GRf*JAT BRITAIN

ADD

P ALESTllE : 1914-1939

bl

Sa Danna

A Th •• la aubmitt.d to the Faoult7 ot the G~.duat. Sohoo1J Marquette Unl •• ralt,

1n Partial FUltillment ot the Re­quirements to~ the Degree ot

Maater ot Arts

Milwaukee, Wiscon.in lul,., 1953

.:

PREFACE

Thi. report attempt. to outline Bl'ltlah1m.psl'ial1a­

tic polloy Whioh led to and evolved trom,the assumption ot

the pa.lestine Mandate. In view ot British oommitments made

to Jew8 and Arabs during "lorld vJar I, hlato!7 was treated

to tne speotaole or imperialism at odds with Inte~tlonal

torces or a nat1ona11.tl0 oharacter. The eontlict~ issues

1n this strange game reaohed cr1 tical Pl'Oportlona in the de­

ca.de preceding the Second World War_

I do not prea1.1l!l8 to add anything new to ourrent re­

views.Much hal alraead:y be$n written 1n tho form 0'1 govern­

ment report. an.1 partisan ace ount.. Pre.l.el,. beoause there

are numerous partisan review., and beeauee the I)aiestine

problem still remains, 1 t ••• ms t1me.lr to Sa the. available

material into at study ... objective .. a hum&nly posslble.

,;

While the Mrratl'f'. tollow. A ohronological order,

there are M08.alons when it 18 nece.8arr to revert to a. tor­

mel" period 1n order to trea t some aapeot at gna tel' length.

This should entail no d1tt1oul ty. tor the reader 1. generally

forewarned of the departUl'e.

My thanks are due to Rabbi Loui. J. Swichkow of

l<I11waukee. Wisconsin tor hi. oontribution ot aolU'Oe mater-

1al. And pa.J'tioul.tJ..r thanks are extended t;o Dr. teo J. Wear­

ing tor h1, helpful md patient critioi_ as adv1 •• r.

..

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Prefaoe __________________________________ _

CHAPTER I. BACKGRO-uND _____ .. _____________ - __ - ________ _

1

The Near Ea.t in British Poliey___________ 1 Zlonlam ____ ._----_________________________ ;;

Al'ab Natlonallam... __ -----•. - ______ --_-__ -_-- 12 CHAPTER II. WORLD WAR 1 _____ - __ - __ - ___ -_______________ 15

The Near Ea.t in Brlt1shStrateS1 and Allied Negotiation. ___ - __ - _______ - 15

Anglo-ArabIc Commitmenta _____________ -____ 18

The Balfour Declaration___________________ 24 CHAPTER III. POSTWAR ISSUES ________________ -___________ 34

Intertm Admlnlatratlon____________________ 34 The Mandate Gr~t ___________ ._____________ 40

MandatoPJ Adminl.tratlon to 1930 ________ -- 48 CHAPTER IV. A DECADE OF DISORDER ______ ---_____________ 60

Aftermath of the 1929 Riots ___ - ________ --- 60 The Outbreak or 1936______________________ 68

The Eve or World War 11___________________ 80 BIBLIOGRAPHY __ --_______________________ --__________ 90

APPENDIX I. Artiole 22 or the Covenant or the League ot Battona__________ 94

APPENDIX II. Mandate tor Pal •• tine _____ - _________ -- 96

ORAPlf'ER I

BACKGROmm

The Hear East in British Poll01

Knsllah oonnectlons w1th Pale.tine and the Jewa be­

gan long betore the F1rat World War and the acqui,ition of

the Pale stine Mandate. Aa haa happened man,. time. in the

world'. hlato17, religion and. emotional asitation initiated

political Gontacta. Aa tar baok 8. tn ••• 1'17 17th oentury.

English Nonconformist. were attracted to the Old Testament

and Jewish tradItions trom which they gave consideration to

the return ot the Jewa to Pale.tine.

The tirat4.t1n1te proPoI.l in England that Ohris­

tian ruler. live the Holy Land. back to the Jeva ca.. in 1621

tram the lawrer, Slr John Ptnoh, in hi' book The World'.

Great Restoration or Calling ottha J.w •• (l) For advocat1ng

suoh a thIng to Christian nation" Pinch w •• impriaoned. Bow­

ever. by the end of the oentury, the Hasp. 81b119the.a Ani!0-JUdaioa reoorda various pUblioationa endorsing the ld •• of ~

Jewi8h re.tol'atlon. After that, the l.eu. recel".4 sporadlc

attention from writers until the 19th oentUl'J'.

Siaultaneoul with the •• humanitarian .xpre.81ona

,:

grew up a •• ar S •• tem politico-eoonomio polio1 or the go.­

ernment 1n Wbloh Pale.tine eventuallJ bee... an .".1' aore impor­

tant pha.e .. In the 15th oentury IIlUch cOIIIeeroe ",a. carried on

(1) Albert M. H1 ... on .. Pal •• tine UDder the Mandate (London, 1950), p.4t. ,p.4-12 enumerate aome aJMPa£6~tlo ln4i­"lduala ot the 19th centurr who sought to help the Jews bJ practioal meana.

2

with the L.vant aoro •• the Mediterranean Se •• (l) The d •• lre, ..

though, to~ Far Eastern wares and market, tor bel'" woolen

manutaoture., led Bnglanel to seek diplomatio relationa with

the Turkllh Emplre, •• &he oontrolled the overland routes to

the Orlent.(2) William, Reborn. wal reooplzed by the Sultan

.a the first amb •• aador 1ft 1583 and he began .. tradItion whloh

iaat.a till the 19th centU1"J.

Enclleh OO1'l'lfl8l"'ce shitted to the more profitable all­

.e. route around Atrica with the oharte. ot the East India

Compan1 in 1600. a,. the end at that centU17 attempts were _de

to oome up the Red. Sea, whence carsoes could then be hauled

through E81Pt on an overland .route. But nothing came of the

venture then, .a an Ottoman ban prohlbl teet :tUl.vlgatlon ot the

Sea above the port ot Jeddah, halfway up the Arabian coast.

In the middle ot the 18th centurr. Turkish ware, ,lu.

a serl.. of Bg1Pt1an revolt. under tbe S • .,.. ..ekins Indepen-

4enee. influenoed England to negotiate with the latter tor

trade route •• But constant political di.turbanoe. prevented

the Bngllah trOll OaPr1!ns on a .eoure and prot! table tra<1e.

S.,. now, Frenoh rivalr,. tor the Indian trade moved

that countrJ to look on ElJPt .a a good milltarr baa. agalna'

England. With it under her oontrol, ahe Gould prev8.nt over-

(1) The 8urY8,., heNin, ot Britieh oo..roi.l rout •• 18 taken tJtOll Haltord L. Hoskina. Britiah Rout •• to In41a ( •• w York, 1928).

(2) Ocmcem11l8 the woolen induatry, ••• I.B.Slack. The aelF of Elisabeth (OXford" 19)6), pp.196-198 -

3

land tranaport ot troop •• "It required a ~ar with Ft"aDoe and

a m.ajot" attaok by the FreDoh in ES'1Pt to Ghanse the attl tude ,;

ot the Brltl.h Government tram one of n88180t to one of ac­

tive tnter.at 1ft ES7Pt.ft (1) Thi. was the V.pol.onto era. The

England Qt thoa. da,.. had not even a merohant in EgJPt, auch

leal • consul. From that t~. on, thoush, ahe .et berself to

letting no power •• sume oontrol ot anr part ot tbe route

tbJtough S1nai 01' the Euphrate. reglon. Sbe auppone4 the Turks

at tho •• point. where ahe her •• lf did nothav. or want poli­

tical control.(2)

In the 19th centurr abe engaged in various aohe .. a

tor 8atabllshlng alternate route. to the laat. The ate .. en­

glne inspired plans tor navisatins the Bupbrat.s rlver around

18)$. It alao _de po.albl ••• rer navigatlon of the treacher­

oua Red S... A railroad vas planned tor the luphPate. vall.,.

1n 1856. (l) All the while Bnsland oontlnued to cU'rJ OD trade

with the Ottomans, to~ their empire wae non-industrial and

dedioated '0 tree-trade. In consequenoe. abe maintained lOme

cODa.rola! a,enta in Paleatine.(4)

(1) Hoskins, p.S6

(2) Por example, on May 6, 1877. after Russia had 4e­olared war OIl Turkey. Derb7, the Bnglleh Poraip. SeoretU*J • • ent a note to Ru •• ta detining the ltmlte of Eniliab neutra­lit,. and. inci10.tina oonoem over the tate of the Sues, B&7pt and the Per.lan Gult. Se. Foundation. ot British For.11D Po­itj8. Ed. bl. liarold TellPe:rle1 and till!an R. 'enson (Lon40n,.

), pp.357-3S8.

() Por the various projects, ae. Ho.kina, pp.154ft, )21.

(4) Theae were in addltlo1'l to a Vioe.Consul .ent to le-

La.

With the opening of the Sue. Canal, greater atten­

tion vaa tocuaed on the Sinal distriot. England at first was .:

oppos.d to the French projeot tor tear ot po11tical oompli­

cationa. She even began oonstruotion of a rival rail route as

a political move to stall the French.(l) But European aupport

and that ot the Pasha va. with Franoe and the Canal was tinal­

ly oompleted. That England changed her opinion of the Oanal

was 1nevitable, as approximately 8eventy.tive per-cent ot the

ships pas.ing through it came to be Engll.h. The subsequent

purchase ot stock gave her a volce 1n administrative polioies

ot the region.

BritIsh influence 1n Turkey began tc wane in the 20th

oentury. !hIs and indicat10ns of Ottoman decay moved the home

government tt' lQok tor sphere. ot influenoe through arrange.

ments w1th other powerl.(2) Pertinent in this regard were the

Franco-Britilh Declaration ot 1904 and the Anglo-Russian Oon­

vention ot 1907. The Foreign Ministera, Delo .... ' ot Pranoe and

Lord Lan.dowe ot England, had worked at 8. Franoo-British En­

tente all through 1903 and came up with the Deolaration a year

later in whloh their mutual po.lt1ona in Egypt and Morocco

were derined. Briefly. England val given a tree hand in Egypt

rusalem by Palmers ton in 183a~ He was the first apPointed DY any oountPy and concerned him.elt mainly with protecttng the Jews. Byamlon, p.7.

(1) Hoskins, pp.29S-298.

(2) The threat ot the German Berl1n-to-Bagdad railway .erved to .trensthen British determination to control the Persian route.

s

and France in Morooco. Neither was to "obstruct the actions"

ot the other in these territories .. (l) Sf the Anglo.Russ1an .:

ConventIon, Ruesia was assured of her influenoe in northwes.

tern Persia and England in the region above the Persian Gulf.

Both were to respect the "integrity and 1ndependenoe ot Per­

Sia". By these agreementa, England felt somewhat more seoure

in the tace or the risIng German threat.

But even at this Btage,Pa.].estine 'did not greatly

interest her .. It was still a part ot Syria and as such oame

under French Intluenee .. (2) In tact, in 1913 the French gov­

ernment obtained a conce.eion for a railway trom Ryak in Sy­

ria to Damascus, Beirut, and thence to a junctUl'e \~i th the

Jarfa to Jerusalem rail line at Ramleh.(l) England felt she had

ample protection tor the Suez' by her posItions in Egypt and

Peraia, an~ that the desert region to the east or the Canal was

obstacle enough tor any aggressor!. Wo:rld War I was to prove

-her in error.

Zioniam

Although England had a Consul in J'eruaal em atter

18)8, ahe was still not politically committed to Palestine 1n

any way. Therefore, Palmers/ton's overtures to the Su.ltan in

(l) Term. ot thea. agreement. can be round in the C_. bridle Hi.t0ft of Britlah For.if: Polic,.. 1866-1919 (New fO"rk. 19z2-iQ23) , t, PP. 309-j12', 3$ • .

(2) Franoe" "cultural" 1!·~paria11.m ia well aummallz.d in Wllllam E. Hookirl£'" The r,pir1t ot World Politloa(New York, 1932) pp.238-243. .

() Korman Bentwlch. Palestine ot the JewI, Past, Pre­sent and Future (London, 19l~) p.17~.

6

1840, that he allow Jewa to enter Pal •• tine, should not be

interpreted .a poll tical moves .. faa.rlton rather "s •• med. to .:

have had a genuine de.ire to proteot the Jewa In Palestine

tor hUlWlnItar1an r.ason ....... "(l) His plea. were on the balie

that the Sultan would reoeive worldwide Jewiah support as well

a8 obtaIn wealthy men Who would enrioh hIs empire.

Public opinIon came to bear strongly on PalMer.ton

when the oppress ion ot the Jew8 in Rhod... and Damasous aroused

the sympathIes ot evangelical bodIes 1n England.(2) The •• lat­

ter felt that Brita1n va. to be the Mo ••• to lead the chosen

people baok to their Ho17 Land. And sinee at that time the

government was helping Turkey regafn power in Syria againet

Neh.met All, the,. oonoluded that it should also be noble with

raga:rd to the Jewa. The intluence ot the •• bodies 18 not to

be minimi •• d, tor in a letter to her friend, Prince.s Lie.en,

dated lfovel'tber 1), 1840 .. Lad,. Palm.raton wote that "we have

on our aIde the tanatioal .ad 1"ellg1oua elementa ll and you know

what 8. toll owing the,. na". in this countP1. 'rile,- are aD.olute.

17 determine. that Jerusal •• and the .nola ot PaL •• tine shall

be reserved tor the Jewa to return to •••• ·(3)

.evertb.el ••• , it was not until the 1880'8 that the

Jews them •• lvel began to evince 8. new ntt1onal. eptrlt. '!'he

Ma. of national atat.. tended to isolate them more than ever.

(1) S1r Oharles It. Webster. The FONlap PollOI of Pal­meraton (London, 1951), II, pp.761-76,.

(2') It'1Ut1on, pp.22-23.

(3) Vebater, p.761.

7

In W.stem. Burope the,. tried to .. et the .1 tuatlon by doing

all in thell' power to beG .. a'81ml1ate<1. But in X •• tem Bu- ,;

rope, Rue.lan oppr ••• lve me.surea pointed out the 1mpraotlca ..

bl11t7 ot .uoh a p~oo.4ure and the nec ••• it,. tor developing

Jevlah oulture in a place apar.t. B •• i4 •• , maD7 telt that ••• 1-

m11atlon In~ly.4 moral degradation.

Hebrew aapiratlODt loon found expre •• lon 1D the un­

orgeni.ed Ohlbath Zion, (Lo"e ot Zion) aacl Bove ... l Zion (Lov.:r.

ot Zion) ao ... nt. which .prang up in the lu-,e. I.wi.h oom­

mmltl •• In RUlai. and .~p •• 81 1,890, one tound in We.tem

unlver.ltl •• the Jevish-Reltan Solentlflc Sooleil mo •• a1m

vu to tisht the ••• 1m1lationlat t:rend 1D4 retain the char­

acter and i.adl tloDa ot JUd8i_. Thia Soolet., oould ·olaim to

have b •• a tbe opadle ot the modem Zlonl" 1IO .... nt- without

41acre41tlag tbe praotloal M)rk done bl laroa 4. Rothaohl1d.(1)

BetON tbe 84 ... 8nt of the Zionl .. ", Rothaohl14 ...

the laac11na tlsure 1n aponaorlng Je,,1sh coloni •• tlon ot Pal •• •

tine. Hia pH-WOP14 war I clonat lone we,.. prompted. b7 rellgious

and h.ane .ot1 ...... A.t the time. he va. 1n nowi •• a polltloal

Zionist. But .tter the Balfour Declaration of 1917, he •••

that the s;oll t10al loal. ot 'heodor S ••• l, the tOUDder of the

Zlon1,t Ocmgr ••••••• 10M would adequatel1 pro.14. tor the

(1) Ohas.a Wel.aDD in hi. autoblopaph7, ~rl~ te4 ~tr (B.w York, 1949), pp.16-17 and RIf',,' traoe. sa aotl­fiE· •• ot the.e mo._nt. In hi. earll ! e. Probabl,. the molt prominent per.ana._ 1n tbe awaken1nl In Bua.l. v.. Leo 'lD'~, a Pollah Jew, who .eoured attention 1ft hi' pamphlet, Auto-u..n~l'.tlfe. Bl. 1'01. 1_ outllaed tD s_oo PoUDdatlon tor fa! •• ,1 •• 110. Pale_tlne--A Stwt.'J' or levl.h, Arab and Brlt1~~ ... Pol101.! (II •• Lven, lfJ41J, r; PP.f4tJ'.

8

world t. Je",8. Subsequently, he save IIOre support to the Zio­

niat movement, while limitins hl ... el.t to baoklng praotioal .:

projects. ot h~8.1t he a.14.

I arPlvea at the Id •• (ot oolon181ns Jew8 1n Pal. •• tll'18) t4len I obaerved the rapi4 atr14 •• of a •• ~ll.tlOD amons the Jewa of Prance, e.­peolall,. the .lxed _l'r1ag... I aaw ,nat ta­m111 •• , ODoe the strongholds ot Ju4alem, be­oame •• tranged from u ••••• MJ ide ••••••• to ore.te .uGh oon41t10n8 .a would. aka It poa­aible tor them to aaintain Judal •• and Jewiah lite and to tUJ.-ther their srovth.(l)

To Rothsohlld, the formation of eommunl tl •• 1n Pale atine

w.. the 0111" anewer to the probl ....

Amid the varied and di8organi.ed reaotions to the

.tat. ot the Jewe appeared Tbeo4or Sersl. a Vienne.. intel­

leotual, with his book, iud.nataat (The Jewish Stat.) in

1896. It 18 pat-adoltieal that Bersl va. UDtaalllar 1d. th the

vu10ua Zion!.t organl.at1ona about h1lI. Mol'. than that, he

v.. not partloular17 intereated 1n tbe rell&loua Obara.t • .,. 1ft

Judal... H1. book _de ao .. ntion of Pale,tine aDd. the Hebrew

18D1U8g8 WU lpo"". It bl"e.thed more tbe 1dIl tban • praoti­

oal prosP-. ( 2)

The plan he e1'1.1.8884 v •• or • 4!plomatl0 natve. Be

hoped to persuade rich Jewl to uae the1r aone,. to bribe the

Sultan 11'1to pemlttlns the ent.,. of poor Jewl into. hi' domain.

(1) I ••• o .aldltoh. BdMoad de Rotbachl14 (w •• htnctoD, 194.$), pp.22-24. Roth •• hllcl .80.1y.a due reoognltion t.,. hi. work in 1929 when h. v.. approaohed to acoept an Honor.,.,. PN­aldenc7 to the newly-or •• te. Jewish A,euo7. ~ •• p.77.

(2) S •• W.1S11&1U1, pp.4l-46 tor 8D appraleal ot the book and Berel'. t.paot on t~ Jewi.h world.

9

But he BOught prlnolpallr tbe go04 •• pyloe. ot the polltloa11r

influential, tirst in Oerman7 and then in Bnsland .. to exert .:

pre.aure on the Sul tan tov8l'da the lame end. Pa111ns to get the

d •• lred help from the w.alth,. JewI, he app •• led to the 3ew1lh

ma.... 'through the Zioni" groupe and called tor a publio de.

monstration in 1891. out of that call 0 ... the Firat ZIonist

Oongr ••• held 1ft Ba.le, SwItzerland. It 0_ to be a "mantt.a.

to ot rle.h and blood, the Jewish people it •• lf rea ••• ning

ita eXIstence and confronting human1t7 with ita historic de­

mand." .(1)

The OongreS8 formulated tbe toll.wins prop-uu

, 1. The px-omotlon on suItable 11ne., ot tbe 0010n1 •• tion of Pal •• tine bJ Je"llh apioulture aDd In.u.t~lal worker,.

2. ,he orlani •• tioD and. bln41ns to,ether or tbe whole ot JeVl!'1 br m •• na ot .PPl'oprlllte In­atltutloDa, looal aDd International, 1n acoor­dance with the lava ot .ach ooUlltr,..

3. 'l'b.e 8tnnatben1ns aD4 fo.teriDg or J.vish natloDal .entlment and coftSclouan ••••

1&.. PnparatoJ'J' .tepa tovard. obtaining govern. _nt coneeDt t lbere ne.e.IU'7, to the atta.lraent ot th. a1m or Zlon1_. (2)

While 8.1'11 va. to 11ve the DeW aovement • cent~al

autborltJ', it v •• felt b1 many, •• peolall,. tho •• trOll Ea.taft'lL

Bu:rope, that be w.. not tuned to the .plr1' of tbe Jewl.h

••••••• The taotlon oppo.ed to hi. r.o. ~ tlr.t years was

led bJ A.ber Glnaberl, oommonly known a. Aba4 B ..... Se v.a

inter •• ted not 10 muoh 1n a political center a. a spiritual

OM. To h1a, Pale.tlne v •• to exert a unitJlna cultural and

(1) Ibid._ p.l .. 6

(2) Bloo Foundation. I, P.41

10

ap1rltual influenoe among the Jewa who Gould .t111 remain

soattered throughout the wop14.(1) -:

Th1. 41 yergenoe on fundamental. oame to • head In

1902 u.4 threatened to weaken the enti" IIOvement. Hersl 1ft

Ootober approached the Engliah government on the pOI.lbl11.

ty of aoqulrtng the Slnai district .a a Jewish home. To a.ral

any 1~.4 'Wa. suitable ~or a national home. H. aonoel.ed ..

OhUl"ch State loa.mat .iailer to the Papao,..(2)

Atter • Zionis' organi •• d BUP"7 ot tbe proposed

homeland in the .pring ot 190), Lord Croa •• , the British ru­

ler 1D EU'Pt. ,... ht. ter.. l'eply NO .... n41na abandonment

of the plaa.() Hi8 pretext waa that tbe B11e water auppl,.

vaa insuttlalent tor lrrlsatlon. But it 1 •• ore probable that,

to Oroaer,

the proposal to .attle thaSlnal peD1uula m1sht bay •••• ed doubttul. it not dalll_POUI. Aa it vaa, it kept the Arab ••••• well apart. Populated and. rend.ered tertU. it might be. come a hlghwa, aloag whioh 1Uftl new probl .. might travel aftd oomplicate the ooaplex1tl •• ot BOPt. (4) .

The 8M" •• of Caarlat Rue.la to the I.viab des1r ••

(1) Ibid., pp.18-22. In 1902, 1n Geneva, was founded tbetl.s' Zron!a' publl.b1ns house" D •• Iu4taobe V.rlag, Whl6b edited tn. periodioal, Dar.!'" •• It v •• aD .spre •• lon by tho •• who de ... d polltl •• 1 Zion! Inadequate. S •• V.iMl.n.n, p.68.

I

(2) Jaoob de Baa •• The040r Be.al (W." YOJ'k. 1921), I, p.182. .

(l) Ibid." II, pp.l02-124 tor the lengtb7 negotiations. 'lb. 4eo181on hid been l.tt to Lord Opo.l-, a. the home ottl •• , atter the Boer War 1JIb1'O sl 10 , perm! tted. looal adminlatratoz-a to deo14e doubttul taaue ••

(4) ~.. p.12S

.... 11

to rid themaelv$' of opp.rels1on waa the ltlah1nev and Hemal

pogroms of 1905. These shook the Western·Zlonlsta with horror.:

and atirred Herzl. at the Sixth Zionist Oongres. that year.

to propose aoceptanoe of autonomous territory in Uganda. The

otter had come from the British government. ~he proposal took

everyone by .u.rprlse and was vehemently re jec,ted by the In­

dignant orthodox Zionists who could not understand Zionism

aslde trom PalestIne a8 a ho.meland.(l) Some good wal derived

trom the upheaval, tOf' ttthli vaa the tlrlt time in the ex11ic

hIstory ot JevrJ that a great government had offioially ne­

gotiated with the elected repre.entatl vel of the Jewish Peopl .••

The identity. the legal perlonalit,. ot the Jewish people had

been ra-eetabli8hedtt .(2)

In 1904, the Dpo11tlcala" reoeived a great blow with

the death ot Hel'zl. The "praotioal." gre .. 8tronger In their

oolonizlng efforts. while tor mOlt Zionists a period. ot le.

thargy ensued. Among Pa.lestinian Jew. Iprang up a new part7

whloh grew out ot Rus.ian and Auatpian 08118, the "ale Zion

(Sool.11.t.)~ They ten~d to complicat~ Zionlst struggles

with their rad1cal ide.s and agitation &mODI the oolonlata.(3)

B7 1914. coloniz,.,tlon had ralsed the number ot Jew­

ish agrloultUJ'al workers in '.,la.tine to about 12,000 wo had

(1) In this tIght. a l.adins part va. taken by Dr. 0ha1m Weismann ~ho was '.,tined to take the ~.1na ot Zionis. during and atter the First World War. For details ot the Uganda otter, see de Baa., pp.174tt.

(2) WeIsmann, pp.82-84

() 8erl Locker'. pamphlet The .re, __ net Pal •• tine (Lon­don, 19)8) .Slv •• a p:ro.Poale atatemenl 0 aru.

12

lome 100,000 acr •• acquired through &14 ,Iven by Rothsoh1ld,

the Hovevel Zion and the Jewish National Fund.(l) In all, the.:

Jews in Palestine numbered between 75,000 to 80,000 concentra­

ted in the large oitie. suoh as Jerusalem, T1beria. and He­

bron.(2)

Arab lationalis.

Oo1nc14ental17, with the inora •••• 1n Jewish colont­

sat1on, grew up a revitali.ed Arab ap1~lt. Thla came to the

fore 1n ilolated Movement. in the Arab world to caat ott Ot.

toman rule.() The only one to bear la.ting fruit, and this

indireotly, va. the M.dlt.rran~an venture ot Keh.met All and

hi. 8onlbrahtm, which va. More a dream ot • personal empire

than a Pan-Arab movement. To the Gontra%"1, Ali railed not

onlJ becau •• ot Palm.raton's opposition, but because "Arab

national oonsoiousness waa non-ex1stent".(4)

Yet, ironically, Ib~ah1m" tolerant rule in Syria

opened the door tor French and American 1I1 •• 1onarl.. who k1nd­

led the tirat t1re. ot Arab nationa11sm. Together with the

Eg1ptian State schools, their ml.81onarr Ichools let 1n motion

eduoational and 11ter&rJ movements whioh even ino1ted the 10-

(1) The Fund wal •• tabllshed at tbe Pourth Congr ••• 1n 1900. For its ~portano. later, .e. Weismann, p.S8.

(2) Faotual data ma1 be tound 1n Beoo Poundat1on, I, pp.Sl-Sl,

( :3) !he Arab na tlonal movement a,. be traoed in the comprehene1.e work bJ' Georg_ Antoniua, The Arab Awaken!ng (Ph11adelobla, 1939)

(4) ~., p.31

13

081 clergr to interested aotion. Beirut, Jeruaalem, Lebanon

and Aleppo beoame centera ot the new intellectual aot1v1t7. .:

It In.plred the ahort-lived Society of Art. and Sciences 1n

Beirut around 1847 J who •• 81m. was to promote w!.d.er knowledge

among the .embers or mixed religious and national origins. In

turn. this Society led to the formation ot the ~~lan Soien­

tific Socletl in 1657. This latter .erved to nurture patrio­

tic a.pirations expre •• ed 1n a poems by Ibrahim. Yasej1, exal.

ting Arabic culture and oalling tor a rejection 01' the Turkiah

yoke. The poem was never written and w •• p •••• d along only bl

mell1017 • ( 1)

A suooes8ion of .ecret sooieti.. toll owed on the h •• l,

at the Syrian Scientitic Society, tbe moat important ot which,

namel ••• , was founded 1n BeIrut in 187$. It circulated notio ••

in olandestine manner, setting forth the tirst clearly define'

political goa181 a grant ot independence tor Syria, Inolud.1ng

Lebanon; recognition or ~abl0 a. the offiolal language, tl' •• -

dom of expNI.lon: and reatriotion ot looal militIa to local

.ervloe.(2)

The l'Uleot Sultan Al)dul B8Jd.d (1876-1908). by rea­

son ot hi. reprfts.lona and centrall.iDs poliol •• , intenaitled

the activitie. ot the .ecret sooieti.s. With the occupation ot

(1) IbId., P.S) -(2) Ibid., pp.82-64. While the •• vere the tirst olearly

derlned ob"]iitlv •• , it 1. not implied that the nationalist. eventually tormulated preoi.e programs. To thia daJ the ne­tlU"e ot At-ab nationa11_ 1s atlll undetined in man,. respects. The Arab world 1s stIll in a fluid state.

14

Egypt by the British in 1882, that country began a distinot

nattonal movement of hel" own, as to beeome e oent&l" for atu- .:

dents, wr1 ters and politieal refugees. Among suoh wet's tht)se

llho came to be called the Young Turks who plotted aga:tnst the

Sultan. An assooiation tormed by them, the C.U.p. (Committee

ot Union and Progress) :1nspired a revolution against Abdul

Hamid on July 28. 1908.'1'here was no Intx-ins1c oonnection be.

tween the Young TtU.-ks and the Arab l'l'lOvem.ent, but when the re­

volutionista foroed Q liberal oonstitution on the Sultan, the

Arab nationalIsts saw the doorway or a new ere open to them.

But their hope. only lasted lome tew montha, tor the

Young T~k. showed themselves to be bent on a proir~ giving

racial supremaoy to the ~urkl.h element. Oentralization and

the auppre •• 1on ot other oPPosing national sentiments equalled

that ot Abdul Hamid. The non-Turkish 81 'Arabi society. founded

shortly atter the revolution, was d1'801~.4 Arter about eight

months, driving the Arab national movement underground. Th1.

gaYe riae to seoret loctetie. again._ 87 1914, the two prinoi­

pal on •• we ... the al.F'atat'tounded by 80me Moslem atudents in

Parta, with headqU8.1'tera later 1n Damaaous, and the al.'Ahd,

which was compo •• d of otticers in the Turkish army. Both were

to jo1n tore.. dur-ing the war to provoke the Ara.b Revolt and

to ahow th .. e.l v.. d.etermined not to allow any toreign domina­

tion .rt.r dl.card1ng 'rUJ'tkiah rule •. (l)

(1) ~ •• p.152f tor turther detail' on the seoret sooieties.

CHAPTER II

WORLD WAR I

The lear E8'~ in British Strategy ~d

Allied legotiationa

The outbreak ot the First World War caused England

,:

to embark on a more aggreslive, and at the aame time protec­

t! •• , polIcy 1n the Near East. To furnish 8 baokground againet

which the wart~e commitm.nte may be studied, a sketoh of the

military oampaign in the eastern Mediterranean may prove help­

ful.

Atter the attaok on OdsI8a by the. Turkish fleet, the

Entente broke ott diplomatic relation. with Turkey on Novem­

ber 4, 1914. By January, 191.$'1 the Bri tiah torce in Egypt had

dec1ded to take up a defenaive 11ne west or the Suez Canal

and managed to keep the advancing Turkish army trom oros81ng.(1)

The un.noes •• tul British c&apalgn at Gallipoll that

year helped eaa. pressure in the S1nai region, permitting the

al11ed oommander 1n Egypt, Sir Arohibald Murray, to take up a

positIon of deten •• in the desert east of the Canal.(2)

Varloua i •. otors now determined the Turks to go onm

all-out otrenaive. Their vIctory at Gal1Ipoli emboldened them,

tllelr morale and blood-thirst wa. intensitied by their orgies

(l) Sir Georg6 O .. A.Arthur. Lite ot Lord lt1tehener (New York, 1920), III, pp.99-101. Kitohener contemptaled an otten­sive but the BrItish War Council decided otherwise.

(2) All details of the Near Eastern campaign are taken trom Henry S. Gullett. The Australian IAE.rial Foroe in Sinai and Palestine (Sydney, 1~2j).

16

in Armenia, Bulgaria had ente~e4 the war 1n the Pall ot 191$.

giving thea dlreot ace ••• to the taotor1 •• of Ge1'll8n'1 all the.:

way to southern Pal •• tine, laatly. GermanJ waa urSlng the move

to prevent a buildup ot PNftch torces in Europe. Then al80,

the Germane t.ared tor an all1ed thrust inward trom the coast

ot Palestine, outtlnc aoroas the Ba8ded ra11 line and iaolatins r

the entire aoutbern reglon.(l)

But the Turkish dJtlve tailed.. The 4ete.t at Romani

In the summer ot 1916 orippi.4th.lr ~ 80 that it wa. De­

ver agaln able to •• aume the otrenaive. 81 JanuarJ ot 1917,

Murra1 had .dvanoed a. tar .1 Rata. Aa tbe British War Staff

atl11 could notattord to supply adequate troope, b1 reason ot

the pre.sins n.ed 1n Europe, Murra,. w •• uaab18 to take G ••••

Wl th the appoint_nb of a nev oOlllUlldel', Sir Edward

All.nb,., In Augwlt, 1917, the home so"emaent tel t that a con­

certed attaok OD the Turks v.. neoe •• U7 to at:rengtben aUied

morale. All.Db.,." taotloa led him to b7-P." 0 ••• and take

a.ereheba 1ft Ootober. ae then advanced up the Pale.ttne plain,

took Jatt. and Jeruaal_ and bJ December had. puahe4 the Turk.

Into the northern plain. The Oel'lllan drl"e 1n Europe in 1916

halted turther activit.,. becau •• or • dratD on Allenb.,." troop ••

In September, though. be beg.n an ott.,n.i .... whioh

oleared the Jordan vall_f. With the help ot hi. new Arab al11e.

under the JIm!!' 1'.1 •• 1 and. Oolonel 'l'.E .Lawrenoe, the frans.

Jordan flank wa. protect8d and swept s~ultaneoua11 into S7-

(1) ~., ohapter II outline. Oentral Power .tratel1.

17

r1a. (1) Soon tollowed the captur-e ot Dama80ul and Beirut. The

Arabs took Aleppo late in Ootober. Just berore ita aurrender,.:·

the Brit1.b saw indioatlona of a Turkiah de.ire to capitulate

and .ent Vice-Admiral Arthur Gough-Oal thorpe to MudPO.. On

Ootober )0, the Turk. 8lgned the treat, whioh surrendered. the

garrison. ot the Beja., Aalr, Yemen, S,rla and Me.opotamia.

When Turk_,. entered the war, Ru •• !a •• 1 •• d the oppor.

tun1tyfor .atistling her age.long d •• ire tor ottoman terri.

tory. In February and March, 1915, ahe opened secret and leng­

thy negotiations with England and France over a tentative d1-

vi.ion ot Ipoila. Out ot the dlplomatlo exchange, tne Foreign

ottic._ of the three powers agreed on tbe following general

terms. reoogn1tion ot, the rights of Bngland and Pranee in AIl­

attc Turkey, agreement to maintain Arabia under independent

Moalem rule, the maintenanoe ot Anglo-Ruaalan agr .... nt. made

in 1907 0".1' sphere. of influence in Peral., Rue.ian rlsht to

Oonstantinople and. control of the Stralt •• (~U Slgnltloant11,

there wa. no .ention ot Pal .. tl~., or tor that matter, a de.

finition ot any territorial'bounds. leither did the sub.equent

seoret Treat,. of London, 8iped br I tal,., Fran.e, England and

Rus.ia on AprIl 26, 1915, 80 an,. tUl'thel'tban to indicate

(1) Oolonel Lawztenoe Inould not be s11ghted. tor his wopk toward. an Arab revival. DurIng the war be beoame a •••• bel' ot Britiah lntelllsenoe and hi. gr •• ' influenoe among the southern Arab trib.. vae uaed to great advanta,e.

(2) 'fext ot the agr ••• ent found 111 United Stat.s Depapt­ment of State. 'orelle Relatione of th. United Stat ••• 1917 (Washington, 1940), eupp.l, .&I.I, p.494

18

that Arabi. was to continue under independent MOlle. rule.

Por the moment, England wal content to let matter. reat. The .:

Itate of war could 11 ttl. permit the 8tra1.n1ng of al11ed ties

b,. attempt. at derining boundaries. Aa to Palest1ne, . abe re­

garded it a8 a oountr7 demanding special consideration b7 maDr

groups and wa. reluotant to al.ume sol. political control.(ll

In lucc •• d1ng negotiation. with the Arabs and her other al11 •• ,

Ihe tried to adhere to this policy bl mak1ng no definite oom­

mitments. However, ahe waa motivated .a much b,. the benetit to

her .a br the complication. of trying to •• t18ty all groupl.

AnIlo-~.bl0 Oommitment.

Aa .een above, tbe ml11tarJ a1tuatloft found the Turka

at the bank of the Sue. earl,. 1n 191$, ' •• p! t. the tomer oon­

tidenoe ot the British that the d ••• rt ottered _ple protec­

tlon tor the ••• tern flank ot the Canal. But not all the Brl·

tiah .t.t .... n were bltnd to their posItion In the Bear Ea.t.

Lord Kitchener, •• Brltl.b Agent in Ei,.,t, bad lons maintained

a lasting auaplclon ot GeJ'ftlUl Infiu.noe in Turk_,. &.\l4 ravored

tupport or independent atat •• in S1'Pla and ArabIa.(2) At one

author not.a •

• 0 OM perhapa w •• aore all •• to the dangel" ot the posItion 1n tbe Arab wOP14 than Kit­ohe"e!', and It must PeIIlaln to hi, o!'edlt and tha t ot Ronald StOM'1 (Seoret • .,. to the Br1-tiah Agenor) that they wepe the tirat to thtnk or ••• ting them by the bold stroke ot

(1) Paul L.Hanna. Brltl.h PolloI 1n Pal •• tine (Wa.h. inston, 1942), p.27.

(2) Arthur, III, p.1S).

19

an allianoe with Meooa.(l)

The Arab tear of Prenoh annexation ot Syria and their

desire to throw ott the Turkish yoke pla,.84 well toto tine handa

of Brltilh diplomate. Ae e.r17 •• Febru&rJ. 1914, Abdullah, the

.eoond 80n ot the Sherif of Mecoa, had approached the Britlah

to 8UPPOrt an l.nau:rreot1on agaln.t 'urkey. (2) The British

at •• dtaltl,. showed d181ntel'e.tedn... 1n the plan, oonsidering

the relationship between Germany end Turke,. and the tact tbat

7urke1 va. 'till a trlendlJPower.

But with the outb~ak ot war aDd Indioationa that

Turke, would alde with the Oentral Po"era, England saw the

n.ed ot allJlna the NleZ' of the RaJ.s, both to protect the

Sues and to ha... a ba.e on the Red S.. ~ whioh to .. et Ger­

man n.v.l threat •• () stol"rl propol •• a plan of alliance to

Kitchener, who wae now War Mint.tel' in Bnglan4, and received

delegation to •• k "whether he (Abdullah) and bl. tath •• and

the Al'ab. ot the Baj •• be with ue or asalnl' Uln • Tbe forth­

com1ng l'e.pcm •••• ked that the Brltlah • .... tob torth to U8

• helping hand and •••• e shall help tho •• who do 8004".(4)

With thi8 rep1" Kitohen •• uaed hie lntlu.noe to perauade the

British Foreign Ottice to favor Arab independenoe. By April,

(1) Antonius, p.139.

(2) ~., p.127.

( :3) Sir Ronald Stopr.. TheM •• oirl or Sll' Ronald. Storrs (lew York, 1937) pp.162-163.

(4) !!1! •• p.l64 tor the .sohms_ ot not •••

20

191$, the 8o •• rnment let 1t be known publlo1J that it ta­

vored an independent Moel •• tate .a a oond.ltion torpea.ce. .:

The Grand Sherit. meanwhile, had oommunioated with

the nationalist le.ders of the al-Fatat and al- t Ah4 .eoret

aocietl ••• !he •• had not taken any action against the Turks

because or unoertal.nt,. •• to allied. intention •• partloular-

1,. the French. In return tor oooperation with the British

and recognItIon ot the Grand SherIf'. leadership in starting

a revolt, the,. demanded the following in tn. 80-called Da­

JUUICUS Protoool.

!be reoosnltlon b,. Great B~ltaln ot the Ind8. peftdenoe of tbe Arab countr1 •• 11Ing wIthin the tollo~ing trontlers. IQltht The 11ne Merlin-Adana to parallel 37° N.

and thenoe along the 11ne Blrejlk-Urta­Mudln-Mldl.t~JaBlrat (Ibn ttrmar)-Amadla to the Persian frontler,

Ea.t. 'lbe Peralan trontier down to the Perslan - Gulf, Soutb. The Indian Ocean (with the exoluslon ot

Aden) J W •• t. The Red S.. and the Meel1 tarran.an Sea - baok to MeNin .. (l)

out ot th18 came the Ru ••• ln-MoMahon oorreipondenoe,

begInning with the Sherif's tir.t lett •• of Jul.,. 14, 1915.(2)

Hia demancta took in the whole Arabian peninsula and aU of

pre.ent Iraq. P.al •• ttne, 3JP!a and Trana.Jordan, bordering

on Perala to the e8.st and Turk.,. to the north., McMahon'a H-

. (1) .Antoniua, p.1S7

(2) Slr Henr7 McMahon v •• High Coaa1 •• 1one". ot ESJPt. Extraot. from the oorrespondence are tOUD4 Infto,.al Inati­tute of International Aftairs. Great Britain and Pal.stine, 121~-1~5 (London, 1(46). pp.ll~4-i41, hiHatter reterred to 8 •. 01 Institute, Gr. 81'.

21

p17 1n August oonaidered it premature to discu •• tb. question

of boundari •••. But Hu ••• ln pressed tor defin1tion. MoMahon

thereupon .et torth the Britiah term. 1n hi. letter ot Octo­

ber 25. '!'he two d1striot. of )ii.raina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the welt of the districts ot Dama80u8, Homs, Bema and Aleppo oannot b. aaid to be pupel., Arab, and should be excluded trom the 11mits demanded.

'With the above mo(J.ttloat1ona, and without prejudioe to our existing treaties with A.rab chieta, we- accept those limits ..

Aa tor tho.e regions lrln.g w1thin thos. fron­tiera vherein Great Britain 1s fr •• to act with­out d.tr~.nt to the interest. ot her a1l1. Franc." I am .. powered ••• to give the following a.surmc ••••• 1

Subjeot to the above moditioationa, Great Britain 1, prepared to recognize and sup­port ~e independenoe of the Arabs in all the regions within the l1mits demanded by the Sherif ot Mecca.

..

Short17 after, the Sh.r~t intiated that the "Vlla­

yeti of Aleppo and Beirut and their ••• co •• t. are purel.,

Arab Viler_ten. McMahon replied in Deoember that " •• the in­

tereat. of our ally, France, are involve' 1n them both, the

que.tion will require careful conaideration and a further

oommunication on the subjeot will be .. delr •••• d to you 1n due

course". Hua •• 1ft'. anawer stated that atter the war "we shall

ask you (What we avert our "7 •• trom toda,> tor what we now

leave to Pranoe 1n Beirut and it. co •• ts". McMahon in lanuar1.

1916, let it be known in advllXlolJ that nothing woul<l ohange

the frlendah1p ot Ensland and Prance att.~ the war. Here the

matter rea ted, trOll whioh one .e •• that Pal. ,tine wal in no

vay mention.d. At moet, the vague term "41Itrlct", in the

22

areal cited, could remotely exolude Pale.tine trom the pro­

mi.ea made to Hu ••• 1n.

After Hussein prool&imed the independence ot the Ra­

Jas and began hIs r.volt in June, 1916, British propaganda

had the eftect of misleading the Arabi ot Palestine. To en­

list their Iympathies, the English oalled on them to tight

tor their independence, making it appear that their caute

va. joined to that or Hu ••• in.(l) The military situation pro­

voked such a. coura. of action a8 the Paleatlnlan Arabs IUp ..

ported the alde they saw winning. ~h.l were not conoerned

about the national aspirations of the Grand Sherif. It wall

after the Gasa engagemente that th~J aroused partioular oon­

cern, tor ooftYinoed that the British were lo.ing, they ·open­

ly ranged themselves on the 81de ot the Turkl".(2)

!he Arab oause beoame more involved when Sir Edward

Gre,.. the British Foreign Secretary. tound it neoe,.arr to

inform the rrench ot the negotiation. with Hu ••• ln. Pranco!.

Georg.a-Pioot ot Franoe va. then aho.en to conduct conteren­

ee' with the Briti8h agent,. Sir Mark S1k ••• re.pecting the

disputed areas. B7 February, 1916, the partIes subm.itted a

temporary .olution to the Ru.aian Foreign Ottioe. This Syke.­

Pioot plan called for a division ot the whole lear Eastern.

region 1n question into five zonna ot influence and control.

POI' purpos •• here. it 11 .uttlcient to note that Franee re-

(1) Antonius, pp.22$-226

(2) Gullett. p.l59

~.

23

cetved exclusive rights to the SyrIan ooastal are .. to be re­

gulated .a ahe saw best in the light ot A):tab claiN, England .:

val to have s1milar right. in the Baara-Bagdad distriot; in

the Palestine area t'the:re .hall be established an internati­

onal administration~ the torm ot which 1s to be decided upon

after oonsultation with Rusala" and all others concerned,

prinoipally the Sherif.(l) The oities ot Hom, Hama, Damascus

and Aleppo were lett In Arab hands.

When the Bolsheviks published the various secret

treatIes made among the alllel~ the Sykes.Picot agreement

threatened to disrupt r81a tiona between England end the Arabs.

The Turkish leaders used 1t as propaganda. to show tha.t the

allied powers had hidden designs on the Arab oountries. England

had to reasaure Hussein or her goodwill .nd intentions. In a

letter to htm, dated February 8, 1918, the Foreign Office de­

clared that "it would be superfluous to pOint out that the ob­

jeot aimed at by Turkey i8 to SOW doubt and suspicion between r'

the Allied Powers and tho.e Arabs who, under Your Majesty' 8

leadership and guidanoe, are striving nobly to reoover their

anoient fr •• dom.".(2) It then assured him that England 1s

t'determined to stand by the Arab peopl •• in their struggle

tor the establishment ot an Arab world". Yet, the letter d14

not deny tbat an Anglo.Frenoh a.greement had be.n made. In the

(1) Documents on Bl"l tlah POrei! P01iOJ" Ed .. b7 E..L .. Woodward & ftoSanAutier ttondon. i941~~52'~lrst 3&rle8, vol.IV, pp.241.247.

(2) Antonlua. p.431

24

neat language ot diplomacy. it evaded the laaue. And Hus.81n

took the mealage at 1 te tace value .. tiThe explanation (for the ~.

Sherif's trust 1n the BrItIsh) 18 a psyohological ones 1t 11 ••

1n the profound beliet he had 1n British integrity--. belier

widely held in the Ara.b world,a.t the time .... (1) Hi. contacts

wi th 8ri tlah tall' play seev,ed to heve made a strong impre •• !-

on on him.

The Baltour Declaration

Zloni •• at tbe outbreak ot the war received a tem­

porar1 .etback. Xatlona! divisions disrupted all plana and

.ctlviti .... 10 Congreas.1 were held trom 191) to 1921. To pre­

vent a diSintegration ot the movement into disorganized unita,

a conference convened 1n !few tork 1n Auguat, 1914, to provide

tor a oenter ot activity .. Up to then, Zionism functioned under

a General Council eleoted by the members at a Congr •••• It met

about ever,. 8ix montha. Rout1,ne d.l1, WOl'lc was handled. by a

s .. ller group, the Exeoutive. A Pale.tine Exeoutlve oarried on

aotivlt,. in the Hol,. Land .. (2) ~he New York oanterenoe estab­

lished a Provlalonal Exeoutive Committ •• to aot In conjunction

with the central Executive. Aa ohairman, 1t eleoted the pro­

minent lawyer, Louis D. Brandels, Who remaIned 1n ott1ce two

lears .. aecaua. ot Amerloa'. neutrallt,. and the wealth ot the

Jewa, thi8 Oommitte. became an important 1nltrument not ool1

(1) Ibid., p.174 .......... (2) Later, 1n 19~9, the Paleatine Exeoutlve waa taken

over b,. the important Jew1.h Asen01.

2S

In Itrengthenlng the whole organisation but in revitalizing

the American branch ot the .ove.ent·.,

Up to then, American Jews were not too intere.ted

in Zionlsm. More than that, "prior to the outbreak of tbe

Firat World War. the dominant otficial .ttl tude ••.• v •• un­

trlend17 to Zionlam a8 • political movement and to the in­

orease ot the Jewish population of Palestine". (1) There waa

.:

no ohange In policy atter 1914 when the United State. found

herself to be the ohier proteotor 01' the Jeva under Turkish

rule. Henry Morgenthau, himself a Jew, va. ambas8ador to Con­

stantinople at the time, having beeD appointed s.fter Wileon'.

election. 't'he president .ent him to hi. mission wlth the ide.

at rendering humanitarian 81d.(2) In thia capaoity, perhaps the

great.at eel-vice given the Zionilt cause w •• the proteotlon or the Jew. t~am Turkish per.ecution, thul ke.ping alive a Jew-

1ah .ettlement in Palestine. Morgenthau al.o helped br trans­

mitting fUDda from the Jewi,h National Fund, and the contri­

butors in tbe United State., to the n •• 47 in Pal.atine.

In ttme, becaus8 or Brandei, an4 hi. publlelty work,

the State Depart.ent lost aome ot its hostility to Zionism.

But it atill bad no definite po11oy~ Aa late a. December, 1916,

in a report to Willon, Secretary ot Stat. Rooert Lansing gave

(1) , .E.Menuel. The aeali tie. ot Ame:rican-Palestine Re­lationa (Waahington, 1949), pp.l11-1XS otters a oiear Inslfih£ In£o~. attitude ot the State Department during this period.

(2) Ibid., pp.l)2, 237. Strange11 enough, Morgenthau became inoreasingly hoatile to Z~on1.m atter the war.

26

three reasons why there was no polioy: we were not at war with

Turkey and should therefore avoid taking terri t017 by foroe J ~.

the Jews themselves were divided and it would be poor policy

to favor one group over another; turning the Holy Land over to

a raoe many considered ho.tile to Christ might arouse resent­

ment among Christians.,(l)

Where the United States did not feel tree to act, Eng­

land, still the center of Zionist political activity, took up

the charge. During the eleotions ot 1906, Ds-. Chaim Weimann,

a riSing power in English Zionism, had interested Arthur James

Balfour, the Conservative Prime Minister (1902-190$) in the

Jewish cauae.(2) Out of thi. first meeting sprang a triend.hip

which terminated in the Baltour Declaration.

A .pe.oh Balfour Made to the Houe. ot Lords in 1922,

when it was debated whether to accept tbe Mandate, might help

to explain his stand on the Jewish question,

I hold that tram a purely material point ot view, the polio, that we initiated i. likely to prove a succe •• ful policr. But we bave ne­ver pretended--certainlY I have never pretended --that it was purely from theae materialistic considerations that the Declaration of 1917 sprung •••• We d •• ire to give them (the Jews) that opportunity ot developing in peaoe and qui.tn ••• under British rule, tho •• great gifts whioh hitherto they have been compelled to

(1) U.S. Dept. of State. Foreign Relations ot the Uni" ted State'f The Lansing Plfers (Washington, 1939), II, p.71.

(2) Blanche E.,C. Dugdale. Arthur Jam.s Balfour, Firat Earl of Baltour (New York, 1937), I, P.jMit a.scrISe, this tIrst MeetIng. Becaus. ot hi. admiration tor Jewish culture, it ,was Balfour who had contacted W.i~ann atter being unable to fathom Jewish rejection ot the Uganda otter.

bring to fruition 1n countrle. that know not their language and belong not to their raoe.(l)

27

Even under Britllh rule, Balfour w.a cognIzant ot

the dlffioulties ot Jewish adjustment in a land populated by

Arabi. In a speech to a Jewish audienoe in 1920, he had ata­

tea. that the que.tion ot .ettlement "will require tact ....

judgment ••• 81Mpathetlc 800d-will on the part er both Jew and

Arab •••• I hope that they (the 'lrabe) will not grudge that

amall notch, tor it i8 not mo:tte geographically, whatever it

may be hl.toricall.y •••• ·(2) To Balfour, Pal •• tlne may have

been a "amall notoh", but 1n the evolvement ot British poli­

cy, the government went +'0 great 'length, to insure British

ascendency.

However, this i, antlcipating the problem.'Por the

Moment, atter the outbreak of the war, when the Jewa were

fighting in the allied armi •• , Wei.mann deoided to approaoh

al11ed Itat.8Men, tor he noted that "the moral torce ot our

cla1ms will prove irresistible, the politioal consielerations

will be favourable".() tt'hrough his own ehemlcal contribu­

tlons to the war etfort, he came to the attention ot Lloyd

George who waa then Ohanoellor ot the Exohequer. Arter a .ym­pathetic oonversation with him, Weismann vaa directed to

Balfour, not yet Fore1gn Secretar1 but Pirat Lord of the

(1) !2!!., II, p.1S8.

(2) Ibid., p.161. -(3) Ibid., p.162. It waa Abad Ha'a. who had written to

Wei$Mann to-;OVe at the propitious moment.

.:

28

Admiralty. While thIs seoond meet1ng between Weismann and

Balfour in December, 1914, was nototticlal, It paved the WB.Y ...

tor tuture discusaiona.(l)

Other important contacts which Weismann made were

Cyril P. Scott, editor of the influential Manchester Guardian,

and Herbert Samuel, a Jew in the Britiah cabinet. In his pa­

per, Scott helped to oirculate a more definite plan to help

the Jews. A prime aIm ot the plan was the "establishment ot a

Jewish State as a means of strengthening the British military

position in tne East".(2) This state wal to be a butfer tor

the Suez and Egypt as well as a oenter ot oommunications with

the East. The Zionists alked the writer or the editorial,

Herbert Sldebotham, to expand it into a Memorandum to give

to the Foreign Ott1ce. Ue wrote a dratt bJ February, 1916, at

a time when England was looking for a Bear Eastern polioy af­

ter her deteat at Gallipoli.(3) Handed to the Asquith govern.'

ment, nothing oame of it. But it was a 8tart in the desired

direction.

Three other formulae were drawn up by the Zionists

before Balfour lslued his Declaration. The Oonjoint Committe.

(1) For both me.tings, with Lloyd George and Balfour, see Weizmann, pp.l$2-l54.

(2) Eloo Foundation, I, p.80t.

(3) Herbert Sidebotham. Great Brita1n and Paleatine (London, 1937), pp.24-27 tor the pertInent editorIa1. Up to that time the government had given little attention to the strategic value ot Palestine. The ~u.stion was aleo posed as to whether Palestine should come under an imperial or 0010-nial polioy. For the distinction, see ibid., pp.36-37 • ..........

29

pre.ented the first in March, 1916. At molt, it was a oompro­

m1 •• eftort to paoity Zionist agitation. It merell oalled on ,:

the government. otFranoe and England to take "aooount ot the

h18tor~o interest that country posse.ae. tor the Jewl.h C01l.­

munity".(l) Th. next came in Ootober ot the same year. An ela­

borate attair,J it made no m.ention ot 8. State but empha.ized

the desirability of improving Palestine by colonization. Th.

major Zionist leaders ot England were r •• ponaible tor its

formulation. The third .emorandum demand •• cae introductIon. (2)

Oircumstano •• rea.bed a point where the Briti.h go­

verftment in 'ebruarJ, 1917, ohose Sir Mark Sykes to negotiate

with the Zionist •• The tirat Meeting took plaoe at the home ot

Dr.Mo ••• O •• ter and aDODg tho •• pre.ent were Lord Roth.child,

Set'Dt.trt Sauel, Nahum Sokolow, Herbert aentwichand Welzmann.

lone but Syke., naturall." knew of the Stlte.-Ploot agreement,

and WeiBmaDD·later oOMMented that 1t v •• months "during which

we carried on our negotiations vith the Brit1.h and other au­

thorit1 •• --before we understood what 1t va. that blocked our

progr ••• ".(3) Underatandably, Syke. pre.ented the diffioult,.

ot tbe attitude ot the other power. to a Jewlah Pal •• tine.

Sokolow, on. ot the outstanding Zionlat. ot the day, waa

(l) Wei_ann, pp.1S6-1S8. The Conjoint Committe. vaa tormed ot mewbera ot the Board ot Deputle., whioh represented the Engliah ITD-gogue., and of the philanthropic Anglo-Jewish Oommitte •• Oppo.ed to the nationalist procram, it cau.e4 aer­ioue div18ion amons English Jewa.

(2) All tour memoranda are found 1n Sidebotham, pp.56-60.

() Welamann, pp.188-189

)0

thereupon ohosen to sound out European cii.positions. Aa it

came about, he received favorable replie. from all, even the "

Vatican.

During Sokolow' a abs.noe, Weimann paid Baltour a

visit. Lord Balfour him •• lt raised the difficulty 01' French

claim. and .uggested an Anglo-Frenoh pr~t9ctorate as a aolu­

tion.(l) But Weismann waa averse to any other plan than a

British protectorate, whioh he considered the beat guarantee

ot attaining Zionist end •• (2)

Not long atter, Balfour took • mia.ion to the United

State ... tter her declaration 01:"' war. While there, he met Bran­

deie. The topic 01' di.cua.ion waa Zionist and publio support

in America ot .. Britiah administration 1n iale.tine. Brandeil

pledged the lupport o.t h1. organisation and a.lured Balfour

that Wilson Val sympathetio, although ott101al Washington was

still nonoommittal in polio7. And becaus8 of Brandeia t great

politioal intlU8nc.~ Balfour went hom. with the reeling that

the United Stat.a was well.disposed.

In June. 1917, Rothlohild and Weismann went to •••

Baltour and Itated that the tim.e had Oom8 top a publio p~o­

nouno&ment 1n favor ot a Jewish homel.nd. Whereupon Balfour

.sked tor a draft declaration to pre.ent to the War cabinet.

!he Zionist Politioal Committe., under Sokolow, prepared what

we have aalled the third memorandum and whioh waa forwarded

(1) Dugdale. II, p.230.

(2) Weismann, pp.177-178, 190-192.

31

b,. Rothach11cl to Baltour ·io Jull'. The _jor pal"asraph ot In­

terest rani

Hi. Majeatr'a Government, atter oona1derlns the a1ml ot the Zionist Organisation, aooept the prinoiple ot reoognizing Pal •• tine •• the National Home of the Jewllh people and the right ot the Jewiab people to build up it. natlonal 11te 1n Palestine under a pro­teotion to be •• tabllahed at the conolusion ot peaoe, following upon the 8uGoe •• tul la­eue ot the war.(l)

The Cabinet found it nece.s • .,. to revia. "Palestine

.a the National Home of the Jewisb people" to URational Home

ln Palestlne". The former olaus. denoted .tat.hood, an inter­

p:retat1on whioh would have alienated Arabs and al11 •••. (2) It

was not until November 2, 1917, that the oompleted Balfour

Declaration va. .ent to Lord Roth.ohild 1D the torm of a

letter,

Hi. MaJesty'. Government view with favour the •• tabllabment 1n Pal.atine ot a lational Home tor the Jewish 'eople, and will u •• their b •• t endeavora to taoilitate the aChieyement ot thl. object, it being ole.rl,. uncle •• tood that noth1D& sball be done whioh mar prejudioe the 01y11 and relt8loue right. ot exlatlns non­Je..,lah Oomm\U11t1e. 1n Pal.atine 01' the 1'1ghta and politioal atatua enjoyed b7 the Jewa 1n an,. other oountl"J'. ( )

Whlle Italy and Pranoe approved tbe atatement, nei­

ther Wi180n nor the United State.' State Department i.sued a

tormal approval. Aa late a. Pebrual'1, 1918, Lan,1ns gave .,

hi' realon tor retu81ns paa.ports to Amerioan Zionists, d8-

(1) S1debotham. p.57. (2) Ibid., p.58t.

(3) Royal Institute, Gr. Sr., p.9.

..

32

.iroue of accompanying a Committee ot Inquiry to Paleatlne,

a., resting on the taot that we did not reoognize the Balfour .:

Deol~ratlon.(l) Eventuall" Wilson threw Lansing t , oaution

to the wind. In answer to Rabbi Stephen Wise's wi.h tor a

word ot encouragement to Siv$ to the Jews on their New Year'.

Day, he expressed his satistaotion, in a letter dated August

31, 1918, over the wo.rk done in Pale.tlne. He qualIfied hi.

statement "with the understanding that nothing would be done

to prejudIce the civil and religloua right. of non.3ewiah

people in Palestine 01· the rights and political status enjo1ed

by the Jewl in other oountriestt--almoat the identioal lCrda

used in tn. Baltour Declaratlon.(2) However it may be argued

by the Zionists, the "Departm.ent r.tu.8d to r.oognize thi.

letter as a declaration ot pollcy".(3)

Various reason. have been advanoed tor England'.

endorsement ot Jewish olatms and hope •• 'rom what ha. been

written, p.rhaps the five most oogent rea.one are th ••••

_. Belier that the Jews would b. the beat people to guard the Paleatine doorway to the East.

b. leed tor worldwide Jewish support in the war .t.tort.

c. Rega.rd tor the rights ot m1Doztltle. and the taet that the war waa tor d.mouraoy.

d. England t • own historic .ympathetic inter.at. e. Antioipation ot an,. Geraan etfort. to win

the Jewa to their 81d8.(4)

(1) The L~.lnG Paperl, II, pp.107-108.

(2) Ra,. Stannard Bak.r. The PubliC) Paper. ot Woodrow Wilson (New York, 1927), III, p.'4j.

(3) Manuel,·p.177.

(4) For oth-ar reasona, aee Eaoo Poundation, p.75t.

33

Whatever the oa •• , at wart. end, the general Arab

f.eling wal that England vaa pledged to an Arab nation, with

Palestine included) the Jewa believed that a National Home

waa equivalent to Statehood, and the French were determined

to gain their Interests trom the Sykes-Picot agreement.

.:

CHAPTER III

POSTWAR ISS UES

Int.r~ Administration .:

The immediate effect or the Balfour Declaration among

the Arabs was one of consternation. As the statement stood, it

seemed a rejection ot all that had been promised in the waJ ot

politioal fr •• dam. King Huesein lost no t~ in asking tor an

explanation. Whereupon, in January, 1918, the British sent

Oommander D •. G.Hogarth to assure Hussein or their good inten­

tiona. The mesBage delivered dwelt on thr •• points.

1. The Entente Powers are determined that the Arab race shall be given full opportunity ot once again forming a nation in the world.

2. So tar 8S Pal.atine 1s Goncerned, ve are determined that no people shall be subject to another ••••

l. Since the Jewisb opinion or the ~rld 18 in favour ot a return of Jews to·Palestine ••• tn .0 tar .a 1s oompatible with the treedom ot the exlst1ns population, both economic and politieal, no obstaol. ahould be put 1n the way of the realization ot this 1d8al.(1)

The King readily a •• ented to Jeva settling anywhore

In Arab lands. Be felt satisfied over the claus. ot economio

and political freedom which went a step further than the !!-vl1 and rellg10ua rights in the Balfour Declaration. Aocord­

ingly he .ent measage. ot .s.uranoe to ht. tollowera.(2)

'rhe International Commission, headed by We1zmann,

1n March, a.emlng1r helped to allay Arab t.ars.() At a ra-

(1) KOlal Inatitute, Gr. Br., pp.147-148.

(2) Antoniua, pp.268-269.

(3) A. to ~emb.r. ot this 1nvestigating oommis81on, aee Weismann, pp.212-213.

3S

caption given by Slr Ronald storr., attended by p~amln.nt

Arab leader., Welzmann made a favorable impression. Jewish.

Arab cooperation appeared likely.(l)

But not all Arab. W9re set at eale. In Cairo, seven

of the more outstanding presented a ~eftor1al to the Arab Bu­

reau asking tor a olearer definition ot Britain's polioy. OIl

June 16, London issued What 1s known aa the Declaration to

.:

the Seven. "It 18 by tar the moat tmportant statement of poll-

0"1 publicl,. made by Gr •• t Brita1n in ootmexion with the Arab

RevoltJ and Jet, strangely enough, it haa remained one ot the

l •• at known out.ide the Arab world."(2) Ita ~portanoe li ••

in the cl •• me •• 01' Itl promiae •• With reterence to the en­

tire disputed Arab terrItory. the Foreign Office established

tour categori.' and the.e provisionsl

1. Terri tori8. tre. betore the war and 2. Territorie. liberated b7 tbe A.abl, Eng­

land recognised the "oomplete and sover­eign independenoe of the Al'abl" therein.

3. Territori •• liberated by the Allie., their future gov.rnment aboul4 "be ba.ed u'pOl'1 the prinoiple or the con.ent ot the governed".

t~. Territories .till under Turkiah rule, England would continue to work tor their freedom and Independence.,.(3)

Following upon Wilson's mea,ag. to Congre8$ of that

year, advoaating e.lt-d.to~lnatlon tor peoples. the Arabs

felt highly elated over the tuture and contrlbut.d whole-

(1) Storr_, p.41S. (2) Antonius, p.271.

(3) ~ •• pp.4J3-434 tor complete text •

•

)6

heartedly to doing their part durIng the remainder ot the war.

With the occupation of enemy territory, the Brltieh ~.

insisted on retaining full control, notwithstanding French pi­

que over not having a share 1n the adm1nlatration .. (1) But when

Allenby'. eampaign spread into Syria, the home government relt

obligated to fulfill her French and Arab promises respeoting

that territory. r

The oecasion tor change arose in Beirut. The removal

ot an Arab tle.g threatened to ete.rt 8 revolt among Emir Fai-

8al1 II troop •• (2) The EmIr asked Allenby to claritl the matter

as his men were getting out or order .. All.nb,. anewered wIth

the nottleial assurance that whatever meaaurea might be taken

during the perl~d ot milItary administration were purely pro­

visional and oould not be allowed to prejudioe the final set.

tlement by the Peaee Conterenoe".( 3) A tew day. ]a ter, on

Ootober 23" &8 the result of an Anglo-Frenoh arrangement, A1 ..

lenby organized a military government wh10h provIded tor

three ~one. falhloned on ~e Sykes-Pioot plant O.B.T. (Ocou­

pied Enemy Territory) ~uth, Palestine north to Aore and eaat

to the Jordan wen~ under British admIn1stration: O.E.T. north,

the Syrian e08.!"t, tell to the Frenoh: and O.E.T. east, Trans.

Jordan arld the intel'ior or S1ria, accrued to Falsal end hi.

(1) Storrs, p.293. Picot had b.en attached to the Egyp­tian ExpeditIonary Foroe in April, 1917, as French political advi •• r.

(2) Antonius, p.275.

(3) Royal InstItute, Gr. Br. , p.149.

37

ott10eI'8.(1)

~. Tbi. arrangement nonthel... tailed to satiety the

Apaba oompletel,.. The ten •• ne.. engendered buJ'rledl,. moved

England to publIsh an added aaaurance, the Anglo-Frenoh Agree.

ment of November 7, 1918.

The object aimed at by Ppanoe an4 Gpeat Br1-taln 1 •••• the e.tabllshment ot national Gov­.rament. and Administrations derlvtng their authorlt,. trom the Initiative aDd tree Choice ot tbe In41senoua populatlon ••••• Par trom vlahins to impos. on the populations of the •• resloDa &nJ partloular In.titutiona, tbel are 0011 conoerned to ensure by ~el1' support and bl adequaie a •• i.tance the r.~ar working ot Goyernment. and A~tnlatratl0D8 tr.ely oho.en br the populatlona them.el.e •• (2)

Agaln tbe Arabi ve.e made to r •• l that ther were on

tbe .erge ot independenoe.

The local ml11taPJ reg1.. wa. not ., ~lplomatl0 8.

tbe home govern.ent •. Ill-sathered personnel and Indetlnite

tnstructione trom the 'ore1gn Offioe produoe. aome unhappy

l'.aulta.(3) 'rhe Zionist. thealelv •• aave .OM oooa.ion tor

friotion. !he International Oommi8.1on had d.8cended hopetul17

am14at an admInlltratlon which 1t believed ••• 47 to fulf1ll

the BQltoUl' Declaration. As it v •• , man1 otticerl had 8caro.17

beard ot the Deolaration, ~11. other. vere hostile to Zionist

a1ms, t.e11118 It vae a mi.take to support Zion1_ at the ex­

pen,. ot A1"ab national!am. (1,.) To the authori tle., the Inat1-

(1) SIOO Poundation, I, p.l20.

(2) Ro,al Institut., Gr. Br., pp.149-1$O.

(3) POI' details, I •• Storrs, pp.380-)82.

(4) WelBM8no, p.217.

36

tution of another language. Hebrew, where two already existed,

was trouble.ome and senseless, immigration would hurt a war-.:

ravaged eoonomy; and then, in the matter of land transactions,

the Turks had made it difficult to satiaty Jewish wishes, for

they bad destroyed or oarried otf the registers in their re­

treat. On top ot all, the war was still on. The military, as

18 often the ease wIth soldiery, was understandably 1rked at

c1vilian importunities.

While the Commi.sion eould accomplish little practi­

cal work at the time, 1t 18 worth noting that We1zmann laid

the corneratone of the future Hebrew Un1versity that July ot

1916.To many Zionists this was of great spiritual signiti­

oanoe.(l) Ae Abad Ba'am wrote to Welzmann, it was to be a

"Uplversity whioh, trom the very beginning, will endeavor to

beoome the true embodiment ot the Hebrew spirit ot old, and

to shake ott the mental and moral servitude to which our peo­

ple has been so long subjected in tne Dlaspora".(2)

Although Weismann lett Palestine in September, the

Commission rema1ned under the guidance or Menahe. US81sbkin,

a rather rash individual. 'llhis and continued British and Frenoh

. control oaused restlessness among the Arab •• This restlessne'8

inoreased when, as we shall see, the Peace Conterenoe in

January, 1919, endorsed the mandate system. Finally, the ad­

vent in June or American investigator., to alcertain Syrian

(1) The Vatioan also considered it ot serious i~ort. Cardinal a.sparri exclaimed later to Weismann: "o'eat votre 1 l univer8it. Que je crain". ~., p.286.

(2) ·Ibid., p.238 • .--.-

39

-:

opinion al to a ~datorr power, lapelled tbe Arab nationa­

l!.ta to convoke a General S1Jllan eonare.e. It pzaote.ted the

proposed mandate to'l'8,.,..1. and the dmge •• of oontinue' Jew­

ish 1mmigrat1on.(1) Emir 'ale.l wa. to%' oompromis. with Prance,

but contlnua1 pNa.ure from the nationalists oompelled h1m in

March, 1920, to aooept the orown to S1Z'la and Paleatine ~ioh

the Congre •• pHsented to him. This •• "e" to .how tbat the

Zionists were tiDe onlJ obat.ole to the unIon of Syria and Pa-

1 •• t1ne. AI a re.ult, tbat April, in Jerusalem, there occurred

the tiret outbreak agalnlt the Jew8.(2) Durin8 a Moalem pil­

ariaas-, pol! tical 1nstlI8tOl" Inc! ted. a !llob to sudden action

whloh brought about s1x l."llh deatha mel man,. wounded. The

reports of the outburet In41cate tbat the Arab polloe dtd

11 ttl. to hal t the v1olenoe, while the Brl tllh ml11 taP,. au­

thol'ltl •• were lax in their clut,..(,3)

Aooording to a military ~.port, ne.er publlo1,. pub­

lished. the •• moti ••• were 01ted tor the riot:

a. Arab dl.appointment at the DOll-fulfillment ot the proud.... _de to th_.

b .. Pear that the Balfour Declaration would 1ap1nse on the ript ot .elt-determination an4 that Jewi,h immigration would. l •• d to Arab eoonomic aubservience.

c. The cla.b of P.a-Arab aotivit! •• and pro­paganda with tbo •• ot Zlanl".(4)

(1) Th. ten resolut1ons 1t drew up are found 1n An­toni us, PP .440-442.

(2) It 1s probable also that tbe .pppo.ohinl San Hemo Oonterence, to di80US. the atatul or Palestine and 8Jl'1&, tRO"e" .0_ to b.ll ..... that. demonatratlon would. make tbe con­ter •• , hesitant about •• tab11ahlD$ &o.e foreign control.

(3) Banna, p'.44

(4) ~ •• pp.176-177, footnote 17.

40

More than ever, 1 t ap peared that a ohange in admin­

istration was necessary, so that when the San Remo Confer­

ence granted the Palestine Mandate to Great Britatn on April

25, 1920, England lost no time in announoing that a clv11

administration would be established.

The iAndate Grant

Some of the events enumerated above overlapped in

time the discussions and negotiations among the Allies as to

the disposition of Palestine. To complete the narrative, it

1s now necessary to retrace some steps to gather in certain

politioal threads.

.:

On a visit to London on November 30, 1918, Clemenoeau

made a verbal agreement with Lloyd George qualifying the Sykes­

Picot arrangement. Mosul was to be tranlterred' from Frenoh to

British influenoe and Palestine was to come under British in­

stead ot international control.(l) In December, the For&ign

Orrice prepared a men.orandum in whioh it elim1na ted France as

a possible controlling power in Palestine and suggested Eng~

land or the United states.(2) No deci8ion, though, was reaohed

on the matter.

At all events, neither England nor Franoe had a mind

to withdraw trom the Near East--regardless ot Wilson's advo-

(1) Doouments on Br1tlah Foreign PollcI, First Ser1es, IV, p.251.

(2) David Lloyd George. Memoir. or the Feace Confer­ence (New Haven, 19)9), II, pp.144.146 • ..........

1&1

oa01 III hi. tow-teen poInte that ·other nationaliti •• then

under Turkiah rule should be ••• ured •• OlUt! i7 of 11te and. an "

opportunltJ tor autonomous development-.(l) Benoe, all ap­

proved a plan, advanoed D7 the South A.trloan l •• der, Jan Smuts,

werabr the, tempered impe,.talistlc deslp_ bJ granttnl a oer­

tato degre. ot •• 1t.deterMination under a truat ••• hlp, or man­

date. (2)

Juat •• ven d&,.. atter the opentDg ot the P •• ce Ooa­

terenoe, on January 2S, 1919, the memb.,.. a180 approved the

oreation ot a Leacue of lation •• Tbrousb Wil.OD'. tn.ilt.noe,

and be to!". the Counell took up the quest!on ot tre.t1 •• , the,.

then appoint.ed a oommi tt.. to dratt tbe OO"lenant. ot the 'wen­

'f-six artle1 •• 4l"awn up, it va. the Sup .... Counoil whioh

tormulat.d Art101. 22, •• tablt.hins the mandator, 87It".(3)

!be Oonterenoe .dopted the Co •• nant QD Aprll 28, 1919, aDd

tirat alp.4 1t 8. part ot tbe '1'r •• t,. ot VeraaIU •• on June

a8. But betore thi. ."eDt took pl ••• , Ipoke.en tor the

Arabs, Zionist. aDd Frenoh were g1"en an opportunlt1 to pre­

.ent thelr 0 •••• "lat1 va to their al.. -.d l4 ahes. Emir

'.i •• l app .... 4 first on "ebruaPJ 6 .1 •• pre.entatlve or the

(1) R.,. Starmar4 Bakel' .. 'l'be .... 18 •• and Papers of Woodrow Willop (Ie" York, 1924,), I, p.r. ,b

(2) .,be plan w •• not ne ... , but Smut. ,8"" 1t • more preois. tora. S.e Qu1DoJ' Wl'lsht. Mandat •• Under the Leagu_ ot W.tlonl (Chio-so, 19)0), pp.16=23.

(3) p.P.Walterl. A Hlltorr ot the Leaaue ot lationa (London, 19S2), I, pp.31-j~.

42

B8Jal. ae .aked tor APab independenoe and the maintenance of

unity in the territory promised b7 the Alll •• , with limit .. - .:

tiona .:riling only from the wishee of the people thea •• l"e •• (l)

He avo1ded ret.Nno. to the delicate que.tlon of Frenoh olalms,

perhaps aa a bid tor Zionist and Brltllh goodwIll. Only in

JanuUJ he had made an agre •• ent wi th Weismann 1n which he

proal,ed to -.nooUJ'ap and stimUlate bn.laratlon ot Jewl into

Pal •• tine on a lar,8 leal.·, 1n return tor wblOb "the Arab

p.asant and tenant tamers .ha.ll be prote.ted in their right.,

aDd ,hall be ••• 1.ted in torwardlns their eoonomic develop­

ment". (2) But when Franoe aoquired the S,.rlen Mandate. the

Bm1r v.. rendered powerl... _d unable to OUTJ out tbe pro­

mi ••• made to welsmaDft.(l)

On Maroh 20, M.Stephen Plohon, the Frenoh Foreign

Miniater, pre,.nted the o •• e tor France. In oPPo81tion to

Arab 01a11l1e, he .eked that.

a. The whole 8,.r1_ 1'8,1011 should be treated ••• un1t.

b. Pranoe should beocme the 1UD4at0l'1' of the League of •• tlon. ot this re,ion.(4)

The en.ulng 41.ouaelon dwelt on tbe 41.pute4 41.­

tl'lots of D ••• ous-U ... -HOIlI and Aleppo ..ntloned ln the Mo­

Mahon-Hu.s.in &&pee.ent. 'fh1s 1n tum le4 to the ldea of d11-

patohing. oomml •• 1on to .Ioertaln the c:lllpolltione of.the

(1) Llo74 aeor,e, II, pp.674-676.

(2) We1111181m, p.247, •.

(3) S.e Antonius, ,.3$6 tor Paleal t , ultimate status.

(4) Llo7d Gearse, II, pp.684-68S.

43

people. French opposition to a venture which might have ten­

ded to her discredit caused it to be abandoned by all except ,;

Wilsun. (1) He went ahead with the Henry C. King III d Oharles

R. Crane Commission in an effort to fulfill the express state­

Ment of Article 22 of the newly-adopted Covenant: The wishes

of these communities must be a principal conaiderationin the

selection of a Mandatory.(2)

As the report of the Commission was unofficial and

not accepted by the other power., nor published till 1922, it

is superfluous to quote its findings •. However, it is well to

note that it recommended a united state of Syria and Paleatine

under Faisal, and the assignment of the Mandate to America

first, then to Great Britain, and not at all to Fr«noe. Moat

of the Zionist aima were opposed as in oonflict with the ci­

vil and religious rights ot non-Jews. "The tact oame out re­

peatedly in the Commission" conference with Jewish represen­

tatives, that the Zionists looked forward to a practically

complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants

of Palestine, by various torms ot purchaae."(3) This state.

ment indicatea one of the toremost, it not principal. causes

tor strite in the Palestine ot succeeding Jears.

The Zionists appeared betore the Supreme Oouncil on

February 27, 1919. Their memorandum again advanced the histor.

(1) Ibid., pp.688-695 tor a report of the proceedings • .......... (2) See Appendix I, section 4. (3) Ray Stannard Baker. Woodrow Wilson and World Settle­

~ (Garden City, New York, 1922), II, p.214.

44

io olaim ot the Jewa to the Holy Land, aDd WelDl81U1 .~ok. ot

the eoonomic plight ot the world'. Jew ... '1h. Frenoh member ot ~.

the Zionist delegation, Sylvain Levi, then •• toni.hed. hi.

colleague. b7 oontesting Zionist end •• We1ESannsa1ned an op­

portunlt,. to detend Zionl_ against the charaes when Lansing

asked hi. What he meant by a Jewish National Home. To whioh

Weimann replied that it meant "the orea1)lon or an adminis.

tration which would arl •• out of the national conditions ot

the oountrl--always eafeguarding the inter.ate ot the non-Jew.

--with the hope that by Jewish immigration Paleatine would

~ttmat.17 beoome .a Jewl.h a8 England i. English".(l) The

statement requIre. no lengtbJ comment. At one point, the In­

terest. ot the non-Jewe are to be sateguarded, while In the

end. the implicatlon ot displacing and even d1spo •• e •• ing the

Arabs cannot be avoided.

Although a mandator,. Iystem bad now b •• n .atabllshed,

variQus problema relative to the mandat •• remained unr.solved

untIl the San Remo Oonterenoe of April, 1920. At moat lome

tenslon between Vrance and Bngland vas •••• d b,. an Anglo­

French Oonvention ot Sept.mber 14, 1919., B1 It, Fpanoe re­

celved Syria and Cll10ia and England withdrew to Palestine.

Faleal waa lett in oontrol ot the Interior ot S71'la, but wal

to acoept needed help onl,. trrom Franoe.(2)

(1) Welau.nn. PP.24J-24S.

(2) LloJ'd Geors_, II, pp.706-707. Aa mentioned above, p.39, Paisal reoeived the o!"own to S)'ftl. and Pal •• tine 1n res­pan •• to the comprom18ina .ctions or the Alll •• , Whioh 1n turn led to the riot or April, 1920.

45

A •• ambled at San aamo to dilOUI. tbe Turkl.h treaty,

the delegate I first took up the question of Anglo-Frenoh ri- ~

valry over all interests in M08ul.(1) By AprIl 24. the agree­

ment reached gave Franee a 25% eonoe.81o-ft in the tormation ot

any 011 company and allowed her to build pipelines through

Syria to the Medlterranean.(2) That aame 4.,., the conteree.

assented to the inclusion ot the Balfour Declaration in the

Turkish Treat.,.. after proteat. from France that ahe 4id not

originall,. agree to the Baltour form, but onll to the Ide. ot

a National Home. The following day, with their respeotive in­

teresta .eoured, France beoame the mandatol7 power top Syria

and ~.banon, and Great Britain for Pal •• tlne~and Mesopotamia. , The Turkish Treaty wal then signed at S.~e8 on August 10,

1920. But the Turkish government dId not rat!:y the Tre.ty aa

it stood. It was not until 1923 that it signed a convention

at the Lausanne Oonterence, torcing her to renounoe lover-

8Ignt1 over territory, outside her trontlerl. And unlike the

'raat,. ot S'vrea, no reterence was made to the Oovenant, the

mandates or to the Balfour Declaratlon.(3)

So tar, the allie4 powers had oreated a mandatory

(1) The December 21, 1919, agreement pertaining to theae oil interesta rna,. be found'in Doc_ent. on British For­eign PollOI, First Ser1e., IV, pp.llX$-1116.

(2) Wright, p.49a, 51.

(3) J. St01&novaky. The Mandate tor Paleatine (London, 1928), p.21. A summary ot the proviliona or th. Treaty ot S6vres 1s had in Llo'1d George. II, pp.662-863.

46

8,stem and allocated Pal •• tine to Great Britaln. The n~xt prob­

lem conoemed. the. terms ot the Palestine Mandate. !niland had. . ~

drawn up a draft mandate 1n December. 1919, which abe submitted

just ,one ,..ar later.(l) The League ot Battons did not contirm.

a pevilion until JulJ 24. 1922. Before that time, it had to

.olve • number ot que.tiona. ane concerned the disposltion ot

the Holf Plac... in whioh the Vatioan tnterposed, and another

oentered on the adjuatm.nt ot tromtlera with Franoe.(2) 'lnal-

1,.. becau.. ot Frenoh 1nai.tance that the Slrlan Mandate be

•• ttled tlrat, the Pal •• tine Mandate waa not declared tn .t­teet until September 28, 1923, atter the ratification ot tbe

Treat, ot Lau.anne.

A la.t atep in approval of the Palestine Mandate

0._ with the Oonvention betw.en the United Stat •• and Great

Britain .llfted on Deoemb •• 3, 1924.(3) While not a memb~r ot

the League ot Hationa, the United Stat •• inaiat.d on equal

rights 1n the mandated terrl'ory on the around. that abe had

partio1pated 1n tbe dereat ot GermanJ.(4) Bven though the

Mand.te 1t •• lf "8. incorporated 1n the Oon.ontlo~, thu.1I mllle'­

tns the United Stat •• a 81anatory to 1t, it 1. ,eneral17 so-

(1) 'ext ot thia dratt found 1ft Dooumenta on British Porelgn Policl, 'irat Seri •• , IV, pP.S71-5?2. 'Se aucce •• lve atase. In t68 preparation ot 1t are outl1Ded 10 Eeoo Poun­datIon, pp.164-174.

(2) POI' a lummarr ot the varioua que.tions betoPe the League, a •• Ranna, pp.6)-66 and Llo74 Georse, pp.7S8-767.

(3) Oonvention Setw.en the United Stat •• and Gre.t Bpl­~. Treat7 serle., 10.128 (W.sHington. 1926).

(4) It i8 disputed if she had legal grounds tor the \

47

oepted that 8the United States had actually abandoned Pale.­

.. tine and the Jewish Bational Home to Britain and her good

orrioes".(l) The United States was in the atrong grip or the

twenties, the yeaI'I ot non-participation in foreign affaira.

Her interests in Palestine were solely the protection or !mer-

lean rights •• stipulated in the Convention. Any modifioations

ot the mandate teJ'Jft' whioh .trected thole rights required the

aasent of the United Statel.(2)

The mandate grant and its terms were not well re­

ceived by the Sherif Hua •• in. Indirectly, his inability to

cope with theruthles8 diplomacy of the Allies brought about

hie own downfall. To put it poIntedly, hi. diplomaoy lacked

military strength.

Atter his revolt Qgainet Turke7 in 1916, he had him­

selt proolaimed "King ot the Araba", thus arrogating to him­

self prerogatives which the other Arab chiettains in the pe­

ninsula had. not granted hlm.( 3) He thereby placed himself in

the unenviable position ot pressing olatm. against Great Bri­

tain and at the same time ot .oliciting her help in hi. qu~­

re1 with Ibn Salud, ruler of the sultanate of lajd and it~'

claim, as ahe wal not at war with Turkey nor had it been her polioy to m.ake claims on the right of conquest. S.e Wright, pp.483tf.

(1) Carl J. Priedrioh. Amerioan Forelgn Poliol on Pa­l •• tine (Washington, 1944), P.2~.

(2) See Convention, &rt.7, p.10.

(3) Antoniu8, PP.21), 335.

48

dependenoi ••• (l)

Poliowtng tbe San RemoConterenoe, the Brlti8h .ent

Colonel T .. E. Lawrence aa an em11.8l"'1 to the Sherit to dra" up

• treat,. ot a •• ent to the mandat ••• The maln oblt.ole to an

agr •• ment oame with Bu ••• ln'. refusal ot reoognition untll •

claus. wa. inoluded aooording lateguard. ot the polltioal and

eoonomic right. proml.ed 1n the Hogarth Me •• age.(2) H18 nu­

.erOUB .xohange. with the Brltlsh ForetlD Ottice ended with

neither 11de oapitulatlng. Then Ibn S.'ud !nvaded the Bejas

in August, 1924. The British perhaps law an end ot their

trouble. with the Sherif, tor the, turned. d.at ear to hi.

pl ••• tor help. And BUlsein, unable to hold hi. pos1tion, ab-

4ioated on Ootober 3rd. Ibn Salud " •• proolatmed King ot the

Beja. on JanU&rf 8, 1926.(3) England had thus extricated her­

•• It tram an embara •• 1ns oommitment.

Mandatory Admlnlltration to 1930

~.

Con.ltarlDg the tMperiallatl0 mot1 ••• whlch Induoed

Oreat B~ita1n to .eek the Mandate. it v •• nece.'arT tor her

"to cheok and 41aoourase aD1 foro.. or oombination ot tore ••

In Pal •• tlne whioh mlght re.ult in a weakenins ot her hold in

Pal.ltine.- And conver •• lf, it waa •••• ntl.1 tor her to encour­

age such topoe. al mlsht ex1et 1n Paleatine whloh could be re­

l1ed on to .upport the oontinued British ocoupatlon of Palol-

(1) Ibid., pp.326-3'O tor the nature of thi. quarrel • ......... (2) S.e abo .. , P.l4. (3) M.V.Seton-William •• > Britain and tbe Arab St.tel (Lon­

don, 1948), p.186.

49

ttne".(l) It w., in puraulng such a polloT that sbe sraduallJ

alienated both Z10nlata and ArabI. H •• ooaprom18ill8 attitude .:

.erved onlJ to exaepel'ate both parti ••• Wbat w •• at tirst an­

ti-Zionlst 1n the Arab national movement cam. to be antl-Bri­

t18h. And _ong the Je"" their lnere.'1nI auee ••• in building

a Xational Boa. in the tace ot Britlah balt-meaaur •• made thea

increaaingl., h •• dlel. ot the mandator,. power.

The tirat Blah Oonal •• ioner, S1r Herbert Samuel, In­

augurated the oivil administration ot Pal •• tine on Jull 1,

1920. A. Samuel w •• a Jev who had shown hl ••• 1t to be pro­

Zionist, the Jewa were elated ov.~ the appointment and the

Arabe distrustful. But neither should have been too optimis­

tl0 or pe •• tm1atlc. fbe H1Sh Oommi •• lone,. oommitted h~.e1t to

.• pollcy ot promoting tbe well.belns ot both. In a Brltlsh

memorandUII ot Jul.1. 1947, to the Unl ted. Xatlona Speoial 0011-

mitt.e, Lord 8 .. _1 I, quoted. .s holdlns tbat "the measure.

to tOlter-the well.belas ot the Arabs should be preoi •• ly

tho •• whloh'v. ahould ad.opt in Pal.atine it there were no

Zlon!.t que.tion and it there had been DO Balfour Deolara­

tlon". (2)

Howe.er g004 hi' intentlona, Lord S .. uel'. tirat

move vaa not oaloulated. to win the Arabs. He .et up an Ad­

visory Counoil compo.ed ot eleven Britlah otfioiala and ten

othere aeleote4 tpom the Moalem, Chrlatian and lewish COMmun-

p.96. (1) John Marlowe. Rebellion in Pale.tine (Loncion, 1(46),

(2) Bernard Joa.ph. Brltlsh Rule tn Pal.,tine (Wa.b­ington, 1948), p.187.

$0

itt ••• (l) To the ArabI, thte aot waa contrary to tbe Cove-

nant t. promia. ot .elt-soye:rnment. The,.. indicatea thell' 41,- -:

pl •• aure at the Tblx-d. Pale.tine Arab Oonsr ••• held in December,

1920.(2) The,.. demanded a .atlonal Government elected by tbe

people and deprecated the tact that the British:

a. Reooplze4 tbe Zionist orseni •• tlon 88 an official bod,...

b. E.tablished an A4v180ry Council which did not repre.ent the people.

c. Allowed admis.ion ot Zloni.t immigrants. d. Appo1nted Je •• to goverment ottic.. in a

Moal .. and Obri.tlan world.(l)

AI to -the tmm1gl'ants, the countrJ had been opened to

the Jewl 1ft September. In 1919, the number ot Jewa in Pal •• tine

v •• plaoed 80mewhere around 55,000. Acoop41ng to the first ot­

tlclal aansu. ot Ootober, 1922, thl. tlsure rOle to 8),790 out

of a total population ot 7S2,048, ot WhOM S89,177 were MOI-

1e.I.(4) Approximate figure. tor theaontba between SepteMber,

1920--Ap:ri1, 1921, set the number ot immigrant, at about

(1) pt-.F .Andrews. The Holl Land Under Mandate (Oaabrldge, 1(31), II, p.74.

(2) Actuall,. the tlrat Oongre •• toP Pal •• tlne. The other two were the Syrian Conar ••••• ot Jul71 1919, and March, 1920, to which the Pale.tlnian Arab •• ent del.e.ate •• With the dif­tloultl •• cODaequent upon tbe Fr.nch ae.umption ot the S1rlan Mandate, tbe Allab. ot Pal •• tine deold.4 to •• tablish their own political organl __ • Out ot thl& Congr ••• oame the Arab Exeou­tlve, tbe oentral bod,. oontl"olllng polltloal aotlvlt,.. It WI,S dominated by the Huealn1, a landholding tami17 hlgh alaq In' religioua artalra. Such landholder. a. tbe Hu.alnl law the ex­panding Zionist mo._ent .e a danger-to tMil' posltlona, .0 that their perlonal Intereate oame to be jolne4 to tho.. of Arab National!.m. Purthel' detal1s 1n B800 Poundatlon, I, PP. 466, 474.

(3) Ib14., pp.47S-476. -(4) See Royal Institute, Gr. Br., P.61 tor statistioal

data taken trom tbe Report tor 1938.

51

10,000. It waa this increaaing n~ber whloh gave the Arabs

added conoern .. They expr.ssed themselves on the matter to Mr .. ~·

Winston Church!ll on his visit to Palestine in Maroh, 1921.(1)

The substanoe of their oomplaints was similar to that ot the

resolutions of the Third Congres •• (2) But they received no sa­

ti.taction trom the meeting.

The mounting Arab tension rele •• ed itself on May 1,

1921, during Labor parad.s. The two groups ot marchers be­

longed to the F.deration ot Jewish Labor. The Socialist. had

reoeived authorization to march while the •• all Communist bo-

d1 had not. An ensuing ola.h between the two gave the Arabs

an occa8ion to show their hostIlity to all Zionists. Beginning

1n Tel Aviv and Jafta, the riot. spread to several other

town •• Within a tive day periQd, 48 Arabs and 47 Jews were

killed, not to apeak ot 219 wounded tor both lewa and Araba.(3)

S1r Herbert Samuel placed the district under martial law and

immediately appointed a Committee ot Inquiry. !he report it

drew up ga •• the •• o.u •••• among oth.~., as lying at the root

ot the trouble:

a. Arab tear ot a ateady incre.a. ot Jewish immIgration which would ultimate11 tend to their political and economic subjection.

b. Beliet that the Zionist Oommission waa ex­erting undue intluence on the administration.

(1) Ohurohill, a. Oolonial Secretary' ot State, was mak­ing a general Bear Eastern lurvey. Out ot it, eventually, 0 .. 0 the reoognition ot Iraq's Independence and the .eparation of Trans.Jordan trom Paleatine .. Antonius, PP.316-l18.

(2) Esoo FoundatIon, I, p.264.

(3) Andrews, II, pp.77-78.

o. Re.entment Oft,. the loo •• ne.. and UTO­Banoe of the fOuna immigrants tram Eas­tern Bvope.(l)

S2

TheN 1. DO ne •••• it,. tor 801na into the merits or

demerits ot the finding., tor little waa etrected. Lord Samu­

el _rei,. reiterated. the nec •• sit,. tor I.t_guarding Arab

rlshts •. (2)

ShortlJ atter, an Arab delegat10n went to London to

tight againat the inolusion of the Balfour Declaration 1n the

draft mandate. I~ partloularl,. sought the inoorporation ot a

provision tor a Legislative Counoil, an aba which caused no

little tpouble 1n aucc •• 4tDs ,ears. In tb1s regard, the Brt­

ttsh govarmaent proposed 8 Oonltltut1on "bloh provided tor a

Briti.h Hllb Oommt.alon.~, an Executive Oouncil and a Legla­

latlve Councll.(3) The LeSislature vae to con81at ot the High

Oommi •• lone", ten official .ambers and tw_l.e elected unotti­

oial members. Aa 1t stood, the BiSh Commis.loner had contHl

or eleven vot •• , lnolud1ns hi, own. Since two ot the elected

member. were '0 be Jewa, 104 atnce the B18h Commi.sloner had

a. veto power and control 0 •• 1' an,. ordinanoe pertalnlns to the

Mandat. provlalona, the Arab, rejected the propo •• l on the

grounds that it vaa not juat11 repre.entative.

At thl. potnt of imp ••••• Mr. Ohurchill. at the oon-

(1) 'al •• tin. R'Ial Oommle.lon aeiort (LODdou)~ a.d. •

5479 ot Jul.,.. 1"37, p.5 • nao Prank d. a&an. Pale.tine Dil.... (Waahlngton, 1948), pp .12)-124 •

•

.:

() Other provlaiona ot Constitution 10 Andrew., pp.81-6J.

$)

clu.ion ot hi. lear Eastern survey. drew up a memorandum in

June, 1922, on "Britieh Policy in Pale.tineft• He presented

it to the Zionist. a8 an interpretation of the Ba.ltouz. Deola­

ration. It assured the Jewl that beoause they were in "Pal •• -

tine as ot right and not on sufferanoe", it was neoessary

that they 8hould be able to increase their numbers by immi­

gration. However, this ~lgratlon oould not "be so great 1n

volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity ot

the country at the ttMe to absorb new arrivals".(l)

While on the whole tavorable and aoceptable to the

Zionists, this new statement Qt policy .erved to quality the

Balfour Declaration in that it opened the way tor the limita­

tion ot immigration. But the Arabs were dissatIsfied, as the

Committee on Immigration waa to be oompo.ed or the unacoep­

table Legi8lative Counol1.(2) They held that the danger. of

~lgrat1on could only be controlled by a representative go-

vernment. /

"

On September 16. 1922, the Zioni.ts reoelved another

llmi'batlon to the Balfour Declaration when the Councilor the

League ot Nations approved the restriction. allowed in Article

25 ot the Mandate pertaining to Trana-Jor4an.(3) While Trana­

Jordan beo~. an extenaion ot the Palestine Mandate and plaoed

(1) Royal Institute, Gr. Br." pp.l,,6-1S7 as taken from the British White P~er, Omd. 1100.

(2) Andrew., II. pp.100-10l.

(3) For these r'8atrictlons, see ROlal Corrni88ion Re­port, p.l1.

54

under the Palestine High CommIssioner, tor all 'praotical pur­

poses, actual government was plaoed in the banda ot Abdullah, ,;

brother of Emir Fa.1sal, and the territor,. olosed to Jewish

immigration. The High Commis8ioner aoted only in an advisory

capacity. Great Britain could not esoape the measure in oon­

sideration ot her promise ot independenoe in the Deolaration

to the 3even.(1}

In February, 192), Lord Samuel tried to oarry out the

plan for a Legislative Council which the Arab delegation in

London had rejected. The majorIty ot the Arabi simply refused

to vote. An Order in Council then nullifIed the prooeeding.

and the High Commiesioner was forced to e.tablish an Advisory

Counoil, having the same number ot members a. the proposed

Legislature., But seven ot the ten Arabs appointed wIthdrew on

pressure tram the Arab Executive.(2)

In a further effort to win the Arabs and secure their

oooperation, the London gove:rnra.ent reoommended the establish.

ment of an Arab Agenoy 8~11ar to the Jew11h Agancy ot Article

4 o:f the Mandate. However, the Arab Agenoy wa. to be limited

to Palestine Arabl--whl1e the Jewish repre.ented the world-­

and its members were to be eleoted by the High Commissioner.

Besides these two disorepanoies, the Arab Exeoutive aleo felt

that the proposal tended "to place them on an equal tooting

(1) Th1a area had been liberated b7 the Arabs. • •• above, p.35.

(2) ROTal Commission Report, p.56.

ss

with the alien Jewa", and so, rejected It.(l) Unwilling to

make any concesaioDa, the HIgh Commi.sioner thereatter go­

verned with an Adv18or7 Counoil ot Britl.h officials only.

Generally apeaking, though, conditions in Paleatine

were peaceful until 1928, and this is spite ot the tact that

immigration reached a peak ot 33,801 in 192$. Up to then, the

National Home wa. prospering. But between 192$-1928, a de­

pression almost undermined Jewish colonisation, due mainly to

a collaps. ot Poliah ourrenoy. In 1926, immigration dropped

to 1),081 and emigration leaped to 7,)65. In 1927, the res­

pective tigure. vere 2,713 and 5,071. 'On top ot all, the Bri­

tish, tee11ns more secure, had reduced their occupation toroe

coneiderably. The conclusion ia reached that the "main cause

et Arab quieaoenee ~.I sharp decline 1n the fortunes of the

Bational Hoae".(2)

But thIs state ot artairs dId not last long. The

1929 imm1gration figure. doubled those ot the prevlou. year

and Arab f~ar8 mal be said to have increa.ed correspondingly.

Other eventa whioh contributed to their apprehensions were

the expansion ot the Jewish Agenol, and evidence that, ot all

the Arab statea, Paleatine was the only one not progressing

towards Independence.(3) Iraq was granted a Legislative Coun-

(l) R01al Institute, Gr. Br., p.42. An analrll. ot the proposed Arab Agenof i. round In sto7&novakJ, pp.98-99.

(2) Royal Commie.1on Report, p.64. () At the SIxteenth Zionist Congre •• 1n August, 1929,

non-Zioniat. joined with Zionlat. 1n an agre.ment to promote the National Home. Thi •• erved to ohannel the w.alth of Amer­ican non-Zionist •• See Weismann, pp.31J-314.

"

56

eil eleoted b1 the people on Feb:ruary 20, 1928, Egypt had wrung

• tev conce •• iona trom Bngland in 1927J and a constituent a8-

sembly had been tormed 1n STria in 1928 to dratt a oonstitu­

tion, although not lucce •• tul at the time.(l)

-:

A premonition ot the growing unreat oame on September

24, 1928, in the torm ot religious friotion. The oecaaion 11

called the Wailing Wall Incident. The Wall vaa considered hol,.

by Jew and MOlle. alike. The Jews prayed on one 8ide .a it once

tormed the we.tern wall of the Temple, and the Arabs venerated

the other aide a •• part ot the Haram-eah Sherif, a Moslem

ahrlne.(2) A pre .. ,.,ar TUl"k1.h regulation prohIbited the use ot

any appurtenanoe. betore the Wall. But on the day noted, the

Jewa .et up a .cre.n to divide the men and women .. When the Jewl

refu •• d to remove lt, the polic. torotbl,. as.umed the task. The

Arab. were hlgbl1 lncen.ed at the profanation by tn. Jews, while

the latter were indignant at what the,. ~on.ld.red an interter­

enoe with their religioul right •• Oontinued prot.ats were made

on both ald •• , but tor the moment, no outbreak ooourred.

Then, ln Jul1, 1929, the Moale •• had obtained per­

mil.lon to renew conatruotion meant to heighten thelr seotion

or the Wall. The Jewish pre •• raised loud crles over this in­

tringement ot the statuI quo, de.pite the taot that the au­

thorities .a. it to be .1tbin MOllem right •• The Sixteenth

(1) KOlal Oammiaei.~ Report, pp.64-6S.

(2) Within the Harem-a.h Sherlf 11a, the Dome ot the Rook, inoorreotl,. known al the Mosque ot Omar, and reputed to be the altar on whioh ,Abraham attempted to otter hi' Ion .. An­drewa, II, p.223.

57

Zlonlat Congre.s. then in •••• 10D. aspa.ated the 1 •• ue b,.

publlahins the atatement that "OUl" rishta under the Mandat. "

are more oOltPlete and I10re extensive than thoa. embraced wIth­

in the prinoiple ot ~. ,t.'ua guo".(l) OOming tro. a repre.

sentation ot world JeV1!"l. the exprel.ion was not caloulated

to paoltr the Arabs.

On August 14, about 6000 Jewa gathered at Tel Aviv

tor a prot •• t demonstration. On the 15th, acae youth. trom

among them cam_ to Jerwsal_ to stage a a1ml1ar demonstration

at the Wailing Wall. On the whole, it was o~.rll, although

some tew Insi8ted an ra181ns the Jewleh fla, and shouting tor

their rights. The Moal .. _ tONed a counter.demonatl'atlon the

next d8J. BJ' now, t •• l1ng w.. :running hip. 10 •• rioue trou­

ble oocurred until the 2)1'4, a Fr1day, a d81 on whioh maDY

Moale., came to Jerusale. to pray_ Thea ..... amed with club.

and stlok.. JU8t how the di.turbano.. ,t8rte4 atter that i.

unoertain, aa the, were sporadic. The In ••• tl,.ttaa Commlsaion

atterwards plaoed the major blame on the Arabs, although it

exonerated the Brltish Administration and the Arab Ex.eoutiv.

ot guilt. At an7 rate. the dilorder 8pread to the tOwnl at

Hebron, Sat.el, Jatta, lulue and the 8U1Toundlng v111age ••

Between the 24th and 29th, 133 Jewa and 116 Arab, were killed,

•• well .1 .$20 wounded tox- both 81d ••• (2) .

The Hlah C0811 •• 1oner .t the t1Jle, 91r JohnOhaneel-

(1) Andrew., II, p.2$7.

(2) Ibid., pp.259-268 tor deta11s ot the .arioue tncl­dente .a t~trom the Rei0rt at tbe Oommie,loD on the Pales­ttn. Disturbanoe. or ASSua i'2~. a;a.3Sj6.

58

lor. who had gone to London to discuss the matter ot repre­

.entatl v. gove1"n1t'lent, hurried baok and announoed the au.pen- ~.

aion ot the disous.lona in oon.equenoe ot Arab atroo!ti •••

87 September ll, the Colonial Offlce appointed a Commle,lon

b •• ded b.,. Sir vialter Shaw to inveatigat. the whole JUtte ••

Ita tindlngs, gatbered between Ootober.Deoember, lilted thea.

oaus •• tor the d1atUl"ban.e.

a. Fundamental.l,. ttruatratlO1'l ot Arab poli­tical and national aspiration ••

b. Eoonomloal11, tear tor the tuture. The In­exhaustible tunda at the diepoaal ot the 001Uina 1-.111'81.1t8 .ade 1 t tt appear improba­ble that such oompetitor. will in ,..ar. to oome b. oontent to ahare the Gountr,. w1th them".

o. Contlict. In interpreting the If.tional HOlle. (1)

Among the OOftlJftl •• 1on'. reo01lllen4atlon., perhaps the

mOlt ~portant can be aummarlzed .a tollow.,

a. The British Government should l.aue a olear atateaent or pollo,. re,aNing non­Jeviah rights.

b. It should rene. the l1DJliSN.tlon ngula­tlone .a to prevent the .xo ••••• ot 1925 and 1926.

o. It ahould inv.stlset. the po •• lbil!t! •• ot a.8" _thode ot oultivation and •• ttle­ment.

4. The pOlltion ot the Zionist Orsenta.tion "do •• not entitle it to ahar. 1n any desp •• 11'1 the Oovemment ot Palestlne". (2)

With "l&I'd to settlement and 1Inlpaa.t1on, Sir John

Hope Simpson ".I.. appointed 11'1 Ma.,. ot that ,.eU' to le.4 a. coa­

mitt.a ot aqulrJ'e The Shaw Report had been publl.hed in

April, 19)0. Ae Simpson'. Oornmitt.e did Dot complete their

(1) Royal Oomal •• 1oa Report, pp.68-69~

(2) Ibid., pp.70-71 • .........

$9

investigation until October, the re.ult, ahall be treated in

the next chapter. .:

Mention may be made here that the Permanent Mandatea

Commis81on, estab11ahed under the Covenant, met tor an extra­

ordinary ••• Ilon In June. It was hlshlJ orit1cal ot BritIsh

polloy, holdIng that "the inaction or the Mandatory Power was

the fundamental cause of the dlatuttbtmoe ot such dimenllons".

It oited the inattention shown to "the 8001al and economic

adaptation ot the Arab population to the new oonditions due to

Jewish imrrd .. gratlon" and bl.ed the 1'1arldatorr tor ".a1ntalninS

foroel 80 inadequate a. to tall to aeoure the 88sentlal oond1-

tion tor development ot the Jewish National Home, .eourity tor

perlona and property".(l}

But the Engliah sover.nment v •• not to be diaturbed

at thllt1me b,. anJone or an)' group. Pending a det1nltlve

report trom the Slaplon Commi •• lon. it suspended tmmlgratlon

into Pale.tine. Wel~ met with the Colonial Seoretary, Lord

Pa •• field. an~ the Prtme Minister, Ram •• ,. MaoDonald. in an .t. tort to rever •• the re.triotive measur •• , but waa unaucoess­

ful. Be came to t •• l that the Slmpson Commi8sion was "either a

auperflult,. or a propaganda instrument tor (the government-.)

predetermined pol1cr".(2) It 80, England accompli.hed little

br withholding hep deal,lona, tor tho •• gl •• n later never a4-

justed existing ditterenoea.

(1) Roral Institute, Gr. Sr •• p.49. (2) Weic.anft, p.332

OHAPTER IV

A DECADE OF DISORDERS 1930.19)9

Atte~.th ot the 1929 Riot.

The event. and i.au.s of the I~oe.dlng pages are

more or le •• repetltloua. The causes for the recurrIng 418-

orders differ only 1n aoe •• ional oiroum.tanoe. and 1n aoci­

dental efteot •• Fundamentall.,., one not •• the faotorl ot 1mml ..

gratton, repre.entative government and the land questIon .a

oontinuing and intenaifylng the state ot unrest. The purpose

ot this ohapter will lie onl.,. in pr ••• nt1ng a pioture of the

increaaing ten .• lons and the .. aaure. taken b,. Great Bri t.in

in d18charging her dutie •• a Mandatory.

AI 8lreadJ indio ate'. the Hope Stmplon Oommis81on

va •• ent to Pale.tine to .tudJ the probl ... ot land settle­

ment and immigration. The value ot the report 11 •• 1n that it

va. the firat thorough inye.ttgation ot the land que.tion in

reterenoe to the Churohill Memorandum wh10h coun.eled again.t

immigration exo •• ding the economic capao1t,. ot tJ'l.e oountry.

Th. aubstanoe ot the findings mIght be condensed to

two point •• Contral'Y to ell previous .ltilU.t •• , whioh plaoed

cultivable land at 10,592,000 dunaml, the Oommie.ion .et the

tigure at 6,$44,000 dunam •• (l) It theretore ooncluded thatt

1. Iven 1t the land were d1 vlded equally among the Arabs, there would still not be enough· tor all faml11a. to obtain a livelihood.

2. There wae no more roam tor •• ttlers untIl agricultural tmprovementa .. 4. olo.er .et-

(1) A dun .. 1. equ.a1 to about one.fourth an aore.

.:

61

tlement poaalble.(l)

~. While the Commission made the •• two observations,

they were by no meana the onl, important consideration •• We

may quote .everal statementa taken troMit. Report whioh

aerve to help one understand the souroe of Arab grievanc •••

Regarding Zionist propaganda whioh stretohed out of all pro­

portion the ben.fIts derived trom immigration, one linds that.

It i8 a mistake to aalUMe that the Vale of Rlar •• lon waa .. wilderness betore tbe arri­val of the Jewish •• ttlere and that it 1. now a parad1 •••••• (De.pit ... great deal ot im­provement), it ii, however, unjust to the po­vertJ-strioken rellah who haa been removed from the •• 1_48 that the sUSg •• tion should

'continuall1 be made that he wa •• uI.le •• cum­be:rer ot the ground end produoed nothIng trom it. (2)

More notewortbJ, 18 thi. oomment,

Actually, the re.ult of the purohal. of land 1n Pal •• tine bl the Jewi.h National Fund has been that land hal been ext1"atepI'1toriallaed. It oe.I.1 to be land from whioh the Arab can gain any advantage either now 01' at any time in the future. Not on11 can be never hope to 1 •••• or to cultivate it, but~ bl the strin­gent proviaion. ot the lea •• ot the Jewish .at.s.onal Fund, he 1. dep:rl ve4 torever from employment on that land.()

Suoh was the Commieelon t s Report. Together with its

publication in October, 19.30, the govel'l'lJrl8nt i •• ued Ii state­

ment of polloy, generally known as the Pal.field White Paper.

(1) R~lal Commi •• lon ReRort, pp.71-72.

(2) AndJ'ew8, II, pp.328-,329 a. taken trom the R.~ort on Immlgratl0ftemLand Settlement and nevelop!!!nt hI Sir OM 10Ee Simpson. . &. 3&86 or iqj5.

en Ibid., p.341. The Zionist London Conterence or 1920 •• tabll.hed~ requir-.ment ot employing onl1 Jewish labor on land obtained through the Fund. See Eloo Foundation, I, p.341t.

62

It attempted to initiate a oonstructive program 81 .. 4 at three

problems •• ecurity. constitutional development and economio ~.

improvement ..

With regard to .eourity, it proposed an increase in

military forces ot two British infantry battallona. two squa­

drons of aircratt and four seotion. of armored cera. Along

oonst1tutional linea, it had little more to otter than the Le.

8illative Council propo.ed 1n the Churohill Memorandum. Eoono­

mically, it aooepted the findings ot the Simpson Oommie.lon

and pledged it.elf to 8 policy of land development regulated

by BritIsh authoritl. That .... authority w •• to supervi.e

land tranater. acoordlDg to ita own plana •. On immigration, it

looked to re.triotions ba.ed on the eoonom10 capacity or the

oountry to absorb new ~igrants.

Clearl" it i»adgration of Jev. Haul ta in pNventlng the Arab population from obtaln­tng the work neo ••• ary tor lta maintenanoe, or It Jewlah unempla,ment untavourablJ attecta the general labour p08Ition, 1t 1. the 4ut7 ot the Mandatol'1 Pow.r tmder the Ma4ate to re­duoe, or, it neoecs*rr, to auspend suob ~1-pat10n untIl t~ unemployed portIon. ot the 'other sectionat Is in a po.ltlonto obtain work. (1)

The reaction of the 31onlat. to thia White Paper

waa loud and energetic. Some ot them cla1med that Article 6

of the Mandate waa vIolated, ~hloh require. the Handatorr to

enoourage ftol o•8 .ettl.ment by Jews on the landft .(2) Thi.

objection overlooked the tact that the .... Article demands

(1) Andrews, II, p.36S.

(2) Joseph, pp.130-131.

6)

that "the rights and pOlition of other .eotionl ot the pop~

latton are not prejud1ced" and that immigration Should be ta-.:

oll1tated only under suitable oonditions. The Jewish Agenol

took i.sue with the sovernaent on several Icor ••• It oompla1ned

that the Mand.torT ana1r.ed ita obligation. to the non-Jevlah

population, while "it attempt, no oorrelponding anal181s ot 1ta

obligations in reapect ot the Jewish lat10nal Home"; that no

qualifioation va8 made a. to whether all lend-le 8. Arabs .hould

be relnstated on the land, or only tho.e dispo ••• a.ed by Jew­

lah puroha.e. J and that the Mandatol"J dld not take into con­

alderation, a. did Sir John Hope S~paQD, ot the 1nflow ot

Jewish oapital to support Jevish labor, Whioh would redound

to the benetit ot the Arabs.(l) Partioular obJeotion wa. made

to the e.tlmate ot oulti vable land on the baaia that the ae­

rial aurve, v.a unscientltio and covered only one-tenth ot the

total area.

Strange to note, the Zionlst ...... 4 mol". at odds with

the tone ot the White Paper than with the above partioular

pointe. Their re •• ntaent v.. directed at vbat .ppeared a grow­

ing inolinatlon to the Arab c.u .... WeI_arm telt that it un­

dermined thcvhole Zionl.t ettort and 80 re.Igned from the Pre­

aidenoy or the Jewlah Asenol a8 well.. the Zionlst Organiza­

tlon. Several other le.cling Zionist oftlclal_ followed h1m.(2)

Declel v. oppoal tlon allO o ... e from the rank. ot the

(1) :Saoo Foundation, II. p.6S), and Roral InstItute, Gr. Br., Pp.S's-$6.

(2) Weismann, p.333.

6l~

Con.ex-vat1 .. Part1. Suoh men •• Stanle,. B81c1v1n, tbe forme%'

Px-bte Minia'er, an4 bt8 For.11D SeoNt...,., S1r Auten Ohaa- -:

berlatD, crltl01.e4 the lovernment for repudlattaa It. obll­

,.t10118 under the HUlda' •• A •• peeult ot all the PHI.ure,

a .... ,. MaoDorlald, tbe PriM Mini.ter, ret ... tad to the extent

of addr."1D& a pub110 la tt.r to Wei_aDD on rebJ'uaJ7 1),

1931, 4et1nlll8 the poll.,. ot the White Paper. He "tuled to

i.lue It .a an otfl01al doou.ent .a he 414 DO' Gonsider it •

:rev~r.al or ob.an&. in pollo,.(l)

In the lett •• , MacDonald aoknovl.qe4 that the 10-

"J~nt va. Obllse. -'0 t.0111t.,. Jeviab ~l&p.tlonft. A.

to lCl41 ••• g.abl, tbe Mandato..,. •• obllsatloa.. ".ted onl,. with tbo •• who haft be. c.U.po •••••• 4 b,. J .... 1ah bU18.... Oo.em­

ant oontrol of lad t .. at... I, "N1ul.'017 aDd not prob1bl­

torr, althoush It cloea 111'1'01 ... pow •• to patevent tran •• otlou

Mbloh a .. tnoonel.tent with the teno. ot tbe .o~". Ae to

1_1ptatlon, theN 8180 the SOftmment v.. to proceed, •• in

tbe paat, alOl'l8 relUlatol'J liD ••• On OM po1nt the letter

..... 4 to oOlloe. 110" thaD. tONol'l.,..

ft. Maj •• ',,'. Go .... 1 Ie' 40 ao' 1D aDJ va, ohall". thertp.' ot the .. .., '0 to .. u-1 ..... IIPPI'O" aDd _dolt •• thla pol101 (ot ,NteNlltla1 lab •• ). t.rbe p.tDOlpl. ot pre­teND'tal, aDd lD ..... _lul:1 -.plOJ'M1lt or J9w1.h labor by leuleh OS-I .. tlon. 1. e pr1Dolple "Moh the Je'WS all .... 81107 al'8 ell­titled to &EtIN.

MaoDollald 414 quallt'7 the .tat8ll8Dt 'bJ po1Dttns out

(1) Andrew., II, p.31S. Full text of l.tte. found on pp.)94-l99.

6$

that "it in oona.quenc. or th1a polio1, Arab labor 11 41.­

placed 01' exi8ting enemployment beoomea asaravated, that 1s a.:

tactor In the a1 tuat10n to which the Mandator,' 18 bound to

have regard".

Moat Zionists, le4 b7 Weismann, were •• tlatied with

tbe pronouncement. 'l'he7 •• w the pos81bl11tl.a concerning vb.loh

Weismann later wrote.

Whether I wa. rlsbt or not in mr aooeptano. (ot the 'Whit. Pap •• ) 11&,. be j1.ldgecl b,. • 1111-pl. taot. It v •• UDder MaoDonald" letter to _ that the obaD.p 0._ about 1n the Oovel"D-ment'. attitude, aDd tn- the attitude of tbe Pal •• ttne admInistration, lib loll enabled U8 to make the nagnltloent salnl ot tbe enautng 1&ar8. It waa under MaoDonald'. letter tbat lewteh tmmigratlon into Pal.attn. v .. permit­te4 to reaoh,tlsurel 11k. torty thou.8ftd tor 19~ and .1xtr-two thou.and tor 19l5, tigure. undreamed ot 1n 1930.(1)

The Arab. reali.ed vhat W.l~ tnttmated and there­

tore oalle4 the oo.mMUnloatloft tbe "Blaok Lett.r", tor in •• -

.enoe It ..... 4 to wipe out all that had b.en re.eale4 in tbe

Shaw and Simps .. Reports and the Pas.field White P.per.(2)

Aa • r •• ult, Mus. X .... , tbe Prelldent ot the Arab Executive,

tft • letter to the lew York Times d.ted 'ebruarr 18, 19)1,

atated that "Premier MacDonald" letter baa putne' bope of a

pollo7 of oooperation between Arabs. and J.v ••••• I theretor.

a oompelled to aubttdt to the Al-ab Exeoutive Oommitt •• the

propo.ltlon to b0700tt all Jawa 1n all .. tterl, following the

,- (1) Welatanrl, p.33S.

(2) lotal Coad..alon Report, p.1S.

6'

prinoiple. of reolprooatlon".(l)

.: In spite of thi. threat, oondltion. remained rela.

tively quiet tor a tl .. under the new Hllb Commie.laoer, Ar­

thur G. Wauobope. This 1. IW'P1'1alng, consid.eX'ing tbat""­

BUlat.d" immigration tended to 11ft the 1929 mark of S,2S9

immigrants to 9,$$3 tor 1932.(2) Moreover, tbe Paleattn. Go­

.ermMnt 1n 19)1 p8s1at4N4 ... 6000 Jeva who had entere. the

oountry 111egall,. 81 1933, tbe number of illegal entrie .....

into tine thouaand •• ()

!h8 ••• ming paoifioation or the Arabs 1. attributed

to oertain aoon_l0 1Japroy .. nts. POI' one thina.the inONa •• ct

nov ot 1_1pant. brouah' In more .apltal 8114 ra1 •• d the

aoal_ or wa .... '1'he soveftlaeDt alao be,_ I •• uing ahon tel'll

loane to help the low lno .. P'oUP. AD OJ-41aaD08 ot 19)2, re­

vl •• d 1n 1933 to oover sub."en_ta, pro ... 14.' that a tenant ot

not 1... tban one year Gould Dot be .v10te' .\11'11.... he ba.

been provided with. subet.tenoe are. a.pproved 'b,. the Hish

Oomml •• 1oner".(4) More ere41t .ooleti •• vere tormed. The 80-

v.~nt inttlated agrloul,upal demonst.ation. and, 1n g8ft­

eral, tri.d to promote bett.. t.Mins p ••• t1 .. , l' •• omm.nded.

in the pl'e'Y1oua report ••

But 1D 19)), due 111 great pan t. Hitler'. per.eou-

(l) Andvew., II, p.l77.

(2) The worldwIde depression. plqH a part In movins .0 .. to 80 to Pal •• tine. Marlow., p.l)O.

(3) Hotel Commi •• lon Report, ,.79.

(4) 1100 Poundatlon, II, pp.121-124.

67

tion, there. began a tlood ot immlgratl~n. That year there

were 30,)27 immigrants, in 1934, 42,359, and in 1935. 6l,854.(~)

One would be inolined to jump to the conclusion that this in­

ereaae was the oause ot the minor Arab riot. ot 1933. That i.

partly true. Another. factor was the grov1ng senee of mistrust.

"It appeared to the Araba that the reoommendations ot fmpar­

tiel British CIvil Servants had been Bet .alde at the bidding

ot the sinister subterranean influenoes of the leader. ot

World Jewry."(2) This mi8trust was irritated by a spIrit ot

lrultra,tion whioh has been aptly indioated by one author:

The Arab middle 01a88, just aa it was beginning to walk, wa. being outdistanoed by people who had long ainoe learnt to run •••• The Jew waa al­ways in • h~1 aQd that angered and irrItated the Arabs to an extent that 1s almost incompre­hensible to Western minds. It tt~y imitated the Jewa they made themselve. r1diculou., it they dIdn't they got lett behind •••• It waa thi. psy­chological feelIng that drove whatever trace there had ever been ot progressive or construc­tive thought out of the (Arab national) move­ment, and made it purely and limpl,. en t anti' movement doomed 1n advance to t~i11tl.(3)

Regardl... ot the preois. value ot this reflection,

the Arab Executive 1n Maroh, 1933, was arouBed to the point

ot i.suing a manite.to, explaIning that "the general tendenoy

ot the Jews to take pOI.e.slon of the lands ot this holy coun­

tr'1 and their streOling into It by hundred. ot thousands

through legal. all d 111egal meana ha. terrifted the oount17".

It therefore .eked the people "to get ready tor the aeriou8

aota which will be iMpos.d by the resolution. of thIs assem-

(1) Royal Institute, Gr. Br., p.63.

(2) Marlowe, p.132.

(3) Ibid., p.77. -

66

blJ8 .(1) The •• resolution. oontemplated a gene •• l b0100tt and

non-oooperation with the Britiah government. "

The Arab pre.. took up the orr against the Jeva and

British alike. Britlah Imperialism an4 the Jewl were linked

together. The B.ltlahgovernment was no longer coneidered tm­

partIal. The calling ot a general .trike on October 1), 1933,

was ocoaaioned by the unemplo,.ent ot Arab. in industrial oon­

cerna. In one ea •• , 200 Araba were replaoed bJ Jewl.h vorke ••• (2)

The Arabs .. 1 •• 4 tor a d.monstration to Jeruaalem betore go­

vernment ottiae., the tlrst t1me in which actlon waa taken

against the sovernment. Polioe broke up the gatherIng with

their olubs. Other demonstratIons organl.ed in Jatta, W.blue

and Hait.. P1Narms had to be aplo,.ed in • cae case., r •• ul t­

Ina 1n 26 Arab deatba. ( )

AI the whole aftalr va. just a mlnor phase In the

mountIng hostilIty ot tho •• , ••• 1, ve "7 4i-.18. it by notIng

that its cau •• va. e.er the eame. The otfloial report attrI­

buted the r10t. to "a ,enel'al r •• ling of apprehension amongat

the Arabs engendered b7 tbe PUI'oha •• ot land by the Jewa and

b7 Jew18h ~lgratlon".(4)

The OUtbreak or 19)6

The Arab national movement lts.lt telt the growtng

(1) ROla! Commieslon Report, p.Sl.

(2) Seton-WIlli ... , p.137.

(3) Hanna, p.11S.

(4) Royal In.tltut., Gl'a Br., p.8S a. taken trom the !!!POl't ot the Murison-Truste! owml •• 1on or Inquiry.

69

re.tl.8.n ••• 1n the tor.. ot sreater politlcal agitation. Lack

ot succe •• b1 tn. Arab Exeoutive broU8bt about tn. formation

01' new partte.. The tirst ot the •• , the extJllem.el,. nationalla.

tic 18t19181 (Independenoe Party) val organized in 19)2 b1

one of the three •• oretari.. ot the Ex.outl ve, Aunl Abd.ul Ha.

dl. It regarded Great Brlta1n as the principal obstacle to

Arab independence J .ought tbe union ot Iraq, Trans-Jordan and.

Pal •• t1ne. md atter 19)), .howed a pro-I •• t inollnatlon. Then

1n March,· 1934, the Pr.,1dent 01' the Arab beoutiv. ,Mua. Ita­

sem, died or injuria. rece1ved in the dl.turbanoe. ot 1933.

Unable to a,ree on a new pre.148nt, the Exeouttve re801ve4 to

permit the to~.tlon ot partial.(i) In all, there oame to be

81x partie. with the I.tlg,lal. The.e were,

1. Pale.tine Arab far'i' h.aded. bJ' Jaaal. Hu­•• Inl. It .Iop\.! ~e poll01e. of the old Arab Sxeoutty. 1n conttnutns to prot •• t the •• tabllabmant ot the Jewish Xatlonal Hoae. '

2. .atlonal Deren.. ,utI' 4om1natl' b7 the 1 •• hi,Sibl taotion un~er Ra,heb a&7, former aa70r ot Jeruaalea.(2) It, plattorm w •• 11-al1ar to that o~ the Paleatpe; Arab P~. It alao hoped tor a union 0 rans.30r and Paleattne in whioh tbe Ba.h.shlb1 would be the ruling el •• ent.

3. Retormpart~ another tamil,. poup, headed 6,. DPe HUla 1'ha11dl, who bee ..... ,.or ot Jen.al. In 1934e It dltte .. d tront the other pU'tl •• 1n that 1t sought tbe tnoluslon ot Pal •• ttn. 1ft aD Arab Federation.

4. Bationalil' BlOt! gUided. bl the la""er, Ab­dUl tatlt Hi,. S ab. It bad DO platform dls­tlnct trom tb. othera, ,.ektna oalJ' to a4-•• noe tbe •• pl •• tiona ot ita 1.8der.

5. 0O!!ll'!S8 Ex.outive of lTationall,t Youth,

(1) !h. 18t191al v •• not an offiolal part,. t111 then. ActuallJ, it v •• a oontinuatlon ot the pre-war and •• oret !l­Patat 4001e'7_ Se. Antonlu., p.292.

(2) The B.,h •• bibi were. landholdtq t_l11 in 001'1-• tant rl vall"1 vi th the Hu.s81n1.

,;

under the leaderShip of Yaooub Gbut •• ln. It showed principal lnter.at in lmprovins the

10

eoonomio oon4i tlonl of the rural 01... by _ani calculated to dltSUdde Arabs tram .elltDg their landl to Jewa. Itl -1nfl,...enoe dw1ndled wIth tim • • 8 the other part!.. began to Include their own youth tollowera.(l)

.,;

Bf April, 19)6, the leaders ot all tbe •• partie. ca.-

btoed to to~ an Arab Bllber Committ.e whioh replaoed the Arab

Executive.

With the augmented Immigration, legal and 11legal,

and the oon.equent inor •••• d comp.tl ticm, Arab landowners who

1014 land to Jewl besan to b. denounoed 1n the molqu •• and the

pre.,. Part1 le.dera were c •• tigated tor letttng perlonal d18-

pute. intertere with bab unity. The •• l_del'l lOon besan to

ahov a united tront whea, in Jrove.ber., 1'3.$, a 18Z',. shipment

ot arm. to • Jev (nev •. r looated) dlaturbe4man,. Arab •• The,.

pre.ented a memorandum to tbe High Commi •• ioner demandingl a

atop to Jeviah 1ttnlgratlon, investigation or 1118,al entrie.,

requirement of personal identity oarde aftd the .stablishment

ot democratic lovernment.(2)

It va. on the que.tion of democratic 80vernment that

the atom broke. In Janual"1. 1934, 8 Munioipal Oorporationa

Ordinance provided tor eleotions to twenty Munloipal Counoils

by male voters at .a.t twenty-flve years ot age. Later, tbe

(1) Origin and poliete. or tb ••• parti •• tound in Eaco ' Foundation, II, pp.773-781. ,

I

(2') Arnold J. ToJftb •• , 04. Surv.,. ot International At­talrat 1916 (London>, p.722 .a talliin 6_ Ese HeRrt Sy II. ~aj •• J'.~ov.rnment on ,be Administration ot P.~.~tni and Trans· ora.1t tor me fear 1"$.

71

Peel Commission which investigated the riots ot 1936 declared

thea. elections unsatistactory as rev took part in them, and ~

because the government monopolized the more important services

auch as health and education.(l)

But Sir Arthur Wauchope in December, 1935, announced

them to be adequate and on this basia took the next step ot

presenting a new plan tor a Legis~tiv. Councll. Up to then

the Arabs had opposed an1 plan whioh did not otter proportIo­

nate representation. The Zionists, on the other hand, being a

mlnor1t1, tought anr propoaal which would glve the Arab. an

opportunity to obstruct theIr aims. In con •• quene., the Br1-

tish tried to comprom1 •• the dltterence. with a 28 member

Council diVIded a. tollows.

8 elected and 3 nominated Moal ... 3 " "4 • Jewa 1 " "2 ft Ohristlana S otticials and 2 oommercial repr.sentative. (2)

Thi. plan gave the Arab. a repre.entation of tourteen

members to balance that ot the Sri tiah-J.wlsh oombination, and

va. a m.inOI' Victor., tor the Arabs. 'l'b.e L"".iatence ot the Bri­

tish government in pre •• ing thIs scheme •• em8 to have been in \

keeping with her new polio., ot appeasement 1n the tace of the

growing Ita11an threat, not to speak ot Hitler'. rising ambi­

tions. B'1 1936, England. saw that the expanding Italian Afrioan

Empire would entail a ohanse 1n BritIsh faperial .trategy in

the Middle Ba.t.

(1) ROlal CommiSSion Report, pp.348-jl~9.

(2) Survel ot International Aftair., 1936, pp.723-724.

800dw111.

On the one hand, Italian .toro •• b ••• d on the Mediterranean end iaat Atrica oould make the p.s •• ,. ot ~e B •• tern Mediterranean aDd the Red Se. extremal,. haaardous tor Powera op­po.ed to I tal,., but on the other haDel, tho •• Pover., having toro.. ba.ed on the M1ddl. Eaat could 1'.&411,. .ever the oommunioation. between Italr and her empire.(l)

Bence the neoel.it,. tor the British to se.k Arab

72

~.

The re.etion ot tbe Arabs to the new legislative plan

waa mixed. The Retorm Part,. ot Dr. Khal141 move4 to aooept 1t.

Other •• usse.ted alterationa. On the whole, most Arabs found

it to be better than an1thlng previoua.

'I'he Jews "ere .. tolent 1n their op~oal tion. The,. could

not accept aft,. plan whioh would give a •• Jor1t,. to an,. group

oppo •• d to the Mandate, although in this 0 ••• , .a we have •• en,

tbe •• jorltJ val onl7 over the Jewish repre.entatlon.(2)

As ito .. e about, when the Engliah Pax-li.ent and the

Permanent Mandat.. Oommission began a .erle. or debate. whioh

generally vent 8.sa1nat Wauohopet. plan, the Arabs deepaired. of

IUGee.a and. tel t that the Jew. ve .. e exeS'tins und.ue !li.tluenoe

on the government. The .ltuation w •• agsra.at.a b1 the know­

ledge th.t rlottns 1n Egypt, 1ft 1935. had brought a •• at Bri­

tain to c6.r".14e .. n8sot1atil18 .. treat., with that oountZ7'. Then

there wae the recent .trike ot JanuarJ, 1936, 1n 5J'l'1. whioh

moved France to deolde to terminate her Mandate and 8upport

(1) ArnoldJ. ToJDb •• , _d. Sury_z or International At­t.ira. The World. In Maroh 1939 (London), ,.129.

(2) V.i.-ann, ,.360 tor the Zion1,' stand in the matter.

73

Syria in her ettorts to enter the League of I'ationa.(l)

Therefore, beginning April 15, 19)6, the Palestinian -:

Arabs began to emplo7 the 8,,4 tactics a. their Syrian and

Egyptian brothera. That daf, Arab highwaymen stopped ten carl,

robbed the pa.sengers and killed three Jew •• Reprisala took

place the next day 1n Tel Aviv. This stirred Arab mobs in Jaf­

ta a tew d878 later, and three more Jew. were killed. It was

then, on April 25. that the Arab Partie. oonvened, resolved on

a general strike and formed the Arab Higher Committee. They

refused to oall ott the strike unless their basio demand-­

atappage ot Jevl.h ~lgratlon--wa. fulfilled.(2) Wauohope,

in the middle or May, promised them an investigation ot their

grievQnoes by a Roral Commisslon if they would tirat restore

order. They, in turn, would consider nothilll unle.. lmndgr'l-

tlon ceased.

Following the example of Jerusalem and Jatta, Arab

communi tie. throughout Paleatine elo •• 4 their shop. and stopped

work. Guerrilla. roU184 the hill a .,. Demonatrations, atoning.

and scattered al.aults became oommon.()

B1 the end of June, 137 prominent Arab otticials sub­

mitted a memorandum to tn. H1gh Oo~sllon.r in which they,

a. Blamed the disturbanoe. on Arab exaspera-

(1) Survey Qr International Affaira, 19)6, p.727.

(2) ROlal Commisslon Report, p.97.

(3) Ibid., pp.97-98 tar an ottloial narrative ot the d180rder. Wiiliam I. Zitt. The RaRe of Pal •• tine (New York, 19)8), pp.41S-427 otter. a vivid!,. detan.! a.scription ot the violence, altbough markedly pro-Zionist tn cast.

tion,. together w1 th a "10.. of tal th in the value ot ofticial pledg.. and ••• uranc •• tor the future It •

b. Reiterated that 'c •••• tion ot immigration vas the onl'J solution to the deadlook.

o. Prote.ted the pollc1 ot repre •• ion by .111-tal'1 £01"0 •• (1)

74

The memorandUlll d1d not change the pollo,- ot the Pa­

l.attn. government. Thereupon, revolt and violenoe lnorea.e4

~'

in tntene1t,. d~1ng the 8Ulft11.eP. Aid in ems and. men now ca_

from Syria end Trans.Jordan. '!'here were minor enoounters with

British troops. Sabotage and destruotion •• emed unoontrollable.

The Emir ot Trans-Jordan had ottered to _d1at. earl,. 1n June

and. repeated. the otte.. on Auguat 7. Both t1m.. he waa re Jeo­

ted becawae or the demand on immlgratlon.(2) But b1 August 30,

on • rumor that the Britlah would suspend baill'atlon, the

Araba aooepted the .edt.tine l.rv10.1 of the !tins of Iraq, who

immediately beSaD prel1MlnarJ nesotiationa with the Britt.h.

Untoz-tunatel,., one ot the .oat aerioue enoountez-I between

Araba and Brit1sh troops took place at Tulkar.m on September 3.

Th. British IO"eJ"'n1rlent then announoed that It had nevel' agI' •• d

to au.pend 1anmlgratlon 'but, lnate.d, 4.014ed to lend. rein.

torcements. The negotiations ended here.

The ArabI lOon 0... to ••• the hopel ••• n... ot their

position. !br •• tao tors tinal17 bz-ougbt them to oal1 ott the

'trike on October 12. One v.. the Jldll tavr .1 tuation. The Bri­

tilh had b,. then raia.d an ottenalve toroe ot 20,000 men.

(1) R21al Oommle.lon Report. p.99.

(2) Ro,.al Institute, Or, 81"., p.92.

7$

Another wae an economic oonsideration. The long layotte were

. beginning to work hardship. Moreover, the orange harvest waa ~.

at hand, a main source of livelihood tor the Arab8.(1) Fl­

nally, the unIted reque.t of the rulers or Saud! Arabla, Iraq

and TranI-Jordan, to trust in British gooel intentione and atop

the bloodshed. gave the Pale.tinian Arabs an aXCi.;.';,!' to capi.

tulate.(2)

The strike beina oalled ott, • R07al Commisslon,

headed by Lord Pe.l, arrived in Falestine on lov.alba%' 11,

1936. But .s the government peru.ed to atop all immigration-­

although 1t did reduce tbe quota more than a thlrd--the Arab

leaders announced that no repre •• ntative ot theirs would ap­

peer betore the Commie.ion. aeoaul. ot this, lome consider the

COJIInl •• 1on'a report unfair 1n that, eventu..117, it listened

to onl7 12 Arab vitnels., in a S da, pe~lo4, .s against 100

Briti.h and Jewish wltne •••• ov.r a span ot 7 O~ 8 w.eka.C)

w. __ , omit the proo.ed1ngs ot tbe Oommie,ion aa the

olatma brougnt betore it .oar.ely dirt ... , from all that we

have noted in th... ohapters. (l~)

In 1t, analY8is ot tbe caua •• of the disturbanoe, the

Comm18!lon drew attention to the tacta that the attaok waa

"chletl'1 anddirectl,. 8bled at the Govel'llRlent" and that 1n

(1) And It v .. to the Arabs' advantage that their ohier oompetltor in the or ana- lndultry, Spain, vae In • 01911 war.

(2) Roxal Commie.lon Report. pp.10l-102.

(3) Antonius, pp.400·401.

(4) The more important 01a1m8 .. ,. be tound in ROZel OommI •• ion Report, pp.106tt, 143, 241, 29).

76

th18 1nstanoe, 1t 41tte~e4 from prevloua outbreaks 1n that the

Arab otf101al8 .howed tb .... lve. Intranalgent. Furthermore,

outside Arab help had been procurred.(l)

~.

The Report ga .. two underlying oaul •• tor tine revolt,

Arab dealre tor national independenoe, and Arab hatred and

tear of the •• tabllabment of the Jewlah •• t1onal Home.(p.llO).

Some ot the complementary caul •• were.

a. The ettect ot growing indep.ndenoe 1n other Arab countr! •••

b. The inoH_sinal,. hlah immigration. c. The tnequalit, ot opportunlt7 tor tho Araba

to pr •• ent c.... to the loverDJlent. d. 'lbe lnteneit, or Jewish National1., and

the modernism amons the le.lah 7outh.(pp.111-112).

Concerning the development ot Pal.atine, the Oommll­

,Ion did not overlook the benetita conferred bl the Sewa.(pp.

128-129). A!tab 01 trloul t~. and general 80onom,. protl ted br the Incr •••• 4 oapital. The" vas greater employment of Allabs

1n urban are.l. Varioul health progr..a .04 clinios allo ald­

ed the Arab •• Publlc •• rvic •• were more .4"81'1084 than ne1gh:"

boring countrie ••

But in api t. or 'the.. advanoe., tbe Oomal.alon aaw tl t

to make th ••• reoommendatlons.

a. Aa to lan41 It tollowed the oautloua path ot previous report.. It sugg •• ted empowering the Hisb Commi •• loner to prohibit the trana­tel' of land to Jeva in an.,. particular area. (p.222). ADd untU IUPV'.,. and •• ttl ... nt vere oompleted, It weloomed -the detinite prohibition ot the sale ot 1.olated and CQm­paratlvely small plots ot land to Jev8."(p.226)

(l) Ibid., p.l04. Aa the substance of the next .everal pag •• deftl •• X~lu.lv.1J with the HOtal Commie.ion Report, page r.t~reno.u .h~ll be liven tmmedlaE. 7 In tiS. text.

b. Ae to 1mmlgration. It abandoned the eoono-mic absorptive prinoiple •• inadequate and aueporte4 • plan ot limitation according to a political high level". Thi. level was to be fixed tor the next five 1eara at 12,000 per 1ear.(p.300, 306).

o. As to a Legislative Counoil: The plan w.s to be abandoned. Being none too optimistIc ot the suoceas ot any demooratio Institution, because of the unwillingneas to compromise, it suggested an enlargement ot the Advlso~ Council by more unoffioial members.(p.361).

77

Bea1des the •• ~.oommendstion., the Commission advo­

cated a stronger milltarr toroe to meet the poor seourity ot­

tered in the paat. On this score, it admitted that the com­

plaints of the Jews "were disnlflad end r •• tra1ned".(p.201).

With regard to the Arabs t lonsstanding repudiation

ot the Mandate as inconsistent with Article 22 ot the Cove­

nant, tht) OOl1llftla.ion rejected their arguaent on the baais

that provi8ional reoognltion ot "oommunlties formerly belong­

ing to the '1'urkiah Empire" vaa permissive and not obllgato17.

It indioated alao that the grant ot authority to the Manda.

tOrJ required it to act 4itterentlr toward Paleatine than

toward Syria and Iraq.(p.38). This ditterenoe was in the na­

ture of 8 dual obligation to Jews and Araba. The Commi •• ion

noted. though, that the t~ll1ment ot this obligation had

b.en disheartening to the Mandatory. "Neither Jew nor Arab

hal an,. sen •• ot .ex-vice to a single State."(pp.370-371).

Therefore, the Oommie.lon proposed a partition ot Paleatine,

with eaoh people rultng a part, even though suoh a plan would

not complete17 .atist, either part7.(p.394).

.:

The Commi •• lon" plan ot partition wa. not detinitive

78

but merel" sugge.tlve. It divided Pal •• tlne and Trana-Jolldan

into three regiona, a Jewish State, tulna in the ooasta1

plain froa ~.l Aviv northward, thenee ••• tward to include

the Valle, ot Eear.elan and aal11e., an Arab State, compris­

tng the territory south and •• st ot the J.wiah State, ••

well a. Tpana~Jor4anJ and a British Enol ••• , permanently

mandated, Govering I.rueal_and Setbleh_ with, a corr140r

to Jatra.(pp.38)-)8S).

wttb th.publloat1oft ot the :Aoral 0oun1 •• 1on Report

on Julr 7, 1937. the goYel'l1aent i.sued • Wh1 t. Paper whioh

acoeptea the O0llnl1 •• ion t • l'eocamendatloDl and announced a

stud., to be lI.de 011 a plan ot partl tlon. Me8llwhl1e. a poll tl­

cal hlgh 1 ••• 1 ot 8.000 Jewa would be kept tor the p.rlod

between Auguat 19, 19)1 and Marob 1), 19)8.(1)

The Bngllah Parliament i_dlatel,. b.,m d.ebat ••

on the question ot partition tft wbioh great oonoern was shown

oyer It •• t.sta aDd imperial aspecta, partloularly with regard

to Haita. !his ••• port V.I the termlnu. of tbe 011 pipeline. a

ttJ".t 01... harbor aDd a lar,e center of commer.e and oommun­

loatlons.(2) But Parliament, UDa~le t~ oome to any deols1on,

tumed the •••• 0".1' to the Mendat.. 0caaa1I.101l.

This body openea an Extraord1nar, S •• alon Jul1 30.

It. lengtbJ dtsouasionl tlnally endea wl~ general o~po.ltlOD

to the 1Mu41ate or •• tlon of .eparate .tat.. 1n Pal.stine. As

(1) Hanna, p.l)l.

~.

(2) Arnold J. TO'Jllb ••• Survel or International Att.ire, llll. Vol.I (London), pp.S.$S-5S&.

79

a luggestion onlJ, it proposed either the to~atlon of two

mandates or provisional oantonlzatlon.(l) In etteot, both

Parliament and the Mandatea Commission were at a 10a8 as to

how to resolve the problem and loathe to give an outright

decision.

The Jews themselves were divided on the question.

~.

Wel~ favored partition as it provided aomething better

than a cI78talllzed Jewish minority in aft Arab State.(2) But

the Twentieth Zionist Oongr •••• whioh met in August, rejeoted

the idea that the Mandate was unworkable and found partition

unacceptable. The non-Zionist members or the Jewl.h Agenoy

opposed a Jewish State altogether. Other members were tor hav­

ing a conterenoe ot Jew& and Arabs to explore the possibili­

ties of an undivided Palestine.(3)

Trans-Jordan and the Na.haahlbi taotion seemed to

favor a partItion plan as 1t meant a larger kingdom tor the

former and .aoendenoJ over the Husain! tor the latter.(4) But

in September. a Pan-Arab Congress at Bludan in Syria. repre­

sented by Pal •• tine, Tran .... Jordan, SYl'ia, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt

and the Hejaz, not only rejected partItion but brought up all

their old demand •• ($) This seemed to be a .ignal tor fresh

(1) Cantonizatlon oalled tor three zones, with eaoh zone reaponsible tor oertain adminlstrative work., while the Manda­tory controlled such matters a. torelgn relationa, customs eto.

(2)

()

(4)

Weismann, p.386.

SurveYOr InternatIonal AttaiX-.:l, 193Z. I. PP.547-548.

Ibid., p.S50. -(5) See E.oo Foundation. II, p.860 tor thea. demands.

80

outbreaks, tor immediately thereafter, on September 26, the

Aoting Dl.trlct Oommi •• ioner of Galil .. , L.Y. Andre"s, and -:

hia ml1lt&rJ eacort, were killed.

The Eve ot World War II

The resurgenoe ot terrorism ushers to a tinal phaae

1n our report. The di80rder8 of this era took on a more vlo­

lent torm. In the one ,.ear or 19)8 alon •• over 3000 deathe

are reoorded.Cl) The forms which the lawle •••••• took are too

num.roul to r.co...."t. The pipe11ne from Moaul to He,ita was

greatly d ... gedr a ne" airport at L7dda burn.dJ Arab bands

exaated reprisals on Araba who did not baok the cause; and

extremists imported tra. Syria tb~.d reb.l groupe which took

to lootIng and Dlurdering. The Jews tound it neo •• sarl to 01'­

gani.. tbelr own guerrilla banda a8 a .. ana or protection.

The.e are not to be oontu.ed with the terror1et gang. which

aro •• durIng and .tter World War 11.(2)

B7 September 30, the government hurrle41J enaoted

legislation outlawing a •• oelation. contr8rJ' to public vel­

rare. The next da7, the AZ'ab Bisher Ccmnltte. and it. natio­

nal committ ••• were 41s.01ved. Warrent. top the arrest or the

leaders were i.sued. But Raj Amin &l-HuI.1ni. the Pre.ident

of the Supr ... MOIl_ Oounoil, tleet to Lebanon, and Jamal Hu­

aaln!, head ot the Ar.b P8rt1, •• eaped to Syria. The dl •• o­

lutton lncr •••• d rather than lel •• ned tbe di.orders, tor the.e

(1) 10,81 Institute, Gr. Br., p.117'.

(2) Zltt, pp.l~63-464 11 ..... an aooount ot Arab aotlvitl •••

81

leade~8 atmp1, direoted aotlvltle. fromouta1de Paleatlne.(l)

'rhe Bri t18h then tried to m •• t the a1 tuatlon with Mi-...

l1tary oourt_, tor tho •• accused ot aabotage or b •• ring arma.

The.e aooomplisbed little, tor 1n the ,.ear 19)8, out ot )82

oa ••• tried, 141 were acquitted, although 38 were given 11r •

• entenoe. and 54 exeouted.(2)

Meanwhll.., 80 .a not to aroul. the Araba further,

the government h •• itated to advance the plan ot partition.

But on Januar, 4, 1938, it announced that • commie.lon would

be,d1apatohed to .tud7 the e.tabllshment of inelependent atate ••

It wal not until April 27. though, that it .eleote •• body

h.aded DJ 811' John Woodhead. During the oommi •• lon t • inve.ti­

gation, ma4e in KaJ, June and July, terNr!. •• oontinued and

prooe.ded to grow wor •• , even atter the oomml •• 1on lett tor

England. Nor did it help 8!lJ' to quiet the Araba that the immi­

gration quota tixed at 8000 to~ the pre"iou8 alx months v ••

reduced to )000 tor the Maroh-September perlod.Cl)

The Araba took advantage of the Ozechoalovakian arl-

81a in Europe and Great 3rltatn's inability to .end more troop.

to 'ale.tlne. Bal'17 10 Octobel' they oooupied the Old City of

J.neal •• tter 8om8 bombing and sniping raida. Fortunatel,. tor

the Britt.h, the oonolu8ion of the Munioh Agreement 1n septem­

ber enabled them to .end reintor-oemente, 80 that by the end

of Ootober tber reoooupied the Old Clty.

(1) !he British pre •• al.o sugge.ted that the rebel. were reoelvlng ar..a and mane, trom the a.PomaDa and Italian •• Burvey or International Attaira, 1938. II, Pp.41S-416.

(2) ROlal Institute, Or. Br., p.llS.

() Marlowe, pp.196-197.

82

Prom then on. the UIQ' began to cut down the guer­

rl11a banda b,. combing the v111ages and oountrY8ide. Failure ~.

ot v11lagel"8 to cooperate in exposing rebels brought on 001-

leot1ve puniahments in the form of tln •• and d •• tructlon ot

houses. B1 January. 19)9, the Arab rebellion bad 108t moat ot

1t8 torce.

On November 8, 1938, the Woodhead Commission had pre­

sented Its report to Parllament.(l) It rejected the re.l pro­

posal or partItion, oalled Plan A, .s it lett 294,700 Araba in

the Jewiah Stat. a. a,ainst 304,900 Jewa who had on1,. 1,140,200

dunams of land to the Araba' ),854.700. Thi. plan would have

onl, cont!nued the source ot friction in a .. ellar area. It

theretore sub8tituted two other plana. Plan B d1ttered fram

A in that it excluded Galll •• trom the Jewleh State, Making

1 t mandated terr1 tol"J, and lave about halt ot the _all coas­

tal are. below the corridor to the Arab Stat •• Two .embera ot

the Oommia.lon had rejected th" plan .a 1 t atill lett about

188,000 Arab. 1n the Jewlah State. Moreover, tbe7 telt that

the boun~l •• ot the Jevlah State were auch that they would

be dIfficult to derend. La.tll, Plan a out otf the Valley or

Eadr •• lon to the oo.at, providing tor a KorthernMandatect

TerrItory, aDd l ••• ing only the coaetal .trip tor the Jevlah

State. The aeml-ar14 region of southern Pale stine was _de a

Southem Mandatect Terrltor,-.

TbM Oommie,lon ooncluded that!![ plan ot partition

(1) s •• R07al Inltltute, Gr. Br., pp.164-167 tor the Pal •• tine Partition Oommie.lon Report. Ootober. 1238. 0.4.5854.

8)

would leave the Arab State dlfficult to lupport, deprived of

Jewish oapi tal and terri tor,. in whioh to expand •. Therefore, a.~·

an additional lugg.stion, it proposed the oreatlon of a customs

unlon with the mande.ted terrltories, In plaoe of partition.

However, it noted that such a plan would involve constitutional

dlfflcultl.s.

In the faoe ot th18 .1tuatlon, together with the Cam­

mia.lon'. Report, the govePl'llHnt i •• ued its usual White Paper

in which it agreed with the Oommis8ion on the ~praoticabl1lty

o·t oreating •• parate Stat... It then propola' a' conterenoe in

London of repr •• entatIv •• of the Pal •• tine Arabs, and theIr

neighbors, wIth those of the Jewish As.noT, to discuss a fu­

ture pollcJ.(l)

The Conterenoe oonvened on Februar)' 7, 19)9. Promi­

nent Arab leaders came tram Egypt, Saudi Ar~ula$ TraD~-Jordan

and Yemen, ., well .a Pal •• tine. The Jev1.h Aganof delegation

included member, ot the Ex.outlv., head.4 b.,. Weismann, and

Zionist and non-Zlonl,t leaders tram Great Brltaln, the United

Statea, France, Germany, Belgium, Poland, Bastern Burope and

South Afrioa. The Arabs refu.ed to sit with the Jevi 1.8 they

atl1l dId not recognize the Jewish Agencl. The British govern­

ment was forced to oonduct aeparate cont.pencea.

"The atmosphere ot futility which domlnatedthe Oon­

terenoe wal, ot courle, part ot the general atmolphe:re ot the

(1) Text ot thi. White Paper, Cmd. $893, tound in Sur-vey ot International Affaira, 1938. I, p.437. ---

84

time. It (1) In the presenoe ot Neville Chamberlain, the Prime

Minister, and Malcolm MaoDona14, the Colonial Seoretary, Weiz­

mann felt that the government was read, to plaoate the Arabs

as it was placating Hitler. An indication ot tni. came with

the revival ot the MoMahon and Hogarth communioations, whioh,

heretotore, had been Ignored. A committ •• ot English-Arab re­

pre.entatIv.I gathered the oomplete oorr •• pondenoe and by

March 17 published an offloial EnglIsh tranalation.(2)

But durtng the weeki of disous.lon, one tinds little

more than a zaelterat10n or old Jewish 814 Arab oontentions

whioh would aerve no purpo •• to restate here. In the cour ••

ot the talks, the British proposed •• veral plana to aatiety

both parti ••• Managing to set .revI and Arabi to .. et Intor­

mall,. on Februa1"7 2), MacDonald sugge.ted • termination ot the

Mandate and the establishment ot an 1ndependent Palestine

State. The governmental torm would be worked out atter a per­

iod ot tranal tlon. (.3) This plan and variationa ot 1. t wer.

found unaooeptable, at one t~ to the Jewa and, at other

ttme., to the Araba. A tlnal 8cheme called tor a Federal State

of oantona, giving the Jewa some author1.t,. in tho •• oantons

in whioh theJ were a majorit7. Both Jew. and Arabs rejected

1 t. (4) Wh •• eupon, the sovel"rllHnt deolded to work out 1 t. own

(1) W.l~, p.402.

(2) Eeoo Foundation, II, p.893.

(l) Ibid •• pp.896-898. -(4) SurV8Z ot International Attal •• , 19l8. It p.457.

8$

polioy.

In the meant1ae, it continued to oonter with the .:

Arab l •• dera of Iraq, ESYPt and Saud! Arabia. aepresentative.

ot theae three countri •• Met at Cairo in April and formulated

80me compromising proposal. which they forwarded to London.

The memorandum aocepted limited immigration, to end atter fIve

years) lought full indepandenoe atter ten 78.1'8, promised

safeguards tor the Jewa in the new Stat., wanted no British

representation on the Oonatituent Assembly, and oalle4 tor

drarting the oonet! tutlon aft •. J' three ,.e.rl. (1) Great Bri­

ta1n implied di.interestedn... in the memorandum by announ­

Cing the comins publication ot her definitive polio1.

This policy oame out in the eo-caUed White Paper ot

May 17, 1939. To the Zioniat. the world o .. r, ltv •• cona1-

dered a great betrayal. Well1J1l8DD oalled it the pre.determined

polloy or the Chamberlain government. He spoke later of re­

oeiving a letter from the Colonial Ottioe, ".ddr •••• d to me

obviously b1 a 01er1cal error--1t wa. apparently .eant only

tor members or the Arab delegation. TheN, in olear teNS,

waa the outline ot what was atterward to be the White Paper,

8ubmitted tor Arab approvall"(2) This va. during the London

Conterenoe. Howev.r thl. m81 be, all the importunities ot

Weismann, thereatter, to move Chamberlain to modity the Whit.

Paper, ~er. ot no avail.

(1) IbId., p.459. ~

(2) Weismann, p.406.

86

The government's new statement ot policy opened

with the declaration that !tit 18 not part ot their policy .:

that Palestine ,should beoome a Jewish Stateft.(l) The views

and proposals then outlined may be summarized as tollows,

1. Constitutions It desired selt-government tor Palesttne, but could not "toresee the exact oonstitutional forma" it would take. Theretore, it intended that, a. There be an Independent Pal •• tine State

in ten year., having treatl relations with the United Kingdom.

b. Arabs and Jew. share in the government. c. In transition, England was to have con­

trol ot the government and wa. to in­stall Palestinians in the various de­partment. aooording to Jeviah and Arab proportions in the population.

d. No oona1del'ation would be given to an elective le£ielature until conditions permitted.

2. Immigration, It was against ,topping immigra­tion altogether. Inltead, it provided that: a. For the next tive yearl, 7$,000 ~1-

grants be admitted to Paleattne on a ,..8ar11 quota ot 10,000, with the &d,d1-tion ot 25,000 refugeel. Atter that, ad­mis.ion could only be had it the Arabs permitted.

b. The HIgh Commis.ioner be ultimatel,. re­aponlible tor determIning the eoonomio capac! t,. ot Paleatine.

3. Landr The High Commis.ioner va. given power. to prohibit and regulate land. tranarera.

The British Parliament passed the White Paper by a

narrow majority, Denunoiations came from the Labor and Liberal

Parties on the score that England was disowning her obliga­

tions under the Mandate, The Conservative., in oontrol ot the

ministry. felt bound to support the government. One i. in­

clined to feel that the Engll~h Parties vere more intent on

-----------(1) Royal Institute, Gr, Br., pp.167-114 tor the com­

plete StateTiient ot Poliol_ Mal 1939. British White Paper, Cmd. 6019.

87

partisan politics than on a just settlement ot the Pale.tine

problem. (1)

As the White Paper based its position on nthe assur­

ances which have been given to the Arab people in the past",

the Permanent Mandatea Commission, whioh met in June, 1939,

proceeded to review the legality or this position. Ultimately,

it came about that when Malcolm MaoDonald was queried as to

the worth ot the Hogarth Measage, "he atill admltted ••• that

the Mandate wea muoh more an important inatrument than the Ho­

garth Mesaage".(2) Not long atter, the Commisslon handed it.

report to the Council otthe League of Natlo~. in whioh It

condemned the White Paper a~ "not in aooordance with the in­

terpretation whioh, in agreement with the Mandatory Power and

the Council. the Commission had placed upon the Palestine

Mandate".(J)

"

Naturally, the Jews were opposed to the White Paper,

tor it rejeoted most of what they sought under the Balfour

Declaration and the Mandate. The Twent7-tl~8t Zionist Con­

gress whioh met in Geneva, August 16, 1939, pursued the usual

course of debates and resolutions. But because ot the approach-

ing war. the delegate. felt "that nothing said or done at suCh

a moment could have meaning tor a long time to come".(4) A rew

(1) With the P ••• field Wh1te Paper ot 19)0, it was the Conservative Part~ whioh denounoed the government tor repudia­ting its mandatory obligat1ons., See above, p.64.

(2) Joseph, p.148.

(3) Eavo Foundation, II, p.927.

(4) Weizmann, p.413.

88

weeke later, "the fOung generation whioh had been 10 outraged

by the pollo,. ot the Chamberlain Govel"'D1ll8nt torgot 1 ta 8r1e. ~.

vancea and oame to the derense ot the OOUftV,. .a one manit. (1)

With tbe outbreak ot the- Seoon4 World War, tbe whole

PalestIne question entered a period of au.penelon. The Arabs

were pacIfIed to a great degree by the dutItul fulfIllment of

the White Paper's pollo,. on immigration. And the British had

played their hand well. Thelr conce •• lona were •• de with the

knowledge that Itthe Zionists, however 1nfurlated, could obvi­

oual,. be relied on not to make oommon caul. with their Nazi

pera.cutors, where •• the bOltl1Ity ot tbe Arabs (however tn­

etfectual in purely mi11tary tONe) pre.ented immediately a

formidable tHreat to the vital BrItish position 1n the Middle

Ea.t".(2) Ind.ed, Great Britaln's Middle Eastern pollo,. be­

tween the two World Ware may be typifIed .a a "gradual 11eld­

ing up by treati •• negotiated with the moderate nationalist

torcea. ot suoh attribute. ot power .a were not vital to Bri­

taIn'. imp •• lal intere.ta".(l)

Th18 may be •• 1d 1n respect of the Arab.. In Jewish

ey.s, that "yielding up" wal at the expen •• ot the Balfour De.

claration.

By 1921 'ran.-Jordan was lopped ott, in 1922

(1) ~ •• Pp.41S-416. (2) Survey ot International Attaira, The World in March

!2.l.2.. p.ll8.

(3) Surveyor International Att.1ra: The Middle Ea.t in the War, p.19.

free immigration beoame immigration on the ba­sia ot eeonomic obsorptive oapaoitYJ in 1933 land sales were restrioted; in 1931 partItion waa aocepted by the Government, in 1938 parti­tlcn was rejected by the Government; and in 1939 we see the funeral ot the Mandate •. (l)

89

In the final analysls, we find tbat the foreign con­

trol imposed In Arab oountrles was not tor the sake ot the

Inhabl tanta.

It, came about as an inoident In the unceasing, all-embracing interneoine atrite ot the Wes­tern Nations. 'lh.,. occupied the Middle Eest in order to go soae\dtere e lae, or t.o prevent their rival. doing .o •••• What was im.portant for them was the land and ita resource ••••• Brltaln and France never had a :t-1iddle Eastern po11or.They had 80me sort ot policT--or .everal sorts-­into whioh the Middle East had to tit.(2)

"

For this very reason, it see~. appropriate to end

here our study or Great Britain and Palestine. During and fol­

lowing World War II, new tore •• and policies enter the Pales­

tine scene. The United stat •• assumed a major role atter the

War and had a voice in Palestine affairs .. The Arab world uni­

ted in an Arab League. The Jews placed themselve. on a mili­

tary tooting, 80 that clash •• between Arabs and J~w. assUMed

ditterent proportions. Great Britain deoided to relinquish

her Mandate. The United Nationa proposed to aasume it. The

State ot Israel was established. And to this day, the problem

ot Palestine and its Arab refugees haa not been so17ed.

(l) Joseph, p.165 as taken from a parliamentary speech of Tom William8. House ot Commons, Otticial Report, Mal 22, 1939.

(2) Albert Hourani. "Decline ot the West in the Middle East ft

, International Aftair., XXIX (January, 1953), p.30 • ......

90

BIBLIOGRAPHY

" Pl'1!an Sourc ••

Baker, Ra7 Stannard. The Publio ra28.1 or Woodrow Willon. Vol.III (lew York, 1921).

Conventlon Betw.en the United Stat •• and Gr •• t Britaln. Treat7 aeries, 10.128 (W •• hington, 1926).

Goooh, G. p., and Herold 'emper18Y, 84. British Dooumenta on the Origine ot the War, 1898-1914 (London, l~j2). 12 vot ••

Lloyd aeorS8, Dav14. ~lr. or the P •• ce Oonterenoe (Ie ... Baven, 1939). 2 voil.

Pal •• tine RoZel Oommie.lon Report. aBd.S479 (London, July, 1931).

Storre, Slr Ronald. The Meaolrl of Slr Ronald Storr. (lew York, 1937) •

U.S. Dept. ot State. Apalo-Amerloan COIal'tee ot Ingula (Wash­Ington, 1946).

u.s. Dept. of state. Pore 1ft Relatione ot the United St.t ••• PublioatioD' trOll 191~- J4 (W.86Iqton'.

U.S. Dept. ot State. Mandate tor Pal •• tine (Washington, 1931).-

W.inatm,Chaba. Trial and Enor (llew York, 1949).

An autobiography by one who a.sURed le.der.hip in the Zio­nist movement tram It. earll •• t y •• r ••

Woodward, E. L., and Rohan Butler, ad. Doo .... nt. 011 Bri tiah Foreifij PollOI. 1919-1919. Firat Serl ••• 'ol.tv (London, i91~7- 52).

Seoond_a Souroe.

Andrew., F. F. The Roll Land under Mandate ( Oambridge, 1931). 2 Y01.8.

Thi. work 1. us.ful b7 rea.on ot its oopioul u,. of 4oou­mentar, soUPOe .at.rial.

Antonius, aeorS8. The Arab Awakening (Philadelphia, 1939).

An indispensable study ot the Arab National Movement.

Arth~! Sir aeorS8 C. A. Lite ot Lord Kitohener (New York, 1920). 3 vola.

91

Lord Kltohener, a8 a pre-World War I Hlgh OaMmi •• loner ot Egrpt, had a craep of the British po.ltlon 1n the lear,E •• t.

Baker J RaJ' Stannard. Wood.J.-ow Wileon and World Settlement (Gar-': den City, W.v York, 1~!~). j v01a.

aentW!Cht

Norman. Pal.atine ot the Jewa. P.at, Pre.ent and Pu­~ London, 1~1').

Although written b1 an authority on Pal.,tine, th18 book 1. helpful onlJ ••• baoksround stud,.

Blaok, J.B. The aeiE otElla.beth, 1228-1603 (OXford, 1936).

Used a •• reterenoe tor ins1and'. earlJ commeroial intereate.

DeHaaa Jaoob. Theodor Berel (lfew York, 1927). 2 vol ••

A nece •• arr blosrapbJ ot the man re.pon.ibl. tor the tor­matlon of the Zionist Consre •••••

Dugdale, Blanohe E. a.. Arthv Jam.. BaltOUl', Firat Barl 01' Balfour (Xew York, 1"3').

Eeoo Foundation tor Pal •• tine. Pal •• t11'1e, A Stu41 of Jewlah, Arab and Brltl,h Poll01.! (Rew Bavan, 194". vo! ••

Thia work proved 'Valuable in prov141na cloo.anta,..,. and ata­t1atloal retereno •••

Friedrich, Carl J. Aael'loaft PONie PoliOI on Pale.tine (Wa.h­ington, 1944).

8r1al Por08 in Sinai and •

A h1ghlJ intereatlDs and vel"J well wltten eooount ot Dr1-tlah atrat.,loal and tactioal operation. in the Middle East during World War I.

Hanna, Paul L. Brltlah Poliol ln Pal •• tine (Wa.hington, 1942).

Thla va. one ot the be.t documented booka uI.d, but It va. 80 condensed at t1 .. a .a to caus. a.. oontusion.

Hooking, William E. !he Spirit ot World Politic. (Wew York, 1932).

Oontain. reterence. to the ,enera1 polioi •• or Great Britaln and Pran.. 1n the Hear East.

BOlklnl, aaltord L. Brltl.h Rout •• to India (W.w York, 1928).

A thoJ!tOugh atudJ' ot Enslan4' 8 COIIIIeroial Intereata tr. her earll.at ,.aara, ahowlng th~1r relation to con.equent poll-

92

tioal oontacta.

Hyameon, A.M. Palestine Under the Mandate (London, 1950).

Bramson, A.M. Palestine (New York, 1917).

~.

Both ot these works by HY8mson, while written in a popular style, oontain details not readily found in other books.

Joseph, Bernard. BritIsh Rule in Palestine (Washington, 1948).

The value of this book li.. in the very evident pro-Zionllt use ot source material. It gives one an understanding or the thinking and arguments or 8ame Zieniata.

Kohn, Hans. A Historl ot Nationalism in the East (Hew York, 1929).

otters only a general survey ot it. subject.

Lawrence, T.E. Seven Pillar. ot Wisdom (lew York, 1935).

Pr •• ent. the exploit. ot Oolonel Lawrenoe among the Arabs with a luggestion ot exaggeration.

Manuel, ~.E. The Realit!e. or American.Pal •• tine Relationa (Waahlngton,iq¢9).

Marlowe, John. Rebellion in Palestine (London, 1946).

This author'. contribution lies in the personal appraisal he make. or the tox-ce. at work in the Pale.tine question.

Haiditoh, Iaaac. Edmond de RothschIld (Wa.hlngton, 1945).

A ~all but creditable study ot the great phIlanthropist.

Roral Institute ot International Attair •• Great Britain and Palestin., 1912-19~. Intormation Paper. 10.20 (ton!on, 1946) •

The wealth ot documentUJ' a.terial make. 'this book one ot the mOlt usetul employed.

Sakran, Frank O. Pal •• ttne Dilemma (Washington, 1946).

A review .1milar to that ot John Marlowe'. Rebellion 1n Pal •• tine.

Seton-William., M.V. Britain and the Arab State. (London, 1948).

The appen41oe. are ot pertlcul~ valu., reproduoing numerous tx-e.tle. and asre ... nt. between England .nd the Arab Stat.s.

93

Sldebotham, Herbert. Gr.at Britain and Paleatine (London, 1937).

The book's t.portanoe li •• in the author'. journall~tl0 baokground and contact. with Zionism.

Stoyanov8k7. J. The Mandate tor Pale.tine (London, 1928).

An historical and legalistio analysi. ot the Pale.tine Mandate tormula.

Temperley, Harold, and Lillian M. Pen,on, ed. Foundation. ot ~tt.h Poreige PolloI, 1792-1902 (London, 1938).

"

Toynbee, Arnold J. Survel ot International Attaira. 1936 (Lon­don).

--4onl.---2-vo~-.;

-I-u;on4onr.

Survel ot International Attairl. 1911 (Lon­

flurveX ot Internatlon~ Attaira, 1938. Vol.

survey ot Intema-tional Att.ir.. !he World rtf-Xarch 1932 (Lenla •

SlQ'"e,. of International Attair" The Mlddle ---E"~-lli--tlii War (tonlon). -

Walters,P.l .. A Hlat0!:I of the League ot lfatlona. Vol.I (Lon­don, 19,2).

Ward, Sir A.W., and G.P. Gooch, e4. The 08Mbrl~. Hllto£7 of BritI.h POreign Pol107 (lew York, 192~.lq2j • j voXa.

Web,ter, Sir Chul ••• The '01',119 PollOI ot Palmeraton. 1830-!!!!1! (London, 19$1). ! '101 ••

Reoount, the more Important 19th oenturJ oonnectiont between Judal'. and the EnSll'h people.

Wright, Qulno7. Mandate, Under the Le.~. or latioDA ,Chloag?, 1930) •

A soholarlf .tudJ of the orig1n and oonatltut1on ot the mandate .,..t_.

Zlt!, WIlliam B. The RaE- ot Pal •• tine (W.w York, 19)8).

While ,tronglr partlal to Zionl •• , the author" narratIve ot the Pal.stinian conflict. 1. probab17 the moat d •• crip­tlv8 to be tound.

APPElilDIX I

Article 22 of the Covenant ot the

League ot Nationa.

9h

~.

1. To tho •• colonie. and territories whioh .e a oonsequenoe

ot the late war have oeas.d to be under the sovereignt,. ot the

States which tormerl,. governed them and which are inhabIted by

peoples not yet able to stand by themsel ••• under the strenu­

ous conditions of the modern world. there ahould be applIed

the principle that the well-being and development ot such peo­

pl •• to~ a laored trust ot oivilization and that seourities

tor the perfomance ot tMs trust should be embodied in th1s

Covenant.

2. The best method ot giving praotioal ettect to thla prin­

ciple i. that tn. tutelas_ ot such peopl...hould be entrua­

ted to advanoed nations who, b7 reaeon ot their resouroes,

their experienoe or their geographical poei.tion. can beet un­

dertake this re.ponelbl1it,., and Who are wIllIng to acoept it,

and that thia tutelage ehould be exerols.d by them .a Manda­

toriea on behalf ot the League.

3. The character ot the mandate must differ acoording to the

atage ot the de.,.elopment ot til. people, the geographioal Ii tu­

ation of the terrltorJ, it' economl0 oondltions and other sl­

mllar circum.tanoe ••

4. Certatn oommunitle. formerly belonging to the Turk1sh Em­

pire have reaohed a atage ot development where their existenoe

• Section. not relevant to the Pale,tine Mandate have been omitted.

95

as independent nation8 can be provisionally reoognized sUb­

ject to the rendering ot administrative advice and assistanoe ~.

by a Mandatory until such ttme as they are able to stand alone.

The wishes ot these communities must be the prime oonsideration

in the selection of the Mandatory_

7. In every 088e ot mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the

Counoil an annual report in reference to the territory commit.

ted to its charge.

S. The degree ot authority. oontrol or administration to be

exeroised by the Mandatory Ihall, it not previously agreed up­

on by the Members ot the League, be explioitly defined 1n eaoh

oaa. by theCounoil.

9. A Permanent Oommisslon ahall be constItuted to receive and

examine the annual reports ot the Mandatories and to advise

the Counoil on all Mattera relating to the observanoe ot the

Mandate ••

96

APPENDIX II

Mandate for Palestine*

Art.l The Mandator7 ahall have full power. ot legislation and

of administration. lave as they may be limited by the

terms ot this mandate.

~.

Art.2 The Mandatory ahall be responsible tor placing the ooun­

try under suoh political, administrative and economic

conditions a8 will aecure the establIshment ot the Jew-

ish national home, .8 laid down in tne preamble, and

the development or self-governing institutiona, and al­

so tor sateguarding the civil and religious rights ot

all inhabitants ot Pal.stine, lrreepeotlve ot race and

religion.

Art.) The Handatorr ahall, 80 tar al circumstances permit,

encourage local autonomJ.

Art.l.... An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised a8 Ii

publio body tor the purpose or advi.lng and oo-ope~a­

tins with the Administration ot Pal.stine in such eco­

nomic, social and other matters .a ma1 atrect the es­

tablIshment ot the Jewish national home and the inter­

est. of the Jewish population ln Pale.tine, and, subjeot

always to the oontrol ot the Administration. to a •• lst

and take part in the development ot the count17.

The Zionist organisatIon, 80 long as its organ1 •• -

* As • complete text ot the Mandate tor Pal •• tine may be tound in almost any book dealing with the Paleatine ques­tion, only thoae article. are reproduoed herein whioh have more direct bearing on our study.

97

tion and constitution are in the opinion ot the Man­

dator,. appropriate, shall be recognised a. such agenoy .... ·

It shall take step. in oonsultation with His Britannio

Majeatits Government to secure the co-operation ot all

Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment ot

the Jewish national home.

Art.6 The Administration ot PalestIne, While ensuring that

the rights and p08ition of other B.ctions ot the popu­

lation are not prejudIced, shall tacilitate Jewish im­

migration under Buitable oonditions and ahall enoourage,

in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in

artiele 4, oloa. settlement by Jews on the land, inolud­

ing State lands and waate lands not required tor publio

purposes.

Art.ll The Administration or Palestine ahall take all nece.eary

mea.ure. to safeguard the interest. or the communit7 in

conneotion with the development or the oountry, and,

subject to an,. international oblilatlon8 acoepted bi

the Mandatory. ihall have tull power to provide tor pub­

lio ownership or control of any of the natural resouroe.

ot the country or ot the public worke, .ervicee and uti­

lities established or to be established therein. It

.hall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs

ot the count17, having regard, am.ong other things, to

the desirability ot promoting the 01088 settlement and

intensive oultivation ot the land ••••

Art.l3 All responsibIlity in connection with the Holy Plaoes

98

and religious buildings or sitee in PalestIne, includ­

ing that of preserving existing rights and ot seouring -:

tree acoess to the Holy Places, relIgious buildings

and sites and the tree exeroise ot worship, while en­

suring the requirements ot public order and deoorum,

1s assumed by thb Mandatory, who ahall be responsible

801ely to the League ot Nations in all matters connec­

ted her~with, provided that nothing in this articl~

shall prevent the Mandatory trom entering in.to such

arrangements as he mar deem reasonable with the Admin­

istration tor the purpose ot carrying the provisions

ot thIs article into etrect; and provided also that

nothing in this mandate shall be construed a& conter­

ring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with

the fabrio or the management ot purely Moslem saored

shrines, the immunitIe.of which are guaranteed.

Art.22 English, Arabic and Hebrew ahall be the official lan­

guages ot Palestine. Any statement or inscription in

Arabic on stamp. or money in Pal •• tine shall be re­

peated in Hebrew, and any statement or insoription in

Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.

Art.25 In the terrItories lying between the Jordan and the

eastern boundary of PalestIne 8S ultimetely determined,

the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent ot

the Counoil of the League of NatIon., to postpone or

withhold application ot such provisions of this mandate

as he mar oonsider Inapplioable to the existing looal

99

condItions. and to make such provision tor the admi­

nistration of the territories a8 he Ma,. oonsider 8ult- ,;

able to those conditiona, provided that no action ahall

be taken which 18 inconsistent with the provi81on8 ot

articles 15. 16 and 18.*

Art.27 The oonsent ot the Council ot the League ot Nations i.

required tor an, modification ot the term. of this man­

date.

* These articles provide tor tr.edom ot vorship and non-disorimination 1n matters ot relIgion, taxation and com­merce.