DAVE BRANNAN

CENTER FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND SECURITY DEPT. OF NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Opening Credits

Music

Religious and Theologically Motivated Terrorism, Part II

By Dave Brannan

Contemporary Religious Terrorism

In the previous module, we addressed the general motivations and ideologies that drive

today’s religious terrorists. This module will build on that framework in order to create a

more in-depth understanding of contemporary religious terrorist groups and their belief

systems.

It is difficult to consider religious and theologically motivated terrorism in the United

States without the focus turning toward Islam. The 9/11 attacks forced many to consider

religious motivations for political violence for the first time, and in so doing turned our

attentions toward a religion that was very foreign to many in the US But we would be

wrong to believe that Islam alone is capable of supporting terrorism. To that end, this

module will now consider specific examples of religious groups that have supported

terrorist violence.

Christian Identity Theology

For example, Christian Identity theology has supported terrorist violence in the US and

elsewhere. Although most Identity groups and believers are not terrorists and would not

say that they support terrorism, the theology and group sociology is primarily considered

in “studies” literature.

Christian Identity theology groups are often associated with the KKK, Aryan Nations, and

other racially motivated ideologies from the extreme right. The theology insists that the

lost tribes of Biblical Israel are found today in the white races from Europe and North

America. Identity theology adherents believe that the “White-Adamic-man” is, as a race, the

true recipient of the covenantal blessings promised to Israel in the Christian Bible. Identity

literature and believers suggest that the lost tribes of Israel went north into and

throughout Europe and the white races found there today—and their extension in the US—

are the true people of God, the literal Israel of God.

Seed-line and Non-seed

Identity theology can be understood as four distinct types: Repentant Seed-line, Rebellious

Seed-line, Repentant Non-Seed, and Rebellious Non-Seed. Each of these is based on textual

interpretation of certain passages of the Bible coupled with local practice, and while some

forms of theology do not support extra-judicial violence of any kind, others do. As an

illustration of how theology and religion can be understood through Social Identity

Theory—Identity theology provides an excellent canvas.

All these theological imperatives are racially discerned and thus counter to enlightened

western values. As such, it can be dangerous for researcher of these groups to provide

distinction between the types of Identity beliefs for fear of being labeled racist or in some

way supporting racism in making those distinctions. But the issue needs to be addressed by

homeland security officials and researchers, if for no other reason than resource allocation.

Some of these theological types are potentially dangerous while others are not; to treat all

without regard to violence is unhelpful for policy reasons, and potentially does violence to

the ideals of free religious belief in the US.

Rebellious Seed-line

The violent manifestations within Identity groups have been primarily associated with

Aryan Nations and some groups of the Ku Klux Klan. These spring from an idiosyncratic

understanding of Chapters 2 and 3 of Genesis in conjunction with their understanding of

the implications of Romans 13. Using hermeneutics not accepted by mainstream

Christianity, the Seed-line Identity adherents interpret these passages as saying that only

white men are human, while all other races are either sub-human animals, or, in the case of

those who identify themselves as “Jewish,” are the offspring of the Devil—the product of a

sexual union between Eve and the Devil. Though this belief is impossible for many modern

Christians to find rational, the theology continues to find acceptance in both the US and in

other countries such as Canada, South Africa and Australia.

The Rebellious Seed-line Identity adherents in particular have committed crimes and

terror attacks in the name of God. These attacks have included bombings, assassinations,

robberies, counterfeit schemes and other criminal acts in support of their groups. Some of

the more notable groups have included the Covenant, Sword, Arm of the Lord (a Missouri

based group which was involved in a nearly two week stand off with the FBI SWAT teams),

and The Order (whose members sought to break away from the US and create a Whites-

only homeland in the Northwest).

Patron and Client

For Identity theology adherents of all kinds, the ultimate patron in the patron-client

relationship is God. By considering God their patron, adherents of this religion see their

idiosyncratic understanding of biblical text as absolute authority. The religious in-group is

defined in absolute terms by those who understand their world through the lens of Identity

theology. People outside that absolute understanding of the world and world events are

necessarily counter to their vision of god—the patron—and are thus the enemy. In the

apocalyptically charged and cosmic view of the group, these distinctions make almost any

action not only legitimate, but mandatory for the “true” believer.

Christian Identity Theology (cont.)

Americans do not normally associate Christianity with terrorism, but as we have previously

discussed, using specific hermeneutics to interpret key texts can lead to theological

justification for violent acts. Non-Seed Identity adherents may not be prone to terrorist

violence and do not hold the same interpretation of the Genesis passages, yet they still

believe that God has formed a special covenantal relationship with the white races.

Analysts must therefore use caution when researching these issues. The difference

between a theology that supports terrorism in the name of God and one that does not (but

may conflict with mainstream values and therefore be suspect) can be determined by what

would appear to be small or inconsequential issues to the untrained eye. The in-group may

well express their beliefs in language that is offensive to the mainstream but still not be

potential terrorists. Distinguishing between the various socially constructed groups is

difficult but worthwhile if authorities are to avoid wasting resources or violating minority

group rights.

When analyzing various Christian Identity theology in-groups—and indeed any religiously

motivated terrorist groups—it is important to recognize that what may appear to be a

unified movement can in fact be highly divergent at the local level. Christian Identity

groups are certainly not unified in either their understanding of theological interpretation

or what interpretation means in relation to group actions, but each of these groups has

something similar or transferable.

The Christian Identity Paradigm

First, Christian Identity groups get a sense of absolute and unifying cohesion from their

religious devotion. Their sense of group identity is derived from a shared understanding of

something they believe is ordained by God, operating outside of politics and temporal

issues. That common understanding gives these groups a sense of absolute assurance in

their “rightness,” so that holding a different view immediately makes one an enemy. A

second important provision of their theological understanding is a common pool of

indoctrinated people for terrorist recruitment and resource provision. This can be easily

seen in the virtual world of the Internet where legal but racially prejudiced websites seek

to indoctrinate people anonymously, thereby providing a pool from which resources can be

accessed for terrorist activity. Thirdly, Identity groups benefit from their idiosyncratic

understanding of authoritative sacred text, as it allows followers to take actions without

fear of doing something contrary to their perceived religious morality. Their religious

worldview allows them to violate what is considered socially taboo--often illegal actions—

that social pressures would otherwise prevent them from doing. The three issues we

identified in this analysis—group cohesion, a common pool for recruitment and resources,

and theological justification for illegal actions—are each directly identified by the

framework discussed earlier in the module.

Jewish Extremism

Let’s now move on to an international case to see how our framework provides analysis

and insight on a very different religious terror group. We’ve already established that

religious terrorism reaches back from the modern age to at least 70 A.D. When we started

this study, we were reminded that most religions have provided ideological support for

terrorism, and that some of the earliest religious terrorists were Jewish. The Jewish Zealots

under 1st century Roman rule were an early example, but more contemporary examples

are considered here.

Take for instance the “Bloc of the Faithful,” or Gush Emunim, an Israeli right wing

ultranationalist, religious and political revitalization movement formed in March 1974 in

the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War. Gush Emunim followers received prior religious

blessing for their actions from those within the group who saw their attack as legitimate.

One attack carried out by Gush Emunim members in the occupied West Bank town of

Hebron resulted in the deaths of three Arabs, in addition to the wounding of thirty-three

more Arab students. It is important to note that these attacks were not predicated upon

nationalist reasons. The terrorists carrying out the attack sought only religious

dispensation for their actions, not civil impunity or justification.

New York-born Rabbi Mier Kahane, who was assassinated by a Muslim terrorist in 1999,

preached a racial message of God-ordained hatred toward Arabs. The Gush Emunim attack

in Hebron, was carried out by members of Gush Emunim who were also influenced by

Kahane's theologically motivated message of hatred toward Muslims. His followers saw the

modern state of Israel as a return to the Jewish, theocratic rule of biblical Israel.

Kahane justified attacks against the Arab population living in Palestine saying;

“Why is it that we do not comprehend that it’s precisely our refusal to deal with the Arabs

according to halakhic obligation that will bring down on our heads terrible sufferings?”

The Halakah Kahane mentions refers to Jewish law and jurisprudence. Thus, rather than

being politically or nationalistically motivated, the Rabbi displayed an intense religious

devotion to his perceived “truth”--that Arabs were the enemy and should be handled

according to his interpretation of ancient Jewish law.

The actions the Gush Emunim members took in attacking Arab students is part of a

challenge and response paradigm in which they made honor claims against their foe

through challenges justified according to their theological understanding of the Biblical

text. Just as we saw in the Christian Identity interpretation of text, Kahane used an

idiosyncratic hermeneutic to come to this conclusion. Most rabbis, however—even ultra-

nationalist ones—do not hold this same interpretation of their sacred text.

Jewish Extremism (continued)

Following WWII, the creation of Israel as a state was realized and assisted by Allied nations,

in part seeking to rectify the atrocities of the Holocaust. Located in the land of biblical

Israel, the secular state of Israel provided, and continues to provide, powerful religious

imagery in the struggle between both secular and religious Jews and their neighboring

Arab states. Rabbi Mier Kahane emigrated from the United States to Israel in 1971. While

nationalist feelings were important to Kahane and his followers, it was textual

interpretation that guided their actions. They saw existing civil law as insufficient to

protect or respond to real and perceived grievances from Arabs and Muslims. Their

interpretation of religious text, allowed them to characterize their actions as religious duty,

not civil disobedience. For Kahane and the terrorists he inspired devotion to religious text

and belief systems outweighed existing political realities. Instead of waiting on political

change, Gush terrorists sought to assist God by taking violent action against their enemies--

God’s enemies. Theological imperative was the primary issue for followers of this belief

system, and in this case, proved to be a motivation even more powerful than nationalism.

For students using Social Identity Theory as an explanatory framework for analysis, the

Cultural markers of Honor / Shame, Limited Good, Challenge / Response and the Patron /

Client relationship are key to understanding the actions from outside the group. The

limited good of the group is wrapped up in the control of the Promised Land. Indeed, the

group’s honor is tied to protecting their Patron—in this case God—by responding to what

the group perceives as an honor challenge by Arabs living and working in that Promised

Land. The in-group is clearly defined by theological understanding in the eyes of Kahane’s

Gush followers and Arabs become more than just an out-group by definition—they become

the enemy of God. Violence taken by the group or individuals that see themselves as a part

of the Gush Emunim in-group can actually build in-group cohesion through the use of

violence against perceived out-groups like Muslims and Arabs, regardless of the their

actions.

Islamic Threat: Al Qa’ida leads

As we have discussed throughout our study, religious terrorism comes in many forms and

stems from many different religions. Since the 9/11 attacks, we as a Western society have

thought often about radical Islam’s support for terrorist attacks against the United States.

However, Islamic terrorism is not a cohesive force mobilizing against the West, and the US

would be wise to not write it off as such.

Rather, many divisions exist between different Islamic groups and belief systems. The

obvious schism between the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam is the most basic starting point.

Further cultural and local divisions within groups make it even more difficult for analysts

to accurately disentangle the differences between Islamic motivations and groups.

Al-Qa’ida, meaning “the base,” was led by Osama bin Laden until he was killed by US Navy

SEALS in May 2011. Since bin-Laden’s death, it is believed that the central core of al-Qa’ida,

operating from Eastern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan region known as the FATA, or

Federally Administrated Tribal Area, has been led by Ayman al-Zawahiri. It is important to

note that al-Zawahiri doesn’t instill the same patron / client relationship with followers

that bin-Laden did. Zawahiri’s failed Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization merged with al-

Qa’ida in part because of al-Zawahiri’s failure in the patron role.

Al-Qa’ida is perhaps the most notorious international terrorist organization of all time. By

concurrently assailing four aircraft to attack the Pentagon and both towers of the World

Trade Center in New York, al-Qa’ida executed the most spectacular attack by a sub-national

terrorist organization against a nation state. Nearly 3,000 people were killed, and the

event was quickly labeled a religiously motivated terrorist attack. This fact was reaffirmed

by bin Laden shortly after the attacks and repeatedly in years since.

The Al Qa’ida Doctrine

Bin Laden frequently gave thanks to God for the success of the attacks, openly stating that it

was made possible because al-Qa’ida had God on their side. Bin Laden and the other

members of what we will refer to as “al-Qa’ida Central” (meaning that they are the root of

the now-branded movement) are Sunni Muslims. Their belief system has been informed by

the theology of 18th century of Wahhabist Muslims from the Arabian Peninsula. Wahhabism

is a particularly fundamentalist, austere and rigid form of Islam practiced by some Saudi

and other various Muslim believers. Some have called the particular brand of Islam

followed by bin Laden, al-Qa’ida, and others, as “Takfir Salifism.” Takfir followers are

known for accusing others claiming to be Muslims as, in fact, apostate to “true” Islam. But

while others outside the movement might make this distinction, al-Qa’ida members and

others who claim the ideology insist that their belief system is simply “true Islam.”

In general, Sunni Islam, with the Wahhabist and Salifist movements specifically, can be tied

to a fundamentalist understanding of the Quranic text.

In particular, al-Qa’ida’s agenda can be reduced to three essential elements or goals:

o The establishment of an Islamic state governed by Shari’a law as interpreted by their religious leaders alone;

o The liberation of Muslim lands from all “aggressors,” as they define those aggressors; and,

o The actualization of a social contract between leaders and followers based on strict adherence of Islamic laws and principles--in other words, the re-establishment of the Muslim Caliphate. This Caliphate rule is seen by al-Qa’ida as the proper physical manifestation of political rule on earth.

Each of these elements relates specifically to al-Qa’ida’s understanding of their religion and

theological interpretation as it relates to their desire for political and social change.

Additionally, al-Qa’ida acquired an edict from a respected Saudi cleric, giving the group

religious authorization to use any weapons—including nuclear, radiological, chemical and

biological weapons--against those they consider “infidels”. The cleric went on to specify

that these attacks could “legitimately” kill up to 10 million people within his religious

understanding of the edict.

Led by Zarqawi, the al-Qa’ida in Iraq routinely killed Shia Muslims because of Shia efforts to

stir up a civil war. Although there is a substantial link between al-Qa’ida Central’s input

from the Federal Administrated Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan in the major attacks since

9/11, it is also true that since the US removed them from Afghanistan, defining al-Qa’ida

has become increasingly difficult. It is common for virtually any Salifist Islamic group to be

labeled as “al-Qa’ida,” “al-Qa’ida sympathizers,” and the like, as the group has been

dispersed from its central bases in Afghanistan.

Al Qa’ida’s Structure

In a 2006 testimony to the US Congress, Bruce Hoffman presented a 4-tiered understanding

of al-Qa’ida that is quite helpful. According to this outline, al-Qa’ida operates according to

descending levels of sophistication: al-Qa’ida Central, affiliates and associates, locals, and

networks.

“Al-Qa’ida Central” is comprised of the remnants of pre-9/11 al-Qa’ida. Although its core

leadership includes some of the familiar, established commanders of the past (like al-

Zawahiri), there are a number of new players who have advanced through the ranks as a

result of the deaths and capture of key al-Qa’ida senior-level managers. Important figures

such as KSM, Abu Atef, Abu Zubayda, Hambali, Abu Faraj al-Libi and Abu Hamza al-Masri,

bin-Laden and most recently, al-Awaki, have all been killed or captured, and these efforts

have indeed damaged the effectiveness al-Qa’ida’s of central leadership. While there is a

debate about the effectiveness of the remaining core centered in or scattered around

Pakistan, even recent plots from 2009 can trace training and inspiration back to al-Qaida

Central.

This category comes closest to the al-Qa’ida operational template or model behind the

1998 East Africa embassy bombings and 9/11 attacks. Such high value, “spectacular”

attacks are entrusted only to al-Qa’ida’s professional cadre: the most dedicated, committed

and reliable element of the movement. Previous patterns suggest that these “professional”

terrorists are deployed in pre-determined and carefully selected teams. They are also

provided with very specific targeting instructions. In some cases, such as the East Africa

bombings, they may establish contact with, and enlist the assistance of, local sympathizers

and supporters. This is for logistical and other support purposes, and sometimes to enlist

these locals to actually execute the attacks. The operation, however, is planned and

directed by the “professional” element, with the locals clearly subordinate, playing a strictly

supporting (albeit critical) role.

Al Qa’ida: Affiliates and Associates

“Al-Qa’ida Affiliates and Associates” includes formally established insurgent or terrorist

groups who have benefited from al-Qa’ida over the years. This encompasses any group that

has benefited from bin Laden’s largesse, his spiritual guidance, or has received training,

arms, money and other assistance from al-Qa’ida. The recipients geographically span from

Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Chechnya, the Philippines, Bosnia, and Kashmir. By supporting these

groups, bin Laden’s intentions were three-fold: first, he sought to co-opt these movements’

local agendas and channel their efforts towards the cause of global jihad; second, he hoped

to create a jihadi “critical mass” from these geographically scattered, disparate movements

that could one day coalesce into a single, unstoppable force; and third, he wanted to foster

a dependent relationship. As repayment for prior al-Qa’ida support, these movements

would be obligated to either undertake attacks at al-Qa’ida’s behest or provide local,

logistical and other support to facilitate strikes by the al-Qa’ida “professional” cadre

mentioned previously.

This category includes groups such as: al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), Abu Musab Zarqawi’s al-

Qa’ida in Mesopotamia (formerly Jamaat al Tawhid wa’l Jihad), Asbat al-Ansar, Ansar al

Islam, Islamic Army of Aden, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Libyan Islamic

Fighting Group (LIFG), Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) Jemaah Islamiya (JI),

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),), and the various Kashmiri Islamic groups based in

Pakistan.

Al Qa’ida: Locals

“Al-Qa’ida Locals” are amorphous groups of al-Qa’ida adherents likely to have had some

prior terrorism experience, participated in some previous jihadi campaign in either Algeria,

the Balkans, Chechnya, or perhaps Iraq, and may have trained in some al-Qa’ida facility

before 9/11. They will therefore have had some direct connection with al-Qa’ida, however

tenuous. Their current relationship and perhaps even communication with a central al-

Qa’ida command and control apparatus may also be insubstantial, if not dormant. The

distinguishing characteristic of this category, however, is that there has been a connection

with al-Qa’ida.

One specific example of this category is Ahmed Ressam, who was arrested in December

1999 at Port Angeles, Washington State, shortly after entering the U.S. from Canada.

Ressam had a prior background in terrorism, having belonged to Algeria’s Armed Islamic

Group (GIA). After being recruited to al-Qa’ida, he was provided with basic terrorist

training in Afghanistan. In contrast to the professional cadre detailed prior, however,

Ressam was given very non-specific, virtually open-ended targeting instructions before

being dispatched to North America. Also, unlike the well-funded professional cadre,

Ressam was given only $12,000 in ‘seed money’ and instructed to raise the rest of his

operational funds from petty thievery. He was also told to recruit members for his terrorist

cell from among the expatriate Muslim communities in Canada and the US.

Al Qa’ida: Networks

The “Al-Qa’ida Network” consists of home-grown Islamic radicals from North Africa, the

Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia, as well as local converts to Islam living in

Europe, Africa and perhaps Latin America and North America. These individuals have no

direct connection with al-Qa’ida or any other identifiable terrorist group, but nonetheless

are prepared to carry out attacks in support of al-Qa’ida’s radical agenda. Motivated by a

shared sense of enmity and grievance towards the United States, the West in general, and

their host-nations in particular, their relationship with al-Qa’ida is more inspirational than

actual. They feel stirred by profound rage over the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, as

well as the oppression of Muslims in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, and elsewhere.

Critically, these persons are neither part of a known, organized group nor even a very

cohesive entity unto themselves.

Examples of this category include the group who carried out the March 2004 Madrid

bombings (mostly Moroccan Islamic radicals based in Spain) and their counterparts in the

Netherlands responsible for the November 2004 murder of Theo Van Gogh, among others.

This framework is very helpful when studying terrorism, as it makes it clear that every

level of commitment to al-Qa’ida becomes a part of its alliance without necessarily being

directed operationally by al-Qa’ida Central.

Terror and the Rational/Irrational

Al-Qa’ida’s terrorist attacks have often been derided by commentators as vicious acts of

cowardly madmen. There is no doubt that they are vicious; however, the use of terrorism

as a tactic by sub-national groups should not be thought of in terms of bravery versus

cowardice. Rather, it is an attempt to overcome the balance of power dominated by

powerful states. It is organizationally intelligent, not insane or “mad.” As objective analysts

of conflict and war, we must be careful when distinguishing between morally reprehensible

actions on the part of our enemies and the actions of a “mad” person, lest we underestimate

their effectiveness and resolve. Studying the motivations behind religious and theologically

motivated terrorists allows us to examine the internal logic of their attacks without

justifying their actions or desires.

The US is the most powerful economic and military might on the planet; in fact, the current

US military has been described as the greatest military might that ever existed on earth. To

stand and fight such a force would be futile and the strategy employed by al-Qa’ida and

other terrorist groups allows effectiveness in spite of overwhelming military might. It is a

generally accepted tenet of Islam that once areas have come under Muslim rule, they are

forever destined to be ruled by Muslims. Thus, Al-Qa’ida’s claim to Islamic tradition may

resonate with the tribal and historically aware co-religionists around the world.

After the 9/11 attacks, it was reported that the leadership of al-Qa’ida came under criticism

from fellow Muslims because of the number of people killed in the attacks.

These complaints related to the Quranic requirement for Muslims to give adequate

opportunity to their enemies to “repent and believe” in Islam. Following these criticisms,

bin Laden himself made public statements that if America would convert to Islam there

would be no further attacks, and that he would personally “mentor” President Bush in his

religious studies. Although this may sound outrageous to us, it is further evidence of the

group’s absolute devotion to the theology and religious belief of Islam, and apparent need

to appeal to the West--to not be seen as “terrorists,” but rather, as Muslims.

Conclusion

As we look at the three essential issues being fought for by al-Qa’ida, it is again apparent

that the group’s appeal to religious language allows entrance by non-violent Muslims into

at least tacit support. Many Muslims of any description would like to “return the glory of

the Caliphate to Muslims” define violent conflict in terms of “defense against aggressors,”

and promote a social contract between leaders and followers based on adherence to

Islamic laws and principles. But again, the difference lies in an individual’s or groups’

interpretation of these issues Ultimately however, as this module and the series as a whole

have demonstrated, a violent religious group doesn’t need to look any further than

themselves, their beliefs about god, or their hermeneutic for interpreting their religious

text, in order to find justification for their violent actions.

Closing Credits

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