MATTER OF S-A-A-

APPEAL OF VERMONT SERVICE CENTER DECISION

Non-Precedent Decision of the Administrative Appeals Office

DATE: AUG. 25, 2017

PETITION: FORM I-360, PETITION FOR AMERASIAN, WIDOW(ER), OR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT

The Petitioner seeks immigrant classification as an abused spouse of aU .S. citizen. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 204(a)(l)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(l)(A)(iii). Under the Violence Against Women Act (VA WA), an abused spouse may self-petition as an immediate relative rather than remain with or rely upon an abuser tb secure immigration benefits.

The Director of the Vermont Service Center denied the Form I-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant (VA WA petition), concluding that the Petitioner did not establish that she had a qualifying relationship ·with her spouse, A-M-A-, and was eligible for immigrant classification based on that relationship. 1

The matter is now before us on appeal.' On appeal, the Petitioner submits a brief~ in which she claims that she is eligible for the benefit sought.

Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal.

I. LAW

A petitioner who is the spouse of a United States citizen may self-petition for immigrant classification if the petitioner demonstrates that he or she entered into the marriage with the United States citizen spouse in good faith and that during the marriage, the petitioner or his or her child was battered or subjected to extreme cruelty perpetrated by the petitioner's spouse. Section 204(a)(l )(A)(iii) of the Act. In addition, a petitioner must show that he or she is eligible to be classified as an immediate relative under section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Act, resided with the abusive spouse, and is a person of good moral character. Section 204(a)(l)(A)(iii)(II) of the Act.

The burden of proof is on a petitioner to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375 (AAO 201 0). A petitioner may submit any evidence tor us

1 Initials are used throughout this decision to protect the identities of the individuals.

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Matter of S-A-A-

to consider, however, we determine the credibility of and the weight to give that evidence. Section 204(a)(l)(J) ofthe Act; 8 C.F.R .. § 204.2(c)(2)(i).

II. ANALYSIS

The sole issue on appeal is whether the Petitioner's marriage to A-M-A- is valid for immigration purposes, in order for the Petitioner to establish that she is the spouse 'of a United States citizen, as required by Section 204(a)(l)(A)(iii) of the Act, and eligible for immigrant clas~ification based on that relationship. Based on the evidence before us, the Petitioner has not established that she is a spouse of a United States citizen and we will dismiss her appeal.

The Petitioner submitted a copy of the Marriage Registration Certificate indicating that she married A-M-A- in Pakistan in 2009. The Petitioner explained that their marriage was arranged between A-M-A- and her family, the wedding ceremony was held very soon after her family agreed to the marriage, and they observed several traditional marriage rituals over the next two weeks. The Petitioner also stated that she was aware that the A-M-A- was .already married to another person at the time. The Petitioner recalled that A-M-A- made preparations for her to immigrate to the United States following the death of his first spouse in and she entered the United States in 2013 as a conditional permanent resident. According to the Petitioner, A-M-A- made all of the arrangements for her to immigrate to the United States and she did not realize until several months after she entered the United States that he submitted a fraudulently obtained marriage certificate indicating that he and the Petitioner married in 2012.

As a general rule, a marriage will be recognized for immigration purposes if it was valid under the law of the place where it was contracted. Matter of Arenas, 15 I&N Dec. 174 (BIA 1975). However, even if valid where contracted, a marriage will not be recognized for immigration purposes if it is contrary to the public policy of the United States. Matter of H-, 9 I&N Dec. 640 (BIA 1962) (polygamous marriages will not be recognized, even if recognized in the jurisdiction where the marriage took place). In this case, the Petitioner entered into a bigamous marriage with A-M-A- because he was already married to his first~spouse when he and the Petitioner married. Bigamous marriages are contrary to U.S. public policy. !d. Conseq~ently, even if the Petitioner's marriage to A-M-A- was valid under the law of Pakistan, it is invalid for immigration purposes under the Act.

On appeal, the Petitioner contends that she was the "intended spouse" of A-A-, as that term is used in section 204( a)( 1) of the Act. The term "intended spouse" in section 204( a )(1) of the Act refers to a petitioner "who believed that he or she had married a citizen of the United States and with whom a marriage ceremony was actually performed ... but whose marriage is not legitimate solely because ofthe bigamy of such citizen ofthe United States .... " Section 204(a)(l)(A)(iii)(Il)(aa)(BB) ofthe Act. Here, the Petitioner married a U.S. citizen, a marriage ceremony was performed, and her marriage to A-M-A- is not legitimate for immigration purposes due to A-M-A-'s bigamy.

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Matter of S-A-A-

This is not the end of our inquiry, however, as a Policy Memorandum provides additional guidance regarding the interpretation of "intended spouse." Memorandum from Johnny N. Williams, Executive Associate Commissioner, USCIS, HQADN 70/8, Elig{bility to Se(fPetition as an Intended Spouse of an Abusive US. Citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident, 2 (Aug. 21, 2002), https://www.uscis.gov/laws/policy-memoranda. According to this Policy Memorandum, "[w]hether the self-petitioner is an intended spouse ... is a matter of evidentiary proof . . . [which] must demonstrate that the self-petitioner believed that s/he entered into a legally valid marriage."

In her personal statement, the Petitioner reported that she was aware when she married A-M-A- that he was already married to his first spouse. The Petitioner did not mention in her personal statement whether she was aware that her marriage to. A-M-A- would or would not be recognized for immigration purposes as a legally valid marriage in the United States. The Petitioner recalled that A-M-A- made all of the arrangements for her to immigrate to the United States, including obtaining a fraudulent marriage certificate, but she claimed that she was unaware of those arrangements and she did not learn of the fraudulent marriage certificate until after she entered the United States. In the Petitioner's brief she submits in support of this appeal, her counsel asserts that the Petitioner believed that her marriage to A-M-A- in Pakistan was also valid in the United States, but her counsel does not offer any support in the record for this assertion and the assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 n.2 (BIA 1988) (citing Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980)). Accordingly, the Petitioner did not meet her evidentiary burden to demonstrate that she believed that she entered into a marriage which would be legally valid for immigration purposes with A-M-A-.

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The Petitioner also claims on appeal that, by operation of section 5/212 of chapter 750 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes Annotated, a marriage which is invalid due to bigamy becomes valid as of the date that the legal impediment is removed. 750 ILCS 5/212. Section 5/212(a) prescribes that "a marriage entered into prior to the dissolution of an earlier marriage" is prohibited under Illinois law, while section 5/212(b) provides that "[p ]arties to a marriage prohibited under subsection (a) of this Section who cohabit after removal of the impediment are lawfully married as of the date of the removal of the impediment." Under this reasoning, the Petitioner contends that her marriage to A-M-A- was no longer bigamous after the death of A-M-A-'s first spouse in

The Petitioner's reliance on Illinois law is misplaced. As we noted above, a bigamous marriage is not recognized for immigration purposes because it is contrary to the public policy of the United States. Matter of H-, supra. The Board of Immigration Appeals further held in Matter of H- that the dissolution of a prior marriage subsequent to a second bigamous marriage does not render the second marriage legally valid. !d., at 642. Here, too, the death of A-M-A-'s first spouse after he married the Petitioner did not alter the invalidity of the Petitioner's marriage to A-M-A- for immigration purposes.

Accordingly, the Petitioner did not demonstrate a qualifying relationship with a U.S. citizen pursuant to su~section 204(a)(l )(A)(iii)(II)(aa) of the Act. Because the Petitioner did not demonstrate that she had a qualifying relationship with A-M-A-, she also did not establish that she is eligible for

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Matter of S-A-A-

immediate relative classification based on such a relationship, as required by section 204(a)(l)(A)(iii)(II)(cc) ofthe Act.

III. CONCLUSION

The Petitioner did not establish that she had a qualifying relationship with her spouse and was eligible for immigrant classification based on that relationship. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

Cite as Matter ofS-A-A-, ID# 459557 (AAO Aug. 25, 2017)

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