May 27th 2016

DANU Strategic Forecasting Group

Backgrounders: Mali

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Foreword

DANU Strategic Forecasting GroupDANU SFG is a student run multinational Think Tank that seeks to forecast future developments in security and intelligence related fields. Our mission is to facilitate discussion surrounding conflicts, their current developments and their future trajectories. We aim to increase public awareness of con-flicts that receive less coverage in the media, or that are generally less understood, but nevertheless pose potential risks for their region. Through the use of clear and concise conflict intelligence fore-casts, easily digestible by the expert and layman alike, we see our products assisting our consumers by informing them of potential future conflict scenarios and their likelihood. By consistently and sys-tematically producing our forecasts we strive to become one of Europe’s leading student led Think Tanks.

For more work by the DANU SFG, visit comprehensiveanalysis.com. Further analysis on Libya and Mali will be published, as well as a strategic forecast.

BackgroundersThe following document consists of background memos on various topics relating to Libya and Mali. Members of the DANU SFG research a specific areas of interest to help identify key indicators. These indicators will be used in further analysis to generate the strategic forecast for the next ten years in Libya and Mali.

The backgrounders were edited by Sana Chaudhry and Ewan Gordon.

Formatted by Adrienne Ruth.

For more information please visit comprehensiveanalysis.com

May 27th 2016

Regensburg, Germany

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Table of Contents

Foreword....................1

Table of Contents....................2

Summaries....................3

Backgrounders....................6

- The President of Mali ....................7

- The Prime Minister of Mali....................9

- Economy of Mali....................11

- Development of Mining Industry in Mali....................14

- Foreign Aid to Mali....................17

- Tuareg Militia in Mali....................19

- Ansar Dine....................22

- Operation Serval and Operation Berkhane....................24

Resources....................26

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1 This section is a compilation of summaries from each of the background memos. The purpose of creating this section was to produce BLUF (bottom line up front). BLUF is routinely seen in executive summaries, in reports, and abstracts in scholarly articles. BLUF is considered an essential skill.

Summaries

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Summaries

Mali

The President of Mali Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, current President of Mali since 2013, has attended the University of Dakar, the University of Paris, and the Institute d'Histoire des Relations Internationales Contemporaines. He has founded the Alliance of Democracy in Mali, whilst simultaneously becoming its active Secretary for African and International Relations, back in May of 1991. President Keita is most notoriously known for his construction of the political party ‘Rally for Mali (RPM)’ back in June 2001.

The Prime Minister of Mali Modibo Keita was appointed Prime Minister of Mali for the second time in 2015. There is a severe lack of information regarding his background and personal situation. Even his date of birth cannot be established. This creates severe challenges when analysing his personal and political agenda, as well as the political structure of Mali. It also creates challenges when engaging with Mali as a whole.

Economy of MaliThe economy of Mali ranks among the twenty-five weakest countries in the world and over 44 percent of the people live below the poverty line. The economy mainly relies on agriculture, constituting 40 percent of the GDP and employing 80 percent of the labour force, and mining. Both agriculture and mining are heavily influenced by global commodity prices, which make the economy highly vulnerable to price shocks. Besides commodity price vulnerability, the country also has problems with corruption, political instability and the effects of climate change.

Development of Mining Industry in MaliMali is the third largest exporter of gold on the African continent. Commercial gold mining and exploration in the country have only started since 1984 because of the economic instability and violence encountered in the region. Mali’s underdeveloped mining industry and natural resource richness provide an almost risk free environment for future investors.

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Foreign Aid to MaliThe Republic of Mali is one of the poorest countries on earth, as well as one of the largest recipients of foreign aid. Foreign aid, which accounts for over one quarter of their national budget, seeks to improve the livelihood of the Malian people and support transparent state infrastructures. However, aid implementation faces many challenges, which spur from endemic corruption.

Tuareg Militia in MaliBoth Tuareg militia and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are a threat to Mali’s internal security and regional stability. Those actors are most probably intending to take power in future if a democratic and stable government cannot be established permanently.

Ansar DineAnsar Dine (Defenders of Faith) is a paramilitary terrorist group of insurgents based in Northern Mali operating throughout the entire country. The group is led by Iyad Ag Ghaly. Their objective is to impose Sharia law throughout Mali. Their primary operations are against the Malian military and opposing rebel groups.

Operation Serval and Operation BerkhaneFrance launched Operation Serval in conjunction with eight other African nations in response to advancing Islamist insurgents aiming to topple the Malian government. The operation was a success in not only barring the offense, but also in re-establishing government control throughout Mali. This was followed by Operation Berkhane which has the aim of establishing a permanent army.

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2 - The President of Mali- The Prime Minister of Mali- Economy of Mali- Development of Mining

Industry in Mali- Foreign Aid to Mali- Tuareg Militia in Mali- Ansar Dine- Operation Serval and

Operation Berkhane

By P. Angelini, N. Christodoulides, R. Florescu, E. v. Gent, E. D. Hansen, E. Langvad, L. Pirlea J. Ricker.

Edited by E. Gordon

Backgrounders

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By Paul Angelini

• From May 25th to 26th, 1991, in addition to being the founding father the of Alliance of Democracy in (ADEMA-PASJ), Keita was also appointed as its Secretary for African and International Relations.

• From 1994 - 2000, Keita served as Prime Minister.

• On February 14th, 2000, Keita resigned as Prime Minister.

• In June 2001, Keita founded his own party - Rally for Mali (RPM).

• From 2002 - 2007, Keita served as Speaker of the National Assembly.

• From 2013 to present, Ibrahim Keita has been serving as the acting President of Mali.

Section 1

The President of Mali - Ibrahim Boubacar Keita

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Education Ibrahim Boubacar Keita attended the University of Dakar, the University of Paris and the Institut d'Histoire des Relations Internationales Contemporaines (IHRIC: Institute of the Modern History of International Relations). He holds a Master's degree in History, as well as an additional graduate degree in Political Science and International Relations.

Political TenureUpon the founding of the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA-PASJ), Keita became its Secretary for African and International Relations at its constitutive congress, held between May 25 to 26th 1991. However, due to disagreements within the ADEMA, Keita resigned as Prime Minister on February 14th 2000; following with his resignation from the leadership of the party in October 2000. Keita then founded his own party, the Rally for Mali (RPM), which he has led since its official status was announced on June 30th, 2001. Ibrahim Boubacar Keita has been the elected President of Mali since September 2013 after also running for the office in 2002 and 2007. He was the Prime Minister of Mali from 1994 - 2000, speaker of the National Assembly from 2002-2007. As acting President, Keita has the support of fifteen political parties that signed a memorandum of agreement on January 12th 2012, with ambitions to "create a Republican and Democratic centre that is strong and stable."

Multi- Party System / Coalition GovernmentThe political parties consist of: Movement for the Independence, Renaissance and African Integration (Miria), the Union of Mali for Progress (UMP), the Malian Union-African Democratic Rally, the African Front for the mobilization and alternation (Fama), the Rally of Democratic Republicans (RDR), the Rally for Justice in Mali (RJD), Sigikafo Oyédamouyé Party (PSO), the Democratic Consultation, the Party of the difference in Mali (PDM), the Socialist and Democratic Party of Mali (PSDM), the People's Progress Party (PPP), the PPM, the MPLO, the RUP, the Democratic Action for Change and Alternative in Mali (ADCAM) and the Rally for Mali (RPM).

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By Elise Degnan Hansen

• He was born in Koulikoro, Mali (unknown DOB).

• Modibo Keita previously served as Prime Minister of Mali for three months (March-June) in 2002 under-then President Alpha Oumar Konare.

• Keita also headed the government delegation that negotiated with separatists in 2014.

• He is a member of the party ‘Alliance for Democracy in Mali’.  

• There is a severe lack of personal information surrounding Prime Minister Modibo Keita.   His date of birth varies between 1942, 1943 and 1953.   Little is known about his upbringing and family situation.  This makes it challenging to identify his political agenda and motivations.

Section 2

Prime Minister of Mali - Modibo Keita

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IntroductionFollowing the March 2012 Tuareg militias uprising in Mali, which resulted in a military coup of the capital Bamako, the government fell apart. Islamic rebels took advantage of the situation and gained control of the Northern parts of Mali. The violent situation prompted a French military intervention that stripped the militants of their powers. Following the resignation of the previous Prime Minister, Moussa Mara and his government, Modibo Keita was appointed Prime Minister of Mali by President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in January of 2015.  

Alliance for Democracy in MaliThe Alliance for Democracy in Mali is a social democratic party.  It is a pan-African party for liberty, solidarity and justice (ADEMA). ADEMA is an umbrella movement, which includes activists from several organisations including Sudanese/African Democratic Rally, the Malian Party for Revolution and Democracy, the Malian Party of Labour, the Malian Popular and Democratic Front.  In addition they attracted many supporters without previous political affiliation.

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By Egbert van Gent

• 44 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, according to 2009 estimates.

• 80 percent of the labour force works in agriculture.

• Agriculture is important for export, mainly cotton, and for sustenance farming, millet and sorghum.

• Mali's export depends on gold and cotton. These products are heavily influenced by commodity prices and thus are an unreliable source to build a stable economy.

• Corruption, political instability and ecological issues slow down economic development.

Section 3

Economy of Mali

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Mali’s economy is weak as it is dependent on three parts – agriculture, mining and services – from which both agriculture and mining are highly dependable on commodity prices and climate change. Mali’s economy also suffers from the corruption and political instability within the country.

General InformationMali has a GDP per capita of $1.600 (PPP) and, according to the World Bank, in 2015 Mali was ranked among one of the twenty-five poorest countries in the world. In 2015, the real growth rate of the GDP was around 5 percent. The unemployment rate of Mali is estimated to have been around 30 percent in 2015, an increase of 21.8 percent, from 8.2 percent in 2014. Out of the nearly 17 million inhabitants in 2009 it was estimated that around 44 percent live below the poverty line. It is likely the real percentage of people living in poverty is higher due to the increased unemployment rate and the instability of the country. Mali has a trade deficit of around 100 billion CFA Francs, approximately 170 million US$.

Agriculture Agriculture is one of the main components of the economy and constitutes nearly 40 percent of the GDP. 80 percent of the labour force works in agriculture and 20 percent work in industry and services. Agriculture in Mali is important economically and is especially important because most of the farming is done on a small scale, sustenance focussed level which feeds the country’s population. The major crops are cotton, rice and cereals – such as sorghum, millet and maize. Millet and sorghum are important for the food security of the country as well as for poverty reduction. Rice constitutes more to the household incomes and general economic growth. Cotton is one of the major export products of the country. In 2013, raw cotton constituted 60 percent of the exports of the country, however due to the price fluctuations of cotton it is an unreliable source for economic growth. Additionally, climate change has a notable impact on cotton production. Due to shortening rainy seasons, cotton production will sharply decrease. Geographically the agricultural region is in the south of the country surrounding the Niger River Delta, between Bamako and Mopti towards the southern borders.

In the area just above the cities of Bamako and Segou, as well as in the dry areas around Timbuktu, agriculture is more focussed on livestock. The development of better livestock farming throughout the country can help constitute to a growth in household incomes as well as increase nutrition. However, due to the strong fluctuation in rainfall in the country drought can be very dangerous for cattle and can lead to further economic downfall.

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Hindering Factors for DevelopmentThe economy suffers from other problems besides climate change and commodity price fluctuation. Corruption is a big problem in the country. Mali ranks 35 out of 100 on the Corruption Perceptions Index, with 0 being highly corrupt and 100 being fully clean. Corruption is known to have a negative effect on all parts of society as it is related with documentation of property rights, international aid, government positions and land distribution to elites and international buyers, without consent of the current owners of the land. In addition to corruption is the problem of political instability which leads to a decrease in international trust resulting in decreases Foreign Direct Investment and discourag-ing international trade.

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By Nikolas Christodoulides

• Mineral exploration in the country started in 1984.

• Mali is Africa’s third largest gold producer.

• Considerable deposits of bauxite, iron ore, manganese, tin, and copper are also known to exist.

• Only six out of 113 potentially gold rich regions of the country have been mapped out.

Section 4

Development of Mining Industry in Mali

Introduction:Mali’s natural resources that are currently being mined include gold, phosphates, kaolin, salt, limestone, uranium, gypsum and granite. Mali is Africa’s third largest gold producer. Gold represents 95% of the country's overall mineral production. Kimberlite pipes have been also located, some of them diamondiferous, but further exploration which results in commercial production has not occurred yet. Considerable deposits of bauxite, iron ore, manganese, tin, and copper are known to exist in the country but they have not been mined because of a lack of proper transportation infrastructure. It should be mentioned that experts in the field of economics and the mining industry consider iron ore’s existence in a country more important than oil because it is one of the main raw materials used extensively in emerging manufacturing economies.

Gold Mining and Mali’s diversification of mining industry:After the government’s reformation of the mineral code in 1991, foreign mining companies and investors have accelerated the development of the country’s mining industry. Whereas all mines are still state-owned, some quarries are privately owned. Since 1997, Mali has attracted $850 million in new gold development investments and the goal of producing 50,000 kg of gold per year by 2006 has been achieved. Mali is also in the process of developing its iron ore extraction industry in order to achieve diversification of foreign exchange earnings away from gold, but the pace will largely depend on global price trends.

Foreign companies operating in Mali and artisanal mining:Mali’s government has no state-owned mining companies and that is proved by the number of foreign mining companies operating in the country. The list consists of the AngloGold Ashanti, IAMGOLD Corporation, St. Watson Mining Company, Cluff Gold, African Mining and Exploration, Avnel Gold Mining Limited, AXMIN Inc., Merrex Gold Inc., Great Quest Metals Ltd, Spartacus Company and PG Natural Resources. Artisanal mining has been banned during certain parts of the year in the country because of water competition between farmers and individual miners but also due to environmental pollution inflicted by the overuse of mercury.

Mali’s mining potential and obstacles in reaching it:Morila, Sadiola and Loula are Mali’s three major gold mines. The first two used to produce over 80% of the country’s gold whereas the new Loula mine which opened in 2005 is producing more than 250,000 ounces of gold per year. The country’s potential is also understood only if it is considered that only about six of the 133 potentially gold rich regions in the country have been mapped out.

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Mali’s mining potential and obstacles in reaching it, continued:Mali’s mining richness is still undervalued due to the lack of the country’s economic stability and the violence encountered in the region. Lack of critical infrastructure is also one of the most important obstacles that foreign mining companies have to deal with when operating in the country. Whereas Mali’s future might prove difficult to predict, the country’s developing mining industry is seen as a source for future economic development and investment.

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By Johnathon Ricker

• Over 25% of Mali’s state budget is financed by foreign aid.

• In 2014, Mali was the most deadly place for UN Aid Workers.

• Mali ranks 179 out of 188 on the Human Development Index.

• Mali ranks 148 out of 152 on the Gender Inequality Index.

• 36.1% of Mali lives below the poverty line.

• Mali’s GDP(PPP): $29.15 billion.

• GDP Per Capita: $1,800.

• GDP Real Growth Rate 5%.

• 80% of Mali’s labour force is dedicated to agriculture.

Section 5

Foreign Aid to Mali

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List of Foreign Aid DonorsThe Republic of Mali receives aid from many multilateral donors including: International Monetary Fund; World Bank (International Finance Corporation, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, International Development Association, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development); African Development Bank; Arab Funds; European Union; and the United Nations. Additionally, the Republic of Mali receives aid through a number of bilateral aid partnerships with the United States; France; Denmark; United Kingdom; Canada; Belgium; Luxembourg; Netherlands; Sweden; Japan; China; and Germany. Furthermore, Mali also received support from a number of NGOs.

Foreign Aid Goals and ProgramsForeign aid to the Republic of Mali comes in many forms and seeks to improve different aspects of society. Promoting democratic institutions, responsive governance, and respect for human rights are some of the broader aid goals. Some of the ways that foreign aid programs seek to alleviate poverty are through greater access to loans; reduction in the time for business registration; increas-ing access to electricity; reducing pollution; promoting policy reforms; allowing for easier property titles registration; promoting foreign direct investment; enhancing mutual understanding with partner countries; constructing schools; training teachers; funding hospitals; providing vaccines; training doctors; spreading health sanitation awareness; building latrines; implementing micro irrigation; improving post harvest processing; drilling water wells; turning rural roads into all weather roads; and constructing river jetties and pedestrian overpasses.

"We are poor not because of a lack of aid, we are poor because aid does not reach the targeted populations." – Malian Teacher

Challenges to Foreign AidAid implementation faces many challenges from endemic corruption within the government, religious institutions, and amongst influential families. The lack of oversight and accountability allows for an environment in which aid resources are not used to their fullest potential, thus hinder-ing economic growth and the development of sustainable livelihoods.

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By Lia Pirlea

• The Tuareg are a nomadic tribe with Berber origins.

• Artificial creation of the Malian borders has created cultural issues within the country.

• The Tuareg have separatist tendencies and accuse the central government of disregard.

• In 2012, Tuareg people declared unilateral independence from the Malian Republic.

• In 2015, a peace agreement was signed between the central government and Tuareg.

• AQIM is a violent non-state actor engaged in criminal and terrorist activities.

Section 6

Tuareg Militia in Mali

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IntroductionThe Tuareg people are nomadic tribes of Berber origin located in Northern Africa. However, with the creation of artificial borders in Africa, the Tuareg people have found themselves sharing the state of Mali with other political, ethnic and cultural groups. One of the aims of the Tuareg rebels in Mali is to fight for the independence of the Azawad territories in the North of Mali, which the Tuareg militias consider theirs. The central government located in Bamako is accused by the Tuareg militias of negligence and isolation. They also argue that the government is more interested in protecting the interests of the territories in the Southern part of the country.

In the early 1990s, Tuareg rebels perpetrated a series of revolts. Diplomatic and military interventions by the central government achieved little. In 2007 there was an another Tuareg militia insurrection in the North. In 2011, with the civil war in Libya and with the ease to move munitions between the countries, the insurrection had the firepower to achieve their objectives. In April 2012, the movement unilaterally declared independence from the central government. The Tuareg were able to declare independence because the country was experiencing a power vacuum after a coup d’état. Nonetheless, in 2015, after the intervention of France and UN, the Tuareg rebels agreed on signing a peaceful agreement in order to stop the conflict between the North and the central government. The agreement provided some special powers, but not the independence as re-quested by the Tuareg. This aspect might lead to another rebellion in the near future.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) AQIM is a terroristic group that arose in Algeria in 2007. However, with different conflicts in the area and with the possibility to move freely between countries, AQIM became a constant presence in the Northern Mali. AQIM is involved in illegal trafficking in the Sahel area. The group is a major actor in the trafficking of luxurious cars, cigarettes smuggling and kidnapping for ransoms. The group controls a complex network of people smuggling. It is considered that the group has a Mafia-style operating system where the business is based on family connections and less frequently, ideological affiliation. It is considered that the group tends to capture mostly French and Spanish citizens for historical reasons. The group sees both Spain and France occupying territories (for example, Andalucía on the Spanish coast) that are seen historically as part of the Caliphate.

In Mali the collaboration between Tuareg and AQIM is seen as important. AQIM was the major actor helping the Tuareg rebels to declare independence in the North. The relationship between the two groups was based on political and economic interests and was substantially economic as the Tuareg often provided AQIM with prisoners. However, the two groups are fighting over the same territory and this explains the reason why they are not collaborating anymore.

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The Tuareg population desires the independence of the North, while the AQIM wants the creation of a Caliphate in the same geographical area. The overthrow of the president in 2012 helped AQIM to gain more power in the territory. AQIM is a threat to Mali due to its strong organization and the fact that it has become a more important regional actor.

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By Elias Langvad

• Ansar Dine are experienced fighters from the conflict in Libya.

• They have managed to gain control over several cities but eventually lost them after international intervention.

• Their leader, Iyad ag Ghaly, is an experienced commander.

• They have close relationships with other groups in Mali such as AQIM and MUJAO.

Section 7

Ansar Dine

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The Group and its Objectives Ansar Dine was established in late 2011 and emerged in Mali in March 2012. The majority of Ansar al-Dine fighters are Tuaregs and Berabiche Arabs from the Timbuktu area. A number of the Tu-areg’s fighters are militias who returned from Libya after fighting alongside Muamma Gaddafi. Their objective is to implement strict sharia rule of law throughout Mali. After the government in Bamako was overthrown in a military coup on 22nd of March 2012, Ansar Dine gained partial control over areas in Northern Mali alongside the rebel group National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). Ansar Dine and MNLA had a brief alliance during their operations in Northern Mali. MNLA declared the state of Islamic Republic of Azawad shortly afterwards. Ansar Dine’s objectives of imposing a strict sharia rule of law did not coincide with MNLA’s aims, and the alliance was broken. The MNLA was chased out from the major Northern cities of Mali by Ansar Dine. After the French led intervention of Operation Serval and Operation Barkhane in Mali, Ansar Dine has lost control over some of the cities but remain as a paramilitary terrorist group. They have conducted attacks in Northern, Central and Southern Mali.

Leadership The founder and head of Ansar Dine is Iyad Ag Ghaly. Ag Ghaly was involved in Muammar Gaddafi’s Islamic Legion before it was disbanded in 1987. He then returned to Mali and was active in several Tuareg uprising since his return, including leading a rebellion against the Mali Government in 2000, making him an experienced commander. He has also held governmental roles. In 2008 he was appointed Mali’s diplomat to Saudi Arabia which was a position he held until 2010 when he was recalled after meeting with known jihadists. Ag Ghaly tried to gain control over MNLA in 2011 but after being rejected he created Ansar Dine.

Ansar Dine’s associations Ansar Dine have close relationships with different military groups in Mali and abroad. One ally is the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). MUJAO helped Ansar Dine oust MNLA from Northern Mali and shares the same objectives as Ansar Dine, the implementation of Sharia law. MUJAO incorporates foreign fighters among their ranks, in contrast to Ansar Dine who consists of Malian’s. Ansar Dine also operates closely with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which has ties with MUJAO. AQIM operates mainly in Northern Mali where they helped Ansar Dine and MUJAO establish themselves. MNLA and Ansar Dine’s relationship have been strained and there have been reports of several skirmishes between the two.

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By Radu Florescu

• From January to November 2012, Jihadist militants take over northern Malian territory.

• From January 2013 to July 2014, Jihadists are driven out by Operation Serval.

• From August 2014 to present, permanent French anti-terror operation Berkhane in Sahel region.

Section 8

Operation Serval and Operation Barkhane

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IntroductionThe Sahel region began experiencing destabilizing events following the Arab Spring, which has provided weapons to ethnic militias and Islamic militants along the under governed Sahel region. This reached the apex in the beginning of 2012 when Tuareg rebels (MNLA) lead a revolt for inde-pendence against the Malian military government. The rebellion soon capitalized on the political fra-gility in Bamako, following a military coup, by capturing half of Mali. However, after ideological dis-putes the MNLA was eventually driven out by their former AL-Qaeda (Maghreb branch) affiliated Isla-mist allies. The Islamist group resumed the offensive against Bamako in January 2012. Unable to withstand the attack, the Malian government successfully requested assistance from France and the United Nations.

Operation Serval Following approval of the UN Security Council, France launched Operation Serval on the January 11th 2013 with the aim of stopping the Islamist advance. With the support of French airstrikes, Special Forces and the MNLA in the north, the Islamist offensive was stopped. With heavy military equipment arriving a few days later, 4000 French troops and 2900 soldiers from neighboring African Union countries took on the offensive to take back the country. Within a few weeks, Islamist rebels ceased to exist as a conventional fighting force. The remaining combatant –including Tuareg militia – resorted to a guerrilla style insurgency in the countries’ North Eastern mountainous region and committed various acts of terror throughout major cities. Operation Serval ended with Malian/French control of all major cities, the death of most rebel commanders and scattering of remaining insurgents throughout the Sahara region.

Operation Berkhane Operation Berkhane succeeded Operation Serval on the August 1st 2014. It is a permanent military mission composed of France and the five countries whose territory span into the Sahel region. The aim of the mission is to combat and prevent insurgent and terrorist activity from operating in the remote and ill-governed territory with a special emphasis on Chad, Mali and Niger.

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3Resources

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BBC News. 2002. Mali’s Golden Hope. [Online]. [Accessed on 9 April 2016]. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1945588.stm

BBC News. 2013. Mali crisis: Key Players. BBC Online [Online] [Accessed on 9 April 2016]. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17582909 TRAC. 2016. Ansar Dine. [Online] [Accessed on 9 April 2016]. Available at: http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/ansar-dine

Bigg, M. M. (2015) Mali president names Modibo Keita as new prime minister. [online]. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/usmalipoliticsprimeministeridUSKBN0KH23G2015010 8 [Accessed 22 May 2016]

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Lugo, B. O. 2009. The Mineral Industry of Mali. [Online]. [Accessed on 9 April 2016]. Available from: http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2006/myb3-2006-ml.pdf

Mail & Guardian Africa (2016) French prime minister Valls in Mali as extremists threats grow for West Africa. [Online]. Available at: http://mgafrica.com/article/20160219french-primeministervallinmaliasextremiststhreatsg rowforwestafrica [Accessed 22 May 2016]

Matteucci, D. (2012) Il Mali tra golpe, Tuareg e jihadisti. [Online]. Available from: http://www.limesonline.com/il-mali- tra-golpe- tuareg-e- jihadisti/34318. [Accessed: 11/04/2016]

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"Membres du conseil exécutif de l'Adéma-PASJ élus au congrès constitutif du 25 et 26 Mai 1991.", ADEMA website (French).

Section 1

Resources - Mali

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Ministere de la Defense, Dossier de Presse: Operation Berkhane, un an d'operation, 10 Juillet 2015.

Ministere de la Defense, Operation Serval: presentation de l'operation, 25 Novembre 2013.

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DANU Strategic Forecasting Group