences etween real
and a
representation.
We are
witnessing
he
end of
perspective
nd
panoptic
space
(which
emains moral
hypothesis
ound
up
with v-
ery
lassical
nalysis
fthe
objective"
ssence f
power),
nd
hencethe
very
bolition
f
he
pectacular.
The medium tself
is no longer dentifiables such,and themergingf the
medium nd
the
message
McLuhan)
s the first
reat
or-
mulaof this
new
ge.
There
s
no
longer ny
medium
n
the
literal
ense: t s
now
ntangible,
iffusend
diffracted
n
the
real,
and it can
no
longer
even be
said thatthe
latter
s
distorted
y
t.
54)
If
one
position
n
the
Renaissance
debate
was
essentially
ominal-
ist that
words
hould be
identical to
reality
nd
genres
"pure"
-
Baudrillard's
position
eems to
reverse t:
technology
should" be
a representation, ot a duplication; t"should" mitate, otdupli-
cate. But as
in
the
English
Renaissance
when words
became a
profligate
echnology
hat
could not rest n
their
references nd
began
to take n
a life f
their wn
"A
sentence s
but
chev'ril
love
to a
good
wit,"
ays
este
n
Twelfthight.
How
quickly
he
wrong
ide
may
e
turn'd utward"
3.1.11-13])
he
mage
of
the
replicant
s not
itself
representation
uta
thing
with
life
f
ts
wn.Or at east t s
the
representation
f
ucha
possibility.
The robotno
longer
nterro-
gates
ppearance;
ts
only
ruths
n
its
mechanical
fficacy....
eing
and
appearance
re
melted nto
common
ubstance f
production
and work"Baudrillard,imulations4).
Yet this s
not
entirely
ow
"robots" r
replicants
re
used
in
science
fiction.
f
they
do
not
interrogate
ppearances, they
om-
monly
erve o indicate
the imits f
human
ethics.
They
do not
n
fact
eliminate
the
comparative
measure of
human action. From
Metropolis
o Blade
Runner r
Karel
apek's
R.U.R. from
he Rus-
sian
film
Aelita o
Greg
Bear's
book
Queen
fAngels,
r
the android
Data
in
Star Trek
the
"nonhuman"
figures
erve to
criticize he
idealist
project
thatwould
separate
humans from
heir mechani-
cal"
functions f
labor
and calculation
and
would eliminate the
complicating
ituationsncurred
hrough
motions nd
imperfec-
tions ike
disease. As
machines or
computers
or robots
are
per-
fected o
the
point
of
duplicating
humans
n
order to
serve
them,
it
becomes a
virtual
habit in
science
fictionto
criticize
the de-
mand for
such
service
n
the first
lace.
The ideal
that
would
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133
assume to
give
humans the
leisure
to
"be"
humans
by
giving
repetitive, oteworkto machines or computersconventionally
signals
the
oppression
nherent
n
that
deal.
In
his
criticism
f
the
Utopian
projections
f
Artificialntelli-
gence,
TerryWinograd
makes
several
mportant oints,
the most
significant
f
which s that
AI
reduces the mind "to the
nteractive
sum of
decontextualized
fragments"
203).
The
customary
evice
in
science fictionfor
showing
his imitation
n
Artificial ntelli-
gence
or
duplicate
humanoicfs
s to contextualize
the
robot,
or
the
replicant.
n
creating
context
for
the abor of the
robot,
the
science fiction onventionhabitually reates an occasion for the
development
of
subjectivity,
laced
in
a context
in
which it is
intended to
replace
human
labor,
the machine
instead becomes
human.
In
the novel
by Greg
Beao~,
Queen
ofAngels
for
example,
the
explorer
pace probe
known
is
AXIS
gradually
evelops
a
subjec-
tivity
n the models of its
creators.
Out
in
the
depth
of
space,
it
eventually
nows oneliness
auid,
based on its
programming,
e-
cides to
split
hat
ubjectivity
rji
rder to function.4 he
testwhich
its
creatorsdevise for the
possibility
f the
development
of
AXIS
self-awarenesss a oke: "Why jiid heself-awarendividual ook at
his
image
in
the mirror?To
get
to the other side"
(114).
The
AXIS
computer
arrives t
maiiy
lternative
nswers
o the riddle
and
finds ll of them
equally
humorless,
ince its oneliness takes
priority.
ad Bear considered
this
further,
e
might
have allowed
the
computer
to
laugh,
since
laughter
tself an be said to
derive
fromthe
recognition
of such a
split
n
subjectivity
what
Arthur
Koestler called the
"bifurcation
f
conflicting
odes").
And one
conventional
istinction
etween
machines and humans s
exactly
the
capacity
or
aughter.
n
R.U.R.,
on the other
hand,
the robots
are such perfectduplicatesof human action, forced nto labor,
that
hey
ecognize
their
ppression by
the
Corporate
owners
nd
rebel. The Marxist
oint
n
so
many
of science fiction's orrelates
betweenhuman and robot s
that
he contextof mechanical abor
is itself
ehumanizing,
s
exemplified
y
the
human laborerswho
work ike automatons
n
Metropolis
nd in
Aelita.
n
Blade Runner
even the nventor
yrell
ecogtiizes
hat he
replicants
re
capable
of
developing
"emotion"
because
of
materiality
nd
context,
nd
through
hem,
sense of self.
In BladeRunner eplicants re functionally umanin theway
the
film
represents
heir
desires
for
continuation,
for
love,
for
familial
memories,
or
freedom
rom he
oppressive
ontrolof the
Corporation,
nd
finally
or
compassion,
as
when
Roy Batty
aves
the life of the
Blade
Runner,
Deckard.
Batty
lso carries
vestiges
of the
Oedipal
drama
when
he
confronts
Tyrell
whom he calls
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Discourse 6.3
"father"
ust
before he
puts
out
Tyrell's yes.
The
TyrellCorpora-
tion itselfbecomes a sign of the "inhuman" that is defined as
absolute economic and
technological
ontrol.To this
degree,
the
film
maintains onventional
oppositions, uggesting
s do other
such films s
King of
Hearts that
n
an insane
world,
only asylum
inmates re sane. Like the
nmates,
he
replicants
ave borderline
identities: hat
s,
they
annot be
clearlydesignated
as one
thing
or another.The
point,
however,
s that
value
is
determinednot
by
some
ontological
status what
they
are" as
beings
-
but
by
the
quality
f actions and desires.As
technological
extensionsof hu-
man creators, he replicants dentifyhe notion that the origin
(mechanical
or
biological)
and status
machine
or
human)
do
not determine value. The
replicant,
ike the
cyborg,
n
other
words,
uggests
hatvalue is not inherentto
identity.
et,
in
the
confusion
that arises
n
not
being
able to
"fix"
upon
an
identity
the
film
also locates
what
might
be called
an
epistemological
anxiety
oward
echnological
transformation,
n
which the
figure
both
is and is not itself nd the medium IS the
message.
This
locates once
again
the
problem
of the
graft
nd the concerns for
what to do
when an
entity
s
the embodiment of
metaphor:
"A
naturalperspective,hat s and isnot," s Orsinosays t the end of
Twelfthight
5.1.217).
As
technology
s found
to be so embedded
in
the world s to
be
indistinguishable
rom
he
world,
o be
constituting
he world
as "simulation" s far as
Baudrillard s
concerned,
one
might
ay
that
the tensionof differences hat
constitute
metaphor
nd
rep-
resentationhas
collapsed.
At this
point,
however,
he anxieties
raised
might
enternot on the
question
of differencesnd bound-
aries between human
and inhuman but on how to act
in
a limit-
less,
unbounded
world where
technology
roduces
a
perspective
that "is and is not." Because of technology, ven the body is no
longer
a
convincing
site for
unitary
and
singular
identity.
Haraway, gain,
s
optimistic.
Why
hould our bodies end at the skinor include
t best
other
beings
encapsulated
y
skin?From the
seventeenth
century
ill
now,
machines ouldbe animated
given
hostly
souls to
make them
peak
or moveor to accountfor
their
orderly
evelopment
nd mental
apacities.
Or
organisms
could be mechanized reduced o
body
understood s re-
sourceof mind.Thesemachine/organismelationshipsre
obsolete,
nnecessary.
220)
What am
trying
o
suggest
here is that
n
spite
of the
radical
changes
n
theterms
nd conditions fthe
known nd the
unknown,
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135
thought
nd
unthought,
human
and
inhuman,
natural and un-
natural,there s a persistent olarization n attitudes owardthe
uncertainborderlandsof
identity, xemplifiedby
the
divergence
in
attitudesbetween
Baudrillard
and
Haraway.
Both
attitudes,
however,
ould be characterized s
reactions
o
the
contemporary
violation of a dualistic
norm: a dualism which is
oppressive
to
Haraway,
useful to
Baudrillard.
The crucial location
for
ethical
contemplation
s
in
the
attitude
toward
ratherthan
in
the onto-
logical
statusof the
technological
object:
not to ask what
is the
"true"nature of the
cyborg
r
robot,
but to ask about the source
and function fthat ttitude oward t. ForHaraway, he function
is to
open possibilities
or
forging
ess
oppressive
ocial
relations;
for
Baudrillard,
t would seem to be to find
ways
f
maintaining
skepticism
oward he
reality
f
the simulacra and
its
part
n the
Enlightenmentproject
that
Ross
noticed. Baudrillard's idea
is
not,
believe,
to reinstate ome
metaphysical
round
forvalue but
to
keep
from
being
seduced
by
the conflationof
image
and the
real thatwould create
another
totalized,
undifferentiated orld.5
Together, Haraway
and
Baudrillard
might
describe how
to
maintain
kepticism
nd
expectation
within
technological
world
in whichsuch phenomena as robots,artificialntelligence, nd
virtualrealities are
themselves
realities;
how to act both within
and outside dualistic
conceptions by making
distinctions;
ow
to
support
differencewithout
dualism.
The
divergent
reactions to
technology,
he simulacra and
the
postmodern
condition are
in-
dicators
of how
human
values
and
udgments
stillfunctionwithin
and as
part
of the
proliferation
f "technoculture." t is
diverging
attitudeswhich
eem
to
have
persisted.
Each is
giving
heoretical
description
orwhat s
fundamentally
n
attitude
oward echnol-
ogy.
f
neither ttitude
an be considered
final,
he two nonethe-
less share a concern forhow the technological phenomena of
both
combinatory eings
and simulacra
are
implicated
n
ethical
and
political
ctions.
What is at stake for each one is the
possibility
hat
prodigal
learning
and human
technology
will undermine and overturn
formsof
knowledge, authority
nd
action.
This,
in
fact,
s the
apparent
basis
of Fredric
Jameson's
hope
in
postmodernism.
Jameson,
too,
has an
optimism
hat
might
be said to
precede
his
description
nd
theory
f the
postmodern.
He
distinguishes
he
historical ifference etween modernism nd postmodernismn
the basis of the relative
lace
of the aesthetic
n
relation
o a domi-
nant
deology
nd
phase
of
capitalism.
Modernism s characterized
by
its
rejection
of and
by
the cultural
dominant, whereas,
he
claims,
postmodernism
S the culturaldominant.Postmodernism
is
simply
revolutionfrom
within,
but it carries for
Jameson,
it
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Discourse 6.3
seems,
no less
revolutionary otential.
Subversion from
within
what s alreadyhuman,as opposed to thatcomingfrom n out-
side,
locates
what
manypostmodern
elebrantsfindas
the
politi-
cal
potential
n the
technological.
In
the
specific
case of the
possibility
of
replicants
or
simulacra
as
they point
to the human encounter with
tself,
t
might
be usefulto consider
Heidegger's
terms
danger"
nd
"sav-
ing power"
of
technology
rom
his
essay,
The
Question
Concern-
ing
Technology."Suppose
that the
power
to
generate
simulacra,
both actual
in
postmodern
rt and
hypothetical
n
technological
sciences, s understoodsimply s whatHeidegger called the "re-
vealing"
of what s
in
the
path
of that
power "destining").
The
AI
scientistor the
genetic engineer says,
n
effect,
hat from the
limited
power
have now
to
create
thinking
machines or
perfect-
ible human
beings,6
future
n
which
replicant
human
beings
can
be created s conceivable and
possible.
These entities xist head
of the
presentgiven
conditionsof
technologicalexpertise
a
des-
tining
and a
challenging
forth).
The actual creation of
such
replicants,
n
the
example,
is thus ess
significant
han the
possi-
bility
hat
opens
ahead of
actuality
nd
"challenges"
the actual to
meet t. The technological apacity nsome sense "causes" tsown
futurity,
ut that
futurity
s also
only
xistent
n
the
present
ondi-
tion of the
technological,
which s
why
iscussions f
actual
dupli-
cations
of
human
thought
nd human
beings
tend to
focus on
what
could
be rather than on what is now. The
technological
"challenges
forth"ts
own
possibilities,
ut the
challenging
s more
like an act that cannot reside
in
any given technological object.
The
danger,Heidegger suggests,
s
that:
As oon s
whats unconcealed o
onger
oncerns an ven s
object, utdoesso, rather,xclusivelys standing-reserve,nd
man
n
themidst f
objectlessness
s
nothing
ut he
rderer
f
the
tanding-reserve,
henhe comes o the
very
rink f
pre-
cipitous
all;
hat
s,
he comes o the
point
where e himself ill
have o be
taken s
standing-reserve.
eanwhile
an,
recisely
as the ne so
threatened,
xalts
imselfo the
posture
f ord f
the arth.
26-27)
In
these
terms,
Heidegger might say
that the
projections
of
AI
science and
genetic engineering
reveal the human as
standing-
reserve or resource) for tsownsimulation; hey consume" the
human
in
ordering
t
forthe
purpose
of
simulation,
uch that
he
human is
not a
thing
n
itselfbut
something
ready
for use.
In
some
sense,
that s both
the
danger
and the
"truth" f human
technology.
t is
"dangerous"
because it forecloses n
both "chal-
lenging"
nd
"destining"
r
what
could
be called the
openness
of
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994
137
technology
o its
futurity.
t
produces
the
dangerous
illusion that
the human is "lord of the earth"and is not in factalready"in-
debted" to thatwhich s more
han
and ahead of itself. he delu-
sion is that because of
the
way
n
which the world is a human
"construction" f
language
and
codes,
which
are at the founda-
tion of
technology,
mankind
ssumes
thatwhatever t encounters
is therefore
nly
tself r a
self-construction.
et because it s
now
opening upon
an
imagined
perfect
imulation,
these technolo-
gies
also
serve to reveal what
Heidegger might
all the "essence"
of
the human
-
an essence
comprised
of
technological
capabili-
ties.This is theHeideggerian paradox or "mystery"ftechnology.
The
very
Enframing"
hat
threatens
o close
off he revelation f
what s the essence
of the
human
in
its
technological
capacity
for
ordering,
s also the means
by
which
the
revelation
f
that ssence
can
take
place.
The
coming
o
presence
f
technology
hreatens
evealing,
threatenst with he
possibility
hat ll
revealing
illbe con-
sumed
n
ordering
nd that
verything
ill
resent
tself
nly
n
the
unconcealednessf
standing-reserve.
uman
activity
an
never irectlyounterhis anger.Human chievementlonecannever anisht.
33)
In
the mundane
example
of Rachael
in
Blade
Runner,
he
actuality
f the
replicant
forecloses
on
any
useful
or
functional
distinction etween the human and the simulated
human,
which
is
why
Rachael does not seem
to
elicit
any
fearor
anxiety
rom s.
To
the
contrary,
he and the other
replicants
define the "inhu-
man"
as the
corporate
nventor
who
is
willing
o use
replicants
s
human
labor
in
"standing-reserve."
t
the same
time,
he
repre-
sents the figureof the human as both a construction f the hu-
man and as
something
more
than
human.
What
she
"challenges"
-
though
not
in
the sense
that
Heidegger
uses it
-
is
an ethical
rather than an
ontological
status
of the human. The
danger
of
technology epresentedby
the
film
s
shown
by Tyrell
who con-
sumes the
replicant
abor
in his
ordering
of the
technological
human and
thereby
onceals their ssential
"humanity,"
hich s
defined
by
a functional
memory
and desire.7 The simulated
memory
s
shown to be
experienced
as
real,
in
the collection of
simulated
family
photographs
and their
importance
to the
replicants.Rachael remembers akingmusic essons,but she does
not know
if
it was she who had
them,
or
Tyrell's
niece,
upon
whom her
experiences
were modeled.
Regardless,
Deckard tells
her,
"youplaybeautifully."
ut
this
puts
the
mystery
f the techno-
logical
into a
position
as
mystery
hat
simultaneously
efines the
"human"
as the
experience
f
memory
nd desire
nd undermines
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138
Discourse 6.3
the dea that
xperience
s the sole standardof
validity
nd truth.
This is a crucial contradictionn thefigure f thereplicant.The
status
of the
replicantproposes
that the
"experience"
of
an
im-
planted memory
s
indistinguishable
rom "real"
memory
per-
haps
because
memory
s
already
a form
of virtual
reality):they
function
dentically.
et
experience may
not
necessarily
e coex-
tensive
with the "truth" f the
origins
of those
memories. But
apart
from hese
paradoxes,
the value of the
replicants
n
the
film
resides
not
in the
paradoxes
of their
truth nd their
experience
but
n
the
differentialetweenthem nd
the creators.As
Jameson
puts t,
There omes nto
being,
hen,
situation
n
which
we can
say
that
f
ndividual
xperience
s
authentic,
hen t cannotbe
true;
nd that f
scientificr
cognitive
modelof
the same
contents
true,
hen t
escapes
ndividual
xperience.
411)
The
conceptual mapping
of the
world,
like the
concept
of
Rachael's
identity,
oes not conform o her
experience.
Yet it
is
just
that
disconformity
hat constitutes
elf-awareness s
well as
the
ground
for
recognition
f
others.For
Jameson
the character-
istic of
postmodernism's
nswer to the
disconformity
etween
concept
and
experience
s
in
the
"insertion s individual
ubjects
into a
multidimensional et of
radically
iscontinuous
ealities..."
(413).
The
discontinuity mong
the individual
subjects
on the
Bridge
of the
Enterprise
s,
nonetheless,
presented
as a
coopera-
tive
discontinuity.
he
component
bodies of The
Borg,
and the
way they
re
represented
s
anathema to
the crew of the
Enter-
prise,
imply
a horror not
of discontinuous
realities but
of too
muchcontinuity too vast n extensionofthebodyand identifi-
cation with he one. The
replicants
r the
robots
n
R.U.R. or the
AXIS
computer
can likewise
"critique"
or
"interrogate"
uman
action
primarily
ecause
they
re
shown to
develop subjectivity,
which s an
encounter of the self s
other-to-itself.elf-division
s
the
condition of
subjectivity.
he
Borg
is a
"monster" lien
be-
cause it is
shown to have no such
self-divisionnd
cannot ever
encounter
tself s other.
We
are
Borg," hey/
e/it
ay.
The
Borg
is alien because
it is
fully
elf-identical.t
signals
the
imagined
horror f total
elf-absorption
nd
self-samenesshat
annot stand
outside tself nd therefore annotresist tsownpower.Heidegger
imagined
such
self-absorption
s the
danger
in
technology.
And
while he
sounds himself
angerously
lose to
turning
elf-division
into a
metaphysical
ategory,
he
importantpoint
is the
differ-
ence
between the
delusion of
"lord of the
earth" that
would lead
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17/21
Spring
994
139
to a
Borg-like
xercise of the
annihilation
nd
absorption
of self
and others, nd theself-division
ecessary
o resist hat xercise.
Man
stands
o
decisively
n
attendance n
the
challenging-
forth
f
Enframing
hat e
does not
pprehend nframing
s
a
claim,
hat e
fails o
see
himself
s
theone
spoken
o,
nd
hence also
fails
n
every
way
o hear n
what
espect
e ek-
sists,
rom
ut of
his
essence,
n
therealm f
an
exhortation
or
address,
nd thus an
never
ncounter
nly
himself.
27)
The
figure
f
the
replicant,
n
these
terms,
oes
not
engage
thequestionoftheboundariesof thehuman and nonhuman,yet
it
does
serve
in
Blade
Runnery
t
least,
to
give
an
image
of the
otherness hat s
already
a
factor
n
the encounter
of the
human
with tself.
The fiction
larifies
Heidegger's
paradox
of technol-
ogyby
eparating
ut
Tyrell
s the one
who is
self-absorbed
y
his
technology
nd who
cannot
rsist
his
creations s
images
of
him-
self
-
a
separation
that belies the
simultaneity
f
danger
and
revealing
n
Heidegger's
conception.
Tyrell's
reation,
Batty,
an
resisthis
own
power
and encounter
another
in
Deckard.
Tyrell
does
not
recognize
his
own
"indebtedness" to his
creations.
Heidegger's
idea of indebtednessdecenters the creator as the
single
cause of his
creation
aftd
displaces
him
into a
network f
causalities hat
ncludes the
way
hat he
nvention s
"called forth"
by
the future
or
destining)
and
is
in
a
cooperative
causality
r
"co-responsibility.
Tyrell's
ttempt
o
control
the future
ppears
in
the imitshe
genetically ngineered
into
the
life
span
of the
replicants.
While
he can
control
that
pan
of
time,
he
cannot
control their ctions
within
t,
and the
replicant,oy
Batty,
uccessfully
akes his re-
vengeon him in a mannerthat s bothOedipal and horrifiche
tears
out his
eyes).
This is in
keeping
withthe
thematic ine that
makes
eyes
he
testingground
for
replicants,
ince
through
eyes
the
replicant
not
only
betrays
ts
evel of
emotion
but also sees its
own
condition
("if
you
could
see
what
I
have
seen,"
Batty
ells
Deckard at
the
end).
The
replicant
confirms
yrell's
Freudian)
fear that
the creation
will
overtake
he
creator,
but he
does so
in
an
act of
ustice.
For
Tyrell
s
evil not
simply
ecause he
created
the
replicants
but
because he
reduced the
human to
"standing-
reserve"
nd failed to
see
them
as
things-in-themselves.
One difficultyere,however,s that n partnershipwith hat
political
critique,
the
film
betrays
tself
s a
romance
(perhaps
illuminating
he Marxist
romance).
When
Batty
ies,
having ust
saved the
life of
Deckard
in
an
act of
gratuitous
ompassion,
a
whitedove
flies
upward.
The
film
annot seem
to resist
iving
he
replicants
not
simply
ubjectivity
ut "soul"
as well. t
comes
close
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1
40
Discourse
6.3
to
conferring metaphysical
tatuson its
subject
matter
n
offer-
ingthat mageof a "mystery"fthesoul.On the otherhand,Blade
Runner oes
help
to
displace
the
presentation
f a norm of the
human
based on "nature" nd to
circumvent
rguments
hat de-
finethe
human
in
either ssentialor functional erms. t
replaces
those
arguments
with more conventional thical norm: that
the
guarantor
of the human value is in
its actions not essences or
formal unctions. his
also circumventsome of the
concerns that
Baudrillard
brings
up
in
Simulations
n
which he outlines the
dangers
he sees
in
the
technological
ability
o
produce
a simula-
tion that sindistinguishablerom he real. WhatBaudrillarddoes
not discuss s
the fact that even simulations
bear the burden of
ethical
responsibility
or
action,
and
appearances negotiate
no
less for
both
power
and value
than do the
oppositional
forces
supposedlyguaranteedby
the real.
Science
fiction s
constantly aking
the
debates
among
phi-
losophers
and scientists nd
placing
them
n
conventional
repre-
sentations f
good
and evil.But
the further
oint
s
that
n
spite
of
simulations,
he
difficulty
rises
n
conception
more
than
percep-
tion of what s or is
not "human."
A
simulacrum f the
human,
likeRachael,maybe functionallyndistinguishablerom human
or her
status,
ike the
cyborg, mbiguous,
but neither function
nor
status is sufficient r
final
in
describing
"history"
nd its
complex
network f
originating
onditions, ituation,
unctional
memories,needs,
responses,
he
responses
he
elicits rom
thers,
all of
which erve
n
the
film,
t
least,
to
situate he
very
omplex-
ity
hat
nforms oth
identity
nd value. The
simulacrum s
a real
testing round
of the real. It is still
howing,
ike the
monsters f
the sixteenth
entury,
set of
relations between the
"orders of
morality
nd of
nature." But it
finally oints
not
strictly
o
the
limits f the boundaries of
identity
s an order of
morality
nd
nature
but to the imited
thicsthathumans
practice.
Notes
^ee,
for
xample,
henow
best-selling
ook
by
Roger
enrose,
he
Emperor's
ew
Mind
n
which e
examines he
difficulty
n
experimental
testing
or he
differencesetween
umans nd
computers.
e cites he
famous
uring
est
n
which n
interrogator
ust ecideon thebasis f
responses f a computernd a humanvolunteer,oth hiddenfrom
view,
which ne
is the
computer.
f
the
computer
an
give onvincingly
human
esponses
o the
degree
hat he
nterrogator
annot
etermine
that t
s a
computer,
t
passes
he est.
Penrose
oints
ut
that he
difficulty
or
he
computer
s to resist
itsown
capacity
or
omputation,
o
try
o
respond
o
"common ense"
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19/21
Spring
994
141
questions
f
experience.
ee also
the
rticle
yTerry
Winograd,
Think-
ingMachines,"nwhich ecriticizeshefundamentalermsponwhich
AI
makes claims
to
create
thinking
machines hat
duplicate
human
thinking.
2Sherry
urkle
oints
ut
that
n
this
ontemporary
ebate,
om-
puters
nd
computational
deas
that
ffer he
possibility
f a rational
and rule-driven achine ead
to romantic
esponses"
hat
endto de-
finethe human
n
terms f "what
omputers
annotdo." While she
points
ut Hubert
Dreyfus's
rroneous
ssertion
n
the
1960s
that
computer
ould notbeat
him
t
chess,
he would eem
n
closer
gree-
mentwithhis ater dea
in
What
omputers
an'tDo: that mbodiment
situates he human n a particular ay hat annotbe reproduced y
rule-governed
rder.
Our
specific iology
laces
us
in
the human ife
cycle:
we are
born,
urtured
y
parents,
row,
evelop exually,
ecome
parents
n
our turn. ndwe die.
This
cycle rings
s the
knowledge
hat
comesfrom
nderstanding
he
certainty
f
oss,
hat hosewe
ove
will
die and so willwe..."
(Turkle249).
What
once
might
have been an
ontological argument
bout essential
identity
has
become,
post-
Wittgenstein
r
Sartre,
erhaps,
n
argument
boutfunctional
dentity:
a
thing
s
what
t
does.
3My
hanks o Robert
Harrison
or
discussing
ithme this iew f
theBridge rewnTheNext eneration.
4The decision"
o
split
s
perhaps
vidence
hat he cenario fthe
book s
fiction,
ot
philosophy,
ince
believe
t s more ccurate o
say
that
ubjectivity
tself
s
the
plit
f
elf-awareness.
5In
Seductionaudrillard
istinguishes
etween he "cold" seduc-
tion of
technology
nd the
"warm" eduction hat
plays
he
game
of
appearances.
In
seduction...t is the manifest
iscourse...hat turns
backon
the
deeper
order
whether
onscious r
unconscious)
n
order
to
invalidate
t,
substituting
he
charm nd illusionof
appearances.
These appearances re notin tjheeastfrivolous,utoccasionsfor
game
and its
takes,
nd a
passion
ordeviation
the seduction f the
signs
hemselves
eing
more
mportant
han he
mergence
f
ny
ruth
-
which
nterpretationeglects
nd
destroys
n
its
searchforhidden
meanings.
his
s
why
nterpretation
s
what,
ar
excellenceis
opposed
to
seduction,
nd
why
t s
the east
eductive
f
discourses.... ll
meaningful
discourseeekso nd
ppearances:
his s ts
ttraction,
nd ts
mposture....
perhaps
iscourses
secretly
empted
y
his
ailure,
y
he
bracketing
f
its
bjectives,
f ts ruth
ffects hich ecome
bsorbedwithin surface
that
wallows
meaning.
his is
what
happens
t
first,
hen discourse
seduces
tself,
t
s
the
original
orm
y
which
iscourse ecomes bsorbed
withintself ndemptied f ts ruthnorder obetter ascinate thers:
the
primitive
eduction
f
anguage"
53-54).
The "cold seduction" f
the elevision
ight, y
ontrast,
is
noffensiveo the
magination....
t s
innocuous
ecause t no
longer onveys
n
imaginary,
or
the
simple
reason hat t s no
onger
n
image..."
162).
"Cold"
eduction,
hat
s,
s
fully
elf-containednd has no
use
or
relation o an other.
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142
Discourse 6.3
6See
n
particular
llenNewell.Newell s a
co-creatorfa unified
theoryfcognition nown s "Soar"that s an "embodied heory"r
architectureor the ull
ange
fhuman
ognition."
7It s
worth
oticing
hat
memory
s used
in
the
film
Robocop
o
confirmhat he
echnologically
econstituted
ntity
s still
"person."
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