A strategic assessment of scientific and behavioural perspectives on 'dangerous' climate change

Irene Lorenzoni, Tom Lowe and Nick Pidgeon June 2005

Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research

Technical Report 28

A strategic assessment of scientific and behavioural perspectives on dangerous climate changeTyndall Centre Technical Report No. 28 June 2005 Irene Lorenzoni, Tom Lowe and Nick Pidgeon

Centre for Environmental Risk, and Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, UK, Zuckerman Institute for Connective Environmental Research School of Environmental Sciences University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7 TJ

This is the final report from Tyndall research project: T3.32 A strategic assessment of scientific and behavioural perspectives on dangerous climate change.

Abstract Defining dangerous climate change is of increasing importance for both scientific analysis and the climate policy debate. This report presents the findings of a project examining how dangerous climate change is interpreted through scientific risk assessments, how laypeople and experts perceive the issue and the implications for managing climate change. Whereas the former build upon defining external thresholds and critical levels beyond which substantial change would occur, most people relate to climate change through direct personal experience. A review of the literature and more recent studies shows that in most developed nations, such personal experience is perceived to be limited and, although there is widespread concern about the issue, people are ambivalent about the threat of climate change and potential solutions. Danger is context and time-specific, defined by social and political judgements. Thus, the discrepancy between expert and lay perceptions of climate change and danger may prove problematic in implementing policy options under conditions of uncertainty without consideration of public concerns over particular risks and their preferences for management. Participants to an international workshop, and in interviews undertaken using mental modelling, identified difficulties with the current policy approaches to addressing climate change, which are driven in part by international negotiations around UNFCCC article 2. Issues relating to the role of science, uncertainty, power, equity, social expectations and lifestyles were raised. To promote action on climate change, it was suggested that climate change should be situated in peoples daily lives, weaving it into related policy areas and including it within the broader scope of sustainable development.

Keywords dangerous climate change, perceptions, thresholds, risk assessment and management, lay people and experts1

ContentsSection 1 - Overview of project work and outcomes Section 2 - Technical report 1 Introduction 2 Phases 1 and 2 Interpretations of danger in relation to climate change 3 Phase 4 International workshop 4 Phase 3 Expert definitions of danger in relation to climate change 5 Overall project conclusions Page 4 7 7 8 26 29 60

BIBLIOGRAPHY APPENDICES Appendix 1 List of project outputs to date Appendix 2 - "Perspectives on Dangerous Climate Change" participants Appendix 3 Interview protocol Appendix 4 Meta mental model of expert perceptions of danger in relation to climate change

63

70 71 72 75

1

Acronyms used in this reportAIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome BSE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy CAN Climate Action Network CER Centre for Environmental Risk, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK CFCs - Chlorofluorocarbons COP Conference of the Parties CO2 Carbon dioxide DEFRA Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, UK DTI Department of Trade and Industry, UK ECF European Climate Forum ENSO El Nio / Southern Oscillation EORG - European Opinion Research Group GDP Gross Domestic Product GHG Green house gas GM Genetically Modified HOT - Helping Operationalise article Two [research project] ICCT - International Climate Change Taskforce IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change MORI Market & Opinion Research International NAO North Atlantic Oscillation PIK Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research RCEP Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, UK THC Thermohaline Circulation UKCIP UK Climate Impacts Programme UK Met Office UK Meteorological Office UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation WAIS West Antarctic Ice Sheet WBGU German Advisory Council on Global Change WEHAB Water, Energy, Health, Agriculture and Biodiversity [five key focus areas proposed at the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development, 2002] WISE - Weather Impacts on Natural Social and Economic Systems [EU research]

2

Section 1 - Overview of project work and outcomesAbstract Defining dangerous climate change is of increasing importance for both scientific analysis and the climate policy debate. This report presents the findings of a project examining how dangerous climate change is interpreted through scientific risk assessments, how laypeople and experts perceive the issue and the implications for managing climate change. Whereas the former build upon defining external thresholds and critical levels beyond which substantial change would occur, most people relate to climate change through direct personal experience. A review of the literature and more recent studies shows that in most developed nations, such personal experience is perceived to be limited and, although there is widespread concern about the issue, people are ambivalent about the threat of climate change and potential solutions. Danger is context and timespecific, defined by social and political judgements. Thus, the discrepancy between expert and lay perceptions of climate change and danger may prove problematic in implementing policy options under conditions of uncertainty without consideration of public concerns over particular risks and their preferences for management. Participants to an international workshop, and in interviews undertaken using mental modelling, identified difficulties with the current policy approaches to addressing climate change, which are driven in part by international negotiations around UNFCCC article 2. Issues relating to the role of science, uncertainty, power, equity, social expectations and lifestyles were raised. To promote action on climate change, it was suggested that climate change should be situated in peoples daily lives, weaving it into related policy areas and including it within the broader scope of sustainable development. Objectives Dessai et al. (2004) argue that it is not possible to developing sustainable responses to climate change without recognising the central role of perceptions of danger which mould, affect, influence and shape policy and its uptake. Interaction between climate change and risk researchers has been limited. Whereas the former have focused on definitions of dangerous climate change by experts which tend to be externally described, little attention has been dedicated to how non-experts view climate change, a task which lies more within the remit of risk research. The objectives of this project are to investigate experts and non-experts definitions of dangerous climate change by: 1. Reviewing and analysing data and literature in the remit of risk research to obtain indications of how non-experts relate to climate change and how dangerous climate change may be perceived; 2. Comparing expert and non-expert perceptions and definitions; 3. Bringing together leading scholars in the climate science and socio-psychological disciplines and stakeholders to discuss (a) interpretations and perspectives relevant to their own field of expertise; (b) similarities and differences among these; (c) implications for policy-making. Underlying this project is the assumption that climate change responses cannot be adequately organised and managed if discrepancies exist between working definitions of danger by climate communities and non-experts perception of climate change, which equally shape policy-making. Crossovers and links between climate and risk communities to date have been rare. This strategic assessment sets out to investigate the nature of this gap and to forge a deeper understanding between communities in order to enable the search for constructive policy solutions to climate change as seen from various perspectives.

3

Work undertaken This project was undertaken in four phases, the first two which were effectively merged: Phases 1 and 2 - Analyses of public perceptions of climate change These two phases drew upon datasets available to CER and worldwide literature on lay perceptions of climate change. Four strands of work on lay perceptions of climate change in the UK, undertaken under the Programme for Understanding Risk by CER, were analysed and synthesised to explore the influences on perceptions of risk in relation to climate change among laypeople (i.e. a CER / MORI survey and focus groups undertaken in 2002; CER reviews of psychometric research spanning the past 20 years and postgraduate work on climate change linked to the Centre). These data were cross-referenced with similar work carried out internationally, such as the collaborations with Tony Leiserowitz (Decision Research, USA) and Timo Rusanen (University of Kuopio, Finland). Additionally, some German survey data are also comparable with the CER/MORI poll. The role of the media in shaping perceptions of climate change was also investigated based on a review of available literature. More direct input on this subject was provided by the attendance at the international workshop (see Phase 4) of scholars who had analysed these aspects in more detail with reference to the UK. Phase 3 Expert definitions of danger in relation to climate change The aim of this phase was to examine expert definitions of danger within the climate science community. Dessai et al. (2004) have already provided an indication of some of the various definitions in existence. We expanded that review to a wider set of sources available in the literature, triangulated through exploratory interviews with leading exponents of the climate change research community, analysed through a mental models approach (Morgan et al., 2002). The outputs from this phase were then compared with findings of Phases 1 and 2. Phase 4 International workshop The aim of this event was to bring together academics of a social/psychological background with natural scientists to debate the notion of dangerous climate change from their perspectives and in terms of implications for policy-making. The workshop was held at UEA on 28 and 29 June 2004, funded jointly by the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research and the Leverhulme Trust. Overall, 35 attendees officially participated, including participants from North America, Oceania, continental Europe, and the UK in addition to researchers at UEA Norwich. Results Phases 1 and 2 of the project support previous findings that many laypeople are ambivalent towards climate change. Although there is widespread concern about the issue, individuals find it difficult to balance the risks and benefits (from technologies and energy sources) with the levels at which these are manifest (personal, societal), compounded also by the time component of causes and effects (present vs. future). Societies tend to define climate change through experience, which is generally discrepant with expert notions of dangerous climate change, specifically defined by risk and vulnerability assessments. This may prove problematic if policy is implemented under conditions of uncertainty without consideration of public concerns over particular risks and their preferences for management. Participants to an international workshop and in interviews undertaken using mental modelling highlighted the difficulties inherent in current approaches to addressing climate change, driven in part by international negotiations around UNFCCC article 2. To promote action on climate change, it was suggested that climate change should be situated in peoples daily lives, weaving it into related policy areas and including it within the broader scope of sustainable development. Underlying this notion was a general disenchantment with the applicability and operationalisation of the international agreement on climate change, which is seen as generally incompatible with4

context and time specific notions of danger used by laypeople. The experts in particular articulated three conceptualisations of danger, defined by different perspectives: (i) interference with the climate system (therefore related to mitigation); (ii) severity of impacts to which it is not possible to adapt; (iii) changes to current societies (e.g. costs of mitigating). These discussions invariably focused on issues of decision-making under uncertainty, the role of governments in democratic societies, power, trust and inequity. Thus, whilst the important role of wise leadership was acknowledged, the complexity and pervasiveness of climate change suggested that attention should focus on how to engage the public globally, by promoting relevant and equitable solutions. Relevance to Tyndall Centre research strategy and overall Centre objectives This project provides insights into perceptions of climate change risk by laypeople as well as experts from different disciplines associated with climate change, and how these bear upon the various interpretations to be placed upon dangerous climate change. This Strategic Assessment also provides theoretical insights into perception formation and behavioural change. As such, the findings of this project are relevant to the adaptation and mitigation research areas within the Tyndall Centre, through one of its foci on determinants of risk and inertia in behavioural change, as well as to climate change policy more widely. Thus, although this project was originally categorised as falling within the remit of Tyndall Theme 3 (Adapting to climate change), its results relate to a wider set of research within the Tyndall Centre. In particular, one of the medium term objectives of the Tyndall Centre is to Motivate Society promote informed and effective dialogue across society about its ability and willingness to choose our future climate. This project has reflected on how climate change is perceived by laypeople, especially in Western societies, and includes suggestions deriving from the international workshop and data analysis on how to further public engagement with the risks posed by climate change with a view to potentially translating these into behavioural change. Potential for further work Suggestions for future research were identified throughout the international workshop (and are listed at the conclusion of section 3 of this report). Others include: - Engaging civil society: what scope is there for situating climate change in peoples lives? - Practically examine what combinations of incentives and measures enable and encourage individuals to mitigate climate change; - Investigate the scope for multi-purpose policies, their drawbacks and potential for negative interactions or overlaps; - Explore whether there are critical thresholds that encourage an individual to translate their motivation to act into behavioural change, and whether this is affected differently by gradual vs. rapid change (in the climate); - Re-assessing definitions of danger in relation to climate change after the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Communication highlights International workshop on Perspectives on Dangerous Climate Change, 28 and 29 June 2004; co-funded by the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research and the Leverhulme Trust. Lorenzoni, I. and Pidgeon, N. (2004) Public views on climate change: European perspectives of a long-term risk. Paper prepared for and presented at the Workshop on Global Warming: The Psychology of Long Term Risk, Princeton University, 12 November 2004. Lorenzoni, I. and Pidgeon, N. (2005) Closing the Gap, Defining Dangers of Climate Change and Individual Behaviour. Poster presentation at the Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change conference, Hadley Centre and Met Office, Exeter, 1-3 February 2005. A special journal issue: Lorenzoni, I., Pidgeon, N. and OConnor, R. (eds.) (in preparation) Perspectives on Dangerous Climate Change. Special issue of Risk Analysis.5

6

Section 2 - Technical report1 Introduction

The objective of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), as stated in its second article, is to achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. Understanding what constitutes dangerous climate change is increasingly important for both scientific analysis and the climate policy debate. Interpretation is crucial for determining the extent and level of time and resources for managing climate change. This strategic assessment set out to further the understanding of what constitutes dangerous climate change from climate science and risk research perspectives. Whereas the former has focused on definitions by experts, less attention has been dedicated to how non-experts view climate change. Climate experts often focus upon notions of thresholds of danger beyond which a substantial change takes place. But definitions of danger also depend on lay judgements about the valued characteristics of ecosystems and human systems. In other words, what risks from climate change are acceptable to society? This project investigates the nature of this gap, with a view to questioning current perspectives and to enable the search for constructive solutions to climate change. Insights into perceptions and images of climate change risk (danger, tolerable change) are brought to bear upon the issue of understanding perception of dangerous climate change. This project uses a combination of methods and various datasets to obtain indications of how non-experts relate to climate change and how dangerous climate change may be perceived; and to compare expert and non-expert perceptions and definitions. This technical report is divided into three main sections, reflecting the four phases of the project (as outlined in section 1). We report on Phases 1 and 2 initially, followed by Phase 4 (international workshop) as the latter naturally followed on from the first two. Finally, we outline the findings of the mental models approach applied to expert views of danger in relation to climate change (Phase 3).

7

2

Phases 1 and 2 Interpretations of danger in relation to climate change

2.1 Dangerous climate change: scientific interpretations According to the Oxford English Dictionary (2003), danger is the liability or exposure to harm or injury; the condition of being exposed to the chance of evil; risk, peril. UNFCCC article 2 suggests that harm would derive to human and natural systems if certain disruptions were to occur as a consequence of excessive concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Three elements are key to defining such danger, as per article 2: (i) the impacts deriving from changes to the climate system, (ii) the concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs)1, and (iii) the rate (timing) of any change in climate parameters. By focusing on the notions of threshold beyond which many believe substantial climate change would occur (Schneider, 2001:18; also Parry et al., 1996), the climate community has predominantly worked with tools at their disposal, defining danger through assessments of risk and vulnerability (Table 2.1). Table 2.1 Examples of external definitions of 2004). Danger measured through thresholds in physical vulnerability (various sources) Large scale eradication of coral reef systems dangerous climate change (source: Dessai et al.,

Danger measured through thresholds in social vulnerability (various sources) Irrigation demand exceeding 50% of annual seasonal water usage for agriculture in northern Victoria, Australia Disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Depopulation of sovereign atoll countries Sheet (WAIS) Breakdown of the Thermohaline Additional millions of people at risk from Circulation (THC) water shortage, malaria, hunger and coastal flooding Modification of crucial climate-system Destabilisation of international order by patterns such as ENSO, NAO environmental refugees and emergence of conflicts Climate change exceeding the rate at World impacts exceeding a threshold which biomes can migrate percentage of GDP

Patwardhan et al. (2003:4) extend these notions further by arguing that a more in-depth understanding is required of what limits (i.e. levels and / or rates) of climate parameters are associated with critical impacts on key areas for human well-being, taking the WEHAB2 components as reference points. These can be conceptualised, according to the authors, using the notion of critical thresholds, of which the authors define two types: Thresholds of type I that would entail smooth changes, which could at some point result in damages that could be considered unacceptable by policy-makers. The authors envisage that the threshold would be defined through a socio-political process involving consideration of relative risks and benefits to particular sectors / regions. It is clearly thresholds of this type that should be the subject of societal decision-making to define what constitutes dangerous climate change and impacts thereof.

The IPCC and other government departments (such as DEFRA in the UK) emphasise that stabilisation refers to the concentrations of GHG in the atmosphere, not CO2 alone. Technically, stabilising emissions or energy intensity will not achieve climatic stability. 2 The WEHAB framework was introduced at the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg in 2002 and identifies key areas for human well-being and development, namely Water, Energy, Health, Agriculture and Biodiversity.

1

8

Thresholds of type II: natural bounds, which if exceeded, would lead to major, potentially irreversible, impacts. It is very likely that the irreversibility and scale of such changes would be considered unacceptable by virtually all policy-makers and would thus qualify as dangerous change. Some examples of thresholds of this type are identified in the left-hand column of Table 2.1.

Similarly, the UK Hadley Centre defines dangerous climate change on the basis of sudden change (some components of the climate system which could change abruptly) or thresholds beyond which changes will be inevitable and irreversible. The aim of the Centre is to quantify the risk from high-impact climate events where possible, or alternatively estimate the global and regional consequences of these events, which would provide plausible worst case climate scenarios for impacts studies and adaptation response planning (Hadley Centre, 2004). Another aspect not covered in Table 2.1 is the concept of danger as a function of adaptive capacity. Human, and up to a certain extent natural, systems are not solely passive recipients of climatic changes. In addition to contributing to these changes through GHG emissions, they can also modify their responses to reduce negative impacts or maximise positive impacts deriving from these changes. Time is the other important component of danger. If the onset of a change in the climate is faster than the capability for adaptation, an event is likely to be more dangerous than it would have been if changes were progressive (e.g. regular climate change). The capacity to adapt is enhanced by foresight of upcoming changes and reduced when changes are abrupt, large and / or relatively unforeseen. Thus, abrupt changes are likely to be more dangerous than changes that are more slowly evolving and better foreseen. [] The ability to adapt is itself a measure of whether any particular climate stimulus is dangerous. (Mastrandrea and Schneider, 2001:444). Thus, a dangerous climatic outcome could be considered a function of the inter-relatedness and dependency of timing and adaptive capacity, a characteristic known as tight coupling in normal accident theory (Perrow, 1984:8). Dangerous climate change will therefore be defined not only by what may occur when crossing a physical threshold, but also by what it is perceived or experienced to be, and therefore by the methods enacted to counteract that danger. The other two aspects of article 2 which have been the subject of scientific analysis are the levels of GHG emissions that could stabilise the climate, in order to avoid adverse impacts on human and natural ecosystems, and the timing at which this would occur. ONeill and Oppenheimer (2002), for instance, infer an upper limit for GHG concentrations and the timescales during which these can be achieved to prevent damage to reef systems, protect the WAIS or aver the shutdown of the THC. They estimate that a stabilisation of CO2 concentrations at 450 parts per million (ppm) by 2100 (leading to a range of warming of 1.2-2.3oC) could probably, but not certainly, avoid the collapse of the WAIS, likely prevent the THC from closing down, but incur damage to at least one vulnerable ecosystem (e.g. coral reefs). Timing is crucial: the authors estimate that meeting the Kyoto targets ten years later (in 2020 rather than 2010) could preclude us from stabilising concentrations at 450 ppm by the end of the century. The scientific uncertainties inherent in defining thresholds, or even one single threshold against which the danger of climate change can be gleaned, exemplify the difficulties in translating the notion of danger into policy-useful guidance. Yet based on scientific research some governments and organisations already appear to have made a policy judgement on what constitutes dangerous climate change, thus transposing some external definitions into their modes of operation. For instance, the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU, 2003) examined the threshold beyond which the effect on the three criteria specified in article 2 would no longer be9

tolerable, estimating that the threshold from which damage to the global natural heritage is no longer acceptable [is] in the range of 2oC global warming relative to pre-industrial values (WBGU, 2003:1). The WBGU recommend that to avert dangerous climatic changes, it is essential to comply with a climate guard rail defined by a maximum warming of 2oC relative to preindustrial values (WBGU, 2003:2). As temperatures have already risen by 0.6oC from the times of the industrial revolution, only an increase of another 1.4oC is tolerable, although this should not occur at a rate faster than a 0.2oC warming per decade. The WBGU suggests the European Union (EU) should adopt a leading role in promoting the acceptance of this climate window within the context of the UNFCCC process3. Given the uncertainties inherent in the climate system, the WBGU also recommends ambitious emissions reductions of 45-60% globally from 1990 levels by 2050 to stabilise CO2 concentrations below 450 ppm. This means that industrialised nations would need to reduce their GHG emissions by 20% by 2020. These reductions and targets are consistent with those proposed by various UK commissions (RCEP, 2000). In 2003, the UK Government announced its aspiration to reduce domestic CO2 emissions by 60% by 2050 from 1990 levels, which should result in a cut of about 65 million tonnes of CO2 (DTI and DEFRA, 2003). However, recent statistics show that at European levels, despite commitments to the Kyoto Protocol targets, GHG emissions have recently been rising (Gugele et al., 2003). This poses the question of how, realistically, GHG concentrations can be stabilised. Part of this depends upon societal views on climate change: whether people consider its manifestations dangerous and if they support climate change policies. These factors, amongst others, will influence their practical achievability. For instance, a Greenpeace report (Hare, 1998) suggests that to limit the rate and magnitude of climate change within this century to levels tolerable to human and natural systems (i.e. no significant damage) a ceiling needs to be placed on the amount of carbon dioxide released from the burning of fossil fuels. Greenpeace has calculated this ceiling or carbon budget to be around 225 billion tonnes of carbon. To meet this carbon budget and stabilise global temperature increases below 1oC in the long-term, it argues that 75% of known, economically recoverable reserves of conventional fossil fuels should remain untouched. This raises issues of whether such limits are acceptable and / or tolerable, from policy, public and climate science perspectives. It is clear, therefore, that risk assessments cannot determine what is dangerous purely on scientific bases without some judgement about what is acceptable (Pidgeon et al., 1992; Pidgeon, 1998), and what level of risk is tolerable, by way of a policy response to this assessment (Gerrard, 2000). Tolerability and acceptability are socially constructed. Especially in cases such as climate change, a complex and pervasive phenomenon, shrouded in uncertainty and where management stakes are high, traditional forms of science and policy making alone cannot find and deploy solutions to such an issue. It requires taking into account the context in which risk occurs and therefore the multiple views and values which will drive decisions in the face of uncertainty. Equally, decisions cannot be postponed until full understanding is available. Furthermore, decisions taken in the present will require leaving options open for the future. Within this context Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993:739) and others have argued for post-normal science as a means to initiate and facilitate responses to societal issues and tensions, paving theVarious organisations argue that temperatures should be kept well below the 2oC average (above pre-industrial levels) as this could already result in adverse impacts to human and natural systems or rapid irreversible changes. For instance, the European Union Environment Council Decision of 1996 proposed that temperature increases should not be allowed to exceed 2oC and concluded that CO2 concentrations should be kept below 550 ppmv (parts per million volume) (EC, 1996). Others include the World Wide Fund for Nature (www.panda.org/about_wwf/what_we_do/climate_change/problems/index.cfm), the Climate Action Network (CAN, who define possible changes under temperatures 1-2 oC higher as unacceptable; www.climnet.org/pubs/CANadequacy30102002.pdf), the Alliance of Small Island States and the International Climate Change Taskforce (ICCT, 2005).3

10

way towards a democratization of science. Post-normal science is an attempt to broaden the knowledge base in policy processes. In the context of climate change, this implies moving away from traditional notions of communicating science to the public towards embracing the understanding that there are multiple publics with different views and response patterns which need to be taken into account if policymaking on such a complex issue is to address the roots of the problem successfully. Failure to take public values and views into consideration when taking decisions on climate risk management issues will inevitably prove problematic. A number of reasons can be advanced for this. At a very basic level climate policies will require a degree of buy-in or acceptance from those who will be affected by them if they are to be successfully implemented. Equally, where public policy and citizen frames of reference differ (e.g. regarding the balance between long-term and short-term considerations) the practice of risk communication becomes much more difficult, while policy implementation may be misunderstood, neglected or even opposed by the electorate (Pidgeon, 1998). Such considerations reflect the operational and dynamic definition of danger that Dessai et al. (2004) call for, possibly based upon elicitation and mediation of values with a view to integrating external and internal perspectives of climate change for its management. The basis for post-normal science and decision-making processes is the acknowledgement that there are multiple thresholds defined by the societal values attributed to ecosystem functions and other elements integral to human livelihoods. Crucial in these multiple assessments are therefore who / what is exposed to a certain risk, how that risk compares to others and the practical considerations of taking action. All of these issues were raised in various terms at several stakeholder workshops held world-wide as part of the project Helping Operationalise article Two (HOT): a science-based policy dialogue on fair and effective ways to avoid dangerous interference with the climate system and implications for post-Kyoto policies. For many stakeholders dangerous anthropogenic interference was difficult to define, especially as this was context dependent and arbitrary, with no agreed definitions or accepted notions of the three impacts criteria. Others argued that article 2 did not direct enough attention to distributional and equity impacts, and the implications for human health. They also reinforced the notion that the danger of climate change is context-specific: some areas around the globe are already experiencing this form of change; while unacceptable outcomes of climate policies are multiple and defined by stakeholders interests, perceptions and experience (Gupta et al., 2003). To this effect, risk perception research provides an insight into individual and social considerations of climate change, and the implications of these in light of article 2. These are examined in the sections below. 2.2 Lay perceptions of climate change Dessai et al. (2004) argue that external definitions of dangerous climate change (i.e. risk analysis of system characteristics of the physical or social world) can be at odds with internal definitions of danger. Danger as insecurity or lack of safety is clearly dependent upon personal experiences, values, information, trust, cultural and institutional processes. This section provides a summary of the several consistent trends in studies of public perceptions of climate change revealed in the past two decades by quantitative and qualitative risk studies. These are mostly based on studies conducted in developed nations, as it has proven almost impossible to find documented perceptions studies conducted in developing countries. Awareness of climate change The issue of climate change has woven its way into the general public consciousness. Climate change generates awareness and concern around the globe, although these are nationally-specific (Dunlap and Scarce, 1991; Bord et al., 1998; MORI, 2002; Brechin, 2003). As with many other11

environmental issues, the changing social context at any particular point in time (e.g. the activities of interest groups or the media) can serve to amplify or attenuate perceptions of climate change risk (Pidgeon et al., 2003). However, the importance of climate change tends to be secondary in relation to other environmental, personal and social issues (Witherspoon, 1994; Dunlap, 1998; Thompson and Rayner, 1998; INRA Europe, 1999; Zwick and Renn, 2002; Brechin, 2003; Lorenzoni, 2003). For instance, although 67% of respondents of a 2003 British survey maintained climate change was important or very important to them, more often their main priorities lay with health, family, safety and finances (Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2004 see Table 2.2). According to the EuroBarometer 58.0 of 2002, the most worrying environmental risks for most European respondents were associated with nuclear power and radioactive waste, and industrial activities, pollution, natural disasters and ozone, followed by climate change (very worrying for 39% of respondents in the 15 EU Member States). The survey analysts explain these differences by relating them to media reporting: the issues that elicit more worry are linked to industrial safety and more traditional environmental problems, frequently mentioned by the media over the last 30 years (EORG, 2002:9). The lower worry about climate change, on the other hand, could be explained if it is considered an old environmental issue which has nevertheless only very recently received more extensive media coverage. Table 2.2. Risk in context: the importance of personal (P) and social (S) issues (% responses).Not at all important (1) 0* 1 0* 0 1 0* 1 1 0* 0* 0* 0* 3 2 1 2 9 3 2 3 5 3 8 9 17 2 0* 1 1 0* 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 3 3 2 2 4 3 3 5 5 5 7 8 11 Neither important nor unimportant (3) 2 4 3 4 4 6 6 9 7 7 7 8 14 14 12 18 14 20 20 29 25 25 29 33 35 4 10 10 16 18 17 23 26 24 31 33 36 34 26 31 37 36 32 36 42 32 33 39 27 26 17 Very important (5) 87 85 80 77 75 69 65 63 59 58 56 56 53 49 46 40 40 37 33 29 29 28 26 21 19 Dont know 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 1 0* 0* 0* 0* 1 0* 1 0* 1 0* 1 1 3 1 2 3 0*

Your Health (P) Partner and Family (P) Law and Order (S) Personal Safety (P) Education (S) Being Independent (P) Your Privacy (P) Terrorism (S) Environmental Protection (S) Having a Comfortable Life (P) Personal Finance (P) Social Relations/Friends (P) Radioactive Waste Animal Welfare (S) The Economy (S) Excitement/Fun (P) Work (P) Tackling World Poverty (S) Tackling Human Rights (S) Population Growth (S) Genetic Testing CLIMATE CHANGE Radiation From Mobile Phones GM Food Religion (P)

Source: UEA/MORI GM Food Survey 2003 (Weighted dataset, N =1,363) (Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2004). Note: the non-empty cells (